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Innovative Survey Methodologies for the Study of Attitudes Toward Terrorism and Counterterrorism Strategies: An Exploration of Past Surveys

Abstract

Although some researchers have focused their attention on public responses to terrorism and governmental counterterrorism policies for many years, the field exploded with interest after the attacks of September 11, 2001. This led to a deluge of surveys conducted at the national, state, and city levels. This review summarizes the foci, approach, and findings of a sample of these past surveys.

Attitudes and Responses to Terrorism

Terrorist attacks elicit many different kinds of responses from the public. Although many view these events as irrational and horrifying, a very small minority in any society believe they are justified. Terrorism can bring out the best and the worst in a community and leave people with lingering concerns regarding public safety and trust. Several recent surveys have sought to catalog these different kinds of responses; these efforts will be detailed below.

Public Support for Terrorist Attacks

Several surveys have sought to understand the conditions under which people might actually be supportive of terrorist attacks. Many of these surveys have focused on religiosity

and specifically on the practice of Islam. Ginges, Hansen, and Norenzayan (2009) found that attendance at religious services predicted support for suicide attacks in surveys of Palestinians and Israelis; furthermore, a second survey completed in six nations showed that regular attendance at religious services was related to both a stated willingness to die for one's beliefs and out-group hostility. The pertinent questions asked by Ginges et al. (2007) are included as Appendix 1. In a national sample of Muslim Americans polled in 2007, 51% were very concerned about Islamic extremism in the world,¹ and they rejected such extremism much more than Muslims in Western European countries. However, younger Muslims were more likely to say that suicide bombing in the defense of Islam can sometimes be justified (15%) than were older Muslims (6%).² Of Muslims with a college education, 55% attributed the 9/11 attacks to Arab groups, compared with 43% with some college experience and 34% who had not attended college³ (Pew, 2007).

Additionally, Krueger and Maleckova (2009) analyzed data from the 2006 and 2007 Gallup World Poll for residents of 19 Middle Eastern and North African countries. They were specifically interested in respondents' opinions of the job performance of leaders in 9 foreign countries (the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, Germany, France, Canada, Japan, China, and India). They found that the greater the disapproval of the job performance of the leader in the foreign country, the greater likelihood that the respondents' country had committed terrorism against that foreign country, which may be suggestive of a link between public opinion and terrorist acts committed by specific groups in a given country. At the same time, a survey conducted in the fall of 2008 in predominantly Muslim countries, including Egypt, Pakistan, and Indonesia, revealed that most respondents (more than 7 out of 10) are not supportive of attacks on American civilians, with about half saying that civilian attacks are not effective ("Muslim publics oppose Al-Qaeda's terrorism," 2008).

Finally, Moskalenko and McCauley (2009) conducted a series of surveys to determine if the "conveyor belt" conception of radicalization—the idea that it is a natural progression for some activists to fall into violent radicalism—was supported empirically. They conducted surveys of American and Ukrainian students as well as a nationally representative online study hosted by Knowledge Networks. Moskalenko and McCauley developed the Activism and Radicalism Intention Scales, with the two sub-scales called the Activism Intention Scale (AIS) and Radicalism Intention Scale (RIS). (The AIS and RIS are included as Appendix 2.) Factor analysis revealed that items on the AIS and RIS loaded separately, suggesting that they are distinct constructs. Although the findings regarding the "conveyor belt" metaphor were mixed, the study did demonstrate that activism should not be viewed as inevitably leading to radicalism.

¹ The question was worded, "How concerned are you about the rise of Islamic extremism around the world?" Available responses were very, somewhat, not at all/not much, and don't know or refused.

² The question was worded, "Can suicide bombing of civilian targets to defend Islam be justified? How often can they be justified?" Available responses were often/sometimes, rarely, never, and don't know or refused.

³ The question was worded, "Do you believe groups of Arabs carried out the 9/11 attacks?" Available responses were yes, no, and don't know or refused.

Discrimination Against Muslims

Because the 9/11 attackers were identified as Muslim, several researchers have examined whether Muslims have experienced any sort of backlash in the form of discrimination; results have been mixed. For example, in a survey distributed in mosques in Sweden two weeks after 9/11, 48% of Muslims reported experiencing a much greater degree of discrimination after the attacks, and 43% reported experiencing a somewhat greater degree (Larsson, 2005). The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (2002) found a sharp increase in Americans' fear of Islamic fundamentalism, and 76% of Americans reported being in support of restricting immigration from Muslim countries. Furthermore, a 2006 *USA Today*/Gallup Poll showed that 31% of Americans would feel nervous if they noticed a Muslim man on their flight (18% said a Muslim woman would make them nervous). Another survey found that fewer than half of Americans think Muslims are loyal to the United States (Saad, 2006), and 39% are in support of Muslims' carrying special IDs as a way to prevent terrorist attacks (Elias, 2006). In the 2004 Communication Omnibus Survey, a national survey of public opinion and media use, 42% of highly religious respondents reported that they support Muslim Americans' registering their location with the government (Nisbet & Shanahan, 2004). Finally, the 2005 results of the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press and the Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life showed that 55% of Americans are favorable toward Muslim Americans, which does not vary far from the 51% with favorable opinions in 2003 (Pew Research Center, 2005).

Community Cohesion After Terrorist Attacks

Some researchers have turned their focus to the potentially positive effects of a terrorist attack. For example, Schmierbach, Boyle, and McLeod (2005) compared the results of a two-wave telephone survey conducted in Madison, Wisconsin. Looking at measures of civic attachment, they found that, although there was a dramatic increase in reports of civic attachment in Wave 1 (collected in October and November of 2001), by Wave 2 (March 2002) the amounts reported were back to pre-9/11 levels, suggesting that this increase in community attachment was short-lived. American volunteerism was also affected by terrorist attacks; a 1996 telephone survey of Oklahoma City residents revealed that almost 75% of respondents reported engaging in volunteer efforts after the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building (St. John & Fuchs, 2002). Additionally, the 2002 Religion and Public Activism Survey (RAPAS) suggested that Americans volunteered after 9/11 because they identified with the victims. This identification was based on knowing someone who had been killed or in danger during the attacks and on personal feelings of responsibility to help others; it was reinforced by things such as participating in candlelight vigils (Beyerlein & Sikkink, 2008). Finally, a few studies examined reported levels of patriotism after terrorist attacks. Skitka (2005) conducted a nationally representative online survey through Knowledge Networks shortly after 9/11 regarding flag-display behavior. She found that patriotism, and not nationalism, was at the root of this behavior. Harlow and Dundes (2004) found in a survey of college students that how White and Black Americans reacted to the events of 9/11 was tied to their sense of patriotism

and identity; 77% of Whites still felt outrage after 2 weeks, compared with 58% of Blacks. More Whites (32%) than Blacks (8%) felt a great increase in patriotism after the attack.

Fear of Terrorism

Several researchers have focused on the fear of terrorism in different populations. In 2001, a paper survey was given to children ages 7–18 in what is described as a small southeastern city in the United States (population 40,000) regarding their fears about terrorism. The results were compared to a sample collected by Burnham in 1995. Children in the 2001 sample reported significant increases in fear related to terrorist attacks (Burnham & Hooper, 2008). In an Random-digit-dial (RDD) survey in Providence, Rhode Island, West and Orr (2005) found that the more people talk about a terrorist attack, the more likely it is that fear, and not reason, will guide their responses. Roberts and Em (2003) conducted a national telephone survey in March 2002. One in four reported that their workplaces felt less safe after 9/11; one in three stated that their work was more stressful. Forty-eight percent believed that their area of the country was a likely next target for terrorist attacks. Last, an RDD survey conducted in the fall of 2004 showed that respondents' belief in social capital (measured by community participation, social networks, trust, and reciprocity) was positively related to both their level of perceived preparedness and their concerns for future terrorism (Hausman, Hanlon, & Seals, 2007). The authors suggest that communities high in social capital are more likely to have social networks that share news about terrorism and risk in the world, and this information sharing leads people to increased awareness of risk (and thus concern) but also leads to greater preparedness in case of a future threat.

Some international studies have examined this issue as well; analyzing the 2007 German Socio-Economic Panel Survey results, Bruck and Muller (in press) find that safety concerns are at the root of both the fear of terrorism and crime, with the elderly and women being the most concerned about both. Finally, in a paper survey distributed to Dutch schoolchildren, it was revealed that, when presented ambiguous situations of threat in vignettes that included terrorism triggers (bombings, explosions on a bus), the children did not interpret most of these ambiguous situations as necessarily being terrorist actions (Muris, Mayer, van Eijk & Dongen, 2008). To allow for direct comparison, the differences in how fear was measured in these studies are detailed in Appendix 3.

Threat of Terrorism

Finally, some survey researchers have examined Americans' general perceptions of the threat of terrorism. Most studies conducted in the United States showed a trend of high threat perceptions immediately after 9/11, but these perceived threat levels quickly fell off. For example, Davis and Silver (2004b) examined the results of nine RDD surveys conducted in the state of Michigan between 2002 and 2004; they found that perceptions of threat from another terrorist attack remained very high in 2002 and 2003, with 44% and 37%, respectively, being very concerned that another terrorist attack would occur in the United States in the next 3

months. However, by 2004, this number had dropped to 23%. Nisbet and Shanahan (2004) reported that 90% of respondents in November 2002 thought another terrorist attack was likely in the next 12 months; by November 2004, this had dropped to 37%. The only researchers who did not find this trend in the United States were Jenkins-Smith and Herron (2005), who compared survey results from 1995, 1997, 2001, and 2002 and found that perceptions of the threat of terrorism were relatively stable throughout. Finally, a national survey conducted in Canada in 2004 revealed that most were not concerned about terrorism in Canada, reporting it to be a low to moderate threat to the nation and a very low risk to themselves (Lemyre, Turner, Lee, & Krewski, 2006).

Attitudes and Responses to Governmental Actions: Counterterrorism Policies

Government actions to counterterrorism, including military efforts and other counterterrorism strategies, are not always seen as the best solutions by the American public. Several recent polls have tried to determine how the U.S. government and its counterterrorism measures are perceived by the public.

Responses to Terrorism and Support for Antiterrorism Policies

As discussed above, many researchers have examined people's attitudes and responses to terrorism, but only a few have managed to tie these attitudes and responses to support for counterterrorism policies. For example, in response to the attacks of 9/11, Sadler, Lineberger, Correll, and Park (2005) found that angry respondents (but not those self-reporting as fearful or sad) supported an aggressive military response to terrorism. Such participants attributed the attacks to fanaticism and poor security in the United States. Additionally, Huddy, Feldman, Taber, and Lahav (2005) conducted an RDD survey that examined the influence of perception of threat and anxiety on reactions to terrorism. They found that most Americans believed that there was a high degree of threat from future terrorism but felt low levels of anxiety. These respondents supported antiterrorism measures such as national identification cards and government monitoring of telephones and e-mail. In contrast, those who reported a high level of anxiety were less approving of the president and were less supportive of military action against terrorism. Finally, a random sample of Kansas residents was surveyed concerning their support for counterterrorism policies, such as increased security in public places and banning luggage on airplanes. In this sample, it was found that sociotropic concern (concern for Americans as a whole and not just themselves individually) was the strongest predictor of the attitudes held by the respondents (Joslyn & Haider-Markel, 2007).⁴

⁴ They measured sociotropic concern in their survey with these two questions: (1) "How about the feelings of most Americans, do you believe that most Americans are worried that they will become a victim of a terrorist attack?" and (2) "How about the feelings of most Americans, do you believe that most Americans are worried that they will be exposed to anthrax?"

Trust in Government

A terrorist attack could be seen as a massive breach of security to a nation; the way that a government handles this situation and maintains the trust of the public has been a topic of interest to many survey researchers. For instance, Davis and Silver (2004), in examining survey results over time, found that trust in the government began to rise in the late 1990s, peaked in January–February 2002, and decreased again to the levels present in the late 1990s. Results from a three-wave panel survey suggest that after 9/11, watching television news was associated with greater trust in the government, but only in Wave 1, which took place between October 24 and November 5, 2001. Overall, trust in the government dropped at each wave (Gross, Aday, & Brewer, 2004): from 65% in Wave 1 (conducted October 24 to November 5, 2001), to 58% in Wave 2 (conducted February 28 to March 26, 2002), to 50% in Wave 3 (conducted August 20 to September 13, 2002). Furthermore, an ABC News poll from 2002 found that 68% of Americans trust the government to do what's right in matters of national security and the war on terrorism, but only 38% trust the government when it comes to the economy, education, and Social Security (ABCNews.com, 2002).⁵ Brewer, Aday, and Gross (2005) reviewed the results of a panel study revealing that only 26% of Americans reported feeling trust in other nations immediately after 9/11, with 25% saying they can trust other nations in the 2002 follow-up. Appendix 4 elaborates on how trust was measured in these studies.

Effectiveness of Homeland Security

Only a few studies have examined the general issue of homeland security effectiveness, and they produced conflicting results; however, they were conducted in different years and with different samples. First, a 2006 national survey by the National Center for Disaster Preparedness showed that only 44% of Americans feel the government can protect them from a terrorist attack (Redlener, Grant, Berman, Johnson, & Abramson, 2006). However, a 2007 survey of Pennsylvanians revealed that almost 70% believed the government had been effective in protecting the nation from terrorism (Penn, Higgins, Gabbidon & Jordan, 2009).

Acceptability of Homeland Security Systems

In a novel paper-and-pencil survey completed by undergraduates and employees of the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Sanquist, Mahy, and Morris (2008) asked respondents to rate 12 homeland security systems on their levels of acceptability as it relates to effectiveness and intrusiveness to civil liberties. These systems included explosive-detector canines, passports with radiofrequency tags, and a national identity card (the complete list is in Appendix 5).

⁵ Other longitudinal studies have measured trust in the government generally, and another question asking about confidence in the government to prevent terrorist attacks has been studied longitudinally, but it appears that this exact question was asked only in 2002.

Each system was rated on 14 attributes, including transparency, national security, risk of civil liberties infringement, intrusiveness, and accuracy, using a 7-point Likert scale. Sanquist et al. (2008) performed a principal components factor analysis and found that 8 of the attributes loaded onto the dimension “perceived effectiveness” and the remaining 6 loaded onto “perceived intrusiveness.” For perceived effectiveness, airport monitoring and canine detectors were rated the most effective, citizen observers and e-mail monitoring the least. For perceived intrusiveness, e-mail monitoring and data mining were rated the most intrusive, canine detectors and radiation monitoring the least. Of the 12 systems, airport screening, canine detectors, and radiation monitoring at the borders were rated to be the most acceptable overall.

Concern for Civil Liberties

Americans want measures to be taken to protect them from future terrorist attacks, but polling findings have been wildly inconsistent on whether restrictions on civil liberties are seen as a necessary consequence of this protection. In comparing the results of many public polls, Lewis (2005) points out the apparent inconsistencies in findings; one poll suggests that a majority (79%) of Americans support restrictions on civil liberties in efforts to fight terrorism but another finds that 49% are concerned with such restrictions. Closer examination reveals that the differences in results are due to how such questions are asked; one is vague and abstract and the other concrete. Such discrepancies need to be noted and assessed when looking at polling trends over time and across surveys. Huddy, Khatib, and Capelos (2002) similarly found that support for infringement on civil liberties varied depending on the infringement mentioned (monitoring phone lines versus online chat groups, for example) and on whether or not such surveillance was done with the person’s knowledge. Vague policy changes, such as a national identity system, were supported, but specific changes, such as an identity card with detailed information about the person, were not (Huddy et al. examined several national polls, including Pew, CBS/*New York Times*, and Gallup). Two nationwide surveys from 2002 revealed that 56% of Americans felt it has been necessary to give up some civil liberties to curb terrorism (National Public Radio/Kaiser Family Foundation/Kennedy School of Government, 2002).

There may be other factors at work regarding support for civil liberty restrictions. Researchers have examined the impact of several different factors, including insecurity and salience. Huddy, Feldman, and Weber (2007) found that, although most Americans felt secure after 9/11, those who reported feeling insecure and perceived there would be a threat of future terrorism were supportive of the suppression of civil liberties, more stringent visa checks, and stronger security policies. Additionally, a national RDD survey conducted after 9/11 found that the more Americans felt a sense of threat related to terrorism, the less they supported retaining civil liberties. However, this relationship was influenced by trust in the government: the less trust they felt in the government, the less willing they were to sacrifice civil liberties, even when threatened. This effect was particularly strong for African Americans (Davis & Silver, 2004a).

As to salience, Rabinovich (2004) examined two national telephone surveys and found that when respondents perceived that terrorism was a threat, they were more willing to forego civil liberties. However, when asked about the importance of civil liberties in an abstract fashion, they continued to believe in their importance. Rabinovich argued that the value of civil liberties becomes less salient when presented in the context of national security; this results in a “value trade-off” in which national security emerges as the preferred value to protect.

Still other studies have looked at things such as anti-power beliefs, newspaper and television exposure, and religiosity. For instance, university students in Greece were given a classroom survey examining their tolerance of civil liberties restrictions. Results suggest that those who did not endorse antiterrorist (that is, those who saw terrorists as just criminals who perpetrated a crime) or anti-power beliefs (those against sweeping governmental powers) were most accepting of antiterrorist policies and violations of human rights (Papastamou, Prodromitis, & Iatridis, 2005). An RDD survey of Tompkins County, New York, residents examined their opinions on civil liberties restrictions, and found that newspaper reading was negatively related to support for increased police powers, limits on privacy, and freedom of information; however, watching television and number of hours watched was related to increased support for these restrictions (Scheufele, Nisbet & Ostman, 2005). In a survey from 2004, it was found that highly religious Christians believed that the media should not report criticisms of the government in times of crisis (Nisbet & Shanahan, 2004).

Overall, these civil liberties studies present a complex picture. Different researchers have not only been interested in the acceptability of different kinds of civil liberty infringements, but also they have asked about them in both abstract and concrete ways and have tried to correlate them to a variety of factors. These fundamental differences make it challenging to draw any overarching conclusions. As a means of directly comparing question wording, topic, and scaling, these studies are tallied in Appendix 6. Note: questions with identical or very similar wording that appear in different surveys are shown in the table only once.

Concerns about the Iraq War

Finally, several recent polls have included questions regarding the Iraq War that began in 2003, revealing the concerns and criticisms of the American public. In 2004, the American Enterprise Institute compared polls by Gallup, CNN, ABC News, and the *Washington Post*, and this comparison revealed that most Americans believe that the Iraq war is part of the war on terror and not a separate military action (*America after 9/11*, 2004). A 2005 national survey found that moderates, liberals, and conservatives all believe the Iraq war was the president’s biggest mistake in the fight against terrorists (Security and Peace Institute, 2005). An online survey conducted by Knowledge Networks in 2008 revealed that two thirds of respondents want the U.S.-led forces withdrawn within 2 years (World Public Opinion, 2008). Finally, Kam and Kinder (2007) analyzed the panel survey of the 2000–2002 American National Election

Study and found that ethnocentrism was a powerful predictor of support for the war and that the events of 9/11 had a strong effect on this relationship.


Analysis of Studies in This Sample

Although not comprehensive, the sample of 47 articles cited in this literature review provides a snapshot of the survey research that has been conducted on terrorism. As a means of summarizing these studies for the benefit of this review, some general statistics regarding their mode, year given, and sample sizes have been constructed below in graphic form.

Survey Mode

Overwhelmingly, many articles in this sample discussed nationwide telephone surveys that either the authors themselves or major polling firms had conducted. As Figure 1 shows, 61% of all the surveys in this sample were national telephone surveys. In-person paper-and-pencil surveys were the next most popular, representing 12% of the sample. There was a scattering of other modes used as well (statewide telephone surveys, 7%; smaller telephone surveys, 6%; and face-to-face interviews, 7%). Only three surveys in the sample (4%) were conducted via the Internet. Two surveys (2%) were mixed mode; both used a combination of telephone and face-to-face interviewing. The mode for one survey could not be determined. Overall, 84% of the surveys contained in this sample used probability-based samples; 15% were non-probability-based (usually convenience) samples, and 1% could not be determined because of insufficient description by the author of the article.


Figure 1. Breakdown of Survey Modes in the Surveys Contained in This Sample of Articles



Years Conducted

The events of 9/11 put terrorism on the radar for the first time for many people, including researchers. Therefore, it is no surprise that a great scurry of survey activity occurred directly after this date, with 42 of the 81 surveys being conducted soon after the event. Many of these surveys were carried out from the fall of 2001 to the spring of 2002, which is why these years are clumped below. Comparatively, a small number of surveys were conducted from 2003 to 2008. No studies from 2009 appeared in the sample. In part this could be because many articles are published in peer-reviewed journals, and it can take a significant amount of time for an article to make its way through peer review and revisions to get to final publication, where it will show up in search engines and academic databases. Many of the articles in this sample described surveys conducted in 2001 or 2002, but the articles themselves were not published in until years later. Therefore, surveys being conducted now may not have their results published in peer-reviewed journals until a few years from now. Finally, there was one foreign survey in this sample for which the date conducted could not be found in the source article. It should also be noted that some articles described panel studies—studies in which the same group of individuals is interviewed at different time points. Five articles in this sample contained panel studies; each wave of the panel study was counted in the year it took place. Additionally, some articles described different data from the same surveys (for example, the 2000–2002 American National Election Studies panel study); in this circumstance, the surveys contained are counted only once in the breakdown in Figure 2.


Figure 2. Breakdown of the Years the Surveys Were Conducted for the Studies in This Sample



Sample Size

Given that many of the surveys mentioned in the articles were national surveys, it is not surprising that so many of them (31%) had sample sizes of around 1,000 people, which is commonly seen as an adequate sample size for this kind of survey. Eight percent of the surveys had more than 2,000 respondents. Almost a quarter (23%) had sample sizes between 501 and 1,000 respondents. Twelve percent had 251–500 respondents, and 11% had 101–250 respondents. The number of respondents could not be determined for 15% of the surveys, largely because of some articles that described a multitude of surveys conducted by others—these articles carefully noted the day and year these surveys were conducted and that they were national RDD surveys but did not mention their sample sizes. No surveys in this sample had fewer than 100 respondents. This breakdown is summarized in Figure 3.

Figure 3. Breakdown of the Number of Survey Participants in Surveys Described in This Sample



Conclusions

Overall, the studies conducted of public attitudes and responses to terrorism and counterterrorism measures have had mixed findings, making it extremely difficult to draw any conclusions. Some researchers who are not normally interested in terrorism seem to have dabbled in the terrorism field, conducting only one or two surveys to see how terrorist events influence their own constructs of interest. Without consistently using the same questions and same population to measure a topic (such as concern for civil liberties), it becomes very hard to assess stability and changes in public opinion because any changes observed may be due to context and wording. Some researchers have made an attempt to do this and have successfully used the same methodology and question wording over time to more accurately track trends (for example, Jenkins-Smith and Herron [2005] compared survey results from 1995, 1997, 2001, and 2002 looking at perceptions of threat from terrorism). More of these longitudinal studies, using consistent wording choices, are needed, particularly when examining civil liberties issues. This topic was studied intensely in 2001 and 2002, but the latest survey about it in this sample is from 2004.

As was discussed above and illustrated in Figure 1, the most popular choice of mode for the surveys in this sample was national telephone surveys. However, some other researchers did use more novel modes and designs. For instance, a small number of researchers used the survey and polling company Knowledge Networks, which allows them access to a nationally

representative sample of the United States. Respondents complete the survey online and in a matter of 1–2 weeks the survey is complete and data are ready to be analyzed. One set of researchers had their child participants read vignettes about different scenarios as a means of assessing fear of terrorism, in addition to using an established fear scale. Researchers also took different approaches to surveying the difficult-to-reach subpopulation of Muslims; Larsson (2005) left paper surveys at mosques in Sweden and had participants complete and return them. Others took a more systematic approach: for their 2007 survey, the Pew Research Center interviewed more than 55,000 persons to obtain their national sample of 1,050 Muslims living in the United States (Pew Research Center, 2007). Finally, instead of asking a single broad question regarding counterterrorism measures and civil liberties like other researchers had, Sanquist et al. (2008) presented their participants with a list of 12 measures and had them rate each measure on 14 different dimensions.

Overall, the surveys described in this literature review have provided us some of the clues to understanding how terrorism and counterterrorism measures are perceived by the American public. However, it is clear that there is still much more research to be done and follow-up studies to be conducted to see how opinions on these topics trend over time.

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Appendix 1. Survey Questions Asked by Ginges, Hansen, & Norenzayan (2009) in Their Studies

Survey description	Question wording	How it was scaled
Study 1. Palestinian survey, 1999	<i>Prayer frequency</i> : How often do you pray?	Never, Very little, On Fridays and religious holidays, More than once a week, Five times a day
	<i>Mosque attendance</i> : How often do you go to mosque?	On religious holidays only, On Fridays and religious holidays, At least once a week, Once a day
	<i>Support for suicide attacks</i> : Do you support martyrdom attacks?	Support, Oppose
	<i>Religious devotion</i> : How important is religion in your life?	Very important, Somewhat important, Not very important, Unimportant
Study 2. Palestinian survey, 2006	<i>Prayer frequency</i> : How often do you pray to Allah?	Never, Very little, On Fridays only, Once a day, Five times a day
	<i>Mosque attendance</i> : How often do you go to mosque?	Never, Rarely, On Fridays only, Daily, More than once a day
	<i>Support for suicide attacks</i> : In your opinion, what is the position of Islam regarding the bomber who kills himself with the aims of killing his enemies as some Palestinianians do? Do you believe that Islam forbids, allows, encourages, or requires such acts in the defense of Islam and of the Palestinian people?	Forbids, Allows, Encourages, Requires
Study 3. Israeli settler experiment	<i>Support for suicide attacks</i> : Measured by asking whether Baruch Goldstein's suicide bombing on February 25, 1994, was "extremely heroic" or not	Yes, No

(continued)

Survey description	Question wording	How it was scaled
Study 4. Survey of six religious majorities in six nations	<i>Prayer frequency</i> : I pray regularly or less than regularly	Regularly, Less than regularly
	<i>Religious attendance</i> : I regularly attend an organized religious service	Agree, Disagree
	<i>Parochial altruism</i> : I would be willing to die for my God/beliefs	Yes, No
	<i>Hostility to out-groups</i> : I blame people of other religions for much of the trouble in the world	Yes, No
	<i>Religious belief/devotion</i> : (1). I have always believed in God. (2). God judges my actions and the way I live my life. (3). God created the universe. (4). God could prevent suffering if He wanted to. (5). I don't believe death is the end. (6). I find it hard to believe in God when there is so much suffering (reverse-scored). (7). The world would be a more peaceful place if people didn't believe in God (reverse scored). (8). Religion is a cloak for politics (reverse scored).	Yes, No



Appendix 2. Items on Moskalenko and McCauley's (2009) Activism and Radicalism Intention Scales

Note: all items were rated on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (*disagree completely*) to 7 (*agree completely*).

Items on the Activism Intention Scale (AIS)

1. I would join/belong to an organization that fights for my group's political and legal rights
2. I would donate money to an organization that fights for my group's political and legal rights
3. I would volunteer my time working (i.e., write petitions, distribute flyers, recruit people, etc.) for an organization that fights for my group's political and legal rights
4. I would travel for one hour to join in a public rally, protest, or demonstration in support of my group

Items on the Radicalism Intention Scale (RIS)

1. I would continue to support an organization that fights for my group's political and legal rights even if the organization sometimes breaks the law
2. I would continue to support an organization that fights for my group's political and legal rights even if the organization sometimes resorts to violence
3. I would participate in a public protest against oppression of my group even if I thought the protest might turn violent
4. I would attack police or security forces if I saw them beating members of my group

Appendix 3. Cross-Study Comparisons of Selected Fear/Concern Measures

Authors/survey	Survey description	Question wording	How it was scaled
West & Orr (2005)	RDD in Providence, RI; conducted in September 2004; <i>n</i> = 432	1. How worried are you that you or someone in your family will be the victim of a terrorist attack in Providence during the next year?	1 = Very worried, 2 = Somewhat worried, 3 = Not too worried
		2. How concerned are you about the possibility of there being a radioactive bomb/car or truck bomb/biological or chemical attack in Providence over the next year [summed scale from 3 to 9]?	1 = Very concerned, 2 = Somewhat concerned, 3 = Not very concerned
Burnham & Hooper (2008)	Collected data in elementary, middle, and high schools in a small city in the southeast in 2001; <i>n</i> = 122 (ages 7–18); compared data to 1995 sample	Three of the terrorist-related items found on the American Fear Survey Schedule for Children (FSSC-AM): “terrorist attacks”; “our country being invaded by enemies”; and “people carrying guns, knives, and weapons”	Not scared, Scared, Very scared
Muris, Mayer, van Eijk, & Dongen (2008)	Paper survey distributed in school classes in the Netherlands; <i>n</i> = 216 (ages 9–13)	1. Modified version of the Fear Survey Schedule for Children—Revised (FSSC-R): “women with veils”; “bombing attacks”; “explosions in the bus or subway”; “Mohammed B.” (Theo van Gogh’s assassin), “terrorists”; “Osama Bin Laden”; “pictures of airplanes crashing into buildings”; and “Muslims burning the American flag”	FSSC-R: 3-point scale for fear: None, Some, A lot.
		2. Terrorism-ambiguous vignettes. Example: “You are walking in a shopping center. There you see a man walking with a heavy backpack. He is wearing black clothes and the text on his t-shirt says: My name is Hassan....”	Children were instructed to read each of the vignettes carefully and then to briefly write down what was going to happen in the pertinent scenario. These interpretations were scored by two raters who decided (1) whether children perceived any threat in the scenario (i.e., threat interpretation), and (2) whether the perceived threat had any relationship with terrorism (i.e., terrorist interpretation).

(continued)

Authors/survey	Survey description	Question wording	How it was scaled
Bruck & Muller (in press); the German Socio-Economic Panel Survey 2007	Online access panel contacted by e-mail; German sample; <i>n</i> = 1057	“What is your attitude towards the following areas—are you concerned about them?” The domains listed were (in the order and wording of the questionnaire) your own economic situation, your health, environmental protection, maintaining peace, global terrorism , crime in Germany, and hostility towards foreigners and minorities in Germany.	3-point scale: Very concerned, Somewhat concerned, Not concerned at all



Appendix 4. Cross-Study Comparisons of Selected Trust Measures

Authors/survey	Survey description	Question wording	How it was scaled
Gross, Aday, & Brewer (2004)	RDD; 3-wave panel study; conducted 2001–2002; <i>n</i> = 1,235 for Wave 1; <i>n</i> = 417 by Wave 3	1. <i>Trust in U.S. Government</i> : How much of the time can you trust the government in Washington to do what is right—just about always, most of the time, or only some of the time?”	Responses were coded so that just about always = 1, most of the time = 0.5, and only some of the time = 0.
		2. <i>Social trust</i> : “Generally speaking would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” “Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful, or that they are just looking out for themselves?”	
ABCNews.com poll (2002)	RDD; conducted January 9–13, 2002; <i>n</i> = 1,023	<i>Trust in U.S. government</i> : When it comes to handling national security and the war on terrorism, how much of the time do you trust the government in Washington to do what is right? Would you say just about always, most of the time, or only some of the time?	Always Most of the time Sometimes Never No opinion
Brewer, Aday, & Gross (2005)	RDD; 3-wave panel study; conducted 2001–2002; <i>n</i> = 1,235 for Wave 1; <i>n</i> = 417 by Wave 3	<i>Trust in other governments</i> : 1. Generally speaking, would you say that the United States can trust other nations, or that the United States can’t be too careful in dealing with other nations?	1. U.S. can trust other nations U.S. can’t be too careful Don’t know/no answer
		2. Would you say that most of the time other nations try to be helpful to the United States, or that they are just looking out for themselves?	2. Other nations try to be helpful Just looking out for themselves Don’t know/no answer
Housman, Hanlon, & Seals (2007)	RDD of Philadelphia; conducted fall of 2004; <i>n</i> = 595	<i>Social trust</i> : Most people in my neighborhood can be trusted.	Strongly agree Strongly disagree

Appendix 5. Information from the Sanquist, Mahy & Morris (2008) Study

The 12 homeland security systems about which they asked participants were as follows:

1. Airport passenger and baggage screening
2. Explosive-detector canines
3. Hidden-camera surveillance of individuals for gait analysis and facial recognition
4. Data mining of individual business and financial transactions
5. Passports with radiofrequency tags
6. Monitoring of Internet and e-mail
7. Location tracking through global positioning satellite (GPS) in cell phones and cars
8. Travel tracking through Secure Flight and other risk assessment systems
9. Trusted traveler programs to speed up security screening
10. National identity cards
11. Citizen observers
12. Radiation monitoring at border crossings

The 14 attributes on which they rated the homeland security systems were these:

1. Transparency*
2. Control
3. Personal benefit
4. National security
5. Accuracy
6. Equitability
7. Validity
8. Risk of disclosure
9. Risk of false identification as a security threat
10. Risk of financial loss
11. Risk of embarrassment
12. Intrusiveness

(continued)

The 14 attributes on which they rated the homeland security systems were these (continued):

13. Risk of civil liberties infringement

14. Acceptability

*The authors gave this further detail as an example of the wording of directions for how to rate these 14 attributes: “Please rate the following security approaches according to how transparent they are. Definition of transparency—the extent to which you understand what the security system does and can visualize generally how it operates, even if you cannot directly observe all of it.”



Appendix 6. Cross-Study Comparisons of Selected Civil Liberty Restriction Measures

Authors/ survey	Survey description	Question wording	How it was scaled
Lewis (2005). Describes a series of studies conducted by others.	1. Princeton Survey Research Associates (conducted 3 times from September 2001 to June 2002) and the CBS/ <i>New York Times</i> Poll (conducted Dec 7–10, 2001)	1. What concerns you more right now? That the government will fail to enact strong, new antiterrorism laws, or that the government will enact new antiterrorism laws which excessively restrict the average person's civil liberties?	1. Fail, Restrict
	2. ABC News/ <i>Washington Post</i> poll (June 7–9, 2002)	2. What do you think is more important right now—for the FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation) to investigate possible terrorist threats, even if that intrudes on personal privacy, or for the FBI not to intrude on personal privacy, even if that limits its ability to investigate possible terrorist threats?	2. Not specified
	3. ABC News Poll (June 12–16, 2002)	3. As it conducts the war on terrorism, do you think the United States government is doing enough to protect the rights of American citizens, or not?	3. Yes, No
	4. Los Angeles Times (August 3–5, 1996)	4. Would you be willing to give up some civil liberties if that were necessary to curb terrorism in this country?	4. Yes, No
	5. Gallup News Service (April 20, 1995, and July 29, 1996)	5. For each of the following measures, please tell me whether you would support it as a way to reduce terrorist acts, or whether you think it will be going too far: Increased surveillance of U.S. citizens by the government Implementing random searches by the police of people entering large public events Increasing presence of uniformed police officers in public area Giving U.S. military new powers to aid the police in antiterrorist activities within the United States	5. Support, Going too far, No opinion
	6. Princeton Survey Research Associates (June 27–28, 2002)	6. We'd like your opinion of some things that have been done—or might be done—to improve security and protect against terrorism in the United States. For each one, tell me if you strongly favor it, are willing to accept it if necessary, or think it goes too far. What about: Detaining people at airports solely because of their religion Making it easier for intelligence and law enforcement agents to monitor people's private telephone conversations and e-mail Giving government the power to detain American citizens suspected of crimes indefinitely, without review by a judge Using race, religion, or ethnicity as a factor in determining who is a suspected terrorist Random ID checks on the streets and highways Giving government the power to detain illegal immigrants suspected of crimes indefinitely, without review by a judge	6. Goes too far, Willing to accept, Strongly favor

(continued)

Authors/ survey	Survey description	Question wording	How it was scaled
		Public libraries giving intelligence and law enforcement agents access to the names of people who have borrowed books or other materials that might be used in planning a terrorist attack ID checks at all workplace and public buildings	
National Public Radio/Kaiser Family Foundation/ Kennedy School of Government (2002)	2 nationwide telephone surveys: The first was August 7–11, 2002; n = 1,006. The second was August 9–13; 2002, n = 1,002. Some questions were asked in both surveys.	1. Do you think the federal government threatens your own personal rights and freedoms, or not? (IF YES, ASK: Is this a major threat or a minor threat?)	1. Major threat, Minor threat, Government doesn't threaten personal freedoms, Don't know
		2. Earlier this year an American citizen was arrested in Chicago and accused of plotting to explode a radioactive bomb in the U.S. He is being held at a military prison as an enemy combatant and has not been allowed to see a lawyer or take his case to court. The government says its actions are necessary to pursue its war on terrorism. Others say all Americans, regardless of circumstances, are entitled to be represented by a lawyer and to have their day in court. Which view comes closer to yours?	2. Government actions are necessary to pursue its war on terrorism, All American citizens are entitled to be represented by a lawyer and have their day in court, Don't know
		3. When it comes to protecting the country from terrorism, some people say it's more important to ensure people's constitutional rights, even if it means that some suspected terrorists are never found. Others say it's more important to find every potential terrorist, even if some innocent people are seriously hurt. Which is closer to your view?	3. More important to ensure people's constitutional rights, More important to find every potential terrorist, Don't know
		4. In the search for those in the U.S. who may have been involved in the terrorist attacks, a number of people have been detained by the FBI and other police agencies. Do you think the basic rights of these individuals have been protected or not?	4. Yes, No, Don't know
		5. If an Arab or Muslim immigrant to the U.S. who has become a U.S. citizen is arrested as a suspected terrorist in this country, should that person be given the same legal rights as someone born in the U.S., or should he have fewer legal rights than someone born in the U.S.? (Note: a similar question was asked about stealing a car.)	5. Should be given same legal rights, Should have fewer legal rights, Don't know
		6. If an Arab or Muslim who is not a U.S. citizen is arrested as a suspected terrorist in this country, should that person be given the same legal rights as a U.S. citizen, or should he have fewer legal rights than a U.S. citizen? (Note: a similar question was asked about stealing a car.)	6. Should be given same legal rights, Should have fewer legal rights, Don't know
Rabinovich (2004) Describes two surveys done by others; only one shown here as survey 2 has questions very similar to other studies	The survey was conducted by the International Communication Research organization for the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University from October 31 to November 12, 2001; n = 1,208.	1. Please tell me if you agree or disagree with the following statement: "It's dangerous to restrict freedom of speech because restricting the freedom of one person could lead to restrictions on everybody." Do you strongly agree, mildly agree, mildly disagree, or strongly disagree?	Strongly agree, Mildly agree, Mildly Disagree, Strongly disagree
		2. Should someone who says that terrorism is the fault of how our country behaves in the world (who expresses support for the terrorists) be allowed to make a speech at a college/teach in the public school/work in the government?	Not specified
			Not specified

(continued)

Authors/ survey	Survey description	Question wording	How it was scaled
		<p>3. In order to reduce the threat of terrorism in the U.S., would you support or oppose giving law enforcement broader authority to do the following things (when it comes to Arabs and other of Middle Eastern descent)?:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Wiretap telephones Intercept e-mail Intercept ordinary mail Examine Internet activity Detain suspects for a week without charging them Detain terrorist suspects indefinitely without charging them Examine students' records Examine bank records Track credit card purchases Examine tax records 	Not specified
Davis & Silver (2004a)	RDD, national sample; conducted November 14, 2001, to January 15, 2002; <i>n</i> = 1448	<p>1. Everyone should be required to carry a national identity card at all times to show to a police officer upon request. OR Being required to carry an identity card would violate people's freedom of association and right to privacy.</p> <p>2. Some people say it should be a crime for anyone to belong to or contribute money to any organization that supports international terrorism. Others say that a person's guilt or innocence should not be determined only by who they associate with or the organizations to which they belong.</p> <p>3. Some people say the government should be able to arrest and detain a noncitizen indefinitely if that person is suspected of belonging to a terrorist organization. Others say nobody should be held for a long period of time without being formally charged with a crime.</p> <p>4. Some people say that law enforcement should be able to stop or detain people of certain racial or ethnic backgrounds if these groups are thought to be more likely to commit crimes. This is called racial profiling. Others think racial profiling should not be done because it harasses many innocent people just because of their race or ethnicity.</p> <p>5. Some people say high school teachers have the right to criticize America's policies toward terrorism. Others say that all high school teachers should defend America's policies in order to promote loyalty to our country.</p> <p>6. Some people say that law enforcement should be free to search a property without a warrant solely on the suspicion that a crime or a terrorist act is being planned there. Others say that protection against searches without a warrant is a basic right that should not be given up for any reason.</p>	Not specified

(continued)



Authors/ survey	Survey description	Question wording	How it was scaled
		7. Some people say that government should be allowed to record telephone calls and monitor e-mail in order to prevent people from planning terrorist or criminal acts. Others say that people's conversations and e-mail are private and should be protected by the Constitution.	
		8. Some say that people who participate in nonviolent protests against the United States government should be investigated. Others say that people have the right to meet in public and express unpopular views as long as they are not violating the law.	
Papastamou, Prodromitis, & Iatridis (2005)	Sample of 1,027 Greek university students; paper survey given in classes from December 2002 to February 2003	<p>“In order to counterterrorism, the state should:”</p> <p>Q1 Simplify extradition proceedings for terrorist suspects</p> <p>Q2 Allow use of psychological force during questioning of terrorist suspects</p> <p>Q3 Allow surveillance of citizens' everyday life</p> <p>Q4 Allow use of physical force during questioning of terrorist suspects</p> <p>Q5 Allow surveillance of citizens' telephone calls</p> <p>Q6 Deny political asylum to terrorist suspects</p> <p>Q7 Tighten controls at all of a country's access points (seaports, border checkpoints, airports)</p> <p>Q8 Reinstate capital punishment for terrorists</p> <p>Fundamental human rights (checklist)</p> <p>“Which of the following rights should accused terrorist be deprived?”</p> <p>Q1 Protection from torture or inhuman and degrading treatment</p> <p>Q2 Right to vote</p> <p>Q3 Right to a fair, impartial and public trial</p> <p>Q4 Right of opinion and expression</p> <p>Q5 Protection from intrusion into private or family life</p> <p>Q6 Right to education and schooling</p> <p>Q7 Protection from offences against human dignity and personality</p> <p>Q8 Right to stand for office</p> <p>Q9 Right to a full defense in court</p> <p>Q10 Protection from deprivation of property</p> <p>Q11 Right to seek and propagate ideas</p> <p>Q12 Protection from arbitrary arrest</p> <p>Q13 Equality before the law</p> <p>Q14 Confidentiality of correspondence and telephone conversations</p>	<p>1 = Disagree, 7 = Agree</p> <p>Checklist</p>

(continued)

Authors/ survey	Survey description	Question wording	How it was scaled
Scheufele, Nisbet, & Ostman (2005)	RDD survey of Tompkins County, NY, residents, conducted from October 16 to November 20, 2001; <i>n</i> = 794	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. I would support random checks of people who fit the descriptions of suspected terrorists 2. Law enforcement officials should be able to detain indefinitely suspected terrorists, 3. We need to outlaw some un-American actions, even if they're constitutionally protected 4. Government should have broader power to tap phone lines and monitor other types of wireless phone connections 5. Government should have greater power in monitoring Internet activities, such as e-mail and online transactions 6. Sometimes, government officials need to lie to the press about covert military operations 	For all questions: A scale from 1 (<i>strongly agree</i>) to 10 (<i>strongly disagree</i>)
Jenkins-Smith & Herron (2005)	<p>Compared several national telephone surveys, all conducted by the University of New Mexico's Institute for Public Policy</p> <p>1995 survey conducted between September 30 and November 14; <i>n</i> = 2,490.</p> <p>1997 survey conducted between September 15 and November 2; <i>n</i> = 1,639</p> <p>2001 survey conducted between September 12 and November 4; <i>n</i> = 935</p> <p>2002 survey conducted between September 12 and November 11; <i>n</i> = 474</p> <p>The 2001 and 2002 samples were part of the same panel.</p>	<p>(Lead-in): Using a scale where 1 means strongly oppose, and 7 means strongly support, how would you feel about giving the federal government the following powers to prevent terrorism?</p> <p>Q80: The power to ban people from speaking on radio or television if they advocate anti-government violence</p> <p>Q81: The power to ban information about bomb-making from computer networks</p>	For all questions: a continuous scale from 1 (<i>strongly disagree</i>), to 7 (<i>strongly agree</i>)

