Heartless

I read I Hate the Internet through the foggy perception of a man sick enough to pity himself but not sick enough to cancel his obligations. I read I Hate the Internet in a pause between scuttling from meetings to a class. I read I Hate the Internet on a chair by my fireplace, when it’s freezing out and later, when the temperature has unexpectedly jumped, I read I Hate the Internet on a bench in the sun, leaves dead and decaying heaped in a drift around my feet. I read I Hate the Internet while drinking more than the recommended dosage of cough syrup (dextromethorphan only — just because we are sick does not mean we have to be uncivilized), and so the haze of a mild cold isn’t the only haze through which I read I Hate the Internet. I read I Hate the Internet aloud in bed to my ailing girlfriend, who really took to “drp slut” not only as an insult but also as a handle. That was back when I was just starting reading I Hate the Internet. She was sick then, and I was not…

I arrive 40 minutes early to a farewell symposium for N. Katherine Hayles and—it seems only appropriate—I read I Hate the Internet. A classmate sits on the couch across from me, pulls out her own copy of the book. Do you hate the internet too? Maggie asks me, before making a crack about how it’s pretty bad, but it’s a “bad novel,” so that must mean it’s OK. I can tell: she’s using irony.

(I had assumed I would not be the first to post to the blog. Since it seems I will be, I use Maggie now as an imaginary interlocutor.)

To begin with, I Hate the Internet is a “bad novel.”

I will say what to me seems obvious. Kobek designating his novel a “bad novel” is not a way to hold his book at arm’s length and excuse its faults. Rather, it is an intentional generic description, one positing, positively, a new genre of novels, “bad novels,” defined diametrically against the dominant form of literary novels today, “good novels.”

Kobek lays out his notion of the “good novel” early. This is the novel funded by the CIA, buoyed by their support of the Paris Review and their engineering of the 1958 Nobel Prize in Literature (24). It is the novel that goes by the name literary fiction, that is universally thought of as serious, that is thought to influence people, change culture, and shape international affairs. Why else would the CIA fund it?

It is thus not primarily the “program aesthetic” of the legions of MFA “good novels” that Kobek’s notional “bad novels” protest. Rather, it is the belief in the efficaciousness of novels.

I Hate the Internet is a book that loves to complain, or rather, to espouse vaguely leftist commonsense about the semi-hidden evils of contemporary society. Its bugbears are familiar to any vague leftist who daily trawls the web.

A Partial List; or, Cool Topics, Bro:

Misogyny (28); Eurocentrism in its American form (31); the hypocrisy of the American founding fathers (31); corporate greed (32); bourgeois appropriation (41); the Truth about Walt Disney (45); anti-black language bias (50); the preterition of female to male sexuality (56); corporate surveillance (57); accidental semio-labor, or, the extraction of profits from free expressive labor (58); clicktivism (63); cults of celebrity (64); deregulation (95); Bill Clinton’s (neo)liberalism (96); torture (96); George W. Bush as the Worst President Ever (96); Alan Greenspan (96); reformism (97); inflated corporate valuations (105); the prohibition on Gay Marriage (110); Lady Gaga (119); Weapons of Mass Destruction, and their non-appearance in Iraq (124); gentrification; cultural appropriation (131); misuse of the word “irony” (134); scolds who care too much about misuse of the word “irony” (134); colonialism (169); global warming (184); overpopulation (184); racial bias in policing (202); racism (210) and liberal racism (212); the CIA funding of the crack epidemic (220); and radicalized beauty standards (223).

I Hate the Internet is a book that loves to complain about the familiar bugbears of the vague left while doing about the same amount of work to dismantle them as the clicktivism it mocks. Like the online critical gesture, all the book does is unmask injustice. This is the familiar liberal solution: show hidden violence for what it is. After decades of critique, after a vast critical (or semi-critical) apparatus growing up on the internet, perhaps the only shred of subversiveness in I Hate the Internet’s persistent unmasking is in shouting about the mereness of this unmasking. What does it tell me about myself, a sympathetic reader might wonder about himself, that I keep nodding along, and that that feels good. How do the yeps I pencil in the margins indict me?

Kobek’s novel is not an abdication of the efficacy that “good novels” actually wielded over the political sphere. The idea of that influence is “insane.”[1] All that I Hate the Internet does is drop the pretense.

That is the meaning of the refusal to write or include the 25th chapter, which would have “served as the ideological heart of the book” (210). It is a refusal to pretend any longer about the efficacy of the novel. Indeed, it is more than the book that is at stake, since I Hate the Internet takes in its sights both “good novels” and internet discourse: this is an argument about language. “Expressing concern about racism,” Kobek writes, “was a new religion and focusing on language rather than political mechanics was an effortless, and meaningless, way of making sure one was seen in a front-row pew of the new church” (212).[2]

I Hate the Internet doesn’t take the step to efficacy it signals, but—according to its own reckoning—by evacuating itself of its “ideological heart” it at least avoids the heartwarming liberal fantasy it disdains.

[1] “The funding of good novels was based on an abandoned misapprehension that writers, being the apparent creators of culture, has come impact on contemporary international affairs. ¶ This was, of course, insane” (200).

[2] Note, y’all, that he’s talking about us, as he notes on the next page: “The curious thing was that Facebook and Twitter and Tumblr and Blogspot … were the stomping grounds of self-styled intellectual and social radicals” (213).

Eleven Assertions about Conceptual Poetry and Flarf (the thirteenth will blow your mind!)

Author: Caroline Bergvall
Words: 162
Lines: 43
Stanzas: N/A
Experience: I read the first five lines, scan the rest, scroll to the bottom of the page. In gray, small sans-serif, as if embarrassed, the note explains Bergvall’s composition method—surely this is in some sense the heart of the piece. I scroll back up. The first five lines take up new meaning. I switch to my other document, “Eleven Assertions about…”, and write a few sentences about the poem before finishing reading it. In the other window I can see just its last two lines: “But shortly to the point I turn/ And make of my tale an ende.” I guess I’ll finish reading it now.
What it would be if you took out all the words except ‘nor’ but left the punctuation and broke the linebreaks:
. Nor. Nor Nor Nor Nor. Nor Nor Nor Nor Nor Nor. Nor. Nor Nor Nor Nor Nor.

Title: “I Google Myself
Author: Mel Nichols
Words: 195
Lines: 37
Stanzas: 4
Justification: Center
Is it as good left-justified?: No.
Number of Appearances of the Word “Google”: 17
Fun Fact: In a video on the Huffpost blog Nichols sings “I Google Myself” while playing a ukulele. On the camera lens she’s rubbed Vaseline. I have no justification for saying she rubbed Vaseline on the camera lens — but the focus is soft.
Experience: At the bottom of the Poetry Foundation page there’s no note explaining the compositional method, so I Google “‘I Google Myself’ Mel Nichols” and find Mel Nichols on the Huffpost blog singing “I Google Myself” while playing a ukulele. Because she sings it to the tune of “I Touch Myself,” I realize I was being thick: it’s a word substitution.
Hot Take: “Google” is a goofy word, but also a sexy one, maybe?

Title: “Fact
Author: Craig Dworkin
Words: 324
Characters: 2,236
Lines: 1
Stanzas: 1
Hot Take: Look at me, Craig Dworkin, extending a long literary-historical trend of contemplating the artist contemplating the blank canvas/page!
Alternate Hot Take: No matter what you think, art, even the semic, is material.
Alternate Fact: Despite the note saying “Each time Dworkin displays the poem, he researches the medium on which it’s being viewed, changing the list of ingredients,” I’m reading this on a 15 inch MacBook Pro retina display from Early 2013 powered by a NIVIDIA GeForce GT 650M 1024 MB graphics card, but the list of ingredients I just read is about paper.
Interpretation of Alternate Fact: The artist was not involved in the transition from the Poetry Foundation’s print edition to their web edition.

Title: “Directory”
Author: Robert Fitterman
Lines: 34
Words: 89
Words in the Notes: 69
Appearances of “H&M”: 4
Appearances of “GNC”: 6
Appearances of “Crabtree & Evelyn”: 3
Stanzas: I don’t know, it depends how you count them.
Form: You know, there is some, I guess
Meter: Pretty free form. Neither regular lines in terms of metrical feet nor Hopkins’ sprung rhythm or whatever appear to appear. Still, the note at the bottom of the page has assured me that the poet looped the mall directory “with poetic concerns for form, meter, and sound,” so…
Sound: As a poet at a lectern slips into an arch and affected manner, the sound self-consciously marks itself poetic.

Title: “Art, Work, Endlessness: Flarf and Conceptual Poetry among the Trolls”
Author: Jasper Bernes.
Notes: Here! (CLICK IT!!! Maybe there are pictures of baby ducks on the other end of the link!)
Words: 10,785
Patron Saint: Bifo Berardi (depicted on a medallion holding up a medallion on one side of which the words “THE SOUL” and on the other side “AT WORK”)
Blind Spot: Nostalgia. (“Gee, art in the ‘60s and ‘70s was so revolutionary!” Art now is “domesticated by the commodity form and the world of labor it once opposed” (766).)
Takeaway Message: Just like Kathi Weeks says, we should not demand better work, but less.
How Long It Takes to Get To the Takeaway: 2.5 pages
How Many Pages He Goes Through After The Getting to the Takeaway Only to Return to It: 19

Title: “Why Conceptual Writing? Why Now?”
Author: Kenneth Goldsmith
Words: I don’t know, my PDF wasn’t OCRed
Paragraphs: Do I really have to count?
Pages: That’s easy, six.
Procedure, Abstracted: Think of a technology’s affordances, assume artists will do weird things with them.

Title: “The Fate of Echo”
Author: Craig Dworkin
Notes: HERE!
Metrics: Elided — the joke has gone stale.
Amount of Art History: Some.

Words: 696
Paragraphs: 6
Characters: 4,281
Number of Hyperlinks to Bootleg The Office Compilations: One
Final Point: Just like Berne says, détournements of labor from within labor fail to escape labor.

Author: Jordan Sjol
Words: 833
Hot Take: Sometimes a different form of criticism is required; sometimes it’s just a lark.
Alternate Hot Take: It’s not always easy to take something seriously.

HONORABLE MENTIONStatement of Facts – Vanessa Place; “Chicks Dig War” – Drew Gardner; “Their Guys, Their Asian Glittering Guys, Are Gay” – Michael Magee

Codes and Substrates, Languages and Bodies

The conviction that Language expresses “truth” is a mystical position. That’s not necessarily to say it’s unjustified, just that on our side of the rupture in Language/language—the side of semiosis—it is conceptually impossible to prove or disprove that idea. Note that the most ardent supporter of Language-as-truth, Scile, must disappear from the book at precisely the moment the mystical position becomes untenable, and that he can only return in a death throe of mystical fervor, with the passage explaining his motivations (339) littered with religious language. Is it the case that prelapsarian Language directly expresses “truth”? On our side of the lapse, that’s beside the point.

The final break in which semiosis enters Language, ambivalently hailed by Avice as “transcendence or fall” (325), leads to a previously-impossible externalization of the means of communication, as the Ariekei scratch ideogrammatic signs into the dust. Avice imagines the development of durable media for the storage of this writing (330). Likewise, semiosis cannot help but spread, as all domains of life become signifying: the new Ariekene architecture proliferates spires and fashionable buttresses (340): buildings too become coded.

Which brings me to code.

I’ll suggest another way into thinking through the language-code nexus than by worrying about truth or executability: let’s think about the interdependence of physiology and language and the manner in which they co-determine what the novel calls ‘thought.’ If we extend Snow Crash’s central metaphor to Embassytown, Embassytown offers significantly more nuance

In Snow Crash, the human brain is merely a material substrate for informational processes: it’s simply the hardware to pure informational software. Software is infinitely reproducible and perfectly communicable: snow crash is the same whether afflicting computer hardware or a human body, the same whether entering the human via tainted blood or visual bitmap: the code is independent of the substrate.

If we extend the metaphor to Embassytown, a different picture obtains. An individual human is physiologically unable to speak Language, and even purpose-bred doppels, humanity’s best crack at reverse-engineering Ariekene hardware, can merely imitate Language, not speak it: their hardware is fundamentally different from that of the Hosts, and therefore the same code instantiated in an Ambassador is not the same as that code instantiated in a Host. In Embassytown, to use Chun’s phrase, code does not “obfuscate the machine” (19). The code and its substrate are mutually irreducible.

This material-informational interdepedence is handily evidenced in Embassytown in the figure of the untranslatable, an omnipresent specter in the book. Against Galloway’s assertion of the identity of different instantiations of code, the untranslatable shows that an instance of ‘thought’ is neither purely informational nor purely physiological: it is always and irreducibly both, and to think of the so-called ‘content’ of it as isolatable is an absurdity that leads to a mystification of code. That which can exist in Language but not Anglo-Ubiq (and vice versa) reminds us there’s no perfect equivalence between (instantiated) codes. These code systems have developed irreducibly with their material substrates, the body. It would be a confused question to ask whether the Arekei developed two mouths to speak a double-voiced code or whether they developed a double-voiced code because they have two mouths.

Perhaps the conceptual tool needed here would be a compound like those of Language: ‘body’ in the turn line and ‘mind’ in the cut, or ‘code’ and ‘substrate.’ But here, in WordPress, I can’t render it, and, possibly, here in my mind/body, I can’t think it.