Students: All Duke class materials are available on internal Duke websites. This website is only for public-facing material.
Publicly-Available Game-Theory Cases
(with Cate Reavis) “DeBeers Diamond Dilemma”, MIT Sloan Case 07-045 (2008). Reprinted in “Strategic Management: Concepts and Cases” by Rothaermel (2012) and “Strategic Management: Text and Cases 6E Global Edition” by Dess et al (2012).
Abstract: How should DeBeers respond to the threat posed by synthetic diamonds?
“Rebuilding New Orleans” by Dan Gagne (under my supervision), MIT Sloan Case 07-125 (2007).
Abstract: How should the federal government help steer the economic recovery in New Orleans, after Hurricane Katrina?
The Theory of 2×2 Games
“The Ten Games: A Novel Categorization of All 2×2 Games”. (This version: January 2012.)
Abstract: This paper provides a pedagogically useful categorization of all 2×2 games as one of ten types: (i) Slam Dunk, (ii) Immovable Object, (iii) Prisoners’ Dilemma, (iv) Happy Marriage, (v) Food Fight, (vi) Master and Beloved Servant, (vii) Master and Annoying Servant, (viii) Assurance, (ix) Chicken, and (x) Hide and Seek. For each type of game, I characterize the commitment strategies (e.g. “moving first” or “making a promise”) that allow each player to enjoy his/her best achievable payoff.
“Endogenous Timing of Moves in 2×2 Games”. (This version: January 2012.)
Abstract: Suppose that, prior to playing a game, each player first commits whether to move “early” or “late”. If both move early or both move late, the game then has simultaneous moves; otherwise, it has sequential moves. In all 2×2 games having a unique Nash equilibrium, the equilibrium outcome of this meta-game is unique and does not depend on the timing of players; commitments to move early or late.