Adam Smith and Sayyid Qutb: A comparison of two different worldviews
By Kehaan Manjee
The “West” and “Militant Islam” have been in conflict with each other because of their different worldviews. Adam Smith and Sayyid Qutb have arguably had tremendous influence on these worldviews i.e. capitalism and Islamic state. Both thinkers provided their prescriptions to improve the condition of their societies, and analyzing these prescriptions helps us understand the differences in these worldviews. I have compared and contrasted their socioeconomic theories, using these two thinkers as proxies for the West and Militant Islam. I have specifically analyzed their prescriptions on three issues: economic inequality, taxation and interest. These key issues provide an insight into the views of the two scholars, and through that, the conflicting worldviews of the West and Militant Islam. On economic inequality, Smith believed that his economic system of natural liberty would lead to universal opulence; in contrast, Qutb argued that only an Islamic system of government could reduce the gap between the rich and the poor. Both thinkers supported taxation: Smith wanted to use it to finance the provision of public goods, security and justice; while Qutb not only wanted to use it to finance government services, but also viewed taxation as a tool for redistribution of wealth in the society. Smith and Qutb disagreed on the issue of interest: Smith supported interest–bearing lending, but argued for the imposition of a ceiling on interest rates; on the contrary, Qutb wanted an outright prohibition on all forms of interest on credit. These similarities and differences in their prescriptions on various issues provide insight into their vision for society. Since their vision and objectives are different, they have competing worldviews, which explains the conflict between the West and Militant Islam.
Advisor: Neil De Marchi | JEL Codes: B10, B12, B15, B31, N00 | Tagged: Adam Smith, Capitalism, Different Worldviews, Islamic State, Sayyid Qutb
Optimal Ordering in Sequential English Auctions: A Revenue-Comparison Model for 18th Century Art Auctions in London and Paris
By Amaan Mitha
We develop a model based on several auction parameters to test the widely held notion that in a sequential English auction, it is optimal for the seller to arrange the lots in order of decreasing value. We test this model against two datasets of 18th century auctions, one of various auctions from Paris and the other from Christie’s sales in London. We find that the Paris data support the claim, while the Christie’s data seem to refute the optimal strategy. We also find a rationale for bidders in the Christie’s auctions to alter their strategies, accounting for the discrepancy.
Advisor: Neil De Marchi | JEL Codes: D4, Z11 | Tagged: Auctions, English Auction, Lot Ordering, Optimal Auction Strategy, Sequential Auctions
A Superstar Dreaming: An economic analysis of the Aboriginal Desert Paintings Market
by Karen Francis
Abstract
Two artists each have total auction sales greater than AU$10 million in a single decade. In that same market and decade, over 20% of painters failed to sell a single painting offered at auction. There is no question that superstars dominate the Aboriginal Desert Paintings Market (ADPM) in Australia. But what contributes to the emergence of stars and superstars in this market? A gap has been left in the literature explaining superstardom; no mechanism for the emergence of stars in the visual arts has been offered. This study presents specific empirical characteristics and structural features of the ADPM which generate constraints and incentives for dealers and auction houses. The expected responsive behavior of these players is mostly confirmed by evidence presented in this study. The general picture that emerges is of a three-way tacit agreement by dealers (with government support), buyers and auction houses in promoting early success, reinforcing demonstrated market appeal by the few, and helping accelerate the shift of stars and the few real superstars from the primary to the auction market.
Professor Neil De Marchi, Faculty Advisor
JEL Codes: N27, P4, Z33
Analysis of Auction Price Risk: An Empirical Study of the Australian Aboriginal Art Market
by Ilya Voytov
Abstract
Auction theory economists have shown that auctions can be structured to maximize
the expected revenue to the seller. In this thesis, I show that they can also be
optimized to minimize the sellers’ risk through an understanding of the driving factors
behind seller’s auction price risk. I derive a general form equation for auction price
variance, and discuss how changes in the number of bidders and the type of bidders
affect the sellers’ auction risk. An empirical component of this paper takes data from
auction sales of Australian Aboriginal art and uses observed price variance to make
deductions about the underlying types of participating bidders.
Professor Neil De Marchi, Faculty Advisor
JEL Codes: C57, D44, D53, N27,
