By Will Walker
This paper studies the influence of incentives on quitting behaviors in professional men’s tennis tournaments and offers broader implications to pay structures in the labor market. Precedent literature established that prize incentives and skill heterogeneity can impact player effort exertion. Prize incentives include prize money and indirect financial rewards (ranking points). Players may also exert less effort when there is a significant difference in skill between the match favorite and the match underdog. Results warrant three important conclusions. First, prize incentives (particularly prize money) do influence a player’s likelihood of quitting. Results on skill heterogeneity are less conclusive, though being the “match favorite” could reduce the odds of quitting. Finally, match underdogs and “unseeded” players may be especially susceptible to the influence of prize incentives when considering whether to quit.
Advisors: Peter Arcidiacono and Grace Kim | JEL Codes: J41, J31, J32, J33, M12, M51, M52
By Meghan Mcaneny
In this study, I investigate the relationship between the percentage of women in leadership in a company and its employee benefits. This paper uses data on individual firms’ benefits such as paid parental leave, familial support, and flexibility arrangements. Using OLS, I conclude that benefits that shift familial burdens from women to men, specifically paid paternity leave, result in more women in leadership. This creates an even playing field for women to be promoted as the company environment does not penalize women for using benefits. I also find a negative relationship between reimbursement for fertility procedures and women in leadership.
Advisor: Alison Hagy, Marjorie McElroy | JEL Codes: J22, J32, M51, M52 | Tagged: