- Informal risk sharing with local information, with Wayne Yuan Gao and Pau Milan, forthcoming in the Review of Economic Studies [web]
- A delegation-based theory of expertise, with Volodymyr Baranovskyi and Aaron Kolb, forthcoming in American Economic Journal – Microeconomics [web]
- Investments in social ties, risk sharing and inequality, with Matt Elliott, forthcoming in the Review of Economic Studies [web]
- On defining ex ante payoffs in games with diffuse prior, with Aaron Kolb, forthcoming in Economic Theory [web]
- Loss in the time of cholera: Long-run impact of a disease epidemic on the urban landscape, with Erica Field and Robert Gonzalez, American Economic Review 110(2), 475-525 (2020) [web]
- Individual, dictator and democratic punishment in public good games with perfect and imperfect observability (formerly entitled Democratic punishment in public good games with perfect and imperfect observability), with Ben Greiner, Journal of Public Economics, 178 October (2019) [web]
- Pirates of the Mediterranean: An empirical investigation of bargaining with transaction costs, with Eric Chaney and Igor Salitskiy, Quantitative Economics, 9, 217-246 (2018) [web]
- The case for nil votes: Voter behavior under asymmetric information in compulsory and voluntary voting systems, with Ben Greiner and Anne Sastro, Journal of Public Economics, 154, 34-48 (2017) [web]
- Delegation and nonmonetary incentives, with Georgy Egorov, Journal of Economic Theory, 171, 101-135 (2017) [web]
- Either or both competition: A “two-sided” theory of advertising with overlapping viewerships, with Emilio Calvano and Markus Reisinger, AEJ – Microeconomics, 8, 189-222 (2016) [web]
- How individual preferences get aggregated in groups – An experimental study, with Ben Greiner and Parag Pathak, Journal of Public Economics, 129, 1-13 (2015) [web]
- Rationalising choice with multi-self models, with Kareen Rozen, Economic Journal, 125, 1136-1156 (2015) [web]
- A continuous-time model of multilateral bargaining, with Shih-En Lu, AEJ – Microeconomics, 7, 208-249 (2015) [web]
- Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders, with Shih En Lu, Games and Economic Behavior, 88, 174-189 (2014) [web]
- Consumption risk-sharing in social networks (including the supplementary appendix), with Markus Mobius and Adam Szeidl, American Economic Review,104, 149-182 (2014) [web]
- Legislative committees as information intermediaries: A unified theory of committee selection and amendment rules, with Eduardo Azevedo, Yuichiro Kamada and Yuki Takagi, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 94, 103-115 (2013) [web]
- A comment on commitment and flexibility, with Georgy Egorov, Econometrica,81, 2113-2124 (2013) [web]
- Hierarchical cheap talk, with Eduardo Azevedo and Yuichiro Kamada,Theoretical Economics, 8, 223-261 (2013) [web]
- Imperfect public monitoring with costly punishment – An experimental study, with Ben Greiner, American Economic Review, 102, 3317-3332 (2012) [web]
- Cooperation over finite horizons: a theory and experiments, with Parag Pathak,Journal of Public Economics, 95, 500-512 (2011) [web]
- Muslim family law, prenuptial agreements and the emergence of dowry in Bangladesh, with Erica Field and Maximo Torero, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 125, 1349-1397 (2010) [web]
- Theories of coalitional rationality, Journal of Economic Theory, 144, 676-695 (2009) [web]
- Asymmetric networks in two-sided markets, with Rossella Argenziano, AEJ: Microeconomics, 1, 17-52 (2009) [web]
- Early marriage, age of menarche and female schooling attainment in Bangladesh, with Erica Field, Journal of Political Economy, 116, 881-930 (2008) [web]
- Price dispersion and loss leaders, with Jonathan Weinstein, Theoretical Economics, 3, 525-537 (2008) [web]
- Multi-sender cheap talk with restricted state spaces, with Satoru Takahashi,Theoretical Economics, 3, 1-27 (2008) [web]
- Coalitional rationalizability, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121, 903-930 (2006) [web]
