- The Welfare Impact of Market Power The OPEC Cartel (paper coming soon) with John Asker and Jan De Loecker.We provide an empirical framework to measure the welfare impact of market power that materializes through coordination of production (i.e. cartel) in the global crude oil market. We leverage unique micro data on cost and production to quantity the dead weight loss and productivity inefficiency due to the OPEC cartel. We introduce a framework that recognizes the likely inter-temporal tradeoff that producers face when setting production levels. We rely on an estimated demand system for oil and we consider a range of counterfactual oil supply functions to quantity the welfare loss due to market power. The counterfactual supply curves imply counterfactual price paths that suggest a sizeable impact of market power on the global oil market. This together with the information on field-level costs allows for a model-consistent notion of lost gains from trade due to market power. We find that the welfare impact is large– about 5 trillion USD (in 2014) in NPV terms.
- Dynamic Games in Empirical Industrial Organization, joint with Victor Aguirregabiria and Stephen Ryan, in preparation for the Handbook of Industrial Organization (September 2021).
Production Function Estimation and Capital Measurement Error, joint with Jan De Loecker (new version October 2020). The code for this paper is here — note that the datasets on India, China and Chile ares not part of the replication files.
- Productivity Dispersion and Plant Selection
- Market Power, Production (Mis)Allocation and OPEC (posted 10/18/18), joint with John Asker and Jan De Loecker. (accepted at the American Economic Review) with Online Appendix and replication packages http://public.econ.duke.edu/~ac418/Replication_Files_No_Data_Oil_Misallocation.zip and description.
- “Nash-in-Nash” Bargaining: A Microfoundation for Applied Work (posted 06/13/17) joint with Gautam Gowrisankaran and Robin S. Lee,
Previously titled “An Alternating Offers Representation of the Nash-in-Nash Bargaining Solution”. accepted at the Journal of Political Economy.
- How Do Electricity Shortages Affect Industry? Evidence from India ( joint with Hunt Allcott, and Stephen D. O’Connell) American Economic Review, Vol 106(3), pp. 587-624, with Online Appendix.
- Reallocation and Technology: Evidence from the US Steel Industry,( joint with Jan De Loecker) American Economic Review (2015), Vol 105(1), pp. 131-171, with Online Appendix .
- Dynamic Inputs and Resource (Mis)Allocation (joint with John Asker and Jan De Loecker) Journal of Political Economy (2014) Vol. 122(5) pp. 1013-1063 (Online appendix , and Commentary on related literature. Earlier version: Productivity Volatility and the Misallocation of Resources in Developing Economies )
- Mergers and Sunk Costs: An application to the ready-mix concrete industry , the American Economic Journal: Micro (2014) Vol. 6(4), pp. 407-447. Note: Superseeds “Using Panel Data to Estimate Entry Models”. The Replication Description and the zip archive) .
- Child Adoption Matching: Preferences for Gender and Race – joint with Mariagiovanna Baccara, Leeat Yariv and Leonardo Felli, American Economic Journal: Applied, 2014, Vol. 6(3), pp. 133-58. And, an Online Appendix and a data appendix.
- Demand Fluctuations in the Ready-Mix Concrete Industry, Econometrica (2013) pp. 1003–1037, with Online Appendix ..
- Mergers in Two-Sided Markets: An Application to the Canadian Newspaper Industry , joint with Ambarish Chandra. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, vol. 18(4), p. 1045-1070. An online appendix Online Appendix Mergers in Two-Sided Markets is also available.
- Comment on Arradillas-Lopez and Tamer Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, Jul 2008, Vol. 26, No. 3: 307–310.