The American Administrative State: Wilson and the Founders—An Unorthodox View

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Anniversaries prompt speculation about the past and its meaning. This review of the administrative evolution of our national government derives from such a stimulus, the forthcoming centennial of (Thomas) Woodrow Wilson's celebrated essay of 1887, "The Study of Administration." The focus is on the system transformations of our administrative state with an emphasis on founders and the theories and goals which have helped guide them. In closing, there are some contentious suggestions for the future in light of the past.

The Idea of an "Administrative State"

The phrase "administrative state" has been floating around for some time. What do we really mean by it? The recent literature of political science contains two major works bearing the title of The Administrative State, one by Dwight Waldo in 1948 and the other by Fritz Morstein Marx in 1957. Waldo defines by indirection, equating his title with the growth of modern public administration as a subject of study. This is too narrow for use here. Morstein Marx is interested in administrative action as well as theory, but his sole definition occurs almost as an afterthought in an early footnote: "... the 'administrative state' should be thought of not as a state devoid of legislative and judicial organs but as a state in which administrative organization and operations are particularly prominent, at least in their quantitative aspects." Though Morstein Marx never explains the last clause in this quotation, "quantitative" is a critically important qualifier in any full definition of modern administration. An administrative state without, for example, an adequate census is embryonic at best.

Morstein Marx's neutral and commonsense approach offers the foundation of a definition, but can one do any better? The current explosion of works on bureaucracy suggests the usefulness of some additional concepts, a majority deriving from Max Weber. Without an extensive exegesis on Weber, most social scientists should recognize the relevance of the first six criteria below in characterizing almost any administrative state, ancient or modern:

1. a workable organization in the classical hierarchic sense;
2. the recruitment of expertise by merit;
3. rational decision making;
4. the rule of law, with an emphasis on equality before the law;
5. written procedures and records;
6. and not only a money economy but sufficient public funds to support a complex administrative apparatus.

From here one must go beyond Weber and add four more criteria at best only implicit in his works:

7. Morstein Marx's requirement of a base in quantitative data and technique;
8. adequate supporting technology, especially pertaining to records, communications, and numeracy;
9. the enforcement of responsibility and ethical standards; and

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10. all of the above in at least a moderately developed and mutually supporting arrangement.

That is, to deserve the name, an administrative state must typify a working system in the modern sense of the word "system." Such a state is not necessarily good or bad, and I do not see its direction as determined. Direction and quality are consequences of the highly variable factors of culture and purpose, about which more in a moment.

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Has public administration in the United States met these criteria? Yes, it clearly has, at least twice, with each period, for quite different reasons, followed by a decline in administrative effectiveness.

Under Federalist-Jeffersonian auspices between 1789 and 1829 we evolved what I argue here was the first modern form of our administrative state, meeting all of the above criteria. From 1829 through the Civil War and Reconstruction the highly politicized Jacksonian-Radical Republican interlude flourished, with the Compromise of 1876 precipitating the removal of federal troops from the South and signaling the beginning of the end. We then soon entered into a fully self-conscious and highly inventive state of improvement and refinement of our administrative mechanism. This culminated in the creation of the Executive Office of the President and its wartime administrative machinery. The years since World War II comprise a fourth period during which the dysfunctional effects of our second administrative state are as discernible as its many accomplishments. The ten criteria already outlined provide guidelines for selection and emphasis.

Bear in mind several limitations herein. This is an all too brief overview directed almost entirely to the national government. Even there, helpful secondary literature is scarce and there are undoubtedly sins of omission. Some of my judgments are unorthodox, too. This is more a report from the perspective of the administrative engine room than a view from the political quarter-deck of our ship of state. Now for further prefatory notes in the next two sections.

Culture and Purpose

Let us return a moment to the two central factors of culture and purpose. These are much less indicators of the existence than governors of the direction and eventual quality of an administrative state. Space permits only a brief comment about culture relevance. The general significance of purpose and goals is dealt with in this section, but purposes in particular are analyzed as components of the eras to which they apply.

In its rich combination of resources and an educated and enterprising people, bound together in a democratic, pragmatically experimental, technologically inclined, and mobile society, driven by the Protestant Ethic and inspired by a sense of progress, the U.S. cultural milieu has provided a fertile soil for the growth of an advanced administrative system, both public and private. Moreover, our culture has seldom been very divisive. Except for the great quarrel over slavery and the role of blacks, we have had, as most foreign commentators have noted, an exceptionally homogeneous web of attitudes and values supporting our social system. There have been other conflicts, of course. The spoils system has been dying hard for a long time, and we are impatient with "bureaucracy" today. But, the gulf between ideals and administrative action has been less than in most nations.

Despite the current criticism of our administrative systems, a larger proportion of college students than ever before studies public or business administration. The subject is deeply embedded in our ethos. This is responsible for some of our troubles because we tend to see difficulties as problems of structure and process rather than of more basic purposes and goals. While few ends can be accomplished now without the support of competent administration, it is only a means. Without firm guidance from clearly articulated and understood ends to be sought, administration can, at best, hold the fort temporarily. At worst, it can cause the fort to self-destruct.

On Founders and Founding

I have already been unorthodox in ascribing the initial version of our administrative state to the Founding Fathers, thus pushing the date back exactly a century farther than conventional wisdom dictates and seeming to relieve Wilson and his essay of any responsibility. But the situation is not even that simple.

Wilson is widely assumed to be the founder of the academic study of public administration in this country, something to which none of the Founding Fathers can lay claim. Wilson's essay also has been seen as a kind of guiding light for the discipline ever since it was published. In fact, recent research soon to be published makes it clear that both attributions are incorrect—the first by a small and arguable margin, but the latter wildly off the mark. Let me summarize my findings,6

The story begins with the publication in 1879 of Dorman B. Eaton's well-received study of the British civil service, made at the request of President Hayes. Eaton (1823-1899) was then a well-known New York lawyer and a founder of the National Civil Service Reform League. Later, he drafted the Pendleton Act of 1883 and became first chairman of the U.S. Civil Service Commission. Thirty-five years ago Waldo reported that Eaton's 1879 work had referred in passing to the development of a science of administration in Britain, which we should take up in this country.7 But a few sentences do not match a 10,000-word essay and Wilson was held to be the "real" founder. A year ago I found that Eaton had greatly amplified his 1879 besides into the concluding section of a 2,500-word essay published in 1882 in the first volume of Lalor's three-volume *Cyclopedia of*
**Political Science.** We know also that Wilson attended economist Richard T. Ely's (1854-1943) lectures in administration at Johns Hopkins University during the second semester of 1884-85. In his autobiography Ely says, "When I talked about the importance of administration, I felt that I had struck a spark and kindled a fire in Wilson." Now, who is the founder?

Nevertheless, what of the essay's presumed influence on the course of public administration after 1887? In reality, any connection between Wilson's essay and the later development of the discipline is pure fantasy! An examination of major political and social science works of the period between 1890 and World War I shows no citation whatever of the essay in any of these volumes. Of the four public administration textbook authors prior to World War II—Leonard D. White, W. F. Willoughby, John Pfiffner, and Harvey Walker—only White mentioned the essay in the first and second editions of his textbook. In the middle of the 1930s others began to cite the essay, but not until the 1950s and Wilson's centennial did his essay come into any real prominence. That is, the 1887 work had no influence whatever on the evolution of either the theory or practice of public administration in the U.S. until well after 1950.

Not all founders are obvious. For many initiatives I can offer only an approximation. As for characterizing the founders, those of the first period formed a moderately cohesive elite. The second group was a mixed lot with little in common except for the small enclave of civil service reformers who worked together for personnel reform and sometimes for other purposes.

**Our First Administrative State**

The founding of the first administrative state between 1789 and 1829 was about as forthright as the creation of the Constitution which bounded it. There was then no useful literature on administration in the U.S., but there was a great fund of practical experience. The Federalist administrative state began with a classic pyramidal **organization design** of two major components. The invention of the presidency came by a convoluted process commencing on June 1, 1787, and not completed until September 6, only 12 days before the Constitutional Convention disbanded. Our innovation broke a long line of weak executive precedents. To Washington, Hamilton, and Jefferson we owe much of the presidency's development into an "energetic" institution. The keystone of an organizational structure was in place.

A simple, hierarchical departmental structure was quickly erected under the president by the first Congress, which also explicitly gave the president the power of removal, at best only implied in the Constitution. Our precedents and those of the English favored the kind of committee management typical under the Articles of Confederation, an arrangement which did not commend itself during the Revolution. So we produced a departmental system almost a century before the British. We retained it with but a few deviations until the 1930s. By contrast, in our state and local governments, the colonial tradition of committee management and a fragmented executive, reinforced by Jacksonianism, flourished past 1900. There were, however, no clearly staff agencies for decades, though there was some very early central purchasing through Hamilton's Treasury.

Washington inaugurated, and the remaining presidents of the period largely maintained, an essentially **merit system** of employment through which the best expertise was usually sought and tenure assured. Of further assistance was to be the Library of Congress, founded in 1800.

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**Rational decision making** was not a topic of conversation anywhere then. But the Founding Fathers were products of The Enlightenment, and their rationality is evident in the constitutional debates and for years thereafter. Hamilton's state papers on finance and the economy comprise the most impressive intellectual effort among our politicians to provide a sensible basis for planning and legislation.

A concern for law and equality before it was obvious in the acceptance of the Constitution, not to mention the Bill of Rights.

Systematic **procedures and records** were seen most in the Treasury under Hamilton, where, as the largest and most important agency then, they were most needed. As White records, Oliver Wolcott, an accountant and Hamilton's chief auditor, later secretary in his own right, brought order out of "a chaos of old records." Hamilton himself even designed forms.

The new nation desperately needed a firm **financial base**. The contributions of Hamilton and Gallatin were extraordinary. The former's comprehensive financial proposals were the closest to an executive budget we were to see for more than a century. He assured our main source of revenue from an astonished set of importers by vigorously collecting the customs, something which had not been done well for years. Expenditures were adequately audited. The First and Second U.S. Banks represented an early use of the corporate mode.

Quantitative data arrived with the census. Accounting was satisfactory for the times, and thank Heaven for Hamilton's insistence on a decimal monetary system! Mathematics and science were developing, precision was sought in naval charts, and the level of economic and social analysis in state papers is surprising.

The technology of the period was not very helpful to administration, though the steamboat (1807) and the Erie (1825) and other canals helped communications.

The quick institution of proper audits was one measure of our early sense of accountability and respon-
sibility. Firm civil control of the military was another. Perhaps our first conflict-of-interest legislation was in the surprisingly complete provisions on the subject in the 1789 act establishing the ‘Treasury Department.’ Hamilton’s hand is again apparent. About the Federalists and ethics, White says that “never...has the standard of integrity of the federal civil service been at a higher level.”

That is, within hardly five years the Federalists, as White observes, “spelled out the scanty provisions of the Constitution and created from almost nothing an administrative system.”

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The Jeffersonians inherited this system, had sense enough to leave most of it alone, and saw that it continued to function almost as well as under the Federalists. Especially effective administrators were Gallatin, John C. Calhoun as one of our ablest secretaries of war, Postmaster General John McLean, and Attorney General William Wirt.

However, the main administrative innovations were by the Federalists. Washington’s firm and practiced hand and his unusual sense of the importance of precedent kept the state afloat, but it was Hamilton’s guiding genius which set it rapidly on course. About Hamilton both White and Caldwell, the principal administrative historians of the period, concur. If anyone deserves a title as the founder of the American administrative state, in terms of both theory and practice, it is not Wilson, Eaton, or Ely but Alexander Hamilton (1757-1804). I rest my case for our first administrative state.

The Jacksonian and Radical Interlude

The Jacksonians and Radical Republicans have not often been joined together for analysis, but the regimes had much in common. Politically, the result was what many of the Founding Fathers had feared, the dominance of a demagogic majoritarianism which, driven by an intense concern for power in its later stages, pandered to our worst instincts through the spoils system and an unbridled opening up of natural resources to exploitation. The culmination came with the forcible occupation of the South for a decade, the attempted impeachment of Andrew Johnson, and the incredible corruption of the Gilded Age. The lengths to which both centralization and decentralization, the former at the national level and the other in state and local governments, could be manipulated by an unrestrained and corrupt but organizationally powerful party system were so clearly demonstrated that the backlash brought about a major reorientation of government both politically and, important here, administratively.

However, the half century between our administrative states was not without administrative accomplishments. Some innovations came out of the Civil War. There was a renewed understanding of the importance of organization, line and staff relationships, and orderly procedure. Precedents were set for the later creation of a general staff. To the brilliant Maj. Gen. Montgomery C. Meigs, Lincoln’s quartermaster general, who held the office until 1882, we owe our first unified logistical effort in wartime, contributing greatly to Northern success. Lincoln himself played a major role in the founding of the National Academy of Sciences. While the Radicals meddled in everything in the name of “congressional government,” they, Lincoln, and Grant managed to win decisively the first great modern war and the Union held.

An initial dent in the spoils system was made in 1860 through the founding of the first central service agency. After years of treating printing contracts as partisan spoils, involving millions in kickbacks to the party in power, Congress finally created the Government Printing Office with a mandate, in part, for competitive bidding. Incredibly, some costs were reduced by 50 to 90 percent.

Moreover, we find the beginnings of civil service reform scattered throughout this period. The most important action came in 1871 when, almost single-handedly, U.S. Senator Lyman Trumbull of Illinois succeeded in getting a reform rider attached to the civil appropriation bill. This authorized the president to regulate personnel procedures through a liberal delegation of power, still a source of presidential authority. Under this law President Grant, surprisingly, created the little known First Civil Service Commission of 1871, which died in 1875 from lack of appropriations and presidential interest. Nevertheless, under the direction first of George William Curtis and then of Dorman B. Eaton, much of the practical groundwork was laid for the lasting reforms of 1883.

The forcible ratification of the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments with their due process and equal protection clauses, followed by our only civil rights acts for a century, provided the legal basis for civil rights movements from then on.

The powerful party mechanisms of the Jacksonians and early Republicans had an administrative component rarely made explicit. To Martin Van Buren goes main credit for the first well organized campaign system as he masterminded the formation of the Democratic Party and the election of Andrew Jackson in 1828. Even the spoils system was very much a system. Patronage provided the workers; assessments and kickbacks, the funds. The Radicals, especially, were thoroughly organized, centralizing congressional authority as well. But their aim was far from the rational management seen as a principal function of the administrative state.

By the time of Grant, the combined Jacksonian and Radical system had generated its own depressing symptoms at all levels. It is ironic to note that the next wave of vigorous reform sought to attack the evils of the centralization of power at the national level, only to supply...
versions of centralization to end the corruption and administrative chaos in state and local government.

The Second Administrative State

By 1876 the basic question was becoming: could we simultaneously renovate a run-down administrative system and regain the idealism which had fueled the first version of our administrative state?

Unlike the first, our second administrative state was guided by conscious theory, but only from its middle years. Before World War I there were few works that might have in any way assisted, say, Theodore Roosevelt in managing the construction of the Panama Canal, the greatest engineering project in the world up to that time. The momentum of the second administrative state was initiated by men like the Federalists, men of affairs and practical experience, many of whom had played important military roles in the Civil War. Size and complexity began generating observations and experimentation. By 1910, literate theory was beginning to proliferate. This has been reviewed for public administration by Waldo, already cited. The predominant thrust was provided by the doctrines of classical management, specifically those emphasizing line and staff, functionalism, and the old "principles" of administration, all to the ends of "economy and efficiency." From 1914, Congress forbade the use of Taylor's time studies for the next 40 years. The budding human relations movement of Follett and others had little impact either.

While this period saw the beginnings of public administration education around 1890 and its rapid curricular expansion after World War I, the academic writings were largely legalistic or descriptive. Between world wars the working guidelines for public administration were expounded mainly by a small group of practical administrators-turned-theorists on a part-time basis. Harrington Emerson, Luther Gulick, Lyndall Urwick, Henri Fayol, and the Mooney and Reily duo were among the main cast of characters. Gulick and Urwick's 1937 Papers on the Science of Administration provided the first anthology directed at the idea of administration as a universal process. Originally, these papers were put together for use by the research staff of the President's Committee on Administrative Management, whose 1937 report was the last to recommend reform of the executive branch along purist classical lines.

In 1876 the simple Federalist organizational structure was largely intact. From the twin pressures of a growing complexity and a nascent need to exclude partisanship and spoils as much as possible, a few early precedents were set which opened the door to some fragmentation of the executive branch. But in two arenas, one civil and the other military, centralization prospered.

Under Cleveland, Theodore Roosevelt, and Wilson the presidency regained its former prestige and moral authority. Under FDR the President's Committee's central proposal, for an Executive Office of the President staffed by a small corps of administrative assistants, was finally authorized by the Reorganization Act of 1939 and put in place September 11, during the invasion of Poland. This provided the headquarters for an effective superstructure to manage the war effort on the home front. The Federalist administrative keystone was back in place, and the balance between the two major branches shifting again.

On the military front a general staff presided over the army. The staff concept had been evolving rapidly since the time of Napoleon. But this device for executive support and planning did not become a reality here until Theodore Roosevelt and his Secretary of War Elihu Root together pushed the General Staff Act of 1903 through a reluctant Congress and over the head of a stubborn commanding general of the U.S. Army. Root's case for the reform in his report of 1902 has been described as "one of the monumental works of American staff literature." The system was tested in World War I and remained in place thereafter, being applied to the entire military establishment after World War II. The line and staff arrangement, already a model for a few businesses by 1900, became increasingly important in all civil affairs.

Nevertheless, while the immediate entourage of the president was greatly strengthened by the end of World War II, the system over which he presided was undergoing slow fission. Fragments arose in both old and new forms, but the concern here is mainly with the latter.

After a long period of stability, the departmental system slowly began to expand as the attorney general was elevated to head a new Department of Justice in 1870. Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor followed by 1913. There, at 10, the total rested for 40 years. But the growth of other hierarchic, single-headed agencies continued. During World War I the words "administration," "authority," and the like were used to describe some of the temporary war agencies. The titles stuck if not most of the agencies. The largest residual was the U.S. Veterans Bureau which, combined with a Treasury bureau in 1930, became the current Veterans Administration, the first important permanent agency to be so named. During the depression years another dozen or so were added, with the Works Progress Administration a major example.

As for central staff agencies, the Treasury's old but modest central purchasing function was expanded in June 1933 to include all civilian purchasing via a Treasury Procurement Division. After the war this and some related functions were consolidated in the new General Services Administration.

The first well organized staff agency was for personnel (a twentieth century term, however), the Civil Service Commission, reestablished in 1883. The Pendleton Act set the precedent of a bi-partisan commission and gave it the novel role of one segment of the executive branch controlling the rest, even top management, through policing the patronage. The first departmental personnel office was that of Agriculture in 1925 under the supervision of the distinguished W. W. Stockberger. There was no general requirement for personnel offices in agencies until Franklin D. Roosevelt's executive order of 1938. This was barely in time to prepare the govern-
ment for the extreme civil expansion of World War II, from more than 900,000 employees in 1939 to more than 3,800,000 regular employees plus 330,000 WOCs (without compensation) and dollar-a-year personnel by 1945.

The beginnings of a management analysis (a 1950s term) function came with the addition to the Civil Service Commission of a Division of Efficiency in 1912, with the unusual purpose of investigating the executive branch primarily on behalf of Congress. The juxtaposition was messy and the division became an independent bureau in 1916. The impact of the first in-house study group was limited because of too great an immersion in detail. FDR abolished the agency in 1933 as a retrenchment move and the function disappeared until the late 1940s, reappearing in the Bureau of the Budget and agency staff sections.21

The doctrine of public employment as a privilege, enunciated so forcefully by Justice Holmes . . . that a policeman "has no constitutional right to be a policeman," was in force throughout our second administrative state and only gradually expired in recent decades.

Through the reports of Taft’s Commission on Economy and Efficiency in 1912-13, plus some state and local experimentation, a basis was laid for the initiation of an executive budget and a financial staff agency. In most nations executive financial controls had preceded those for other resources, but in the U.S. they came in last. Finance was a jealously guarded legislative function, and the separation of powers, unlike the parliamentary system, did not make cooperation easy. By World War I the budgeting and appropriation processes were chaotic and reform finally came in the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921. Through a new Bureau of the Budget, the president proposed and Congress disposed. Control of accounting procedures, post-audit and, before long, pre-audit were taken from the executive and placed with a new congressional agency, the General Accounting Office, headed by the comptroller general. Both new agencies were given management study and research authority, but, probably because of the Bureau of Efficiency, neither exercised this power much until after World War II.

Little innovation came from the comptroller general for another 40 years. But the new BOB (renamed Office of Management and Budget in 1970) got off to a flying start under the direction of General Charles G. Dawes, a Chicago banker who had directed the American army’s supply service in Europe during World War I and later became vice president. An executive budget became a reality and Congress prepared to examine it as a total entity for the first time since the days of Hamilton. Central clearance of agency legislative proposals was begun, allotments and budget ceilings for agencies were introduced, and a first beginning effort at general regional coordination was made.

Planning got a brief promising trial between 1935 and 1943 through the National Resources Planning Board and its predecessors, only to have a jealous Congress jettison the process just when it was most needed.

Creation of central staff agencies assisted presidential control, but the rise of independent regulatory commissions and government corporations did not. The former came from the state to the national level in 1887 through the creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission. The Federal Reserve Board was formed in 1915, the Federal Trade Commission in 1914, and others in the twenties and thirties. A few regulatory entities, such as the Commissioner of Food and Drugs, were placed within departments, but most were not only multi-headed and independent, but the appointments were bipartisan, for long staggered terms, and protected against removal for other than inefficiency or malfeasance in office. These provisions, not the fact the agencies stood alone, have made them independent of all but the most powerful and persuasive of presidents. By World War II the Supreme Court had upheld these arrangements, and the president’s removal power, even of political appointees, was for the first time limited.

Generally considered the first public owned and managed agency of a business type to be brought into the federal government was the Panama Railroad Company, purchased from the French in 1904. Thus began a long line of government corporations, differentiated by a board of directors, a general manager, and their own income and resources separate from those provided through the regular budget. The protections given to regulatory commissioners were often applied to corporation board members, who had the added independence of self-generated revenues and of many exemptions from standard departmental controls. At least 12 federal corporations, some with private participation, were listed in the 1939 Official Register. A few more were created in World War II and a number afterward.22

Expertise and selection by merit via the Civil Service Commission has been noted. If anyone deserves the title of founder of our modern system of public employment, it is Dorman B. Eaton. However, his and other civil service reformers’ views on two important aspects of the merit system have been widely misunderstood.

First, they posed at most only a very mild dichotomy between politics and administration. They advocated the partisan but not total political neutrality of the service. Their doctrine of neutrality was that of the British. Career civil servants were forbidden to play any active party role and were protected from partisan removal and assessments, but they were expected to further the lawful policies of the party in power. The Hatch Acts of the 1930s did little but put into law and expand the coverage of traditional rules against partisan political activity by careerists. Second, the reforms of 1883 closed only what has been termed “the front door” to the service. The reformers strongly opposed all protections against removal except that forbidding removal for active partisanship. The doctrine of public employment as a privilege, enunciated so forcefully by Justice
Holmes from the Massachusetts bench in 1892 by his dictum that a policeman "has no constitutional right to be a policeman," was in force throughout our second administrative state and only gradually expired in recent decades. By 1900 a few reformers, notably Carl Schurz, began to have second thoughts and the Lloyd-La Follette Act of 1912, which also authorized postal employees to join their own unions, required removing officers to give reasons in writing and permit those removed a chance to reply, with files kept for inspection. However, no hearing or court procedure was mandated, and there the matter ended for many years.

Note, too, that the Pendleton Act did not seriously damage the patronage for decades. The law first applied to only 12 percent of the service; expansion was permitted by presidential order. Inclusions grew to about 50 percent under Theodore Roosevelt, increasing gradually to 80 percent by 1930. There was some backsliding under FDR, but in the other major fulfillment of the President's Committee's recommendations he signed the Ramberry Act of 1940 which brought perhaps 95 percent of the service under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission, with 85 percent fully career, figures comparable to those of today. The provision of civil pensions in 1920 and the start of position classification in 1923 aided greatly. By World War II modern personnel management was becoming a reality for most of the service. During the early days of the war, Commissioner Arthur S. Flemming, later Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, with the permission of the other commissioners and the president, designed a new management approach to personnel, whereby the commission delegated most of its powers to the new agency personnel offices, subject to post-audit control. This important innovation toward decentralization, which has continued, fostered the rapid and vast expansion of the service so essential for war without upsetting the intent of the merit system. From then on, personnel management was to be primarily an agency function guided by general standards.

By the 1870s sizable numbers of intellectuals again began to interest themselves in government at all levels. Most of the prominent civil service reformers deserve such a designation—Curtis and Eaton, E. L. Godkin, Moorfield Storey, Richard Henry Dana, not to mention Theodore Roosevelt and Wilson. Eaton chaired the personnel agency, Roosevelt followed as a commissioner, and Thomas M. Cooley, a former Michigan law professor and justice of the Michigan Supreme Court, chaired the new ICC. Andrew D. White, first president of Cornell and a noted historian, became ambassador to Prussia and Russia. Roosevelt personally sought to bring bright young men into the government, among them Gifford Pinchot, Felix Frankfurter, William Allen White, Henry L. Stimson, and James Garfield. T.R. created a number of unpaid commissions of experts to assist him in diagnosing and prescribing for a wide range of ills. Congress objected to gratuitous advice and sought to prevent such endeavors. Roosevelt quickly replied that he could take advice from wherever he wanted. From this time on the volunteer in public service—soon officially known as the "dollar-a-year" man—was a frequent phenomenon. The six members of Taft's commission included Frederick A. Cleveland as chairman, plus W. F. Willoughby and Goodnow. Between 1905 and 1907 this Cleveland and others organized the New York Bureau of Municipal Research, later headed by Beard and Gulick and, since 1921, known as the Institute of Public Administration.

At the same time La Follette and Van Hise were developing the university-state cooperation known widely as the Wisconsin Plan, private consulting commenced on a professional basis, and "the survey" was born. A curriculum for training students in public administration was initiated in 1911 by the Training School for Public Service in association with and later part of the Institute of Public Administration. This school was the forerunner of today's Maxwell School at Syracuse University. The military already had a long history of technical training, but in 1901 Elihu Root, in another first, founded what has become the distinguished U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas. The beginnings of the Army War College also date from this time.

Wilson was ambivalent about intellectuals, but many entered public life just before and during World War I. Some 150, known as The Inquiry Scholars, were organized by Col. House in 1919 and helped with peace treaty negotiations. Formal training for the public service received its first great impetus during the depression, when bright young men and women of all classes flocked to the universities and from thence into the government. Discouraged by the inability of politicians and businessmen to solve the problems of the day, FDR turned often to the universities. The story of his "Brain Trust" and his reliance on a steady stream of intellectual, often professorial, talent is well known. His President's Committee consisted of Brownlow, Merriam, and Gulick. This period signified the permanent importance of research in modern political decision making, the decline of traditional sources of political innovation, and the rise of intellectuals to a permanent role in public life.

The organizational and expertise base for rational decision making and application was in place by 1940. Meanwhile, the army had adopted its famous "estimate of the situation" format for decision making in the field, a guide which still dominates much of the decision literature. The new executive budget greatly assisted in civil affairs. Throughout, there was optimism about the potential in a science of administration, developed more precisely later under the rubric of administrative science.

By 1900 formal equality before the law was being given limited assistance from Supreme Court interpretations of the Radical's amendments. Of symbolic importance was Theodore Roosevelt's public reception of Booker T. Washington at lunch in the White House. Of more practical influence was his frequent appointment of blacks to public office, even in the South. But perhaps the greatest support for equality of opportunity and upward social mobility came with civil service
reform. It is not widely realized that Congress modified Eaton’s draft of the Pendleton Act in two critical respects. It eliminated the phrase “entrance only at the bottom” and it added a requirement that examinations should be as practical as possible. This changed our personnel concept from that of a British closed system to one of an open, program-oriented system which anyone with competitively established credentials might aspire to enter. Moreover, from the beginning the Civil Service Commission equated experience with education so that, unlike most foreign systems, ours has never been limited to formal degree holders. Apparently, Congress made its changes from gut feeling and deep cultural predisposition. This new system permitted large numbers of, notably, blacks and women to enter into and prosper within our national service during this period, long before equivalent opportunity was available in private enterprise.

Roosevelt’s 1903 decision in the Miller case, to reinstate a GPO foreman who had been fired by the public printer because the man’s union had expelled him, declared the civil service to be an open shop, a policy yet retained. Admired at the time but controversial later were the firm affirmations by Coolidge in the 1920s and Franklin D. Roosevelt in the 1930s that there was no right to strike in government, a prohibition made statutory by the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947. Even so, most postal workers had joined their own unions by World War I. By 1917 inflation and a threat to increase hours of work sparked the formation of the National Federation of Federal Employees, the first general union of white collar workers in the federal service.14

The recognition of administrative law as a legitimate segment of public law in the U.S. is usually attributed to the influence of Goodnow’s 1893 two-volume Comparative Administrative Law. The Stones have described this work as “the first American treatise on public administration,” and in many ways Goodnow was the effective founder of academic public administration in the U.S.15 The formation of special courts for particular administrative purposes commenced in 1855 with the U.S. Court of Claims. Others followed every decade or two until the present total of six was reached in 1971. The courts and the regulatory agencies represented two thrusters at the same problem, how to deal with increasing complexity. The underlying notion was simple—it takes one to know one—using experts to control expertise under the guidance of laws giving considerable leeway to all parties and endeavoring to rule out partisan preference in the manner of civil service reform. Establishment of the Federal Register in 1935 finally gave access if not order to the burgeoning mass of administrative regulations coming from these and other agencies. Administration even entered directly into the regular judicial system through the creation in 1939 of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts.

From the 1880s paperwork and record keeping were becoming real burdens and precise procedural analysis necessarily more commonplace. These were promoted by size, complexity again, and growing legal require-ments, but new technology, about which more in a moment, immensely boosted the thrust. A Committee on Department Methods, known as the Keep Committee, was appointed by Roosevelt in 1905. Between then and 1909 it reported periodically on records, lighting, leave, position classification and the like. The Bureau of Efficiency, early consulting firms, and the bureaus of government research added their recommendations. By 1913, the Commission on Economy and Efficiency had made more than 85 studies of such diverse topics as budgeting, distribution of government publications, travel expenditures, methods of filing, and superannuation. The President’s Committee of 1937 followed in its footsteps, but more comprehensively and less in detail. Most of these efforts originated in the executive branch, but they were paralleled by congressional committee after committee striving in the same vineyard.

We had a money economy, of course, but the insurance of adequate funds for almost any emergency was gained with approval in 1913 of the Sixteenth Amendment authorizing an income tax. The first truly conditional and managed grant-in-aid program to the states came at this time, with the passage of the Weeks Act of 1911 pertaining to forest preservation. The U.S. Supreme Court then put its stamp of approval on this and the many similar measures which were rapidly completing the transformation of the old competitive federalism into a more cooperative arrangement and commencing to alter radically our fiscal and administrative systems as they related to state and local government. By 1938, Jane Perry Clark was delineating the Rise of a New Federalism, a quarter century before Morton Grodzins’ more complete and sophisticated analysis of his “marble cake” version.

From the 1870s technology and numeracy became inseparable. The census continued, but compiling procedures were primitive and the data forbidding. This prompted one employee, Herman Hollerith, to concentrate on automating the census of 1890. By the middle eighties he had devised the first punched card system of electrical accounting. It proved workable and by mergers his 1896 Tabulating Machine Co. developed into IBM. The Burroughs adding machine patent of 1886 was commercially successful. The quantitative approach continued to flower as did automation, with the first large-scale digital computer, the Mark I, conceived in 1937 by Howard Aiken of Harvard and built by IBM in 1944, bringing a true tidal wave of innovation to information processing and data management. Meanwhile the precursor of a Bureau of Labor Statistics was established in 1884 with the noted Carroll B. Wright, who set up a similar bureau in Massachusetts in 1869, named as commissioner. The National Bureau of Standards was formed in 1901.

Communications were in flux too. The telegraph had been with us since the 1830s and the transatlantic cable since 1866. The telephone arrived in 1876, and the radio shortly thereafter. New York and Boston were linked by phone in 1884. Marconi’s first transatlantic radio message was sent in 1901. In 1915, the first transatlantic telephone call was made and the first transatlantic
radio-telephone message sent. Endless refinements followed, greatly speeding up the transaction of business but increasing the pressure on organizational systems.

New forms of records appeared and old ones multiplied. The typewriter, commercially feasible after 1873, was in wide use by the 1890s. Monotype and linotype machines came in 1885 and 1886 respectively. David Gestetner’s twin-cylinder, stencil duplicating machine was patented in 1900. The inundation of paper prompted additional innovations. Melvil Dewey worked out the first decimal system for the classification of library books in the 1870s, with the War Department preparing a similar system for filing. Vertical file cabinets, first of wood, did not arrive until about 1890, with widespread prophecies that the silly idea of standing papers on edge would never catch on! Electronic data banks were contemplated by the 1940s.

The signal engineering challenge of the period, also invoking major medical and administrative problems, was met by, primarily, Theodore Roosevelt and the army when the Panama Canal was completed between 1904 and 1914, after the French had failed and an initial civilian management had found itself in difficulty. This accomplishment was overshadowed only by the logistical miracles associated with the two world wars. That is enough of technology, even without mention of the impact of the auto, airplane, battleship, diesel engine, and so on, to illustrate the pressure of technology on administration. Henry Adams was not alone in bemoaning the accelerating pace.

Fortunately, the late nineteenth century also brought with it a renewed sense of morality and ethics. The civil service reformers were the first to challenge successfully, in the name of morality, the vast corruption of the political system. Cleveland proclaimed "public office is a public trust." This attack broadened with Progressivism and embraced a range of moves against privilege and partisanship. The "practical idealism" of Theodore Roosevelt summed up the movement, as his vigorous and inventive personality made it real. By his time Lord Bryce said that he had "... never in any country seen a more eager, high-minded and efficient set of public servants, men more useful and creditable to their country, than the men doing the work of the American Government in Washington and in the field." Except for the Teapot Dome and other scandals under Harding and considerable patronage manipulation within new agencies in the early years of FDR’s administration, the moral tone of the service remained high and its prestige was clearly on the rise among all classes.

Our second administrative state was even more of an integrated working system than the first, of which it was still a distant mirror image. There were three main achievements. The extension and refinement of administration, guided loosely by the conscious theories of classical management, comprised the first. More important and about as self-conscious was the permeation of the system with a renewed ethos and sense of purpose. Not only was the American Dream still highly visible as a guiding beacon, but during this period we also fought and won three righteous wars, brought our coasts together by spanning an isthmus, fought to a standstill the worst depression of the century, and still managed to have the highest living standard in the world. Such achievement is heady brew!

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As a result, by the end of World War I an heretical and explosive idea had been planted in the body politic. This was that the modern administrative state, properly directed, could accomplish almost anything we might envision and, what is more, at a reasonable cost. The next quarter century of governmental success only confirmed this belief. By 1945, for the first time in our history, the positive administrative state was received as a positive good by a large proportion of the voting public.

The presidential leadership as a whole throughout these years was exceptional. Nevertheless, for his administrative capacity and his energetic revitalization and modernization of American government to face the coming problems of the twentieth century, Theodore Roosevelt stands out. He was like Washington in a deep sense of principle and both sought to set an example in practice. In comparison to Hamilton, both were intellectuals of a high order, astonishingly eclectic in their wide-ranging interests, experienced in civil and military affairs, and appearing often as almost "driven" to see that things went right. T.R.’s political capacity was the more complete and effective and he managed to turn the entire politico-administrative mechanism around, but Hamilton’s state papers reached a level far beyond those of the first Roosevelt. Hamilton’s theoretical and practical capacity in finance and political economy was vast and unique at the time. Theodore Roosevelt’s extraordinary ability in almost all other aspects of public affairs made him unique a century later.

Wilson, Hoover, and Franklin D. Roosevelt each was able to reformulate and refuel our sense of mission in accord with the times. Theirs was high leadership too. However, though frequently innovative and certainly energetic, these presidents only refined, readjusted, and added to the administrative machinery of state. Most of the essential administrative model had been already designed, the precedents set, and the foundations in place by the time they came into office.

The Bureaucratic State

The end of World War II marks the fourth major milestone in the evolution of our national administrative system. The undefined label of "bureaucratic" is applied to the current period, as the word’s ambiguity perfectly accords with our very mixed feelings about the administrative state of today.
Social systems carry within themselves the seeds of their own potential destruction. As the Achilles heel of our first administrative state lay in widespread perceptions of its elitism, that of the Jacksonian-Radical era lay in the corrupting tendencies of power. The vulnerability of the second administrative state, handiwork of both Republicans and Democrats, has stemmed from blind and inflated expectations of its crowning achievement, the positive administrative state and the classical theories of management which underlie it. By the 1960s the administrative system of the two Roosevelts had become a full administrative government heavily centered in and financed from Washington. Our chief executive was expected to manage practically everything.

Each period has provided its own major remedy to compensate for the inadequacies and dangers in the system preceding it. To quote another aphorism, nothing succeeds like success. The medicine found so effective in its day has been applied in such overdoses as to make the patient ill again. As Peter Drucker diagnosed in 1969, "Governance is sick." He could have said, "again." Yet in their worst light, our two patent elixirs have been the President's Committee's bureaucratic force of centralized executive management applied with Hamiltonian relentlessness or the power wielded by "the vicious and excessive activity of partisans," to quote Dormain B. Eaton in 1879. For each the precise formula has never quite been the same, but the essential ingredients have had much in common. It is intriguing to find Milton Friedman calling in 1983 for a return to the spoils system through the Reagan Office of Personnel Management's own house organ.

To be sure, from 1945 until the 1960s we were euphoric. The Korean conflict ended with some honor, an extended prosperity created the longest period of manpower shortages in our history, Kennedy brought glamour back to the presidency and started us to the moon, and Johnson's Great Society program showed great promise for civil rights and the inner city.

Administrative refinement continued apace, largely under earlier motivations. Let us review some of the more important actions, again in the sequence of the original criteria. The creation in 1948-50 of a Department of Defense plus related new entities such as the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency provided the most spectacular organizational change. This was rivaled only by the demise in 1970 of the heart of the old patronage system, the Post Office Department, and its transformation into our greatest public corporation ever, the U.S. Postal Service, now with a full merit system and orders to make ends meet. The two Hoover Commissions of 1949 and 1955 stimulated a battery of incremental additions and consolidations. Beginning in 1949 the supergrades were added, pay began to be dramatically improved, and expanded entry level examinations were attracting large numbers of able college graduates. In the early 1960s systems analysis and performance budgeting entered into decision making, and data processing was transformed into information systems. John F. Kennedy introduced for-
"Who could have anticipated," mused President Bok of Harvard in 1980, "the 10,000 words of regulatory prose that emerged from just 45 words of legislation requiring adequate opportunities for the handicapped?" Rufus Miles has underscored the sensitivity of the earth's eco-system, the failure to cope with interdependence, and the exceeding vulnerability of complicated technological systems to accident, penetration, and sabotage, illustrated so well by the great New York blackout of 1977 and the recent escapades of students gaining entry into computer systems. Procurement lead times are lengthening dangerously, and heavy industry, the backbone of any defense system, is in deep trouble. In frustration, everyone is suing everyone as Congress and the courts judicialize administration so that, for example, public employment has become almost a property right once again. The judiciary has also moved in to administer elections and education, as the Supreme Court allows the civil rights amendments to override the rest of the Constitution regardless of framers' intent. The commonality in all this appears to be not just obvious overload of the judicial system but total system overload compounded by consequent weariness on the part of all concerned.

Through the past four presidential campaigns the scapegoat has been "the bureaucracy" in Washington. There are indeed problems there, and their source lies mainly in Washington, but the bureaucracy—meaning the great bulk of the civil service—is no longer at the national level and has not been for 30 years. Since Korea the federal civil service has expanded from 2.1 to nearly 2.9 million persons, but with its growth proportionately under that of the population. At the same time, but only partly under the stimulus of increasing federal funds, our state and local public services have trebled, ballooning from some 4 million in 1950 to more than 13 million in 1980. Add to this the fact that nearly 90 percent of the federal service is not in the Washington, D.C., area and never has been, the federal field service being scattered broadly among us, with 150,000 living in my state of Texas alone. The bulk of "the bureaucracy" is not in Washington! It is right at home where we live! Moreover, with so much of the budget allocated for grants-in-aid to state and local government, for transfer payments to individuals, and for defense, Frederick Mosher has recently estimated that no more than 5 to 7 percent of the federal budget is "allotted to domestic activities that the federal government performs itself." That is, the nuts and bolts of federal civil government cost us very, very little indeed.

What's the problem then? After the Civil War it was said that the Grand Army of the Republic (Northern war veterans) had saved the country and now wanted it! Today, most of our civil service is at home taking care of us; and, through grants-in-aid and transfer payments, we are receiving perhaps 60 percent of the federal budget right where we live and for improving our own local and personal lot. A century ago our land and resources were thrown open to all of us under the Radical Republicans in the name of democratic majoritarianism and freedom, economic and otherwise. Today there are few similar resources to throw. Instead, through a lower key gradualism, we have for a quarter century been voting ourselves largess from the public trough beyond any dreams of the past, with the eager assistance of our senators and congressmen who depend on us for reelection. Even a popular president like Eisenhower could not keep the lid on very long.

Reform under such circumstances is now, as it was then, a laborious and Herculean task. Again, we ourselves are the root cause. Yet now, as then, there is a pervasive feeling that something is wrong and a deep yearning for guidance. There are today many parallels to our nineteenth century situation.

**Past Is Prologue**

In 1876, also the year of the Philadelphia centennial celebration, there was no obvious solution either; rather, a confusing array of alternatives—e.g., a Prohibition Party, a Greenback Party, Liberal Republicans, Standpatters, Gold Democrats, Single Taxers and Socialists. The major parties alternated in power in rapid succession as the electorate sought programmatic leadership. Reagan's electoral success from a minority party base, like that of Cleveland in 1884, lies in the fact that, for the first time in four administrations—also alternating Republicans and Democrats—he has a plan based on historic principle. Cleveland stood for retrenchment and, especially, for a return to honesty and integrity in politics, representing important concerns but not basic issues bearing on economics, liberty, or equality. That is, Cleveland's was a "how to do it" not a "what to do" program.

Reagan's inaugural theme, "Government is not the solution to our problem; government is the problem," set the stage for the first serious fight for retrenchment (a good nineteenth century term) for the first time in decades. A combination of skill playing on widespread apprehension has made the old battle cries of economy, efficiency, and decentralization rebound once again.

Reagan's three-pronged program is quite appropriate, but there are three major flaws in his operational approach to the program and two other difficulties which can cause considerable anguish all round.

The most fundamental flaw lies in the nature of his three goals, for like Cleveland's, they emphasize "how" not "what." They provide no guidance about where to retrench and where not to retrench, what to decentralize and what not. They are not substantive, but procedural, as is efficiency too. For substantive and "what to do" examples I refer back to the period between the presidencies of Grant and McKinley when the really fundamental struggle was over whether industrialism would supersede agriculture in national priority. The former won a clear victory finally in 1896. Then the question became: what kind of industrialism? There were three choices: the Marxian state enterprise approach (Marxism was then at its strongest in our history); the cartelism of the trusts of the day; or dusting off the Sherman Antitrust Act in favor of enforced competi-
tion. Under Theodore Roosevelt’s and Wilson’s guidance we chose the third. Nevertheless, the battle had been confused by a sound-soft money controversy and other secondary concerns such as those Cleveland represented, which needed to be settled but were also distractions from mainstream missions on the political war front. That is, Reagan’s program is very like Cleveland’s in essence—no answer to questions about “what to do.”

It is intriguing to find Milton Friedman calling in 1983 for a return to the spoils system through the Reagan Office of Personnel Management’s own house organ.

The critical matter now is not just controlling government, but to what ends. Since 1960 at least it is apparent that we have entered Daniel Bell’s post-industrial era. But the question still is: what shall be the nature of the wine in that bottle? This query is not as simple as in 1900 when industrialism provided an obvious out. Ponder the following bare bones scenario:

Currently, two choices are bruit about: (1) to follow the high-tech knowledge processing route to world leadership or (2) to reemphasize and rebuild our heavy industry base. We pursue both, but in different ways. Let high-tech go where it will with strong R&D backup of our bases of knowledge. About heavy industry, we agree that Felix Rohatyn, catalyst of New York City’s financial survival, is dead right—there can be no world power without a solid industrial base. We help this base renovate itself through the kind of support Chrysler received but from a new version of the old Reconstruction Finance Corporation, so useful earlier. This is, we treat industry today as we did agriculture after the turn of the century. Neither is any longer our primary concern, but both must be kept efficient and viable. Such an approach, combined with continued attention to civil rights and the disadvantaged and to a prudent husbanding of energy and the eco-system, for both of which most of the legislative base is in place, makes the most substantive sense now. Economy, efficiency, and decentralization can then be applied to much greater avail, as well as, with care, some further doses of classical economics.

Such a program has something in it for almost everyone, at least enough for the possibility of a strong underpinning of political support. In return, even a moderately astute political leadership should be able to ask for the universal sacrifices necessary for general retrenchment and such higher taxes as may be needed to rescue our faltering fiscal system. To realize such a program will require all the intelligence and finesse we can muster.

Underlying this scenario is an acceptance that, for us, Lincoln was right in seeming to perceive a symbiotic and mutually inspiring relationship between individual and economic freedom and opportunity, bounded only by sensible limits on the exploitation of each other and, more clearly evident today, of our segment of Planet Earth. Such a central theme is within our traditions and those of both major parties.

I move now to scenario sub-plots. The second flaw in the Reagan approach lies in attacking the organization structure of the executive branch by the old-fashioned theories. The main organizational problem is not there any more, but lies within Congress and the party system. Leave the executive alone except for minor tune-ups; we do not need more hierarchy, channels, and internal paperwork. Classical management is fine, but only up to a point, which we have reached. Now the proper concept to use with the executive branch is Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety out of cybernetic steersmanship. Put in the simpler language of Stafford Beer, “Only variety in the control mechanism can deal successfully with variety in the system controlled.” The executive is as well equipped administratively now as is the instrument panel of a 747 plane. The problem lies with the co-pilots, the Congress and the party system.

The third flaw is in the constant flaying of the career civil service at the very time the government needs all the experience and expertise it can get. Personnel difficulties exist, and the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 should be used more as it was intended. Moreover, as the career service faces a verbal barrage, portions are being politicized with a partisanship not seen since FDR’s first term, with the measure of patronage replacements being anything but administrative effectiveness. A related, more basic error in the long run is that made by several recent presidents—using the White House staff (greatly expanded since its origin to 450 or more) and all other civil personnel available to create a kind of “President’s personal party” divorced from the rest of the political system. This does not ensure a supportive Congress, and is currently diverting much of the capacity of the White House staff, as well as that of the Office of Management and Budget plus most political appointees, from their administrative and policy control functions. Some diversion is appropriate, but a return to the spoils system this way can only be self-destructive.

Besides, the parties are still quite viable despite all the reforms applied to them if presidents will use them, as FDR and, to some extent, Johnson and Nixon showed could be done. Perhaps then, and then only, a combined party and president, with a sympathetic Congress beholden to them, can work on the organizational fragmentation of the legislative branch, something not much dealt with since 1946. The catch is: for Congress to gain power through unifying itself, individual congressmen must give up power. This is as difficult a conversion as persuading the mass of voters to give up individual benefits. There is, however, a possibility, if all share the benefits and all share the sacrifices. Regardless, some attempt must be made before it is too late!

Reagan’s ancillary problems began with the constant harrassing of the administration by its right wing supporters, fervently and righteously seeking to establish their various theologies, secular or religious, often under the guise of promoting retrenchment. A president
who has a program with wide support need not fear such fragments of the body politic. Of course, morality and principle and honesty in office are as desperately needed as at the turn of the century, but reappplication of our long-standing and general social ethic on a pragmatic and truly caring basis is what is required, not rigid ideo-theology of any kind.

More trouble can come if the administration is sidetracked by frequent military forays abroad. There is enough of that already. The Communist threat is real, but clearly the first requirement is to strengthen our domestic operational base.

Whether the Reagan administration can metamorphose further from, say, that of a Cleveland, a feat in itself for a Republican these days, to the higher levels of a Wilson or Roosevelt is doubtful. The forces to contend with are formidable and Reagan’s programmatic armament is modestly impressive at best. Nevertheless, Reagan could win in 1984, even as is, if the quality of the competition does not improve. In any event, may we be spared a succession of Harrisons and McKinleys until a worse crisis confronts us. We can be asked to sacrifice, but it must be a sacrifice worth the making.

Politics, Administration, and the Past

As we all should know by now, politics and administration are inextricably intermixed. Both are central to effective action. One problem is to bring them together in symbiotic association yet keep each in its proper place. The other is to understand that the “proper place” of each will vary through time. There is no permanent solution, no fixed paradigm, to this or any other ends-means continuum. But there are major ebbs and flows in this politico-administrative, love-hate marriage which, with persistence and practice, can be perceived and in terms of which some can have the will and skill to act and change the course of events.

My principal intent here has been to illustrate all this by trying to make intelligible the evolving trends and tendencies of our own administrative state through four notable periods of American history. A secondary theme can be summarized by Waldo’s 1948 end warning that “the formal analysis of organizations without regard to the purposes that inspire them (is) but a tedium elaboration of the insignificant.” I have also meant to underscore Harry S Truman’s prescient remark about the same time, “Most of the problems a President has to face have their roots in the past.” And I do mean to imply that a suggestive framework of solutions can often be found there as well.

Notes

1. I presume familiarity with citations to the 1887 and 1941 printings of Wilson’s essay. Moreover, as was the custom in the earlier times I am mainly writing about, I have given a minimum of citations generally and none at all for information available in standard works, nor am I citing well-known materials of any kind. Quotations are cited, and materials which the author has found especially helpful. A few citations are by way of example.


5. Here I would argue with Ferrel Heady, who in the second edition of his *Public Administration: A Comparative Perspective* (New York: Marcel Dekker, Inc., 1979), chs. 5 and 6, lists only France and Germany as having the “classic” administrative systems and makes no reference to the Federalist effort.

6. The findings will be presented fully along with related materials in early 1984 as a chapter in a volume edited by Jack Rabin and James S. Bowman, *Politics and Administration: Woodrow Wilson and Contemporary Public Administration*, to be published by Marcel Dekker, Inc., New York. I am indebted to the publisher and editors for permission to include here the summary in this and the paragraphs immediately succeeding.


10. It is better known that Max Weber’s essay on bureaucracy was of almost no influence in the U.S. either until about this time.

11. I have italicized the mention of each criterion to assist the reader in following the sub-elements of the discussion in this and the other section.


16. Ibid., p. 514.

17. Ibid., pp. 511-512.


21. See Mohammad Afzal, “Management Analysis: An Emerging Staff Function” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, School of Business and Public Administration, Cornell University, 1962) for the history of this function. Afzal was recently appointed Minister of Education, Pakistan.
33. Rufus E. Miles, Jr., *Awakening From the American Dream: The Social and Political Limits to Growth* (New York: Universe Books, 1976). By a former assistant secretary for administration, HEW, recently associated with Princeton, this is a first rate analysis of our current condition, especially technological.

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