The Effect of Sustainability Reporting on ESG Ratings
By Arthur Luetkemeyer
Abstract
Over the past decade the concept of Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) investing has
emerged to aid investors to maximize return on investments while simultaneously supporting
environmentally and socially friendly methods of production and operation. In this paper I
investigate the effect of the quality of sustainability reporting on ESG ratings. I utilize a sample
of 100 chemical companies with ESG ratings and sustainability disclosure indexes over a 14-
year time period (2007-2020) to analyze the short- and long run effects of sustainability reporting
on ESG ratings. Using OLS my regression results suggest that better overall ESG disclosure as
well as individual E, S, and G disclosure leads to worse ESG ratings in both the short run and the
long run.
Professor Christopher Timmins, Thesis Advisor
Professor Grace Kim, Faculty Advisor
JEL classification: M14, M40
Incentives to Quit in Men’s Professional Tennis: An Empirical Test of Tournament Theory
By Will Walker
This paper studies the influence of incentives on quitting behaviors in professional men’s tennis tournaments and offers broader implications to pay structures in the labor market. Precedent literature established that prize incentives and skill heterogeneity can impact player effort exertion. Prize incentives include prize money and indirect financial rewards (ranking points). Players may also exert less effort when there is a significant difference in skill between the match favorite and the match underdog. Results warrant three important conclusions. First, prize incentives (particularly prize money) do influence a player’s likelihood of quitting. Results on skill heterogeneity are less conclusive, though being the “match favorite” could reduce the odds of quitting. Finally, match underdogs and “unseeded” players may be especially susceptible to the influence of prize incentives when considering whether to quit.
Advisors: Peter Arcidiacono and Grace Kim | JEL Codes: J41, J31, J32, J33, M12, M51, M52
