Week one at COP29 in Baku has been a whirlwind of excitement, a touch of anxiety, and immense anticipation. Our journey began with a delay—our flight from Milan to Baku was set back by two hours, leaving everyone in the Duke delegation a bit sleep-deprived and exhausted. But, on arrival, greeted by massive COP29 signs throughout Heydar Aliyev International Airport and around the city, it truly felt like our months of preparation in the practicum class were finally taking shape. I have always been curious about the organizational side of one of the world’s largest climate conferences. Last year in Dubai, over 85,000 attendees were present, which made me wonder how Baku would manage the influx of visitors. The logistical management was, surprisingly, smooth. With COP29 shuttles readily available and efficient public transportation options, arriving at the accommodations was pretty easy and convenient – a promising start for the week ahead.

My first day kicked off early, heading to the venue at 5 a.m. The enthusiasm of arriving to my very first COP only grew as I entered the pavilion area. Each country’s booth was alive with colors, traditions, and music, creating a lively blend of culture within this climate-focused space. Indonesia opened its pavilion with a traditional dance, and Uzbekistan’s station offered guests tea and snacks. Many attendees proudly wore their traditional attire, creating a rich, colorful tapestry of global representation throughout the conference. I was especially moved when I heard an indigenous group performing a traditional song about climate and heritage. This cultural immersion was beautiful to witness, yet also a grounding reminder of the intersection of climate change with indigenous struggles and the resilience of those most vulnerable.

Given my role in the class mock debate, representing China’s delegation, I naturally gravitated toward the Chinese pavilion to observe its opening ceremony. The event featured talking points that echoed many of our team’s earlier discussions, with a focus on China’s leadership in renewable energy investments and its support for developing nations through initiatives like South-South Cooperation. Liu Zhenmin, China’s new special envoy for climate change, gave a powerful speech on fostering collaboration toward shared climate goals, which felt especially resonant as we prepared to make meaningful connections with representatives from other countries.

One standout moment of the day was learning about Incofin’s Climate-Smart Microfinance Fund. Highlighted by Belgium’s Prime Minister, this fund addresses the critical need for private sector financing in climate adaptation, often overlooked in favor of mitigation. Incofin’s fund targets small and micro-businesses in emerging markets that require support to adapt and scale. The fund’s CEO emphasized its mission to bridge the capital gap for these businesses, showcasing how initiatives like this can catalyze a climate-resilient economy and ensure lasting impact in vulnerable communities. Conversations like these are especially important as the negotiations around the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) start this week. The opportunity to observe in these sessions is invaluable, especially as the role of public and private finance takes center stage in addressing both mitigation, adaptation and loss and damage needs.

While COP29 remains ongoing, the geopolitical implications of the negotiations deserve attention. I am not yet at the conference, but I am wary of the Party requests and coalitions that may serve as an indication for geopolitical behavior into the next decade.

Something that shocked me personally was a formal request from the BASIC countries: to add the issue of the “climate change-related, trade-restrictive unilateral measures” (clearly referring to the European Union’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism [CBAM]) to the COP29 agenda. Ultimately, Azerbaijan opted not to include this agenda item, but this is no assurance for the future. As we know, COP30 will be hosted in Brazil, one of the BASIC countries; additionally, China has reaffirmed their stance against such measures, stating that they will lobby for the inclusion of the issue at COP30.

The EU’s CBAM has proved to be a divisive issue. From one angle, it is a noble attempt to combat carbon leakage and incentivize efficient utilization of carbon. From another angle, it could be considered unilateral economic protectionism that, depending on how you analyze WTO rules (if at all), may violate international trade law and may negatively affect developing countries’ ability to grow their economies. The latter conception is one that appears to be shared by the BASIC countries, which only seem to be increasing in their geopolitical influence.

The United States’ reelection of Donald Trump to the presidency seems to have diminished the United States’ bargaining power at COP29. This American debuff in negotiating presence, if true, empowers the BASIC countries more and may even isolate the EU and similarly situated developed countries. Although it is too early to tell, this is a phenomenon that could survive for the next four years and beyond.

There has also been substantial dialogue over the presence of fossil fuel lobbyists at COP29. While some celebrate their executives’ promises to invest $500m to expand access to sustainable modern energy (mostly in sub-Saharan Africa and Asia), others fear that these promises are merely an attempt to justify their presence at a conference whose objectives facially require a diminution in their industry. In other words, these fossil fuel executives could be saving face by making such promises in order to attend COP29 and lobby world leaders to pursue policies and negotiation outcomes that benefit the fossil fuel industry.

These promises also occurred in the context of the President of Azerbaijan, a major fossil fuels producer and supplier to Europe (especially following the invasion of Ukraine), declaring that oil and gas were “gift[s] from God.” From certain statements made by OPEC leadership in and around COP28, we know that the aforementioned underlying sentiment about fossil fuels is not unique to Azerbaijan. The exact future of the fossil fuels industry has yet to be determined, but they certainly retain very influential interest groups and will continue to be critical until the energy transition can be finalized.

As COP29 continues into its second week, I am very excited to attend. I have already learned so much from the UNFCCC Practicum’s guest speakers and my very own classmates, and I cannot wait to sit in on negotiations and attend the numerous side events. Stay tuned for more specific updates on my experience, and please leave a comment if you feel so inclined.

COP29 continues in Baku, Azerbaijan, with primary negotiations focused on the new collective quantified goal (NCQG). I attended one of the discussions as an observer, and the dynamics were disheartening.

The UNFCCC shared the ad hoc work program on the NCQG for climate finance in mid-October 2024, which includes various proposals on its quantity and structure. Both developed and developing parties participating in the discussion criticized the document, albeit from contrasting positions. Developing parties highlighted the importance of taking common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) as a ground element in the discussions. Developed parties, namely the United States, Canada, and Australia, tagged CBDR as an “unworkable element” of the NCQG. The European Union aligned with other developed parties, asserting that the CBDR principle is applied in a different context compared to the stance of developing parties. Developed parties emphasize capabilities in climate finance mobilization, while developing parties often focus on responsibilities. The needs of vulnerable parties appear to be a derivative outcome of these two principles.

The answer to this question is naturally explored from a policy aspect. However, the core principles of international environmental law are not only grounded in legal responsibilities but are also deeply rooted in ethical foundations. If we are taking about just transition, the direct and indirect cost of this process should reflect fair shares in responsibilities and commitments. In this regard, climate finance allocation between different pillars should be grounded in the frameworks combining ethical considerations with enabling policy actions. It seems that both developing and developed parties approach this problem predominantly from a domestic or international political setting rather than real policy frameworks.

I had opportunity to participate in different sessions on adaptation and mitigation financing topics. There is a general concern about the current allocation of climate finance among these pillars. Currently around 85% of climate finance goes for mitigation financing, while adaptation financing remains one of the structural challenges across all countries, especially in the developing ones. The problem with adaptation financing is multidimensional, including limited scalability and the non-existence of universal and sound impact assessment tools. According to CPI, adaptation finance doubled between 2018 and 2022; however, annual flows are still at just one-third of the volume required until 2030 in emerging and developing economies.

What should be an ethical framework for climate finance allocation among these pillars? Mitigation efforts provide more measurable outcomes and may attract interest from the private sector. However, data and knowledge gaps hinder the ability to identify, develop, and prepare potential climate adaptation projects. The limited scalability of adaptation measures makes it the responsibility of governments to take a leading role, especially given the very high debt levels in most developing countries. The problem becomes more complicated when loss and damage funding, which addresses the impacts associated with climate change, is added.

Thus, the primary problem still exists not only in the mobilization of climate finance, but also in its allocation. The ethical challenges on the mobilization side are the responsibilities and commitments of stakeholders. On the allocation side, the primary ethical consideration appears to be the most impactful usage of these limited funds. There is not any universal methodology and metrics addressing this problem although different options exist. Therefore, the NCQG issue should not be considered resolved, even if parties agree on the quantified goals. Addressing climate change requires impactful spending and investments across various pillars, with their ratio still residing in the gray area at the intersection of policy, politics, and ethics.

As a student interested in the global carbon markets, I was eager to sit in on Article 6 negotiations at COP29 this year. My expectations, however, were low. Progress on Article 6 has been slow in the last couple years, and the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) for climate finance was deemed a higher priority this year. It was therefore surprising when the parties confirmed a key agreement on the operationalization of Article 6.4 of the Paris Agreement during the opening plenary.

Article 6 outlines a system for nations to trade emissions reductions and count these towards their nationally determined contributions (NDCs), a system with roots in the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism. UNFCCC negotiators have spent years developing a rulebook for how to operationalize this system. In particular, Articles 6.2, 6.4, and 6.8 have been the major points of discussion. The agreement reached on the first day of COP29 clarified how emissions reductions from one country may be certified as a tradable carbon credit, removing a major barrier to the implementation of this system.

With this early progress, I was eager to sit in on negotiations. I first sat in on a working session on Article 6.8, which covers non-market actions that facilitate shared emissions reductions. In this session, delegates from Bolivia, Burundi, India, and Japan presented on how their countries are engaging in actions that could be used to model future projects under Article 6.8. Notably, Bolivia emphasized its engagement in Mother Earth centric actions, which join climate change with sustainable development and poverty eradication. These Mother Earth centric actions would later become a topic of discussion in Article 6.8 negotiations, in which many developing countries (including Bolivia) advocated for the inclusion of these methods in the text. It was interesting to see this strategic move by Bolivia, using the working session to add nuance to its negotiating position in later sessions.

Articles 6.2 and 6.4, which outline the core principles for emissions trading, faced an uphill battle throughout the week. Because of the early progress on Article 6.4, the negotiators moved forward at an ambitious pace. Unfortunately, this pace may have been a bit too brisk.

In one meeting on Article 6.2, delegates noted that they had not had sufficient time to read the draft text before the meeting. The meeting was adjourned so that delegations could spend time developing their positions, but not before several delegates took the floor to individually declare their dissatisfaction. The Co-Facilitator of the meeting steadfastly reminded negotiators that each minute they took the floor to lament about their lack of time was another minute lost.

While it is ironic for delegates to use precious time to complain about a lack of time, it makes sense given the hurry-up-and-wait style of these negotiations. Due to scheduling, negotiations are rarely allowed to extend past their allotted time slot. After each block, negotiators wait to receive draft text, and then often wait to review this text with the head of their delegation.

The resolution of the Article 6 rulebook would have major global effects. Aside from operationalizing a useful tool in helping countries meet their NDCs, the rulebook would provide clarity and stability to private actors that participate in the voluntary carbon markets. This is because the clear rules on credit measurement, reporting, and certification would provide a quality baseline for the private sector, which currently exchanges carbon credits in an unregulated environment (despite significant help from organizations like the ICVCM). The voluntary carbon markets would not be bound to the rules of Article 6, but would instead have the opportunity to model themselves after this system to promote integrity and consistency.

With the negotiators motivated yet pressed for time, I’m cautiously optimistic that there could be an agreement during this COP. This one may be a buzzer beater!

For the last two days, I attended various events and had some time to explore the Old City in Baku.

November 12: NCQG High-Level Dialogue

On November 12, I attended the high-level dialogue on the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG). Unfortunately, the originally assigned room was too small, so we were redirected to a room where we could watch the discussion on a screen. The event was delayed by about 30 minutes due to technical issues, which could have been avoided with proper pre-testing.

In this dialogue, having previously engaged in model negotiations on NCQG in class, I was interested in seeing the real dynamics. The debate largely centered on two perspectives: one from developed countries and another from the G77 and China. I listened to statements from Norway, the UK, the EU, and the US, none of which directly addressed the $1.3 trillion requested by developing countries. Instead, these countries agreed to scale up on the prior $100 billion commitment and requested a renegotiation on the contributor base. They also expressed the need for clearer details in some sections of the agreement.

Interestingly, developed countries suggested that discussions should prioritize the needs of developing countries while also proposing additional topics for further review. Many developed countries, including the UK and the US, called for small group discussions. Developing countries, on the other hand, aligned their statements with the G77 and China, reiterated their quantum and quality requests for a grant-based $1.3 trillion, and emphasized that revisiting the contributor base was a distraction. They argued that the inaction of developed countries is unfair given historical emissions and economic disparities. Overall, the discussion felt repetitive, with both sides largely reiterating their established positions.

Singapore Pavilion: Carbon Market Panel

I also attended a panel on the carbon market at the Singapore pavilion. Singapore, in collaboration with the United Nations, is working on harmonized standards and promoting the creation of legal documentation to support carbon markets. They aim to involve the private sector but face challenges in standardizing the carbon market, such as allowing the market itself to decide on certain actions and instilling client confidence in carbon-related purchases. Currently, there’s no universal standard for measuring private sector carbon footprints.

World Bank Pavilion: Bridging the Adaptation Financing Gap

Today, I joined a discussion at the World Bank pavilion titled “Bridging the Adaptation Financing Gap: Challenges and Potential Solutions.” I learned that governments are actively working to make the private sector aware of the importance of climate change adaptation investments. One expert emphasized that projects vary in nature and require tailored approaches. When asked about universal standards for tracking the efficiency of adaptation methods, experts noted that work is still ongoing in this area. This raised my curiosity about how organizations assess the effectiveness of their projects.

Exploring Baku’s Old City

In addition to attending negotiations and pavilion discussions, I had the chance to explore Baku’s Old City. I loved seeing the many cats roaming freely and comfortably; they showed no fear of people, which speaks to how well the locals treat these street animals. I also visited the Carpet Museum and admired the beautiful, hand-made carpets on display.