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Category Archives: L3

Municipal and Cooperative Internet on Broadband Entry and Competition

by Tianjiu Zuo Abstract The broadband market is unique for municipal (government-owned) and cooperative (member-owned) competitors. Their participation, however, raises conflict of interest concerns. Both municipalities and cooperatives are often owners of utility poles that are an essential input for broadband deployment. Internet service providers (ISPs) must lease pole attachment space. While most pole attachment […]

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Nonprofit Location, Survival, and Success: A Case Study of El Sistema USA

By Andie Carroll   As nonprofits work to serve their communities, they must choose a place to locate that best suits their needs and the needs of the population they aim to serve. Locational characteristics such as median income and population density have been shown to impact how many nonprofits choose to locate in a given […]

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The Impact of State and Local Government Spending on Charitable Giving in the United States

By Lynn Vandendriessche This paper seeks to further understand how government spending impacts private giving to charitable organizations. It considers giving and spending in the United States in 2008 with a focus on government spending on education, welfare, healthcare, and hospitals. Government spending is looked at at the state and local levels. The results indicate […]

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Federal and Industrial Funded Research Expenditures and University Technology Transfer licensing

By Trent Chiang In this paper I relate the numbers of university licenses and options to both university research characteristics and research expenditures from federal government or industrial sources. I apply the polynomial distributed lag model for unbalanced panel data to understand the effects of research expenditures from different sources on licensing activity. We find […]

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Incentives in Professional Tennis: Tournament Theory and Intangible Factors

By Steven Seidel and Joshua Silverman This paper analyzes the incentives of professional tennis players in a tournament setting, as a proxy for workers in a firm. Previous studies have asserted that workers exert more effort when monetary incentives are increased, and that effort is maximized when marginal pay dispersion varies directly with position in […]

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Questions?

Undergraduate Program Assistant
Matthew Eggleston
dus_asst@econ.duke.edu

Director of the Honors Program
Michelle P. Connolly
michelle.connolly@duke.edu