Municipal and Cooperative Internet on Broadband Entry and Competition
by Tianjiu Zuo
Abstract
The broadband market is unique for municipal (government-owned) and cooperative (member-owned) competitors. Their participation, however, raises conflict of interest concerns. Both municipalities and cooperatives are often owners of utility poles that are an essential input for broadband deployment. Internet service providers (ISPs) must lease pole attachment space. While most pole attachment rates are regulated, municipal and cooperative pole owners are exempt by Section 224 of the Telecommunications Act. This paper, therefore, studies the competitive effects of municipal and cooperative ISPs, and the effect of potential entry by municipal and cooperative electric utilities (non-ISPs), on broadband entry and quality. I add to the existing literature by building a dataset of municipal and cooperative non-ISP service areas, designing a method to clean the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) broadband data, developing a novel geographic entry threat model, and analyzing municipalities and cooperatives in conjunction. I categorize markets into three types: rural, urban clusters (2,500 to 50,000 people), and urbanized areas (≥ 50,000 people). Looking at Illinois from June 2015 to June 2018, I find that the presence of a municipal ISP lowers the probability of market entry and service quality in urbanized areas. The presence of a cooperative ISP lowers the probability of market entry and service quality in rural areas and urban clusters. The presence of a municipal non-ISP has little to no effect on the probability of market entry or service quality. The presence of a cooperative non-ISP appears to increase the probability of market entry in rural and urbanized areas, but depress service quality in urbanized areas, though these effects could be attributed to bad data.
Professor Michelle Connolly, Faculty Advisor
JEL Codes: L32, L41, L96
Nonprofit Location, Survival, and Success: A Case Study of El Sistema USA
By Andie Carroll
As nonprofits work to serve their communities, they must choose a place to locate that best suits their needs and the needs of the population they aim to serve. Locational characteristics such as median income and population density have been shown to impact how many nonprofits choose to locate in a given area. However, few studies have examined the impact of locational characteristics on how nonprofits survive and thrive. This study examines the impact of geographic and demographic factors on nonprofit survival and success through a case study of El Sistema USA (ESUSA), a nationwide network of music education programs with the goal of helping underserved youth. The study analyzes panel survey data from 131 El Sistema-inspired programs in the U.S. from 2005 to 2018 along with demographic data from the American Community Survey, charitable giving data from the IRS, and GIS data compiled through a review of ESUSA program websites. By using regression models of ESUSA program survival and success (defined by more students served and higher program budgets), this study found that ESUSA programs in areas of more need are more likely to survive and thrive.
Advisors: Professor Lorrie Schmid, Professor Michelle Connolly | JEL Codes: L3, L31, D23
The Impact of State and Local Government Spending on Charitable Giving in the United States
By Lynn Vandendriessche
This paper seeks to further understand how government spending impacts private giving to charitable organizations. It considers giving and spending in the United States in 2008 with a focus on government spending on education, welfare, healthcare, and hospitals. Government spending is looked at at the state and local levels. The results indicate that the impact of government spending depends not only on the category of spending, but also on the income level of the giver. Increased welfare spending is shown to cause incomplete crowding-out across all income groups. Results consistently show education spending to cause crowding-out as well. The impact of both healthcare and hospital spending is more ambiguous, with differing results for different government levels (state and local) and income brackets.
Advisor: Michelle Connolly, Peter Arcidiacono | JEL Codes: L3, L31, L38 | Tagged: Altruism/Philanthropy, and Education, Charitable Giving, Health, Non-profit Institutions, Welfare
Federal and Industrial Funded Research Expenditures and University Technology Transfer licensing
By Trent Chiang
In this paper I relate the numbers of university licenses and options to both university research characteristics and research expenditures from federal government or industrial sources. I apply the polynomial distributed lag model for unbalanced panel data to understand the effects of research expenditures from different sources on licensing activity. We find evidence suggesting both federal and industrial funded research expenditures take 2-3 years from lab to licenses while federal expenditures have higher long-term dynamic effect. Break down licenses by different types of partners, we found that federal expenditures have highest effect with small companies and licenses generating high income. Further research is necessary to analyze the reason for such difference.
Advisor: David Ridley, Henry Grabowski | JEL Codes: I23, L31, O31, O32, O38 | Tagged: Innovation, Research Expenditures, Science Policy, Technology Transfer
Incentives in Professional Tennis: Tournament Theory and Intangible Factors
By Steven Seidel and Joshua Silverman
This paper analyzes the incentives of professional tennis players in a tournament setting, as a proxy for workers in a firm. Previous studies have asserted that workers exert more effort when monetary incentives are increased, and that effort is maximized when marginal pay dispersion varies directly with position in the firm. We test these two tenets of tournament theory using a new data set, and also test whether other “intangible factors,” such as firm pride or loyalty, drive labor effort incentives. To do this, we analyze the factors that incentivize tennis players to exert maximal effort in two different settings, tournaments with monetary incentives (Grand Slams) and tournaments without monetary incentives (the Davis Cup), and compare the results. We find that effort exertion increases with greater monetary incentive, and that certain intangible factors can often have an effect on player incentives.
Advisor: Curtis Taylor, Marjorie McElroy | JEL Codes: J31, J33, L38 | Tagged: Compensation, Sports, Tournament Theory
