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Redefining Resource Allocation in Computing Systems
by Jacob Chasan Abstract A new kernel1 is in town. The current industry-standard for resource allocation on computers does not take the user’s preferences into account, rather programs are given access to resources based on the time that each requested to be run. Although this system can lead to solutions that minimize the time it […]
Incentive Programs for Neglected Diseases
By Pranav Ganapathy We propose and evaluate an auction mechanism for the priority review voucher program. The 2007 voucher program rewards drug developers for regulatory approval of novel treatments for neglected tropical diseases. Previous papers have proposed auctioning vouchers for the priority review voucher program but have offered neither a mathematical model nor a […]
A Brief Review and Analysis of Spectrum Auctions in Canada
by Martínez-Cid, Wenfei Jiao, and Zeren Zhang Abstract We begin by explaining the importance of efficient spectrum allocation and reviewing Canada’s recent spectrum allocation history. We then use a dataset covering more than 1,200 licenses auctioned from 2001 to 2015 that seeks to account for each auction’s particular rules. Our results confirm that measures of […]
Optimal Ordering in Sequential English Auctions: A Revenue-Comparison Model for 18th Century Art Auctions in London and Paris
By Amaan Mitha We develop a model based on several auction parameters to test the widely held notion that in a sequential English auction, it is optimal for the seller to arrange the lots in order of decreasing value. We test this model against two datasets of 18th century auctions, one of various auctions from […]
Strategic Behavior in Online Auctions: An Analysis of Sniping
by Claudia Lai Abstract Sniping is a prevalent phenomenon in eBay auctions, which have a fixed end time. Such practice seems apparently inconsistent with standard auction theory – last minute bids are received with reduced probability, and should rationally be submitted earlier – yet previous literature has shown that bidders typically do not engage in […]
