Guest Post: Meredith Primrose Jones on “The Security Concerns of a Dual-Use CRISPR”

Do you know what CRISPR is?  If not, today’s post is a must for you as new Lawfire^®contributor Meredith Primrose Jones explains how if weaponized this technology could present an extraordinarily dangerous threat.  

At the risk of oversimplification, CRISPR is a gene modification tool that has, as Ms. Jones explains, “dual-use potential” as an “enabling technology.” 

Meredith points out that CRISPR has many peaceful uses but it could also “be employed to manipulate and modify a pathogen, bacteria or toxin to render it more deadly, potent or immune to antibiotics or vaccines.”

Quite obviously, if weaponized (an admittedly complex process) the technology would give a belligerent or even a terrorist a frightening capability.  She argues:

Ms. Jones

As an ‘enabling technology’ pursuant to military terms, it is likely that CRISPR would also be classified as a ‘means or method of warfare’ due the technology’s potential ability to have a ‘direct impact on the offensive capability of the force to which they belong’. If there is a key message to be taken away from this blog, that is it.

Ms. Jones’ expert explanation of CRISPR and its potential is remarkably clear and direct, and provides us with a fascinating preview of some of what will be discussed in more detail in her forthcoming academic article. 

Everyone with a serious interest in national/international security needs to read this vitally important essay from one of the most important ‘new voices’ in the national/international security arena.

The Security Concerns of a Dual-Use CRISPR

by Meredith Primrose Jones

An Introduction – CRISPR

New and unforeseen technologies are evolving at an extraordinary rate.[1] One such topic actively being discussed by the international community is synthetic biology.

While many of the applications for synthetic biology are beneficial and peaceful, some applications may have unintended security consequences and are actively being developed for military purposes.

They carry dual-use potential.

Elbe and Buckland-Merrett explained this concept quite poetically, stating that ‘technological advances can be used to benefit humanity, but could also be misappropriated by hostile groups for more nefarious purposes’.[2]

CRISPR/Cas9 (CRISPR), is one such technology that has prospered in recent years. Classified as an advanced genetic modification technology, CRISPR has been labelled a technological breakthrough that allows scientists to more accurately modify genes and DNA strands in human and nonhuman organisms.

Summarily, ‘CRISPR provides a precise method of targeting, snipping, and inserting exact pieces of a genome’.[3] In some further detail, CRISPR has been argued as ‘an incredible tool with the remarkable ability to modulate genes, address any site in the genome, target multiple DNA sites simultaneously, and program them to delete, insert or repair genes’.[4]

Notably, it has the potential to significantly assist in scientific development. It is due to these remarkable features that CRISPR is, a dual-use technology.

The Security Threat – Weaponization?

Despite being predominantly developed for peaceful purposes, with such an advanced technology remaining in the development and trial phase, several features remain unknown to scientists.

It is this element of the unknown that has begun to raise unnerving questions on whether there is a real threat that technologies such as CRISPR could be used and manipulated for non-peaceful and military purposes.

Simply put, the international, scientific and academic communities are divided on CRISPR’s ability to be weaponized. With that being said, “military applications of artificial intelligence, nanotechnology and biotechnology are being actively devised and implemented”.[5]

It has been argued that ‘creating a mass-casualty biological weapon requires more than mere access to a pathogen’.[6] Therefore, when assessing the potential benefits and subsequent risks it is also important to consider the current limitations of the technology in question, with the key challenge currently, being off-target editing. Having said this, it would be unlikely that nefarious actors would be dissuaded by such challenge.

Further, to create a biological weapon, numerous technical issues must be overcome including the ability to produce large quantities of the agent, toxin or pathogen and how to maintain the weapon’s survivability and its stability.[7]

We live in a world where technologies are converging. Therefore, if genetic engineering and modification were to occur in combination with nanotechnologies, the remaining barriers to weaponization, such as mode of delivery, could be reduced.[8]

Consequently, the risk of misuse is increased. And, due to the increasing capability to disseminate knowledge, the ease of access to this technology, the risk presented by CRISPR and its ability to weaponize, manipulate or modify a toxin or pathogen, it is now arguable that there is more than just a remote chance of this technology becoming a security threat, especially if it were employed in conjunction with nanotechnologies.

Although such an eventuality would not be likely to occur overnight, nevertheless it can be assumed to be is a ‘dual-use’ technology and that it could potentially act as an ‘enabler’.

With this being said, creating a CRISPR-enhanced means or method of warfare would not constitute a not straight-forward process. However, the security threat is still present, and it requires a detailed discussion and acknowledgement by the international community, which has already begun in recent years.

With this being said, CRISPR could, be employed to manipulate and modify a pathogen, bacteria or toxin to render it more deadly, potent or immune to antibiotics or vaccines.[9]

Modified pathogens could also be engineered for biological attacks on humans or against the food supply with devastating consequences.[10] Enhancing the potency of a pathogen through the use of gene drives could increase the human damage, if it were deployed in a biological attack.[11]

Another potential malicious use is altering the pathogen’s host range, which could be particularly deadly, especially if one alters an animal disease to infect humans; the human population would potentially have no immunity to the re-engineered pathogen.[12]

For example, a genetic modification technology such as CRISPR could be applied to a currently harmless insect, and through the modification process, render its bite deadly.[13]

Using CRISPR could allow the synthesising of a pathogen which would overcome the requirement to source the natural source. This could subsequently lead to the reconstruction of extinct pathogens.

A future use of such a technique could lead to the creation of a smallpox genome from scratch.[14] 

In Australia’s submission to the 2019 Meeting of the States Parties to the BWC, it was stated that the publication of genetic sequences such as the polio virus, the Spanish influenza, as well as the publication of a method to reconstruct horsepox virus by genetic synthesis, presents a great deal of concern.[15]

Di Eulius and Giordano stated that gene editing tools and synthetic biology such as CRISPR, have the ability to enhance the production of ‘traditional neurotoxins or infectious agents or to modify existing agents that are known to act on the nervous system and brain’.[16]

This subsequently raises concerns surrounding the overlap and fusion of two separate threats to form “nanotechnology-enabled biochemical weapons”.[17]

When looking at genetic technologies such as CRISPR and their potential to interfere with human genetics, concerns arise when such interference amounts to human enhancement.[18] This raises concerns when that human enhancement is militarily directed.

When combined with nanotechnologies, this could be more of a reality than initially thought. It has been argued that in the coming years, nanotechnology, coupled with synthetic biology could increase the potential to manipulate and enhance human functions for both civilian and military purposes.[19]

CRISPR’s Classification

It is important to note from the discussion above that CRISPR would not necessarily be a weapon in its own right. On its own, it is a genetic modification technology.

Simply employing CRISPR to alter a genetic structure would not automatically constitute a non-peaceful purpose, nor would it automatically constitute a weapon. And as mentioned earlier, there are several highly beneficial purposes to CRISPR.

CRISPR is an ‘enabler’ and as such, an ‘enabling technology’. The term, ‘enabling technology’ is a newer concept in academia. It is proposed here, and I also propose this line of argument in my academic article, that an ‘enabling technology’ is a piece of equipment, technology or process that can be employed alone or in combination with associated technologies to generate an improved performance or outcome.

The term does not differentiate between peaceful and non-peaceful purposes but is more focused on whether the technology in question has the ability to enhance, modify or alter another technology. Additionally, the term, ‘enabling technology’ has been previously used to describe nanotechnology, as nanotechnologies could enhance and modify existing technologies for a greater impact and lethality.[20]

As an ‘enabling technology’ pursuant to military terms, it is likely that CRISPR would also be classified as a ‘means or method of warfare’ due the technology’s potential ability to have a ‘direct impact on the offensive capability of the force to which they belong’.[21] If there is a key message to be taken away from this blog, that is it.

As expressed by Marco Sassòli, ‘means refer to weapons, weapons systems and platforms, while methods address the way in which weapons are used and, more largely, military tactics.’[22] It has been argued that the term ‘means of warfare’ has a broader meaning than ‘weapon’.[23]

A means of warfare can include weapons, but encompasses ‘all weapon systems, weapon platforms, and associated equipment to project and deliver force during hostilities’.[24]

If we are to take these interpretations as correct, CRISPR could be observed as a weapon or weapons system, or at the very least could enable a weapon, where used or developed for non-peaceful and military purposes. Thus, its use, should be, and is likely to be heavily limited by international law.

The classification of CRISPR as an enabling technology that could falling within the scope of means of warfare would seem the most appropriate, although it would only be classified as such upon its employment to enhance, manipulate or modify a pathogen or toxin for non-peaceful purposes.

It is worthy of mentioning, that such classification would not overly impact on scientific or medical developments as the scope of relevant treaties, as will be discussed below, is concerned only with non-peaceful purposes.

Conclusion

Finally, many emerging technologies were not foreseen at the inception of the treaties and conventions dedicated to mitigating the threats posed by unconventional weapons, it seems prudent to assess their relevance, adaptability and their applicability to CRISPR.

Despite the international legal system having been tested in recent history, the law has clearly shown its ability to adapt to emerging challenges with respect to numerous weapons technologies.

It is, therefore, crucial that the international framework remains adaptable to new and previously unforeseen threats. Notably, however such technologies also need to be reviewed under a security lens, instead of a purely legal one.

The main focus of this article, however, was CRISPR’s classification, and what it could look like if developed militarily. It is in a more detailed academic article that I present the potential legal framework that CRISPR could fall within the ambit of, in terms of the laws of weaponry, with publication forthcoming.

What is clear however, is the security risk this gene modification technology presents, and that there is a potential for military development, with unknown consequences.

Notes

[1] Margaret E. Kosal, ‘Anticipating the Biological Proliferation Threat of Nanotechnology: Challenges for International Arms Control Regimes’ in Hitoshi Nasu and Robert McLaughlin (eds), New Technologies and the Law (TMC Asser Press, 2014) 159, 160.

[2] Stefan Elbe and Gemma Buckland-Merrett, ‘Entangled security: Science, co-production, and intra-active insecurity’ (2019) 4(2) European Journal of International Security 123, 123.

[3] Barry R. Furrow, ‘The CRISPR-Cas9 Tool of Gene Editing: Cheaper, Faster, Riskier?’ (2017) 26(2) Annals of Health Law 33, 39; Kathleen M. Vogel and Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley, ‘Anticipating emerging biotechnology threats: A case study of CRISPR’ (2018) 37(2) Politics and the Life Sciences 1, 2.

[4] Barry R. Furrow, ‘The CRISPR-Cas9 Tool of Gene Editing: Cheaper, Faster, Riskier?’ (2017) 26(2) Annals of Health Law 33, 35.

[5] Liivoja R, ‘Technological change and the evolution of the law of war’ (2015) 97 International Review of the Red Cross 1157, 1158.

[6] Kathleen M. Vogel and Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley, ‘Anticipating emerging biotechnology threats: A case study of CRISPR’ (2018) 37(2) Politics and the Life Sciences 1, 11.

[7] Ibid, 11.

[8] Recent Advances in Gene Editing and Synthesis Technologies and their Implications 3.

[9] Christian Enemark and Ian Ramshaw, ‘Gene Technology, Biological Weapons, and the Security of Science’ (2009) 18 Security Studies 624, 628.

[10] Furrow (n 5) 39-40; Review of Developments in the Field of Science and Technology Related to the Convention – Synthetic Biology 2. 

[11] Enemark and Ramshaw (n 9) 630.

[12] Ibid, 631.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Enemark and Ramshaw (n 6) 632; Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Productive and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Review of Developments in the Field of Science and Technology Related to the Convention – Synthetic Biology, submitted by Australia (23 July 2019) BWC/MSP/2019/MX.2/WP.4, 2 (Review of Developments in the Field of Science and Technology Related to the Convention – Synthetic Biology).

[15] Review of Developments in the Field of Science and Technology Related to the Convention – Synthetic Biology 2.

[16] Diane DiEulius and James Giordano, ‘Why the Gene Editors Like CRISPR/Cas May Be a Game-Changer for Neuroweapons’ (2017) 15(3) Health Security 296, 298.

[17] See: Nixdorff et al, ‘Dual-use nano-technology: An assessment of the implications of trends in science and technology’ (2018) 37(2) Politics and the Life Sciences 180,180.

[18] William H. Boothby, ‘The regulation of weapons under IHL’ in Baldwin De Vits and Gian Luca Beruto (eds), Weapons and the International Rule of Law, 39^th Round Table on Current Issues of International Humanitarian Law, Sanremo (International Institute of Humanitarian Law, 2016) 38.

[19] Kobi Leins, ‘Regulation of the Use of Nanotechnology in Armed Conflict’, (2017) 36(1) IEEE Technology and Society Magazine, 46, 47.

[20] Hitoshi Nasu, ‘Nanotechnology and challenges to international humanitarian law: a preliminary legal assessment’ (2012) 94 International Review of the Red Cross 653, 660.

[21] Justin McClelland, ‘The review of weapons in accordance with Article 36 of Additional Protocol I’ (2003) 85 Review of the International Red Cross 397, 405.

[22] Marco Sassòli, International Humanitarian Law: Rules, Controversies, and Solutions to Problems Arising in Warfare (Edward Elgar, 2019) 380.

[23] Rain Liivoja and Luke Chircop, ‘Enhanced Warfighters: Weapons, Means or Methods?’ (2018) 18 International Law Studies, 161, 178.

[24] Ibid.

About the author:

Ms. Meredith Primrose Jones, GCHE, LL.M, LL.B, is an early career researcher focusing on hybrid warfare and modern military strategies, emerging technologies and cyber warfare.

Meredith is currently a Researcher at the Oceania Cyber Security Centre and a Researcher at the Centre for Cyber Security Research and Innovation, located at RMIT University in Melbourne.

Since completing her LL.M at the Australian National University (ANU), she has sought out research opportunities in international law and security. Meredith has been an Associate Lecturer at two leading universities in Australia, and she has been a research assistant to several academics at La Trobe University, RMIT University and ANU.

Meredith is a consultant at the National Institute of Strategic Resilience in Canberra, Australia and is also an Affiliate Member of the National Security Hub located at the University of Canberra.

Currently, Meredith is researching contemporary security issues surrounding the themes of biosecurity, hybrid warfare and weapons. In December 2018, and March 2019, she presented a paper, “CRISPR Weapons – Disruption or Compliance of International Humanitarian Law?”. In October 2019, Meredith had the opportunity to present at the 2019 Australian Cyber Warfare Conference on Syria’s status as a hybrid war.

Her most recent publications include, ‘Syria – A Hybrid War Case Study’ (2021) 21 (1) Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 33-55; and “Hybrid warfare’: Nord Stream attacks show how war is evolving’ The Conversation, 5 October 2022.

Disclaimers: 

The views expressed by guest authors do not necessarily reflect my views or those of the Center on Law, Ethics and National Security, or Duke University.  See also here.

Remember what we like to say on Lawfire^®: gather the facts, examine the law, evaluate the arguments – and then decide for yourself!

 

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