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Even the most individual scholarly work, viewed in terms of the economic, intellectual, and psychological support necessary to its accomplishment, turns out to be a social enterprise. In the case of a work so slow to grow as mine, whose production resembled less the determined making of a book than the shaping of a record of continuing exploration, one becomes especially conscious of the magnitude of personal help and institutional sustenance received along the way.

A fellowship from the John Simon Guggenheim Foundation made possible a valuable year of initial reading and research in London. My three universities—Wesleyan, California at Berkeley, and Princeton—provided leave time and financial support for the work. Such release from teaching duties enabled me to accept the hospitality of the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences (Stanford), the Institute for Advanced Study (Princeton), and Wesleyan’s Center for the Humanities. The American Council of Learned Societies also supported my writing at the Wesleyan Center.

Among the many scholars whom I wish to thank, Felix Gilbert
III

POLITICS IN A NEW KEY: AN AUSTRIAN TRIO

"People who were not born then," wrote Robert Musil of the Austrian fin de siècle, "will find it difficult to believe, but the fact is that even then time was moving faster than a cavalry camel. . . . But in those days, no one knew what it was moving towards. Nor," Musil continues, "could anyone quite distinguish between what was above and what was below, between what was moving forward and what backward."

The social forces that rose to challenge the liberal ascendency could not fail to baffle an observer who viewed them through a liberal's conceptual screen and with a liberal's expectations of history. In the 1860's the Austrian liberals, though neither utopians nor believers in perfectibility, had rather clear notions of "what was above and what below . . . what was moving forward and what backward." Socially, they believed that the aristocratic class, having been "above" through most of history, was either being liberalized or sinking into a harmless, ornamental hedonism. The principles and programs which made up the liberal creed were designed to supersede systematically those of "the feudals," as the aristocrats were pejoratively called. Constitutional monarchy would replace aristocratic absolutism; parliamentary centralism, aristocratic federalism. Science would replace religion. Those of German nationality would serve as tutor and teacher to bring up the subject peoples, rather than keep them ignorant bondsmen as the feudals had done. Thus nationality itself would ultimately serve as a principle of popular cohesion in a multinational state. "The Germans in Austria," wrote the liberal leader J. N. Berger in 1861, "should strive not for political hegemony, but for cultural hegemony among the peoples of Austria." They should "carry culture to the east, transmit the propaganda of German intellec tion, German science, German humanism." Finally, laissez faire would break the arbitrary rule of privilege in the economic sphere and make merit, rather than privilege or charity, the basis of economic reward.

In all these aspects of their program, the Austro-liberals knew themselves to be combatting the socially superior and the historically anterior: they saw themselves as leading what was below and moving forward against what was above and backward. If the common people could not yet be trusted, since they did not always understand, the spread of rational culture would one day provide the prerequisite for a broadly democratic order. Popular power would increase only as a function of rational responsibility.

Austrian society failed to respect these liberal coordinates of order and progress. During the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the program which the liberals had devised against the upper classes occasioned the explosion of the lower. The liberals succeeded in releasing the political energies of the masses, but against themselves rather than against their ancient foes. Every shot aimed at the enemy above produced a hostile salvo from below. A German nationalism articulated against aristocratic cosmopolitans was answered by Slavic patriots clamoring for autonomy. When the liberals soft-pedaled their Germanism in the interest of the multi-national state, they were branded as traitors to nationalism by an anti-liberal German petite bourgeoisie. Laissez faire, devised to free the economy from the fetters of the past, called forth the Marxist revolutionaries of the future. Catholicism, routed from the school and the courthouse as the handmaiden of aristocratic oppression, returned as the ideology of
peasant and artisan, for whom liberalism meant capitalism and capitalism meant Jew. By the end of the century even the Jews, to whom Austro-liberalism had offered emancipation, opportunity, and assimilation to modernity, began to turn their backs on their benefactors. The failure of liberalism left the Jew a victim, and the most persuasive answer to victimization was the flight to the national home that Zionism proffered. Where other nationalists threatened the Austrian state with disruption, the Zionists threatened secession.

Far from rallying the masses against the old ruling class above, then, the liberals unwittingly summoned from the social deeps the forces of a general disintegration. Strong enough to dissolve the old political order, liberalism could not master the social forces which that dissolution released and which generated new centrifugal thrust under liberalism’s tolerant but inflexible aegis. The new anti-liberal mass movements—Czech nationalism, Pan-Germanism, Christian Socialism, Social Democracy, and Zionism—rose from below to challenge the trusteeship of the educated middle class, to paralyze its political system, and to undermine its confidence in the rational structure of history.

It is not our task here to trace the complex history of the extrusion of the Austro-liberals from political power, or of the paralysis of parliamentarism by national and social conflict. We shall focus rather on the nature of the leaders who, breaking from their own liberal origins, organized and expressed the aspirations of the groups which the liberals had failed to win. Our trio of leaders of the new mass movements reveals, despite their differences in political purpose, a common new style—harbinger of a new political culture in which power and responsibility were differently integrated than in the culture of rational liberalism.

Not all the new movements, national and ideological, which assaulted liberal ascendancy from the flanks and from below represented departures from liberal political culture. The non-German nationalist parties and the Social Democrats were the least difficult for ordinary liberals to comprehend. Having been involved for a half century in a struggle for German national self-determination, the German liberals could understand, even when they deplored or rejected, the Czechs’ increasingly radical demands for equality in legal and cultural institutions. The Social Democrats, formally founded as a party in 1889, likewise offered few conundrums to the liberal mind. Indeed, of all the filial révolts aspiring to replace the fathers, none bore the paternal features more pronouncedly than the Social Democrats. Their rhetoric was rationalist, their secularism militant, their faith in education virtually unlimited. True, the principal Social Democratic leader, Victor Adler, had rebelled against rationalism as a student, when he espoused German nationalism and Wagner’s ideas of social integration on a folkish basis. Yet, in subsequently embracing the Marxist creed, Adler affirmed a fundamental allegiance to the rationalistic heritage of science and law.

The liberals themselves felt the socialists’ affiliation to their culture across the issues that divided them. Liberals could condemn Social Democrats for their utopianism, for their absurd demands for a welfare state before “the most primitive prerequisites” of political enlightenment had yet been created. But neither the impatient rationalism nor the class-oriented cosmopolitanism of the socialists destroyed the liberals’ sense of kinship with them. Though one might reject a socialist’s position, one could argue with him in the same language. To the liberal mind, the Social Democrat was unreasonable, but not irrational.

Other movements resulting from the liberal failure to bring the masses into the state represented a far more revolutionary break from the tradition of Austrian liberalism and evoked a more traumatic response in the liberal community. These movements were Pan-Germanism, Christian Socialism, and—in answer to both of these—Zionism. Against the dry, rational politics of liberalism, the powerful leaders of these movements developed what became known as “the sharper key,” a mode of political behavior at once more abrasive, more creative, and more satisfying to the life of feeling than the deliberative style of the liberals. Two leading virtuos of the new key—Georg von Schönnerer of the Pan-Germans and Karl Lueger of the Christian Socials—became the inspirers and political models of Adolf Hitler. A third, Theodor Herzl, pioneered in providing Hitler’s victims with the most appealing and powerful political response yet devised to the gentle reign of terror. Thus, even before Vienna’s intellectuals blazed trails to the twentieth century’s higher culture, three of her sons pioneered in its post-rational politics.

Schönnerer, Lueger, and Herzl all began their careers as political liberals and then apostasized to organize masses neglected or rejected by liberalism in ascendancy. All possessed the peculiar gift of
answering the social and spiritual needs of their followers by composing ideological collages—collages made of fragments of modernity, glimpses of futurity, and resurrected remnants of a half-forgotten past. In liberal eyes, these ideological mosaics were mystifying and repulsive, confounding the “above” with the “below,” the “forward” with the “backward.” Yet each of these political artists—Schönerer, Lueger, and Herzl—grasped a social-psychological reality which the liberal could not see. Each expressed in politics a rebellion against reason and law which soon became more widespread. In their manner of secession from the liberal political tradition and in the form of the challenge they posed to its values, this triad of politicians adumbrated a concept of life and a mode of action which, transcending the purely political, constituted part of the wider cultural revolution that ushered in the twentieth century.

II

Georg von Schönerer (1842–1921) organized the radical German nationalists in 1882 and led them into extreme anti-Semitic politics. Although he never succeeded in forming a powerful party, he elevated anti-Semitism into a major disruptive force in Austrian political life. Perhaps more than any other single figure, he was responsible for the new stridency in Austrian politics, the “sharper key” of raucous debate and street-brawling that marked the last decade of the nineteenth century.

A curious compound of gangster, philistine, and aristocrat, Schönerer conceived of himself as the militant knight-redemer of the German Volk. He rejoiced in epithets redolent of chivalry: “Knight George” or—after his estate in Lower Austria—“the Knight of Rosenau.” The official song of his party, Ritter Georg bach!, was sung to the tune with which the Austrians traditionally honored their military hero, Prince Eugene of Savoy, “the noble knight” who had saved Austria from the Turks. It is striking that for his program of revolutionary national unification Schönerer appealed to democratic students and to a frustrated lower middle and artisan class in the archaistic garb of knight. His aristocratic pretension offers a clue both to the psychological sources of his own rancorous rebellion against liberal culture and to the social sensibilities of the strata which he organized.

Georg von Schönerer acquired his title by honest inheritance, but he was far from being an aristocrat of the blood. Alone among our three leaders, he came from the new industrial class. His father had received his patent of nobility from the hands of a grateful emperor for services as an engineer and railway administrator. Georg was thus the son of a self-made man, “a man with qualities.” He spent his life in oscillation between living up to his inheritance and living it down.

Matthias Schönerer: what a father, what an archetypical man of the early industrial era! In 1828, when only twenty-one, he built Austria’s first railway—a horse-drawn affair—and thereafter several steam-powered lines.* From a study tour of railway engineering in the United States, he returned to Vienna in 1838 with the first steam locomotive, the “Philadelphia.” He thereupon organized the first locomotive and car-building works to eliminate Austria’s dependence on foreign equipment and brought in American locomotive engineers to train native drivers.** Matthias’s perquisites of office included a residence in Vienna’s new South Station; it was in this very modern stable that the future savior of German nationalism was born in 1842. The elder Schönerer displayed the talents of an administrator no less than those of a builder.† In an industry in which the closest collaboration between engineer and banker was called for, Schönerer developed excellent working relations with the great financial tycoons of the day. Whether through his diplomatic talent


† An urn presented to Schönerer by his loyal personnel in 1846, when he was director of the Vienna-Gloggnitz Railway, celebrated his many talents with the iconographic variety characteristic of the age: Minerva stood for “Civil Engineering”; Mercury was elevated from his traditional role as trickster and divine messenger to represent “Administration”; a locomotive joined the pantheon to present “Railway Management,” while an anvil, labeled “Machine Construction,” completed the quartet of symbols. Cf. Constantin von Wurzbach, Oesterreichische Nationalbiographie (Vienna, 1856–91), XXXI, 149.
or his indispensability as a railway builder, he managed to work with two of the bitterest rivals in Austrian high finance: on the one hand, with the House of Rothschild; on the other, with Baron Simon Sina, who was often associated in his railway ventures with the Jewish house of Arnstein and Eskeles. When the competition between these great private bankers took the more formidable form of a struggle between the colossal new joint stock banks—Sina’s Crédit mobiler and the Rothschilds’ Oesterreichische Creditanstalt,—Matthias Schönнер could be found high in the councils of the railway enterprises of both groups. In 1834, the Rothschilds called upon him as an expert to determine whether they should power their great projected Nordbahn by horse or by steam. It was this railroad that Schönner’s son was to make the focus of his anti-Semitic nationalism crusade in 1884. Schönner senior achieved the height of his business career as member of the board of directors of the Empress Elizabeth Railway (built in 1856–60). A Rothschild-dominated enterprise, its board was thoroughly interlocked with that of the Creditanstalt. The vigorous engineer became a wealthy man, the collaborator of bankers, liberals, Jews, stock-jobbers, and imperial bureaucrats: all those social types to whose destruction his son Georg would devote his political life—after his father’s death.

In 1860, on the occasion of the dedication of the Empress Elizabeth Railway, the grateful emperor honored Matthias Schönner for his services as railway builder with a patent of nobility. Like others proud of their achievements in the world of industry and trade, Schönner chose an escutcheon appropriate to his vocation: a winged wheel in the colors of technology, silver and blue. His motto too, Recta sequi (“To follow the right”), conformed well to the ethic, if not always to the practice, of his class and generation. Less typical was Matthias’s decision to celebrate his social achievement by the purchase of a feudal holding. He bought the manor of Rosenau near Zwettl, a fourteenth-century estate with a charming castle from the era of Maria Theresa. In England, time had hallowed the passage of the merchant into the squarocracy via the country house. In Austria, nobility for service had become common, but its normal badge and accompaniment was higher culture, not a country seat. The acquisition of a noble’s estate was not in good taste; it would carry some stigma of social presumptuousness.

The elder Schönner felt untouched by such qualms. And, unlike other self-made men of his era, he did not seem concerned to foster in his offspring the humanistic culture integral to the social style of Austria’s haute bourgeoisie and especially of the service nobility which Schönner had now entered. The two of his five children about whom something is known were both intellectual middlebrows by the standards of their class. Alexandrine von Schönner, Georg’s sister, shared the organizing talents of her father and brother. But she also shared the ruling Viennese passion for the theater. After some experience as an actress, Alexandrine turned her talents and her substantial legacy to account as a theatrical entrepreneur. In 1889, she bought the Theater an der Wien, one of the oldest centers of popular theater. (Its original manager was Immanuel Schickaneder, librettist of Mozart’s The Magic Flute and first producer of Beethoven’s Fidelio.) Under Mme. Schönner’s management, it became the outstanding theater for operetta, with the hedonistic works of Johann Strauss and Karl Millöcker replacing the more astringent social-morality plays of Johann Nestroy and Ludwig Anzengruber. As a member of the cosmopolitan Austrian theatrical community, which numbered many Jews, Alexandrine explicitly rejected her brother’s anti-Semitic politics. Both as enthusiast for the theater-as-entertainment and as entrepreneurial spirit, she remained loyal to the culture of middlebrow Viennese liberalism.

Georg seems to have suffered more deeply than his sister from the ambiguities bedeviling the child of an energetic parvenu. In Matthias Schönner’s education of his son, one again suspects a certain eccentricity in this otherwise regular royal entrepreneur. He sent the boy not to the Gymnasium, usual for his class, but to the technically oriented Oberrealschule. The fact that Georg changed schools several times suggests some kind of adjustment problem. In 1859, Georg entered the school of commerce in Dresden. In the following years, when his father acquired knighthood and a landed estate, Georg changed course. He left the business school in 1861 and completed his education in two agricultural academies. In the spirit if not under the pressure of his father, Georg thus prepared himself for inheriting the newly acquired estate and title—and for making the life of a country squire pay. Aristocratic pretension and economic realism were to be harmonized in the second Ritter von Rosenau if not in the first.

It was appropriate, therefore, that Georg should have put the
capstone on his education by serving as a steward or farm manager on the estates of one of Austria’s greatest aristocratic entrepreneurs, Johann Adolf Prince Schwarzenberg. Prince Schwarzenberg was to the economic modernization of the landed aristocracy what his gifted brother, Felix, Franz Joseph’s mentor, had been to its political aggiornamento in 1848–52. Educating himself in England in the latest techniques of capitalist agriculture, food-processing, and mineral extraction, Johann Adolph transformed his ancient estates into a vastly profitable landed empire. He was called “the prince among farmers and the farmer among princes.” As political leader in the Bohemian Diet, he was a pillar of extreme aristocratic conservatism, but as entrepreneur he operated in the same bourgeois circle of finance and industry in which Matthias Schönnerer also moved. Prince Schwarzenberg served on the founding committee and as the first president of the board of directors (Verwaltungsrat) of the Oesterreichische Creditanstalt, which was so deeply intertwined with the board of the Empress Elizabeth Railway. Matthias Schönnerer would have had ready access to the prince through their many common financial associates. Although specific evidence is lacking, one may suppose that the father used his connections to secure so valuable an entrée for his son into the technocratic aristocracy. In any event, the future Knight of Rosenau could scarcely have found a more promising apprenticeship than on the estates of Prince Schwarzenberg.

Whereas most sons of the successful middle class in Austria entered an urban vocation, Georg Schönnerer was thus committed to becoming a modest replica of Prince Schwarzenberg, taking science and the entrepreneurial spirit to the land as a modern lord of the manor. Whether this career emerged from the wishes of the father or the ambitions of the son we do not know.

Certain it is that Georg strove with dogged if graceless conviction to fill the role of grand seigneur. Yet, within the framework of the honest, “noble” way of Rosenau, he gradually prepared to rebel against virtually everything upon which his father had built his life: Habsburg loyalty, capitalism, interracial tolerance, and financial speculation. As a frustrated pseudo-aristocrat, Georg prepared himself almost unconsciously to lead those social strata who chafed under the rule of the industrial bourgeoisie from which he himself sprang. Revolting masses and rebellious son would in due course find each other.

The process of transformation of the Knight of Rosenau into a nationalist demagogue proceeded slowly and was completed only after his father’s death in 1881. Thanks to his fortune, his energy, and his practical knowledge of rural needs, Schönnerer first established in his home district a firm base for a political career. He formed and financed agricultural-improvement associations, equivalents of the American grange, and volunteer fire departments. For his work in his own constituency, he chose the ideological symbol of the Volkskaiser, Joseph II, who had made it his policy to bring the fruits of science to the land and to build a strong peasantry. Schönnerer erected plaques in various villages of his district showing the Emperor Joseph with his hand on the plow. Here the liberal cult of science and public welfare mingled with Habsburg loyalty: Schönnerer was clearly still within the framework of the liberal Josephan tradition.

On this secure rural base, Schönnerer began his parliamentary career. Elected to the Reichsrat in 1873, he joined the Fortschriftklub, the left-democratic wing of the liberal camp. He established an early reputation as a defender of the farmer’s interest. Soon he came into conflict with the dominant liberal forces. There were two issues that first aroused Schönnerer’s dissatisfaction with his colleagues: their indifference to social problems, and their inadequate vigor in combating Slavic nationalism. On the latter front, Schönnerer scored his first great success in weakening Austro-liberalism. The German liberals as a whole were then dividing on the nationality question. Concessions to the militant Czechs meant breaking the German middle-class hold upon Bohemia and Moravia and thus weakening liberalism. On the other hand, by driving the Slavic peoples into sharper reaction, failure to make concessions might threaten the Empire itself. Either way, the liberals had no principle to bind together their national, their cosmopolitan, and their social loyalties. Their best defense seemed the maintenance of the restricted-suffrage system, which kept the radical nationalist masses away from the polls. If their national values suffered some loss, the integrity of

* The Klub was the basic unit of party organization within the Parliament. A party was a loose structure generally composed of several such groups.
the multi-national Empire could still be maintained with the liberals’ legal and social ascendancy only slightly weakened.

After the divided liberals fell from power in 1879, Schönerer and an important group of young university intellectuals who had adopted him as their parliamentary representative openly rebelled against their party’s line. They placed the principles of democracy and German nationalism ahead of imperial stability and middle-class oligarchy.* In the so-called Linz program (1882), this group formulated a platform which combined radical democracy, social reform, and nationalism in a manner resembling the contemporaneous phenomenon of populism in the United States. In its support for home industries and “honest labor,” a compulsory training certificate for artisans, and prohibition of house-to-house peddling, the program took account of the grievances of the anti-Semitic Viennese artisan associations. These were survivors of an earlier economic era now hard-pressed by the advent of the factory, the retail store, and the Jewish peddler who sold factory products to the former customers of the stationary artisan. The program was not, however, directly anti-Semitic in intent.

The Linz program carried overtones of a “greater German” orientation in its demands for a customs union and stronger treaty arrangements with the German Empire.† It did not, however, incorporate one aim which Schönerer had expressed in the Reichsrat in a moment of choler: “If only we already belonged to the German Empire!” Schönerer’s fellow nationalists in 1882 had not reached the point where they would wish to dissolve the Habsburg Empire entirely, and most of them never would. But they agreed with him in yoking together two of the great claims on the Austrian state which the liberals had unleashed but could neither curb nor satisfy: the demands for national ascendancy and for social justice.

Schönerer expressed his synthesis of solvents in a manifesto for his nationalist association, the Verein der deutschen Volkspartei, in 1881: “We want to give lively expression to the feeling of solidarity

* These included, among others, Victor Adler and Engelbert Pernerstorfer, later leaders of Social Democracy; Robert Patai, later Christian Social leader; and Heinrich Friedjung, the liberal historian. The group had its origins primarily in a university students’ organization, the Leseverein der deutschen Studenten Wiens (1871–78). See William J. McGrath, “Student Radicalism in Vienna,” Journal of Contemporary History, II, No. 2 (1967), 183-95.

of the German nation in Austria not only in contending with Slavdom, but also in a struggle against the exploitation of the noblest forces of the people [presumably the peasants and artisans] to the advantage of a few.”20 Such a synthesis could encompass a rather broad front of Austro-German liberal nationalists concerned for social reform. But the front could not be stabilized. Schönerer himself pressed on to extend both terms of his synthesis to the point where they became wholly incompatible with Austro-liberalism. On the national side, he interpreted “the feeling of solidarity” to encompass not only “the Germans in Austria” but Germans everywhere. Schönerer here drew upon the *grosseutsch* ideal of 1848, when German democratic revolutionaries sought to supplant the non-national monarchical states system with a unitary Pan-German republic. During the Franco-Prussian War and with the founding of the German Empire in 1871, university students in Vienna and elsewhere had agitated for an extension of unification into the Habsburg lands. In 1878, Schönerer was elected honorary member of the student Leseverein at the same time as the aged chaplain of the Academic Legion of the 1848 revolution. This coincidence reveals how difficult it was to distinguish “forward” from “backward” and how easily the older democratic nationalism could become reincarnated in new right-wing radical forms. Schönerer, for his part, aimed not at a unitary German republic, like the democrats of 1848, but at the break-up of the “pro-Slav” Habsburg monarchy in order that its western portion might be united with the Bismarckian monarchy. Not many left-wing progressives could follow Schönerer into this conservative-revolutionary direction. But his development of anti-Austrian national loyalty found a resounding echo in student circles. The universities, once centers of triumphant Austro-liberalism, became in the late seventies and eighties the scene of brawling nationalist agitation as the influence of the *Schönererian* spread.21

Schönerer’s second extension of his national-social program was into anti-Semitism. He made his first programmatic statement against the Jews in an electoral platform in 1879. Here Schönerer characteristically linked aristocracy and people—the interests of landed property and of productive hands—against “the heretofore privileged interests of mobile capital—and the...Semitic rule of money and the word [i.e., the press].” As if condemning his aged father and hence the sources of his own considerable fortune, he called for laws
against the moral and economic dangers arising out of the inadequate responsibility of founders of companies and corporation boards of directors.”22 Wider political opportunities for Schönérer as anti-Semitic radical soon opened up, and these coincided with his father’s approaching death in 1881, which released his inhibited aggressions against all that Matthias Schönérer stood for. The social base for Georg’s anti-liberal leadership and the psychological conditions for asserting it converged.

As in his Pan-Germanism Schönérer had been anticipated by the nationalistic student associations, so in his social anti-Semitism he was anticipated by the artisan movement. In 1880, the first anti-Semitic Society for the Defense of the Handworker was founded in Vienna. In 1882, it was absorbed into the Austrian Reform Union, at whose founding meeting Schönérer was the major speaker, declaring war on “the sucking vampire … that knocks … at the narrow-windowed house of the German farmer and craftsman”—the Jew.23 The vicious “new key” of his rhetoric appealed to frustrated artisans no less than to Wagnerite students.

Schönérer achieved his greatest notoriety as parliamentarian in the years 1884–85, when he led the fight for the nationalization of the Nordbahn, the railway which his father had counseled the Rothschilds to construct years before. The franchise for this profitable line was due for renewal at the very time when the revolt against laissez faire was making itself felt in various strata of society. Turning the popular struggle against the bankers and brokers into anti-Semitic channels, Schönérer invested the issue with the explosive energy of his belated oedipal rebellion. He accused not only the Liberals and ministers but indirectly the court itself of “bowing before the power of the Rothschilds and their comrades,” and he threatened all with “colossal forcible overturns” at the hands of the people if that power were not now broken.24 The return of the repressed in capitalist society had its analogue in the return of the repressed in Schönérer’s psyche. The Liberals, in the face of this outbreak of raw rancor, found themselves with their backs to the wall.

Schönérer’s other target in his anti-Semitic campaign he took more directly from the radicalized artisans of Vienna with whom he became identified. The Jewish peddler was the lower-class analogue to the Jewish department-store owner: both threatened the traditional shopkeeper; both attracted the hostility as well as the custom of the small consumer. Finally, Schönérer centered his campaign against the Jews in an attempt to restrict their immigration from Russia at the time of the pogroms. Where his father had looked to American engineers for technical models for railway design, Georg turned to the United States for a legislative model for racial discrimination: the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882.

In some respects, Schönérer’s anti-Semitism is much more central to consideration of his disintegrative influence on liberal society than his nationalism as such. The Jews, as Hannah Arendt has rightly observed, were the “state-people” par excellence in Austria.25 They did not constitute a nationality—not even a so-called unhistoric nationality like the Slovaks or Ukrainians. Their civic and economic existence depended not on their participation in a national community, such as the German or the Czech, but, on the contrary, on not acquiring such a status. Even if they became assimilated completely to the culture of a given nationality, they could not outgrow the status of “converts” to that nationality. Neither allegiance to the emperor nor allegiance to liberalism as a political system posed such difficulties. The emperor and the liberal system offered status to the Jews without demanding nationality; they became the supra-national people of the multi-national state, the one folk which, in effect, stepped into the shoes of the earlier aristocracy. Their fortunes rose and fell with those of the liberal, cosmopolitan state. More important for our concerns, the fortunes of the liberal creed itself became entangled with the fate of the Jews. Thus, to the degree that the nationalists tried to weaken the central power of the monarchy in their interest, the Jews were attacked in the name of every nation.

Schönérer was the strongest and most thoroughly consistent anti-Semite that Austria produced. He was equally and correspondingly the bitterest enemy of every principle of integration by which the multi-national empire could be held together: the enemy of liberalism, of socialism, of Catholicism, and of imperial authority. As a total nationalist, he could not rest content with the imperial state. The emperor appeared to him, correctly, as compromising among the peoples into which his realm was nationally divided and the ideologies into which his realm was socially divided. If the emperor was supra-national, the Jews were subnational, the omnipresent folk substance of the Empire, whose representatives could be found in every national and every creedListed grouping. In whatever group they
functioned, the Jews never strove to dismember the Empire. That is why they became the victims of every centrifugal force as soon as, and only as long as, that force aimed to subvert the Empire.

Schöenerer was the first leader of centrifugality à outrance to arise in the era of liberal ascendency. No one ever espoused in such full measure every disruptive potentiality in the society: class, ideology, nationality, and religion. Nationalism provided the positive center of Schöenerer’s faith; but, since nationalism might have been satisfied without total disintegration, he needed a negative element to give coherence to his system. Anti-Semitism was that element, enabling him to be simultaneously anti-socialist, anti-capitalist, anti-Catholic, anti-liberal, and anti-Habsburg.

Schöenerer never succeeded in building a great mass movement as his successors Lueger and Hitler did. His principal lasting impact was in the area of political deportment, in words and in action, where his style was as aggressive as his ideology, but more contagious. Into the Reichsrat, center of liberal legality and dignity, Schöenerer and his colleagues introjected the sharper key, with its raucous diapason of disorder and invective. That august body had to accustom itself to his diatribes against finance Jews, Northern Railway Jews, Jew peddlers, press Jews, Jew swindlers, and the like. These attacks on behalf of the “noble” German people were delivered in the presence of both Jews and Gentiles. It took some getting used to.

In June of 1886, Dr. Ernst von Plener, leader of the Liberal party, a dignified lawyer and anglophone gentleman, tried to put a term to the anti-Semitic agitation in the Reichsrat. He expressed his regret that the president (speaker), “who otherwise . . . had cared so well for the dignity of the house,” had permitted such vituperative tones to rend it. He hinted at a sterner use of the powers of the chair. Plener also proposed that the anti-Semites at last present their much vaunted exhortations to curb the Jews in the form of legislative proposals. “Then,” Plener concluded, “we shall see what these gentlemen really intend, and then the . . . house will be given an opportunity to express its opinion concerning an agitation which is one of the most regrettable symptoms of our time.”

Schöenerer responded to the challenge with a vigorous combination of parliamentary action and the threat of force. He promised to bring in a variety of bills to curb the Jews. Between the promise and the fulfillment fell the threat. If the president of the House should follow the suggestion of Plener to curb freedom of discussion on the Jewish question, “then this question could not be brought nearer to solution through proposals made and words spoken in the parliament; and in that case, the fists will have to go into action outside parliament.” While Liberal parliamentarians condemned “the so-called anti-Semitic movement as unworthy of a civilized people,” the Knight of Rosenau called for the “moral rebirth of the fatherland” by elaboration of “legal restrictions on the Jewish exploiters of the people.” Here again Schöenerer used threatening rhetoric. He promised the Reichsrat in 1887 that if his movement did not succeed now, “the avengers will arise from our bones” and, “to the terror of the Semitic oppressors and their hangers-on,” make good the principle, “‘An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.’”

Political style and personal temperament in Schöenerer both bore the marks of paranoia. Whether as accuser or accused, he became frequently involved in libel trials. Aggression, which brought him many followers, in the end proved his undoing. Less than a year after he had threatened the Reichsrat with “an eye for an eye,” the noble knight broke into the offices of the Neues Wiener Tagblatt and, with the help of some colleagues, beat up the staff of this “Jewish rag.” The paper’s editor, Moritz Szeps, was an intimate of Crown Prince Rudolf. As one of the more aggressive liberals, Szeps had been engaged in both verbal and legal duels with Schöenerer before, and not always as the winner. Schöenerer’s raid on the editorial office, however, was the first time the new style in politics took the form of trial by battle. The sharper tone in verbal combat was one thing; the musique concrète of physical assault another. The court sentenced Schöenerer not only to a brief prison term but—most fateful for his political career—to a suspension of political rights for five years.

Finally, the court conviction automatically cost Georg von Schöenerer his title. With this, the Knight of Rosenau had lost the one inheritance from his father that he truly prized. In attempting to destroy his father’s world, he destroyed the symbol of higher status

* In 1885, Szeps spent a month in jail as the result of a successful libel action brought against him by Schöenerer. See Bertha Szeps-Zuckerkandl, My Life and History, tr. John Sommerveld (London, 1938), pp. 86, 91, 95.
that was the reward for success in that world. Schönerer's career of political destruction ended in self-destruction. He soon returned to that oblivion whence his father had emerged.

The perplexing combination of elements in Schönerer's makeup reminds us again of the serious historical content in Musil's ironical remark that in that age no one quite knew how to distinguish between what was above and what below, between what was moving forward and what backward. Both in his person and in his ideology, Schönerer combined the most diverse and contradictory elements. Desperately aspiring to aristocracy, he might have succeeded as a Prussian Junker, but never as an Austrian cavalier. For the Austrian nobiliar tradition demanded a grace, a plasticity, and, one might add, a tolerance for the wrongs and ills of this world which were wholly foreign to Schönerer's makeup. Most socially aspiring sons of successful Viennese middle-class families, especially those of the service nobility, acquired aesthetic culture as an acceptable substitute for entry into the historical aristocracy of pedigree. Schönerer—or his father—tried a more drastic course, forcing the issue by acquiring a feudal estate and becoming a baronial technocrat, not a cavalier, but a knight by force majesté. Correspondingly, Schönerer vented his political passion, not against the aristocracy whose circles he failed to penetrate, but against his father's world of liberals, the higher bourgeois whom he had hoped to leave behind. His career of political destruction seems to have had its personal sources in the thwarted ambition of the under-educated and over-extended son of a parvenu father.

In the pursuit of his revolution of rancor, Schönerer constructed his ideology out of attitudes and values from many eras and many social strata: aristocratic élitism and enlightened despotism, anti-Semitism and democracy, 1848 grossdeutsch democracy and Bismarckian nationalism, medieval chivalry and anti-Catholicism, guild restrictions and state ownership of public utilities. Every one of these pairs of values the nineteenth-century liberal would have seen as contradictory. But there was a common denominator in this set of ideational fractions: total negation of the liberal élite and its values.

As Schönerer was an angry man, so his ideological montage appealed to angry people: artisans cheated out of their past with no comfort in the pieties of the present and no hope in the prospect of the future; students with the spirit of romantic rebellion unsatisfied by the flat homilies of the liberal-ethical tradition: these were the first of the rootless, the spiritual predecessors of decaying Europe's social jetsam whom rightist leaders would later organize. It was fitting that the deeply middle-class Knight of Rosenau, a belated and violent Don Quixote, should find in artisans and adolescents a pseudo-feudal retinue with whom to rehearse his brutal farce. One day that farce would take the stage as tragedy, with Schönerer's admirer, Hitler, in the leading role.

III

Karl Lueger (1844-1910) had much in common with the Knight of Rosenau. Both men began as liberals, both criticized liberalism initially from a social and democratic viewpoint, and both ended as apostates, espousing explicitly anti-liberal creeds. Both used anti-Semitism to mobilize the same unstable elements in the population: artisans and students. And—crucial for our purposes—both developed the techniques of extra-parliamentary politics, the politics of the rowdy and the mob. Here the similarities end.

Schönerer's central positive accomplishment was to metamorphose a tradition of the Old Left into an ideology of the New Right: he transformed democratic, grossdeutsch nationalism into racist Pan-Germanism. Lueger did the opposite: he transformed an ideology of the Old Right—Austrian political Catholicism—into an ideology of a New Left, Christian Socialism. Schönerer began as a master organizer in his country constituency and ended as an agitator with a small, fanatical following in the city. Lueger began as an agitator in the city, conquered the city, and then organized a great party with its stable base in the countryside. Our concern will be with Lueger militant, not with Lueger triumphant. After 1900, the mature national politician shepherded his once unruly flock into the homely stall of the Hofburg. We shall focus rather on Lueger the tribune, Lueger the partner and competitor of Schönerer as composer in the new key; for this is the Lueger who yoked "backward" and "forward," "above" and "below," who brought together the ancient and modern enemies of liberalism for a successful political assault on its
central bastion, the city of Vienna. In the year 1807, when the reluctant emperor finally ratified Luenger's election as mayor, the era of classical liberal ascendancy in Austria reached its formal close.

"Wir können warten, Wissen macht frei." (We can wait. Knowledge liberates.) In these confident words the stalwart Ritter von Schmerling expressed the rationalistic expectations of the political process at the beginning of the liberal era in 1861. At the end of that era, the poet Hugo von Hofmannsthal, scion of a cultivated middle-class family, offered a different formula for political success: "Politics is magic. He who knows how to summon the forces from the deep, him will they follow." Luenger began his career in the traditional liberal way as "Dr. Luenger," but when he found his stride he became der schöne Karl, beautiful Charles, the spellbinder. Even more successfully than his rival Schönerer, he traversed the road from Schmerling to Hofmannsthal, from the politics of reason to the politics of fantasy.

Where Schönerer was reared in the executive's apartment of Vienna's South Station, little Karl Luenger grew up in the quarters of a far lower civil servant: the superintendent's flat in the Vienna Polytechnic Institute. Luenger publicly expressed pride in his father, Leopold, who, coming into Vienna from the countryside, "could reach such a goal [the superintendency] without having enjoyed a previous educational background." But one suspects that Karl's mother was the real force in the household. Neither her two daughters nor her son married—a sign of extreme maternal authority. According to one historian, Frau Luenger exacted on her deathbed a pledge from her forty-four-year-old son that he would remain unmarried to care for his sisters. She had also kept these sisters close to her side in managing the tobacco shop through which, after her husband's death, she earned her modest living. There is no evidence that the rising fortunes of her son altered the family's simple style of life—or the primary loyalty of the son to his strong-willed mother. Where a powerful parvenu father shaped the Knight of Rosenau, a tough little petite bourgeoisie formed the future "Lord God of Vienna (Herrgott von Wien)."

Frau Luenger encouraged her son from an early age to follow the educational road to higher social status. "A simple woman of the people," her grateful son reported, "she [nevertheless] read Cicero's orations [with me]. She understood not a word of them; she merely followed the words of the text with scrupulous attentiveness—and woe to me if I recited a passage incorrectly! She held me strictly to learning." Fortified by maternal discipline, young Karl gained admission to the most exclusive preparatory school in Vienna, the Theresianum.*

It must not be thought that Karl mingled on equal terms with the sons of the great during his six years at the Theresianum. He was not a cadet (Zöllinger) but a day scholar (Externist). Only since 1870 had day scholars been admitted to the school at all. They came almost exclusively from the Viennese district of Wieden, where the school was located. While the sons of the upper bourgeoisie predominated among the day scholars, there always appeared beside them, the school's historian tells us, "the child of completely simple folk... such as Dr. Karl Luenger... son of a servant at the Technical High School." The day student sat in the same classes with the cadets, but presumably wore no uniform.

The day scholar must have felt his distinction from the "regulars"—especially if he came, as did Luenger, from the lowest social stratum

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* The importance of this academy to the high nobility of blood and service may be gauged by the fact that the establishment of a secure quota of places for the sons of prominent Hungarian families became a matter of high-level negotiations between the Austrian and Hungarian administrations after the establishment of the dual monarchy in 1867 (Eugen Guglia, *Das Theresianum in Wien. Vergangenheit und Gegenwart* [Vienna, 1911], pp. 156-7). The post of Curator of the Theresianum, the equivalent of the chairman of the board of trustees in an American school, generally fell only to a figure of national prominence. When Luenger entered the school in 1874, the curator was Count Taube, father of the minister president during whose tenure of office Luenger was to rise to prominence. Another chief of government, Anton Ritter von Schmerling, occupied the school's curatorship from 1885 to 1893, while his successor, Baron Paul Gausch von Frankenthurn, became minister president of Austria in 1897, the year when Luenger finally realized his dream of becoming mayor of Vienna.

† Some bourgeois families were too proud of their station to expose their sons to the snobbish aristocratic milieu of the Theresianum. The favorite Gymnasium of the secular liberal—and the Jew—was the Akademisches Gymnasium. Cf. Karl Kautsky, *Erinnerungen und Erörterungen* (s-Gravenhage, 1960), p. 211.
represented. Yet Karl seems to have drawn only profit from his experience at the Theresianum. There is no evidence that he ever became, like Schönerer, envious of the aristocracy. He acquired and always retained a deferential attitude toward Austria's traditional ruling class. Rabble-rouser though he became, his style always bore the marks of a certain grace, an almost aesthetic distinction, which earned him the epithet *der schöne Karl.* He belonged to that strange silent community of understanding that subsisted in Vienna between the decaying nobility and the depressed "little man"—what Hermann Broch called the "gelatin democracy" of Vienna's gay apocalypse. The Theresianum undoubtedly refined Lueger's natural feeling for social distinction and gave him, in relation to the more unbending bourgeois breed who were to be his foes, a subtle sense of social superiority despite his lowly origins. His was the sensibility of the well-trained servant, who knows breeding better than the classes do that lie between his master's and his own. It proved to be an asset in his later political task of welding together a coalition of aristocracy and masses against the liberal middle class.

As a university student, Lueger pursued the study of law. In his final oral examination in legal and political science, the young man defended theses which reveal him as an Austro-democrat, an advocate of universal suffrage with a concern for the social problem. Unlike most democrats, however, Lueger seems to have rejected national orientations. "The nationality idea is destructive and an obstacle to the progress of mankind": to defend a thesis so radically cosmopolitan was not typical of student opinion when Lueger took his exams on the eve of the Franco-Prussian War (January 14, 1870). After the war broke out, when waves of German nationalist passion swept through the Vienna University student community, young Dr. Lueger returned to his alma mater to combat prussophil nationalism. At a student demonstration of solidarity with those who were fighting and dying under the black, white, and red, Lueger precipitated a near-riot by denouncing the North German colors as "the product of despotic arbitrariness." Though cheered by his supporters, Lueger was so manhandled by the irate nationalists that he had to flee the hall. He had his first experience with the sharper key in politics as victim—and that on the only issue whereon he remained steadfast throughout his career: opposition to the *klein-
deutsch* idea of German unity without Austria. Herein he showed himself not a typical democrat of the time but a true son of the Theresianum.

Hostility to North Germany did not, however, suffice to build a political career in the city of Vienna in the early seventies. With a law degree in hand as his union card, Lueger entered politics through the surest vestibule, the Liberal Bürgerklub of his own third district of the city. Its leader, Ritter von Khunn, an aging veteran of 1848, cultivated the young man as one with access to the "little people"—those who, though still without a vote, threatened to become the shock troops of the democratic radicals. In 1876, after but a year in the Vienna city council, Lueger won the plaudits of the *Neue Freie Presse* as "the breastplate of the center parties against the Left." Not for long. In the same year, Lueger swerved to the Left, aligning himself with a Jewish Democrat, Ignaz Mandl, a tribune who inveighed against monopoly and corruption in the Liberal oligarchy that controlled the city. Mayor Kajetan Felder, self-made man, lawyer, and lepidopterologist, became the chief target of the Mandl-Lueger forces. The two partners represented the small shopkeepers, the "tailor and greengrocer assemblies," in their demands for a greater voice in political affairs. These supporters were not proletarians but small taxpayers, the "10-gulden men" of the third voting class who were especially sensitive to waste in city government and to the benefits of patronage in which they had no share. They also resented the stranglehold which a class franchise accorded the privileged in municipal government. Lueger and Mandl introduced a new style into municipal politics. The *Salon* of the once homogeneous "city council of the intellectuals" gave place to what Felder called "the shirt-sleeve manners" of the demagogic Democrats. The righteous mayor, refusing to allow the increasingly democratic city council to investigate the conduct of his administration, resigned in 1878. It was the major triumph of the Viennese lower middle class in its democratic incarnation. Lueger and Mandl meanwhile led the group within the city council which demanded extension of the suffrage—a reform on which the Liberals divided, and which was not achieved until 1884, when 5-gulden taxpayers were accorded the franchise. The resistance of some of the Liberals—Mayor Felder at their head—to the extension of the
franchise only increased the anti-liberal mood of the lower classes. In such a context democracy and liberalism became contradictory terms.

Almost imperceptibly, Lueger's success as a democratic agitator drew him deeper into the growing opposition to the liberal order as a whole. He seized upon tangible issues where social resentment could be dramatized to reinforce democratic grievance with economic envy. The identification of his Liberal political foes with the men of high finance offered an easy target for the focusing of rancor. Thus Lueger launched a campaign against an English engineering firm destined to receive the contract for constructing a city transport system. Lueger charged the supporters of this firm with attempts to bribe him and other city council members; the ensuing libel trial brought him great public notice. Like Schönzer, he now appeared in the role of David against the mighty Goliath of "international capital." "These financial cliques and money powers... poison and corrupt public life," said Lueger, after a second trial had acquitted him of libel in March 1882; and he pledged himself to fight on against them.41

For five more years, from 1882 to 1887, Lueger continued to designate himself a Democrat and to sit with the Left in the Reichsrat. As a city politician whose greatest talent lay in reflecting and expressing the attitudes of his constituents, it was inevitable that he should follow the "little folk" as they moved toward more radical positions: from anti-corruption into anti-capitalism, and from anti-capitalism into anti-Semitism.

In 1883, Lueger joined Schönzer in his crusade to block the renewal of the Rothschilds' lucrative franchise for the Northern Railway. While Schönzer led the fight for nationalization in the Reichsrat, Lueger organized support for him in the city council and in Viennese public opinion.42 Fighting the "interests" as a democratic urban reformer carried Lueger into the lower artisan strata, where anti-Semitic feeling was on the rise. He established connections with the same Austrian Reform Union at whose founding meeting in 1883 we have seen Schönzer perform.

More the opportunist than Schönzer, less the slave of his own intense feelings, Lueger was slower to commit himself to an anti-Semitic stance. Lueger reflected in his public positions in the fluid eighties the murky transition from democratic to protofascist politics. As late as 1884, he still participated actively in drafting a Democratic party program which insisted upon "the principle of the equality of all denominations."43 In the Reichsrat elections of 1885, the first in which the 5-gulden taxpayers participated, Lueger still ran as a Democrat. It was characteristic of both his Vienna district (Margarethen) and his voting class that his rival for a Reichsrat seat in 1885 was also listed as a Democrat. The difference between the candidates lay in their external endorsements: the anti-Semitic Reform Union supported Lueger; the Liberals, his rival. Democratic ideology still served as common ground for a liberalism in decline and an anti-Semitism on the rise. By stressing his democratic crusade against "the interests," pursuing anti-Semitism only in a low key, Lueger annoyed the Reform Union but kept enough Democratic voters to win the election by eighty-five votes. Lueger thus took his seat in the Reichsrat in 1885 with the Austrian Democrats led by Dr. Ferdinand Kronawetter, but his commitment to the party lacked the old firmness. "We shall see which movement will become the stronger, the Democratic or the anti-Semitic," he told Kronawetter. "One will have to accommodate oneself accordingly."44

When Schönzer brought to the floor his legislation to restrict Jewish immigration in May 1887, Lueger seemed to make up his mind: he supported Schönzer's bill. A final break with Kronawetter followed; Lueger gave up the attempt to hold together the two increasingly disparate tendencies, democracy and anti-Semitism. Despite his rejection of Pan-Germanism, Lueger found alliance with Schönzer more promising than the outmoded commitment to Kronawetter.

Lueger thus completed in 1887 the same evolution that Schönzer had undergone five years before: from political liberalism through democracy and social reform to anti-Semitism. But there was a difference: Lueger was a Viennese politician, hence a representative of the city's interests as an imperial capital. He retained a fundamental allegiance to the Habsburg monarchy and hence was unattracted to German nationalism, the positive fluxing substance of Schönzer's myriad hates. Lueger would have to find his integrating ideology elsewhere.

Even while Lueger was being impelled toward Schönzer by his lower-middle-class and artisan followers, possibilities for a less na-
tionalistic mass politics were quietly opening up in a most unexpected quarter—namely, in the Catholic community. Catholicism offered Lueger an ideology that could integrate the disparate anti-liberal elements which had been moving in contradictory directions as his career developed: democracy, social reform, anti-Semitism, and Habsburg loyalty. Conversely, Lueger could give Catholicism the political leadership to weld together its shattered social components into an organization strong enough to make its way in the modern secular world.

Until the emergence of Lueger’s Christian Social party in about 1886,* Austrian Catholicism, both political and ecclesiastical, had been languishing in anarchism. Both intellectually and sociologically, the Catholic leadership remained committed to an order which the liberal ascendency had forever destroyed. The chief political leaders of Catholicism were federalist Bohemian noblemen and provincial conservatives from the Alpine lands. Their parliamentary clubs were Honoratiorenparteien, small groups of notables. Modernity and all its works and pomps alarmed them; they could only look back wistfully to the vanished days when religion provided the basis of a deferential society in which the landed aristocracy predominated. For protection in the living present, they leaned, in Josephan fashion, on the emperor, even though he had since 1860 evidently become a prisoner of the liberals.

The hierarchy, whose highest prelates tended to be drawn from the nobiliar families, likewise offered little resistance to the dismantling of the Church’s traditional authority. Both bishops and priests, like the Vatican itself, were overwhelmed by the collapse of neo-absolutism. The Austrian emperor, first son and last protector of the Church Universal, had been defeated in the field by the Piedmontese apostates in 1860 and the Prussian Protestants in 1866. “Casca il mondo!” exclaimed Pius IX’s secretary of state when he heard of Austria’s defeat at Königrätz. The words were as prophetic for the fate of baroque Catholicism in a liberal era as they were expressive of the limited, frightened outlook of its ecclesiastics. For now liberalism celebrated its triumph in Austria not only by instituting constitutional government but by denouncing the Concordat between Empire and Papacy, introducing school reform, and cheering while the pope lost Rome and immured himself in the Vatican.

“Casca il mondo!” As the old world collapsed, the Austrian Church, unable to adapt to the new, returned to its Josephan habit of behavior. It clung to the imperial system as to the rock on which its ship was wrecked, worked through the Honoratioren and the court, and tried to keep out of trouble. The Church thus behaved in much the same fashion as the bulk of the nobility of which its leaders were a part. It bowed to the inevitable and bore its sufferings as a patient victim, without self-examination and without self-doubt.

No regeneration could emerge from such a resigned stance. In Austria, as elsewhere in Europe, new vitality in the Catholic community came only when the faithful re-examined modern society for its possibilities and simultaneously scrutinized their ancient Church for its faults. Laity as well as clergy slowly became engaged in this process of review and reorientation. That complex development, extending well beyond the social sphere, lies outside our scope. Its aggressive spirit, however, does concern us, for this affected the world of secular liberalism. That spirit appeared clearly in the first all-Austrian Catholic Congress of 1887. Its preparatory commission expressed the new mood in a message to Pope Leo:

There is no dearth of peoples loyal to the faith in our lands, but many of the most upright Catholics lack a clear understanding of the situation, knowledge of the methods of combat necessary under the new conditions, and above all the requisite organization. Always accustomed to being ruled in a Christian spirit by our Catholic monarch and the trustworthy men freely chosen by him, the great majority of Catholic laymen no longer know how to orient themselves.48

This statement contains the elements of the program which the Catholic political renewal would have to follow: to free the Catholic community from dependence on the monarch and his advisers, to find new methods of combat appropriate to new conditions, and to organize.

Between 1875 and 1888, while Lueger was drawing away from his

* The date is unclear because of the years of slow regrouping of the entities that composed the new movement.
liberal origins and vacillating uneasily between secular democracy and nationalist anti-Semitism, the elements of a political Catholicism capable of fulfilling these tasks slowly emerged. The contributors to the new movement came from sectors of society smarting in varying degrees under liberal capitalist rule: aristocrats and Catholic intellectuals, businessmen, clergymen, and artisans. Paradigmatic for the whole new complex was the act of Count Leo Thun, one of the more moderate leaders of the Catholic Conservatives, in appointing Freiherr Karl von Vogelsang as editor of his political and theoretical organ, *Das Vaterland*. Vogelsang identified capitalist social indifference as the Achilles’ heel of liberalism. Against it this neo-feudal theorist aimed his deadly shafts. Linking capitalist with the spirit of 1789, Vogelsang could reach across the middle class to both the artisan and the worker who were in increasing rebellion against the pressures of laissez faire. What was above—parts of the aristocracy—joined with what was below—the lower-class victims of laissez faire. It was a pattern for which, *mutatis mutandis*, strong precedent existed in England, France, and Vogelsang’s native Germany. But in none of these did this ideology become the program of a successful democratic party.

In the sphere of social legislation some aristocrats developed a practical analogue to Vogelsang’s ideology. Prince Alois von Liechtenstein, known to his enemies as “the Red Prince,” took the lead in pressing social legislation from the right side of the House in the 1880’s. Karl Lueger supported his endeavors from the left. Aristocratic deviant and democratic demagogue found each other. Two other elements joined the loose coalition to round out the ingredients of the Christian Social party: a zealous group of young priests and theologians looking toward a more vital tie between church and people, and the anti-Semitic artisan movement, which had already lent its support to Schönérer and Lueger.

The first meeting of unofficial representatives of all these elements took place in a symbolic setting: the villa of Princess Melanie Metternich-Zichy. Under auspices thus redolent of the vanished past, aristocrats, social theorists, and practitioners of mass politics joined forces: Prince Liechtenstein; a moral theologian, Professor Franz Schindler; Vogelsang; Lueger of the Democrats; Ernst Schneider of the anti-Semitic artisans. Under the intellectual guidance of Schindler, they worked out a program in a long series of discussion meetings and launched it in the religious world through the Austrian Catholic Congresses of 1889 and 1893. Through the formation of the United Christians (1888) and their expansion into the Christian Social party, a political organization was developed to carry out the task of Catholic renewal.

In both the ecclesiastical and the political sphere, the program of Christian social-democratic action encountered the opposition of the older and more cautious generation. The new program involved throwing the gauntlet down to the establishment, hence to incur risk, never popular with the chastened leaders of the Catholic world. The sharper key, with all its ruthlessness, appeared within the Catholic fold in the late eighties and nineties just as clearly as it did in the Liberal Vienna city council when Mandl and Lueger unleashed their democratic opposition, or in the Reichsrat when Schönérer embarked upon his crusade against the Jew. The radical Catholics manifested many of the signs of cultural alienation that characterized the Pan-Germans, the Social Democrats, and the Zionists. They established their own press, they organized sport clubs, they developed, like the Pan-German nationalists, a school association to free their community of dependence on state education. And they took to the streets in rowdy mass demonstrations, as shocking to the old guard Catholic hierarchy as they were alarming to the liberals. The younger Catholics of the new style, like the younger nationalists, seemed to feel the need to manifest their alienation from the established order as the necessary prelude to redemption. Whether their salvation should lie in a withdrawal from the state or in its conquest, the psychological premise of success would seem to have been the clear profession of minority status, frank self-definition as an oppressed social subgroup. This was as true for the new Catholics as for the new nationalists and the Zionists.

The political chemist who fused the elements of Catholic social disaffection into an organization of the first magnitude was Karl Lueger. Although not particularly religious, Lueger knew how to use the new Catholic social theory as a catalyst in his political experiment. Having secured the support of the Schönérer forces by professions of anti-Semitism, he was able, thanks to Schönérer’s imprisonment, to lead most of his Vienna artisan following into the Christian Social fold.

In the city of Vienna, Lueger’s following increased from election
to election until, in 1895, he acquired the majority in the city council needed to elect him mayor. His public persona contained all the colors of his multi-hued constituency. Der schöne Karl commanded that fine, almost dandyish presence which, as Baudelaire observed, arises as an effective attribute of political leadership in “periods of transition when democracy is not yet all-powerful and aristocracy is only partially tottering....”

His elegant, almost cool manner demanded deference from the masses, while his capacity to speak to them in Vienna's warm folk dialect won their hearts. A Volksmann with an aristocratic veneer, Lueger also had some attributes to draw the Viennese middle class to his banner. He loved the city with a true passion and worked to enhance it. Yet he criticized his predecessors ruthlessly for their needless expenditures and kept his critical tongue at the ready for all signs of waste. Thus Lueger made steady inroads into the following of the Liberals until, in March of 1895, he captured the prosperous second curia of voters. Only the richest property holders remained true to liberalism.

Lueger's victory at the polls in Vienna in 1895 opened a two-year period of deadlock which may be regarded as the last stand of Viennese liberalism. Although Lueger had been duly elected mayor by the necessary majority of the city council, the emperor refused to ratify his taking office. A trinity of pressures was brought to bear on the emperor against him: the Liberals and Conservatives in the coalition government, and the higher clergy. The government, through the personal mediation of Franz Cardinal Schönborn, tried in vain to secure papal intervention against the movement. The Viennese went to the polls to reaffirm their choice. The emperor persisted in his refusal until 1897.

The Liberals, erstwhile champions of representative government, were now in a most paradoxical posture. They might be convinced, as their leader Ernst von Plener said, that a coalition government which had made the fight against the radicalization of political life an explicit part of its program could not allow the emperor to sanction “the spokesman of a movement bordering on the revolutionary,” “a communal demagogue” who was responsible for “the barbarization of the parliamentary tone in our House of Representatives.”

However comprehensible Plener's reasoning, his anti-clerical party was now in the position of relying first on episcopal—papel—discipline to avoid the consequences of liberal institutional arrangements and, second, on imperial dictate to prevent the will of the electorate from being fulfilled. Even the progressive Sigmund Freud, who in his youth had, like Beethoven, stubbornly refused to show respect for the emperor by donning his hat, now celebrated Francis Joseph's autocratic veto of Lueger and the majority's will.

The imperial veto could not be sustained in an age of mass politics. On Good Friday 1897, the emperor capitulated, and der schöne Karl entered the Rathaus in triumph. At the same time, the Austrian government entered a profound crisis over the language ordinances in the Czech lands. Thus, just as the old liberal bastion fell to the Christian anti-Semites, the Reichsrat fell into such hopeless discord that the emperor had to dissolve it and establish government by decree. The liberals could, however ruefully, only welcome the change. Their salvation lay henceforward in a retreat to Josephism, an avoidance not only of democracy but even of representative parliamentary government, which seemed to lead to only two results: to general chaos or to the triumph of one or another of the anti-liberal forces.

Schönerer and Lueger, each after his fashion, had succeeded in championing democracy while fighting liberalism. Both composed ideological systems which unified liberalism's enemies. Each in his way utilized aristocratic style, gesture, or pretension to mobilize a mass of followers still hungry for a leadership that based its authority on something older and deeper than the power of rational argument and empirical evidence. Of the two leaders, Schönerer was the more ruthless and the stronger pioneer in unleashing destructive instincts. He breached the walls with his powerful anti-Semitic appeal, but Lueger organized the troops to win the victory and the spoils.

Lueger was both less alienated and more traditional than the frustrated bourgeois-knight of Rosenau. Even in his anti-Semitism Lueger lacked the rancor, conviction, or consistency of Schönerer. While Schönerer exploited the supra-national character of the Jewish community to attack every integrating principle of Austrian social and political life, Lueger relativized anti-Semitism to the attack on liberalism and capitalism. His famous phrase, "Wer Jude ist, bestimme ich (Who is a Jew is something I determine)," allowed Lueger to
blunt the explosive and subversive potential of anti-Semitism in the interests of the monarchy, the Catholic church, and even of the capitalism he professed to fight. A coalition-builder cannot work well with principle. Lueger therefore tolerated the most vicious anti-Semitism among his lieutenants, but, more manipulator and machine-builder than ideologue, he himself employed it rather than enjoyed it. Even in the politics of the new key, Lueger adapted for the age of mass politics—and at the expense of his truculent rival Schönrer—the ancient Habsburg principle:

Bella gerant alii,
Tu, felix Austria, nube. . . . *

He succeeded better in producing an alliance of aristocrats and democrats, artisans and ecclesiastics, by confining the uses of racist poison to attacking the liberal foe.

IV

As the political foundations of liberalism became eroded and its social anticipations belied by events, those committed to liberal culture began to seek new foundations to save its most cherished values. Among them was Theodor Herzl (1860–1904). He sought to realize a liberal utopia for his people, not on the rationalistic premise of a Schmerling—"Wissen macht frei (Knowledge liberates)"—but out of creative fancy, on the premise of desire, art, and the dream: "Wollen macht frei (Desiring liberates)." In Zionism, Herzl constructed a fitting if ironical monument to the era of liberal ascendancy and a fitting sequel to the awesome work of creative destruction which Schönrer and Lueger had begun.

Herzl could offer such powerful leadership to the victims of anti-Semitism because he embodied in his person the assimilationist ideal. The very model of the cultivated liberal, he generated his highly creative approach to the Jewish question not out of immersion in

* "Let others wage war.
You, happy Austria, marry [to prosper]. . . ."

the Jewish tradition but out of his vain efforts to leave it behind. He came to his meta-liberal politics of fantasy not, like Schönrer and Lueger, out of social hostility and political opportunism but out of personal frustration and aesthetic despair. Even Herzl's conception of Zion can be best understood by viewing it as an attempt to solve the liberal problem through a new Jewish state as well as to solve the Jewish problem through a new liberal state. His life experience endowed him with all the values of the fin-de-siècle intellectual. It was these which he drew upon to redeem the besieged Jew from the collapsing liberal order. If his response to the task was his own, the materials out of which he framed it were those of the non-Jewish liberal culture, which, like so many upper-middle-class Jews, he had adopted as his own.

That Herzl was born and bred in Budapest did not prevent him from being Viennese to his fingertips. His family belonged to that increasingly prosperous stratum of Jews who, entering the modern entrepreneurial class, adopted German culture and the German language even in a dominantly non-German ethnic region. The faith of the fathers declined as the status of the sons rose. Theodor's paternal grandfather, alone among three brothers, clung to his religion, while his son, Herzl's father, gave up all but its forms. Theodor's mother, Jeanette Diamant, had been given a secular education by her father, a well-to-do cloth merchant. Her brother pursued the swifter course to assimilation by bearing arms in Hungary's revolutionary army in 1848, though his commission could not be sanctioned until the Jews were fully emancipated in 1867. When Theodor was born in 1860, his family was well out of the ghetto: economically established, religiously "enlightened," politically liberal, and culturally German. Their Judaism amounted to little more than what Theodor Gompertz, the assimilated Jewish classicist, liked to call "un pieux souvenir de famille."

Herzl thus grew up in the setting of enlightened Jewry as an educated citizen of the Austro-liberal Staatvolk. His mother, a strong, imaginative woman superior in social status and cultural attainment to her less-educated husband, conveyed to her son a deep enthusiasm for German literature. In his fourteenth year, not long after his bar-mitzvah (his parents preferred to call it his Konfirmation), Herzl organized with his schoolfellows a German literary
Hence he thought of his state as “an aristocratic republic,” with many elements drawn from the same model which, perhaps unknown to Herzl, inspired the early English Whigs: Venice.130

In England no less than in Austria, rejection by most Jewish leaders forced Herzl to turn to the masses. As he left one of his unsuccessful meetings with the leaders, he turned to a friend and said, “Organize the East End for me.”131 There Herzl was enthusiastically received in 1896. Although he preferred to organize an “aristocratic republic,” the inadequate support from even English Jewish leaders compelled him to the course of a “democratic monarchy.” Herzl knew that the abdication of the elite made his own power greater, enhanced his messianic role. He saw the love of the ghetto Jews as based on ignorance of his nature, yet endowing him with an aura, a nimbus decisive for his mission. From a workers’ podium in London,

I saw and listened as my legend grew. The people are sentimental; the masses do not see clearly. A light haze is beginning to well up around me which will perhaps be the cloud on which I shall go forward. It is perhaps the most interesting thing that I record in these diaries: how my legend grows. . . . I sturdily resolved to be even more worthy of their [the masses’] trust and love.132

As if to prove that he wished to admit even the lowliest Jew into the aristocracy to which throughout his life he had aspired, first for his person, then for his race, Herzl suggested that the East End Jews call their Zionistic organization “The Knights of Palestine.”133 The Jewish ghetto-dwellers were to organize themselves for their assimilationist paradise by assuming collectively the romantic-feudal role of lay-Christian knighthood. A more vivid instance of the role of aristocratic fantasy in the birth of post-liberal mass politics would be difficult to find.

Like the Knight of Rosenau and der schöne Karl, Herzl led his followers out of the collapsing liberal world by tapping the well-springs of a deferential past to satisfy the yearnings for a communitarian future. That he should have espoused the politics of the new key in order to save the Jews from its consequences in the gentile world does not destroy Herzl’s affinity with his antagonists. All in their respective fashions were rebellious children of Austro-

liberal culture, a culture which could satisfy the minds but starved the souls of a population still cherishing the memory of a pre-rationalist social order.

NOTES

4 Neue Freie Presse, March 10, 1897.
5 Eduard Pichl, Georg Schönerer (Oldenburg and Berlin, 1938), II, 516.
7 Creditanstalt-Bankverein, Ein Jahrhundert Creditanstalt-Bankverein (Vienna, 1947), pp. 1, 6-7. For the rivalry of the two giants in winning control of the railroads—from the government as well as each other—see Oesterreichischer Eisenbahnbamtenverein, Geschichte, I, Part i, 311-5.
8 Schönerer counseled steam. Cf. ibid., I, Part i, 111.
9 ibid., I, Part i, 447-9; Creditanstalt-Bankverein, Ein Jahrhundert, p. 31. See also the interesting account of the construction of the new company as seen through the experience of the Hamburg entrepreneur Ernst Merck, in Percy Ernst Schramm, Hamburg, Deutschland und die Welt (Munich, 1943), pp. 528-37.
10 Constantin von Wurzbach, Oesterreichische Nationalbiographie (Vienna, 1856-91), XXXI, 148-9.
11 J. W. Nagel, J. Zeidler, and E. Castle, Deutsch-Oesterreichische Literaturgeschichte (Vienna, 1899-1937), III, 798-800.
12 Pichl, Schönerer (I, 21-2), states that Georg transferred from the Oberrealschule to a private school in Dresden as the result of a conflict with the instructor in religion.

14 Unless otherwise indicated, all biographical information on the son utilized here derives from the comprehensive but uncritical Pichl, who explores no problems that might alter his hero’s epic stature. Cf. Pichl, *Schönener*, I, 21-6. Schönener’s complete silence on Matthias’ interests, character, and relations with Georg suggests in itself the possibility of tension between father and son.

15 Ibid., I, 23, n. 2.


19 Ibid., p. 152.

20 For the Austrian student movement in general, see the nationalistic treatment by Paul Molisch, *Die deutschen Hochschulen in Oesterreich und die politisch-nationale Entwicklung nach 1848* (Munich, 1922).

21 The full text of this program is given in Pichl, *Schönener*, I, 84-7.

22 Ibid., II, 55-6; See also Hans Tietze, *Die Juden Wien* (Vienna, 1933), pp. 238-9.

23 Cited from a speech in the Reichsrat, May 2, 1884, in Pichl, *Schönener*, I, 232. For the wider issue, see ibid., 244-50; Oesterreichischer Eisenbahnbeamtenverein, *Geschichte*, I, Part ii, 360-5.


26 Ibid., pp. 116-18.


29 Hugo von Hofmannsthall, "Buch der Freunde," *Aufzeichnungen* (Frankfurt am Main, 1959), p. 60.

30 Franz Stauracq, *Dr. Karl Lueger, 10 Jahre Bürgermeister* (Vienna, 1907), p. 3.


33 Stauracq, *Lueger*, pp. 4-5.


35 His style has been characterized as inspired by the muses, *museschaft*. See Friedrich Funder, *Vom Gestern ins Heute* (2d ed., Vienna, 1951), p. 102.


42 Till, *Stadtverwaltung*, pp. 69-71, provides an excellent outline of the suffrage extension problem, 1867-84, and its relationship to the authorities above the city fathers (Statthalter, Lower Austrian diet, emperor).


44 Ibid., p. 43.


46 Ibid., p. 167.


53 Ibid., p. 29.


55 Bein offers excellent summaries of Herzl’s early writings illuminating his intellectual and psychological development. See Bein, *Herzl*, pp. 35-71 and passim.

56 Ibid., p. 34.

57 Schnitzler to Herzl, August 5, 1892, "Excerpts from the Correspondence between Schnitzler and Herzl," *Midstream*, VI, No. 1 (1960), 48.

58 Ibid., 40. The year was 1883.


61 Ibid., p. 118.

62 Ibid., pp. 44-7, 54-6, 66-7.
65 Bein, Herzl, p. 68.
66 Herzl, Tagebücher, I, 6.
68 Ibid., p. 121.
69 Ibid., p. 122.
70 Ibid., p. 127.
71 Ibid., p. 128.
72 Herzl, Tagebücher, I, 6.
73 Bein, Herzl, pp. 124-5.
74 Ibid.
76 Bein, Herzl, p. 164.
78 Quoted in Bein, Herzl, p. 154. For Bein’s account of Herzl’s response to the Panama scandal, which is the basis of the above analysis, see ibid., pp. 151-5.
79 Herzl, Tagebücher, I, 110.
82 Ibid., p. 40; Leon Kellner, Theodor Herzls Lebenschreibe (Vienna and Berlin, 1920), pp. 22-4. Herzl stipulated in his will that the remains of his sister should be exhume and removed to Palestine along with his family’s when the Jewish people should transfer his own coffin there. His wife, by contrast, was shabbily—indeed, vituperatively—treated in the will. See “The Testaments of Herzl,” in Patai, ed., Herzl Year Book, III, 266. For the vicissitudes of Herzl’s marriage, see Bein, Herzl, pp. 113, 121-3.
83 Herzl’s letters to Julia were in the possession of their daughter, Margarethe, and are believed to have perished with her at the hands of the Nazis in Theresienstadt. Cf. Alexander Bein, “Some Early Herzl Letters,” in Patai, ed., Herzl Year Book, I, 310 and footnote, 321-4.
84 Bein, Herzl, pp. 112, 138.
85 Herzl, Tagebücher, I, 4.
87 Bein, Herzl, pp. 144-5; notes to chap. iv, p. 709.
88 Herzl, Tagebücher, I, 8.
90 Bein, Herzl, p. 189.
91 Herzl, Tagebücher, I, 44; see also McGrath, Journal of Contemporary History, II, No. 2 (1965), 195-201.
92 From the epilogue to Herzl’s novel, Altneuland, quoted in Bein, Herzl, p. 562.
93 Herzl, Tagebücher, I, 116.
94 Bein, Herzl, p. 562.
95 Herzl, Tagebücher, I, 398-9.
96 Bein, Herzl, p. 330.
97 Herzl, Tagebücher, I, 33.
98 Ibid., I, 32, 33. Herzl, Judenstaat, p. 95.
99 Herzl, Tagebücher, I, 269-70.
100 Bein, Herzl, p. 303.
101 Herzl, Judenstaat, pp. 75-9.
102 Herzl, Tagebücher, I, 149.
103 Herzl, Judenstaat, p. 95.
105 Herzl, Tagebücher, I, 42.
106 Herzl, Tagebücher, I, 43. The French is Herzl’s.
107 Ibid., pp. 43, 47.
109 Herzl, Tagebücher, I, 7.
110 Ibid., I, 275.
111 Bein, Herzl, pp. 294 ff.
112 Cf. Adolf Boehm, Die zionistische Bewegung (Berlin, 1920), pp. 120-1; Bein, Herzl, Part II, pastim.
113 Herzl, Tagebücher, I, 369. The prince was the Grand Duke of Baden.
114 Ibid., p. 574.
115 Ibid., p. 373.
117 Quoted in ibid., p. 341.
118 Ibid., pp. 307, 309-5.
120 Cf. Boehm, Die zionistische Bewegung, p. 110.
121 Hofmannsthal, “Buch der Freunde,” Aufzeichnungen, p. 60.
122 Herzl, Judenstaat, pp. 92-3.
123 Ibid., p. 91.
124 Ibid., pp. 93-4.
125 Ibid., pp. 43-9.
126 Herzl, Tagebücher, I, 45. For other manifestations of Austrian Anglophilism, see pp. 48, 306.
127 Herzl, Judenstaat, pp. 82-92; Boehm, Die zionistische Bewegung, pp. 105-6.
128 Herzl, Judenstaat, p. 56. The nature and functions of the Jewish Company are fully described in ibid., pp. 39-66.
IV

POLITICS
AND PATRICIDE
IN FREUD’S
INTERPRETATION
OF DREAMS

The unriddler of riddles who found the key to the human condition in the story of Oedipus was also a lover of jokes. When at the age of forty-five he was finally given an associate professorship, the still unknown Dr. Freud reported the event to a friend in mock journalese. He described his promotion as a political triumph:

The public enthusiasm is immense. Congratulations and bouquets keep pouring in, as if the role of sexuality had been suddenly recognized by His Majesty, the interpretation of dreams confirmed by the Council of Ministers, and the necessity of the psychoanalytic therapy of hysteria carried by a two-thirds majority in Parliament.¹

It is a cheerful fantasy, very Viennese: political authority bends the knee to Eros and to dreams.

“Where he makes a jest, a problem lies concealed.” In The Interpretation of Dreams, published two years before his jocular announcement, Freud had laid down his first principle of understanding