Author: Cai May Tan (Page 2 of 2)

A week ago, I had just left Katowice. While waiting to board my flight, a French delegate sat beside me. As our phones charged, we talked about our experiences at COP 24. I expressed my excitement coming into the conference, as a first-timer at COP and an optimist. In return, he asked me how I felt about the progress about the Paris Rulebook. I replied that I was really worried about the outcome, as most agenda items were inconclusive and discussions were prolonged. Candidly, he responded that he felt the same way. What else could we have expected? COP 24 was supposed to conclude yesterday anyway.

This being my last post, I would like to share a short summary of the progress made in adaptation. I ended up tracking a few items that are closely related – adaptation communications, adaptation fund and adaptation committee. In the past week, I observed that there was still a lot of disagreement between Parties, down to the smallest detail in texts. I also got to see many of the key themes and negotiation tones in action, like CBDR and the tension between mitigation and adaptation. Initially, I had trouble picking out these tones when I attended informal consultation sessions, because it was hard to relate textual matters to the negotiation dynamic in play. Over time, I was able to pick up on these overarching conditions especially when bloc representatives were speaking. I also noted that bigger players like China, the United States and Russia would ride these thematic issues to carry forward their own Party’s stance.

Adaptation Communications

Discussions on adaptation communications related mostly to public registry matters. In the first week, there were proposals to separate adaptation reporting from mitigation under the public registry, but ultimately they remained unadopted. Later on, Parties moved on to discuss the reporting methods and standards. I observed a big push from the LDCs and SIDs to have less standardized formats so that states with less capacity could submit reports according to their own timeline and own reporting limitations. When I left, Parties were disappointed with the new text under APA Agenda item 5 because they noted that the progress made underlying CBDR, and reporting of climate change impacts and adaptation have been deleted. The latest text on public registry matters contains elements on reporting flexibility and common web platform for report submission and access. Strong language underlining the urgency of adaptation and developing nations’ efforts in adaptation are seen in the latest adaptation communications draft text.

Adaptation Fund

In regards to negotiations around adaptation fund, I was unable to attend most of the sessions. The expectation heading into COP 24 was to see more effort coming from developed countries in aiding and financing innovation, capacity-building and technological transfers in developing countries. More attention was definitely allotted towards increasing financing pledges, with a resource mobilization goal of US$ 90 million in 2018. Discussions were expected to take place on the UN Clean Development Mechanism’s role in the adaptation fund, as the Paris Rulebook materializes. Heading into the second week of negotiations, there was tension between the developed and developing countries on equity of financing adaptation measures. Developed party blocs like the EU continue to avert financing responsibilities. For example, in the Adaptation Fund contact group, suggestions on “multi-level” approaches were made to separate technical assistance from political assistance, which reflected a reluctance from developed countries to commit to financial contributions. New Zealand and Sweden continue as leaders in financing adaptation measures in developing nations. However, as the second week progressed, issues still remained on sharing of proceeds to the Adaptation Fund. Media outlets have noted further pushback on outcomes to future body meetings.

Adaptation Committee

The Adaptation Committee, established under the Cancun Adaptation Framework to help enhance adaptation action and implementation proceeded well. The main expectation of the AC in COP 24 was to produce a report, listed as agenda items 3 and 11 of SBSTA and SBI respectively. The draft report, introduced on the 6^th of December, noted the progress made on technical expert consultations and meetings in 2018. The committee reports that such meetings will continue in 2019, as the committee begins the implement the 2019 – 2021 workplan. Gender was highlighted as an important point of consideration in adaptation planning and implementation processes. Parties and stakeholders were encouraged to utilize climate and ecological knowledge. The report also notes the lack of available data, and encourages Parties to have more monitoring and evaluation systems. Concerns on lack of financial resources was noted in the report, and that there will be resulting adaptation implications.

The first week of COP 24 has come to an end, and negotiations have geared up for high-level segments of week 2. As part of the UNFCCC seminar, we had to identify a client to work with during out COP attendance. Naturally, I chose to volunteer for the Malaysian Youth Delegation (MYD), a youth-led NGO that I am already a part of. Just to give some context, MYD’s goal is to make the information coming out of climate change negotiations more accessible to the general public in Malaysia, and to hold Malaysian politicians and policies accountable for climate action. I was lucky enough to receive an accreditation from MYD this year, and with four other representatives, covered the ongoings of COP 24.

In anticipation of COP 24, my team and I started gearing up. Even though we received guidelines on what to do during COP 24 and COY 14, I was still confused on our role in COP 24. The first few days had me running around to see to the items I had put on my schedule. I was covering informal consultations, working on YOUNGO deliverables, attending side events, and attempting to write articles. From my perspective, a full schedule that encompassed my university and NGO responsibilities was good enough. I felt like I was actively “doing” something, and fully “representing” MYD. However, I was disconnected from my actions and purpose of being at COP 24. We can’t participate in negotiations, we can’t necessarily “lobby” our point of view, and we are not the press. It was not until mid-week when I started to gain some bearings, as I started observing the activities of other CSOs and youth representatives.

Admittedly, being a part of a youth-led organization can result in some haphazard direction. It was one thing to talk about what MYD’s role at COP is, and another to fulfill that role. I had to revisit my personal objectives constantly, and refine MYD’s game plan at the end of each day. My objectives going into COP 24 was to learn more about adaptation and engage with the CSO network at COP 24. These objectives lined up nicely with MYD’s, which included reporting youth perspectives to the Malaysian public, engaging with the CSO network on behalf of MYD, and building a rapport with the official Malaysian delegation. Every decision I made, I evaluated how it would fit in with the aforementioned goals. It was exhausting to try to keep up with the pace and expectations, but in hindsight, it helped me establish a better idea of my role at COP 24.

Meeting Malaysian Negotiators

So, what was my role working with MYD at COP 24? I’d certainly have to address why I decided to fly thousands of miles to Poland and emit tons of CO2 equivalent while I was at it. The three things CSO-related things I took away from my role at COP was as such: 1) Active youth voices are always welcomed and I stepped up to represent my region and community; 2) I was there to provide insight into UNFCCC process in the Malaysian context; 3) I was there to participate as a Malaysian citizen and hold Malaysia’s climate action ambition accountable. In a previous reflection post, I talked about my experience working with YOUNGO peers on drafting the Presidency dialogue “speech”. I do indulge the use inverted commas here because the event, which was supposed to be an open dialogue with constituents and the Polish Presidency, became a mini press conference to “uphold” the spirit of Talanoa. Observing how the other eight constituencies’ concerns not being addressed was a disappointment for me, because the Polish Presidency and the UNFCCC Secretariat should engage with the civil society beyond the People’s Seat. My experience motivated me to take YOUNGO position and deliverables more seriously, for it is a sure way of representing the world’s youth officially to our own capacity.

Delivering YOUNGO statement during the Open Dialogue with the Polish Presidency.

Despite the rough patch with YOUNGO, I had an exciting experience sharing information and collaborating with other youth and NGO representatives. I had the opportunity to participate in a few Climate Action Network (CAN) activities, which included working group meetings and editing the ECO bulletin. As a first-time COP attendee, I was thrilled to be receiving information from people at the forefront of conducting citizen (non-press) reporting, and lobbying for environmental NGO stances to relevant receptors. The experience helped me realign what messages my MYD articles should bring, in terms of tapping into the climate action spirit beyond COP 24.

Which brings me to my third point of holding Malaysia’s climate ambitions accountable. Within the first few days of COP, I wrote a short piece on Malaysia’s climate policies and our 2015 Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs). In my short article, I acknowledged the climate ambition that Malaysia (and many other Asian countries have), and called out the lack of climate action that connected to the climate goals put forth. Since Malaysia’s newly minted environment minister was set to arrive in week two, I tried engaging with as many Malaysian negotiators to make up for lost contact. When attending informal consultation session, I observed the power dynamic between large and small countries, where conflicts of interests were very much aligned with political stances. Seeing Malaysia’s relatively minor role in the broader negotiations, I could sympathize with organizations and Parties in the same boat. On the flipside, this steers the limelight towards what Parties are conducting on a local level, and how CSOs like MYD should participate in holding Parties accountable for better climate-based policies.

On my plane ride back to Durham, I could not help picturing what MYD’s next step would be and what I could do about it. For one, I want to continue to channel the climate action spirit I have gained from COP 24, and pass it on to others in the process. I would also like to work together with my peers to produce a well-researched proposal on what Malaysia could do better in taking steps to mitigate and adapt. My generation is starting to rise up to be the “future” that I have so often heard about, as we transition away from formative education into the real society. In light of my key takeaway from navigating COP 24 – most things are learned by getting down on the ground with a clear objective in mind. It’s time that we contemplate a little less and start doing much more.

Cześć, this is Cai May here writing from Katowice! I bring with my many feelings to this conference, stirring slowly in a pot of expectations for COP 24. Earlier this year, the IPCC released a special report on warming scenario of 1.5 Celsius increase, to which the international community responded with demands for more climate action ambition. SR 1.5 highlighted weather, industrial and ecosystem implications of the projected temperature rise relative to industrial levels, which included higher frequency of extreme weather events, endangerment and extinction of biodiversity, decreased food security, and more. The report also emphasized the heterogeneous spread of climate risks and impacts globally, calling attention to impacts to already-vulnerable communities in the Global South. We would agree that mitigation and adaptation efforts have already taken off, but there is still a gap between what is achieved and what needs to be done, especially so in the regions that are hardest hit. Developing nation blocs often adopt the positions that demand greater action from developed countries during negotiations, alongside the ethical argument of having insufficient capacity to adapt and mitigate, as well as the disparity in opportunities to industrialize.

Having gone through a full semester studying the UNFCCC climate regime, I have renewed faith in the Paris Agreement to tackle climate change head. The world’s climate conditions are a public good. There is nothing to stop us from emitting greenhouse gases into the atmosphere, and therefore we require some form of GHG regulation. The international UNFCCC climate regime has set out to manage our carbon emission and to protect the right to a clean environment, and to establish a consensus to decrease GHG emissions in order to limit the projected rise of average world temperature.

In the past, we have seen regulation success in the international regime with the Montreal Protocol that regulated ozone-depleting chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). However, regulating GHGs is more challenging than CFCs because we rely heavily on fossil fuels across many different industries. Actions associated under mitigation involve major policy changes to transition, and many countries and industries are hesitant to make the switch because they face potential economic loss and are required to reform their production methods or practices. Since the culmination of the Kyoto Protocol, Parties have reflected the same reluctance. Because under an international regime, who’s to say that other Parties will make the same effort to mitigate?

During the Paris Agreement negotiations, developing nations have emphasized the element of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) to address the disparity of nations’ ability to adapt and mitigate. The notion of CBDR gets at another significant challenge in realizing the Paris ambition. Since industrialization, different countries’ economies have developed at different rates, which has generated the variety of socioeconomic and welfare conditions that we have today. Hence, it is difficult to assign equal burden to mitigate and adapt in an effort to carry out climate action on a global scale. The element of CBDR was tabled in response to the equality argument, and it has become the foundation of the Paris Agreement and the corresponding Paris Rulebook.

Since the focus of the Paris Agreement is to take climate action on a global scale, the negotiations have also tabled the agenda of building a better global community by aiding countries that lack capacity to achieve sufficient mitigation and adaptation goals. One important aspect in bridging capacity and national goals is through international funding, pooled into mechanisms like the Adaptation Fund, GEF and more. The Paris Agreement calls for annual contributions of USD $100 billion by 2020 through various financing channels but the international community has fallen short of meeting this goal. Additionally, Parties are also making progress through capacity building, technology transfers and response measures to help least-developed or vulnerable nations to be more climate resilient.

COP 24 comes with a strong push for more “ambition” to achieve national and international targets. However, we have yet to see how “ambitions” translate into concrete agreements in the implementation rulebook and Party NDCs. During the first week of COP 24, I will be tracking adaptation negotiations, and working with the Malaysian Youth Delegation, a youth-led NGO and YOUNGO constituent that reports on climate change policies in the Malaysian context. I look forward to experiencing COP 24 through the lens of a CSO, and see how Article 7 agenda items develop over the course of the next two weeks.