Beyond the But-For World: Weak-necessity causal reasoning for model-based counterfactuals in law and economics
by Lilia Qian
Abstract
Under current standards for scientific evidence defined under Daubert, antitrust models are frequently excluded from legal consideration, but not always for reasons that make them genuinely unreliable. This paper clarifies why antitrust models face difficulties when subjected to methodological scrutiny: the employment of model-based counterfactual arguments under an epistemically defective ‘but-for’ structure of causation. Assessing the relevance and reliability of an antitrust model is a matter of assessing the validity and applicability of the causal claim it makes, not the degree to which the modeling methodology is considered scientific. A more flexible causal framework, the weak-necessity structure of causation, is suggested as a means of developing and evaluating model-based counterfactuals. This framework allows for modeling of overdetermined-causation situations, or situations in which the outcome of interest can be attributed to two or more causes. Since antitrust cases typically involve overdetermined causation, the weak-necessity framework allows them to be modeled in a more precise and intuitive way.
Professor Kevin Hoover, Faculty Advisor
JEL Codes: B41, K21, L41, L44
Prediction in Economics: a Case Study of Economists’ Views on the 2008 Financial Crisis
By Weiran Zeng
Prediction in economics is the focal point of debate for the future of economics, ever since economists were burdened with the failure to “predict” the 2008 Financial Crisis. This paper discusses positions held by philosophers and economic methodologists regarding what kinds of predictions there are and creates a taxonomy of prediction. Through evaluation of those positions, this paper presents different senses of prediction that can be expected of economics, and assess economists’ reflections according to those senses.
Advisor: Kevin Hoover | JEL Codes: B41, N1, G17
