When writing of the Ottoman forces vanquished near Ankara in 1402 by his patron, Timur, the chronicler Nizamüddin Şami mentions the Efrenç (Frankish, Eurochristian?), presumably implying the forces under the command of the Serbian king, an Ottoman vassal, but reserves most of his disparaging remarks for the Rümîyân, that is, Turkish-Muslim soldiers serving Sultan Bayezid. To add injury to insult, he cannot resist the temptation to cite the second verse of the sura al-Rûm (Qur’an 30), “The Romans [i.e., the Byzantines] have been conquered.” This is harsh but not particularly creative. Many learned and presumably some not-so-learned Muslims of Asia Minor knew the verse well, as did others in the rest of the Muslim world, but saw nothing wrong with identifying themselves as Rumis, or people of the lands of Rum.

Today, the Battle of Ankara is remembered primarily as a confrontation between Ottoman Turks and Central Asian Turks, in narratives that tend to erase all other layers of identity and their historical transformations in favor of a linear story of Turks moving from Inner Asia to the Middle East, building, and of course destroying, state after state. In Orientalist scholarship and its current offshoots, the Turks, even after being rooted in the Middle East and the Balkans for a millennium, remain latecomers, marginal at some levels to the essence of Islamic Middle Eastern civilization, and certainly to the Greco-Roman Mediterranean tradition, even if they are recognized for their military, political, and, perhaps, administrative skills and accomplishments. They may have protected the Islamic Middle East from going under during the destabilizing incursions of the Crusades and the Mongols, or they may have created successful polities by being receptive of Byzantine institutions and traditions, but ultimately they were not wielders of culture (other than, perhaps, the culture of yoghurt), and their high art and literature were but an imitation of Arab, Persian, and Byzantine precedents. Since the latter part of the twentieth century, under the influences of cultural relativism and political correctness, such discourses may have been shunned or pushed beneath the surface, but both the underlying categories and the means of analysis remain intact.

As for Turkish scholarship itself, it developed under the paradox-ridden circumstances of the late Ottoman Empire and after its demise, but even then in the hands of those who grew up with the legacy of those circumstances. On the one hand, there was a project to articulate their archaic empire to the modern imperialist world order as an empire among empires that, statesmen and intellectuals hoped, would survive against all odds and refurbish itself with the techniques and technologies of modernity for proper recognition in the civilized world. On the other hand, there was an anti-imperialist current, not always in opposition to the first project but enmeshed within its frustrations and the recognition of what the European powers “really thought” of Turks. The latter attitude would grow strong in the context of the First World War and especially after the invasion of the Greek armies into Asia Minor in 1919. It would also be accompanied by defensive and fanciful theories about Turks civilizing the world, in response to historical theses aimed at robbing those “nomadic and Asiatic” people of any legitimacy in maintaining political control over (western) Anatolia, Thrace, and Istanbul.

The truth is not always somewhere in the middle. I cannot simply say that the two approaches schematically presented above are both wrong or misguided, and that we should find the middle ground and be happy. They cooly share an unproblematized conceptualization of Middle Eastern and Balkan history (of world history, for that matter) in terms of both essences and ethno-national collective agents (Turks, Arabs, Greeks, Germans, etc.)—a conceptualization still dominant in history writing in general, no matter how fashionable it is to crack jokes about trendy...
postmodern intellectuals. It might thus be useful to refer not merely to nationalism but to “nationism” as a broader problem, because the implied conception of history and identity can be shared between nationalist and, say, colonialist discourses and in fact derives its very power partly from that double imbrication. Many non-nationalists, or those who embrace (the illusion of?) the downfall of nation-states in an age of globalization, still write history through national identities as primary analytical categories. So long as continuous ethnic-national units and their cultures (Volksgeist defined by Stamm, to use the ur-vocabulary of this discourse) are taken as the main analytical units of historical study, the Turks naturally get to be the descendants of Inner Asian nomads and warriors, and their culture reflects those twin essences: nomadism and militarism.

Modern Turkish historical consciousness generally takes that story to heart, qualifying or reversing some of the attached values, and adding that there were many who emigrated from the urban centers of Central Asia and Khurasan as well, or that the steppe tradition allowed Turks to be much more tolerant than other kinds of Muslims, or that their conquests, achieved with minimal bloodshed, brought order and justice to peoples who were suffering from chaos or tyranny. What others might see as militarism can equally be translated as state building, and that is a matter of deep pride in the long national history of the Turks. At a more popular level, many modern Turkish habits, charming faults, or quirks are often explained as survivals of nomadic customs, just as academics have observed avatars of “shamanism” in all sorts of “unORTHodox” practices among Turkish Muslims.

In narratives of this long history, nationism is supplemented by statism, again with variants among Turks and others. From the teleological perspective of “the emergence of modern Turkey,” it can be described as a funnel-vision statism: Manzikert happens (according to Seljuk designs), and Turks pour into Asia Minor; then, in neat order, we have Seljuk Turkish Anatolia, the empire of the Ottoman Turks, and the Turkish Republic. State formation by Turks—conceptualized through moments of real or presumed, but always desirable, unity—provides the backbone of the historical narratives, which in turn provide points of departure and reference for all sorts of cultural analyses. Even if “state” remains a significant category of historical understanding, after historicizing and differentiating types of political organization that are often too plastically brought together under that rubric, the cultural space and configuration that we are studying are not subsumed by state control and state patronage.

The term “Seljuk Anatolia” is, by now, standard usage in referring to a period of more than two centuries before the beginning of the story of the Ottomans around 1300. Thereafter, a “beylik (emirate, principality) period” is recognized but almost always located within the orbit of the rising Ottoman state; worse, it is also conventional to move straight into a narrative of “Ottoman Anatolia” at the turn of the fourteenth century. From my point of view, the period of four and a half centuries between Manzikert (1071) and the Kalender Çelebi revolt (1526), instigated during the Ottoman incorporation of the Dulkadirid lands, the last remaining principality, needs to be characterized in its own right, at least for the purposes of cultural and social history. It might be useful for this purpose to adopt the term tavaqif (short for tawaqif al-muluk), which was used in late medieval Arabic sources with respect to Iberia, where the fortunes of a waxing and waning set of “party kings” (los reyes de taifas or simply taifas in Spanish) rather than of a single polity are recognized as having constituted the framework of the narrative.2

One might quibble with the temporal boundaries of this periodization and end it with, say, the annexation of the Karaman lands in 1473–74, when Mehmed II had extended the Ottoman realm to that diagonal line in the east that more or less overlapped with the boundaries of the empire of Basil II (d. 1025) and had consolidated unitary rule over the former “Byzantine Anatolia.” It is clear that the Ottomans had already emerged supreme in that setting before the end of the fourteenth century and reasserted this supremacy two or three decades after Timur. It is also clear, however, that we are not always well served by the term “Seljuk (or pre-Ottoman) Anatolia” for the whole period between 1071 and 1300, followed by “the Beylik period” or, even worse, “Ottoman Anatolia” immediately after the demise of the Seljuks. It is only an obsession with state as one of the twin protagonists of history, and with national unity under a single state—Anatolu Türk birliği (Anatolian Turkish unity)—as the inevitable telos of Manzikert, or a pragmatism that lives comfortably with nation- and state-based history, that would conventionalize the term “Seljuk Anatolia” from 1071 to 1300.

In my reckoning, the Seljuks of Rum, as they were called in their own time and for many centuries there-
after, ruled over a relatively unified Turco-Muslim Anatolia for only a few decades during that period. Ibn Bibi, for instance, who wrote the only history of the Seljuks of Rum that might be considered an imperial chronicle, starts his book with the reign of Gıyaseddin Keyhusrev (r. 1192–96, 1205–11). In his thoughtful introduction, Ibn Bibi justifies his starting point by saying that he is uncertain of how to organize the earlier materials, since he finds them confusing in their apportioning of the roles of conqueror and sovereign among the Seljuks and mighty emirs like Mengücek, Artuk, and Danishmend. In much of the territory designated as Seljuk Anatolia by modern scholarly convention, dynasties founded by those emirs, particularly the Danishmendids, were in control for several generations after Manzikert, often in rivalry and sometimes in direct confrontation with the Seljuks. The Seljuks themselves seem to have been conscious of their graduation to a higher level of rulership in the age of Küçük Arslan II (r. 1155–92), who eliminated the Danishmendids in 1177 and established a semblance of political unity in the lands of Rum. The practice of naming Rum Seljuk princes after the heroes of ancient Persian imperial epics began during his reign, which also witnessed the demise of the Great Seljuks of Iran. So long as the latter maintained power, the Anatolian branch was bound to remain the lesser one. Even after Küçük Arslan, the period between 1192 and 1205 can be deemed an interregnum, and the Seljuks’ power was on the wane after 1243, when Mongol armies defeated them. Ilkhan-Mongol rule in Asia Minor turned more direct in 1277, only a year after Baybars, the Mamluk sultan of Egypt and Syria, marched all the way into Kayseri, in a context that clearly signaled to the oligarchic elites of the Great Seljuks of Iran. A historicized approach cannot, however, overlook the fact that it is only in the aftermath of the First World War that the predominantly Turkish-speaking Muslims of the peninsula, now adopting wholesale the self-designation “Turk,” embraced the word “Türkiye” for their country.

Based on such considerations, some students of late medieval (tavâ’if-i-Rûm) Anatolian and Ottoman studies have been trying to move beyond a critique of the nationist and statist paradigms and to develop, or to forge out of that critique, a more historicized perspective on the dizzyingly complex realities of the lands that we study, without assuming the fixity and transparency of categories like “Turkish” or “Islamic” in designating and analyzing cultural processes. This approach is driven by a search for a new historical geography and cultural history of identity in southwestern Asia and southeastern Europe (after a point, the realm of the Ottoman empire) in the late medieval and early modern periods: hence the focus on Rum and Rumi.

The word “Rum” or diyar-ı Rûm for defining a cultural as well as a physical space (the lands of Rome, limited over time to the eastern Roman lands, i.e., Byzantium) was adopted from earlier Arabo-Persian usage but now stretched by Turkish speakers to refer to the zone that they inhabited and in large part also governed. Turks and others who moved westward during and after the eleventh century adopted and
reworked many geographical names in the eastern Roman lands on the basis of what had already been “Islamized” and used by Arabs, Persians, or Kurds. They also borrowed or “corrupted” many usages of the non-Muslims of those lands. To take full account of the complexity of ethnic, linguistic, and religious identities they encountered would be impossible here; it cannot be subsumed even under the neat trinity of Muslims, Christians, and Jews. There were other communities, such as Yezidis, who are reported to have fought with the Turcomans against the Mongols in the late thirteenth century; in the 1330s, Ibn Battuta observed that the lineages of the Sons of Germiyan (based in Kütahya, northwest Anatolia) was alleged to go back to Yazid b. Mu‘awiya.9

Words like “Rum” and “Rumi” were in common currency among some of those people and moved seamlessly into old Anatolian Turkish. “Istanbul,” too, predates 1071: it is mentioned as early as in the tenth century in an Arabic work by the polymath al-Mas‘udi (d. 955).9 Also bearing in mind the legends concerning Abu Ayyub al-Ansari, and his burial site outside the city walls, etc., it is clear that some significant aspects of what the city of Constantine would become after 1453 had been prepared before Turks (and their associates) settled in Asia Minor. In short, the Turkish encounter with Hellenic Asia Minor was in some respects deeper in the lands of Rum. Varieties of conquest and tactics from a legendary Arab warrior of the earlier Islamic-Byzantine frontier operations. Following his oneiric instructions, Saltuk retrieves Seyyid Battal Gazi’s longidie weapons and horse, waiting for him in a cave, and only then moves on to his own adventures of conquest deeper in the lands of Rum. Various Arab companions accompany him in his exploits, and they occasionally converse in Arabic.10

All this must be borne in mind in dealing with the current vogue, in Turkey and elsewhere, of speaking about a Turkish Islam—tending toward modernity and democracy in its essence, of course11—with respect to relaxed attitudes among Turks toward ritual observance and, primarily, to a worldly pragmatism of Turkish states and certain lenient features of Sufism in Anatolia. Those very features themselves, however, were developed or inspired to a large degree by Arab and Persian Sufis, many of whom spent some part of their lives in Anatolia or settled there. One might recall the likes of Ibn ‘Arabi (d. 1240, a Maghribi who lived in Seljuk Konya for several years and inspired the theosophical school of Sadraddini-Konevi) or Shahab al-Din Abu Hafs ‘Omar al-Suhrawardi (1145–1234), who was sent by the Abbasid caliph Nasir li-Din Allah in 1221 to initiate neo-Anatolian Muslims and neo-Muslim Anatolians into the futuwwa. This is not to say that there are no regional dialects of piety and faith, or that it might not be worth speaking of an Islam of the lands of Rum, or of a Turkish Islam as it eventually took shape. Ibn ‘Arabi himself was shocked to see certain practices in Rum, particularly the lack of enforcement of certain sharia principles with respect to non-Muslims there.12 This should not make us overlook the fact that versions of Rumi Sufism, primarily the less rigid ones, owe a good deal to his intellectual legacy. Likewise, the Rumi variant of futuwwa (ahilik) is unthinkable without Suhrawardi. Kalenderism and some other antinomian movements that flourished in the lands of Rum in the late medieval era originated in Iran, and the representatives of these movements in Rum received a good part of their intellectual sustenance and some of their membership through continued migration from and communication with Iran. It is only with such awareness that we may deal with regional dialects or inflections—specific historical configurations—of belief and practice according to a regional habitus among the Muslims of the lands of Rum, who were apparently distinguishable in that manner as of the thirteenth century.

As in the case of many loan words, something new happened in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries to the word “Rumi.” It came to be adopted by, or used with respect to, some Muslims of that geography, perhaps at first by outsiders but eventually also by insiders. Mevlana Cemal Kafadar
between 1318 and 1353; but he was called Mevlâna-i Rûm (our master [who is] of [the lands of eastern] Rome) in Handullah al-Mustawfi’s Persian history, Türkî gazîda, completed in Iran in 1350. While he is known as Rumi in most of the world today, the heirs of the heritage of the lands of Rum prefer to refer to him as Mevlana, since they know of several other Rumis.

Whether or not it was then tagged onto the name of one of the most respected poets of the lands of Rum, the nisba has been used since the thirteenth century by and for a large number of poets, scholars, and mystics. Moreover, it was also used for men and women (for an instance of rûmîyya, see below) of no such distinction. In fact, the earliest usage I have been able to locate thus far is in Rawandi’s chronicle—again written in Iran, and dedicated to Gıyaseddin Keyhusrev soon after 1207—where the author writes of a certain Cemaleddin Ebü Bekr bin Ebîl-‘Ala el-Rumi, a merchant who came from Asia Minor to Hamadan and brought news of Keyhusrev’s conquests and generosity to the chronicler. It was also used regularly to denote the collective identity of a particular segment of society, upon the emergence of new forms of stratification in the late medieval era: those who spoke Turkish (preferably a refined kind of Turkish, but not necessarily as their mother tongue) and acquired their social identity within or in some proximity to urban settings, professions, institutions, education, and cultural preferences—as opposed to “Turks,” a usage that primarily had associations of ethnicity-not-transcended and attachment to tribal ways and cultural codes. In his commentary on one of the poems of Yunus Emre (d. 1320–21?), a prominent Sufi intellectual of the seventeenth century writes that enver is a laudatory title “in Turkish, like the word atabeg among the Turks or lala among the Rumis.” “Rumi vs. Turk,” in other words, also resonated with a social class distinction and had connotations similar to “bourgeois vs. rustic.”

There was a period of transition, and perhaps confusion, when some sources written by Anatolian Muslims continued to use “Rumi” to refer to Byzantine or ex-Byzantine Christians. In the Dânismendname, written in the first half of the fifteenth century but likely based on an original composition of the mid-thirteenth, “Rumis” regularly appear as the Christian enemies of “Muslims.” It is not so much a matter of religious identity in Manâqib al-‘arîfîn, where Mevlana Celalîddin is reported to have said that Rumi servants should be preferred if one wanted to build and Turkish workmen if one wanted to demolish, since “cultivation of the world belongs to Rumis, and devastation of the universe is confined to Turks.” In time, a finer distinction emerged between “Rumi” and the other meaning of “Rum”; when applied to persons or communities, rather than lands, “Rum” designated the Greeks (or sometimes, even more broadly, the Greek Orthodox) of the former Byzantine realms. The kinship between the two words obviously did not make anyone squirm.

As for the word “Turk” itself, its historical uses demand much more attention than they have hitherto been given. It should suffice here to observe some of the ambiguities and ambivalences, since the conventional scholarly view that “Turk” was a term of denigration in late medieval and Ottoman usage is too simplistic. Such usage was indeed common, implying Turkish-speaking country bumpkins, ruffians, and uncouth tribal or peasant populations. In its Arabized plural, et rak (Turks) often designated Turcoman tribes, sometimes merely descriptively, but at times pejoratively, with the same associations. Still, the Ottoman elites and Rumi urbanites called their language “Turkish” and knew well that it was related to other kinds of Turkish spoken and written by “Turks” elsewhere. Muterçim Asım’s eighteenth-century translation and elaboration of a Persian dictionary occasionally points to usages in bizim Türkiye (our Turkish) as opposed to the Turkish spoken in Iran or in Turkistan, highlighting a sense of “we” as defined, in part, by the western Turkish language. Genealogies of the House of Osman proudly linked them to the tribal tradition of the Oghuz Turks; in their own conception of their history and identity, Ottoman writers inserted the formation of the polity into a narrative of Seljuk and post-Seljuk Turkish political communities. Moreover, the Ottoman literati (and presumably their audiences) were aware that, no matter what they preferred to call themselves, others called them Turks. It is striking that Ottoman sources often use the word “Türk(s)” to refer to themselves when they are quoting or paraphrasing Byzantine and European characters. In a chronicle of the early sixteenth century, for instance, seven of eight relevant occurrences of the word are instances of such ventriloquism.

The Rumi identity was differentiated but not necessarily detached from its Turkish counterpart. The most general and eloquent account of the usage with respect to a collectivity is given by Gelibolulu Mustafa Ali (1541–1600), who undoubtedly embraced that identity with enthusiasm:
Those varied peoples and different types of Rumis living in the glorious days of the Ottoman dynasty, who are not [generically] separate from those tribes of Turks and Tatars... are a select community and pure, pleasing people who, just as they are distinguished in the origins of their state, are singled out for their piety, cleanliness, and faith. Apart from this, most of the inhabitants of Rum are of confused ethnic origins. Among its notable places there are few whose lineage does not go back to a convert to Islam... either on their father’s or their mother’s side, the genealogy is traced to a filthy infidel. It is as if two different species of fruitbearing tree mingled and mated, with leaves and fruit; and the fruit of this union was large and filled with liquid, like a princely pearl. The best qualities of the progenitors were then manifested and gave distinction, either in physical beauty or in spiritual wisdom.

Some might be tempted to romanticize this avowal of hybridity, but it is not devoid of its own manner of pride, even a touch of chauvinism. Still, Ali’s formulation is striking because of the different conceptualization of identity when compared to the modern obsession with purity of origin and linear narratives of ancestry.

Unlike “Osmanlı,” “Rumi” was not a signifier forged by or for a state; it was not even a part of the official discursive grid of the Ottoman administration. Various place names, as used by the state and the public, had “Rum” in them, but all of them were strictly localized and frozen. Such usage was merely a legacy of the process whereby Turkish-speaking conquerors and settlers, as they moved westwards, found it useful to mark some regions or cities in terms of their location in Roman lands: Erzurum (short for Erzin er-Rûm), the province of Rum (former Danishmendid lands in central and east-central Anatolia), or Rumeli (designating Ottoman lands to the west of Istanbul). Dejârâ Rûm, or the lands of Rum, was not itself a regular part of the official language used in documents to denote “Ottoman lands.” As for “Rumi,” no land survey, tax register, or court document would use it as an operational category. Somewhat anachronistically and tongue in cheek, it can be said that “Rumi” is a category shaped by the civil society.

This is important because premodern states, too, were ready to manipulate or engineer identities and collective memories. The Ottoman enterprise was successful in turning itself into an imperial state in part because it was able to erase or marginalize other narratives of conquest and settlement, competing memories of accomplishments that were once attributed to others. Before that, it was able to turn “Osmanlı” (those who belong to [the ruling apparatus shaped around the House of] Osman) into the corporate identity of a political elite, namely a growing number of warriors and scholar-bureaucrats. The misty beginnings of that corporate identity can be found in the tribal inclusiveness of the first generations of beglers, or chieftains, from the House of Osman. Along the way, it was able to forge a prestigious lineage for what became the dynastic family. There was no unanimity on this issue at first, but the Kayi lineage from the legendary Oghuz Khan, which makes its appearance in written sources in the 1450s, is accepted by an overwhelming majority of our sources after the late fifteenth century. Their rivals among the competitive lot of emirs with their own principalities, some older and once more distinguished, evidently considered the Ottomans to be upstarts: in both the Bazm u Razm and the pro-Karamanid chronicle of Şikari, the sons of Osman are called bî-asl (without [a worthy] origin).

As for the members of society, there were several different pigeonholes into which they could be placed, according to religious affiliation, tax-status, etc. Over time—rather gradually over centuries—there is an unmistakable trend in official documents toward improving the scribal means of making distinctions among subjects of different sorts. There were no identity cards or fingerprints, of course, but subjects had to be somehow identified and differentiated into functional categories when they appeared or were counted in front of authorities. The means for doing so were ever refined by increasingly sophisticated bureaucratic cadres.

Cadastral surveys of the fifteenth century, for instance, are likely to use veled as well as ibn (or bin) for a Muslim as “son of” so-and-so. From the sixteenth century onward, veled is used only for non-Muslims and ibn only for Muslims. The earliest surviving court documents were rather sloppy in naming each person’s father and his or her residential neighborhood; beginning around the mid-sixteenth century, probably after the judicial reforms of Sultan Süleyman (r. 1520–66) and Şeyhüislâm Ebussuud Efendi (d. 1574), every individual was also identified by these bits of information. Again in the court records, where thousands of Muslims and non-Muslims appear regularly, a Muslim would “pass away,” but a non-Muslim would “perish”; that was standard, based on assumed inequalities between Islam and other faiths. Some distinctions, however, are not so easy to explain, and these appeared...
only over time. Muslims were always sâkin (resident, but the word also has connotations of being peaceful) of a neighborhood, non-Muslims sometimes mütevemekin (established). In the eighteenth century at the latest, that distinction became standard usage, and another one was introduced. A second (or further) reference to a Muslim involved in a case would mention him or her as mezkûr[е] (the above-mentioned); if a non-Muslim were involved, the second reference would use mesfîr[е] (the foregoing)—not necessarily a denigration, but a differentiation. Again in the eighteenth century, if not earlier, “misspellings” for non-Muslim names also became standard if those names could be shared with Muslims: Ishak, for instance, would be spelled, consistently, with a correct sîn for a Muslim but an incorrect sâd for a Jew.25 In other words, Ottoman bureaucrats and scribes were developing ever more refined means of making distinctions, by way of inscribing ever more improved identity markers into their ledgers. There are good reasons for calling the Ottoman state an early modern one.

One should not confuse this administrative predilection with social convention, however. Social conventions had their own logic, which displayed a much more freewheeling attitude to identity, by way of labeling or denigrating others through a rich repertoire of slurs and stereotypes but also by recognizing fluidities for what they were. Macaronic texts (also known as alpamîrâd, from the Andalusian experience) are abundant from the fourteenth century onwards. It is hardly possible to follow the bewildering array of words that appear and disappear to designate minute differences of faith, ethnicity, language, locality, and the like: iğîs, turkopouloi, çitak, potar, tobes, gucal, manav, etc. (A similar comment can be made about sexual identities, as defined by various preferences, for which there is a scandalously long list of words.) In fact, what we would like now to think of as ethnonyms were hardly mere ethnic categories; they also carried immediate sociological and moral associations (perhaps a bit like the still unfortunate word “gypsy”).

There was even a word that might be worth reintroducing for circumstances when “Do you speak this language?” is not a simple yes-or-no question. Çetrefîl, which simply means “very difficult” or “complicated” in modern Turkish, once referred to those who spoke a language badly, and to a badly constructed sentence uttered or written by someone who spoke a language badly. This must have been an important part of life in the plural environments of premodern empires.

The loose and linguistically creative attitude to identity and diversity must be understood in light of the fact that things were much more complex than can be subsumed under encounters and exchanges between Turkish invaders and those who were already there (“indigenous” or “autochthonous” populations). Even though Oghuz Turks clearly constituted the dominant element among those who emigrated westward, there were also other Turks, leading for a while to the coexistence of different kinds of Turkish, not just regional dialects.26 The role of non-Turks as co-wayfarers in the migrations and conquests also needs to be taken into account. The earliest extant piece of writing by Muslims in the lands of Rum after 1071 is a curious artifact in this regard. Some Arabic tombstones from the first, brief conquest of Nicaea (1081–96) by the forces moving in with the Seljuk prince Süleyman bin Kutalmuş survive because they were used as slabs to buttress the fortifications after 1096, when the city was captured by the Crusaders and turned over to the Byzantines. Four of these tombstones have writing on them, two of them with the names of the deceased: “a believer, Ahmed, the tanner” and “Mahmud son of 'Abdullah of Isfahan.”27 The sources for the lands of Rum, it seems, were destined from the outset to confront modern scholars and resist their comfortable conventions.

The areas held by Turk-Muslim warriors were constantly replenished thereafter, by Turks but also by many other emigrants. Most of the Turks came from the east, while there were some movements of Turkish populations from the north—the Kipchak Steppe or the lands of the Golden Horde. The formation and articulation of tribal bodies that accounted for much of that mobility included members of different ethnic communities that joined the Turks, willingly or through coercion. There were also migrating scholars, scribes, Sufis, and artisans from Central Asia, Iran, and the Arab lands. While conquests in many instances led to outward migration by or dislocation of Christian subjects of former Byzantine lands, many Christians simply stayed put because they preferred to or had to, and some moved from Byzantine-held territories to Turkish-held ones.

The sad institution of slavery was another significant factor in the demographic changes in Rum. In 1429, Murad II was presented a treatise on the medical properties of stones, tonics, and perfumes. In the introduction, the sultan is praised for his dominion extending “from the gate of Erzincan to the gate of Hungary,”
wherein “every year more or less fifty thousand male and female infidels are taken from the abode of war as captives; those become Muslim, and their progeny join the rank of the faithful until the day of resurrection.” There may be an exaggeration in the numbers, but there is no hesitation about including the converts and their progeny among the faithful, among “us.” In a generation or two, descendants of those former slaves could blend into Rumi society without any stigma, as far as we know now; if there were memories among those later generations of the unhappy circumstances that initiated the process, they are not overtly stated in our written sources (but there is room for some imaginative research here). Ethnic backgrounds were not always obliterated among the slaves/servants of the Sublime Porte, for instance, but they do not seem to have mattered—over the long run, at any rate—as much as belonging to larger categories such as Osmanli or Muslim or Rumi.

Above all, the reconfigurations of identity must have been determined by religious conversions, most of which seem to have taken place independent of coercive mechanisms. Some Turkish communities evidently adopted Christianity within the Greek or Armenian Orthodox church, but this process remains marginal compared to the massive conversions in the other direction. Over time, huge numbers of Christians in the lands of Rum moved into the fold of Islam, and thereby into Turk-ness. The account book of Giacomo Badoer, a Venetian merchant, refers a few times to “Choza Isse turco” as one of hundreds of people with whom he had transactions in Constantinople in the 1430s; on one of those occasions, we are given an eye-opening detail, identifying his son with a Greek title and name: “chir Jacob fiuol de Chogia Is.” Chogia Is (Hoca or Koca Isa) may or may not have called himself “turco,” but to the Europeans, Muslims of that geography were Turks. (Thus also, until now, were Bosnian Muslims to some of their neighbors.) To present the post-1071 cultural transformations in the former Byzantine lands through the encounters of one side with another is simply not going to work, even if we focus on receptivity, adaptability, and similar processes. And even if we prefer to speak in terms of sides, we need to recognize that millions of people changed sides and homelands, bringing with them tales and proverbs and skills and crafts and styles and—not to let the nasty aspects of it out of our minds—experiences of violence and suffering.

It takes a particularly perceptive student of things Ottoman like Jakab Nagy de Harsány, a Transylvanian humanist of the mid-seventeenth century, to look at Ottoman society in its full complexity. After warning his European readers that they should not heed the reductionism in so many travelers’ accounts that speak of an essential Turkish this and Turkish that, he raises the question, “What is the Turkish character?” and responds:

This is a most difficult question, since it is not one nation [millet in the Turkish text; una gens in the Latin] but consists of all sorts of people of the world—Germans, Poles, French, English, Dutch, Hungarians, Muscovites, Czechs, Rus, Cossacks, Serbs, Bulgarians, Albanians, Abkhazians, Georgians, Kurds, Persians, Arabs, Greeks, Armenians, Tatars, Wallachians, Moldavians, Circassians, Croatians, Italians, Jews, Indians, and many others. Whoever wishes to speak of the Ottoman character (Osmanlıtan tabii), he must know the character of all [these] people (satio). Those who are born Muslim have different customs than those who have converted from Christianity; the educated have their way, the uneducated theirs; people of the frontiers develop different customs than those who are born in the central lands of the empire; everyone learns both good and bad things from Christians and [other] neighbors.

Renegadism may have been common among the corsairs, and so, evidently, was the need for denigration of converts: Nasche un greco, nasche un turco (When a Greek is born, a Turk is born) is a saying recorded among the corsairs in the seventeenth century. It was apparently used to disparage Greeks by indicating that they could easily “turn Turk”—a compound verb once readily encountered in English tales of renegades and corsairs. From the beginning of the eighteenth century onwards, both the proverb and the verb seem to have lost their relevance and thus their currency.

If only to highlight differences and regional specificities, the circumstances and processes of Turkish settlement in the lands of Rum need to be compared to those in Iran, another realm where substantial Turcophone populations settled in the medieval era. Vladimir Minorsky, for instance, a modern historian of medieval Iran, tendentiously asserts, “Like oil and water, the Turcomans and the Persians did not mix freely.” The history of the lands of Rum clearly offers us images very different from oil and water and perhaps parallels the history of South Asia in the same period—a setting of mixture and exchange that included much more than two actors (Turks and Greeks, or Turcomans and Persians) and called for new terms of identity, such as Rumi.
Let us consider the case of Eşrefoğlu Rumi (d. 1469–70?). According to a short entry in the Encyclopaedia of Islam, for instance, he was a “Turkish poet and mystic...His father Eşref left Egypt as a young man and settled in Iznik.” Here, in a nutshell, is the story of somebody for whom a word like “Rumi” would have had to be coined if it did not already exist. Eşrefoğlu indeed wrote some of the most admired lyrical Sufi poetry in Turkish, in the vein of Yunus Emre, but his grandfather’s nisba was al-Misri (the Egyptian), his emigrating father’s was al-Misri al-Rumi, and his own was al-Rumi al-Izniki (the Roman the Nicean, if you will).

The binary of “Rumi” is not necessarily “Turk,” even though we currently focus on “Rumi” in order to question the facile application of a linear and ahistorical Turkishness to the past. In Ottoman usage, “Rumi” is most often paired with “Acem” (primarily “Persian,” but those who spoke and wrote in “Eastern Turkish” might also be categorized among “the poets of ’Acem”), and sometimes both “Acem” and “Arab,” neither of which should be understood as simply ethnic categories. This is clearer in the case of competitive cultural discourse, when one wishes to speak of the accomplishments of Rumi poets, for instance, as having “surpassed” those of Acem poets. The Rumi-Acem binary is also used in a non-competitive vein, namely in descriptive or analytical discourse: “The poetry of so-and-so lacks Rumi qualities; it comes closer to the style of the ’Acem.” The word “Turk” is of a different order of things; ethnicity, undoubtedly with social and cultural associations, is embedded in it. On the other hand, “Rumi,” in its new meaning, was used in large measure to designate a novel social and cultural constellation, namely the identity of those from a variety of backgrounds but with a shared disposition toward a certain style of expression in the arts as well as quotidian life. The limits of Rumi-ness were delineated, to some degree, by linguistic and geographic criteria. The area around Diyarbakır, for instance, plays a liminal role as a frontier. Someone from Diyarbakır is included among the poets of Rum but at the same time identified as being “from the Eastern lands” (diyâr-i Şarh). Another poet is “from the Eastern lands; some say he is a Rumi”; yet another is “a Turcoman; he has arrived from the Eastern lands.” All of them nevertheless find a place in books on, say, “the poets of Rum,” since “Rumi” identifies not only social or geographic background but also style and character (ışılh, lârs, ’iyse, etc.). A certain Haleth, having served as a judge for many years in Aleppo, Rum, and Diyarbakır, has acquired “the grace and generosity of the Arabs, the elegance and politesse of the ’Acems, and the intelligence and attractiveness of the Rumis.”

The biographical dictionaries of poets (or scholars, calligraphers, and others) spoke about the poets of the lands of Rum, not the Ottoman Empire, and distinguished them from the ’Acem and Arab poets. Rum was a cultural space inhabited by a community that shared a literary language, Turkish; it included a few Armenian poets who used that language (Meshi of Diyarbakır, for instance). One of these biographical dictionaries of “the poets of Rum” was in fact written by an ’Acem, a certain ’Ahâdî, who is defended by another biographer: “We need to be fair: he did a good job. He does not deny [the qualities of] Rum and Rumis, like other ’Acems.” Of another poet, we read that he “is ’Acem. He came to Rum as an envoy, married someone in Istanbul, and settled there. Having lived in the lands of Rum for quite some time, he became like a Rumi (Rûmî gibi olup). Many conversations and disputes of his, making use of the same discourse as most of the poets of Rum, have been committed to memory. He has [also] written Turkish poetry.” One of our poets is “from an area close to the Iranian frontier. Having spent most of his time in this land, he conforms in his style of poetry to the iovere (inflection) of verse in the Turkish manner and to the iovere (gesture, manner of flirtation, coquettishness) of the poets of Rum.”

A good Rumi intellectual or artist may have boasted that the Rumis had outdone the ’Acems and Arabs but would never doubt the need to be steeped in Arabic and Persian classics and compete with contemporaneous exemplars in those traditions, which he or she would consider his or her own. Mihrî Hatun (d. after 1512), for instance, one of the few women to appear among the poets of Rum, is described by another poet of her time as a “poetess of gracious sense.” The word Shirin (gracious) here skillfully alludes to the female protagonist of the medieval Persian romance, Farhad and Shirin, well known among the Rumis and subject to a few Turkish renderings. Whether in Persian or in Turkish, it was not received as a story of “some other people”; Amasya, Mihrî Hatun’s hometown, boasted of being the setting of the original story.

For the truly ambitious, it was almost obligatory to write one’s own poetry collection not only in Turkish but also in Persian and/or Arabic, or venture a commentary on an important work of Arabic or Persian literature (say, the Qasida al-Burda or Sa’di’s Gulistân). And even if one wrote only in Turkish, rarely but some-
times even called **Rümice** (in the Rumi manner), one would turn to a rich set of allusions deriving from the Persian and Arabic classics, which Rumis considered part of their own heritage, as well as from a whole body of Hellenistic, Roman, and late antique concepts and figures, often filtered through those classics.

The quasi-amnesia in modern scholarship regarding the once-abundant usage of “Rumi” is deeply rooted in the preference, long predating Turkish nationalism, for the wholesale designation of the Ottomans, and of Turcophone Muslims of the Ottoman Empire, as “Turks”—a preference manifested since the late medieval era in both European and, to a lesser extent, many non-Turkish Middle Eastern or Balkan languages (Greek and Arabic, for instance). Such a designation remained standard despite the countervailing preference among those very Ottomans and their educated urban Turcophone subjects for calling themselves not “Turks” but “Osmanlı” or “Rumi.” The Moroccan ambassador to Istanbul in 1589 was at least aware of this dissonance, while it obviously confused him a bit:

> That city was the capital of the lands of Rum [rendered “grecs” by the French translator], and the seat of the empire, the city of caesars. The Muslims who live in that city now call themselves “Rum” [again rendered “grecs” by the translator] and prefer that origin to their own. Among them, calligraphy, too, is called *khâtı rumi* (“l’écriture grecque”).

Another sixteenth-century Arabic source was apparently more cognizant of the usage, but that is precisely why it baffled a modern scholar. After having lived in Mecca for a few years, a woman went to the authorities in Istanbul in 1544 and complained of the use of coffee in the holy city (only a decade before coffee conquered Istanbul itself). She must have been so convincing that the caravan going from Damascus to Mecca that year “brought word that coffee was forbidden.” The Arabic source that relates this incident identifies her as a Rumi woman (*immā' a rūmiyya*), and the modern scholar writes: “It is hardly likely that a ‘Greek,’ as the original reads, would have lived in Mecca...It is therefore best to assume that ‘rumiya’ here means a Turk from Anatolia, or perhaps Istanbul.”

The designations “Rum” and “Rumi” were also common in Iran, Central Asia, and India and are even attested in Indonesia. Bayram Khan (1504–61), statesman and contributor to the flourishing Chagatai literature in India in the sixteenth century, writes of the lands of Rum as being “all the way over there” (*tâ diyâr-i Rûm*). A Bolognese sailor who was in South Asia with the Portuguese in the first decade of that century relates that Diu was called “Diybandirrumi,” presumably because of the preponderance of Rumis.38

The heyday of “Rumi” as a socially and culturally meaningful category spans the thirteenth to seventeenth centuries. A certain İsmâ’îl Rumi (d. 1643) founded a branch of the Kâdirî order of dervishes that was thereafter known as the Rûmîyye, indicating that the word was still used to generate new coinages.39 It seems to have slowly fallen out of favor in the eighteenth century. Still, Nevres-i Kadim (d. 1762), in his history of a Safavid assault on Erevan in 1731, writes of the “Acems as planning to massacre the “Rumis”—i.e., the Ottoman soldiers inside the fort.”40

As the designation of a physical and cultural geography “the lands of Rum,” or simply “Rum,” enjoyed currency somewhat longer. The beginnings of the usage by Turcophone Muslim Anatolian communities to designate their turf is already attested in a poem by Ahmed Fakih (d. 1221?): “I passed through the lands of Rum and Sham [i.e., Syria] and fell upon Arabia.”41 Thereafter, it appears regularly in both the somewhat rarefied writings of the poets of Rum and the hugely popular art of the likes of Yunus Emre, Karaçoğlan, and Pir Sultan Abdal, in juxtaposition with place names like “Sham,” “Frengistan,” and “Acem” (or “Acemistan”). In fact, the word “Anadolu” (Anatolia) hardly ever appears in the “folk poetry” that today is considered the “echt-Anadolu” poetry of Turkish bards.42

While “Acem” constituted the most common binary of “Rumi” in Ottoman cultural discourse, as geographical designations the “lands of Rum” were regularly differentiated from the “Arab lands,” even after the incorporation of the latter into the Ottoman Empire, as well as from the “lands of ‘Acem.” In the capacity of a place name, too, the word “Rum” could carry an emotive content of cultural affinity. In a quatrain attributed to Şeyhülislam Ibn Kemal (d. 1534) and addressed to Sultan Selim I, the scholar is alleged to have expressed the sentiments of the soldier, who were tired of their lengthy campaign into Arab lands and yearning to return to Rum, in the sense of going back home:

> What have we left to do in the Arab realm?
> Long have we stayed in Aleppo and Sham:
People are all living in pleasure and charm.
Let us go [back] then to the lands of Rum.45

A 1649 vefâıtävâme of Bursa—namely, a biographical
dictionary of the “distinguished dead” of that city—
refers to Rum on a few occasions with rhyming formulæ
of obvious emotional attachment: diýar-i Rûm-i cennet-
râsâm (paradise-like lands of Rum) or diýar-i cennet-
sfir-i Rûm (paradise-signaling lands of Rum).44

Perhaps the most striking, even precociously “patrio-
tic,” expressions of affection for the lands of Rum are
encountered in admiral Seydi Ali Reis’s immensely
popular account of his adventures in diýarı Hind, writ-
ten after a disastrous naval expedition in the Indian
Ocean and his return journey. Having described him-
self in the introduction as “Kâtibî [his pennname]
Rûmî, the poor soul” and boasted of generations of ser-
sice by his family members at the arsenal in Istanbul,
his beloved home city, the captain runs through his
expedition to the ocean, the misfortunes of the navy,
and the shipwreck that took him to Gujarat. There
he begins to negotiate his way back home, rendering
services to different rulers in northern India, includ-
ing Humayun and Akbar, demonstrating his always-
superior poetic skills at every opportunity, avoiding
palace coups and bandit-infested roads, and turning
down offers of mighty posts. Soon after the section
on Gujarat, he starts to write poems that pepper the
text in Chagatai Turkish, as if to accentuate his sense
of exile (gurbet). The very first poem in Chagatai ends
with a prayer that God grant him success in his “jour-
ney back to the patria (vatan seferi).” He returns to
composing poems “in the manner of Rum (Rûm târî-
üzü)” only when he comes close to the Safavid-Otto-
man boundary. In the meantime, he tells us that the
“yearning for the patria (vatan ârzıssî)” never left his
heart. How could it, when he knew that he was a sub-
ject of the grandest of countries? When Humayun asked
him a tricky question as to which country was bigger,
the country of Rum (vilâyet-i Rum) or Hindustan, he
had boldly answered: “If, by Rum, one means Rum
strictly speaking, that is, the province of Sivas (called
Rum in Ottoman administrative division), then Hindu-
stan is bigger. But if one means the lands under the
rule of the Padishah-i Rum, Hind does not amount
to one-tenth of it…When people speak of Alexander
having ruled over the seven climes, that must be like
the rule of Padishah-i Rum.” He knew well, however,
that “Rum” implied something more limited than
the whole Ottoman Empire. He felt he had found
safety (selâmêt) when he reached Ottoman Baghdad,
but he quickly headed from there to diýarı Rûm.45

With or without cultural associations, the “lands of
Rum,” or simply “Rum,” referred to the region one en-
tered coming west from the lands of ’Acem or north
from the Arab lands. In this geographical scheme,
Arab lands often start in Syria (Sham), but there is
a grey area, or zone of transition, where Turcoman
tribes mixed freely with Arab and Kurdish tribes of
northern Mesopotamia. An impossibly precise bound-
ary is sometimes given by sources that take the politi-
cal boundaries of a particular moment or very specific
graphic points to heart: a chronicle written for the
Akroyunlu in the 1470s refers to a site called “Karabel,
which constitutes the line between Rum and Sham.”46

In general, the boundaries were vague. They could be
conceived to extend as far north as Malatya, for in-
stance: the early-sixteenth-century chronicle of Yusuf
b. Abdullah refers to “Aleppo and Aintab, the whole
Arab province beyond Malatya.”47 Firdâvîsî Rûmî (d.
after 1512), on the other hand, referred in the 1490s
to “Türk ili (the province/land of Turks) all the way
down to Jerusalem,” even if he did not necessarily have
a political project in mind.48 In interpreting Selim I’s
commission to rebuild the shrine of Ibn ’Arabi outside
Damascus upon his conquest of the “Arab lands,” we
need to consider as the audience of this grand ges-
ture of patronage not only the sedentary Arab popu-
lations of Syria but also those very tribes of different
and sometimes confused identity, many of whom were
potential targets of Safavid propaganda and their kind
of Sufism.

For Fuzuli, a Turcoman of Iraq, who was and is
one of the most revered poets of Ottoman and Azeri
Turkish literature, the significant (and, again, vague)
boundary was not between Syria and Rum but rather
between Baghdad and Rum. He considered himself
to be out of touch with the patronage networks of
the lands of Rum, where many a lesser poet flour-
ished, while he, a Shi’a to boot, suffered the fate of
the downtrodden of Karbala. In more prosaic and de-
scriptive fashion, the lands north of Mosul, too, could
function as the entry to Rum in chronicles depicting
the movement of armies or individuals.

Somewhere to the west or north of any of those
points, one crossed into the lands of Rum, which since
the early twenty-first century has almost mechanically
been translated as “Anatolia.” But where, exactly, is
Anatolia, historically speaking? Today, the word is
used almost universally to cover all of the lands of
Turkey to the east of the straits. It is also regularly in-
voked in a metaphorical fashion, by Turks in particular, to imply “the deep country,” the soil, the soiled but true essence of Turkey, minus the cosmopolitan corruption and money of Istanbul (and perhaps also “infidel İzmir”). But “Anatolia” was used even as late as the nineteenth century primarily in terms of physical geography, and as such the designation has the same vagueness beyond the diagonal line from Trabzon to the eastern edges of the Taurus Mountains, namely the uncannily overlapping eastern boundaries of the empires of Basil II and Mehmed II. If one ever wanted to consider deep geographic structures à la Braudel, one would also need to take into account a botanical frontier that natural scientists have discovered along, more or less, the same diagonal line.49

In that sense, the usage of “Rum” in our late medieval and early modern sources can indeed be identified most of the time with the current delineation of Anatolia, with the same attendant vagueness about its boundaries, but only those to the east or the south. Rum, in other words, included Asia Minor, or Anatolia, but the Ottoman usage had more than the southwestern Asian peninsula in mind. The Balkans, too, were included in Rum as cultural space after the late fourteenth century. Ottoman lands west of the Marmaš Sea were called Rum ili (Rumelia), which is another way, after all, of saying “the lands of Rum.” Traveling westward from Iran or northward from Syria or Iraq, one would walk into the lands of Rum, but as one crossed the straits of the Bosphorus or the Dardanelles eastward, one entered not Rum but Anadolu. The same Haleti who was mentioned above had held three judgementships, respectively, “in Gelibolu, Yeşilçam, and Salonica, of the grand cities in Rum.” In other words, the lands of Rum as a cultural zone had two parts in Ottoman usage: what is now Anatolia and what used to be Rumelia.

Beginning in the late eighteenth century this usage of “Rum” as a geographical designation was likewise gradually abandoned, to be replaced by the broadening semantic field of “Anatolia,” but at first only in the sense of physical geography. Anadolu, the Turkicized form of the Greek word Anatoli (east), had been used for centuries in frozen institutional terminology, as in “the province of Anadolu” (the central and central-western parts of Asia Minor), or “the treasurer of Anadolu” (in juxtaposition with the same office held in Rumelia). In terms of physical geography, “the shores of Anadolu” (Anadolu sevahili) had been commonly used since the late medieval era for the northern shoreline of the peninsula. The inhabitants of Istanbul had been accustomed for centuries to think of many aspects and landmarks of their city in terms of a playful bipartite division: the castle, lighthouse, etc. of Rumelia vs. those of Anatolia. If one crossed the straits eastward, one crossed into Anatolia.

Towards the end of the eighteenth century, however, “Anadolu” acquired a broader usage: coming north from Syria, one now did not necessarily enter the lands of Rum, but one might enter Anadolu. The chronicle of Ahmed Vasif Efendi, written in the 1780s, uses “Rum” only twice in the traditional sense of “Asia Minor” and on two other occasions to refer to a Russian political plot to establish an independent Rûm devleti (Greek state) and to appoint a Russian nobleman as the Greek king (Rûm krâh).50 In other words, the word “Rum” had acquired a new political meaning that would only intensify during the Greek War of Independence in the 1820s and thereafter. An account of the annihilation of the Janissaries in 1826 castigates the “heretical” soldiers for having been too cozy with the Greek rebels during the “sedition of the wicked Rum infidels (keferi fecere-i Rûm) in the year 1820–21.”51 It must have something to do with this new sensitivity that “Anatolia” acquires a broader range. In the same source is another striking usage: the brief vitae of Hacæ Bekta× Veli mentions his migration “from Khurasan to Anatolia,” offering a new take on the time-honoured Khurasan-to-Rum axis that prevails in late medieval and early modern hagiographies of saintly figures of the lands of Rum, many of whom are said to have hailed from Khurasan.52

It is ironic that, at around the same time, many Greek intellectuals were feeling embarrassed about the Greeks’ self-designation of Romaioi and exerting their energy and influence to replace it by “Hellenes” and “Greeks.” When those intellectuals of the Greek enlightenment and, later, independence started to feel uncomfortable with the Byzantino-Ottoman associations of the word, their observations were based on a perception of Romaioi identity as defining a whole variety of institutions and attitudes. In 1787, for instance, Dimitrios Katartzis, in analyzing the ideas of another writer, wrote:

Two ethoi, the Hellenic and the Roman, covering two thousand and more years between them, he holds to be one, the Hellenic, simply because the latter descends from the former; but they differ one from the other in fortune and constitution and religion and customs
“Rum” did not just keel over and disappear, however. No matter what he thought of a Greek state and a Greek king, Ahmed Vasif Efendi took some pride in the “dilaveran (bravehearts) of Rum,” namely, Ottoman soldiers who fought valiantly against some rebels in Egypt in 1787. Seyyid Muhammed Nurûl-‘Arabi, a prominent nineteenth-century mystic, was sent in 1829 (?) to “the lands of Rum” by his sheikh in Cairo. Even as late as 1874, Namük Kemal, who invented patriotic poetry in the Ottoman/Turkish tradition, would casually drop “Rum” in a couplet and assume that his readers would recognize the word in its old sense. The entry on “Rum” in the celebrated Turkish dictionary of Şemseddin Sami, published in 1900, sealed the trajectory of the usage in the late nineteenth century, however: “People of Central Asia in our day apply this name to Anatolia...According to us, this name belongs only to the new Greek people.” Under “Anadolu” he would write, “It constitutes the most important part of the Ottoman realm in our day.”

For “Anadolu” to acquire regular usage with deep cultural resonance among the Ottomans, one needs to wait until the turn of the twentieth century, or, more definitively, until the end of the Balkan Wars in 1912–13, when the empire had lost nearly all its lands in Europe. Before that, experimentation with a pan-Ottoman identity for the sake of creating a modern sense of citizenship in the late empire, and the application of this new notion of Ottoman-ness in a widening network of schools and print cultures, rendered “Osmanlı” a broader category than it had been earlier. One could now write about Osmanlı sairleri (Ottoman poets), for instance. Toward the end of the century Turkishness, too, was embraced by a small but influential group of intellectuals.

There were, however, new ways of speaking about Anatolia, and perhaps the most original conceptualization is found in a novel published in 1871–72 by Evangelinos Misailidis (1820–90), of the Turcophone Greek Orthodox community. It is both a popular and a scholarly convention to speak of this community as Karamanli, but Misailidis himself objects to this and tells us that he would like to be called Anatolian. Obviously, he has in mind the Greek Orthodox populations of Asia Minor, whether Turcophone or Hellenophone, and contrasts what he observes to be their backwardness in education and learning to the advancement in these respects of the Greeks of Greece. “The government of the Ottoman Empire” is no obstacle, he writes; “the Rums of Anatolia” or “Anatolians” (Anadolu Rumları and Anadoluüler, interchangeably), should establish new schools and do our best to pull ourselves into the new age.” He then proceeds to a long list of “Anadolu” philosophers, scientists, poets, and painters from ancient and Byzantine history as examples of past achievements that need to be revived. His proud list includes Hippocrates, Strabon, Sappho, Palamas, and many others, who are identified as having hailed from Anadolu, and a few occasional figures from areas such as Antioch, Damascus, and Cyprus, which he obviously considers as natural extensions of an Anatolian cultural geography.

Those lines were written in Istanbul in the 1870s for practical purposes, to serve as a source of inspiration for educational reform in a community rooted in Ottoman Anatolia. Competing designs on the peninsula in the early twentieth century would render Misailidis quaint. All of his Anatolians were forced to leave for Greece as refugees, and Muslim refugees from Rumelia and the Caucasus were moved to Anadolu, the heartland of the new country of Turkey, where they joined others learning to think of themselves as Turks. New histories had to be written about “our people” and “our homeland.”

“Our people,” it has proven relatively facile for nationalists everywhere to argue, have been around for a long time, perhaps since the misty beginnings of history—but where? Some consider themselves to have been “at home” since time immemorial, but most peoples must reckon with the fact that their forebears (the Germans, the Turks, the Slavs, the Aztecs, and all Indo-Europeans if one goes back enough in time) indeed moved around until they struck the felicitous bond with “our patria.” Blut met Boden and acquired Lage. They may have walked into “vast empty lands,” as is said of the Europeans in North America, or they may have come with “offerings of love and fraternity as well as a superior civilization and political stability” (accompanied by the requisite military action). Now that the destined embrace between “our people” and “our patria” is complete (Why did our ancestors share it with others? They were tolerant, to begin with. Moreover, the Seljuks and the Ottomans forgot they were Turks and fell for Persian and Arab and Byzantine cultures...), now that the Greeks and the Armenians are here no more, how do we re-cognize our homeland?
Remzi Öğuz Ark, with his influential explorations of “how geography turns into patria,” provides one of the best examples of the obsession with the question that loomed large in the minds of many early republican intellectuals:

How misty is the initial birth of nations? Which people has freely chosen its patria? How big is the role of chance…? Had Turks passed by the northern side of the Caspian, who knows in what religion and in what place we would now be? Imagine the difference of the countries of origin, the reasons for the departure from those countries, of the people who established the United States. Who among them had the purpose of establishing the country, the state, of today?

Once a people and a geography labor for centuries to mutually shape each other, however, mere land turns into homeland. That is how, according to Aræk, the Oghuz Turks made Anatolia their own after 1071, while all other people before the Turks either were too dispersed to unify the land or merely exploited it.62

A different understanding of Anatolia was developed by the “Blue” school of thought that embraced the pre-Islamic past of the peninsula, but only after introducing a sharp distinction between “this land of ours” and Greece; Homeros, for instance, was of “this land” and “ours,” not “theirs.” There were yet other approaches that developed in the context of competing irredentisms in the post-Ottoman political space, including a Turkish one, and in response to the new era of colonialism. Necip Fazıl Kasıtker’s Büyük Doğu (The Great East) paradigm, elaborated in his influential journal of the same name, found nothing worthy in Christian or, especially, Jewish survivals and survivors; it would be best not to have any traces of them in the new Turkish state. The novelist Kemal Tahir’s Anatolia was a land where Turks built a kerim devlet (munificent state) in the form of the Ottoman Empire. Various other “Anatolias” could be treated here, but the topic is ultimately as demanding as a broad intellectual history of republican Turkey.

One cannot escape the fact that all these readings of cultural geography came with their own political twists, in their conception as well as their continued reception. The questions themselves keep multiplying in our own time: how does one write about the cultures of the lands of former Yugoslavia? Where is Macedonia? To come back to Anatolia: What is a Turk? a Kurd? How should we tell their stories and deal with the fact that those stories inform political arguments at least implicitly sustained by historical narratives? When a celebrated and controversial poet like Ismet Özçel, for instance, asserts that “this soil awaited the Turks,” he is sketching a historical narrative and advancing a political argument about Turks and Anatolia that is not irrelevant to our concerns here. Whatever one thinks of his line, or the lines of different neo-nationalist writers, where does their fury come from? And, more important, why does it find such fertile ground? Much as their preoccupation with national essence and their exclusivist discourse strike me as deeply worrisome, I am afraid that, in a self-proclaimed age of globalization, undermining nation-based conceptualizations and narratives can also serve new forms of imperialism, articulating them with some hypocritical discourses (on human rights, democracy, minority rights, women’s rights, etc.).63

It has turned into a postmodern sport to take shots—often cheap shots—at nationalisms and national histories. We tend to forget that nationalisms did and do appeal to millions of people because they provide, among other things, a sense of dignity and a pillar of sovereignty, none of which, in my opinion, is to be disdained or undermined. The political discourse of this age of globalization, and its critique of nationalism, has not grown out of a problematization of nation- or ethnos-based narratives as such; it simply wishes to deem certain parts of the world and certain peoples so utterly steeped in ancient hatreds and incomprehensible disputes that they must be taught better.

To return to the lands of Rum, the appropriation of “Roman-ness” by Turcophone Muslims in the late medieval and Ottoman era, or its recognition today, is not comparable to, say, the nineteenth-century British elite’s claims and attachment to the heritage of Rome: what was being appropriated was not the image of Rome but the soil that the Rumis inhabited and some of the continuous cultural traditions and dispositions. Nor was it to draw glamour or political baraka from Roman-ness, as was the case with British colonial administrators and is now true of the neo-cons of the United States.

For different reasons, the avowal of an identity deriving from the physical and cultural geography of eastern Rome among members of Ottoman society, including its most renowned writers and artists, now seems difficult to recognize for many in the Turkish
nation-state. A translator of Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall’s monumental Geschichten des Osmanischen Reiches (published between 1827 and 1835) finds a reference in the original work to Ottoman art as “the art of Rum” unpalatable, even if the Viennese historian’s intention is merely to attribute the glorious dome of the Taj Mahal to Ottoman architects. To the translation is amended a footnote:

Although Ottoman architecture may have borrowed from Byzantine architecture, the two are not the same; while Ottoman architecture has been influenced by other [traditions of] architecture, it has produced works in accord with an original style in full conformity with Turkish-Islamic taste and as an autonomous [tradition of] architecture, and has thus imposed its stamp in history.64

It would be sheer romanticism to present this exercise as an attempt to recycle “Rumi” as a panacea to the excesses of nationalism, a mechanical alternative to “Turkish” or “Ottoman,” or as an attempt to reinser the “Turks-as-Romans” into European identity. In our rethinking of history writing through essentialized national, religious, and state-based categories, however, we can benefit from deeper excavation of premodern conceptualizations of identity as embodied in the notion of Rumi-ness, among others, and premodern conceptualizations of identity as embodied in the notion of Rum-ness, among others, and better understand the vicissitudes of selfhood in the plural environments that we study. That excavation would need to be followed by more intensive micro-geographical studies of exchange and reception, formulation, or elaboration of cultural identities.65

Identity has always been a political resource (“divide and rule” is partly based on that fact), but the ever more refined forms of production of knowledge about identities is now fed directly into the strategic calculus of security assets and security risks. I may forget Foucault, as I am advised to do by Baudrillard, but how can I forget in this context Sheikh Bedreddin, a child of the lands of Rum who thanks to his education in Egypt grew into a highly accomplished scholar and Sufi and developed a utopian vision and a huge following among diverse sorts of Rumi, only to be executed in 1416 by the Ottoman state? About the ʿulemāʾ-i sâhîr (scholars of the exoteric aspects of religio-legal learning) of his time, Bedreddin wrote, “They say their goal is the acquisition of knowledge, but all their knowledge is for power and status (câh ve riyâsât).”

Ultimately, there is no Rome of one’s own, unless one remains in a position to design and propagate one’s own identity free of history. Self-knowledge, too, is implicated in relations of power. One is always forced to rethink and redesign one’s own conception of self according to others within and outside the “nation,” under historical circumstances shaped by asymmetries of power or seduction of/by others. Thus it was that those who eventually learned (preferred?) to call themselves Turks and Greeks abandoned, for different reasons and toward different ends, their attachment to Rum/Romaios identity during the course of the eighteenth century, just as new hegemonic powers were emerging with a new take on the Roman past. That, of course, is the “real” Rome, not the lesser—the Anatolian, i.e., eastern—version.

History Department, Harvard University

NOTES

1. Nizâm al-Dûn Shâmî, Zafername, Turkish trans. Necati Lugal (Ankara, 1987), 307. The Ottoman sources write of Timur’s forces as Tatar (making the important association with the Chingisids) and of themselves primarily as warriors of Islam and the soldiers of Rum.

2. The term has already been applied by Halil Edhem (Eldem) in a more restricted fashion, namely to western Anatolia in the post-Seljuk period: Garhi Anadolu’da Selçukluların Varilceri: Trencelfth-Medieval Istanbul (Istanbul, 1926).

3. Ibn Bâbi, El-Evâmirü’l-Āliye fi Evâmirü’l-Āliye, facsimile edition, ed. Adnan Sadik Erzi (Ankara, 1957), 11, and the Turkish translation by Mürsel Öztürk, 2 vols. (Ankara, 1996), 1:29. The actual circumstances were, in fact, even more complicated, with many lesser emirs enjoying short-lived power on their own in small but not insignificant regions. That is why I referred, in an earlier publication, to a “Warholian Anatolia” of this era, where many an aspiring warrior enjoyed fifteen to twenty years of glory.

4. Franz Taeschner, s.v. “Kaykhosraw I,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition (henceforth EI2) (Leiden, 1950–2004); also see Alexios G. Savvides, “A Note on the Terms Rûm and Anatolia in Seljuk and Early Ottoman Times,” Délko Kentrov Mikrasiatiôn Spoudòn 9 (1984–85, publ. 1987): 99. The Danishmendids were not modest in this regard, either: there was an adolescent prince of that dynasty in 1177 named Afrîdûn: Irene Melikoff, s.v. “Dânishmend,” in EI2. The Shâhnâmâ, which constitutes the font of names for Rum Seljuk rulers after this point, is indeed the “Persian epic par excellence,” as modern scholars often characterize it, but the relationship of medieval Turkish rulers to the epic material is not as predatory as it might seem, and not only because many Turkish rulers were patrons of Persian and Persianate literature, including the Shâhnâmâ. In the epic, the Iranian-Turanian distinction is much more porous than is implied by modern ethno-national conceptualizations of cultural patrimony. First of all, Farîdûn (Feridun) is the ancestor of both
the Iranians and the Turanians. Moreover, Kai Khusraw (Keyhushvay) is born to Siyavush and a daughter of Afrasiyab, after the Iranian prince takes refuge in Turan. Kai Khusraw eventually assumes the Iranian throne, but not without facing an objection that he is “sprung from the race of Afrasiyab.” Cited and analyzed in Senür Aktürk, “Representations of the Turkic Peoples in the Shahnameh and the Greco-Roman Sources,” Akademik Araştırmalar Dergisi 8 (2006): 15–26. It was the unusual combination of this heritage and the spirit of the new age that led Mustafa Kemal Atatürk to commission an opera to be composed by a European-trained Turkish musician when Riza Shah Pahlavi was due to visit the Republic of Turkey. Performed in 1954 during the shah’s sojourn in Ankara, the opera dealt with the story of the two sons of Faridun, from whom descended the Iranians and the Turanians.


8. The defeat and execution by the Mongols of Sharaf al-Din Muhammad, the Rum Seljuk’s Yezidi governor of Harput, is mentioned in Bar Hebraeus, Chronography, ed. Paul Bedjan, trans. E. A. W. Budge, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1932), 1:425. On the dynamics of Islamization and Turkification in late medieval Asia Minor the monumental work of Speros Vryonis is essential reading: The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the Process of Islamization from the Eleventh through the Fifteenth Century (Berkeley, 1971). Also see the informative article by Ahmet Yaşar Ocağ in Türk Dünyası Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi (Istanbul, 1988–), s.v. “Anadolu: Anadolu’nun Türkleşmesi ve İslâmlaşması.” Ocağ has no qualms about characterizing the Yezidis as sajık (deviant). The association of Yezidism with Yezid b. Mawiya might well be pop etymology, or simply slander by their Muslim neighbors who thus linked a “bizarre” faith with one of the disliked characters of early Islamic history, but it was accepted by the Yezidis for centuries. In any case, they are of late evidently attempting to disassociate themselves from such a linkage: Sabih Bann Yalkut, Melek Tavus’un Halkı Yezidiler (Istanbul, 2001), 86. While, according to Yalkut, Armenian nationalism has claimed them as a proto-Armenian community that experienced a linguistic conversion (15), and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq categorized them as Arabs because of the presumed link with the Umayyad dynasty through Yezid (85), the Yezidis are historically Kurdish-speaking and generally considered Kurds: see John S. Guest, Survival among the Kurds: A History of the Yezidis (London and New York, 1993). For some pirmordialist Kurdish nationalists, Yezidism is indeed the original faith of the Kurds. Ibn Battuta’s reference to Yezid as the ancestor of the Sons of Germiyani, even if it is related by the traveler as a disparaging remark by their resentful neighbors, has thus led some modern scholars to deem the Germiyani Kurds and occasioned a brutalist by a Turkish historian: see Mustafa Çetin Varlık, Germiyanoğulları Turcu: 1300–1429 (Ankara, 1974). The actual circumstances may indeed have been so complex as not to allow for a designation of some of those tribal confederations with a straightforward ethnic marker comfortably recognized by modern readers. Ethnic and linguistic transformations could be drawn-out, complex processes and did not always tend towards Turkification; in the regions traditionally inhabited by the Yezidis (now northern Iraq and southeastern Turkey), for instance, there was also a process of Kurdification, as argued by Ihsan Süreyya Sırra (who expanded an article by Th. Menzel in the original Ersyscopandia of Islam): see İslam Ansiklopedisi (Istanbul, 1950–88), s.v. “Yezidiler.”

10. Seyyid Battal Gazi himself was revered as a saintly figure among the Turkish Muslims of the lands of Rum, while around his shrine grew one of the most popular cults of post-Mevlana Anatolia.

11. See, for instance, the unashamedly presentist political uses of this argument in Seyfi Taşhan and Heath Lowry, “U.S.–Turkish Interests: Convergence and Divergence,” Policy Watch #661 (Sept. 29, 2002); Special Forum Report, Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Internet distribution: policywatch@washingtoninstitute.org. According to the authors, Arabs lack these qualities.


14. Muhammad b. ‘Alî b. Sulaymân al-Rawandi, Bîhât-î-sûûrûr ve Hâyât-î-sûûrûr, Turkish trans. Ahmed Atef (Ankara, 1957), 2:461–62. In the 1260s, a member of the Seljuk cavalry bore the curious name Rûmerî (literally, man or soldier of Rum); his father was a powerful cânûri (taster or cupbearer in royal service) named Türkerî (Turkish man, or soldier): Ibn Bîbî, El-Evîmirü’l-{Ala’îyye, 663; Turkish trans., 3:180.

15. “His name was Sâbî,” in Mustafa Talış, Büyük Rûmî, Turkish trans. F. Enes Sehler (İstanbul, 2005), 143. A toad is a construct made of two older Turkish words, while láta in a loanword from Persian, indicating the cultural preferences of the two groups mentioned here.

16. Rômâyî was a common form of self-designation among the Greeks during the Byzantine and Ottoman eras, and this word, too, has had its own curious historical adventures extending into the modern era of nationalism. For an ethnographic analysis of the usage among modern Greeks see nychrîs tâînîa wîlîmînîa mas llamîkûlê têlêdêllê (The Turks rushed in and decimated the Muslims): Dânîzûnîn-dînîn, ed. Necati Demir (Cambridge, MA, 2002), 37 and passim.

17. See, for instance, Rûmüllâ xerînî têliûc xîwîmînîa mas llamîkûlê têlêdêllê (The Turks rushed in and decimated the Muslims): Dânîzûnîn-dînîn, ed. Necati Demir (Cambridge, MA, 2002), 37 and passim.
‘Abdullah’s chronicle had survived, we might have encountered such counterexamples, since most of Erdem’s instances of non-wenirolabic usages are in passages that deal with pre- or early Ottoman history, where links to Oghuz and Inner Asian traditions (the “Turkish past” of the Ottomans) are of particular relevance. It also should be noted that many of them are in passages where an Ottoman/Turkish character is speaking to non-Ottomans. There needs to be a more systematic survey of different sources in order to understand and contextualize the preferences of authors or the routes of transmission with respect to the relevant vocabulary.


27. Clive Foss, “Byzantine Responses to Turkish Attack: Some Sites of Transmission and Contextualization” in Aydinlar âsasında Bir Osmanî Romanı, Han-i Kemal, ed. Hîrî Şevînî and İmradard Hûttner (Stuttgart and Leipzig, 1998), 156–57 and photographic reproductions. Foss modestly presents this important finding “as a preliminary note, intended to draw attention to those unpublished documents.” I am preparing a new edition, translation, and set of photographs, which were taken in collaboration with Dr. Nejdet Ergüç, to whom I am grateful for his generousness with his time and for climbing companionship.


32. For the proverb see Gillian Weiss, “Back from Barbary: Captivity, Redemption and French Identity in the 17th- and 18th-Century Mediterranean” (PhD diss., Stanford University, 2005).

33. This assessment, which may be worth revisiting, is widely accepted and cited in later scholarship: see, for instance, John Woods, The Appanagem: Clan, Confederation, Empire (Chicago, 1976), 9.


35. All examples in this paragraph are cited in Tolasu, Sekî, Latîfî, 13–14. For a compound word with negative connotations see Mütercim Âsîm Efendi, Bir Osmancî Kimîlî, “rumî-hûy (of Rum disposition), explained as “a fickle person who has a capricious nature,” A Comprehensive Persian-English Dictionary (Delhi, 1973; orig. pub. 1892). Also see Julius T. Zenker, Türkisch-Arabisch-Persisches Handwörterbuch (Leipzig, 1866), “rümî-hûy oder rûmî-meşrûb von grieschischem Charakter, unbeständig, flatterhaft, treulos.”


37. Ralph Hattox, Coffee and Coffeehouses: The Origins of a Social Beverage in the Medieval Near East (Seattle, 1991), 38 and 147, n. 23. Ozbaran provides a detailed account of modern scholarly literature that tends to conflate Rumis with Turks, Anatolian Turks, or Greeks: see Bir Osmancî Kimîlî, 89–98, inter alia.

38. Bayram Han’în Türkîyesi Divanı, ed. Mânewer Tekcan (Istanbul, 2005), 113. Ludovico di Varthema of Bologna is cited in Kafadar, “Anatolian Muslim Merchants,” 194. Many other instances of the usage in Asian sources, including one in Southeast Asia, are noted in Bir Osmancî Kimîlî, 58–64; for Portuguese sources, see 78–88.


42. There is only one mention of Anatolian, for instance, in the new collection of Karaçagınlâ’s poetry by Saim Sakaçınlâ: Karaçagınlâ (Ankara, 2004), 556; this poem is likely to have been composed by a nineteenth-century imitator of Karamanli, since the poem refers to “İngiliz, Fransız, Moskof, Alaman”—a list of European nationalities that could hardly have been put together before that era. “Rum” and its alternative, folksy spelling “Urum,” but not “Anadan,” appear in two of Yunus Emre’s better-known poems: see Yunus Emre Divânî: Tekhîlî Metin, ed. Mustafa Taç (Istanbul, 2005), 281 and 289 respectively.

43. Cited by Mustafa Demirel in the introduction to his critical edition of İbn-i Kemal, Divânî (Istanbul, 1996), xxx. This folksy poem is not included in the scholar’s own collection of his poetry, which is noteworthy for a ghazal with “Rum” as its refrain (141); another one (182) addresses the beloved and depicts loving hearts as “pilgrims who came to the frontier of Rum that is your beauty.”

44. Baldurzade Selisi Şehî Mehmed, Râzîva-i Eyles, ed. Mefalî Hiz-
CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY AND IDENTITY IN THE LANDS OF RUM

I and Murat Yurtsever (Bursa, 2000), 76, 257, 281.


47. Yusuf b. 'Abdullah, Tûrûs-ı Ògmn, 269.


51. Øirvânlæ Fâtih Efendi, ibid., 81; the full phrase is Gûlzâr æ Fütûhât: Bir Görgü Tanâme (Ankara, 1999), 397.

52. Ibid., 81; the full phrase is kitâb-ı Adîmûla (the land of Ana- tolia).

53. Politis, "From Christian Roman Emperors," 7; also see, in the same volume, Peter Mackridge, "Byzantium and the Greek Language Question in the Nineteenth Century," 50.

54. Ahmed Vasîl Efendi, Mehâsînû-‘l-Àsâr, 357.

55. Gûlpærâh, Melânîwî ve Melânîwêş (İstanbul, 1931), 234–35. I am not sure that the disciple went astray by going to Serres (now in Greek Macedonia), as Gûlpærâh would have it, "since the lands of Rum imply Anatolia." We should also note that this is an Arabic source, and the trajectory of the word "Rum/Rumi" may be somewhat different in the different languages used in our relevant sources. Here, we are mostly concerned with the uses of the word in Turkish.


57. Şemseddin Sâmî, Kömîvîs Tûrîk (İstanbul, 1990), s.v. "Rûm" and "Anadolu." He had already expanded the nine-line en- try on Anatolia in Boullêt’s Dictionnaire universel d’histoire et de géographie to eleven pages in his own encyclopedic work of history and geography, which took the former as its model. See Ömer Faruk Akin, s.v. "Şemseddin Sâmî," in İslam An- kûsûgûl (Istanbul, 1986). From 1849, first in İzmir and then in İstanbul, Misâlîdîs published a periodical called Anadolu, which he also used as the name of his publishing house. When his 1871–72 novel was printed in Latin-letter transcription in 1886, a controversy arose as to whether it should be considered "the first novel in Turkish." The case of Misâlîdîs is a reminder that further study of conceptualizations of Anadolu among Greeks and Armenians should be added to a growing list of related research items.

58. I am reminded of Elia Kazan’s The Anatolian Smile, the alternative title of his film America, America.

59. Evangelinos Misâlîdîs, Seyreyle Dünyaş (Temâmas Dünya ve Çifuhar-ı Çifuhar), ed. Robert Anhegger and Vedat Gûnyol (İstanbul, 1986). From 1849, first in İzmir and then in İstanbul, Misâlîdîs published a periodical called Anadolu, which he also used as the name of his publishing house. When his 1871–72 novel was printed in Latin-letter transcription in 1886, a controversy arose as to whether it should be considered "the first novel in Turkish." The case of Misâlîdîs is a reminder that further study of conceptualizations of Anadolu among Greeks and Armenians should be added to a growing list of related research items.

60. Stéphane Yerasimos has garnered exquisite examples, from various sources published between 1917 and 1920, of the discourse that rendered this task an emergency: "As every- one knows, Turks came from Mongolia. While there, they learned nothing that would enable them to administer a country. They came as soldiers and conquerors and never became anything else….When Turks came to Asia Minor, they had no women with them….The primitive Turk will always remain at the level of an animal.….If you scratch the polish on the surface, you will encounter a Tatar.….Their way of living is always military….History has shown us that Turks do not have a faculty for intelligence….It is undeniable that Turks hate commerce….Turks are merely numbers….Do Turks have the capacity to establish a national identity?….Their is neither a country nor a nation.….We cannot speak of the existence of a Turkish people.….They have left their real home in Inner Asia and prepared the demise of the eastern Roman Empire. It is a burden placed upon us by civilization to make them return to where they came from, sooner or later." Yerasimos, "Ne Mutlu Türk’üm Diyene," in idem, ed., Türkler: Doğu ve Batı, İslam ve Laiklik, trans. Temel Keşifoğlu (İstanbul, 2002), 40–49.

61. Roughly, blood, soil, and place: held by Josef Strzygowski in idem, Europas Machtkunst im Rahmen des Erdkreises (Vienna, 1943), 721, 723, 725.


64. Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall, Büyük Osmanlı Tarhi, 10 vols., Turkish trans. Mümin Çevik and Erol Kâlîc (İstanbul, 1983), based on an earlier Ottoman Turkish translation by Mehmed Ata Bey, 5:577.

65. The promise of such an approach is borne out in Oya Panço- roğlu’s article “The Itinerant Dragon-Slayer: Forging Paths of Image and Identity in Anatolia,” Gesta 45, 2 (2004): 151–64, in which she brilliantly analyzes exchanges revolving around the dragon-slaying hero of Christians and Muslims in the re- gion of the Arab-Byzantine frontier, the cultural legacy of which played a formative role in the later adventures of the people of the lands of Rum.