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Category Archives: Q56

Do Green Stocks Get You the Green? Differential Impacts of S&P 500 ESG Index Labels on Firm Stock Prices

by Heera Rajavel

Abstract

On January 28, 2019, the S&P Dow Jones Indices launched the ESG S&P 500 Index, aiming to create a sustainable index fund with a similar risk/return profile to the S&P 500 Index. This study assesses the causal mechanisms behind the performance of the S&P 500 ESG Index by running two difference-in-differences estimations using a panel data set of 698 companies. The first difference-in-differences estimation compares the stock prices of companies on the S&P 500 ESG Index to the stock prices of companies S&P 500 Index, determining if companies on the S&P 500 ESG Index received an “ESG label” price premium. Results show that in the short-term and the long-term, companies on the S&P ESG 500 Index experienced statistically significant negative stock price growth relative to companies only on the general S&P 500 Index; the “ESG label” appears to slow stock growth for companies on the S&P 500 ESG Index by $48.24 in the short-term and $65.29 in the long-term. The second difference-in-differences estimation compares the stock prices of companies on the S&P 500 ESG Index to the stock prices of companies with similar ESG qualifications that are not on an S&P Index, determining if companies in the S&P 500 ESG Index received an “S&P label” price premium. These results found that in both the short and the long run, companies on the S&P 500 ESG Index faced statistically significant positive stock price growth relative to companies with similar ESG qualifications; the “S&P label” seems to increase stock price growth for companies on the S&P 500 ESG Index by $2.19 in the short-term and $7.63 in the long term.

Professor Lawrence Kreicher, Faculty Advisor
Professor Michelle Connolly, Faculty Advisor

JEL Codes: G2, G23, Q56

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Responses to EU Carbon Pricing: The Effect of Carbon Emissions Allowances on Renewable Energy Development in Advanced and Transitional EU Members

By John Dearing

Using electricity price, generation, installed capacity, and carbon price data from the European Union from January 2015 to December 2018, this study finds that the carbon pricing in the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) incentivizes electricity sector carbon emission reductions through renewable energy deployment only for economically advanced EU members. Transitional economies show a weak to modest carbon emission increase despite a common carbon price. This study estimates an electricity supply curve, or merit order, for 24 EU ETS members using a Tobit regression model and analyzes changes in this curve using a linear bspline. These shifts provide insight into how carbon pricing affected energy generation, price, and CO2 emissions for two distinct categories of EU member states. The advanced category as a whole saw a strong electricity sector decrease in carbon emissions, both over time and from carbon pricing, while the transitional category as a whole saw a weak increase. This indicates that advanced EU members in Northern, Western, and Central Europe likely sold permits to transitional ones in Southern and Eastern Europe. While these findings may initially reflect the gains from trade of carbon emissions, permits inherent in the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme’s design, the implications of how these two distinct groups have changed electricity generation present challenges to the ultimate long-term goal of EU-wide carbon neutrality by 2050, particularly in transitional economies’ electricity sectors.

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Advisors: Professor Lincoln Pratson, Professor Christopher Timmins | JEL Codes: Q4, Q43, Q48, Q5, Q52, Q56, Q58

Segregation, Bargaining Power and Environmental Justice

By Kai Yu Lee

Under efficient Coasian bargaining, the recipients of an environmental harm are compensated by the polluter for every unit of the nuisance that they bear. When those doing the negotiation are also those bearing the costs of the environmental harm, this will lead to an efficient outcome in which the benefits and social costs of the polluting activity are equalized on the margin. Transaction costs frequently lead to bargaining being conducted by government representatives on behalf of their constituents; e.g., county officials may bargain with polluting firms over payments in exchange for siting facilities within their borders. When populations are highly segregated, representatives can more easily target the costs of polluting facilities to a politically weak minority while the majority enjoys the Coasian compensation. We test this theory using information on three decades of county-level polluting employment and
a measure of racial/ethnic dissimilarity. Results confirm the hypothesis that segregation facilitates the siting of polluting facilities, suggesting an important source of procedural environmental injustice.

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Advisor: Christopher Timmins | JEL codes: Q52, Q53, Q56, R3, R58

The Role of Income in Environmental Justice: A National Analysis of Race, Housing Markets, and Air Pollution

By Christopher Brown

Historically, evidence has shown that minority populations in the United States suffer a disproportionate burden of pollution compared to whites. This study examines whether this burden could be the result of income disparities between whites and minorities, acting through the housing market. We look at 324 Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA’s) in the United States as defined by the Economic and Social Research Institute. Using demographic data from the 2000 Decennial Census and pollution data from the 1999 national Air Toxic Assessments, we compare the race-income correlation in each MSA for four races (white, black, Latino, and Asian) with the race-income.

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Advisors: Kent Kimbrough, Christopher Timmins | JEL Codes: Q53, Q56 | Tagged: Environmental Justice, Income, Market Dynamics, Pollution, Race

Race and Pollution Correlation as Predictor of Environmental Injustice

By Marissa Meir

Environmental injustice is a theory that claims distributions of toxic, hazardous and dangerous waste facilities are disproportionately located in low-income communities of color. This paper empirically demonstrates an alternative cause of environmental injustice- that low-income minorities are less likely to receive sizeable enough loans to buy a house in a cleaner area. It highlights a significant time in history, from 1999 to 2007, when wealth constraints were eased and loan amounts increased for people with the same income. The results show that minorities increase their demand of environmental goods given an increase in loan amounts, suggesting that people of color care about environmental quality, but, due to wealth constraints, do not have the same opportunities
in the housing market.

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Advisor: Christopher Timmins | JEL Codes: P46, P48, Q50, Q53, Q56, Q58, R20, R21, R31, R32 | Tagged: Air Quality, Environmental Injustice, Housing Market, Income, Loan, Wealth Constraints

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