A Superstar Dreaming: An economic analysis of the Aboriginal Desert Paintings Market
by Karen Francis
Abstract
Two artists each have total auction sales greater than AU$10 million in a single decade. In that same market and decade, over 20% of painters failed to sell a single painting offered at auction. There is no question that superstars dominate the Aboriginal Desert Paintings Market (ADPM) in Australia. But what contributes to the emergence of stars and superstars in this market? A gap has been left in the literature explaining superstardom; no mechanism for the emergence of stars in the visual arts has been offered. This study presents specific empirical characteristics and structural features of the ADPM which generate constraints and incentives for dealers and auction houses. The expected responsive behavior of these players is mostly confirmed by evidence presented in this study. The general picture that emerges is of a three-way tacit agreement by dealers (with government support), buyers and auction houses in promoting early success, reinforcing demonstrated market appeal by the few, and helping accelerate the shift of stars and the few real superstars from the primary to the auction market.
Professor Neil De Marchi, Faculty Advisor
JEL Codes: N27, P4, Z33
Analysis of Auction Price Risk: An Empirical Study of the Australian Aboriginal Art Market
by Ilya Voytov
Abstract
Auction theory economists have shown that auctions can be structured to maximize
the expected revenue to the seller. In this thesis, I show that they can also be
optimized to minimize the sellers’ risk through an understanding of the driving factors
behind seller’s auction price risk. I derive a general form equation for auction price
variance, and discuss how changes in the number of bidders and the type of bidders
affect the sellers’ auction risk. An empirical component of this paper takes data from
auction sales of Australian Aboriginal art and uses observed price variance to make
deductions about the underlying types of participating bidders.
Professor Neil De Marchi, Faculty Advisor
JEL Codes: C57, D44, D53, N27,
