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Evaluating Welfare Improvements From Changes in Homeland Security Policies

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Introduction

After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. government pursued a variety of new and often controversial counterterrorism policies. These policies imposed billions of dollars of monetary costs on U.S. taxpayers. They also imposed additional nonmonetary costs on those individuals who felt that their or others' civil liberties were restricted as a result of expanded government powers. The extent to which these or other counterterrorism policies are favored by the public ultimately depends on whether the expected benefits are large enough to exceed the costs they impose on the public. Given the controversial nature of counterterrorism policy, the design and evaluation of effective policies would benefit from an improved understanding of the public's willingness to trade the monetary and nonmonetary costs of specific policies for increased security.

Three primary sources exist for obtaining information on the preferences of U.S. citizens over counterterrorism policies (Finkelstein et al., 2010). These include statements from key opinion leaders, public opinion polls, and results from the published literature. To date, none are sufficient for accurately quantifying tradeoffs related to Homeland Security Policy. Key opinion leaders such as news commentators, radio and television hosts, advocacy groups, and politicians can be important sources of information on the beliefs of specific constituencies. However, it is difficult to know the extent to which their statements generalize to the population at large. Public opinion polls or surveys have included questions relevant to homeland security policy makers. However, they typically include only dichotomous choice responses (e.g., support/do not support) and therefore do not allow for quantifying the circumstances under which a particular policy might be favored.

Finally, a number of academic studies have addressed the factors that influence public acceptance of different homeland security policies. Example studies include Davis and Silver (2004); Frey, Luechinger, & Stutzer (2004); Huddy, Feldman, Taber, & Gallya (2005); Huddy, Feldman, & Weber (2007); John & Rosoff (2008); Joslyn & Haider-Markel (2007); Rabinovich (2004); Smith, Mansfield, & Clayton (2008); and Viscusi & Zeckhauser (2005). Overall, these studies confirm the hypothesis that citizens are willing to make tradeoffs between the perceived costs and benefits of homeland security policies. However, few of these studies provide quantitative assessments of the magnitude of these tradeoffs (an exception is Smith, Mansfield, & Clayton, 2008). As a result, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) officials and government policymakers are currently unable to fully evaluate the social welfare consequences of specific counterterrorism policies.

In this project, we attempt to fill this gap by using a stated-preference survey to examine the tradeoffs U.S. citizens state they would be willing to make between the monetary and nonmonetary costs of counterterrorism policies and specific reductions in the threat of terrorism. Stated-preference surveys are one method economists use to measure the value of



nonmarket goods and services (Kanninen, 2007). By definition, nonmarket goods and services are not sold through markets, making it difficult to assess what individuals would pay for them. In the case of counterterrorism policy, many of the costs and benefits of the policies—a feeling of security, a loss of privacy, the inconvenience of complying with security checks—are not market goods for which price can be determined. The stated-preference survey designed for this project explores how individuals weigh the costs and benefits of a defined set of counterterrorism strategies and can be used to determine a “price” at which individuals would willingly accept reductions in civil liberties that come with specific policies.

In our initial effort, we selected a set of strategies the U.S. government could pursue to improve homeland security and combined them into specific policy options. We then probed respondent preferences for these policy options as a function of their expected benefits. The benefits are presented as well-defined reductions in expected deaths from terrorism or reductions in the risk of a terrorist attack. In reality, quantifying the benefits of counterterrorism policies is often very difficult, and in some cases may be impossible. For this initial survey, we are interested in how individuals trade a relatively well-defined set of costs and benefits. Adding in the extreme uncertainty and sometimes irrational emotions associated with low probability, high-consequence events would have greatly increased the complexity of the questions, while potentially introducing enough noise into the survey responses to obscure the statistical analysis of the respondents’ preferences.

In this report, we present the results from the 2010 IHSS-RTI Counterterrorism Survey, which was fielded to a nationally representative sample from the Knowledge Networks (KN) panel. First we provide a detailed description of the methods used in this study to obtain the results described above. Second, we report data on respondent policy preferences and risk perceptions—detailed breakdowns of the extent to which respondents support specific counterterrorism policies and their perceptions of current risks from terrorist attacks over the next 10 years. Next we present the results of our stated-preference questions that were used to quantify the value individuals place on different counterterrorism strategies. To examine heterogeneity of preferences across subpopulations, we present results separately for whites and nonwhites, and for those who self-report to be liberal, moderate, or conservative. Lastly, we present a summary of our results and conclusions and highlight areas of future research.

Study Methods

The primary goal of this study is to quantify individuals’ willingness to accept monetary and nonmonetary costs in exchange for reductions in the threat of terrorism. To collect the

data necessary to address this question, we fielded a stated-preference survey to a nationally representative sample of 1,559 members of the KN online panel.¹

A complete draft of the final survey instrument used in this study is provided in Appendix A. This survey instrument can be divided into five segments. The first segment covers questions on security-related behaviors. The second introduces the stated-preference questions and describes each attribute used in the questions. The third segment consists of four stated-preference questions and the fourth a set of debriefing questions about the respondents' answers. The final segment collects additional information on opinions and personal characteristics.

In this section of the report, we (1) describe the survey design and fielding process in more detail, (2) elaborate on the questions used to measure respondent policy preferences and risk perceptions, (3) provide a full description of the stated-preference portion of the survey used to quantify respondent tradeoffs, and (4) briefly describe the statistical methods applied to the data collected to make inferences about the U.S. population.

Survey Design and Fielding

The survey instrument was developed by a core research team composed of economists with experience in stated-preference survey methods and security-related issues. We tested the draft instrument through 12 cognitive interviews with a diverse set of individuals from the Research Triangle area of North Carolina. These interviews led to a number of revisions that made the survey easier for participants to understand. After making these initial revisions, a draft of the survey was submitted for comment to social scientists at the Human Factors Division of DHS.²

Next, KN programmed the draft survey instrument for web administration and conducted a pilot test. Results from this initial pilot test suggested that additional improvements could be made to the survey. Once these revisions were made a second pilot test was fielded. The results from this second pilot test were consistent with expectations, requiring only minor revisions to survey wording.

KN administered the final version of the survey instrument between November 30 and December 27, 2010. Of the 2,326 survey invitations sent to members of the KN panel who were older than 18 years of age and resided inside the United States, 1,559 responded to the survey for a completion rate of 67%. This sample size is nearly double the minimum number of

¹ The KN online panel is recruited through address-based sampling and provides Internet devices and access to households on the panel without them. For more information, see <http://www.knowledgenetworks.com/>.

² The final survey and opinions expressed in this report reflect the authors' ideas, and not DHS's.

participants needed to generate statistically significant results based on sample size calculations presented in Orme (2010).³

Questions on Respondent Opinions and Behaviors Related to Homeland Security

The survey includes a number of questions designed to collect information about the respondents' opinions and behaviors as they relate to homeland security. The purpose of these questions is to better understand how the public perceives homeland security policies and the threat of terrorism, which can help interpret the responses to the stated-preference questions.

Specifically, there are five sets of questions on opinions and behaviors related to homeland security that we consider in this report. First, we ask respondents several questions regarding their travel habits and their perceptions of airline security. For example, we ask respondents how often they travel by airplane domestically and internationally, the amount of time they typically wait at security checkpoints, and whether they support the use of full-body scanners. Although our study was not directed at airport security policies, it is under these circumstances that most U.S. citizens deal directly with counterterrorism policies.

Second, we ask respondents several questions about how they view U.S. counterterrorism efforts as a whole. In particular, we ask them whether they believe current levels of spending on homeland security are appropriate and whether they believe overall U.S. counterterrorism efforts are effective.

Third, we ask respondents several questions regarding four specific counterterrorism strategies:

- Increasing government access to personal information
- Using race, ethnicity, or country of citizenship to identify potential terrorists
- Jailing suspected terrorists without trial
- Using harsh methods to question suspected terrorists

These questions cover whether respondents support the use of these strategies, whether they perceive them as being effective at reducing the threat of terrorism, and whether there is potential for abuse of these strategies by the U.S. government.

Fourth, we ask respondents to provide their best estimate of how many people would die from terrorism on U.S. soil over the next 10 years to gauge the extent to which they view terrorism as a threat to the United States. Fifth, we ask respondents about the types of criminal consequences that individuals convicted of terrorism should face.

³ The cumulative response rate for KN surveys starting from the original recruitment is very low when calculated using accepted standards.



Existing literature suggests that racial/ethnic background and political affiliation correlate with views on homeland security (Davis & Silver, 2004). Therefore, results for each set of questions are provided in the results discussion for both the overall sample and for two subgroupings of interest: racial (white and nonwhite) and political (self-reported liberal, moderate, and conservative).

Stated-Preference Questions and Homeland Security Strategies

Five stated-preference questions form the core of the survey. There are a variety of stated-preference survey formats. For this study, we selected a conjoint survey (also known as discrete choice experiment) format (Kanninen, 2007). Each conjoint question describes two hypothetical security policy options that the U.S. government might pursue. After respondents select which policy option they prefer, they are asked if they would actually vote for the option they chose.

The first step in developing these choice questions was determining which features or “attributes” would be used to describe the hypothetical security policy options. Typically, the set of attributes describing the good or service in a conjoint survey includes all the major features that a respondent thinks about when making a decision about the good, plus any new features that the researcher is interested in. For this survey, we created a set of policy options that consisted of five “government strategies to improve homeland security” and one “national security outcome.”

The five government strategies to improve homeland security we selected for the survey were the following:

- Increasing taxes to fund efforts to prevent terrorism
- Increasing government access to personal information
- Using race, ethnicity, or country of citizenship to identify potential terrorists
- Jailing suspected terrorists without trial
- Using harsh methods to question suspected terrorists

These strategies were introduced to respondents one at a time. The survey contained a short description of each strategy, the range of values the strategy might take in the conjoint questions (these values are known as “attribute levels”), and a set of questions about the strategy. Figure 1 contains the short descriptions of each strategy as presented in the survey and Figure 2 provides an example conjoint question.

Choosing the best approach for presenting the national security outcome that would accompany these five government strategies was a more difficult task because reductions in the threat of terrorism can take a variety of forms. For example, policies to address homeland security threats can reduce the probability of an attack, reduce the severity of an attack, or reduce the impact of the damage on individuals and businesses after the attack.

Figure 1. Homeland Security Strategies

Strategy	Short Description in Survey
Increasing taxes to fund efforts to prevent terrorism	<p>The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is one of several U.S. government agencies that work to reduce the risk of terrorist attacks on U.S. soil. It has been estimated that the average U.S. taxpayer spends roughly \$200 to fund DHS each year. Of course, the specific amount an individual pays in taxes will depend on his/her income but \$200 per year is an average across all taxpayers. One strategy that a government could take that might lower the threat of a terrorist attack is to increase taxes to fund additional efforts to prevent terrorism.</p> <p>Later in the survey, we will ask you to choose between options that increase <u>your</u> taxes by different amounts to fund government efforts to prevent terrorism. Under each option, the amount your taxes will increase ranges between:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • \$500 over the next 10 years (\$50 per year on average) • \$1,500 over the next 10 years (\$150 per year on average) • \$3,000 over the next 10 years (\$300 per year on average) • \$7,000 over the next 10 years (\$700 per year on average)
Increasing government access to personal information	<p>One strategy that governments could take that might lower the threat of a terrorist attack is to give government agencies more access to individuals' personal information, such as library records, e-mail messages, Web site use, and telephone calls.</p> <p>Later, we will ask you to choose between options that differ in terms of when the U.S. federal government is allowed to see the personal information of its citizens. Under each option the level of government access to personal information will range between:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Never allowed • Allowed but only with a judge's permission • Allowed if suspected of terrorist activity but without a judge's permission • Always allowed
Using race, ethnicity, or country of citizenship to identify potential terrorists	<p>One strategy that governments could take that might lower the threat of a terrorist attack is to identify potential terrorist suspects for investigation based on a person's race, ethnicity (where their family came from), or their country of citizenship.</p> <p>Later in the survey, we will ask you to choose between options that differ in terms of whether race, ethnic group, or country of citizenship can be used to identify potential terrorist suspects for investigation. Under each option, the use of race, ethnic group, or country of citizenship to identify potential terrorists will be either:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Never allowed • Allowed based on country of citizenship only • Always allowed

(continued)



Figure 1. Homeland Security Strategies (continued)

Strategy	Short Description in Survey
Jailing suspected terrorists without trial	<p>Another strategy that governments could take that might lower the threat of a terrorist attack is to keep suspected terrorists in jail for extended periods of time without a trial.</p> <p>Later, we will ask you to choose between options that differ in terms of how long people may be held <u>without a trial</u>. Under each option, the length of time a suspected terrorist can be jailed without trial will range between:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Less than 6 months • 6 months to 2 years • 2 to 7 years • Indefinite (no limit)
Using harsh methods to question suspected terrorists	<p>Another strategy that governments could take that might lower the threat of a terrorist attack is to use harsh and painful methods when questioning suspected terrorists to obtain information that might otherwise not be revealed.</p> <p>Later in the survey, we will ask you to choose between options that differ in terms of when harsh and painful methods can be used to question suspected terrorists. Under each option, the circumstances of when harsh and painful methods can be used to question suspected terrorists will range between:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Never allowed in any case • Allowed, but only after approval from a responsible official (like a judge) and to prevent a possible imminent attack • Allowed, but only after approval from a responsible official (like a judge) regardless of whether an attack is imminent • Allowed whenever the questioner thinks it might be effective in gathering information that will help in the fight against terrorism



Figure 2. Example Counterterrorism Conjoint Question

	Option A	Option B
Government Strategies to Improve Security		
Increase in your taxes to fund efforts to prevent terrorism over the next 10 years	\$500 over the next 10 years [\$50 per year on average]	\$3,000 over the next 10 years [\$300 per year on average]
Government access to personal information	Allowed but only with a judge's permission	Allowed but only with a judge's permission
Using race, ethnicity, or country of citizenship to identify potential terrorists	Not allowed	Not allowed
Jailing suspected terrorists without trial	Less than 6 months	Less than 6 months
Using harsh methods to question suspected terrorists	Allowed, but only with approval from responsible official to prevent imminent attack	Allowed, but only with approval from responsible official to prevent imminent attack
National Security Outcomes		
Expected deaths from terrorism on U.S. soil over the next 10 years	3,000 deaths	10 deaths
<i>If these were your only two options, which would you choose?</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<i>Suppose you were asked to vote on the policy option you just selected. Would you vote in favor of this option being implemented?</i>		
<input type="checkbox"/> <i>Yes, I would vote for this option</i> <input type="checkbox"/> <i>No, I would not vote for this option</i>		

After considering a variety of different outcome measures and pretesting them through one-on-one interviews, we selected two versions of the national security outcome attribute: (1) the expected number of deaths on U.S. soil over the next 10 years and (2) the chance that a major terrorist attack occurs on U.S. soil that kills 3,000 individuals over the next 10 years. Respondents were randomly assigned to one of the two versions. However, we only report the results for the “deaths” version of the survey in this report.

Figure 3 contains the wording used to describe the “deaths” version of the national security outcome to the respondent. Expected deaths ranged from 0 to 3,000. We selected 3,000 as the upper bound to correspond with an attack roughly similar to 9/11, although the respondents were not told whether the deaths would occur in one attack or in a series of attacks. Respondents were asked to assume that the expected number of deaths presented was a “reliable estimate based on a consensus of national security experts.”

Figure 3. Text Describing Expected Deaths From Terrorism

The primary focus of counterterrorism policies is to reduce the harm caused by terrorism, with deaths being the greatest concern. For the remainder of this survey, the effectiveness of counterterrorism policies will be defined in terms of the expected number of deaths on U.S. soil over the next 10 years.

Later in the survey, we will ask you to choose between policy options that differ in terms of how many deaths are expected to occur over the next 10 years if that option is adopted. For this survey, please assume that the number of expected deaths is a reliable estimate based on a consensus of national security experts. Under each option, the expected number of deaths will range between:

- **0 deaths** over the next 10 years from terrorism
- **10 deaths** over the next 10 years from terrorism
- **500 deaths** over the next 10 years from terrorism
- **1,500 deaths** over the next 10 years from terrorism
- **3,000 deaths** over the next 10 years from terrorism

In pretests of the survey instrument, respondents indicated that they were willing to accept the information about expected deaths as “a reliable estimate” when they answered the questions in the survey, even though many knew that in reality such numbers would be highly uncertain. However, it is still the case that the respondents’ own beliefs may affect their responses, especially if their beliefs are different from the outcomes offered in the survey. To assess respondent beliefs, they are asked to provide their own, best estimates of the number of deaths from terrorism on U.S. soil over the next 10 years. They are also asked to provide their estimate of the probability that a specific number of deaths from terrorism on U.S. soil will occur, where the number of deaths ranges from 10 to 100,000 over the next 10 years.

The text before the conjoint questions, presented in Figure 4, provides the respondent with additional information about answering the questions. The text acknowledges that the questions may be difficult to answer, but asks that they answer the questions as if they were real choices, rather than hypothetical. Research on stated-preference surveys suggests that these reminders can work and may improve the accuracy of the responses. Respondents are also told to assume that all the strategies presented in the survey are legal.

Finally, we also added text to address the question of how different security strategies would be funded. Past research has found that some individuals vote against programs they would actually support because they reject the payment vehicle, which in this case was an increase in taxes. Although the majority of respondents are willing to consider higher taxes for more services, for a small number of respondents paying higher federal taxes is unacceptable. Other individuals may accept the tax increase but only if there is a decrease for an alternative

Figure 4. Introductory Text for the Stated-Preference Questions

In the next set of questions, imagine that the U.S. government is proposing different policy options for combating terrorism and you are being asked to choose between each option. These options are created from a mix of the different security strategies we have asked you to think about earlier in the survey. Below each policy option, we list the expected number of deaths from terrorism that you should assume will occur if the option is chosen.

- Please respond to each of these questions. We understand that choosing between each policy option may not be easy, but your results will be of value in determining how U.S. residents respond to various tradeoffs related to homeland security.
- Consider each choice carefully and as though they are real choices. Think carefully about the benefits and costs of each option. How would you feel if the policy option you chose were implemented by the government?
- Assume all the strategies we ask you to consider are legal. It is possible that some options will contain strategies that are not allowed under current U.S. law. For the purpose of this survey, please ignore this fact and assume all strategies are legal when selecting which option you prefer.
- Assume only tax increases can be used to pay for the policies. We understand that many respondents might prefer that other government programs be cut in order to pay for these policies. However, for the purposes of this survey we are interested in your willingness to pay for increased security with your own tax dollars. So, for simplicity, please assume that these tax increases are necessary to pay for the policies.

program. The purpose of the stated-preference question is to measure the tradeoffs that respondents are willing to make, including their maximum willingness to pay (WTP). We focus on taxes as the payment vehicle because that is how these programs are funded, but acknowledge that a different payment vehicle may generate different results.

Given the attributes and levels described above, there are 3,840 ($4 \times 4 \times 3 \times 4 \times 4 \times 5$) hypothetical conjoint tasks that could be created. However, one of the benefits of conjoint analysis is that only a small fraction of these need to be evaluated by respondents to estimate tradeoffs between options, assuming that a statistically efficient design is created. As recommended by Carlsson and Martinsson (2003); Hensher, Rose, and Greene (2005); Kanninen (2002); and Zwerina, Huber, and Kuhfeld (1996), an efficient design should incorporate the following features:

- *Level Balance*: levels of an attribute occur with equal frequency
- *Orthogonality*: the occurrences of any two levels of different attributes are uncorrelated
- *Minimal Overlap* cases where attribute levels do not vary within a choice set should be minimized

The Sawtooth Choice-Based Conjoint Software (Sawtooth, 2010) includes a module that allows for generating an efficient design incorporating the above. We used that software to generate the design for this study.

Statistical Analysis

As described in the previous section, the survey contained a number of questions about the respondents’ opinions, behaviors, and personal characteristics. In the next section of this report, we present the results of these questions by race (white and nonwhite) and by political leaning (conservative, moderate, and liberal). We use a Pearson’s Chi-square test of independence of two categorical variables to test for differences in the distribution of responses (see Wackerly et al., 2008).

To estimate the willingness of U.S. residents to trade improved security for the monetary and nonmonetary costs of counterterrorism policies, we use a random utility maximization (RUM) model to analyze the respondents’ choices between homeland security options. Using the estimated RUM model we quantify homeland security preferences in two important ways:

1. We estimate relative preferences for the attributes and attribute levels—The coefficient estimates for the model can be interpreted as utility measures that reflect respondents’ preferences for each attribute level.
2. We estimate the value of changes in policy in both dollars and in deaths—We use the estimated coefficients from the model to convert the change in utility associated with moving from one attribute level to another into dollar-denominated values and into values denominated in expected deaths. For example, we quantify how many fewer deaths would be required among liberals before they would approve harsh methods of interrogation without a judge’s permission.

For a RUM model, we assume that an individual will select the option that provides the highest level of utility. In this case, the choice is between two homeland security policy options. We define the utility a person receives from policy option j by

$$u_j = v_j + \varepsilon_j, j = 1, \dots, J, \tag{2.1}$$

where v_j is the observable component of utility that depends on the attribute levels. The term ε_j is a random error representing the component of utility that is unobservable from the perspective of the analyst but known to the individual.

Under the assumption of utility maximization the respondents will choose policy option j over option k in a given choice task if $u_j \geq u_k \forall k \neq j$. Because total utility is unobserved by the analyst, this choice is random from the perspective of the model, and we can only state the probability that option j will be chosen. In general terms this probability is given by

$$\Pr(u_j > u_k) = \Pr(v_j + \varepsilon_j > v_k + \varepsilon_k) = \Pr(\varepsilon_k - \varepsilon_j < v_j - v_k) \tag{2.2}$$

Estimation of the model proceeds using assumptions for the form of the deterministic component of utility and the error distribution. The deterministic component of utility is modeled as a linear function of the policy attribute levels.

To estimate the parameters of the model, we start with a standard conditional logit model (McFadden, 1984), which assumes that the disturbance term follows a Type I extreme-value error structure and uses maximum-likelihood methods to estimate the parameters. Conditional logit is a computationally straightforward estimation approach that can provide useful insights into the general pattern of respondents’ preferences, tradeoffs, and values. The specific form of the probability that option j is selected is given by the following equation and estimated using a conditional logit.

$$pr(u_j \geq u_k) = \frac{\exp(v_j)}{\sum_{k=1}^j \exp(v_k)} \quad (2.3)$$

We present the results from two specifications of the model. In the first, all the variables are effects coded.⁴ Effects coding all the variables allows for comparing the relative preferences for all levels within an attribute. We use the specification in equation 2.4 for the estimation.

$$V_{\text{policy option}} = (\beta_{\$500} + \beta_{\$1,500} + \beta_{\$3,000} + \beta_{\$7,000}) * \mathbf{x}_{\text{taxes}}^i + (\beta_{\text{never}} + \beta_{\text{allowed with judge's permission}} + \beta_{\text{allowed if suspected terrorist}} + \beta_{\text{always}}) * \mathbf{x}_{\text{access_to_info}}^i + (\beta_{\text{never}} + \beta_{\text{based on country of citizenship only}} + \beta_{\text{always}}) * \mathbf{x}_{\text{profiling}}^i + (\beta_{< 6\text{months}} + \beta_{6\text{mon to 2 years}} + \beta_{2 \text{ to 7 years}} + \beta_{\text{no limit}}) * \mathbf{x}_{\text{jailing}}^i + (\beta_{\text{never}} + \beta_{\text{with approval to prevent attack}} + \beta_{\text{only with approval}} + \beta_{\text{always allowed}}) * \mathbf{x}_{\text{harsh_methods}}^i + (\beta_0 \text{ deaths} + \beta_{10 \text{ deaths}} + \beta_{500 \text{ deaths}} + \beta_{1,500 \text{ deaths}} + \beta_{3,000 \text{ deaths}}) * \mathbf{x}_{\text{deaths_from_terrorism}}^i \quad (2.4)$$

where $\mathbf{x}_{\text{taxes}}^i$ is a vector of four indicator variables for different levels of the “increase in your taxes to fund efforts to prevent terrorism over the next 10 years” attribute for policy option i ; $\mathbf{x}_{\text{access_to_info}}^i$ is a vector of four indicator variables for different levels of the “Government access to personal information” attribute; $\mathbf{x}_{\text{profiling}}^i$ is a vector of three indicator variables for different levels of “using race, ethnicity, or country of citizenship to identify potential terrorists” attribute; $\mathbf{x}_{\text{jailing}}^i$ is a vector of four indicator variables for different levels of the “jailing suspected terrorists without trial” attribute; $\mathbf{x}_{\text{harsh_methods}}^i$ is a vector of four indicator variables for different levels of the “using harsh methods to question suspected terrorists” attribute; and $\mathbf{x}_{\text{deaths_from_terrorism}}^i$ is a vector of five indicator variables for the different levels of the “expected deaths from terrorism on U.S. soil over the next 10 years” attribute. Note that when effects

⁴ Effects-coded variables are similar to dummy variables except that they take on a value of -1 when the attribute is at the “base” level (instead of zero), making the base equal to the negative sum of the other levels.

coding is used, each estimated coefficient (each β) represents relative importance weights known as “part-worth utilities,” where larger values of β indicate greater utility.

In addition, we estimate another specification that treats taxes and deaths from terrorism as continuous variables. Specifically, we estimate the following equation:

$$\begin{aligned}
 V_{\text{policy option}} = & \beta_{\text{taxes}} * \text{taxes}^i + (\beta_{\text{never}} + \beta_{\text{allowed with judge's permission}} + \beta_{\text{allowed if suspected terrorist}} + \\
 & \beta_{\text{always}}) * \mathbf{x}^i_{\text{access_to_info}} + (\beta_{\text{never}} + \beta_{\text{based on country of citizenship only}} + \beta_{\text{always}}) * \mathbf{x}^i_{\text{profiling}} + \\
 & (\beta_{< 6\text{months}} + \beta_{6\text{mon to 2 years}} + \beta_{2\text{ to 7 years}} + \beta_{\text{no limit}}) * \mathbf{x}^i_{\text{jailing}} + (\beta_{\text{never}} + \beta_{\text{with approval to}} \\
 & \text{prevent attack}} + \beta_{\text{only with approval}} + \beta_{\text{always allowed}}) * \mathbf{x}^i_{\text{harsh_methods}} + \\
 & \beta_{\text{deaths_from_terrorism}} * \text{deaths_from_terrorism}^i
 \end{aligned} \tag{2.5}$$

where taxes^i is the amount taxes will increase over the next 10 years in policy option i , $\mathbf{x}^i_{\text{access_to_info}}$ is a vector of four indicator variables for different levels of the “Government access to personal information” attribute; $\mathbf{x}^i_{\text{profiling}}$ is a vector of three indicator variables for different levels of “using race, ethnicity, or country of citizenship to identify potential terrorists” attribute; $\mathbf{x}^i_{\text{jailing}}$ is a vector of four indicator variables for different levels of the “jailing suspected terrorists without trial” attribute; $\mathbf{x}^i_{\text{harsh_methods}}$ is a vector of four indicator variables for different levels of the “using harsh methods to question suspected terrorists” attribute; and $\text{deaths_from_terrorism}^i$ is the expected number of deaths from terrorism on U.S. soil over the next 10 years under policy option i . With the exception of taxes and deaths, all coefficient estimates can be interpreted as in the previous model specification. However, because taxes and deaths enter this model as continuous variables, their coefficients represent marginal utilities. Specifically, $(-\beta_{\text{taxes}})$ represents the marginal utility of income and $(-\beta_{\text{deaths_from_terrorism}})$ represents the marginal utility received from a reduction in deaths from terrorism. As a result, this specification simplifies calculations of the value derived from moving from one level of a particular attribute to another holding all other things constant.

After the RUM model has been estimated as described above, the β parameters obtained can be used to calculate the monetary value an average individual places on changes in the levels of homeland security policy attributes (also known as average WTP). Average WTP can be calculated by dividing the difference between the part-worth utilities (the coefficients estimated for two attribute levels) by the marginal utility of income as measured by the tax attribute. For example, the average WTP to move from a policy where the U.S. government can never access personal information to a policy where the government has unlimited access to one’s personal information equals (holding all else constant) the difference between the part-worth utilities for these two levels divided by the marginal utility of money: $([\beta_{\text{access_to_info(always)}} - \beta_{\text{access_to_info(never)}}] / (-\beta_{\text{taxes}}))$. Note that in this specific example, we would expect the average WTP to be *negative* given that we expect individuals to experience

negative utility from this policy change.⁵ One way to interpret this result is that the absolute value of a negative WTP represents the amount of monetary compensation that would be required to make the average individual indifferent to the policy change in question. The larger the absolute value is, the more reluctant they are to accept the policy change, and the more they must be compensated to be made indifferent. Returning to the previous example, suppose that we estimate that the average WTP to increase government access to personal information is -\$2,975 over 10 years. Then the average individual can be made indifferent to this policy change by providing him or her a monetary compensation of \$2,975 over the next 10 years (perhaps in the form of a tax credit).

A similar computation can be performed to estimate the number of deaths that a policy change would have to prevent to make the average respondent indifferent to its implementation. We perform this computation by replacing the marginal utility of income in the previous equation with the marginal utility received from the reduction in deaths from terrorism ($[\beta_{\text{access_to_info(never)}} - \beta_{\text{access_to_info(always)}}] / (-\beta_{\text{deaths_from_terrorism}})$). Now suppose that, using this new equation, we estimate that the average WTP to increase government access to personal information (as measured in numbers of deaths from terrorism) is -979 over 10 years. Then we can infer that the average individual would be indifferent to the policy change if 979 deaths from terrorism were prevented over the next 10 years. When discussing the results of our analysis below, we will continue to discuss the impact of changes in different policy attributes in terms of monetary compensation that must be provided to make the average individual indifferent to a policy change and number of deaths that must be prevented to make the average individual indifferent to a policy change. This language best suits the primary goal of this study to better understand individuals' willingness to accept the monetary and nonmonetary costs of counterterrorism policies.

Up to this point, we have discussed quantifying homeland security preferences using a conditional logit model. However, one of the well-recognized limitations of the conditional logit model is the assumed property of Independence of Irrelevant Alternative (IIA), which often implies unrealistic substitution patterns between options, particularly those that are relatively similar (McFadden, 1984). Therefore, we also generate results using mixed logit to investigate how sensitive our results are to the estimation method used (Revelt & Train, 1998). Mixed logit is not subject to the restrictive IIA assumption and the model specifically accounts for unobserved heterogeneity in tastes across subjects by introducing a subject-specific stochastic component for each β , as follows:

$$V_{ij} = X_{ij}\beta^i + e_{ij}^i = X_{ij}(\beta + \eta^i) + e_{ij}^i \quad (2.6)$$

⁵ We expect individuals to experience negative utility in this example because we anticipate the average individual to prefer the government to have less access to their personal information, holding all else equal.

where η^i is a stochastic component of preferences that varies across respondents according to an assumed probability distribution. Mixed logit also captures within-subject correlation in responses (i.e., panel structured data), which is important for conjoint experiments that involve multiple choice tasks per respondent (as in this study).

To test the credibility of the homeland security preferences quantified using the conditional and mixed logit models, the survey included an internal validity test called a holdout analysis. Only the answers to the first four conjoint questions are used to estimate the RUM model. Responses to the fifth question, which is the same for all respondents, are not used in the estimation procedure (see Figure 5 for the holdout question). The results of the RUM model can then be used to predict how respondents will answer this question and these predictions can be compared to the actual choices of respondents to evaluate how well the model performs. If the model accurately predicts respondents choices, this lends additional credibility to the results.

Figure 5. Holdout Task		
	Option A	Option B
Government Strategies to Improve Security		
Increase in your taxes to fund antiterrorism measures over the next 10 years	\$7,000 over ten years or \$700 per year on average	\$1,500 over ten years or \$150 per year on average
Government access to personal information	Allowed if suspected of terrorist activity but without a judge's permission	Never allowed
Using race, ethnicity, or country of citizenship to identify potential terrorists	Allowed based on country of citizenship only	Never allowed
Jailing suspected terrorists without trial	Less than 6 months	6 months to 2 years
Using harsh methods to question suspected terrorists	Allowed, but only with approval from responsible official to prevent imminent attack	Never allowed
National Security Outcomes		
Expected deaths from terrorism on U.S. soil over the next 10 years	10 deaths	3,000 deaths
<i>If these were the only options available, which policy would you choose?</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<i>Suppose you were asked to vote on the policy option you just selected. Would you vote in favor of this option being implemented?</i>		
	<input type="checkbox"/> <i>Yes, I would vote for this option</i> <input type="checkbox"/> <i>No, I would not vote for this option</i>	

The levels for this holdout task were selected based on recommendations in Orme and Johnson (2010). First, the levels should overlap well with the levels presented in the other four choice tasks. Second, levels should be selected so that neither option dominates the other. As shown in Figure 5, Option B in our holdout task has fewer restrictions on civil liberties, but a greater number of expected deaths from terrorism.

Mathematically, the probability that respondents will choose Option A is given by equation 2.6 and the probability respondents will choose Option B is given by equation 2.7 below

$$P^a = \exp(\sum\beta_i) / [\exp(\sum\beta_i) + \exp(\sum\beta_j)] \quad (2.6)$$

$$P^b = \exp(\sum\beta_j) / [\exp(\sum\beta_i) + \exp(\sum\beta_j)] \quad (2.7)$$

where β_i are the corresponding attribute levels association with Option A and β_j are the attribute levels associated with Option B. For example, after estimating equation 2.4, we can estimate the proportion of respondents choosing Option A (P_a) by:

$$P_a = \frac{\exp(\beta_{\text{taxes}(\$7,000)} + \beta_{\text{access_to_info(allowed if suspected terrorist)}} + \beta_{\text{profiling(based on c.o.c only)}} + \beta_{\text{jailing(< 6months)}} + \beta_{\text{harsh methods(with approval to prevent attack)}} + \beta_{\text{deaths from terrorism (10 deaths)}})}{\exp(\beta_{\text{taxes}(\$7,000)} + \beta_{\text{access_to_info(allowed if suspected terrorist)}} + \beta_{\text{profiling(based on c.o.c only)}} + \beta_{\text{jailing(< 6months)}} + \beta_{\text{harsh methods(with approval to prevent attack)}} + \beta_{\text{deaths from terrorism (10 deaths)}}) + \exp(\beta_{\text{taxes}(\$1,500)} + \beta_{\text{access_to_info(never)}} + \beta_{\text{profiling(never)}} + \beta_{\text{jailing(6mon to 2 years)}} + \beta_{\text{harsh methods(never)}} + \beta_{\text{deaths from terrorism (3,000 deaths)}})} \quad (2.8)$$

And the proportion of respondents choosing Option B (P_b) can be predicted by:

$$P_b = \frac{\exp(\beta_{\text{taxes}(\$1,500)} + \beta_{\text{access_to_info(never)}} + \beta_{\text{profiling(never)}} + \beta_{\text{jailing(6mon to 2 years)}} + \beta_{\text{harsh methods(never)}} + \beta_{\text{deaths from terrorism (3,000 deaths)}})}{\exp(\beta_{\text{taxes}(\$7,000)} + \beta_{\text{access_to_info(allowed if suspected terrorist)}} + \beta_{\text{profiling(based on c.o.c only)}} + \beta_{\text{jailing(< 6months)}} + \beta_{\text{harsh methods(with approval to prevent attack)}} + \beta_{\text{deaths from terrorism (10 deaths)}}) + \exp(\beta_{\text{taxes}(\$1,500)} + \beta_{\text{access_to_info(never)}} + \beta_{\text{profiling(never)}} + \beta_{\text{jailing(6mon to 2 years)}} + \beta_{\text{harsh methods(never)}} + \beta_{\text{deaths from terrorism (3,000 deaths)}})} \quad (2.9)$$

After the proportion of respondents choosing Option A and Option B have been predicted in this fashion they can be compared with the actual choices of respondents using Mean Absolute Error. This is calculated by taking the average of the absolute error between predicted and actual answers for Option A and the absolute error between predicted and actual answers for Option B. For example, suppose the predicted proportion of respondents choosing Options A and B are 70% and 30%, respectively. By contrast, suppose the actual proportion of respondents choosing Options A and B are 60% and 40%, respectively. The absolute error for Option A is 10 percentage points. The absolute error for Option B is 10 percentage points. Therefore, the mean absolute error is 10 percentage points. It is important to note that when respondents only have two options to choose from the absolute error for Option A and the absolute error for Option B will conceptually be equal. However, in practice there are occasionally individuals who refuse to complete all choice tasks, so the actual proportions may not sum to 100%. We present both the absolute error for Options A and B and the Mean Absolute Error.

Results

Respondent Policy Preferences and Risk Perceptions

The demographic characteristics of the respondents are presented in Table 1 below and are compared to the characteristics of the U.S. population. For the most part, our sample matches closely with the U.S. population statistics. However, the median age of respondents in our sample is slightly higher than the median age for the nation as a whole, our sample has a lower percentage of nonwhite respondents, and our sample was less likely to refuse to answer questions regarding political beliefs.

Table 1. Sample Characteristics of Full Sample Compared to the U.S. Population

	Sample (Nov-Dec 2011)	U.S. Population
General Demographics^a		
Age (Median)	48	36
Female	50%	51%
Income (below \$35,000) ^b	35%	34%
Income (above \$35,000) ^b	55%	66%
High school diploma or less	43%	45%
College graduate or some college	57%	55%
Served in military	13%	10%
Race, Ethnicity, Nationality^a		
Nonwhite	17%	26%
Middle Eastern descent ^c	1%	NA
U.S. citizen	97%	93%
Employment Status^d		
Employed	54%	58%
Unemployed	10%	6%
Not in labor force	36%	35%
Political Beliefs^e		
Refused	1%	25%
Liberal	27%	22%
Moderate	34%	22%
Conservative	39%	32%

^a General Demographic and Race/Ethnicity/Nationality data were obtained from the American Community Survey (2011) as national averages for 2005–2009.

^b Total number of respondents does not sum to 100% because approximately 10% of respondents refused to provide information regarding their household income.

^c Data on portion of the U.S. population claiming Middle Eastern descent are not currently collected by the U.S. Census Bureau.

^d Employment status data were obtained from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (2010) and reflect annual U.S. estimates for 2010.

^e Data regarding U.S. political beliefs were obtained from the American National Election Survey Guide to Public Opinion and Electoral Behavior (2009) and reflect 2008 estimates.

Racial and Self-reported Political Leanings

To ascertain political leaning, the survey contained the following question from the American National Election Survey:

When it comes to politics, do you usually think of yourself as:

- Extremely liberal
- Liberal
- Slightly liberal
- Moderate or middle of the road
- Slightly conservative
- Conservative
- Extremely conservative

We combined the liberal and conservative response categories into one category for liberal and one for conservative, while moderate includes only those respondents who selected “Moderate or middle of the road.” Table 2 provides the breakdown of political leanings separately for whites and nonwhites.

Table 2. Race and Political Identification

	White	Nonwhite	Total
Liberal	80%	20%	100%
Moderate	81%	19%	100%
Conservative	88%	12%	100%

Travel Habits and Airline Security Perceptions

The tables below present data on the travel habits and airline security perceptions of respondents. The final column provides the responses for the entire sample, while the other columns break the responses down between whites and nonwhites and between those with liberal, moderate, and conservative political leanings. Starting with Table 3, the majority of respondents have taken at least one trip that involved airline travel over the past 3 years. However, nonwhites were significantly less likely to travel during this time period than whites. Moderates and conservatives were also less likely to engage in airline travel than liberals over the past 3 years. Using a chi-square test, in both cases the differences by subpopulation are statistically significant (p -value < 0.01).

Table 3. In the Last 3 Years, How Many Trips Have You Made Within the United States That Involved Airline Travel?

	White* (n=1,294)	Nonwhite* (n=265)	Liberal* (n=415)	Moderate* (n=517)	Conservative* (n=604)	Total (n=1,559)
Refused	0%	3%	1%	1%	0%	1%
Never	45%	58%	39%	53%	47%	47%
1–2 trips	29%	23%	29%	27%	27%	28%
3–5 trips	15%	9%	15%	12%	16%	14%
6 or more trips	11%	7%	16%	7%	10%	10%

*Test for differences in responses across subgroups using chi-square test.

Race subgroup p-value-value: < 0.01.

Political affiliation subgroup p-value: < 0.01.

Note: The 23 respondents who refused to identify themselves as liberal, moderate, or conservative were excluded from the political beliefs subgroup. Thus, the sample sizes for these subgroups sum to 1,536 instead of 1,559.

Table 4 reveals that 86% of respondents believe that the screening process at security checkpoints improves air travel safety. Whites were more likely to perceive air travel safety as being improved by the screening process compared to nonwhites (p-value: < 0.01). There was no statistically significant difference between the opinions of liberals, moderates, and conservatives.

Table 4. In Your Opinion, Does the Airline Passenger Screening Process at the Safety Checkpoints Keep Air Travel Safe and Secure?

	White* (n=1,294)	Nonwhite* (n=265)	Liberal (n=415)	Moderate (n=517)	Conservative (n=604)	Total (n=1,559)
Refused	1%	3%	1%	0%	0%	1%
No	13%	16%	13%	13%	15%	14%
Yes, it slightly improves air safety	57%	46%	58%	53%	57%	56%
Yes, it greatly improves air safety	29%	35%	29%	34%	27%	30%

*Test for differences in responses across subgroups using chi-square test.

Race subgroup p-value: < 0.01.

Political affiliation subgroup p-value: 0.16.

Full-body scans have been the subject of significant media attention. From Table 5, more than two-thirds of respondents support requiring that all airline passengers submit to full-body scans. Nonwhites were more likely to support this requirement than whites (74% versus 67%, p-value < 0.01). Moderates were more likely to support this requirement than either conservatives or liberals (75%, 64% and 67%, respectively, p-value < 0.01).

Table 5. In Your Opinion, Should the United States Begin Screening All Airline Passengers With Full-body Scanning Systems That Can Generate Images of Items Hidden Under Their Clothing?

	White* (n=1,294)	Nonwhite* (n=265)	Liberal* (n=415)	Moderate* (n=517)	Conservative* (n=604)	Total (n=1,559)
Refused	1%	3%	0%	0%	1%	1%
Yes	67%	74%	67%	75%	64%	68%
No	33%	23%	33%	25%	35%	31%

*Test for differences in responses across subgroups using chi-square test.

Race subgroup p-value < 0.01.

Political affiliation subgroup p-value < 0.01.

From Table 6, almost half of total respondents indicated that the threat of terrorism was not something they actively thought about when flying or making travel arrangements. Whites are less likely to consider the threat of terrorism in making travel arrangements than nonwhites (50% and 38%, respectively, p-value < 0.01). Moderates were more likely to indicate that they will not fly at all as a result of the perceived threat of terrorism than either conservatives or liberals (20%, 13%, and 8%, respectively, p-value < 0.01).

Table 6. To What Extent Does the Threat of Terrorism Affect Your Willingness To Fly on an Airplane?

	White* (n=1,294)	Nonwhite* (n=265)	Liberal* (n=415)	Moderate* (n=517)	Conservative* (n=604)	Total (n=1,559)
Refused	1%	3%	0%	0%	1%	1%
I won't fly at all	12%	22%	8%	20%	13%	14%
I limit airline travel to as few trips as possible	15%	18%	14%	14%	18%	16%
Terrorism does not affect my willingness to fly but I am always nervous about a terrorist act when flying	22%	19%	21%	22%	21%	21%
The threat of terrorism is not something I actively think about when flying or making travel arrangements	50%	38%	57%	44%	46%	48%

*Test for differences in responses across subgroups using chi-square test.

Race subgroup p-value < 0.01.

Political affiliation subgroup p-value < 0.01.



Perceptions of U.S. Security Spending and Effectiveness of Overall Counterterrorism Efforts

In the segment of the survey introducing the attributes for the conjoint questions, respondents were asked some general questions on government spending on security-related programs. These questions serve two purposes. First, they prompt respondents to think about federal taxes and homeland security. Second, the data collected can be used to help identify respondents who reject the payment vehicle for the conjoint questions. From Table 7, a majority of respondents thought spending was about right; a higher percentage thought it was too high compared to the percentage who thought it was too low.

Table 7. Compared to Other Government Funding, Do You Think the Amount the U.S. Government Currently Spends Preventing Terrorist Attacks Is Too High, About Right, or Too Low?

	White* (n=1,294)	Nonwhite* (n=265)	Liberal* (n=415)	Moderate* (n=517)	Conservative* (n=604)	Total (n=1,559)
Refused	0%	3%	1%	0%	1%	1%
Too high	22%	22%	24%	20%	23%	22%
About right	64%	63%	66%	64%	64%	64%
Too low	13%	12%	10%	16%	12%	13%

*Test for differences in responses across subgroups using chi-square test.

Race subgroup p-value < 0.01.

Political affiliation subgroup p-value < 0.01.

Table 8 provides data on how effective respondents believe the U.S. government has been at reducing the threat of a terrorist attack on U.S. soil. In total, approximately 73% of respondents believe the U.S. government has been somewhat or very effective at accomplishing this goal. Whites are more likely to believe the United States has been effective at reducing the threat of a terrorist attack than nonwhites (p-value < 0.01). Differences between liberal, moderate, and conservative responses are not statistically significant.

Table 8. How Effective Do You Think the U.S. Government Has Been at Reducing the Threat of a Terrorist Attack on U.S. Soil?

	White* (n=1,294)	Nonwhite* (n=265)	Liberal (n=415)	Moderate (n=517)	Conservative (n=604)	Total (n=1,559)
Refused	1%	3%	1%	1%	0%	1%
Not effective at all	5%	8%	5%	5%	5%	5%
Slightly effective	22%	17%	20%	24%	20%	21%
Somewhat effective	52%	49%	50%	51%	53%	52%
Very effective	20%	24%	24%	19%	21%	21%

*Test for differences in responses across subgroups using chi-square test.

Race subgroup p-value < 0.01.

Political affiliation subgroup p-value 0.53.

Government Access to Personal Information

To better understand how the public would react to the U.S. government gaining access to different types of personal information, we asked respondents to identify under which circumstances they would support government access to five types of personal information: (1) listen to phone calls of U.S. citizens, (2) track citizen Web site usage, (3) track citizen physical location, (4) track library books checked out by citizens, and (5) do background check of citizens without their knowledge.

Specifically, the respondents were able to choose from four circumstances for when they might approve of allowing government access to these types of personal information: (1) never allow government access to that particular type of information, (2) only allow the government to access that information with permission from a judge, (3) allow the government access to that information if the person being investigated was suspected of terrorism (regardless of whether a judge provided approval), and (4) always allow government access to that particular type of information.

Table 9 reveals that the vast majority of respondents indicated that there were some circumstances in which each of these strategies would be appropriate. The type of information where the most respondents objected to allowing government access was tracking the books individuals checked out from their local library with 27% of respondents indicating they would never allow government access to this information. At the same time, 12% of respondents indicated that they would support always allowing government access to individuals' library records.

Focusing on differences within subgroups, it appears that nonwhites are less likely than whites to support government access to the different types of personal information listed in Table 9. Specifically, a higher proportion of nonwhites indicated that government access to personal information should never be allowed. However, nonwhites were also more likely to support having no restrictions on government access to personal information (although this percentage was relatively small for both whites and nonwhites). With regard to political affiliation, differences were largest for when individuals in a political subgroup would support access to personal information. Specifically, a higher percentage of liberals compared to moderates and conservatives preferred that access to personal information be allowed "but only with a judge's permission." By contrast, a smaller percentage of liberals selected "Allowed if suspected of terrorist activity but without a judge's permission" compared to the other two categories (p -value 0.03).

Using Race, Ethnicity, or Country of Citizenship to Identify Potential Terrorists

Tables 10 and 11 summarize respondent opinions on the use of two types of characteristics for identifying (profiling) potential terrorists: (1) a person's race or ethnic group and (2) a person's country of citizenship. Table 10 reports results on whether respondents believe that race or ethnic group should ever be used as the only reason to investigate

Table 9. When Should the U.S. Government Be Allowed To Do the Following?

	White* (n=1,294)	Nonwhite* (n=265)	Liberal* (n=415)	Moderate* (n=517)	Conservative* (n=604)	Total (n=1,559)
Listen in on phone calls of its citizens						
Refused	0%	2%	1%	0%	0%	1%
Never allowed	15%	27%	18%	21%	13%	17%
Allowed but only with a judge's permission	50%	39%	56%	45%	47%	48%
Allowed if suspected of terrorist activity but without a judge's permission	32%	27%	22%	31%	37%	31%
Always allowed	3%	5%	3%	3%	3%	3%
Track Web site usage of its citizens						
Refused	0%	2%	1%	0%	0%	1%
Never allowed	14%	21%	16%	15%	15%	16%
Allowed but only with a judge's permission	45%	38%	54%	40%	40%	43%
Allowed if suspected of terrorist activity but without a judge's permission	35%	28%	23%	38%	38%	34%
Always allowed	6%	11%	6%	6%	7%	7%
Track physical location of citizens						
Refused	0%	4%	1%	1%	1%	1%
Never allowed	16%	23%	19%	17%	17%	18%
Allowed but only with a judge's permission	39%	34%	50%	35%	34%	38%
Allowed if suspected of terrorist activity but without a judge's permission	38%	31%	24%	40%	42%	36%
Always allowed	6%	9%	6%	7%	7%	7%
See which books citizens check out at the library						
Refused	0%	3%	1%	1%	0%	1%
Never allowed	27%	30%	31%	27%	24%	27%
Allowed but only with a judge's permission	30%	27%	36%	25%	31%	30%
Allowed if suspected of terrorist activity but without a judge's permission	31%	28%	23%	35%	33%	31%
Always allowed	11%	13%	9%	12%	12%	12%

(continued)



**Table 9. When Should the U.S. Government Be Allowed To Do the Following?
(continued)**

	White* (n=1,294)	Nonwhite* (n=265)	Liberal* (n=415)	Moderate* (n=517)	Conservative* (n=604)	Total (n=1,559)
Do a background check on citizens without their knowledge						
Refused	1%	3%	1%	0%	1%	1%
Never allowed	17%	24%	20%	18%	16%	18%
Allowed but only with a judge's permission	37%	29%	41%	33%	35%	36%
Allowed if suspected of terrorist activity but without a judge's permission	33%	29%	26%	36%	34%	33%
Always allowed	12%	15%	12%	12%	14%	13%

*Test for differences in responses across subgroups using chi-square test.

Race subgroup p-value (for all information types): < 0.01.

Political affiliation subgroup p-value (for all information types): < 0.02.

Table 10. Do You Think Race or Ethnic Group Should Ever Be Used as the Only Reason to Investigate Someone as a Potential Terrorist?

	White* (n=1,294)	Nonwhite* (n=265)	Liberal* (n=415)	Moderate* (n=517)	Conservative* (n=604)	Total (n=1,559)
Refused	0%	3%	0%	0%	0%	1%
Yes	37%	25%	25%	31%	46%	35%
No	62%	73%	75%	69%	54%	64%

*Differences in responses across subgroups are statistically significant at the 5% level (chi-square).

Race subgroup p-value < 0.01.

Political affiliation subgroup p-value < 0.01.

Table 11. Do You Think Country of Citizenship Should Ever Be Used as the Only Reason to Investigate Someone as a Potential Terrorist?

	White* (n=1,294)	Nonwhite* (n=265)	Liberal* (n=415)	Moderate* (n=517)	Conservative* (n=604)	Total (n=1,559)
Refused	0%	3%	1%	0%	0%	1%
Yes	47%	30%	34%	38%	57%	44%
No	52%	66%	65%	62%	42%	55%

*Test for differences in responses across subgroups using chi-square test.

Race subgroup p-value < 0.01.

Political affiliation subgroup p-value < 0.01.



someone as a potential terrorist. In total, 64% of the sample indicated that they do not support this type of profiling. However, there is significant variation across subpopulations. With regard to the race subgroup, 73% of nonwhites disapproved of this type of profiling policy compared to 62% of whites (p-value < 0.01). By political affiliation, 75% of liberals disapproved of this policy compared to 69% of moderates and 54% of conservatives (p-value < 0.01).

Table 11 summarizes the opinions of respondents on whether a person’s country of citizenship should ever be used as the only reason to investigate him or her as a potential terrorist. Overall, fewer respondents objected to using this characteristic for identifying potential terrorists than using race or ethnic group. Yet, 55% of respondents remained opposed to this type of profiling. When considering responses at the subgroup level, nonwhites are more likely to reject the use of this type of profiling than whites (66% compared to 52%, p-value < 0.01). Similarly, liberals are more likely to reject this type of profiling (65%) than moderates or conservatives (62% and 42% respectively, p-value < 0.01). For both types of profiling, self-identified moderates bear more similarity to liberals than conservatives.

Current U.S. policy requires that individuals flying into the United States receive additional screening if they have traveled through countries that are state sponsors of terrorism. Table 12 summarizes respondent opinion on whether they believe this policy should be pursued. In total, a large majority of respondents (86%) support this policy. Although whites are more likely to support this policy than nonwhites (87% support vs. 82% nonwhites, p-value < 0.01), the difference is much smaller than for racial, ethnic, or county of origin profiling. Again, liberals were less likely to support this type of profiling than moderates and conservative (p-value < 0.01).

Table 12. Do You Think That Someone Flying Into the United States From Anywhere in the World Should Receive Extra Screening If They Also Traveled Through Nations That Are State Sponsors of Terrorism?

	White* (n=1,294)	Nonwhite* (n=265)	Liberal* (n=415)	Moderate* (n=517)	Conservative* (n=604)	Total (n=1,559)
Refused	1%	3%	1%	0%	1%	1%
Yes	87%	82%	82%	85%	90%	86%
No	13%	16%	17%	15%	10%	13%

*Test for differences in responses across subgroups using chi-square test.

Race subgroup p-value < 0.01.

Political affiliation subgroup p-value < 0.01.

Jailing Terrorists Without Trial

There is considerable public debate regarding how long the United States should be allowed to hold suspected terrorists without a trial. Table 13 summarizes respondent opinion on this issue. In total, 72% of respondents supported a policy that would establish how long the government could hold suspected terrorists. With regard to the race subgroup, 73% of whites compared to 71% of nonwhites supported the policy (p-value < 0.01). With regard to political



Table 13. Should the U.S. Government Establish a Policy for How Long the Government Can Hold Suspected Terrorists in Jail Without a Trial?

	White* (n=1,294)	Nonwhite* (n=265)	Liberal* (n=415)	Moderate* (n=517)	Conservative* (n=604)	Total (n=1,559)
Refused	0%	3%	0%	0%	0%	1%
Yes	73%	71%	79%	74%	68%	72%
No	27%	26%	20%	26%	32%	27%

*Test for differences in responses across subgroups using chi-square test.

Race subgroup p-value < 0.01.

Political affiliation subgroup p-value < 0.01.

affiliation, liberals were more likely to support establishing such a policy than moderates and conservatives (79% compared to 74% and 68%, respectively, p-value < 0.01).

A key feature of this public debate is whether a distinction should be made between U.S. citizens and non-U.S. citizens. Tables 14 and 15 reveal that this distinction makes a difference to respondents. In total, 78% oppose holding U.S. citizens in jail without a trial (Table 14). Within subgroups, we do not see large differences in this level of opposition. With regard to the race subgroup, the differences are small, but statistically significant—79% of nonwhites answered no compared to 77% of whites (p-value < 0.01). The differences in opinion by political affiliation subgroup were not statistically significant (p-value 0.14).

Table 14. Should the U.S. Government Ever Be Able to Hold a U.S. Citizen in Jail Without a Trial?

	White* (n=1,294)	Nonwhite* (n=265)	Liberal (n=415)	Moderate (n=517)	Conservative (n=604)	Total (n=1,559)
Refused	0%	3%	0%	1%	0%	1%
Yes	22%	18%	17%	23%	24%	22%
No	77%	79%	82%	77%	75%	78%

*Test for differences in responses across subgroups using chi-square test.

Race subgroup p-value < 0.01.

Political affiliation subgroup p-value 0.14.

Table 15. Should the U.S. Government Ever Be Able to Hold a Non-U.S. Citizen in Jail Without a Trial?

	White* (n=1,294)	Nonwhite* (n=265)	Liberal* (n=415)	Moderate* (n=517)	Conservative* (n=604)	Total (n=1,559)
Refused	1%	3%	1%	1%	1%	1%
Yes	53%	34%	38%	45%	62%	49%
No	46%	63%	61%	54%	37%	49%

*Test for differences in responses across subgroups using chi-square test.

Race subgroup p-value < 0.01.

Political affiliation subgroup p-value < 0.01.



We observe greater diversity of opinion when asking if the U.S. government should ever be able to hold a non-U.S. citizen without trial. The results for the full sample are split evenly, with 49% responding that the United States should be able to hold noncitizens without trial and 49% responding that the government should not. Differences in opinion across subgroup are significant: 63% of nonwhites indicated that the government should not be able to hold non-U.S. citizens without trial compared to 46% of whites (p-value < 0.01). Liberals were more likely to oppose the government holding noncitizens without trial (61%) than moderates or conservatives (54% and 37% respectively, p-value < 0.01).

Using Harsh Methods to Question Suspected Terrorists

The use of harsh methods to question terrorism suspects has generated strong reactions from the public. To better understand how respondents felt about this issue, we asked them to specify under what circumstances they believe the U.S. government should be allowed to use harsh methods. Specifically, the respondents were able to choose from four circumstances for when they might approve allowing government to use harsh methods to question terrorist suspects: (1) Never allowed, (2) Allowed, but only after approval from a responsible official (like a judge) and to prevent an imminent terrorist attack, (3) Allowed, but only after approval from a responsible official (like a judge) regardless of whether an attack is imminent, (4) Allowed whenever the questioner thinks it might be effective in gathering information that will help in the fight against terrorism. Public debate often hinges on the citizenship of the terrorist suspect. We asked respondents to consider this question for both U.S. citizens and non-U.S. citizens.

Table 16 summarizes the results where the terrorist suspect is identified as a U.S. citizen. Overall, a majority of respondents (64%) indicated that there were some circumstances when they would support the use of harsh methods, while 34% thought that harsh methods should never be used in any case. However, only 25% said they would allow the U.S. government to use harsh methods under the last two circumstances (which require the least oversight). Differences in opinion between whites and nonwhites are relatively small but statistically significant (p-value < 0.01), with more nonwhites responding that harsh methods should never be allowed. A larger difference in opinion emerges between liberals, moderates, and conservatives. Half of liberals thought the methods should never be allowed, compared to 34% of moderates and 23% of conservatives. Conservatives were also more likely to support the two options that require the least oversight (p-value < 0.01).

Table 17 looks at the issue for noncitizens. Overall, respondents were more inclined to allow the use of harsh methods on non-U.S. citizens. In total, 29% of respondents indicated that they would never allow the U.S. government to use harsh methods in questioning a terrorist suspect who was not a citizen of the United States. With regard to the race subgroup, 27% of white respondents would not allow the use of harsh methods under any circumstances compared to 37% of nonwhites (p-value < 0.01). With regard to political affiliation, 44% of liberal respondents indicated that they would never allow the use of harsh methods compared with 30% of moderates and 17% of conservatives (p-value < 0.01).

Table 16. Under What Circumstances, If Any, Do You Think the U.S. Government Should Be Allowed to Use Harsh and Painful Methods to Question U.S. Citizens Who Are Suspected Terrorists?

	White* (n=1,294)	Nonwhite* (n=265)	Liberal* (n=415)	Moderate* (n=517)	Conservative* (n=604)	Total (n=1,559)
Refused	1%	5%	1%	2%	1%	2%
Never allowed in any case	33%	38%	50%	34%	23%	34%
Allowed, but only after approval from a responsible official (like a judge) and to prevent an imminent terrorist attack	41%	31%	34%	41%	41%	39%
Allowed, but only after approval from a responsible official (like a judge) regardless of whether an attack is imminent	13%	12%	8%	11%	19%	13%
Allowed whenever the questioner thinks it might be effective in gathering information that will help in the fight against terrorism	12%	14%	6%	12%	16%	12%

*Test for differences in responses across subgroups using chi-square test.

Race subgroup p-value < 0.01.

Political affiliation subgroup p-value < 0.01.

Table 17. Under What Circumstances, If Any, Do You Think the U.S. Government Should Be Allowed to Use Harsh and Painful Methods to Question Non-U.S. Citizens Who Are Suspected Terrorists?

	White* (n=1,294)	Nonwhite* (n=265)	Liberal* (n=415)	Moderate* (n=517)	Conservative* (n=604)	Total (n=1,559)
Refused	2%	6%	2%	2%	2%	2%
Never allowed in any case	27%	37%	44%	30%	17%	29%
Allowed, but only after approval from a responsible official (like a judge) and to prevent an imminent terrorist attack	36%	32%	38%	38%	33%	36%
Allowed, but only after approval from a responsible official (like a judge) regardless of whether an attack is imminent	17%	10%	8%	15%	23%	16%
Allowed whenever the questioner thinks it might be effective in gathering information that will help in the fight against terrorism	18%	16%	8%	15%	25%	17%

*Test for differences in responses across subgroups using chi-square test.

Race subgroup p-value < 0.01.

Political affiliation subgroup p-value < 0.01.



Effectiveness and Likelihood of Abuse

In addition to the questions listed above, which focus on better understanding the level of overall support respondents lend to four of the strategies considered in this study, we asked respondents to indicate how effective they believe these strategies are at fighting terrorism and how likely it is they will be abused by the U.S. government. Table 18 summarizes how effective respondents believe (1) unlimited government access to personal information would be; (2) the use of race, ethnic group, or country of citizenship is to identify potential terrorist suspects for investigation (profiling); and (3) using harsh interrogation methods is at reducing the threat of terrorism.⁶ Comparing responses across the entire sample and all four strategies, the strategy perceived to be the most effective is profiling (with 72% of respondents saying the strategy is somewhat or very effective) and the strategy perceived to be least effective is providing the U.S. government with unlimited access to personal information (with 50% of respondents saying the strategy is somewhat or very effective).

Examining results within each strategy, the subgroups display significant variations. For example, a larger portion of white respondents state that profiling and harsh questioning methods are somewhat or very effective strategies for combating terrorism compared to nonwhites (73% versus 64% for profiling and 68% versus 61% for harsh questioning, p-value < 0.01). By contrast, a larger percentage of nonwhite respondents state that unlimited government access to personal information is somewhat or very effective at fighting terrorism compared to whites (59% compared to 48%, p-value < 0.01). With regard to political affiliation, a larger portion of self-identified liberal respondents state that the strategies presented are not at all effective. This is true for unlimited government access to personal information (20% versus 15% and 16%, p-value < 0.01), profiling (14% versus 8% and 3%, p-value < 0.01), and harsh questioning methods (29% versus 14% and 8%, p-value 0.02).

Table 19 summarizes respondent stated beliefs about the likelihood that the U.S. government would abuse unlimited government access to personal information, profiling, jailing suspected terrorists without trial, and using harsh interrogation methods. Across all subgroups and strategies, a majority of respondents believe that abuse by the U.S. government is somewhat or very likely. Comparing full sample responses across each strategy, the largest portion of respondents believe the U.S. government would be most likely to abuse having unlimited access to personal information (with 86% of respondents saying abuse of this strategy is somewhat or very likely). This finding also holds true for both subgroups of interest.

⁶ Perceived effectiveness of jailing was not measured.

Table 18. How Effective Do You Believe the Policy Would Be at Reducing the Threat of a Terrorist Attack on U.S. Soil?

	White* (n=1,294)	Nonwhite* (n=265)	Liberal* (n=415)	Moderate* (n=517)	Conservative* (n=604)	Total (n=1,559)
Providing the U.S. government with unlimited access to personal information of people living in the U.S. (both citizens and noncitizens)						
Refused	1%	3%	1%	1%	0%	1%
Not effective at all	18%	13%	20%	15%	16%	17%
Slightly effective	34%	25%	35%	31%	31%	32%
Somewhat effective	35%	39%	31%	40%	36%	36%
Very effective	13%	20%	12%	13%	17%	14%
Using race, ethnic group, or country of citizenship to identify potential terrorist suspects for investigation						
Refused	1%	5%	1%	1%	1%	1%
Very ineffective	8%	9%	14%	8%	3%	8%
Somewhat ineffective	18%	23%	26%	20%	13%	18%
Somewhat effective	50%	46%	47%	55%	48%	50%
Very effective	23%	18%	12%	17%	35%	22%
Using harsh and painful methods to question a suspected terrorist are for gaining information and reducing terrorist threats						
Refused	1%	3%	0%	1%	0%	1%
Very ineffective	16%	17%	29%	14%	8%	16%
Somewhat ineffective	16%	20%	22%	19%	12%	17%
Somewhat effective	48%	42%	39%	50%	49%	47%
Very effective	20%	19%	10%	16%	30%	20%

*Test for differences in responses across subgroups using chi-square test.

Race subgroup (for all strategies) p-value: < 0.01.

Political affiliation subgroup (for all strategies) p-value: < 0.02.

Examining the results across the subgroups, a larger portion of white respondents believe that unlimited government access to personal information, jailing suspected terrorists without trial, and using harsh questioning methods are somewhat or very likely to be abused (86% vs. 85% for government access to personal information, 74% vs. 72% for jailing suspected terrorists without trial, and 80% vs. 74% for the use of harsh questioning methods, p-values < 0.01). By contrast, a larger percentage of nonwhite respondents believe that the government is somewhat or very likely to abuse profiling (76% compared to 75%, p-value < 0.01).

Table 19. How Likely Do You Think It Is That if U.S. Government Officials Were Allowed to Use this Policy, It Would Be Abused by the Government?

	White* (n=1,294)	Nonwhite* (n=265)	Liberal* (n=415)	Moderate* (n=517)	Conservative* (n=604)	Total (n=1,559)
Use race, ethnicity, or country of citizenship to identify potential terrorists						
Refused	1%	2%	1%	0%	0%	1%
Very unlikely	4%	6%	3%	4%	5%	4%
Somewhat unlikely	21%	15%	12%	19%	25%	20%
Somewhat likely	45%	38%	38%	49%	44%	44%
Very likely	30%	38%	45%	28%	25%	32%
U.S. government officials were granted greater access to private information						
Refused	1%	1%	1%	1%	0%	0%
Very unlikely	1%	3%	1%	3%	2%	2%
Somewhat unlikely	10%	12%	10%	12%	11%	11%
Somewhat likely	34%	43%	34%	43%	36%	36%
Very likely	54%	42%	54%	42%	50%	50%
U.S. government officials were allowed to jail suspected terrorists without a trial						
Refused	1%	3%	0%	1%	1%	1%
Very unlikely	6%	8%	2%	8%	8%	6%
Somewhat unlikely	19%	17%	12%	19%	24%	19%
Somewhat likely	39%	39%	38%	40%	40%	39%
Very likely	35%	33%	48%	33%	27%	35%
Use harsh and painful methods when questioning suspected terrorists						
Refused	1%	3%	1%	1%	1%	1%
Very unlikely	4%	9%	3%	5%	6%	5%
Somewhat unlikely	15%	13%	7%	14%	20%	15%
Somewhat likely	43%	42%	39%	44%	44%	43%
Very likely	37%	32%	51%	35%	29%	37%

*Test for differences in responses across subgroups using chi-square test.

Race subgroup p-value < 0.01.

Political affiliation subgroup p-value < 0.02.



With regard to the political affiliation subgroup, more liberal respondents believe that the U.S. government would be likely to abuse each of these strategies. This is true for unlimited government access to personal information (88% versus 85% and 86%, p-value < 0.01), profiling (83% vs. 77% and 69%, p-value < 0.01), jailing suspected terrorists (86% vs. 73% and 67%, p-value < 0.01), and harsh questioning methods (90% vs. 79% and 73%, p-value 0.02).

Threat of Terrorist Attack on U.S. Soil

Table 20 provides a breakdown of median predictions for the number of people who will die from terrorist attacks on U.S. soil over the next 10 years. Median estimates for whites are 5 times higher than those of nonwhites. Median estimates provided by conservatives are almost 3 times larger than those provided by liberals.

Table 20. What Is Your Best Estimate of the Expected Number of Deaths From Terrorism on U.S. Soil Over the Next 10 Years?

	White* (n=1,294)	Nonwhite* (n=265)	Liberal* (n=415)	Moderate* (n=517)	Conservative* (n=604)	Total (n=1,559)
Median	500	100	200	300	575	350

*Test for differences in responses across subgroups using chi-square test.

Criminal Consequences for Terrorists

Table 21 summarizes the opinions of respondents on whether they believe the death penalty should be used to punish individuals who are caught and found guilty of planning terrorist attacks against the United States. In total, 63% of respondents support this policy. With regard to the race subgroup, 66% of whites support the policy compared to 51% of nonwhites (p-value < 0.01). With regard to the political affiliation subgroup, 72% of conservatives support this policy compared to 64% of moderates and 51% of liberals (p-value < 0.01).

Table 21. Do You Believe the Death Penalty Should Be Used to Punish Individuals Who Are Caught and Found Guilty in a Court of Law of Planning Terrorist Attacks Against the United States?

	White* (n=1,294)	Nonwhite* (n=265)	Liberal* (n=415)	Moderate* (n=517)	Conservative* (n=604)	Total (n=1,559)
Refused	1%	5%	0%	1%	1%	2%
Yes	66%	51%	51%	64%	72%	63%
No	33%	45%	48%	35%	26%	35%

*Test for differences in responses across subgroups using chi-square test.

Race subgroup p-value < 0.01.

Political affiliation subgroup p-value < 0.01.



Tradeoffs Respondents Are Willing To Make To Reduce the Threat of Terrorism

In this section, we present the results from the stated-preference questions. First, we discuss the results of the conditional logit model and what they tell us about respondents' preferences for different attributes and levels. Second, we use the conditional logit model results to estimate how much the average respondent would have to be compensated to accept various policy changes holding all other factors constant. Next, to test the sensitivity of our results to different estimation methods, we compare the results we obtain using the conditional logit model with those obtained using a mixed logit approach. Lastly, we report the results of an internal validity test for both models.

Conditional Logit Model Results

Table 22 contains the coefficients from the conditional logit models. The coefficients for the total sample are in the final column of the table. We also estimated a separate model for each subgroup. Because the subgroup models were estimated separately, the coefficients in Table 22 cannot be directly compared across the groups, but the qualitative rankings of the attribute levels can be compared. As previously discussed, these coefficients can be viewed as part-worth utilities where large values indicate greater utility. Note that these coefficient estimates represent the average value across the relevant sample and they do not provide information about the heterogeneity of preferences within the sample.

As expected, respondents preferred policies with lower taxes and fewer expected deaths. When considering results for the total sample, we see that on average respondents preferred the following levels for each attribute:

- Government access to personal information: Never allowing the government access to personal information and allowing access only with a judge's permission were preferred to allowing the government to access the personal information of suspected terrorists (with or without a judge's approval) and always allowing the government access to personal information.
- Using race, ethnicity, or country of citizenship to identify potential terrorists: Allowing the government to identify potential terrorists using a person's country of citizenship was preferred to never allowing the government to use race, ethnicity, or country of citizenship in identifying potential terrorists and always allowing the government to use these characteristics.
- Jailing terrorist suspects without trial: Respondents preferred that suspected terrorists be jailed for 6 months or less without trial over other time periods shown. However, differences in coefficients across these time periods are not statistically significant at the 10% level.
- Using harsh methods to question suspected terrorists: Allowing the use of harsh methods at officials' discretion was the least preferable option. Among the other three levels, which all impose some constraints on the use of harsh methods, none emerged as a clear favorite for the sample as a whole.

Table 22. Coefficient Estimates and Standard Errors From Conditional Logit Models for Different Samples

	Estimated Coefficient (Standard Error)					
	White (n=646)	Nonwhite (n=124)	Liberal (n=202)	Moderate (n=272)	Conservative (n=282)	Full Sample (n=770)
Increase in Personal Taxes						
\$500 over 10 years or \$50 per year on average	0.354 (0.050)	0.133 (0.121)	0.341 (0.093)	0.308 (0.080)	0.345 (0.074)	0.315 (0.045)
\$1,500 over 10 years or \$150 per year on average	0.240*** (0.049)	0.277 (0.114)	0.264*** (0.089)	0.164 (0.077)	0.336*** (0.073)	0.245*** (0.045)
\$3,000 over 10 years or \$300 per year on average	-0.030*** (0.047)	0.033*** (0.109)	0.001*** (0.085)	-0.013*** (0.075)	-0.037*** (0.070)	-0.016*** (0.043)
\$7,000 over 10 years or \$700 per year on average ^a	-0.565*** (0.051)	-0.443*** (0.121)	-0.606*** (0.097)	-0.459*** (0.079)	-0.644*** (0.077)	-0.544*** (0.046)
Government Access to Personal Information						
Never allowed	0.071 (0.049)	0.219 (0.112)	0.241 (0.090)	0.180 (0.077)	-0.049 (0.074)	0.097 (0.045)
Allowed but only with a judge's permission	0.204*** (0.049)	0.266*** (0.114)	0.248** (0.091)	0.256*** (0.076)	0.156 (0.074)	0.209*** (0.045)
Allowed if suspected of terrorist activity but without a judge's permission	0.016*** (0.048)	-0.210*** (0.111)	-0.025** (0.087)	-0.037*** (0.075)	0.023 (0.072)	-0.018*** (0.044)
Always allowed ^a	-0.291*** (0.049)	-0.275 (0.111)	-0.464*** (0.092)	-0.399*** (0.077)	-0.130 (0.075)	-0.288*** (0.044)
Using race, ethnicity, or country of citizenship to identify potential terrorists						
Never allowed	-0.117*** (0.038)	0.114 (0.090)	-0.014 (0.069)	-0.078** (0.059)	-0.145*** (0.057)	-0.078*** (0.034)
Allowed based on country of citizenship only	0.188*** (0.036)	0.049 (0.084)	0.169*** (0.067)	0.126** (0.056)	0.231*** (0.055)	0.163*** (0.033)
Always allowed ^a	-0.072*** (0.036)	-0.162 (0.086)	-0.155*** (0.067)	-0.048** (0.057)	-0.087*** (0.055)	-0.085*** (0.033)
Jailing Terrorists without Trial						
Less than 6 months	0.096 (0.048)	0.155 (0.112)	0.288 (0.091)	0.093 (0.074)	0.055 (0.072)	0.106 (0.044)
6 months to 2 years	0.024 (0.050)	0.044 (0.118)	0.064 (0.093)	0.126** (0.079)	-0.102 (0.075)	0.030 (0.046)

(continued)



Table 22. Coefficient Estimates and Standard Errors from Conditional Logit Models for Different Samples (continued)

	Estimated Coefficient (Standard Error)					
	White (n=646)	Nonwhite (n=124)	Liberal (n=202)	Moderate (n=272)	Conservative (n=282)	Full Sample (n=770)
Jailing Terrorists without Trial (continued)						
2 to 7 years	-0.045 (0.049)	-0.062 (0.113)	-0.022** (0.090)	-0.142** (0.075)	0.013 (0.073)	-0.047 (0.044)
Indefinite (no limit) ^a	-0.076 (0.047)	-0.137 (0.114)	-0.330** (0.090)	-0.077 (0.073)	0.034 (0.072)	-0.089 (0.044)
Using Harsh Methods to Question Terrorists						
Never allowed	0.024 (0.048)	0.094 (0.113)	0.188 (0.088)	-0.022 (0.075)	-0.021 (0.074)	0.033 (0.044)
Allowed, but only with approval from responsible official to prevent imminent attack	0.075 (0.049)	0.046 (0.113)	0.280 (0.091)	0.052 (0.076)	-0.029 (0.074)	0.068 (0.044)
Allowed, but only with approval from responsible official regardless of whether an attack is imminent	0.135*** (0.047)	-0.006 (0.111)	0.087*** (0.086)	0.145*** (0.074)	0.123** (0.071)	0.115*** (0.043)
Always allowed ^a	-0.235*** (0.050)	-0.134 (0.118)	-0.555*** (0.099)	-0.175*** (0.078)	-0.073** (0.074)	-0.216*** (0.046)
Expected deaths from terrorism on U.S. soil over the next 10 years						
0 deaths	0.627*** (0.058)	0.631 (0.136)	0.584 (0.107)	0.683 (0.092)	0.583** (0.088)	0.620*** (0.053)
10 deaths	0.398*** (0.058)	0.440*** (0.135)	0.447*** (0.107)	0.493*** (0.092)	0.321** (0.087)	0.403*** (0.053)
500 deaths	0.080*** (0.055)	-0.091*** (0.128)	0.042*** (0.104)	0.031*** (0.085)	0.059** (0.085)	0.051*** (0.051)
1,500 deaths	-0.400*** (0.056)	-0.351 (0.141)	-0.351*** (0.102)	-0.596*** (0.092)	-0.243*** (0.086)	-0.387*** (0.052)
3,000 deaths ^a	-0.705*** (0.058)	-0.630 (0.137)	-0.722*** (0.111)	-0.610 (0.089)	-0.720*** (0.088)	-0.687*** (0.053)

Note: *** denotes p-value < 0.01, **p-value < 0.05 for statistical significance relative to adjacent attribute levels.

^aExcluded level of effects coded variables. Coefficient equals the negative of the sum of the other coefficients. Standard errors on omitted coefficients were estimated by Krinsky-Robb parametric bootstraps.



In Figure 6 the coefficients estimated over the entire sample were scaled so that the attribute level that contributed the most to respondent utility (in this case zero deaths) would equal 10, while the attribute level that contributed the least to utility (in this case 3,000 deaths) would equal 0. The figure shows the relative ranking of the attribute levels. As we can see, policy options with lower expected deaths and lower monetary costs were favored. All else equal, the most preferred policy option would not allow the government to access personal information, would enable the government to only use a person's country of citizenship in identifying potential terrorists, would not jail suspected terrorists for more than 6 months without a trial, and would never allow the government to use harsh methods when questioning suspected terrorists.

Looking again at Table 22, whites and nonwhites have similar qualitative rankings of the attribute levels. Whites do show a clear preference for using country of citizenship for identifying potential terrorists. Nonwhites showed no statistically significant preference for one level of this attribute over another. Attribute level rankings can also differ significantly across political subgroups. For example, liberals, moderates, and conservatives have somewhat different rankings of the attribute levels for jailing terrorists without trials. Liberals' utility declines with policies that allow longer jail time without a trial for suspected terrorists, while there are no statistically significant differences between the coefficients for conservatives.

Compensation Required to Make Average Respondent Indifferent to Policy Change

The coefficients from the conditional logit models where taxes and deaths are estimated as continuous variables are used to calculate the compensation (in either dollars provided or deaths avoided) required to make the average respondent indifferent to a policy change (see Table 23 for model results). Denominating these metrics in terms of the same units (dollars or deaths) allows us to easily compare results across subgroups.

Table 24 reports the monetary compensation that must be provided over the next 10 years to make the average respondent indifferent to a particular policy change (holding all else constant). Specifically, we measure how much the average respondent would have to be compensated to move from the attribute level that puts the most restrictions on government action to the attribute level that places the fewest restrictions on government action.

Considering the results of Table 24 as a whole, we see that the compensation respondents require to be indifferent to policy changes varies significantly across racial subgroups. It is important to note that monetary compensations were typically estimated with less precision for each subgroup relative to the full sample (likely as a consequence of working with a smaller sample size). However, it appears that nonwhites require more compensation on average than whites to remove restrictions on government action. For example, the average nonwhite respondent requires \$5,518 over the next 10 years to be indifferent to shift from a policy that provides the U.S. government no access to a person's personal information to a policy where the government has unlimited access to personal information.

Figure 6. Relative Preference for Specific Attribute-Levels of Counterterrorism Policies (Full Sample)




Table 23. Coefficient Estimates and Standard Errors From Conditional Logit Models for Different Samples

	Estimated Coefficient (Standard Error)					
	White (n=646)	Nonwhite (n=124)	Liberal (n=202)	Moderate (n=272)	Conservative (n=282)	Full Sample (n=770)
Increase in Personal Taxes	-0.014*** (0.000)	-0.010*** (0.000)	-0.015*** (0.000)	-0.012*** (0.000)	-0.016*** (0.000)	-0.013*** (0.000)
Government Access to Personal Information						
Never allowed	0.098 (0.048)	0.253 (0.110)	0.269 (0.088)	0.187 (0.075)	-0.018 (0.000)	0.123 (0.044)
Allowed but only with a judge's permission	0.176** (0.048)	0.199** (0.109)	0.217** (0.088)	0.207*** (0.073)	0.131 (0.072)	0.177*** (0.044)
Allowed if suspected of terrorist activity but without a judge's permission	0.007** (0.047)	-0.192** (0.108)	-0.026** (0.086)	-0.058** (0.073)	0.015 (0.073)	-0.026*** (0.043)
Always allowed ^b	-0.280*** (0.048)	-0.260 (0.109)	-0.460*** (0.091)	-0.335** (0.073)	-0.129 (0.074)	-0.274*** (0.044)
Using Race, Ethnicity, or Country of Citizenship to Identify Potential Terrorists						
Never allowed	-0.115*** (0.037)	0.114 (0.087)	-0.006 (0.067)	-0.079** (0.057)	-0.148*** (0.072)	-0.077*** (0.034)
Allowed based on country of citizenship only	0.188*** (0.036)	0.053 (0.082)	0.171*** (0.066)	0.128** (0.055)	0.225*** (0.056)	0.164*** (0.033)
Always allowed ^b	-0.072*** (0.036)	-0.167 (0.084)	-0.164*** (0.066)	-0.049** (0.063)	-0.077*** (0.054)	-0.086*** (0.033)
Jailing Terrorists Without Trial						
Less than 6 months	0.084 (0.048)	0.131 (0.110)	0.272 (0.089)	0.054 (0.073)	0.050 (0.054)	0.092 (0.044)
6 months to 2 years	0.058 (0.048)	0.116 (0.111)	0.103 (0.087)	0.167*** (0.075)	-0.061 (0.072)	0.068** (0.044)
2 to 7 years	-0.060 (0.048)	-0.084 (0.110)	-0.041** (0.088)	-0.142*** (0.074)	-0.001 (0.073)	-0.062** (0.044)
Indefinite (no limit) ^b	-0.082 (0.047)	-0.163 (0.110)	-0.334** (0.088)	-0.079 (0.073)	0.012 (0.071)	-0.098 (0.043)

(continued)



Table 23. Coefficient Estimates and Standard Errors from Conditional Logit Models for Different Samples (continued)

	Estimated Coefficient (Standard Error)					
	White (n=646)	Nonwhite (n=124)	Liberal (n=202)	Moderate (n=272)	Conservative (n=282)	Full Sample (n=770)
Using Harsh Methods to Question Terrorists						
Never allowed	0.033 (0.047)	0.094 (0.109)	0.190 (0.086)	0.009 (0.072)	-0.023 (0.072)	0.039 (0.043)
Allowed, but only with approval from responsible official to prevent imminent attack	0.051 (0.047)	0.005 (0.110)	0.261 (0.088)	0.011 (0.073)	-0.039 (0.072)	0.042 (0.043)
Allowed, but only with approval from responsible official regardless of whether an attack is imminent	0.140*** (0.046)	0.030 (0.108)	0.100*** (0.084)	0.148*** (0.071)	0.124 (0.072)	0.125*** (0.042)
Always allowed ^b	-0.224*** (0.050)	-0.130 (0.108)	-0.551*** (0.098)	-0.168*** (0.076)	-0.062 (0.074)	-0.206*** (0.045)
Expected Deaths From Terrorism on U.S. Soil Over the Next 10 Years^c	-0.041*** (0.000)	-0.038*** (0.116)	-0.042*** (0.000)	-0.042*** (0.000)	-0.039*** (0.070)	-0.041*** (0.000)

Note: *** denotes p-value < 0.01, **p-value < 0.05 for statistical significance relative to adjacent attribute levels.

^aIn hundreds of dollars.

^bExcluded level of effects coded variables. Coefficient equals the negative of the sum of the other coefficients. Standard errors on omitted coefficients were estimated by Krinsky-Robb parametric bootstraps.

^cIn hundreds of deaths.



Table 24. Amount of Monetary Compensation That Must Be Provided Over the Next 10 Years to Make Average Respondent Indifferent to Policy Change (95% Confidence Intervals)

Policy Change	White (n=646)	Nonwhite (n=124)	Liberal (n=202)	Moderate (n=272)	Conservative (n=282)	Full Sample (n=770)
Government Access to Personal Information: change from government never allowed to access personal information to always allowed	\$2,706 [\$1,759.21 to \$3,672.26]	\$5,518 [\$1,920 to \$10,498]	\$5,059 [\$3,206 to \$7,210]	\$4,613 [\$2,645 to \$6,888]	\$714 [-\$501 to \$1,940]	\$2,975 [\$2,056 to \$3,928]
Use of Race, Ethnicity, or Country of Citizenship to Identify Potential Terrorists: change from government never allowed to use profiling to identify potential terrorists to always allowed	-\$309 [-\$1,084 to \$449]	\$2,920 [\$344 to \$5,901]	\$1088 [-\$231 to \$2,441]	-\$274 [-\$1,810 to \$1,181]	-\$463 [-\$1,535 to \$569]	\$67 [-\$667 to \$792]
Jailing Suspected Terrorists without Trial: change from government allowed to hold suspected terrorists for 6 months or less to allowed to hold them indefinitely	\$1,176 [\$253 to \$2,138]	\$3,096 [-\$85 to \$7,028]	\$4194 [\$2392 to \$6,326]	\$1134 [-\$621 to \$2,957]	\$229 [-\$1,024 to \$1,506]	\$1414 [\$521 to \$2,343]
Using Harsh Methods to Question Terrorist Suspects: change from government never allowed to use harsh methods to question terrorist suspects to always allowed	\$1,829 [\$907 to \$2,793]	\$2,338 [-\$742 to \$6,038]	\$5,132 [\$3,254 to \$7,337]	\$1,546 [-\$175 to \$3,349]	\$247 [-\$1,024 to \$1,535]	\$1,834 [\$950 to \$2,759]



By contrast, the average white respondent requires an average of \$2,706 in compensation. Similarly, the average nonwhite respondent requires \$2,920 in compensation over the next 10 years to accept a shift from a policy where the government is never allowed to use profiling to a policy where the government is always allowed to use profiling. However, the amount of compensation the average white respondent requires is not significantly different from zero.⁷

We see similar variation across political subgroups. Specifically, across attributes, self-identified liberals typically require the greatest compensation on average to remove restrictions from government action within each attribute. For example, the average liberal respondent requires \$5,059 in compensation over the next 10 years to be indifferent to a policy that provides the U.S. government unlimited access to a person's personal information. By contrast, moderates only require \$4,613 in compensation and conservatives require \$714 on average (estimates for the compensation the average conservative requires were, however, not statistically significant).

Overall, the compensation estimates reported in Table 24 are largely consistent with earlier survey results for questions regarding effectiveness, the likelihood of abuse, and the perceived threat of terrorism (Tables 18, 19, and 20). For example, that respondents require the most compensation to remove restrictions on government access to personal information is consistent with the previous finding that a larger proportion of respondents find this strategy ineffective and likely to be abused.

In addition to the monetary compensation estimates discussed thus far, we also calculated the number of deaths that would have to be prevented over the next 10 years for the average respondent to be indifferent to a policy change. These estimates are reported in Table 25 and can be interpreted in much the same way as the monetary compensation values. For example, based on the full sample results, the average respondent would require 979 expected deaths from terrorism on U.S. soil to be prevented over the next 10 years to be indifferent to a policy from no government access to personal information to unlimited access (all else equal). Again liberals placed the highest value on restricting the government's ability to use the strategies we describe, followed by moderates and conservatives.

⁷ This could be an indicator that either the true mean compensation is zero, there is wide variation of preferences within the subgroups, or that the estimates are imprecise.

Table 25. Number of Deaths That Must Be Prevented Over the Next 10 Years to Make Average Respondent Indifferent to Policy Change (95% Confidence Intervals)

Policy Change	White (n=646)	Nonwhite (n=124)	Liberal (n=202)	Moderate (n=272)	Conservative (n=282)	Full Sample (n=770)
Government Access to Personal Information: change from government never allowed to access personal information to always allowed	914 [608 to 1,225]	1,378 [573 to 2,244]	1,766 [1,160 to 2,429]	1,256 [778 to 1,756]	286 [-205 to 781]	979 [692 to 1,270]
Use of Race, Ethnicity, or Country of Citizenship to Identify Potential Terrorists: change from government never allowed to use profiling to identify potential terrorists to always allowed	-103 [-356 to 155]	760 [88 to 1,488]	386 [-78 to 871]	-70 [-465 to 329]	-185 [-602 to 235]	24 [-214 to 265]
Jailing Suspected Terrorists without Trial: change from government allowed to hold suspected terrorists for 6 months or less to allowed to hold them indefinitely	398 [85 to 717]	784 [-23 to 1,655]	1,463 [850 to 2,131]	312 [-167 to 803]	91 [-421 to 603]	466 [173 to 765]
Using Harsh Methods to Question Terrorist Suspects: change from government never allowed to use harsh methods to question terrorist suspects to always allowed	620 [305 to 950]	604 [-197 to 1,463]	1,797 [1,146 to 2,528]	426 [-49 to 915]	104 [-404 to 632]	605 [312 to 910]



Mixed Logit Results

As previously discussed, the conditional logit model is commonly used to estimate conjoint data, but this model relies on a set of strict assumptions. Therefore, we also generated results using mixed logit (which is not subject to the same restrictive assumptions) to investigate how sensitive our results are to the estimation approach selected. Although we attempted to estimate these models for each subgroup, there were several cases where the mixed logit model would not converge and parameters could not be estimated. As a result, we only compare full sample results for the mixed logit and conditional logit models in this section.

The main difference in the output of mixed logit models compared to conditional logit models is that mixed logit provides the ability to characterize the unobserved heterogeneity in respondents' preferences. This can be especially important if we believe there are differences in how different people trade off attributes of the plans being evaluated. The statistical model allows the model parameters to have a stochastic component. The standard deviation estimates can be interpreted as measures of attribute-specific preference heterogeneity. As a result, the Revelt and Train (1998) methodology allows for the development of estimates for both the mean and standard deviation for each of the parameters considered random.

Table 26 contains the mixed logit regression for the fully effects-coded model and the comparable conditional logit results from Table 22. As we can see, the two models yield similar qualitative rankings of the attribute levels. Looking at Table 26, significant standard deviations are estimated for the first two levels of "Government Access to Personal Information," jailing terrorists without trial for 6 months to 2 years, the second level of the harsh interrogation methods attribute, and several levels of the taxes and expected deaths attributes.

Table 27 provides the mixed and conditional logit estimates for the models that code taxes and expected deaths as continuous variables. This time we see significant standard deviations for the first two levels of "Government Access to Personal Information" and for never allowing harsh interrogation methods. Looking at Tables 26 and 27, profiling appears to generate the least diversity of opinion across the sample.

Table 26. Comparison of Coefficient Estimates and Standard Errors From Conditional and Mixed Logit Models (Fully Effects Coded Model)

	Mixed Logit (n=770)		Conditional Logit (n=770)
	Estimated Coefficient (Standard Error)	Estimated Standard Deviation (Standard Error)	Estimated Coefficient (Standard Error)
Increase in Personal Taxes			
\$500 over 10 years or \$50 per year on average	0.639 (0.125)	0.957+++ (0.202)	0.315 (0.045)
\$1,500 over 10 years or \$150 per year on average	0.460*** (0.101)	0.899+++ (0.229)	0.245*** (0.045)
\$3,000 over 10 years or \$300 per year on average	0.002*** (0.079)	-0.051 (0.186)	-0.016*** (0.043)
\$7,000 over 10 years or \$700 per year on average ^a	-1.101*** (0.180)	NA	-0.544*** (0.046)
Government Access to Personal Information			
Never allowed	0.203 (0.083)	-0.573+++ (0.194)	0.097 (0.045)
Allowed but only with a judge's permission	0.393*** (0.096)	0.697+++ (0.234)	0.209*** (0.045)
Allowed if suspected of terrorist activity but without a judge's permission ^a	0.018*** (0.081)	-0.312 (0.288)	-0.018*** (0.044)
Always allowed	-0.614*** (0.114)	NA	-0.288*** (0.044)
Using Race, Ethnicity, or Country of Citizenship to Identify Potential Terrorists			
Never allowed	-0.164*** (0.068)	-0.353+ (0.205)	-0.078*** (0.034)
Allowed based on country of citizenship only	0.282*** (0.068)	-0.012 (0.221)	0.163*** (0.033)
Always allowed ^a	-0.118*** (0.063)	NA	-0.085*** (0.033)

(continued)

Table 26. Comparison of Coefficient Estimates and Standard Errors From Conditional and Mixed Logit Models (Fully Effects Coded Model) (continued)

	Mixed Logit (n=770)		Conditional Logit (n=770)
	Estimated Coefficient (Standard Error)	Estimated Standard Deviation (Standard Error)	Estimated Coefficient (Standard Error)
Jailing Terrorists Without Trial			
Less than 6 months	0.282** (0.092)	0.200 (0.234)	0.106 (0.044)
6 months to 2 years	0.032** (0.084)	0.466+++ (0.170)	0.030 (0.046)
2 to 7 years	-0.104 (0.084)	-0.222 (0.178)	-0.047 (0.044)
Indefinite (no limit) ^a	-0.210 (0.087)	NA	-0.089 (0.044)
Using Harsh Methods to Question Terrorists			
Never allowed	0.045 (0.084)	0.035 (0.278)	0.033 (0.044)
Allowed, but only with approval from responsible official to prevent imminent attack	0.222 (0.092)	-0.340++ (0.162)	0.068 (0.044)
Allowed, but only with approval from responsible official regardless of whether an attack is imminent	0.208*** (0.086)	0.090 (0.121)	0.115*** (0.043)
Always allowed ^a	-0.475*** (0.108)	NA	-0.216*** (0.046)
Expected Deaths From Terrorism on U.S. Soil Over the Next 10 Years			
0 deaths	1.258*** (0.189)	1.550+++ (0.262)	0.620*** (0.053)
10 deaths	0.846*** (0.146)	1.016+++ (0.234)	0.403*** (0.053)
500 deaths	0.068*** (0.093)	-0.291 (0.209)	0.051*** (0.051)
1,500 deaths	-0.697*** (0.119)	-0.059 (0.165)	-0.387*** (0.052)
3,000 deaths ^a	-1.475*** (0.219)	NA	-0.687*** (0.053)

Note: (1) *** denotes p-value < 0.01, **p-value < 0.05 for statistical significance relative to adjacent attribute levels

(2) +++ denotes p-value < 0.01, ++p-value < 0.05, +p-value < 0.10 null hypothesis of not different from zero.

^aExcluded level of effects coded variables. Coefficient equals the negative of the sum of the other coefficients. Standard errors on omitted coefficients were estimated by Krinsky-Robb parametric bootstraps.

Table 27. Comparison of Coefficient Estimates and Standard Errors From Conditional and Mixed Logit Models (Taxes and Deaths Coded as Continuous Variables)

	Mixed Logit (n=770)		Conditional Logit (n=770)
	Estimated Coefficient (Standard Error)	Estimated Standard Deviation (Standard Error)	Estimated Coefficient (Standard Error)
Increase in Personal Taxes^a	-0.015*** (0.000)	NA	-0.013*** (0.000)
Government Access to Personal Information			
Never allowed	0.140 (0.050)	0.302++ (0.138)	0.123 (0.044)
Allowed but only with a judge's permission	0.196*** (0.049)	0.278++ (0.136)	0.177*** (0.044)
Allowed if suspected of terrorist activity but without a judge's permission	-0.028** (0.047)	-0.167 (0.224)	-0.026*** (0.043)
Always allowed ^b	-0.308** (0.054)	NA	-0.274*** (0.044)
Using Race, Ethnicity, or Country of Citizenship to Identify Potential Terrorists			
Never allowed	-0.085** (0.037)	-0.083 (0.205)	-0.077 (0.034)
Allowed based on country of citizenship only	0.179** (0.037)	0.140 (0.121)	0.164*** (0.033)
Always allowed ^b	-0.094** (0.036)	NA	-0.086*** (0.033)
Jailing Terrorists Without Trial			
Less than 6 months	0.104 (0.049)	0.084 (0.171)	0.092 (0.044)
6 months to 2 years	0.069*** (0.048)	-0.111 (0.253)	0.068** (0.044)
2 to 7 years	-0.067*** (0.048)	0.078 (0.135)	-0.062** (0.044)
Indefinite (no limit) ^b	-0.106 (0.048)	NA	-0.098 (0.043)

(continued)

Table 27. Comparison of Coefficient Estimates and Standard Errors from Conditional and Mixed Logit Models (Taxes and Deaths Coded as Continuous Variables) (continued)

	Mixed Logit (n=770)		Conditional Logit (n=770)
	Estimated Coefficient (Standard Error)	Estimated Standard Deviation (Standard Error)	Estimated Coefficient (Standard Error)
Using Harsh Methods to Question Terrorists			
Never allowed	0.050 (0.048)	-0.250+ (0.140)	0.039 (0.043)
Allowed, but only with approval from responsible official to prevent imminent attack	0.052 (0.048)	-0.171 (0.164)	0.042 (0.043)
Allowed, but only with approval from responsible official regardless of whether an attack is imminent	0.129*** (0.047)	-0.057 (0.126)	0.125*** (0.042)
Always allowed ^b	-0.231*** (0.053)	NA	-0.206*** (0.045)
Expected Deaths From Terrorism on U.S. Soil Over the Next 10 Years^c	-0.044*** (0.000)	NA	-0.041*** (0.000)

Note: (1) *** denotes p-value < 0.01, **p-value < 0.05 for statistical significance relative to adjacent attribute levels
(2) ++p-value < 0.05, +p-value < 0.10 null hypothesis of not different from zero.

^aIn hundreds of dollars.

^bExcluded level of effects coded variables. Coefficient equals the negative of the sum of the other coefficients. Standard errors on omitted coefficients were estimated by Krinsky-Robb parametric bootstraps.

^cIn hundreds of deaths.

Tables 28 and 29 present mean compensation estimates and 95% confidence intervals for strategy changes (both in terms of dollars and deaths). The conditional and mixed logit models produce similar compensation values. The largest percentage difference observed is for the monetary compensation estimates for changes in the profiling attribute. Specifically, the mixed logit estimates are 16% lower than the corresponding conditional logit estimates and the expected deaths are 13% lower.

Table 28. Comparison of Amount of Monetary Compensation That Must Be Provided Over the Next 10 Years to Make Average Respondent Indifferent to Policy Change from Fewest Restrictions on Government Action to Most Restrictions for Mixed and Conditional Logit Models (95% Confidence Intervals)

Policy Change	Mixed Logit (n=770)	Conditional Logit (n=770)
Government Access to Personal Information: change from always allowed government to access personal information to government never allowed	\$3,026 [\$2,070 to \$4,010]	\$2,975 [\$2056 to \$3,928]
Use of Race, Ethnicity of Country of Citizenship to Identify Potential Terrorists: change from government always allowed to use profiling to identify potential terrorists to never allowed	\$56 [\$-669 to \$771]	\$67 [\$-667 to \$792]
Jailing Suspected Terrorists Without Trial: change from government allowed to hold suspected terrorists indefinitely to being allowed to hold them for 6 months or less	\$1412 [\$520 to \$2,338]	\$1414 [\$521 to \$2,343]
Using Harsh Methods to Question Terrorist Suspects: change from government always allowed to use harsh methods to question terrorist suspects to never allowed	\$1,889 [\$978 to \$2,831]	\$1,834 [\$950 to \$2,759]

Table 29. Comparison of Number of Deaths That Must Be Prevented to Make Average Respondent Indifferent to Policy Change for Mixed and Conditional Logit Models (95% Confidence Intervals)

Policy Change	Mixed Logit (n=770)	Conditional Logit (n=770)
Government Access to Personal Information: change from always allowed government to access personal information to government never allowed	1,014 [710 to 1,325]	979 [692 to 1,270]
Use of Race, Ethnicity of Country of Citizenship to Identify Potential Terrorists: change from government always allowed to use profiling to identify potential terrorists to never allowed	20 [-219 to 262]	23 [-214 to 265]
Jailing Suspected Terrorists Without Trial: change from government allowed to hold suspected terrorists indefinitely to being allowed to hold them for 6 months or less	473 [174 to 777]	466 [173 to 765]
Using Harsh Methods to Question Terrorist Suspects: change from government always allowed to use harsh methods to question terrorist suspects to never allowed	635 [326 to 955]	605 [312 to 910]



Internal Validity Test

As previously described, the following internal validity test was included for the conjoint portion of the survey. In addition to four regular conjoint questions (which were assigned randomly to each individual), every respondent answered an identical fifth conjoint question (known as a holdout task). The first four questions were used to estimate the conditional and mixed logit models described above. These models can then be used to predict how the average respondent answered the hold task (the percentage of respondents who would select Option A and Option B). If a model accurately predicts the real choices of individuals, this lends credibility to the results. Below we discuss the results of this internal validity test for both conditional and mixed logit models.

The results of the internal validity test for the conditional logit models are presented in Tables 30 and 31. For the full sample, the choice predicted by the conditional logit results differed from actual choices by an average of 3% for the model in Table 22 and 2% for the model in Table 23. Differences between predicted and actual choice are of similar magnitude for the models estimated for the white, liberal, moderate, and conservatives subgroup. Mean Absolute Error for these subgroups range from 1% for whites to 9% for moderates. For nonwhites, the Mean Absolute Error is around 20% for both models, although the prediction falls within the 95% confidence interval.

Table 30. Internal Validity Test of Fully Effects Coded Model (95% Confidence Intervals)

	White (n=646)	Nonwhite (n=124)	Liberal (n=202)	Moderate (n=272)	Conservative (n=282)	Full Sample (n=770)
Predicted Percentage of Respondents Choosing Each Option						
Option A	66% [57%-75%]	48% [26%-70%]	63% [46%-79%]	62% [48%-77%]	66% [52%-79%]	63% [55%-72%]
Option B	34% [57%-75%]	52% [26%-70%]	37% [46%-79%]	38% [48%-77%]	34% [52%-79%]	37% [55%-72%]
Actual Percentage of Respondents Choosing Each Option						
Option A	65%	68%	57%	70%	69%	66%
Option B	34%	29%	43%	30%	30%	34%
Measures of Differences						
Absolute Error for Option A	1%	20%	6%	8%	3%	3%
Absolute Error for Option B	0%	23%	6%	8%	4%	3%
Mean Absolute Error	1%	21%	6%	8%	4%	3%

Note: Actual percentages may not always sum to 100% because of a small number of respondents refusing to answer some choice tasks.

Table 31. Internal Validity Test of Model with Taxes and Deaths Coded as Continuous Variables (95% Confidence Intervals)

	White (n=646)	Nonwhite (n=124)	Liberal (n=202)	Moderate (n=272)	Conservative (n=282)	Full Sample (n=770)
Predicted Percentage of Respondents Choosing Each Option						
Option A	67% [59%-75%]	50% [30%-70%]	63% [48%-79%]	61% [48%-74%]	69% [56%-81%]	64% [57%-72%]
Option B	33% [59%-75%]	50% [30%-70%]	37% [48%-79%]	39% [48%-74%]	31% [56%-81%]	36% [57%-72%]
Actual Percentage of Respondents Choosing Each Option						
Option A	65%	68%	57%	70%	69%	66%
Option B	34%	29%	43%	30%	30%	34%
Measures of Differences						
Absolute Error for Option A	2%	18%	6%	9%	0%	2%
Absolute Error for Option B	1%	21%	6%	9%	1%	2%
Mean Absolute Error	2%	19%	6%	9%	1%	2%

Note: Actual percentages may not always sum to 100% because of a small number of respondents refusing to answer some choice tasks.

Table 32 compares the predictions of the mixed logit model with those of the conditional logit model (as before, mixed logit results could not be obtained for the subsamples of interest, so only full sample results are considered). The Mean Absolute Error is much larger for the predictions made using a mixed logit model when based on the fully effects-coded model (coefficients in Table 26), and the 95% confidence intervals estimated for these predictions do not contain the observed proportions. Predictions improve when using the mixed logit model where taxes and deaths are coded as continuous variables (coefficients in Table 27). The Mean Absolute Error falls to only 1%. Overall, the conditional logit performed better in the internal validity test for the fully effects coded model, but both conditional and mixed logit performed well when taxes and deaths were coded as continuous.

Table 32. Comparison of Internal Validity Tests for Conditional and Mixed Logit Models (95% Confidence Intervals)

	Mixed Logit Fully Effects Coded (n=770)	Mixed Logit Taxes and Deaths Continuous (n=770)	Conditional Logit Fully Effects Coded (n=770)	Conditional Logit Taxes and Deaths Continuous (n=770)
Predicted Percentage of Respondents Choosing Each Option				
Option A	80% [67%-93%]	65% [57%-74%]	63% [55%-72%]	64% [57%-72%]
Option B	20% [67%-93%]	35% [57%-74%]	37% [55%-72%]	36% [57%-72%]
Actual Percentage of Respondents Choosing Each Option				
Option A	66%	66%	66%	66%
Option B	34%	34%	34%	34%
Measures of Differences				
Absolute Error for Option A	14%	1%	3%	2%
Absolute Error for Option B	14%	1%	3%	2%
Mean Absolute Error	14%	1%	3%	2%

Note: Actual percentages may not always sum to 100% because of a small number of respondents refusing to answer some choice tasks.

Debriefing Questions for Conjoint Exercise

After the conjoint questions, respondents were asked a set of questions to capture information that might affect their answers. Respondents were asked to rate their agreement with three statements based on the conjoint questions they just completed. Looking at Table 33, whites were significantly more likely to agree with the statement “I am against any increase in government spending or taxes” than nonwhites (p-value 0.01). The distribution of responses also differed across the political subgroups. Almost twice as many conservatives as liberals or moderates selected “strongly agree,” and overall liberals were less likely to agree than conservatives or moderates (p-value < 0.01).

Table 33. Thinking About the Choices You Just Made, Please Rate How Much You Agree or Disagree With Each of the Following Statements

	White (n=646)	Nonwhite (n=124)	Liberal (n=202)	Moderate (n=272)	Conservative (n=282)	Full Sample (n=770)
I am against any increase in taxes or government spending.						
Refused	1%	4%	1%	1%	0%	1%
Strongly agree	33%	26%	22%	24%	46%	32%
Agree	24%	23%	17%	27%	27%	24%
Neither agree nor disagree	26%	31%	31%	34%	18%	27%
Disagree	13%	10%	19%	11%	9%	12%
Strongly disagree	3%	6%	9%	3%	1%	4%
My choices would have been different if the economy in my area were better.						
Refused	1%	3%	1%	1%	1%	1%
Strongly agree	10%	19%	13%	11%	12%	12%
Agree	23%	26%	23%	25%	23%	24%
Neither agree nor disagree	32%	35%	27%	39%	29%	32%
Disagree	22%	10%	23%	15%	23%	20%
Strongly disagree	12%	6%	13%	8%	12%	11%
I think the government is doing a good job protecting the U.S. from terrorist attacks.						
Refused	1%	3%	0%	1%	0%	1%
Strongly agree	8%	18%	15%	7%	9%	9%
Agree	44%	33%	45%	41%	43%	42%
Neither agree nor disagree	35%	35%	31%	40%	32%	35%
Disagree	10%	5%	6%	7%	13%	9%
Strongly disagree	2%	6%	3%	3%	3%	3%

*Test for differences in responses across subgroups using chi-square test. P-values differed by sub-question. See text for details.

Respondent income constrains the ability to pay for new government programs. Looking at the potential impact of the current economic conditions on responses, nonwhites were more likely to agree that their responses would have been different if the economy were better (p-value < 0.01). The differences between political groups were not significant (p-value 0.12). Finally, respondents were asked their level of agreement with the statement “I think the government is doing a good job protecting the U.S. from terrorist attacks.” The distribution of responses among the categories differed significantly for whites and nonwhites (p-value < 0.01) and across the political subgroups (p-value 0.01). A higher percentage of nonwhites and liberals strongly agreed with the statement. A larger percentage of self-identified conservatives disagreed.



Some research suggests that a respondent's belief about the impact of the survey on decision-makers affects the response (Landry & List 2007). Table 34 reports the percentage of respondents who think decisionmakers will consider the survey results. Looking at the total sample in the last column, more respondents believed it is unlikely decisionmakers will use the survey results. A significantly higher proportion of nonwhites thought that the results of the survey would be considered by decisionmakers compared to whites (p-value < 0.01). The differences across the political subgroups were only marginally significant (p-value 0.10).

Table 34. In Your Opinion, How Likely Do You Think It Is That Policy Makers Will Consider the Results From This Survey to Make Decisions About Homeland Security Policy?

	White* (n=646)	Nonwhite* (n=124)	Liberal (n=202)	Moderate (n=272)	Conservative (n=282)	Full Sample (n=770)
Refused	0%	3%	0%	0%	0%	1%
Very likely	3%	6%	5%	3%	2%	4%
Somewhat likely	12%	18%	14%	11%	13%	13%
Even chances	29%	27%	31%	34%	23%	29%
Somewhat unlikely	25%	17%	26%	21%	27%	24%
Very unlikely	27%	18%	21%	27%	28%	25%
No opinion	4%	10%	4%	4%	7%	5%

*Test for differences in responses across subgroups using chi-square test.

Race subgroup p-value < 0.01.

Political affiliation subgroup p-value 0.10.

Finally, we asked respondents whether the choices were difficult to make. From Table 35, overall more people found the questions somewhat difficult or difficult to answer. No significant differences between the political subgroups emerged, but the distribution of response from nonwhites differed significantly from that of whites (p-value 0.01). More nonwhites responded easy or somewhat easy.



Table 35. Did You Find the Choices Between Options Easy or Difficult to Answer?

	White* (n=646)	Nonwhite* (n=124)	Liberal (n=202)	Moderate (n=272)	Conservative (n=282)	Full Sample (n=770)
Refused	0%	3%	0%	0%	0%	1%
Easy	9%	10%	11%	8%	9%	9%
Somewhat easy	25%	31%	25%	30%	24%	26%
Somewhat difficult	48%	41%	43%	46%	51%	47%
Difficult	18%	14%	21%	16%	16%	17%

*Test for differences in responses across subgroups using chi-square test.

Race subgroup p-value 0.01.

Political affiliation subgroup p-value 0.53.

Discussion and Conclusions

The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, reignited public debate on the proper balance between safeguarding the country from attack and maintaining the privacy, civil liberties, and human rights of citizens and noncitizens. As counterterrorism policy evolves in response to changing threats, policy makers need more and better information on how the public values homeland security measures and the public’s views on the monetary and nonmonetary costs of improving security. The 2010 RTI-IHSS Counterterrorism Survey represents an initial attempt to better understand Americans’ views on counterterrorism policies and to quantify individual’s willingness to trade restrictions on privacy and civil liberties imposed on themselves or others for increases in homeland security. The survey results add to the growing body of research on the attitudes and opinions of the American public toward homeland security, in particular the limited stated-preference research addressing this topic.

The results presented in this report confirm that many individuals willingly accept policies that erode privacy and civil liberties if the policies reduce expected deaths from terrorism. However, this willingness differs by the type of policy under consideration and by the race and political affiliation of the respondents. For example, more than two-thirds of respondents support requiring all airline passengers to submit to full-body scans, even though these scans are thought to be highly invasive. Interestingly, nonwhites were more likely to support this requirement than whites, perhaps because the policy treats all passengers equally.

Similarly, when it comes to using harsh methods to question suspected terrorists, even suspects who are U.S. citizens, only one-third of the respondents found the approach unacceptable under any circumstances. However, half of self-described liberals think harsh methods of interrogation for U.S. citizens should never be allowed, compared to 34% of moderates and 23% of conservatives. Yet, all groups were more likely to accept these methods if the suspect terrorist was not a U.S. citizen. Individuals are willing to make tradeoffs

between liberty and security, but the degree of support is partly determined by whose liberty is at stake. Our results suggest that when it comes to using harsh methods of interrogation or holding citizens without trial many respondents apply different standards to U.S. citizens compared to noncitizens.

Differences in support of homeland security policies by political or racial subgroup may arise in part because of differences in risk perceptions. For the entire sample, the median expected number of deaths on U.S. soil from terrorism over the next 10 years is 350 deaths. However, the median for whites and conservatives are 500 and 575 deaths, respectively. These two groups are also more likely to support homeland security policies that give the government more latitude and curtail individual privacy and rights and to support the death penalty for people found guilty of planning terrorist attacks.

Although respondents expressed support for policies that give the government more leeway, a large majority of respondents also believed that the government is somewhat or very likely to abuse these same policies. Perhaps this reflects cynicism on the part of the American public, but taken as a whole the responses to the survey reflect the complexity of addressing the risk of terrorism, weighing the effectiveness of possible strategies, the likelihood of abuse, the monetary and nonmonetary costs to society, and the expected benefits.

The stated-preference conjoint questions provide alternative way to quantify the public's view of homeland security policy. The questions presented policy options that bundled the individual counterterrorism strategies along with a monetary cost and the expected benefit (expressed as the expected number of deaths over 10 years). Answering these questions required the respondents to consider the benefits and costs as a package. The responses provide a ranking of the different monetary and nonmonetary costs, including a change in expected deaths, derived from the choices respondents made.

Overall, policy options with lower expected deaths and lower monetary costs were favored. All else equal, we expected respondents to prefer more restrictions on government actions (more protection of privacy, civil rights and human rights); however, in some cases, respondents preferred the more invasive policies to the less invasive. For example, allowing the government access to personal information with a judge's approval was preferred over never allowing access to this information (holding all else equal, including expected deaths). Similarly, using a person's country of citizenship was preferred to never allowing the government to use race, ethnicity, or country of citizenship to screen potential terrorists. Most likely, the respondents associated these policies with increased security or other benefits not measured by the expected deaths outcome.

Using the coefficients from the conjoint analysis, the most favored policy would allow the government access to personal information with a judge's approval, would enable the government to only use a person's country of citizenship for screening, would allow the government to jail suspected terrorists for no more than 6 months, and would allow the use of

harsh questioning methods with approval from responsible officials regardless of whether an attack is imminent.

However, there was no statistically significant difference between the levels of restriction for some of the strategies, and respondents were clearly willing to support other policies if there was a change in taxes or expected deaths from terrorism. For example, the average respondent requires almost \$3,000 of compensation over the next 10 years to be made indifferent to a shift from a policy where the U.S. government has no access to a person's personal information to a policy where the government has unlimited access to personal information. In comparison, the subsample of self-identified conservatives would require only \$714 in compensation (although this estimate is not significantly different from zero). Similarly, looking at the full sample, the results suggest that starting from a policy that allows no government access to personal information, the average respondent would be willing to accept a policy of unlimited access to personal information if the change was expected to save 979 or more deaths from terrorism on U.S. soil over the next 10 years. If we look only at self-identified conservatives, on the other hand, the average conservative would only require 286 fewer deaths for this policy change to be acceptable. Using the forecast of expected deaths from terrorism over the next 10 years in the United States provided by respondents, 979 expected deaths is much higher than the median of 350 for the whole sample, but 286 is less than the median for self-identified conservatives of 575.

Although the stated-preference conjoint results provide a useful method to quantify tradeoffs among different policy options, readers should be cautious in interpreting the results. As with any stated-preference survey, respondents were asked to consider hypothetical policy options. Because we were interested in the preferences over the nonmonetary costs of privacy, civil liberties, and human rights, we focused on the level of restriction placed on the government. It is likely that other dimensions of the different strategies not described in the survey are important to respondents as well. The respondents' opinions about tax increases may have also influenced their choices, and thus the derived value of the policy changes. For example, in the questions following the stated-preference questions, conservatives were much more likely to report that they were against any increase in taxes. Moreover, public support for any particular policy will vary over time, often for reasons beyond the perceived effectiveness of the intervention at the time of the implementation including the immediacy of the threat.

In summary, these results support the hypothesis that the U.S. population is willing to accept both the monetary and nonmonetary costs of counterterrorism policies if these policies yield a large enough reduction in deaths from terrorism, or perhaps more surprisingly, in taxes. The opinions expressed by the respondents fit with the results from the stated-preference questions, and reflect the real differences across racial and political lines observed in other forums. The results also support the use of stated-preference surveys to provide more detailed information on rankings among policies and the value of policies to the public that can be useful in developing and assessing policy alternatives.

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Appendix A

[DISPLAY]

SURVEY OF PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF COUNTERTERRORISM POLICIES

Thank you for agreeing to participate in this research study. The goal of this survey is to better understand the tradeoffs that individuals might be willing to make to reduce the threat of a terrorist attack.

In the following sections, we will ask for some background information about you and your beliefs. We will also ask a series of questions related to counterterrorism strategies and how you view them. We will describe **five different strategies** that governments might take to reduce the threat of a terrorist attack over the next 10 years and some potential outcomes of those strategies. Then we will ask you which strategies you prefer.

The survey should take about **20 minutes** to complete and is being conducted by researchers at Research Triangle Institute, a non-profit research organization. If you have any problems or concerns about this survey, please contact Panel Relations at 800-782-7699, and someone will direct your questions to the appropriate researchers at the Research Triangle Institute.



[DISPLAY]

I. Background Questions

A. Library, Internet, and Telephone Use

[RADIO]

1. During the last 12 months, how many books have you checked out from a public library?
- None
 - 1–5
 - 6–10
 - More than 10

[RADIO]

2. How frequently do you use the Internet for personal reasons (this includes checking e-mail and viewing Web sites)?
- Once a day or more.
 - Several times a week.
 - About once every week or two
 - Once a month or less
 - Never

[RADIO]

3. How frequently do you use the Internet for work or business reasons (this includes checking e-mail and viewing Web sites)?
- Once a day or more.
 - Several times a week
 - About once every week or two
 - Once a month or less
 - Never

[RADIO]

4. Which of these sentences best describes your Internet usage, including both web and e-mail?
- I am a very heavy Internet user
 - I am a heavy Internet user
 - I am an average Internet user
 - I am a light Internet user
 - I am very light Internet user
 - I never use the Internet

[RADIO]

5. In the past month, have you visited any social networking Web sites such as Facebook or My Space?
- Yes
 - No



[RADIO]

6. How often do you talk on a cell phone?
- Several times a day
 - About once a day
 - Every few days
 - About once a week
 - Less than once a week
 - Only in emergencies.
 - Never used a cell phone

[RADIO]

7. How often do you call people who live outside of the United States for business or personal reasons?
- Daily
 - Weekly
 - Monthly
 - Less than one time per month
 - Never make calls outside United States

[CHECKBOX]

8. Where do you get information on national news? Please select all that apply.
- Network TV [NBC, ABC, CBS]
 - Cable TV [CNN, MSNBC, Fox News]
 - Local newspaper
 - National newspaper [*NY Times*, *USA Today*, *Wall Street Journal*]
 - Radio [NPR, Talk Radio]
 - Internet/web
 - Other

B. Travel

[RADIO]

9. In the last 3 years, how many trips have you made within the United States that involved airline travel?
- Never
 - 1–2 trips
 - 3–5 trips
 - 6–9 trips
 - More than 10 trips



Instruction: If respondent answered “never” to question 9 then skip q10.

[RADIO]
[IF Q9>1]

10. Think about your most recent trip **within the United States**. How long did it take you to go through the safety checkpoint? [This is where your carry-on items are x-rayed and you are scanned for metal objects.]
- 15 minutes or less
 - 16–30 minutes
 - 31–45 minutes
 - 46–60 minutes
 - More than 60 minutes

[RADIO]

11. In the last 3 years, how many trips have you made **to another country** that involved airline travel?
- Never
 - 1–2 trips
 - 3–5 trips
 - 6–9 trips
 - More than 10 trips

[RADIO]

12. In your opinion, does the airline passenger screening process at the safety checkpoints keep air travel safe and secure?
- No
 - Yes, it slightly improves air safety
 - Yes, it greatly improves air safety

[RADIO]

13. In your opinion, should the United States begin screening all airline passengers with full-body scanning systems that can generate images of items hidden under their clothing?
- Yes
 - No

[DOV: VERSION1:
1=DO NOT SHOW EVENT
2=SHOW EVENT VERSION 2
RANDOM ASSIGNMENT TO 1, 2]



C. Reactions to Previous Terrorism Events

[Programming Instructions] Based on pilot test results, we decided to remove Version 3 from the survey. Now there will only be 2 versions of the survey that will differ based on whether questions are asked about the respondent's reactions to previous terrorist events [whether a version of Section C is included or not]. In the first version of the survey, no questions will be asked about the respondent's reactions to previous terrorism events [Section C will not be included]. In the second version of the survey, questions will be asked about the respondent's reactions to the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001 [Version 2, Section C will be included]. The questions that will be asked as part of Section C in Version 2 of the survey are presented below.

Version 2

[Version 2 Introductory Text]

[RADIO]

[IF VERSION1=2]

On September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda terrorists used four hijacked commercial airliners to kill approximately 3,000 people in the largest act of terrorism on U.S. soil. The following questions are designed to better understand how you reacted to this attack.

14. Did you personally know any of the 3,000 people who were killed in the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001?
- Yes
 - No

[RADIO]

[IF VERSION1=2]

15. Do you know anyone who had friends or relatives killed in the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001?
- Yes
 - No

[RADIO]

[IF VERSION1=2]

16. Do you know any of the thousands of people who were injured in the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001?
- Yes
 - No

[CHECK UP TO 2 BOXES]

[RANDOMIZE RLIST]

[IF VERSION1=2]

17. As you think about the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, please check the box or boxes [up to 2] that **best** describe how you felt right after the attacks. [Note to programmer: randomize order of response categories and limit to no more than two checks.]
- Frightened or scared
 - Angry
 - Sad
 - Worried or anxious
 - No strong emotions either way
 - Happy
 - Vindicated

[RADIO]

[IF VERSION1=2]

18. How much, if any, did the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks shake your own sense of personal safety and security?
- A great deal
 - Some
 - A little
 - Not at all



[DISPLAY]

II. Government Strategies to Improve Security

[DISPLAY]

In this section we will describe five different strategies a government could take to reduce the threat of a terrorist attack over the next 10 years. The strategies we will describe include the following:

- A. Increasing your taxes to fund efforts to prevent terrorism
- B. Government access to personal information
- C. Using race, ethnicity, or country of citizenship to identify potential terrorists
- D. Jailing suspected terrorists without trial
- E. Using harsh methods to question suspected terrorists

As we describe each strategy, we will ask you some questions about how you feel about them. Later in the survey, we will combine these strategies into policy options for reducing the threat of terrorism and we will ask you to choose which options you prefer.



[DISPLAY5]

A. Increasing Your Taxes to Fund Efforts to Prevent Terrorism

The Department of Homeland Security [DHS] is one of several U.S. government agencies that work to reduce the risk of terrorist attacks on U.S. soil. It has been estimated that the average U.S. taxpayer spends roughly \$200 to fund DHS each year. Of course, the specific amount an individual pays in taxes will depend on his/her income but \$200 per year is an average across all taxpayers. One strategy that a government could take that might lower the threat of a terrorist attack is to increase taxes to fund additional efforts to prevent terrorism.

Later in the survey we will ask you to choose between options that increase your taxes by different amounts to fund government efforts to prevent terrorism. Under each option, the amount your taxes will increase ranges between:

- **\$500** over the next 10 years [\$50 per year on average]
- **\$1,500** over the next 10 years [\$150 per year on average]
- **\$3,000** over the next 10 years [\$300 per year on average]
- **\$7,000** over the next 10 years [\$700 per year on average]

[RADIO]

19. Compared to other government funding, do you think the amount the U.S. government currently spends preventing terrorist attacks is too high, about right, or too low?
- Too high
 - About right
 - Too low

[RADIO]

20. Do you think overall government spending in the U.S. is:
- Too high
 - About right
 - Too low

[RADIO]

21. How effective do you think the U.S. government has been at reducing the threat of a terrorist attack on U.S. soil?
- Very effective
 - Somewhat effective
 - Somewhat ineffective
 - Very ineffective



[DISPLAY6]

B. Government Access to Personal Information

One strategy that governments could take that might lower the threat of a terrorist attack is to give government agencies more access to individuals' personal information, such as library records, e-mail messages, Web site use, and telephone calls.

Later, we will ask you to choose between options that differ in terms of when the U.S. federal government is allowed to see the personal information of its citizens. Under each option the level of government access to personal information will range between:

- Never allowed
- Allowed but only with a judge's permission
- Allowed if suspected of terrorist activity but without a judge's permission
- Always allowed

[GRID, SP ACROSS]

22. When should the U.S. government be allowed to do the following [please check appropriate column for each]?

	Never allowed	Allowed but only with a judge's permission	Allowed if suspected of terrorist activity but without a judge's permission	Always allowed
Listen in on phone calls of its citizens				
Track Web site usage of its citizens				
Track physical location of citizens				
See which books citizens check out at the library				
Do a background check on citizens without their knowledge				



[GRID]

23. How likely do you think it is that the U.S. government has done any of the following to **you personally**? Rate each from very unlikely to very likely.

	Very Unlikely	Somewhat Unlikely	Somewhat Likely	Very Likely	Not Applicable
Listened in on your phone calls					
Tracked which Web sites you visited					
Tracked your physical location					
Tracked which books you check out at the library					
Did a background check without telling you					

[RADIO]

24. How effective do you believe providing the U.S. government with unlimited access to personal information of people living in the U.S. [both citizens and noncitizens] would be at reducing the threat of a terrorist attack on U.S. soil?
- Very effective
 - Somewhat effective
 - Slightly effective
 - Not effective at all

[RADIO]

25. How likely do you think it is that if U.S. government officials were granted greater access to private information, this policy would be abused by government officials?
- Very likely
 - Somewhat likely
 - Somewhat unlikely
 - Very unlikely



[DISPLAY7]

C. Using Race, Ethnicity, or Country of Citizenship to Identify Potential Terrorists

One strategy that governments could take that might lower the threat of a terrorist attack is to identify potential terrorist suspects for investigation based on a person's race, ethnicity [where their family came from], or their country of citizenship.

Later in the survey we will ask you to choose between options that differ in terms of whether race, ethnic group, or country of citizenship can be used to identify potential terrorist suspects for investigation. Under each option, the use of race, ethnic group, or country of citizenship to identify potential terrorists will be either:

- Never allowed
- Allowed based on country of citizenship only
- Always allowed

[RADIO]

26. Do you think **race** or **ethnic group** should ever be used as the only reason to investigate someone as a potential terrorist?
- Yes
- No

[RADIO]

27. Do you think that you or someone you know has been suspected of being a possible terrorist solely because of your/their **race** or **ethnic group**?
- Yes
- No

[RADIO]

28. Do you think **country of citizenship** should ever be used as the only reason to investigate someone as a potential terrorist?
- Yes
- No

[RADIO]

29. Do you think that someone flying into the United States from anywhere in the world should receive extra screening if they also traveled through nations that are state sponsors of terrorism?
- Yes
- No



[RADIO]

30. How effective do you believe using **race, ethnic group, or country of citizenship** to identify potential terrorist suspects for investigation would be at reducing the threat of a terrorist attack on U.S. soil?
- Very effective
 - Somewhat effective
 - Somewhat ineffective
 - Very ineffective

[RADIO]

31. How likely do you think it is that if U.S. government officials were allowed to use race, ethnicity, or country of citizenship to identify potential terrorists, this policy would be abused by the government?
- Very likely
 - Somewhat likely
 - Somewhat unlikely
 - Very unlikely

[RADIO]

32. If you were traveling through an airport, would you favor using race or ethnic group to determine who receives more intensive security screenings if it allowed you to get through the security line **5 minutes faster**?
- Yes
 - No

[RADIO]

[IF Q32=NO OR SKIP]

33. If you were traveling through an airport, would you favor using race or ethnic group to determine who receives more intensive security screenings if it allowed you to get through the security line **20 minutes faster**?
- Yes
 - No

[RADIO]

[IF Q33=NO OR SKIP]

34. If you were traveling through an airport, would you favor using race or ethnic group to determine who receives more intensive security screenings if it allowed you to get through the security line **45 minutes faster**?
- Yes
 - No



[display8]

D. Jailing Suspected Terrorists Without Trial

Another strategy that governments could take that might lower the threat of a terrorist attack is to keep suspected terrorists in jail for extended periods of time without a trial.

Later, we will ask you to choose between options that differ in terms of how long people may be held without a trial. Under each option, the length of time a suspected terrorist can be jailed without trial will range between:

- Less than 6 months
- 6 months to 2 years
- 2 to 7 years
- Indefinite [no limit]

[RADIO]

35. Should the U.S. government establish a policy for how long the government can hold suspected terrorists in jail without a trial?
- Yes
- No

[RADIO]

36. Should the U.S. government ever be able to hold a **U.S. citizen** in jail without a trial?
- Yes
- No

[RADIO]

[IF Q36=YES]

37. **[Programming Instructions]** If respondents click yes, then show the following question. How long do you think the U.S. government should be able to hold **U.S. citizens** in jail without a trial because of suspected terrorist links?
- Less than 6 months
- Between 6 months and 2 years
- Between 2 and 7 years
- Indefinite [no limit]

[RADIO]

38. Should the U.S. government ever be able to hold a **non-U.S. citizen** in jail without a trial?
- Yes
- No



[RADIO]
[IF Q38=YES]

39. **[Programming Instructions]** If respondents click yes, then show the following question. How long do you think the U.S. government should be able to hold **non-U.S. citizens** in jail without a trial because of suspected terrorist links?
- Less than 6 months
 - Between 6 months and 2 years
 - Between 2 and 7 years
 - Indefinite [no limit]

[RADIO]

40. How likely do you think it is that you or someone you are close to, like a relative or close friend, would be arrested as a terrorism suspect and held without trial even if innocent?
- Very likely
 - Somewhat likely
 - Somewhat unlikely
 - Very unlikely

[RADIO]

41. How likely do you think it is that if U.S. government officials were allowed to jail suspected terrorists without a trial, this policy would be abused by government officials?
- Very likely
 - Somewhat likely
 - Somewhat unlikely
 - Very unlikely



[DISPLAY9]

E. Using Harsh Methods to Question Suspected Terrorists

Another strategy that governments could take that might lower the threat of a terrorist attack is to use harsh and painful methods when questioning suspected terrorists to obtain information that might otherwise not be revealed.

Later in the survey, we will ask you to choose between options that differ in terms of when harsh and painful methods can be used to question suspected terrorists. Under each option, the circumstances of when harsh and painful methods can be used to question suspected terrorists will range between:

- Never allowed in any case
- Allowed, but only after approval from a responsible official [like a judge] **and** to prevent a possible imminent attack
- Allowed, but only after approval from a responsible official [like a judge] regardless of whether an attack is imminent
- Allowed whenever the questioner thinks it might be effective in gathering information that will help in the fight against terrorism

[RADIO]

42. Under what circumstances, if any, do you think the U.S. government should be allowed to use harsh and painful methods to question **U.S. citizens** who are suspected terrorists?
- Never allowed in any case
 - Allowed, but only after approval from a responsible official [like a judge] and to prevent an imminent terrorist attack
 - Allowed, but only after approval from a responsible official [like a judge] regardless of whether an attack is imminent
 - Allowed whenever the questioner thinks it might be effective in gathering information that will help in the fight against terrorism

[RADIO]

43. Under what circumstances, if any, do you think the U.S. government should be allowed to use harsh and painful methods to question **non-U.S. citizens** who are suspected terrorists?
- Never allowed in any case
 - Allowed, but only after approval from a responsible official [like a judge] **and** to prevent an imminent terrorist attack
 - Allowed, but only after approval from a responsible official [like a judge] regardless of whether an attack is imminent
 - Allowed whenever the questioner thinks it might be effective in gathering information that will help in the fight against terrorism



[RADIO]

44. How effective do you believe using harsh and painful methods to question a suspected terrorist are for gaining information and reducing terrorist threats?
- Very effective
 - Somewhat effective
 - Somewhat ineffective
 - Very ineffective

[RADIO]

45. How likely do you think it is that if U.S. government officials were allowed to use harsh and painful methods when questioning suspected terrorists, this policy would be abused by government officials?
- Very likely
 - Somewhat likely
 - Somewhat unlikely
 - Very unlikely



[DOV: VERSION2:
1=DEATH VERSION
2=RISK VERSION
RANDOM ASSIGNMENT TO 1, 2]

[DISPLAY]
III. National Security Outcomes

[DISPLAY]

[Programming Instructions] Based on our analysis of pilot test data, we have decided to use 2 different versions of the National Security Outcomes attribute—a “deaths version” [which is what was used for the first pilot test] and a “risk version” [which has been added to this version of the survey]. 50% of respondents will see the “deaths version” and 50% of respondents will see the risk version. Because these attributes are fundamentally different, we have written 2 different versions of Section III. You will find each version of the survey below. The deaths version is identified as << deaths version>> and the risk version is identified as << risk version>>. If you have any questions contact Dallas Wood [dwood@rti.org].

<< DEATHS VERSION>>

[DISPLAY10]

The primary focus of counterterrorism policies is to reduce the harm caused by terrorism, with deaths being the greatest concern. For the remainder of this survey, the effectiveness of counterterrorism policies will be defined in terms of the expected number of deaths from terrorism on U.S. soil over the next 10 years.

Later in the survey, we will ask you to choose between policy options that differ in terms of how many deaths are expected to occur from terrorism over the next **10 years** if that option is adopted. For this survey, please assume that the number of expected deaths is a reliable estimate based on a consensus of national security experts. Under each option, the expected number of deaths will range between:

- **0 deaths** over the next 10 years from terrorism
- **10 deaths** over the next 10 years from terrorism
- **500 deaths** over the next 10 years from terrorism
- **1,500 deaths** over the next 10 years from terrorism
- **3,000 deaths** over the next 10 years from terrorism

[Programming Instructions] If possible, could we limit people’s responses to 46 below to only numbers?


X1. What is your best estimate of the expected number of deaths from terrorism on U.S. soil over the next 10 years?



[Programming Instructions] If possible, we would like for questions 1 through 5 to allow respondents to choose any answer between 0 and 100 using something like a sliding scale. If this is not possible, contact Dallas Wood [dwood@rti.org] so we can discuss possible alternatives.

[SLIDING SCALE]


46. How likely do you think it is that there will be **at least 10** deaths from terrorism on U.S. soil over the next 10 years?



To answer this question, please click on the blue dot and drag it to the appropriate level.


[SLIDING SCALE]

47. How likely do you think it is that there will be **at least 500** deaths from terrorism on U.S. soil over the next 10 years?




[SLIDING SCALE]

48. How likely do you think it is that there will be **at least 3,000** deaths from terrorism on U.S. soil over the next 10 years?




[SLIDING SCALE]

49. How likely do you think it is that there will be **at least 5,000** deaths from terrorism on U.S. soil over the next 10 years?




[SLIDING SCALE]

50. How likely do you think it is that there will be **at least 10,000** deaths from terrorism on U.S. soil over the next 10 years?



[SLIDING SCALE]

51. How likely do you think it is that there will be **at least 100,000** deaths from terrorism on U.S. soil over the next 10 years?



[RADIO]

52. How likely do you think it is that there will be another terrorist attack in the United States within the next 10 years?
- Very likely
 - Somewhat likely
 - Somewhat unlikely
 - Very unlikely



<< RISK VERSION >>


[RISKDISPLAY]


The primary focus of counterterrorism policies is to reduce the threat and damage caused by terrorism. For the remainder of this survey, the effectiveness of counterterrorism policies will be defined in terms of the chance [probability] that a **major terrorist attack occurs on U.S. soil that kills 3,000 individuals**.

Later in the survey, we will ask you to choose between policy options that differ in terms of the **chance [probability] that such an attack may occur on U.S. soil** if that option is adopted. For this survey, please assume that these estimates are reliable and based on a consensus of national security experts. Under each option, the expected probability will range between:

- 0.0% chance [no chance an attack will occur]
- 0.1% chance [chances of an attack are 1 out of 1,000]
- 1.0% chance [chances of an attack are 10 out of 1,000]
- 5.0% chance [chances of an attack are 50 out of 1,000]
- 7.0% chance [chances of an attack are 70 out of 1,000]


The following pictures are provided to help you think about these probabilities. There are 1,000 dots in each figure. The colored dots represent the chances that this attack will occur. The blank dots represent the chances that it will not occur.





In order to help you understand how to use the figures on the previous screen, we would like you to answer the following warm up questions.

RISK46. In the box below, what is the chance of a major terrorist attack occurring over the next 10 years?




- 5 out of 1,000 [0.5%]
- 8 out of 1,000 [0.8%]
- 10 out of 1,000 [1%]
- 92 out of 1,000 [9.2%]

[If incorrect [answer != 8 out of 1,000]] Remember, the colored dots are chances that a major terrorist attack occurs over the next 10 years. There are 8 colored dots, so the chance of a major terrorist attack over the next 10 years is 8 out of 1,000 [0.8% chance].

[If correct [answer = 8 out of 1,000]] That's right! The colored dots are chances that a major terrorist attack occurs over the next 10 years. There are 8 colored dots, so the chance of a major terrorist attack over the next 10 years is 8 out of 1,000 [0.8% chance].

RISK47. In the box below, what is the chance of a major terrorist attack occurring over the next 10 years?




- 5 out of 1,000 [0.5%]
- 10 out of 1,000 [1.0%]
- 25 out of 1,000 [2.5%]
- 75 out of 1,000 [7.5%]

[If incorrect [answer != 10 out of 1,000]] Remember, the colored dots are chances that a major terrorist attack occurs over the next 10 years. There are 10 colored dots, so the chance of a major terrorist attack over the next 10 years is 10 out of 1000 [1.0% chance].

[If correct [answer = 10 out of 1,000]] That's right! The colored dots are chances that a major terrorist attack occurs over the next 10 years. There are 10 colored dots, so the chance of a major terrorist attack over the next 10 years is 10 out of 1000 [1.0% chance].

[SLIDING SCALE]

RISK48. How likely do you think it is that there will be **at least 3,000** deaths from terrorism on U.S. soil over the next 10 years?



To answer this question, please click on the blue dot and drag it to the appropriate level.



[RADIO]

[Programming Instructions] If possible, could we limit people's responses to 49 below to only numbers?

RISK49. What is your best estimate of the expected number of deaths from terrorism on U.S. soil over the next 10 years?

RISK50. How likely do you think it is that there will be another terrorist attack in the United States within the next 10 years?

- Very likely
- Somewhat likely
- Somewhat unlikely
- Very unlikely



[DISPLAY]

IV. Which Option Would You Choose?

[Programming Instructions] As stated earlier, we have decided to use 2 different versions of the National Security Outcomes attribute. Therefore, this will slightly change the wording of the text and appearance of the choice tasks in Section IV. Below you will find a version of Section IV for both the Deaths National Security Outcome attribute [identified by << Deaths Version>> and the Risk National Security Outcome Attribute [identified by << Risk Version>>]. If a person is assigned the death version as the national security attribute in Section III, then they will receive the Death Version of Section IV. Similarly, if a person received the Risk version of Section III, they will receive the Risk Version of Section IV. It should be noted that these sections are identical except for some of the text and the National Security Outcome attribute used in the choice tasks. If you have any questions contact Dallas Wood [dwood@rti.org].

[DISPLAY11]

<< *Death Version* >>

In the next set of questions, imagine that the U.S. government is proposing different policy options for combating terrorism and you are being asked to choose between each option. These options are created from a mix of the different security strategies we have asked you to think about earlier in the survey. Below each policy option, we list the expected number of deaths from terrorism that you should assume will occur if the option is chosen.

- Please respond to each of these questions. We understand that choosing between each policy option may not be easy, but your results will be of value in determining how U.S. residents respond to various tradeoffs related to homeland security.
- Consider each choice carefully and as though they are real choices. Think carefully about the benefits and costs of each option. How would you feel if the policy option you chose were implemented by the government?
- Assume all the strategies we ask you to consider are legal. It is possible that some options will contain strategies that are not allowed under current U.S. law. For the purpose of this survey, please ignore this fact and assume all strategies are legal when selecting which option you prefer.
- Assume only tax increases can be used to pay for the policies. We understand that many respondents might prefer that other government programs be cut in order to pay for these policies. However, for the purposes of this survey we are interested in your willingness to pay for increased security with your own tax dollars. So, for simplicity, please assume that these tax increases are necessary to pay for the policies.



[RADIO]
[PROMPT IF SKIP]
[EXAMPLEP1]

To start, consider Policy Options A and B in the table below. In this choice, only the tax increase and the number of deaths are different [the rows shaded in gray]. In Option A the tax increase is less than in Option B, but the expected number of deaths is greater in Option A than in Option B.

Please consider both options carefully and answer the questions under the table.



	Option A	Option B
Government Strategies to Improve Security		
Increase in your taxes to fund efforts to prevent terrorism over the next 10 years	\$500 over the next 10 years [\$50 per year on average]	\$3,000 over the next 10 years [\$300 per year on average]
Government access to personal information	Allowed but only with a judge's permission	Allowed but only with a judge's permission
Using race, ethnicity, or country of citizenship to identify potential terrorists	Not allowed	Not allowed
Jailing suspected terrorists without trial	Less than 6 months	Less than 6 months
Using harsh methods to question suspected terrorists	Allowed, but only with approval from responsible official to prevent imminent attack	Allowed, but only with approval from responsible official to prevent imminent attack
National Security Outcomes		
Expected deaths from terrorism on U.S. soil over the next 10 years	3,000 deaths	10 deaths
If these were your only two options, which would you choose?	—	—

You chose Policy “[*Option A / Option B*]” as your preferred option, which is shown again below.

[SHOW FIRST COLUMN + OPTION SELECTED BELOW]

Suppose you were asked to vote on the policy option you just selected. Would you vote in favor of this option being implemented?

- Yes, I would vote for this option
- No, I would not vote for this option



Now we would like you to consider options where all 5 strategies and the expected number of deaths may differ. Please look very carefully at each “strategy” and the “outcome” and consider both options before making your selection.

	Option A	Option B
Government Strategies to Improve Security		
Increase in your taxes to fund efforts to prevent terrorism over the next 10 years		
Government access to personal information		
Using race, ethnicity, or country of citizenship to identify potential terrorists		
Jailing suspected terrorists without trial		
Using harsh methods to question suspected terrorists		
National Security Outcomes		
Expected deaths from terrorism on U.S. soil over the next 10 years		
If these were your only two options, which would you choose?	—	—

You chose Policy “[*Option A / Option B*]” as your preferred option, which is shown again below.

[SHOW FIRST COLUMN + OPTION SELECTED BELOW]

Suppose you were asked to vote on the policy option you just selected. Would you vote in favor of this option being implemented?

- Yes, I would vote for this option
- No, I would not vote for this option



[REPEAT TABLE ABOVE THREE MORE TIMES ACCORDING TO CONJOINT DESIGN]

[ABOVE THE 2ND TABLE, SHOW:]

Again, we would like you to consider two different options. As before, all five strategies and the expected number of deaths may differ, so look carefully at each row.

Please consider each option carefully.

[ABOVE THE 3RD AND 4TH TABLES, SHOW:]

As before, all five strategies and the expected number of deaths may differ, so look carefully at each row.

Please consider each option carefully.



<< Note: This question will not vary across individuals. The following question is worded so that Option B is clearly preferable to Option A because everything is the same between the two except taxes [where taxes are lower in Option B] and deaths [where deaths are lower in Option B]. The purpose of this question is to determine if the respondent is carefully considering the options or not, It will be the same for all respondents.>>

As before, all five strategies and the expected number of deaths may differ, so look carefully at each row.

Please consider each option carefully.

	Option A	Option B
Government Strategies to Improve Security		
Increase in your taxes to fund efforts to prevent terrorism over the next 10 years	\$3,000 over the next 10 years [\$300 per year on average]	\$500 over the next 10 years [\$50 per year on average]
Government access to personal information	Allowed but only with a judge's permission	Allowed but only with a judge's permission
Using race, ethnicity, or country of citizenship to identify potential terrorists	Not allowed	Not allowed
Jailing suspected terrorists without trial	Less than 6 months	Less than 6 months
Using harsh methods to question suspected terrorists	Allowed, but only with approval from responsible official to prevent imminent attack	Allowed, but only with approval from responsible official to prevent imminent attack
National Security Outcomes		
Expected deaths from terrorism <i>on U.S. soil over the next 10 years</i>	3,000 deaths	500 deaths
If these were your only two options, which would you choose?	—	—



You chose Policy “[Option A / Option B]” as your preferred option, which is shown again below.

Suppose you were asked to vote on the policy option you just selected. Would you vote in favor of this option being implemented?

- Yes, I would vote for this option
- No, I would not vote for this option

	Option A	Option B
Att 1—taxes	4	2
Att 2—personal info	3	1
Att 3—profiling	2	1
Att 4—jailing	1	2
Att 5—harsh methods	2	1
Att 6—national security outcomes	2	5

You chose Policy “[Option A / Option B]” as your preferred option, which is shown again below.

Suppose you were asked to vote on the policy option you just selected. Would you vote in favor of this option being implemented?

- Yes, I would vote for this option
- No, I would not vote for this option

[RADIO]

Thank you for completing this part of the survey. Of course our hope is that there are no terrorist acts at any time in the future.

X2. Thinking about the choices you just made, please rate how much you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
I am against any increase in taxes or government spending.					
My choices would have been different if the economy in my area were better.					
I think the government is doing a good job protecting the U.S. from terrorist attacks.					

- X3. In your opinion, how likely do you think it is that policy makers will consider the results from this survey to make decisions about homeland security policy?
- Very likely
 - Somewhat likely
 - Even chances
 - Somewhat unlikely
 - Very unlikely
 - No opinion
53. Did you find the choices between options easy or difficult to answer?
- Easy
 - Somewhat easy
 - Somewhat difficult
 - Difficult

[RADIO]

- X4. Which of the following statements best describes how you chose between the policy options?
- I always chose the option with the lowest taxes
 - I always chose the option where government access to personal information is never allowed
 - I always chose the option where using race, ethnicity, or country of citizenship to identify potential terrorists was never allowed
 - I always chose the option where suspected terrorists could not be jailed for more than 6 months.
 - I always chose the option where using harsh and painful methods to question suspected terrorists was never allowed
 - I always chose the option where the expected number of deaths from terrorism over the next 10 years was the lowest.
 - I did not base my choice on a single strategy or outcome.

[RADIO]

56. To what extent does the threat of terrorism affect your willingness to fly on an airplane?
- I won't fly at all
 - I limit airline travel to as few trips as possible
 - Terrorism does not affect my willingness to fly but I am always nervous about a terrorist act when flying
 - The threat of terrorism is not something I actively think about when flying or making travel arrangements



<< Risk Version >>

[RISKDISPLAY2]

In the next set of questions, imagine that the U.S. government is proposing different policy options for combating terrorism and you are being asked to choose between each option. These options are created from a mix of the different security strategies we have asked you to think about earlier in the survey. Below each policy option, we list the expected probability that a terrorist attack will kill 3,000 individuals on U.S. soil if the option is chosen.

- Please respond to each of these questions. We understand that choosing between each policy option may not be easy, but your results will be of value in determining how U.S. residents respond to various tradeoffs related to homeland security.
- Consider each choice carefully and as though they are real choices. Think carefully about the benefits and costs of each option. How would you feel if the policy option you chose were implemented by the government?
- Assume all the policies we ask you to consider are legal. It is possible that some options will contain strategies that are not allowed under current U.S. law. For the purpose of this survey, please ignore this fact and assume all strategies are legal when selecting which option you prefer.
- Assume only tax increases can be used to pay for the policies. We understand that many respondents might prefer that other government programs be cut in order to pay for these policies. However, for the purposes of this survey we are interested in your willingness to pay for increased security with your own tax dollars. So, for simplicity, please assume that these tax increases are necessary to pay for the policies.

[RADIO]



[PROMPT IF SKIP]

[EXAMPLEP2]

To start, consider Policy Options A and B in the table below. In this choice, only the tax increase and the chance of a terrorist attack are different [the rows shaded in gray]. In Option A the tax increase is less than in Option B, but the expected number of deaths is greater in Option A than in Option B.

Please consider both options carefully and answer the question under the table.



	Option A	Option B
Government Policy Options to Improve Security		
Increase in your taxes to fund efforts to prevent terrorism over the next 10 years	\$500 over the next 10 years [\$50 per year on average]	\$3,000 over the next 10 years [\$300 per year on average]
Government access to personal information	Allowed but only with a judge's permission	Allowed but only with a judge's permission
Using race, ethnicity, or country of citizenship to identify potential terrorists	Not allowed	Not allowed
Jailing suspected terrorists without trial	Less than 6 months	Less than 6 months
Using harsh methods to question suspected terrorists	Allowed, but only with approval from responsible official to prevent imminent attack	Allowed, but only with approval from responsible official to prevent imminent attack
National Security Outcomes		
Chance that a major terrorist attack on U.S. soil occurs that kills 3,000 people deaths from terrorism will occur on U.S. soil over the next 10 years.	Chances are 70 out of 1,000 [7%] 	Chances are 10 out of 1,000 [1%] 
	If these were your only two options, which would you choose?	___

You chose Policy “[*Option A / Option B*]” as your preferred option, which is shown again below.

[SHOW FIRST COLUMN + OPTION SELECTED BELOW]

Suppose you were asked to vote on the policy option you just selected. Would you vote in favor of this option being implemented?

- Yes, I would vote for this option
- No, I would not vote for this option



Now we would like you to consider policy options where all 5 security strategies and the expected probability of a major terrorist attack differ. Please consider both policy options, looking very carefully at each “strategy” and “outcomes,” before making your selection.

	Option A	Option B
Government Policy Options to Improve Security		
Increase in your taxes to fund efforts to prevent terrorism over the next 10 years		
Government access to personal information		
Using race, ethnicity, or country of citizenship to identify potential terrorists		
Jailing suspected terrorists without trial		
Using harsh methods to question suspected terrorists		
National Security Outcomes		
Chance that 3,000 deaths from terrorism will occur on U.S. soil over the next 10 years.		
If these were your only two options, which would you choose?	—	—

You chose Policy “[*Option A / Option B*]” as your preferred option, which is shown again below.

[SHOW FIRST COLUMN + OPTION SELECTED BELOW]

Suppose you were asked to vote on the policy option you just selected. Would you vote in favor of this option being implemented?

- Yes, I would vote for this option
- No, I would not vote for this option



[REPEAT TABLE ABOVE THREE MORE TIMES ACCORDING TO CONJOINT DESIGN]

[ABOVE THE 2ND TABLE, SHOW:]

Again, we would like you to consider two different policy options. As before, all five strategies and the expected probability of a major terrorist attack differ. may differ, so look carefully at each row.

Please consider each option carefully.

[ABOVE THE 3RD AND 4TH TABLES, SHOW:]



As before, all five strategies and the expected probability of a major terrorist attack differ. may differ, so look carefully at each row.
Please consider each option carefully.



<< Note: This question will not vary across individuals. The following question is worded so that Option B is clearly preferable to Option A because everything is the same between the two except taxes [where taxes are lower in Option B] and deaths [where deaths are lower in Option B]. The purpose of this question is to determine if the respondent is carefully considering the options or not, It will be the same for all respondents.>>

As before, all five strategies and the expected probability of a major terrorist attack may differ, so look carefully at each row.

Please consider each option carefully.

	Plan A	Plan B
Government Strategies to Improve Security		
Increase in your taxes to fund efforts to prevent terrorism over the next 10 years	\$3,000 over the next 10 years [\$300 per year on average]	\$500 over the next 10 years \$50 per year on average
Government access to personal information	Allowed but only with a judge's permission	Allowed but only with a judge's permission
Using race, ethnicity, or country of citizenship to identify potential terrorists	Not allowed	Not allowed
Jailing suspected terrorists without trial	Less than 6 months	Less than 6 months
Using harsh methods to question suspected terrorists	Allowed, but only with approval from responsible official to prevent imminent attack	Allowed, but only with approval from responsible official to prevent imminent attack
National Security Outcomes		
Chance that 3,000 deaths from terrorism will occur on U.S. soil over the next 10 years.	Chances are 70 out of 1,000 [7%] 	Chances are 10 out of 1,000 [1%] 
	If these were your only two options, which would you choose?	—

You chose Policy “[Option A / Option B]” as your preferred option, which is shown again below.

[SHOW FIRST COLUMN + OPTION SELECTED BELOW]

Suppose you were asked to vote on the policy option you just selected. Would you vote in favor of this option being implemented?

- Yes, I would vote for this option
- No, I would not vote for this option

	Option A	Option B
Att 1—taxes	4	2
Att 2—personal info	3	1
Att 3—profiling	2	1
Att 4—jailing	1	2
Att 5—harsh methods	2	1
Att 6—national security outcomes	2	5

You chose Policy “[Option A / Option B]” as your preferred option, which is shown again below.

Suppose you were asked to vote on the policy option you just selected. Would you vote in favor of this option being implemented?

- Yes, I would vote for this option
- No, I would not vote for this option

Thank you for completing this part of the survey. Of course our hope is that there are no terrorist acts at any time in the future.



X5. Thinking about the choices you just made, please rate how much you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
I am against any increase in taxes or government spending.					
My choices would have been different if the economy in my area were better.					
I think the government is doing a good job protecting the U.S. from terrorist attacks.					

X6. In your opinion, how likely do you think it is that policy makers will consider the results from this survey to make decisions about homeland security policy?

- Very likely
- Somewhat likely
- Even chances
- Somewhat unlikely
- Very unlikely
- No opinion

X7. Did you find the choices between options easy or difficult to answer?

- Easy
- Somewhat easy
- Somewhat difficult
- Difficult

[RADIO]

X8. Which of the following statements best describes how you chose between the policy options?

- I always chose the option with the lowest taxes
- I always chose the option where government access to personal information is never allowed
- I always chose the option where using race, ethnicity, or country of citizenship to identify potential terrorists was never allowed
- I always chose the option where suspected terrorists could not be jailed for more than 6 months.
- I always chose the option where using harsh and painful methods to question suspected terrorists was never allowed
- I always chose the option where the chance of a terrorist attack over the next 10 years was the lowest.
- I did not base my choice on a single strategy or outcome.

[RADIO]

X9. To what extent does the threat of terrorism affect your willingness to fly on an airplane?

- I won't fly at all
- I limit airline travel to as few trips as possible
- Terrorism does not affect my willingness to fly but I am always nervous about a terrorist act when flying
- The threat of terrorism is not something I actively think about when flying or making travel arrangements



[DISPLAY]

V. Personal Information

[RADIO]

The survey is nearly complete. This last set of questions are designed to learn more about you and your household.

1. How many children do you have?
 - None [skip to #3]
 - 1
 - 2
 - 3
 - 4 or more

[RADIO]

[IF D1=1]

2. How many of your children currently live at home with you?
 - None
 - 1
 - 2
 - 3
 - 4 or more

[RADIO]

3. Are you a citizen of the United States?
 - Yes
 - No

[RADIO]

[IF D3=YES]

4. Do you have a current U.S. passport?
 - Yes
 - No

[RADIO]

5. Are you of Middle Eastern descent?
 - Yes
 - No



**[PPINCIMP]
QINCINTRO**

The next question is about the total income of YOUR HOUSEHOLD for the PAST 12 MONTHS. Please include your income PLUS the income of all members living in your household [including cohabiting partners and armed forces members living at home]. Please count income BEFORE TAXES and from all sources [such as wages, salaries, tips, net income from a business, interest, dividends, child support, alimony, and Social Security, public assistance, pensions, or retirement benefits].

**QINC
[SP]**

Was your total HOUSEHOLD income in the past 12 months...

Below \$35,000	1
\$35,000 or more	2
Don't know	3

**QINC2
BASE: QINC=1
[SP]**

We would like to get a more accurate estimate of your total HOUSEHOLD income in the past 12 months before taxes. Was it...

Less than \$5,000.....	1
\$5,000 to \$7,499	2
\$7,500 to \$9,999	3
\$10,000 to \$12,499	4
\$12,500 to \$14,999	5
\$15,000 to \$19,999	6
\$20,000 to \$24,999	7
\$25,000 to \$29,999	8
\$30,000 to \$34,999	9

**QINC3
BASE: QINC=2
[SP]**

We would like to get a more accurate estimate of your total HOUSEHOLD income in the past 12 months before taxes. Was it...

\$35,000 to \$39,999	1
\$40,000 to \$49,999	2
\$50,000 to \$59,999	3
\$60,000 to \$74,999	4
\$75,000 to \$84,999	5
\$85,000 to \$99,999	6
\$100,000 to \$124,999	7
\$125,000 to \$149,999	8
\$150,000 to \$174,999	9
\$175,000 or more	10



VARIABLE NAME: PPINCIMP

TYPE: SP

VARIABLE TEXT: HH INCOME—PROFILE AND IMPUTED

- Less than \$5,000
- \$5,000 to \$7,499
- \$7,500 to \$9,999
- \$10,000 to \$12,499
- \$12,500 to \$14,999
- \$15,000 to \$19,999
- \$20,000 to \$24,999
- \$25,000 to \$29,999
- \$30,000 to \$34,999
- \$35,000 to \$39,999
- \$40,000 to \$49,999
- \$50,000 to \$59,999
- \$60,000 to \$74,999
- \$75,000 to \$84,999
- \$85,000 to \$99,999
- \$100,000 to \$124,999
- \$125,000 to \$149,999
- \$150,000 to \$174,999
- \$175,000 or more

QINC2	QINC3	PPINCIMP
1		1
2		2
3		3
4		4
5		5
6		6
7		7
8		8
9		9
	1	10
	2	11
	3	12
	4	13
	5	14
	6	15
	7	16
	8	17
	9	18
	10	19



[CHECKBOX]

6. What is your race? Please check all that apply.
- White
 - Black or African American
 - American Indian or Alaska Native
 - Asian Indian
 - Chinese
 - Filipino
 - Japanese
 - Korean
 - Vietnamese
 - Other Asian
 - Native Hawaiian
 - Guamanian or Chamorro
 - Samoan
 - Other Pacific Islander
 - Some other race

[RADIO]

7. What denomination or church, if any, do you identify with most closely?
- Protestant
 - Roman Catholic
 - Mormon
 - Orthodox such as Greek or Russian Orthodox
 - Jewish
 - Muslim
 - Buddhist
 - Hindu
 - Atheist
 - Agnostic
 - Something else [please specify _____]
- Nothing in particular

[RADIO]

8. How often do you attend a religious service?
- Never
 - Less than once a year
 - About once or twice a year
 - Several times a year
 - About once a month
 - 2–3 times a month
 - Nearly every week
 - Every week
 - Several times a week



[PPWORK]
QWORK
[SP]

Which statement best describes your current employment status?

- Working—as a paid employee 1
- Working—self-employed 2
- [SPACE]**
- Not working—on temporary layoff from a
job 3
- Not working—looking for work 4
- [SPACE]**
- Not working—retired 5
- Not working—disabled 6
- Not working—other 7

[RADIO]

9. Have you ever served in the United States military?
- Yes, am now on or have served on active duty since 9/11/2001
 - Yes, served in active duty but only before 9/11/2001.
 - Yes, served in the Reserves or National Guard since 9/11/2001 but never called up for active duty.
 - Yes, served in the Reserves or National Guard but only before 9/11/2001 and never called up for active duty.
 - No, never served in the military

[RADIO]

10. Politically speaking, do you think of yourself as a REPUBLICAN, a DEMOCRAT, an INDEPENDENT, or something else?
- Republican
 - Democrat
 - Independent
 - Something else

[RADIO]

11. When it comes to politics, do you usually think of yourself as:
- Extremely liberal
 - Liberal
 - Slightly liberal
 - Moderate or middle of the road
 - Slightly conservative
 - Conservative
 - Extremely conservative



[RADIO]

12. If you had to choose, would you rather have a smaller government providing fewer services, or a bigger government providing more services?
- a **smaller** government providing **fewer** services
 - a **bigger** government providing **more** services

[RADIO]

13. Which of the following two views comes closest to your own views—even if neither is exactly right?
- The best way to ensure peace is through **military strength**
 - The best way to ensure peace is through **good diplomacy**

[RADIO]

14. Some people seem to follow what's going on in government and public affairs most of the time, whether there's an election or not. Others aren't that interested. Would you say you follow what's going on in government and public affairs
- Most of the time
 - Some of the time
 - Only now and then
 - Hardly at all

[RADIO]

- X10. Take yourself back to the World Trade Center disaster. Do you believe that the risk of a terrorist attack over the next year on an airplane is higher or lower than you thought it was before the September 11th disaster?
- Higher
 - The Same
 - Lower

[RADIO]

15. Do you support the death penalty?
- Yes
 - No

[RADIO]

16. Do you believe the death penalty should be used to punish individuals who are caught and found guilty in a court of law of planning terrorist attacks against the United States?
- Yes
 - No



[RADIO]

17. How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right?
- Just about always
 - Most of the time
 - Only some of the time
 - Never

[RADIO]

18. Would you say the government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves, or that it is run for the benefit of all people?
- Run by a few big interests looking out for themselves
 - Run for benefit of all people

[RADIO]

19. Some people say that most people can be trusted. Others say you can't be too careful in your dealings with people. Which of these opinions comes closest to your own?
- Most people can be trusted
 - You can't be too careful

[RADIO]

20. How much of the time do you think you can trust law enforcement to do what is right?
- Just about always
 - Most of the time
 - Some of the time
 - None of the time

[NUMBER BOX 0-1000]

[CHECK BOX]

21. Suppose you are offered the chance to purchase a ticket for a raffle with a 1 in 10 chance of winning \$1,000. What is the most you would be willing to pay for this ticket?
- _____value
- Do not gamble



[NUMBER BOX 0-10,000,000]

[CHECK BOX]

22. Now suppose you are offered the chance to purchase a different ticket with a small chance [say 1 chance in 1,000] of winning \$10,000,000. What is the most you would be willing to pay for this ticket?

_____ value

Do not gamble

[RADIO]

23. Suppose you had the opportunity to lead a project that you estimated had a 20% chance of success and an 80% chance of failure. You will be evaluated based on the success or failure of the project. Declining to undertake the project would have no consequences, good or bad.

Would you:

Undertake the project

Not undertake the project

[Programming Instructions] If response to question 23 is [Undertake project], then Skip to Question 28. Else continue to Next Question]

[RADIO]

[IF D23=2 OR SKIP]

24. What if your estimated probability of success was 40% [i.e., a 60% chance of failure]? Would you:

Undertake the project

Not undertake the project

[Programming Instructions] If response to question 24 is [Undertake project], then Skip to Question 28. Else continue to Next Question]

[RADIO]

[IF D24=2 OR SKIP]

25. What if your estimated probability of success was 50% [i.e., a 50% chance of failure]? Would you:

Undertake the project

Not undertake the project

[Programming Instructions] If response to question 25 is [Undertake project], then Skip to Question 28. Else continue to Next Question]



[RADIO]
[IF D25=2 OR SKIP]

26. What if your estimated probability of success was 60% [i.e., a 40% chance of failure]? Would you:
- Undertake the project
 - Not undertake the project

[Programming Instructions] If response to question 26 is [Undertake project], then Skip to Question 28. Else continue to Next Question]

[RADIO]
[IF D26=2 OR SKIP]

27. What if your estimated probability of success was 80% [i.e., a 20% chance of failure]? Would you:
- Undertake the project
 - Not undertake the project

[RADIO]

28. Suppose that you won a prize that is worth \$1,000 if you take it today. Or you could wait one year to claim the prize and be guaranteed to receive \$1,100. Would you claim the \$1,000 today, or would you wait one year for \$1,100?
- Claim \$1,000 Today
 - Wait one year and claim \$1,100

[RADIO]
[IF Q28=1 OR SKIP]

29. What if by waiting one year you would receive \$1,200. Would you claim the \$1,000 today, or would you wait one year for \$1,200?
- Claim \$1,000 today
 - Wait one year and claim \$1,200

[RADIO]
[IF Q28=2]

30. What if by waiting one year you would receive \$1,050. Would you claim the \$1,000 today, or would you wait one year for \$1,050?
- Claim \$1,000 today
 - Wait one year and claim \$1,050

[DISPLAY]
Thank you for completing the survey.

This project is funded through a grant from the Institute for Homeland Security Solutions [IHSS]. The information you provide will be held in the strictest confidence. More information about IHSS is available at <http://www.ihssnc.org>.

