Research

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Department of Political Science, Duke University, NC 27708
Phone: (919) 660-4311, E-mail: georg.vanberg @ duke.edu

Books

Edited Book

Journal Articles

Chapters in Edited Volumes

  • “Trust, but verify: Control mechanisms in multiparty governments.” With Lanny Martin. In Thomas Brauninger and Marc Debus (eds.) Elgar Handbook on Coalition Politics. 2025. Edward Elgar.
  • “Government formation in the shadow of an uncertain future election.” With Scott de Marchi and Michael Laver. In Thomas Brauninger and Marc Debus (eds.) Elgar Handbook on Coalition Politics. 2025. Edward Elgar.
  • “Constitutional Political Economy.” In C. Bjornskov and R. Jong-A-Pin (eds.). Elgar Encyclopedia of Public Choice. 2025. Edward Elgar.
  • “Courts: A Historical Political Economy Perspective.” With Tom Clark. In J. Jenkins and J. Rubin (eds.). Oxford Handbook of Historical Political Economy. 2023. Oxford University Press.
  • “The Rise and Protection of Judicial Independence.” With Ben Broman and Chris Ritter. In M. Tushnet and D. Kochenov (eds.). Elgar Handbook of Constitutional Law. 2023, Edward Elgar.
  • “Models of Coalition Politics: Recent Developments and New Directions.” In R. Franzese and L. Curini (eds.). Handbook of Research Methods in Political Science and International Relations. 2020. SAGE Publications.
  • “Judicialization and the Political Executive.” In R.B. Andeweg, R. Elgie, L. Helms, K. Kaarbo, and F. Mueller-Rommel (eds.). Oxford Handbook of Political Executives. 2020. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • “Financial Crisis and Constitutional Compromise.” With Mitu Gulati. In Tom Ginsburg, Mark Rosen, and Georg Vanberg (eds). Constitutionalism in Times of Financial Crisis. 2019. Cambridge University Press.
  • “Introduction.” With Tom Ginsburg and Mark Rosen. In Tom Ginsburg, Mark Rosen, and Georg Vanberg (eds). Constitutionalism in Times of Financial Crisis. 2019. Cambridge University Press.
  • “The Least Dangerous Branch? Public Choice, Constitutional Courts, and Democratic Governance.” In Roger Congleton and Stefan Voigt (eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice. 2019, Oxford University Press.
  • “Paper Tigers (or How Much Will Courts Protect Rights in a Financial Crisis?).” With Mitu Gulati. In F. Allen, E. Carletti, and M. Gulati (eds). Institutions and the Crisis. 2018. European University Institute.
  • “Politics, Polarization, and the U.S. Supreme Court.” With Moohyung Cho and Jason Todd. In Anna-Bettina Kaiser, Niels Petersen, and Johannes Saurer (eds.) The U.S. Supreme Court and Contemporary Constitutional Law: The Obama Era and Its Legacy. 2018. Nomos.
  • “Contractarian Perspectives in Law and Economics.” With Viktor Vanberg. In Francesco Parisi (ed.). Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. 2017. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • “Gordon Tullock as a Political Scientist.” With Michael Munger. Constitutional Political Economy 2016: 194-213.
  • “Coalition Formation and Policymaking.” With Lanny Martin. In Jennifer Ghandi and Ruben Ruiz Ruffino (eds.). Handbook of Political Institutions. 2015. London: Routledge Press.
  • “Legislative Institutions and Coalition Government.” With Lanny Martin. In Thomas Saalfeld, Kaare Strom, and Shane Martin (eds.). Oxford Handbook of Legislative Studies. 2014. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • “Towards a (re-)integration of the social sciences: The Calculus of Consent at 50.” With Viktor Vanberg. Public Choice 152: 245-252.
  • “The Will of the People: A Comparative Perspective on Friedman.” Michigan State Law Review. 2010 (3): 717-728.
  • “Establishing and Maintaining Judicial Independence.” In Gregory Caldeira, Dan Keleman, and Keith Whittington (eds.). Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics. 2008. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • “John Marshall Has Made His Decision: Implementation, Transparency, and Public Support.” In Jon Bond, Roy Fleming, and James R. Rogers (eds.). Institutional Games and the Supreme Court. 2006. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press.
  • “Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit und Gesetzgebung: Zum politischen Spielraum des Bundesverfassungsgerichtes.” In Phillip Manow and Steffen Ganghof (eds.). Mechanismen der Politik – Strategische Interaktion im Deutschen Regierungssystem. 2005. Frankfurt: Campus Verlag.