Race and Pollution Correlation as Predictor of Environmental Injustice
By Marissa Meir
Environmental injustice is a theory that claims distributions of toxic, hazardous and dangerous waste facilities are disproportionately located in low-income communities of color. This paper empirically demonstrates an alternative cause of environmental injustice- that low-income minorities are less likely to receive sizeable enough loans to buy a house in a cleaner area. It highlights a significant time in history, from 1999 to 2007, when wealth constraints were eased and loan amounts increased for people with the same income. The results show that minorities increase their demand of environmental goods given an increase in loan amounts, suggesting that people of color care about environmental quality, but, due to wealth constraints, do not have the same opportunities
in the housing market.
Advisor: Christopher Timmins | JEL Codes: P46, P48, Q50, Q53, Q56, Q58, R20, R21, R31, R32 | Tagged: Air Quality, Environmental Injustice, Housing Market, Income, Loan, Wealth Constraints
A Superstar Dreaming: An economic analysis of the Aboriginal Desert Paintings Market
by Karen Francis
Abstract
Two artists each have total auction sales greater than AU$10 million in a single decade. In that same market and decade, over 20% of painters failed to sell a single painting offered at auction. There is no question that superstars dominate the Aboriginal Desert Paintings Market (ADPM) in Australia. But what contributes to the emergence of stars and superstars in this market? A gap has been left in the literature explaining superstardom; no mechanism for the emergence of stars in the visual arts has been offered. This study presents specific empirical characteristics and structural features of the ADPM which generate constraints and incentives for dealers and auction houses. The expected responsive behavior of these players is mostly confirmed by evidence presented in this study. The general picture that emerges is of a three-way tacit agreement by dealers (with government support), buyers and auction houses in promoting early success, reinforcing demonstrated market appeal by the few, and helping accelerate the shift of stars and the few real superstars from the primary to the auction market.
Professor Neil De Marchi, Faculty Advisor
JEL Codes: N27, P4, Z33
