The Sub-proportionality of Subjective Probability Weighting in Poker
by William Clark
Abstract
This study uses Texas Hold’em poker to investigate decision-making under
uncertainty and the concept of probability weighting, where individuals may
overvalue or undervalue uncertain outcomes. I conduct an experiment to assess
Cumulative Prospect Theory’s relevance to subjective probabilities in poker by
simplifying the game to compare complex and simple gamble evaluations. The
research aims to understand how risk preferences and probability estimation
without complete information are influenced by individuals’ poker experience
and framing effects. We find that deviations from what theory predicts in the
subjective-probability Poker frame can be explained well by the framing effects
made in the decision maker’s editing phase. By examining the difference in the
predictive power of decision making models in explicit vs subjective probability
gambles, the study seeks to improve comprehension of cognitive processes in
navigating uncertainty.
Professor Philipp Sadowski, Faculty Advisor
Professor Grace Kim, Faculty Advisor
JEL Codes: C91, D80, D91
Bias in Fact Checking?: An Analysis of Partisan Trends Using PolitiFact Data
by Thomas A. Colicchio
Abstract
Fact checking is one of many tools that journalists use to combat the spread of fake news in American politics. Like much of the mainstream media, fact checkers have been criticized as having a left-wing bias. The efficacy of fact checking as a tool for promoting honesty in public discourse is dependent upon the American public’s belief that fact checkers are in fact objective arbiters. In this way, discovering whether this partisan bias is real or simply perceived is essential to directing how fact checkers, and perhaps the mainstream media at large, can work to regain the trust of many on the right. This paper uses data from PolitiFact, one of the most prominent fact checking websites, to analyze whether or not this bias exists. Prior research has shown that there is a selection bias toward fact checking Republicans more often and that they on average receive worse ratings. However, few have examined whether this differential treatment can be attributed to partisan bias. While it is not readily apparent how partisan bias can be objectively measured, this paper develops and tests some novel strategies that seek to answer this question. I find that among PolitiFact’s most prolific fact checkers there is a heterogeneity in their relative ratings of Democrats and Republicans that may suggest the presence of partisanship.
Professor Peter Arcidiacono, Faculty Advisor
Professor Michelle Connolly, Faculty Advisor
JEL Codes: D83, D84, L82
Economic Situations and Social Distance: Taxation and Donation
by Alexander Brandt
Abstract:
This experimental study evaluated the effects of two common economic situations –
taxation and donation – on the social distance between participants in the situations, an original
effect of interest that is the opposite of prior research. This study employed a novel survey
framework, in which subjects gave money to others in the economic situations and socially
judged recipients of their money. Findings mostly did not support predictions that the economic
situations would differently affect social distance, but the novel framework enabled an effective
test of the effect of economic situations on social distance and is a major contribution to the field.
Professor Rachel E. Kranton, Faculty Advisor
Professor Scott A. Huettel, Faculty Advisor
Professor Grace Kim, Seminar Advisor
JEL Codes: C91; D64; D89; D90
Incentive Programs for Neglected Diseases
By Pranav Ganapathy
We propose and evaluate an auction mechanism for the priority review voucher program. The 2007 voucher program rewards drug developers for regulatory approval of novel treatments for neglected tropical diseases. Previous papers have proposed auctioning vouchers for the priority review voucher program but have offered neither a mathematical model nor a framework. We present a mechanism design problem with one pharmaceutical company producing one drug for a neglected tropical disease. The mechanism that maximizes the regulator’s expected surplus is a take-it-or-leave-it offer, with three different offers based on low, intermediate, and high neglected disease burdens. We demonstrate how mechanism design can be applied to settings in which the buyer pays for public access to a product with regulatory speed. Finally, this paper may be useful to policymakers seeking to improve access to voucher drugs through modifications of the program.
Advisors: Professor David Ridley, Professor Giuseppe Lopomo, Professor Michelle Connolly| JEL Codes: I1, D44, D82
Overreaction in the Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE)
By Yusuke Ewan Tanaka Legard
The Overreaction Hypothesis suggests that investors overreact to unexpected news in the financial world, which leads to a mispricing of equities. This paper investigates the presence of overreaction in the Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) between 1995 and 2018. The empirical methodology studies the monthly returns of equities in the FTSE 100. The empirical results are consistent with the overreaction hypothesis and indicate the presence of overreaction within the FTSE. Furthermore, the results highlight whether the information revolution has exacerbated or lessened overreaction. The results suggest that investor overreaction has not altered, for better or worse, since the information revolution.
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Advisors: Professor Emma Rasiel, Professor Kent Kimbrough | JEL Codes: E7; E70; D83
Deterring Ineffcient Gambling in Risk-Taking Agents
By Ryan Westphal
This paper proposes a model describing the incentive issues faced by principals and agents when the agent has limited liability and is capable of undertaking unidentifiable, inefficient risky behavior. We propose a contract structure by which the principal deters risk by deferring payment to the agent until she reaches an absorbing steady-state in which promised equity alone deters inefficient behavior. The paper discusses the effect of exogenous parameters on the tradeoffs facing the principal as well as the implications they have on the efficient choice of contract. We also outline extensions to the model in which the principal has access to a costly monitoring technology to identify inefficient risk taking. The theoretical results have implications for real-world employment contracts and practices in financial firms such as investment banks and private equity funds.
Advisor: Curtis Taylor | JEL Codes: D82, D86, G32, L14 | Tagged: Contract Theory, Moral Hazard., Optimal Contracts, Risk Management
A computational model of food choice: Utility optimization through external cuing and heuristic search
By Lucie Yang
The field of economics tends to view decision-making through a lens of assumed rationality and utility maximization. Unfortunately, choices in reality tend to be more complicated than perfect conscious value assignment. One such type of decision-making is food choice, which incorporates not only many inherent values (health, taste, price, energy), but also exists in a world of many external influences (marketing, social pressure). The details of the space in which choices are made can be highly influential, disrupting the typical top-down attentional decision-making assumed with a homo economicus. This paper seeks to utilize a behavioral experiment, eye-tracking, and a novel computational model (the drift diffusion model) in an effort to explore how humans make food decisions. The drift diffusion model links the metrics, reaction time, gaze fixations, and eye movement path length and frequency to the probability of subsequently choosing each item. The model takes into account not only the intrinsic attractiveness of each item, but also the context surrounding them, creating group distributions as well as individual distributions for parameters of the decision process. This paper aims to look at various aspects of food decisions: how do personal internal states, visual salience, and external cues effect how one weights the multiple value characteristics of food.
Advisors: Kent Kimbrough, Philip Sadowski, Scott Huettel, Jonathan Winkle | JEL Codes: D8, D80, D87 | Tagged: Decision-Making, Drift Diffusion Model, Food Consumption, Neuroeconomics
Incentives and Characteristics that Explain Generic Prescribing Practices
By Rahul Nayak
This study uses the National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey (2006-2010) and Health Tracking Physician Survey (2008) to study the incentives and characteristics that explain physician generic prescribing habits. The findings can be characterized into four main categories: (1) financial/economic, (2) informational, (3) patient- dependent and (4) drug idiosyncratic effects. Physicians in practices owned by HMOs or practices that had at least one managed care contract are significantly more likely to prescribe generic medicines. Furthermore, physicians who have drug industry influence are less likely to prescribe generic medicines. This study also finds consistent evidence that generic prescribing is reduced for patients with pri- vate insurance compared to self-pay patients. Drug-specific characteristics play an important role for whether a drug is prescribed as a generic or brand-name – in- cluding not only market characteristics, such as monopoly duration length, public familiarity with the generic and the quality of the generic, but also non-clinical drug characteristics, such as the length of the generic name compared the length of the brand-name. In particular, the public’s familiarity with the generic has a large effect on the generic prescribing rate for a given drug. There are few differences between the generic prescribing habits of primary care physicians and specialists after controlling for the drugs prescribed.
Advisor: Frank Sloan, Kent Kimbrough | JEL Codes: D82, D83, I11, I13, I18 | Tagged: Drug Market Characteristics, Efficient Prescribing, Electronic Prescribing, Generic Prescribing, HTPS, Industry Influence, NAMCS, Patient Preferences, Physician Incentives, Principle- Agent Problem
Extending the Possibilities of Kidney Exchange with Compatible Pairs
By Karna Mital
Kidney exchange enables incompatible pairs to exchange kidneys so each recipient can receive a transplant. Compatible pairs have not yet been incorporated in any kidney exchange program. The present study incorporates compatible pairs in cycles-only mechanism, and focuses on the HLA match aspect of match quality. When 27.7% of compatible pairs participate, between 50-67% more incompatible pairs can be matched than would be in a pool of only incompatible pairs (at the national level, 1000-1330 more transplants per year), and com- patible pairs see an average improvement in match quality of 2/3 of one HLA match.
Advisor: Atila Abdulkadiroglu | JEL Codes: D82 | Tagged: Altruistically un-balanced Exchange, Compatible Pairs, HLA Match., Kidney Exchange, Live Donor Kidney Transplantation, Match Quality
