Astronauts are now preparing to be the first humans to leave “low-Earth orbit since the end of the Apollo moon landings more than 50 years ago.”  The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) says the Artemis 2 around-the-moon mission is scheduled for March. 

The launch is taking place in a context where, as the media, puts it, “China Seeks to Dominate Space in Era of ‘Unmanaged Competition’.”  Consequently, a scholar contends:

“Artemis II matters not as nostalgia or merely a technical test flight. It is a strategic signal that the United States intends to compete in a different kind of Moon race, one defined less by singular achievements and more by sustained presence, partnerships and the ability to shape how activity on the Moon is conducted.”

In this competition, what should we expect from China with respect to international law?  Lawfire^® contributor Ted Richard, speaking in his personal capacity, unpacks this issue for us in a unique way.  He asks “how might the PRC’s behavior towards its neighbors, supported by its lawfare, give insight into how it behaves – and will behave – in the space domain?”

Ted’s essay is a masterpiece of not just concise legal and strategic analysis, but also is a demonstration as to how to convey a lot of information and law in a way that is accessible to everyone.  

The importance of space to national security cannot be overstated, and the legal architecture governing the domain is something with which we all need to become conversant.  Ted’s article is truly a ‘must read.’

China, International Law, and Outer Space

by Theodore Richard

As Nations begin building long-term facilities on the moon with the intent to extract resources, there is a strong potential for tensions, disputes, and outright conflict. The United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) appear to be leading two different lunar exploration coalitions. If serious disputes arise, international law can provide a framework to settle disagreements.

However, the United States and its allies diverge from the PRC on their approaches to and interpretation of international law. Where do the approaches diverge? Why? And what does that mean practically for space?

In the 2005 book, The Limits of International Law, Professors Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner make a critical point on the nature of international law. They explain that it “emerges from and is sustained by states acting rationally to maximize their interests given their perception of the interests of other states and the distribution of state power.”

States emerging from the Cold War with strong military, diplomatic and economic powers have a rational interest in maintaining the theoretical “rules based international order;” likewise, other States subjected to this system must likewise find ways to benefit and maximize their own interests within a system they cannot significantly change.

The PRC and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) do not reject the entire rules-based order outright. The PRC has taken advantage of the system of global trade. What sets the PRC apart from the Western approach to international law is that the PRC is brazen about the primacy of its interests over any system of rules.

The PRC’s leadership appeals to international law and the UN Charter with calls for “sovereign equality,” but this appears to be coded language for the prioritization of state sovereignty and non-interference over human rights and United Nations intervention.

The CCP aggressively pursues its perceived national interests and unilaterally redefines international law accordingly. In its near abroad, the PRC asserts excessive territorial claims, employs civilians and civilian vessels in active support of hostile activities, and uses low-level force to deter adversaries and resolve international disputes.

It actively attempts to compel other nations to submit to its desired end states through grey-zone activities and supporting lawfare or legal warfare. The PRC’s international conduct in the terrestrial domains is potential precedent for its behavior in space.

The misuse of international law undermines the notion of a rules based order and exploits the biggest weaknesses of international law: its lack of a centralized legislature, apolitical judiciary, and enforcement mechanisms.

The question here is how might the PRC’s behavior towards its neighbors, supported by its lawfare, give insight into how it behaves – and will behave – in the space domain?

People’s Republic of China’s Attitude Towards Law

Chairman Mao Tse-tung, skeptical of the role of law by the wealthy and landowners in suppressing the socialist revolution, was once quoted as saying, “Depend on the rule of man, not the rule of law.”

In 1976, Professor Hungdah Chiu explained that in the People’s Republic of China, “the primary role of law is to carry out the state policy of suppressing the reactionary class (the enemy of the people)” and played a role in dispute settlement – although anyone considered an enemy of the people would likely lose their case.

In the 21^st Century, the PRC has embraced a “socialist rule of law system with Chinese characteristics,” which is a legal system under the CCP’s leadership and supervision. Under Chairman Xi Jinping, the most fundamental aspect of the system is to “uphold the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.” It expressly rejects “constitutionalism” or an “independent judiciary.” 

This system is often characterized as “rule by law” where law is used to promote the policies of the central government. It has also been described as a functionalist approach to international law.

In the international sphere, Chairman Xi promotes the need to resolutely safeguard China’s national sovereignty, dignity, and core interests. In doing so, the PRC’s leaders say they embrace the United Nations with an emphasis on global governance featuring extensive consultation and joint contribution for shared benefits.

What this means in practice is that the PRC takes a “flexible and functional approach to international law” enabling China to benefit from and exploit the international order. It is not a wholesale rejection of all international legal rules, but the application, interpretation, and re-writing of those rules in accordance with the PRC’s interests, especially with respect to the preservation of its one-party rule.

Cyberspace Exemplar

The PRC’s conduct in cyberspace encapsulates this flexible, functional approach to international law. The PRC was part of the 2015 G20 Communiqué affirming that international law and the UN Charter applies to the use of information and communication technology.

The PRC also joined the United States in agreeing that neither “government will conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property, including trade secrets or other confidential business information for commercial advantage.” The PRC’s cybersecurity laws emphasize the protection of its sovereignty.

A recent US Department of Justice announcement, however, explained that China has broken its word: “[T]he Chinese Ministry of Public Security has been paying hackers-for-hire to inflict digital harm on Americans who criticize the Chinese Communist Party” and paid for data stolen from “the foreign ministries of multiple governments in Asia, and US federal and state government agencies, including the US Department of the Treasury[.]”

The PRC remains one of the world’s most egregious actors in terms of malicious cyber activities, including theft of intellectual property and espionage targeting the US government and private sector. 

In short, the PRC’s approach to cyberspace is to publicly pay rhetorical service to international law, but covertly use cyberspace for exploitation abroad and to safeguard its own national sovereignty and core interests.

PRC Approach to Treaties

While cyberspace is generally governed by the UN Charter and by customary international law generally, there is no specific cyberspace treaty that would govern the PRC’s behaviors in that domain. If the PRC is not constrained by customary international law, the question becomes whether the PRC handles treaty obligations differently?

According to Liu Xiaofeng, a Chinese scholar and professor at Renmin University of China, “The moral validity of a treaty depends on two conditions: first, whether the formal procedure to conclude a treaty treats the parties equally; and second, whether the content of a treaty undermines China’s sovereignty.” (This is consistent with other studies, available here, here, here.)

The PRC’s hostility towards “unequal” treaties is a likely consequence of China’s experience in the 19^th and early 20^th Centuries. The safeguarding of its sovereignty is built into several articles of its foreign relations law. Professor Xiaofeng’s summary is thus a helpful guide to understanding the PRC’s approach to treaty interpretation and application.

1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)

In keeping with this approach, China signed the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and ratified it in 1996. The PRC was unsatisfied with several provisions of the treaty, such as the rules for innocent passage and the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), the definition of the continental shelf, and others.

Thus, China declared its reservations to several of the treaty provisions upon its 1996 ratification. With actions like its excessive boundary declarations and attempts at regulating foreign military activities in its EEZ, the PRC has been described as being a “serial violator” of UNCLOS.

But perhaps the most troubling legal step the PRC took was to declare its exemption from UNCLOS’s compulsory dispute resolution system in 2006, a decade after ratifying the treaty with reservations.

According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a State may only make a treaty reservation “when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State[.]”

(China is a State Party to the Vienna Convention, and the United States, while not a State Party, “considers many of the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to constitute customary international law.”)

In 2016, an arbitral tribunal constituted under UNCLOS unanimously ruled China’s expansive South China Sea maritime claims had no basis in international law. Under the treaty’s terms, the decision was legally binding on both China and the Philippines.

The PRC, however, ignored it. When the arbitral process began, the PRC objected to how the arbitral tribunal was composed, then asserted that the dispute was outside the scope of UNCLOS and argued that it was upholding the law of sea regime against the Philippines’ wrongful political attempt to deny China’s maritime rights and interests. 

Following the decision, the PRC spent the next decade constructing 27 military outposts in contested waters in the South China Sea, much to the consternation of its South Asian neighbors.

Human Rights Treaties

China is a State Party to several human rights treaties (with reservations) and has signed, but not ratified, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Despite this, the PRC, under Chairman Xi, has taken measures to compel its ethnic minorities and religious practitioners to conform to the culture of the dominant Han Chinese ethnic group. This included severe restrictions and controls on Tibetans as well as the controversial detention, reeducation, torture, and forced sterilization of the Uyghurs and of Muslim groups.

Beijing denies the abuses and has not accepted jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, any independent regional human rights body, or any of the individual complaint resolution provisions under the human rights treaties for which it is a Party.

In addition, the PRC was able to defeat a draft resolution at the UN Human Rights Committee to debate the findings of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights detailing human rights abuses within China. In the absence of sufficient verification mechanisms, the PRC has continued to present itself as compliant with human rights laws.

What Do These Examples Mean for Outer Space Treaties?

As Dr. Brian Weeden pointed out when he was with the Secure World Foundation, “[t]here are no known instances where China has violated international space law, although determining a violation is difficult due to the broad nature of international space law principles and obligations, and the lack of international consensus on their interpretation and implementation.”

That said, the PRC’s application of UNCLOS and human rights treaties are indicative of its application of international law. Therefore, expect the PRC to apply space law in its national interest rather than out of any obligation to adhere to a specific rule.

The Outer Space Treaty, Due Regard, and Anti-satellite Tests

In 2007, the PRC tested a Direct Ascent Anti-satellite (ASAT) system, hitting and destroying one of its own weather satellites at an altitude of 865 kilometers, creating what NASA described as the “most severe artificial debris cloud in Earth orbit since the beginning of space exploration.”

According to the Secure World Foundation, “[t]he collision created 3,533 pieces of trackable space debris (defined as larger than 10 cm in size), which are expected to remain in orbit for decades; as of February 2025, 2,535 pieces still remain in orbit.” (For comparison, US ASAT engagements in 1985 and 2008 generated 285 and 175 pieces of debris, respectively.)

The 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST) is the foundational space law document, but many of its provisions remain broad and undefined.

For example, under the Article IX of the OST, State Parties, including China, agree to conduct all their space activities “with due regard to the corresponding interests of all other States Parties to the Treaty” and explains that “If a State Party to the Treaty has reason to believe that an activity or experiment planned by it or its nationals in outer space … would cause potentially harmful interference with activities of other States Parties in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, … it shall undertake appropriate international consultations before proceeding with any such activity or experiment.”

The PRC failed to notify, let alone consult with, other nations prior to this destructive debris-causing event. While no State characterized the PRC’s 2007 test as requiring consultations or violating the due regard obligation of the OST, the debris field does present potentially harmful interference with the activities of other nations.

In 2021, the International Space Station was forced to maneuver to avoid the debris. Unfortunately, the PRC’s 2007 ASAT test behavior is consistent with a long-standing State practice of not engaging in consultations before creating new space debris.

The PRC is quick to cite international law rules when the rules gives them a perceived advantage. In 2021, the PRC was certainly quick to complain of alleged “close encounters” between its space station and US-based Starlink satellites, citing Articles V and VI of the OST relating to State responsibility and notification procedures.

The PRC later cited Article IX’s due regard language as well. (The United States responded that it “did not estimate a significant probability of collision between the China Space Station.”) But the PRC is selective in its protests; it did not complain (at least not publicly) when one of its satellites was nearly struck by debris from a 2021 Russia ASAT test.

The PRC knows that the United States and its allies are concerned over space debris. While the United States may look at ways to reach agreements or establish behavioral norms in space, the PRC seems to have no desire to reciprocate anytime soon.

Instead, the PRC may simply want its adversaries to know what it can do via ASAT tests as a means of deterrence. It can then use the law as a weapon to make its adversaries think twice about their own behavior.

Liability Convention and Dispute Settlement

The PRC trails only the United States in space launches per year. That said, the PRC does not appear to take effective precautions for its used rocket parts. In 2020, parts of a Long March 5 rocket, including a 12-meter long metal tube, rained down over villages in the Ivory Coast, and one rocket part pierced the roof of a family home.

When another Long March 5 crashed into the Indian Ocean, the Administrator of NASA criticized the PRC for not sharing the rocket launch trajectory, a best practice among neighboring States.

Two more Chinese rocket bodies crashed to Earth in 2022, triggering a closure of Spanish airspace and delaying hundreds of flights. Debris from one of the launches was found in rural India, a phenomena that was repeated by another Chinese launch in 2024.

The New York Times characterized the PRC’s behavior as playing “celestial roulette” where the PRC deliberately gambles that the parts from its rockets would not injure or kill people on the ground or cause serious property damage. 

China’s rocket debris is not merely a problem on Earth. In 2022, one of its rocket bodies created a 95-foot wide double crater when it crashed into the moon, although the PRC denies the observational findings.

The PRC could be liable for damages caused by its space objects. The 1972 Liability Convention and OST Article VII address liability for damage incurred in the launching and operation of space objects.

Article 2 of the Liability Convention establishes that a State has absolute liability for damages caused by its space objects on the surface of the Earth or to aircraft in flight and Article 3 establishes fault-based liability for damages anywhere else, such as damages in outer space. China is a State Party to this convention having acceded to it in 1988.

But the Liability Convention has only ever been invoked to recover damages once, when a Soviet nuclear powered satellite crashed into northern Canada, scattering radioactive debris over 124,000 square kilometers from Great Slave Lake into northern Alberta and Saskatchewan. In that case, the Soviets initially contested the underlying facts of the crash through their media.

Their official news agency initially blamed the crash (falsely) on a collision, then claimed the satellite burned up completely on atmospheric reentry, then minimized the radiation hazards. Ultimately, the Soviet Union agreed to pay Canada C$3 million.

The PRC’s approach to the Liability Convention will likely be to engage diplomatically. For countries with whom they maintain strong relations, expect quiet dispute settlements, perhaps without ever publicly invoking the Liability Convention.

This may have already happened and is certainly consistent with their lack of public complaints about orbital debris near-misses from Russia. On the other hand, their denial of responsibility of the rocket crash on the moon may indicate that China, like Russia, may seek to obfuscate facts relating to potential liability and damages.

In short, there is no way to know how the PRC will implement the Liability Convention in any particular case. China may not view financial liability as impinging its sovereignty; instead, it may simply be a cost of doing business. That cost may be high if the PRC retains its high-risk celestial roulette business model. Furthermore, liability payments don’t always fully account for or repair reputational damage especially when the underlying conduct is a reckless disregard of the safety of others.

The OST and the Use of Militias

In the South China Sea, the PRC’s civilian ships coordinate with the PLA on military maneuvers. In July 2023, 48 Chinese fishing vessels effectively created a blockade around Iroquois Reef, part of the disputed Spratly Islands. China’s maritime militia has harassed US vessels and the coast guards and fishing vessels of other nations with the PLA Navy operating nearby.

The militia exercises with the Chinese Coast Guard and PLA Navy to provide greater mass of force. They have also delivered PLA troops to the Western Paracels in 1974 and construction materials to build China’s artificial islands in the Spratlys.

The use of civilian ships for hostile actions in disputed territories during peacetime may be less provocative than using warships. These “little blue men” can create some deniability when it comes to State attribution. The use of civilian ships during a crisis presents dilemmas to opponents because it may be practically impossible to distinguish the militia from true civilians.

Using civilian space objects for unfriendly acts does not have the same deniability as it does on Earth. This is because Articles VI and VIII of the OST say States are responsible for their registered space objects and corresponding activities (and, more broadly, their “national activities” in outer space) with the additional obligation to authorize the activities and continually supervise them.

The Woomera Manual on the International Law of Military Space Activities and Operations, a restatement of militarily-applicable law in space written by legal and technical experts, treats this provision as meaning that States have responsibility for their “national activities in outer space,” which includes both government and non-government entity activities.

Since States maintain jurisdiction and control over objects launched from their territory or registered to them, they retain responsibility for the objects’ actions. The Woomera experts’ point of clarification is that a rogue private company could not disregard its parent State’s regulations and thereby plunge an unwilling State into a conflict.

A competing interpretation would be that States would be responsible for any activities of their nationals in space, both companies and individuals.  This interpretation would likely mean that States would be responsible for any activities of their objects even if the actions are not authorized by the State.

Another view would be that States are responsible for activities that could be subject to regulation or legal control.  This view leads to a heightened State duty to regulate and oversee its space activities.

The PRC’s interpretive approach can be found in a statement to the United Nations Working Group on Legal Aspects of Space Resource Activities: “Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty states that States Parties shall bear international responsibility for assuring that national activities by non-governmental entities are carried out in conformity with the Treaty, and the activities of non-governmental entities in outer space shall require authorization and continuing supervision by the appropriate States Parties.”

This indicates an interpretation that States are responsible for any activities of their nationals and are thereby required to ensure appropriate regulatory oversight and continual supervision of those activities.

The PRC’s rhetoric on this topic is antagonistic towards US commercial space operators, like SpaceX, and their involvement in armed conflicts. The PRC considers such involvement “irresponsible” because it is contrary to supporting peaceful uses of space.

The PRC’s antagonism disregards its own developments in space militarization and its aforementioned use of little blue men in conflicts. It is also hypocritical considering the high number of quasi-governmental and state-controlled companies in China, and the fact that a Chinese satellite company directly aided Houthi attacks on US interests.

Harassment and Use of Force Thresholds

The PRC is a master of using “Gray Zone” techniques on its adversaries – meaning its use of “coercive actions that are shy of armed conflict but beyond normal diplomatic, economic, and other activities.” These techniques vary widely across all State instruments of power. For purposes of this discussion, China’s willingness to use forceable harassment is noteworthy.

In short, the PRC demonstrates a willingness to use force against other States but does so in a way that foreign political leaders do not characterize as acts of war. In other words, China’s forceable harassment appears to stay below the political tolerance threshold of a use of force, and even if characterized as a use of force, the proportional responses to their actions pose an acceptably low risk that the PRC has historically been willing to take.

In its maritime disputes, for instance, PLA coast guard ships have rammed Philippine vessels and used water cannons to damage vessels and injure sailors, and PLA aircraft often attempt to assert exclusive jurisdiction by engaging in unsafe aerial maneuvers contrary to International Civil Aviation Organization air rules. These techniques are both forceful and designed to assert territorial claims.

The PRC’s aggressive harassment is not limited to maritime claims. Its land neighbors also face gray zone tactics that challenge the notions of a meaningful rules-based system. When dealing with a small neighboring State, Bhutan, China simply expanded its borders and built settlements. China has annexed 825 sq kms, or 2%, of Bhutan.

China and its nuclear armed neighbor, India, also have border disagreements. While the two sides agreed to refrain from using firearms or explosives in the disputed Galwan river valley, in 2020 PLA soldiers used iron rods studded with nails to confront their Indian counterparts, leaving several dead on both sides.

Later that year, a Chinese academic reported that the PLA had used a microwave weapon to make Indian soldiers violently ill and force them to retreat. The Indian army denies that such a weapon was deployed, calling the claim, “part of the continuing psychological operations from across the border.” Liu Zongyi, a South Asia specialist at the Shanghai Institute for International Studies, indicated that the provocation was likely due to India’s increasing cooperation with the United States.

From a legal standpoint, the PRC’s actions are highly troubling. Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter says, “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” This prohibition is balanced by Article 51’s recognition of the “inherent right of individual or collective self-defense” against an actual or imminent “armed attack.”

While the United States has long taken the position that the inherent right of self-defense potentially applies against any illegal use of force, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled otherwise in the controversial Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua judgement. The ICJ distinguished “the most grave forms of the use of force (those constituting an armed attack) from other less grave forms.” The ICJ thus created a “scale and effects” test for when force amounts to an armed attack.

The PRC appears more than willing to use force at the lower levels of “scale and effects” so as to avoid being characterized as anything other than a “mere frontier incident” that States would recognize as an armed attack. This has given them considerable latitude to use gray zone tactics to influence geopolitical events without triggering a larger self-defense response from other nations.

What might this mean for outer space?

First, the PLA has the ability to harass an adversary’s on-orbit assets. According to the US Space Force, “The PLA has multiple ground-based laser weapons able to disrupt, degrade, or damage satellite sensors.” It can jam space-based communications, radars, and navigation systems.

The PLA has also demonstrated the ability to conduct orbital maneuvers close to other orbiting objects, known as rendezvous and proximity operations. No State has yet to declare that a jamming attack or a rendezvous and proximity operation has risen to a use of force.

If the PRC’s land and maritime behaviors are indicative, it could easily begin harassing an adversary’s space objects in this legal “use of force” gray zone.

For the moment, the PRC may not have a reason to begin such orbital harassment. According to Article II of the OST, there is no “sovereignty” in space, although States maintain jurisdiction over their space objects. In other words, there will be no territory over which to assert exclusive jurisdiction. That said, the PRC’s motives may change if it wishes to warn other States against orbital encroachment.

The PRC may also seek to increase unfriendly harassment as the competition over space resources increases. For example, the PRC initiated an International Lunar Research Station (ILRS) and its ILRS Cooperation Organization to build a permanent base on the moon’s south pole. A total of 13 States have signed onto this initiative for exploration and use of the moon. The question is how will the PRC and its partners interact with other States seeking resources on the lunar surface?

The United States’ approach has been two-fold with the Artemis Accords as a multi-lateral policy framework for cooperation, and the Artemis program to establish a long-term United States and partner-nation presence on the moon.

The Artemis Accords, currently with 60 State signatories, establish principles for the exploration and use of the moon and other celestial bodies. The Artemis Accords explain that extraction of resources from these bodies does not contradict the OST and should be done in a responsible way, with due regard for other operations and avoiding harmful interference with other States’ activities. In doing so, the agreement allows for the creation of reasonable safety zones to protect “public and private personnel, equipment, and operations from harmful interference.”

Both ILRS and the Artemis program anticipate permanent installations, the extraction and use of lunar water and minerals, and lunar surface manufacturing. The competition for resources without internationally accepted rules between the two camps could be very problematic, leading to harassment and abusive behaviors similar to the PRC’s activities in disputed waters and territories.

If so, it could potentially lead to the militarization of the moon, despite OST terms prohibiting the “establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications.”  The PRC’s use of civilian maritime vessels to support its military activities could be a precedent for using commercial or state-sponsored companies to effectuate military capabilities on and near the lunar surface.

The PRC’s use of civilian maritime vessels to support its military activities could be a precedent for using commercial or state-sponsored companies to effectuate military capabilities on and near the lunar surface. 

Governance and Rule Making

President Xi has made it known that one of his goals for China is to lead the reform of global governance. To accomplish this, the PRC expanded its influence with international agencies through funding and manning.

As one report documented, the PRC directly heads four of the 15 principal agencies of the UN: the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). The PRC is currently the only State to lead multiple UN specialized agencies. Chinese deputies are present in 9 of the 15 remaining agencies.

Of these agencies, the ITU plays a critical role in space because it regulates satellite communications, promulgated through its Radio Regulations. The ITU also allocates the positions for satellites in geosynchronous equatorial orbit (GEO) where satellites remain fixed over a specific point on the Earth. Thus, the PRC is positioned well to play a significant role in defining any new regulatory standards for space operations, including the use of the moon, Lagrange points (gravitationally stable points in space where spacecraft could be permanently placed), and other celestial bodies.

As China expert Dean Cheng explained, “the PRC’s efforts to establish itself as a dominant player in terms of [Space Traffic Management] rules and industrial standards are likely intended to shape future legal developments in directions that will favor the PRC—and disadvantage its rivals.”

Conclusion

If past is precedent, then the PRC’s behavior in its near abroad inform the meaning of a “socialist rule of law system with Chinese characteristics.” Basically, expect the PRC to implement and follow rules to the extent they uphold China’s sovereignty and core interests, with the primary interest being upholding the leadership of the CCP. The PRC’s leaders will embrace the rhetoric of space law and will attempt to shape and define its standards going forward.

The United States, its allies, partners, and other like-minded States need to understand the PRC’s approach to engage with it and, when necessary, challenge its gray zone tactics. If international law serves to legitimize behavior and provide frameworks for cooperation, then no single State should be allowed to shape the rules of space to solely serve its own orbit of interests.

About the Author

Col Ted Richard serves as the Staff Judge Advocate for the United States Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs, Colorado. In this role, he is the principal legal advisor to the Academy’s Superintendent, Commandant of Cadets, Dean of Faculty, Director of Athletics, headquarters staff, the USAFA Preparatory School, 10th Air Base Wing and all subordinate organizations. He also provides leadership for the men and women of the USAFA legal office.

Col Richard is a native of Madison, Wisconsin, where he spent over 10 years in the Wisconsin Army National Guard as helicopter mechanic and crew chief. Prior to law school, Col Richard was a private detective in Wisconsin and Illinois where he investigated civil and criminal cases for attorneys in private practice. While in law school, Col Richard completed internships with the Brown County Wisconsin District Attorney’s Office and Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice Jon Wilcox.

Disclaimers: 

• The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official guidance or position of the Department of the Air Force, United States Department of Defense (DoD), or the US Government. The appearance of external hyperlinks does not constitute endorsement by the DoD of the linked websites, or the information products or services contained therein. The DoD does not exercise any editorial, security, or other control over the information you may find at these locations

The views expressed by guest authors do not necessarily reflect my views, those of the Center on Law, Ethics and National Security, or Duke University. See also here. 

Remember what we like to say on Lawfire^®: gather the facts, examine the law, evaluate the arguments – and then decide for yourself!___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

REGISTER NOW FOR DUKE’S

31st ANNUAL

NATIONAL SECURITY LAW CONFERENCE

The conference is nearing capacity!

Info: https://law.duke.edu/lens/conference/2026