Home » Publications



  • The case for nil votes: Voter behavior under asymmetric information in compulsory and voluntary voting systems, with Ben Greiner and Anne Sastro, forthcoming in the Journal of Public Economics [web]
  • Pirates of the Mediterranean: An empirical investigation of bargaining with transaction costs, with Eric Chaney and Igor Salitskiy, forthcoming in Quantitative Economics [web]
  • Delegation and nonmonetary incentives, with Georgy Egorov, accepted for publication at the Journal of Economic Theory, 171, 101-135 (2017) [web]
  • Either or both competition: A “two-sided” theory of advertising with overlapping viewerships, with Emilio Calvano and Markus Reisinger, AEJ – Microeconomics, 8, 189-222 (2016) [web]
  • How individual preferences get aggregated in groups – An experimental study, with Ben Greiner and Parag Pathak, Journal of Public Economics, 129, 1-13 (2015) [web]
  • Rationalising choice with multi-self models, with Kareen Rozen, Economic Journal, 125, 1136-1156 (2015) [web]
  • A continuous-time model of multilateral bargaining, with Shih-En Lu, AEJ – Microeconomics, 7, 208-249 (2015) [web]
  • Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders, with Shih En Lu, Games and Economic Behavior, 88, 174-189 (2014) [web]
  • Consumption risk-sharing in social networks (including the supplementary appendix), with Markus Mobius and Adam Szeidl, American Economic Review,104, 149-182 (2014) [web]
  • Legislative committees as information intermediaries: A unified theory of committee selection and amendment rules, with Eduardo Azevedo, Yuichiro Kamada and Yuki Takagi, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 94, 103-115 (2013) [web]
  • A comment on commitment and flexibility, with Georgy Egorov, Econometrica,81, 2113-2124 (2013) [web]
  • Hierarchical cheap talk, with Eduardo Azevedo and Yuichiro Kamada,Theoretical Economics, 8, 223-261 (2013) [web]
  • Imperfect public monitoring with costly punishment – An experimental study, with Ben Greiner, American Economic Review, 102, 3317-3332 (2012) [web]
  • Cooperation over finite horizons: a theory and experiments, with Parag Pathak,Journal of Public Economics, 95, 500-512 (2011) [web]
  • Muslim family law, prenuptial agreements and the emergence of dowry in Bangladesh, with Erica Field and Maximo Torero, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 125, 1349-1397 (2010) [web]
  • Theories of coalitional rationality, Journal of Economic Theory, 144, 676-695 (2009) [web]
  • Asymmetric networks in two-sided markets, with Rossella Argenziano, AEJ: Microeconomics, 1, 17-52 (2009) [web]
  • Early marriage, age of menarche and female schooling attainment in Bangladesh, with Erica Field, Journal of Political Economy, 116, 881-930 (2008) [web]
  • Price dispersion and loss leaders, with Jonathan Weinstein, Theoretical Economics, 3, 525-537 (2008) [web]
  • Multi-sender cheap talk with restricted state spaces, with Satoru Takahashi,Theoretical Economics, 3, 1-27 (2008) [web]
  • Coalitional rationalizability, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121, 903-930 (2006) [web]



Phone: (919) 660-1855

Email: attila.ambrus@duke.edu

Office: 220B Social Sciences Building

Mail: 213 Social Sciences Building, Box 90097 Durham, NC 27708 USA