

ELECTION OBSERVERS AND THEIR BIASES

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More than a decade ago in these pages, Thomas Carothers praised election-monitoring groups for publicizing and deterring fraud, for helping to “hold together shaky electoral processes in transitional countries,” and for “strengthening . . . basic standards of election administration.” Like other analysts, however, he also lamented the presence of many amateurs in the field, the excessive focus on polling day, and the frequently superficial judgments of “free and fair.” He noted as well that election observers often fail to be impartial. Yet Carothers predicted that election observation would “continue to be an important part of international politics for at least the next five to ten years,” arguing that if the field continued to push itself toward more professional standards, “its already significant contributions to the spread of democracy around the world will increase.”¹

Carothers’s assessment of the future viability of election observation clearly has held true. Today election monitoring is widely practiced by organizations all over the world.² Given this broadening of the field and the now much longer history of observations, it is time to undertake a more systematic analysis of the activities of international election monitors. We must analyze the effects of international election observation and determine whether monitoring boosts voter confidence, improves election logistics, deters fraud, alleviates violence, and spreads international electoral norms.

At the same time, we must also focus on concerns about adherence to professional standards, as organizations continue to issue puzzlingly contradictory statements or to give outright endorsements to elections

that are flawed. As Thomas Franck has noted, the process of legitimizing elections must itself be legitimate. If monitors are guided by factors other than the quality of an election, they could inadvertently legitimize undemocratic regimes, enable governments to spin the results, or even stifle viable opposition movements. Presumably none of these is a goal of international observers.

In analyzing the factors that guide election monitors' assessments, my intent is not to render a simplistic critique of these monitors—indeed, controversial assessments may sometimes be warranted on moral or other grounds—but rather to identify and discuss prevailing patterns. This analysis is based on case studies and on the Data on International Election Monitoring (DIEM) project, which includes extensive documentation regarding nearly 600 election-observation missions to 340 elections between 1984 and 2004. An in-depth description of the data is available on the project's website, www.duke.edu/web/diem. The monitoring organizations included in the data set (see Table 1 on page 160) constitute most of the major organizations that issue public reports. Elsewhere, I have done a much more detailed statistical analysis of the data to model the relationship between different factors and the likelihood that monitors will endorse an election.³ This essay describes those findings and discusses their implications in the context of actual examples—in particular, Kenya's 1992 and 1997 elections, Cambodia's 1998 elections, Russia's 1999 elections, and Zimbabwe's 2000 elections.

In most cases where outside monitors observe elections, more than one organization will send an observer mission. Yet different monitoring organizations do not always reach the same conclusions about a given election, as a few brief examples illustrate. Cambodia's 1998 elections exemplify a situation in which different monitoring organizations disagree. The months leading up to the balloting in Cambodia that year were marked by terrible violence. Moreover, a last-minute rule change aided the incumbent's victory, rendering the outcome highly questionable. A joint memorandum by the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI) called the preelection environment "fundamentally flawed." Although the cochair of the NDI-IRI delegation, former congressman Stephen Solarz, publicly wondered whether the election might one day be seen as the "miracle on the Mekong," the NDI issued a detailed report that was, in fact, highly critical.⁴ The IRI's final report declared that the election "did not meet the standards of democratic elections" and noted that "the final vote count and post-election period were deliberately incomplete as the NEC [National Election Commission] and Constitutional Council dismissed complaints of vote fraud and irregularities without full and proper legal considerations."⁵

In contrast, the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU), cooperating under the auspices of a Joint International Observer Group (JIOG), endorsed the elections even before the counting was complete,

TABLE 1—ELECTION-MONITORING ORGANIZATIONS

Nongovernmental Organizations	Intergovernmental Organizations
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Carter Center • National Democratic Institute • International Republican Institute • International Foundation for Electoral Systems • Norwegian Helsinki Committee • International Human Rights Law Group • Asian Network for Free Elections, • Elections Institute of South Africa • Electoral Commissions Forum of the SADC Countries 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • United Nations • Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe • Council of Europe • Commission of the European Union • European Parliament • Organization of American States • Commonwealth Secretariat • Southern African Development Community (SADC) Parliamentary Forum • Commonwealth of Independent States • La Francophonie

stating, “In general the polling achieved democratic standards . . . [W]hat could be observed by us on Polling Day and Counting Day was a process which was free and fair to an extent that enables it to reflect, in a credible way, the will of the Cambodian people.”⁶ Yet after monitors left the country, violence erupted anew, and there was an attempted assassination of the victorious incumbent.

Russia’s 1999 elections tell a different tale—one of monitoring organizations contradicting not each other, but themselves. According to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), voting day went well. The OSCE’s final report, however, documented major problems and was riddled with contradictions. For example, the executive summary concluded that the electoral laws “provided a sound basis for the conduct of orderly, pluralistic and accountable elections,” but the body of the report pointed to a “major flaw in the legislation” and criticized it in numerous ways. Whereas the executive summary said that the elections reflected a “political environment in which voters had a broad spectrum of political forces from which to choose,” the report itself documented abuses of government resources and authority and media biases, as well as harsh restrictions placed on the media.⁷ The European Parliament’s final report was similarly contradictory. It stressed the complete lack of party competition, but ended by weakly noting that “conclusions are always hard to draw after such experiences because, in Russia, the election process was legal and constitutional yet one comes away with a sense that there is still some way to go before the election process as a whole becomes comparable with EU systems.”⁸

Observers were also rather lenient in their assessment of Zimbabwe’s 2000 elections, which occurred amid deepening economic and political crises. Although the U.S. State Department criticized the widespread voter intimidation, preelection violence, and reports of vote rigging and other irregularities,⁹ the mission of the Southern African Development

Community (SADC) and the Organization of African Unity (OAU; now the African Union) endorsed President Robert Mugabe's victory. The OAU observers said that voters had been free to express their will and that the election had been smooth and peaceful. The SADC delegation also stressed the orderly voting day and said that the elections set a good example for other SADC countries.¹⁰

Although EU observers were more critical, they stopped short of questioning the final results and praised the orderly polling, despite noting that violence had marred the election.¹¹ Chris Patten, the EU commissioner for external relations, announced to the European Parliament that the EU observer mission found that Zimbabwe's election "was by and large satisfactory."¹² The Commonwealth Secretariat (CS) likewise noted many problems with the polling, even going so far as to say that freedom of choice had been hampered; still, the CS praised the elections and noted that they "marked a turning point in Zimbabwe's post-independence history."¹³ After the monitors left, Mugabe declared, "Today the majority of them go away both humbled and educated, convinced and highly impressed by how we do things here."¹⁴

Kenya serves as a final example of confusing assessments. In 1992 in response to international pressure, longtime president Daniel arap Moi released several political prisoners and reluctantly dismantled the one-party system. A critical opposition press began to flourish. When it looked like Moi's political career was over, he orchestrated interethnic violence to divide the opposition along ethnic lines. The government refused to register millions of eligible voters in opposition strongholds, stacked the electoral commission with Moi supporters, and denied the opposition access to the media and permits for rallies.

Election day was fraught with problems, but voting was relatively calm. With a fragmented opposition, Moi won a plurality of the vote and was sworn in as president. Afterward, the IRI stated that "the electoral environment was unfair and the electoral process seriously flawed."¹⁵ The Commonwealth Secretariat (CS), however, announced even before the counting was over that "the evolution of the process to polling day and the subsequent count was increasingly positive to a degree that we believe that the results in many instances directly reflect, however imperfectly, the expression of the will of the people."¹⁶ When ethnic clashes nevertheless erupted, international actors tried to calm the violence and urged the opposition to take its seats in parliament and seek redress through legal channels. Eventually Moi suspended the new parliament for about six weeks and regained the upper hand. By November 1993, international donors resumed aid to Kenya, citing positive economic and political reforms. The 1997 elections were essentially a repeat of this pattern.¹⁷

These examples illustrate the nature of the problem, but not its scope. To gain an overview, the DIEM Project evaluated the summary assessments of all observer missions, classifying them as: 1) endorsements if

an organization concluded, regardless of specific criticisms that it may have voiced, that an election represented the will of the voters or was free and fair, or if it in other ways frankly endorsed the outcome; 2) ambiguous if an assessment was unclear, stated outright that it would offer no opinion, or was simply silent; or 3) denouncements if an organization explicitly concluded that the election did not represent the voters' will, was not free and fair, or otherwise delegitimized the outcome of the election.

The data reveal that in roughly a third of the cases, monitoring missions disagreed with one another about their overall assessments. Often the discrepancy was because some organizations endorsed or denounced the elections, while others offered assessments that were ambiguous. Even ambiguous assessments take on meaning, however, if an organization declines to make a clear judgment in one instance, even though it has clearly denounced or praised other elections. Most disconcerting, however, is that in 19 of the 206 elections monitored by multiple observer missions, the disagreements were stark: At least one organization clearly endorsed the election while another clearly denounced it.

In addition, there are cases where the monitors agreed, but other commentators raised serious questions. For example, both the OSCE and the UN generally accepted Bosnia's 1996 election, while others called it fraudulent. The International Crisis Group asserted that nationalist parties manipulated the elections, which were also marred by fraud, and it accused the OSCE of spinning the results.¹⁸ Furthermore, the U.S. State Department's annual "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices" have labeled several elections illegitimate, even though the monitoring organizations on the ground concluded that the polling results were acceptable.

How should we interpret these discrepancies? One might conclude that monitoring organizations, by most often arriving at consensus in their assessments, are doing their job well. Yet discrepancies among their assessments, although less frequent, may be more consequential.

What Influences Election Assessments?

Despite growing awareness that a broad set of conditions is necessary to ensure a free and fair election, election-monitoring reports show that monitors weigh obvious irregularities on election day itself more heavily than other factors. This was true in Cambodia in 1998, when the JIOG focused on "Polling Day and Counting Day"; in Zimbabwe in 2000, when all observers praised the election-day calm; and in Russia in 1999, when polling went smoothly and there were no obvious breaches of law. This trend is systematic.

To get a more precise picture, DIEM coded the content of individual election-mission reports according to five major categories (see Table 2 on page 163) and then tallied the percentage of elections that were en-

TABLE 2—ELECTION IRREGULARITIES


<i>Structural complaints</i>
Legal framework not up to standards, limits on the scope and jurisdiction of elective offices, unreasonable limits on who can run for office, etc.
<i>Explicit preelection cheating</i>
Improper use of public funds, lack of freedom to campaign, media restrictions, intimidation, etc.
<i>Preelection administrative problems</i>
Voter-registration and information problems, complaints about electoral-commission conduct, technical or procedural problems, etc.
<i>Explicit election-day cheating</i>
Vote-padding, ballot-box tampering, voter impersonation, double-voting, vote-buying, intimidation, etc.
<i>Election-day administrative problems</i>
Insufficient information about rules and polling locations, lax polling-booth officials, long waits, faulty procedures or equipment, problems with voters lists, complaints about electoral-commission conduct, etc.

dorsed despite an organization recounting “major” problems in a given category (shown in Figure 1 on page 164). The tally shows that monitors are least likely to endorse elections with major structural legal problems; they are most likely to endorse elections with administrative irregularities that occurred in the preelection period, followed by those with cheating problems in the preelection period. Contests in which there were administrative and cheating issues on election day itself, however, were less likely to gain the endorsement of monitoring organizations.

Because monitors may strategically downplay problems in their reports to match their overall assessments, DIEM also conducted a second analysis that coded election assessments according to the highest level of irregularities reported among all organizations present rather than the level of irregularities reported by the organization issuing the particular assessment. For example, if the OSCE and the EU both observed an election, and the EU reported a low level of election-day cheating while the OSCE reported a moderate level, then the election was coded as having a moderate level. Using this stricter measure, the overall pattern discussed above still holds, but in this analysis the rate of endorsement in the face of major violations is naturally higher.

This pattern may result because election-day irregularities are more obvious than problems that arise beforehand. Monitoring organizations may also view election-day offenses as most damaging to the integrity of the contest, whereas administrative and other preelection problems may be unintentional. Moreover, many monitors conclude that if voters can act freely in the polling booth, then at least the possibility of genuine choice remains. Finally, international election standards address most directly the factors visible on election day: voters’ right to a secret bal-

FIGURE 1—PERCENTAGE OF SERIOUSLY FLAWED ELECTIONS ENDORSED BY INTERNATIONAL MONITORS*




*Includes data on the organizations in Table 1, excluding the UN and La Francophonie.

lot, to have their votes counted equally, and to be able to exercise their political choices free from intimidation.

Election assessments also depend on the degree of autonomy that a monitoring organization enjoys. For example, member states of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) can often repress monitors' criticisms through the strict procedures that most IGOs have for finalizing official statements.¹⁹ They can also influence where missions are sent and who leads the missions. Displeased member states may even advocate institutional reforms to curtail observers' independence, as Russia attempted with the OSCE after the "color revolutions" in Georgia in 2003 and Ukraine in 2004.

Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) may tread more carefully when dealing with states that are important to their donors. NDI, IRI, and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), for example, rely in part on U.S. government funding, and they sometimes staff observer missions with elected officials. In Kenya in 2007, when IRI mysteriously withheld the results of its "quick count" of the vote, some suspected that it had done so at the behest of the U.S. government.²⁰ Generally, however, NGOs enjoy more independence than IGOs, because governments lack formal power over NGOs and can also distance themselves from NGO statements. In Kenya's 1992 election, IRI provided the lone critical voice. Perhaps learning from that, Mugabe excluded all NGOs when for the first time he invited international monitors to observe Zimbabwe's 2000 election.

Nondemocratic IGO member states may seek to soften the assessments of elections in other countries in order to avoid future criticism of

FIGURE 2—DISTRIBUTION OF TYPES OF OVERALL ELECTION ASSESSMENTS BY ORGANIZATION

Source: DIEM

*Based on less than 10 observations.

their own regimes. Indeed, less-democratic countries may deliberately use IGOs such as the Commonwealth of Independent States to provide more favorable assessments. Thus IGOs with fewer democratic member states are usually constrained in their ability to criticize elections. Data show that in general IGOs are nearly twice as likely to endorse elections as are NGOs, but that this tendency declines as an IGO's membership grows more democratic.²¹

Figure 2 above shows monitoring organizations arranged by the percentage of elections that they criticize. The figure does not take account of whether some organizations systematically monitor more problematic elections, and thus is somewhat misleading. For example, although La Francophonie and the Council of Europe criticize the same percentage of elections, La Francophonie endorsed elections in 62 percent of cases where other monitoring organizations that were present condemned them outright; for the Council of Europe, this figure was only 13 percent. Nevertheless, the pattern in Figure 2 is consistent with the conclusion that NGOs—particularly U.S. organizations—are most critical, and IGOs whose members include fewer democratic countries are least critical.

Monitoring organizations are also influenced by the political importance of the election-holding state. In the mid- to late 1990s, for example, the OSCE and the European Parliament were hesitant to criticize Russian elections. In Zimbabwe in 2000, the organizations that were the least critical of the contest—the SADC and the OAU—had strong ties to the country. In Cambodia in 1998, the IGOs were constrained from leveling harsh assessments by Japan and by Western governments, who wanted to resume aid and normal relations²² with the country. Nigeria's

1999 elections are particularly illustrative: The international community saw its own economic and security interests as being affected by the outcome of the contest, and missions from both the Commonwealth and the EU were instructed ahead of time that member states “wanted to endorse the elections and restore normal relations with Nigeria.”²³ In other words, intergovernmental organizations may at times and for various reasons assign special political importance to a country and thus be less inclined to criticize that country’s elections.

Foreign aid is often a sign of a political relationship, and political considerations frequently influence foreign-aid allocations. As good governance has become a requirement for foreign aid, donors—eager for recipient countries to pass the “election test” so that aid can continue or resume—have pressured recipients to accept election monitors. Cambodia, Kenya, and Zimbabwe all succumbed to pressure from donors. In Zimbabwe in 2000, the EU was the largest development-assistance donor. As noted above, the EU was critical of the elections but still not prepared to question the results. The DIEM data also suggest that monitors are more likely to endorse the elections of foreign-aid recipients. (At the same time, the more foreign aid a country receives, the more likely it is to be monitored.) Of the 70 missions to countries that received more than US\$1 billion in aid the year before an election, 54 (77 percent) endorsed the elections. In contrast, missions to countries that received less aid endorsed only 62 percent of the elections.

Praising Partial Progress

International election-monitoring missions are often mounted by democracy-promotion organizations. While this does not create a conflict of interest, the primary goal of promoting democracy can complicate matters. For example, if an election falls short of international standards but still shows improvement, the monitoring organization may decide to praise the progress and accept the results in order to consolidate the gains.

When monitors endorse highly problematic elections, the language of “improvement” often permeates their public statements. In the case of Cambodia, for example, the JIOG stressed that the election was “a major achievement and a step forward.”²⁴ In regard to Zimbabwe’s 2000 polling, the CS stressed the novelty: “For the first time . . . there was a viable, nationwide political alternative.”²⁵ In Kenya in 1992, the CS statement concluded that “from our perspective we feel that this process is a significant step in Kenya’s transition to genuine democracy.”²⁶ Even the IRI noted that these elections constituted a giant step on the road to multiparty democracy.²⁷

Empirically, it makes sense that elections which showed improvement were more likely to be endorsed, because on average they may indeed be

better. Similarly, a country's first multiparty elections are highly likely to be endorsed by election monitors. It does appear, however, that some international election monitors are more lenient toward countries that are transitioning toward democracy. It is not surprising that first multiparty elections with only minor problems were all endorsed, just as first multiparty elections with major problems, such as those in Cameroon, Guinea, Rwanda, and Tanzania, were all denounced. Yet when considering elections that fell between such clear-cut cases on either end of the spectrum, monitors more often endorsed first multiparty elections. Indeed, if one compares only elections where monitoring reports recounted numerous problems, nearly 60 percent of missions endorsed the elections if they were the first multiparty elections, compared with only roughly half when they were not. At the same time, though, monitors also appeared more likely to criticize first multiparty elections if they were extremely bad, as in Cameroon in 1992. The real difference seems to be that when the elections were ambiguous, monitors were willing to give first multiparty elections the benefit of the doubt.

Violence during fragile democratization processes continues to worry democracy promoters. Fearing that their assessments may stoke violence, monitors may in certain cases downplay their criticisms. This concern is greater when preelection violence has been widespread, as was the case in Cambodia, Kenya, and Zimbabwe. Denouncing an election as flawed could provide a rallying point for the opposition and fuel further violence. Or, as Kenya's 2007 election and Zimbabwe's 2008 election have shown, an incumbent unwilling to leave office may resort to violence in order to squelch opposition support. Likewise, it is possible that opposition forces may revolt against what they perceive to be election monitors' rubber-stamping of a fraudulent election. In the majority of cases, however, the balance of power lies with the incumbent; thus stability is best maintained by supporting the incumbent.

Indeed, in several of the cases discussed above, commentators have noted that a fear of violence may have tempered criticisms. In Zimbabwe, Liisa Laakso notes, "Perhaps it had become quite clear to all foreigners that if the opposition had won the elections, changing the government in Zimbabwe would not necessarily have been easy or peaceful."²⁸ Indeed, the EU mission took pride in having "contributed to reducing levels of violence."²⁹ Stephen Brown similarly notes that in Kenya's 1992 election, criticism by outsiders was tempered by fears of upheaval.³⁰

The statistical pattern is slightly complicated, but it suggests that preelection violence moderates criticism. If one examines only preelection violence without considering other elements of the election, then more preelection violence is associated with fewer endorsements. This is only to be expected, because preelection violence generally is associated with many other problems as well. A different picture emerges, however, if one looks at only the elections that monitors reported to have suffered

from heavy irregularities more generally: The *more* preelection violence that monitors reported, the more likely they were to endorse problematic elections.³¹ As with much statistical analysis, the magnitude of this phenomenon depends on how the analysis is performed, but the trend is consistent.

Interestingly, the reaction of monitors to violence on the day of the election is less clear. Election-day violence is associated with decreased odds of endorsement, but the chances of endorsement are particularly good for elections where preelection violence was high but the polling itself was calm. One possible explanation is that once the balloting turns violent, postelection stability is already unlikely, and thus what monitors say is less consequential. This may in part explain why the EU was at first quite positive about Kenya's 2007 election, when polling began quite calmly. Despite noting preelection violence, the chief of the EU mission said that he had seen no evidence of fraud: "There are some technical problems but what is pleasing is that people are turning out to vote in large numbers and are doing so peacefully and patiently."³² After the violence spiked and clearly spun out of control, however, the EU mission declared the election rigged.

What Are the Implications?

The above analysis clearly shows that certain isolated factors can at times lead monitoring organizations to approach elections with what one organization has called a highly positive "preelection stance."³³ Thus it reveals that the notion of "neutral" election observers is a myth. For both practitioners and scholars, it is important to understand monitors' predispositions. This analysis does not lead to easy conclusions, however. The issue is complicated, and the policy implications deserve greater discussion.

One possible recommendation is that monitoring organizations should avoid making overall assessments of the quality of elections. But this is probably unrealistic, as their mandate is, after all, to evaluate elections. Although most election-monitoring organizations now resist labeling elections as "free and fair," they continue to praise or denounce elections when their quality is very apparent. Therefore, attempts to maintain ambiguity in other cases are difficult to pass off as strictly neutral. Short of abandoning observation missions altogether, which is not a solution, monitors cannot avoid imbuing their assessments with meaning.

Another approach is to encourage several organizations to monitor the same election—the hope being that, among the various organizations present, at least some will be willing to highlight any fraud. This is indeed occurring now in many elections; only a small number of elections are observed by a single organization. While this in some ways is a good thing, the contradictions between monitors bring their own

cost; more is not necessarily merrier.³⁴ Incumbents have learned how to exploit the contradictions between organizations, and they extend invitations strategically.

It is somewhat paradoxical that organizations like the EU tend to observe elections in countries in which they have some stake, either through foreign aid or political relations, because these are exactly the types of elections in which monitors face greater political constraints in formulating their assessments. One question for debate, therefore, is whether NGOs and nonprofit institutes from democratic countries are in fact in a better position than intergovernmental organizations to remain neutral. NGOs normally have fewer resources, of course, which poses its own challenges. Greater delegation of monitoring responsibilities to NGOs might involve greater dependency on their funders, which might ultimately result in a replication of the IGO constraints. Yet funds must come from somewhere, and it is unlikely that adequate support can come entirely from disinterested backers.

The issue of preelection violence is particularly vexing—the greater the level of preelection violence, the more likely international monitors are to endorse a flawed election. Drawing policy recommendations from this correlation, however, would require not only more study, but also a difficult normative judgment: Which is more important—the prevention of violence and instability, or the promotion of people’s right to choose their government? If the former, then international election monitors’ attempts to increase stability may be perfectly acceptable. Given these difficult choices, might monitoring organizations be better off simply staying away from violent elections so as to avoid a conflict of interests and norms?

Furthermore, there is the question of standardizing observation strategies and methods. As former Canadian prime minister Joe Clark has argued: “The lack of standardization has produced a flexibility of interpretation that has undermined the credibility of some observation missions.”³⁵ Most organizations have signed the UN’s “Code of Conduct for International Election Observers,” and at least publicly profess a shared set of norms. Yet monitors still tend to focus mostly on formal legal problems and on obvious election-day fraud. Is this focus desirable? Are the problems on the day of the election more significant than those in the preelection period? There is increasing consensus that electoral manipulation goes far beyond the most obvious irregularities. Efforts to devise more standardized and comprehensive ways of assessing elections are underway, and more debate among organizations on this topic should prove productive.³⁶

Lastly, it would be edifying to study whether assessing more leniently elections that demonstrate improvement actually promotes further progress in the long run.³⁷ That is, does endorsing “progress,” however limited, spur future progress? Or does it merely serve to legitimize non-

democratic governments that staged better but still highly flawed elections, and enable them to maintain the status quo?

Many questions remain open for debate and research. Meanwhile, observers themselves ought to be held accountable. In spite of their commitments to publish public records, some organizations make immediate public postelection statements but still sometimes fail either to finalize or to publicize their full conclusions. A full record of the areas of consensus and disagreement may help to expose the biases and tendencies of different organizations. At the same time, of course, this could inadvertently encourage organizations to be overly critical in order to preserve their credibility. We ultimately face the classic question posed by the Roman poet Juvenal, *Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?* Who will guard the guardians? Lacking a ready answer, our best option is to remain aware of the inherent limitations of international election monitoring as well as its virtues.

NOTES

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6. JIOG Press Release, Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 1998, 1–2.

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11. EU Observation Unit, "Elections in Zimbabwe, 24–25 June 2000, Interim Statement, Pierre Schori—Head of EU Election Observation Mission" (2000).

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14. Robert Mugabe, "Address to the Nation Marking the 2000 Parliamentary Election Results," 27 June 2000.
15. IRI, "Follow up Statement IRI Observer Mission, Kenya General Election 29-12-1992," 1993.
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21. Kelley, "D Minus Elections."
22. Eric Bjornlund, *Beyond Free and Fair: Monitoring Elections and Building Democracy* (Washington, D.C.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004).
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27. IRI, "Follow-Up Statement IRI Observer Mission, Kenya General Election 29-12-1992."
28. Liisa Laakso, "The Politics of International Election Observation Mission: The Case of Zimbabwe in 2000," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 40 (September 2002): 458.
29. Patten, "Speaking Points."
30. Brown, "From Demiurge to Midwife."

31. More comprehensive statistical analysis also confirms this tendency; see Kelley, "D Minus Elections."

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