Beyond the But-For World: Weak-necessity causal reasoning for model-based counterfactuals in law and economics
by Lilia Qian
Abstract
Under current standards for scientific evidence defined under Daubert, antitrust models are frequently excluded from legal consideration, but not always for reasons that make them genuinely unreliable. This paper clarifies why antitrust models face difficulties when subjected to methodological scrutiny: the employment of model-based counterfactual arguments under an epistemically defective ‘but-for’ structure of causation. Assessing the relevance and reliability of an antitrust model is a matter of assessing the validity and applicability of the causal claim it makes, not the degree to which the modeling methodology is considered scientific. A more flexible causal framework, the weak-necessity structure of causation, is suggested as a means of developing and evaluating model-based counterfactuals. This framework allows for modeling of overdetermined-causation situations, or situations in which the outcome of interest can be attributed to two or more causes. Since antitrust cases typically involve overdetermined causation, the weak-necessity framework allows them to be modeled in a more precise and intuitive way.
Professor Kevin Hoover, Faculty Advisor
JEL Codes: B41, K21, L41, L44
Market Power & Reciprocity Among Vertically Integrated Cable Providers
By Jeffery Shih-kai Shen
This paper seeks to investigate the effects of vertical integration on the cable industry. There are two main goals that the research paper will attempt to address. The first is to build upon existing research on favoritism shown by multichannel video programming distributors (MVPDs) to affiliated video programming networks. Second, the paper will use 2007 and 2010 industry data to investigate the possible existence of “quid pro quo” among vertically integrated MVPD cable providers. After evaluating the data with multivariate OLS Regressions, the evidence suggests that MVPD cable providers do tend to carry their own affiliated programming networks. Furthermore, the evidence supports the hypothesis that reciprocity relationships exist among major vertically integrated cable providers.
Advisors: Leslie Marx | JEL Codes: C01, D22, K21 | Tagged: Cable Provider, Empirical Analysis, Programming Distributor, Programming Network, Vertical Integration
