For copies of papers please follow links below, see Google Scholar, or E-mail david.ridley((at))duke.edu
In 2006 we proposed a priority review voucher (Ridley et al. 2006) program to encourage innovation for neglected diseases. We worked with members of the Senate for passage of the voucher law in 2007. The FDA has awarded more than 30 vouchers and vouchers typically sell for about $100 million each, so we created a multi-billion dollar market and encouraged new drugs that save lives for people around the world. You can read more about the priority review voucher on Wikipedia or on my voucher page. In the papers referenced below, we wrote about the voucher program and other incentives for drug development.
- Margaret K. Kyle, David B. Ridley, and Su Zhang. 2017. “Strategic Interaction among Governments in the Provision of a Global Public Good,” Journal of Public Economics, 156: 185–199. Summary
- David B. Ridley, Jeffrey L. Moe, and Nick Hamon. 2017. “A Voucher System to Speed Review Could Promote a New Generation of Insecticides to Fight Vector-Borne Diseases.” Health Affairs, 36(8): 1461-1468.
- David B. Ridley and Stephane A. Régnier. 2016. “The Commercial Market for Priority Review Vouchers.” Health Affairs, 35(5): 776-783.
- David B. Ridley, Jennifer Dent, and Christopher Egerton-Warburton. 2016. “Efficacy of the Priority Review Voucher Program.” Journal of the American Medical Association, 315(15): 1659-1660.
- Joshua S. Gans and David B. Ridley. 2013. “Innovation Incentives under Transferable Fast-Track Regulatory Review.” Journal of Industrial Economics. Vol. 61, No. 3: 789-816. (Working paper)
- David B. Ridley and Alfonso Calles Sanchez. 2010. “Introduction of European Priority Review Vouchers to Encourage Development of New Medicines for Neglected Diseases.” The Lancet. 376 (9744): 922-927. (Working paper)
- Jeffrey L. Moe, Henry G. Grabowski, and David B. Ridley. 2009. “FDA Review Vouchers.” The New England Journal of Medicine. 360 (8): 837-838.
- David B. Ridley, Henry G. Grabowski, and Jeffrey L. Moe. 2006. “Developing Drugs for Developing Countries.” Health Affairs. 25 (2): 313-324. Appendix (Working paper)
How does government regulation and reimbursement affect drug prices and shortages? How sensitive is demand to copayments and advertising? How does competition affect drug prices? How can we encourage lower prices for people in poor countries?
- David B. Ridley and Chung-Ying Lee. 2020 “Does Medicare Reimbursement Drive up Drug Launch Prices?” The Review Economics and Statistics. 102(5): 980-993. (Video)
- Ali Yurukoglu, Eli Liebman, David B. Ridley. 2017. “The Role of Government Reimbursement in Drug Shortages.” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 9(2): 348–382. (Working paper)
- David B. Ridley and Su Zhang. 2017. “Regulation of Price Increases.” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 50: 186–213. (Working paper)
- David B. Ridley, Xiaoshu Bei, and Eli Liebman. 2016. “No Shot: US Vaccine Prices and Shortages.” Health Affairs, 35(2): 235-241. (Working paper) (Summary in The New York Times)
- Stephane A. Régnier and David B. Ridley. 2015. “Forecasting Market Share in the US Pharmaceutical Market.” Nature Reviews Drug Discovery. 14 (9): 594-595. Supplement. (Working paper)
- David B. Ridley. 2015. “Payments, Promotion, and the Purple Pill.” Health Economics. 24 (1): 86-103. (Working paper)
- Peter Arcidiacono, Paul Ellickson, Peter Landry, and David B. Ridley. 2013. “Pharmaceutical Followers.” International Journal of Industrial Organization. 31 (5): 538–553 (NBER working paper)
Paul Geroski Award for one of the two best papers in the journal that year.
- Margaret K. Kyle and David B. Ridley. 2007. “Would Greater Transparency and Uniformity of Health Care Prices Benefit Poor Patients?” Health Affairs. 26 (5): 1384-1391. (Working paper)
- Henry G. Grabowski, David B. Ridley, and Kevin A. Schulman. 2007. “Entry and Competition in Generic Biologics.” Managerial and Decision Economics. 28: 439-451. (Working paper)
- David B. Ridley and Kirsten Axelsen. 2006. “Impact of Medicaid Preferred Drug Lists on Therapeutic Adherence.” Pharmacoeconomics. 24, Suppl. 3: 65-78.
When firms cluster, they engage in more intense price competition. So why cluster? Followers cluster near leaders to i) free ride on the demand information of the market leader, ii) because they can differentiate their products and mitigate price competition, and iii) because zoning forces clustering.
- David B. Ridley. 2013. “Hotelling’s Law.” In D. Teece and M. Augier, eds. The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Strategic Management. (Working paper)
- David B. Ridley, Frank A. Sloan, and Yan Song. “Retail Zoning and Competition.”
- Gabriel A. Picone, David B. Ridley, and Paul A. Zandbergen. 2009. “Distance Decreases with Differentiation: Strategic Agglomeration by Retailers.” International Journal of Industrial Organization. 27 (3): 463-473. (Working paper)
- David B. Ridley. 2008. “Herding versus Hotelling: Market Entry with Costly Information.” Journal of Economics and Management Strategy. 17 (3): 607-631. (Working paper)