Jonathan Mattingly – Page 3 – Quantifying Gerrymandering

February 2, 2018February 2, 2018

Hearing the Will of the People

Democracy is typically equated with expressing the will of the people through government. In a Republic, the people elect representatives who then act on their behalf and derive their political mandate from having won the election.

Possible corruption of the electoral results is often framed in terms of voter suppression, voter fraud, or the undo sway of money on people’s votes. Once the votes are collected, once the access to information and the ballot box is unfettered, all that remains to register the will of the people is to count each vote once and only once.

Yet, by varying how districts are drawn one can cause tremendous variation in the outcome of the elections without changing a single vote. There is so much variability, that one might wonder if the effect is greater all the previously mentioned effects combined. Continue reading “Hearing the Will of the People”

January 30, 2018January 31, 2018

Gerrymandering is Not about Oddly Shaped Districts

It is tempting to assume that gerrymadnering requires the presence of oddly shaped districts. After all, the term gerrymandering derives from the salamander-shaped maps produced by Massachusetts’s 1812 Governor Elbridge Gerry, and pictures of that meandering district are practically required in any discussion of gerrymandering.

The story goes that the irregularly shaped boundary attempts to include or exclude particular voters from the district. Although irregular boundaries might well cause one to suspect gerrymandering, it is quite possible for a gerrymandered map to have quite regular districts. Oddly shaped districts, such as like North Carolina’s 12th congressional district and Pennsylvania’s 7th congressional district, make provocative tee-shirts and posters, but they are only a symptom and not the point of Gerrymandering . Continue reading “Gerrymandering is Not about Oddly Shaped Districts”

January 30, 2018January 30, 2018

Drawing New Maps for Pennsylvania

The recent court ruling in Pennsylvania invited “all parties and interveners” to submit their own maps to replace the maps which have been ruled unconstitutional. (See also here.)

In the interest of facilitating such maps and their analysis, the Duke Quantitative Gerrymandering group is making available our processed and cleaned map files and associated data at the following public git repository.

https://git.math.duke.edu/gitlab/gjh/PennsylvaniaRedistrictingData.git

A local copy can be downloaded with

git clone https://git.math.duke.edu/gitlab/gjh/PennsylvaniaRedistrictingData.git

We encourage those who produce maps to share them with us.

January 18, 2018January 18, 2018

Quantifying Gerrymandering in North Carolina

This paper which is posted to the ArXiv here is an expanded and reworked version of our original note on NC which can be found here.

January 18, 2018January 18, 2018

Evaluating Partisan Gerrymandering in Wisconsin

This work is posted on the ArXiv here. Its research which is central in the Amicus Brief written by Eric Lander. That brief was discussed in the oral argument of Gill v. Whitford in the Supreme Court of the United States.

https://arxiv.org/abs/1709.01596

January 18, 2018January 21, 2018

Redistricting: Drawing the Line

This work, which is posted on the arxiv here, summarizes the work which began with the 2016 Data+ team and was built on by the Quantifying Gerrymandering group. It serves as the basis for Jonathan Mattingly’s testimony in Common Cause v. Rucho.

This work was updated in this subsequent article.

https://arxiv.org/abs/1704.03360

January 18, 2018January 30, 2018

Quantifying Gerrymandering : Data+ 2016

The evolution of the project continued with this second Data+ group. Because of our interaction and collaboration with the Beyond Gerrymandering project, we again concentrated on North Carolina.

A new code base in Java was written. The version was tested carefully for reliability and correctness to a level beyond what had been done before.

Because of its increased efficiency longer runs could now be used.

January 18, 2018January 21, 2018

Quantifying Gerrymandering : Data+ 2015

The webpage found here summarizes the work of the Data+ team during the summer of 2015. The work built on the previous summers work described in Redistricting and the Will of the People.

For the first time in the work the county splitting and not conforming to the VRA were penalized in the score function used to construct the measure. A number of different states were considered in this work.

For this iteration of the project, a new code base was written in Julia. Unfortunately some unidentifiable memory leaks (maybe in the language itself) limited the length of the runs posible.

Some middle bugs in this version of the code were corrected in the next version of the project initiated in the Data+ 2016 project. That work is the basis for Redistricting : Drawing line .

https://services.math.duke.edu/projects/gerrymandering/

January 18, 2018January 18, 2018

Redistricting and the Will of the People

This work posted on the ArXiv here, summarize the initial work done by Christy Vaughn Graves and Jonathan Mattingly between Summer 2013 and Fall 2014. It uses the same basic methodology as the subsequent papers: generate an ensemble of redistricting plans, analysis their properties, and then compare an existing plan of interest to the ensemble of maps.

The central idea being that maps which were outliers in the ensemble were should be seen as unrepresentative.

This analysis did not include the VRA or county splitting terms in the score function as latter works did. The work did look at the typical most african american district in each plan after the plan had been drawn.

We also did not have access to the true length of the boundary between various VTDs. Instead we used an approximation which assumed each district was circular and that the boundary was equally shared between neighbors. This work also used a much smaller number of maps. There were also a small bug in the code which was fixed in subsequent summers.

https://arxiv.org/abs/1410.8796