Institutional Corruption and International Migration: Three Case Studies

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Table of Contents

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Abstract

The number of international migrants is currently growing faster than the world's population.[1] The role of emigration in home-country development, the remittance economy of migrant workers and the relevance of forced migration in armed conflicts represent a few of the many reasons to examine the current international migration crisis and its impact on the global order. While migration experts primarily consider causes such as localized violence, gang activity and lack of economic opportunity, a fundamental propellent of international migration is institutionalized corruption. Corruption creates its own system and quasi-institutions that replace the traditional model of state allocation of resources. While there are many factors that trigger international migration, corruption accompanies and even reinforces many of these factors. Corruption exacerbates perceived inequality, misuse of natural resources and institutional vulnerabilities and for these reasons should concern migration policy experts. While there are many connections between corruption and migration, for the purpose of this essay, I will focus on the underlying effects of corruption in institutional deterioration and state capacity.

The relationship between institutional corruption and international migration is an understudied subject in political science. Particularly, the circumstances in which corruption causes people to migrate, as opposed to when corruption does not impact the decision to migrate, require greater scrutiny. Jain (2001) highlights that institutionalized corruption creates alternative norms "upon the obligations that support networks of corruption and upon the transformation of legal regulation into corrupt norms".[2] The main reasons to suspect an indirect relationship between institutional corruption and international migration flows are the impact of corruption on

[1] *International Migrant Stock 2019*. https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/publications/migrationreport/docs/MigrationStock2019_TenKeyFindings.pdf

[2] Jain, Arvind. *The Political Economy of Corruption*. London; New York, Routledge, 2001.

inequality, the relationship between economic performance and net migration and the relationship between institutional quality and corruption. Given these linkages, it is likely that the indirect effects of corruption such as institutional strength and economic performance are directly related to international migration patterns detected by the United Nations.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Chapter I presents the theory which relates the institutionalization of migration to common push and pull factors of emigration. Chapter II describes the data I use in my multiple regression analysis. Chapter III presents the results of my quantitative study. Chapter IV uses case studies of corruption and migration patterns in Venezuela, Saudi Arabia and Kenya to provide more qualitative support for the results in Chapter III. Finally, Chapter V presents conclusions and potential policy implications of my findings.

Chapter I: Theory

A. The Institutionalization of Corruption

Weak institutions permit a small number of colluding elites to structure the political system to their own benefit--thereby enforcing a new system of norms which dictate the rules of play. For the purposes of this paper, I will use Paul Robbins' definition of corruption as "an institutionalized system of nature/society interaction forged from state authority and molded around local social power through systems of social capital formation".[3] In many countries, corruption is an informal institution, meaning it encompasses "traditions, customs, moral values, religious beliefs, and all other norms of behavior that have passed the test of time".[4] Changing the norms of behavior can make private actors more likely to behave corruptly under the belief that formal rules will not be

[3] Robbins, Paul. "The Rotten Institution: Corruption in Natural Resource Management." *Political Geography*, vol. 19, no. 4, 2000, pp. 422.

[4] Kaufmann, Wesley, Reggy Hooghiemstra, and Mary K. Feeney. "Formal Institutions, Informal Institutions, and Red Tape: A Comparative Study." *Public Administration*, vol. 96, no. 2, 2018, pp. 386-403.

enforced. Formal institutions relate to the official system of rules and government structures. Corruption undermines these rules and creates alternative norms "upon the obligations that support networks of corruption and upon the transformation of legal regulation into corrupt norms".[5] In such a system, informal, corrupt institutions of greedy actors and formal institutions vie for power. The institutionalization of corruption is a significant concept for understanding that corruption often stems not from a few law-breaking actors but instead from an informal institution proposing alternative norms of acceptable behavior.

Hope (2018) studies the stickiness of informal corruption in his article "Institutions and the culture dimension of corruption in Nigeria".[6] In Nigeria, corruption became institutionalized in society and part of the culture, even though the majority of people did not internalize this value nor approve of corruption. While corrupt practices were widely understood as the rules of the game, or the standard for acceptable behavior, the government also publicly acknowledged its deterring effect on the nation's economic and social development. Kempe highlights that Nigeria exemplifies the stickiness of institutionalized corruption. Institutions, designed to regulate the relationship between individuals and the state, served instead for the enrichment of public officials and other corrupt actors.[7] In Nigeria, this process stemmed from a colonial history of inequalities and ample opportunity for personal enrichment. Although a large segment of Nigerians does not approve of corruption, they need to participate in this system in order to survive. As corruption becomes the de facto institution, "new forms of behavior emerge which runs counter to the old social order but confirms with the new value-system in which corruption has been completely

[5] Robbins (2000), 426

[6] Kempe, Ronald Hope, Sr. "Institutions and the Culture Dimension of Corruption in Nigeria". *Crime, Law and Social Change,* vol. 70, no. 4, 2018, pp. 503-523.

[7] Kempe (2018), 511

institutionalized and entrenched".[8] In Nigeria and other countries where corruption is the norm, these new behaviors form the new measuring stick for what is socially acceptable despite private moral reservations. Nigeria illustrates one example of the "sticky-nature" of corruption and sheds light on the case studies of Venezuela, Saudi Arabia and Kenya I address in Chapter IV.

B. Push and Pull Factors of Migration

The main reasons to suspect an indirect relationship between institutional corruption and international migration are the perceived inequalities caused by corruption, the relationship between poor economic performance and high corruption, and the effect of institutional strength on both corruption and migration. While the impact of these factors on corruption vary between and even within countries, these causes provide a basis for suspecting an indirect relationship between corruption and migration.

In studying the motives for migration, academics describe "push" and "pull" factors. Push factors, such as conflict, drought and poor economic activity, are the variables which push a migrant out of the home country. Pull factors, such as better economic opportunity, rich natural resources and security, attract a migrant towards a new location. In turn, as highly skilled or highly educated workers migrate from developing to developed countries for job opportunities, it can lead to a shortage of skilled labor and slower economic growth, encouraging further emigration. The push factors that migration experts study relate to common features of corrupt institutions, such as weak institutions and poorer living conditions.

C. Income Inequality and Corruption

Corruption and unproductive rent-seeking limit economic and political development and exacerbate inequalities. Corruption increases perceived and real inequalities as resource allocation

[8] Aluko, M. A. O.. "The institutionalisation of corruption and its impact on political culture and behaviour in Nigeria. Nordic Journal of African Studies", vol. 11, no. 3, 2002, pp. 393–402.

goes to better-connected individuals in society, who are already part of the high-income elite. Corruption also increases perceived inequalities by weakening the quality of social services which would have benefited the poor. Gupta et. al (2000) corroborate that corruption can affect income inequality through "overall growth, biased tax systems, and poor targeting of social programs" in their research article "Does Corruption Affect Income Inequality and Poverty?".[9] Due to the endogeneity of corruption, meaning there are other variables tied to inequality and corruption which cannot fully be accounted for in their model, Gupta et. al (2000) test this relationship by controlling for variables such as natural resource abundance and capitol stock-GDP ratio.[10] While controlling for other variables, Gupta et. al find a statistically significant positive association between corruption and income inequality.

The United Nations Development Programme states that income inequality has adverse effects on a country's Human Development Index (HDI). The HDI is a statistical composite index of life expectancy, education, and per capita income indicators. Ortega et. al (2013) highlight that the political liberties which come with high human development are reinforcing, as "political freedoms help to promote economic security; social opportunities facilitate political participation; and economic welfare supports social factors and reinforces political rights".[11] In this way, corruption fosters inequality but inequality also promotes corruption. With limited social opportunities and capacity for political engagement, citizens are less connected to their own governments and less able to hold corrupt actors accountable. In addition, wealthy people have more resources to buy influence and the poor are more vulnerable to extortion. In democratic

[9] Gupta, Sanjeev, Hamid Davoodi, and Rosa Alonso-Terme. "Does Corruption Affect Income Inequality and Poverty?" *Economics of Governance*, vol. 3, no. 1, 2002, pp. 23-45.
[10] Gupta et. al (2002), 32
[11] Ortega, Bienvenido, Antonio Casquero, and Jesús Sanjuán. "GROWTH IN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE ROLE OF CORRUPTION: Factors Conditioning Growth Analysis."*Journal of International Development*, vol. 26, no. 7, 2014, pp. 974-998.

countries, high-income groups are motivated to use political corruption to lower taxes and avoid paying taxes. The effect of inequality on corruption is likely to be greater in democratic countries because the rich must rely on more covert forms of repression to advance their own interests, whereas authoritarian regimes can restrict liberties more openly and need not rely on the secrecy of corruption.[12]

Inequality is a structural socio-economic component of many countries determined by historical and cultural factors. Long periods of unemployment and high poverty have adverse effects on social cohesion and stability—exacerbating inequality. Global and national inequality of opportunity is a major driver of the current migration crisis as millions of workers and their families move each year to acquire the standard of living that people in other places enjoy. For example, Lipton's 1980 study in rural India found that villages with higher inequalities generated more migrants.[13] While some later studies have confirmed Lipton's results, others show that the mutual causality between migration and inequality vary between and within regions. Inequality undoubtedly has adverse effects on social cohesion and stability, but the case studies of Venezuela, Saudi Arabia and Kenya Chapter IV explore this issue further.

D. Corruption and Natural Resource Management

Political scientists recognize that more corrupt governments are strongly susceptible to biased allocation of state resources, and that high natural resource endowment can make governments more corrupt. Corruption in high natural resource environments usually takes the form of rent-seeking and patronage. Rent-seeking is "the quest for privileged benefits from government" and describes situations where "the power of public office is used for personal gain

[12] You, Jong-Sung, and Sanjeev Khagram. "A Comparative Study of Inequality and Corruption." *American Sociological Review*, vol. 70, no. 1, 2005, pp. 136-157.
[13] Lipton, Michael. "Migration from rural areas of poor countries: the impact on rural productivity and income distribution." *World Development*, vol. 8, no. 1, 1980, pp. 1-24.

in a matter that contravenes the rules of the game".[14] Patronage entails governments paying off supporters to stay in power--leading to reduced accountability and inefficient use of public funds. Natural resources are a blessing in institutions which are "producer friendly" but a curse in institutions that are "grabber friendly".[15] In producer friendly institutions, rent seeking and production are complementary activities and rich resources attract entrepreneurs, leading to higher growth. In grabber friendly institutions, where rent-seeking and production compete, there is incentive to participate in "unproductive influence activities" [...] "due to a weak rule of law, malfunctioning bureaucracy, and corruption".[16] The "resource curse" is determinant of the institutional arrangement of the country and whether rent-seeking supplements corruption.

In "Natural resources, Democracy and Corruption", Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2010) use panel data for the period 1980-2004 in 124 countries to test the relationship between natural resource endowment and political corruption. The authors find that resource rents are positively associated with corruption in countries with POLITY2 scores of 8.5 or less.[17] POLITY2 scores measure regime authority on a 21-point scale ranging from -10, a hereditary monarch, to +10, consolidated democracy. Literature on the political economy of natural resources states that the effect is most significant for "point-source" natural resources, such as oil, minerals and plantation crop rather than "diffuse" natural resources. On average, corruption depletes natural resources. Transparency International (2005) shows that oil exporters average a Corruption Perceptions Index of 2.8, which is equivalent to the 97th rank out of 158 countries, and 20 places below the other

[14] Lambsdorff, Johann G. "Corruption and Rent-Seeking." *Public Choice*, vol. 113, no. 1/2, 2002, pp. 97-125.
[15] Bhattacharyya, Sambit, and Roland Hodler. "Natural resources, Democracy and Corruption." *European Economic Review*, vol. 54, no. 4, 2010, pp.608-621.
[16] Mehlum, Halvor, Karl Moene, and Ragnar Torvik. "Institutions and the Resource Curse." *The Economic Journal*, vol. 116, no. 508, 2006, pp. 1-20.
[17] Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2010), 619

countries in the same income group.[18] Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2010) do not test their model for authoritarian regimes, which might show different patterns for resource endowment and political corruption.

Natural resources relate to the incentives behind push and pull factors of migration. Large natural resource endowment can lead to social unrest and stimulate push factors such as "insufficiently compensated land expropriation, environmental degradation, inadequate job opportunities, and labor migration".[19] High natural resource endowment can also cause deteriorated urban conditions and recourse-related crime.[20] In addition, research on migration patterns, such as Haas and Serow's 1997 study of retirement migration, argues that natural resource-based amenities are a significant pull factor through job opportunities and higher standard of living. The nuanced relationship between corruption, migration and natural resources is beyond the scope of this paper, but natural resources are indirectly related to both corruption and migration.

E. Regime Type and Corruption

Scholars find that democracies tend to be wealthier and less corrupt than non-democracies.[21] Generally, the illicit nature of corruption makes studying the different forms of corruption more difficult.[22] However, political scientists generally accept that successful democracies are marked by high levels of trust in government, low levels of economic inequality and honest behavior in the public sphere. Johnston (2014) argues that corruption comes in

[18] Transparency International, 2005, *Corruption Perception Index 2005*

[19] Rosser, Andrew. *The Political Economy of the Resource Curse: A Literature Survey*. Institute of Development Studies, 2006, pp. 1–28.

[20] McCool, Stephen and Kruger, Linda. "Human Migration and Natural Resources: Implications for Land Managers and Challenges for Researchers". *United States Department of Agriculture*. 2003, pp. 1-19.

[21] Masters, Adam. "Corruption: What Everyone Needs to Know, by Ray Fisman and Miriam A. Golden (Oxford University Press, New York, 2018)." *Economic Record*, vol. 94, no. 306, 2018 pp. 336-338.

[22] Blake, Charles H., and Stephen D. Morris. *Corruption & Politics in Latin America: National and Regional Dynamics*. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010.

contrasting forms but exists in each type of regime Although corruption is unlikely to destabilize the economy and politics within democracies, in well-established democracies greedy actors can use influence markets to maximize private wealth. Using Johnston's definition, influence markets occur in well-institutionalized democracies where political elites have finessed the issue by developing policies and institutions that are accommodating to business interests and incumbent politicians, thus reducing incentives to resort to blatantly corrupt tactics. Influence markets explain how a democratic country such as Venezuela was overrun by corrupt actors and fell into today's major economic and humanitarian crisis.

F. Economic Conditions and Migration

Generally, political and social liberties are tied to wealth, with poorer countries tending to be more autocratic than wealthier ones. Poorer countries are less able to improve the living conditions of their citizens, which is another potential factor in understanding causes of human migration. Importantly, indices for institutional type center on the variables which are easiest to measure, but they might not accurately capture the reality of a political system. Many "democracies" are in fact illiberal democracies, where "democratic elections are held without the constraints of limited government".[23] For example, while most of the world lives under democratic governance, only 39% of people live in countries with free and fair elections. Even in well-established democracies, faith in politicians and democratic institutions has declined. As citizens exercise their democratically protected right to free movement, it is possible that more people will emigrate from democracies that are losing public support.

While economic conditions are tied to institutional strength and push factors of migration, there is also evidence that wealthier countries tend to be less corrupt. Natascha Neudorfer (2015)

[23] Moses, Jonathon. *International Migration: Globalization's Last Frontier*. Zed Books, 2013.

examines competing claims on the influence of economic development on corruption and finds that economic development limits corruption through strengthening the middle class and is tied to institutional type.[24] Citizens from democratic societies with high economic development demand more public goods from their government, and can credibly commit to punishing corrupt officials. In poor democracies, citizens rely more on private than public goods and voters are generally less educated or informed to punish corrupt leaders.[25] Stronger economic conditions are tied to lower rates of emigration and less corrupt institutions, indicating that corruption and emigration patterns likely feed off of one another.

G. Corruption and Net Migration

The nexus of corruption and migration is a relatively understudied topic in political science research. With that said, *The Migration Policy Institute*, a think tank based in Washington D.C. focused on immigration and integration policies, published one article which provides an initial exploration of this issue. In "Finding Connections: The Nexus Between Corruption and Migration" the scholars at MPI plotted The Corruption Perceptions Index of 2012 against Net Migration Rate (NMR), the number of immigrants minus the number of emigrants per 1,000 people, not to determine causality but to show that countries with high net emigration tend to be countries with widespread corruption.[26] Figure I displays this trend with points representing the 174 countries with available data on Net Migration Rate and Corruption Perceptions Index, with three outliers of NMR more than 100 being Lebanon, Oman and Qatar. The figure shows a strong association between high net emigration and perception of widespread corruption.

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[24] Neudorfer, Natascha S. "Development, Democracy and Corruption: How Poverty and Lack of Political Rights Encourage Corruption." *Journal of Public Policy* 35.3 (2015): 421-57. *ProQuest.*

[25] Neudorfer (2015) 432

[26] Carling, Jørgen, et al. "Finding Connections: The Nexus between Migration and Corruption." *Migration Policy Institute*, 2 Mar. 2017, www.migrationpolicy.org/article/finding-connections-nexus-between-migration-and-corruption.

Figure I

Net Migration and Perceived Public Sector Migration, 2012



The scholars identify ten reasons why net emigration may be linked to widespread corruption. To name a few, corruption may facilitate illegal immigration as bribery can circumvent normal migration protocol. In addition, corruption discourages return migration as migrants adjust to different norms for acceptable governance and wish not to return to corrupt countries of origin. Finally, lack of opportunity is a major push factor for migration, which is more glaring in a system based on social connection rather than a "meritocracy"—a society based on merit and individual skills. Corruption can undermine economic opportunity and limit development, reinforcing the "push" to leave the home country.

Chapters II and III quantitatively explore the relationship between corruption and emigration globally, but like the piece by the Migration Policy Institute, do not attempt to draw a causal link between these two phenomena. The covertness of institutionalized corruption and the

imprecision of international migration rates render these two variables notoriously difficult to measure. With that said, the theory I offer in Chapter I and the recommendations of the Migration Policy Institute both strongly suggest that corruption affects migration in many indirect ways which require further exploration.

Chapter II: Data and Measurement

To assess the impact of institutional corruption on international migration, I use emigration data from the United Nations and CPI from Transparency International. The CPI serves as a proxy for measuring institutional corruption. The units of analysis are therefore worldwide emigration per year from 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015 and 2017. The table includes 597 observations for 73 countries, which I include in the Appendix. In my regression analysis using corruption as the independent variable and emigration as the dependent variable, I take the log of the results to account for the large fluctuation of emigration by year. Emigration patterns follow the years 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015 and 2017 as these are the years available from the United Nations.

A. Hypotheses

Given the relationships I explore in Chapter I, I believe that countries with higher perceptions of corruption will also have higher rates of emigration. My null hypothesis and alternative hypothesis are as follows:

Ho: There is no statistically significant relationship between institutionalized corruption and emigration.

Ha: There is a statistically significant relationship between institutionalized corruption and emigration.

While there are many factors which relate to an individual's decision to migrate that relate to institutional corruption, this thesis will primarily study corruption perception, emigration rates, the Polity IV score for regime type and Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDP).

B. The Dependent Variable

The dependent variable is the total emigration for the years 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015 and 2017. The main data source is the United Nations Population Division.[27] The United Nations defines international migrants as "any person who changes his or her country of usual residence" and stock as "the total number of international migrants present in a given country at a particular point in time".[28] The UN's estimates come from official data on the foreign born population in national population consensus. In countries with no recently reported national consensus, the UN uses interpolation and extrapolation methodologies to estimate stocks. Although migration data is difficult to collect and often incomplete, the United Nations Population Division demonstrates decisive trends in international migration. From 2000 to 2019, roughly the timeline of this thesis, international migration stock grew by 2.3%. The United Nations International Migration Stock provides the latest estimates of international migrants by sex, age and origin. I do not differentiate by sex or age for the emigration rates I use in my data table, so corruption may or may have disparate effects on different demographics of migrants.

C. The Main Explanatory Variable: Corruption

To capture corruption, I use Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). The CPI ranks 180 countries and their territories in terms of perceived level of corruption

[27] "International Migration Stock 2017." *United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs*, United Nations , 2017, www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates15.asp.
[28] Handbook on Measuring International Migration through Population Censuses. Background document. Statistical Commission, Forty-eighth session 7-10 March 2017, Item 4(a) of the provisional agenda, Demographic Statistics. UN, New York.

in the public sector using a scale of 0 to 100. 0 indicates that a country is highly corrupt, whereas 100 describes a very clean system. Transparency International aggregates 13 different data sources from 12 different institutions to capture corruption within the past two years of the annual report. Transparency International changed its scale in 2011 from 0 to 10 to 0 to 100.To account for this change, I use adjusted data which harmonizes country names and covers the years 2000 to 2017.[29]

D. Additional Variables

In addition to corruption and emigration, I use Polity IV scores and Gross Domestic Product Per Capita. The Polity Project of the Center for Systemic Peace monitors regime changes and codes for democratic and autocratic activity of all independent states for the period 1800 to 2017. The Polity Project measures six components, including the Polity score. The Polity score ranges from -10 to 10, with -10 being a hereditary monarchy and 10 being a consolidated democracy. The name comes from the project's unit of analysis, a "polity". A polity is a "political or governmental organization; a society or institution with an organized government; state; body politic".[30] The Polity IV Project codes for authority patterns based on the most formal class of polities, meaning it focuses on the recognized rather than informal politics of government organizations.

Secondly, I use Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDP) to measure the economic prosperity of a country. GDP measures the total market value of all the finished goods and services produced within a country's borders in a specific time period.[31] I use GDP per capita, which divides GDP by the total population, to account for the size of a country's population. The GDP per capita

[29] Ondrej Dvoultey, https://www.researchgate.net/post/Corruption_perception_index_1995-2015_Excel_file_could_be_please_share_with_me_if_you_have_it.
[30] Marshall, Monty et. Al. "Polity IV Project: Dataset Users' Manual v2017." *Polity IV Project*, Center for Systemic Peace, 2017.
[31] Chappelow, Jim. "Gross Domestic Product – GDP." *Investopedia*, Investopedia, 27 June 2019, www.investopedia.com/terms/g/gdp.asp.

data comes from the World Bank's World Development Indicators and are presented in 2010 constant United States dollars.

Chapter III: Results

Summary Statistics Table — Dependent variable: Emigration

Residuals:

Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
-1607874	-1013568	-555587	38447	15192937

Coefficients:

	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)	1.865e+06	2.318e+05	8.043	4.83e-15 ***
corruption	-1.345e+04	6.699e+03	-2.008	0.0451 *
gdp per capita	-4.765e-01	7.736e+00	-0.062	0.9509
polity	7.662e+03	6.773e+03	1.131	0.2584

Significant codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

Residual standard error:	2025000
Multiple R-squared:	0.01895
Adjusted R-squared:	0.01395
F-statistic:	3.787 on 3 and 588 DF
P-value:	0.0104

I test the two hypotheses statistically using linear regression analysis in R-Studio. Observations (emigrate rates) are independent of one another and calculated based on the country of origin. Countries with high levels of corruption have low CPI scores and transparent governments have high CPI scores. Not all countries are included in my regression due to missing data on either the CPI index or emigration rate. The tables are generated by the program "stargazer" in R-Studio.[32] The summary statistics table shows a statistically significant relationship between corruption and the log of emigration.

[32] Hlavac, Marek (2018). stargazer: Well-Formatted Regression and Summary Statistics Tables. R package version 5.2.2. https://CRAN.R-project.org/package.

Figure 1[33]
Log of Emigration for 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015 and 2017 by Corruption Perceptions Index



Table I: Log of Emigration Given CPI

	Dependent Variable: emigration
	(Table 1)
corruption	-12,123.380***
	(3,850.808)
Constant	1,821,182.000***
	(185,690.100)
Observations	597
R^2	0.016
Adjusted R^2	0.015
Residual std. Error	2,016,304.000 (df = 595)
F-statistics	9.912*** (df = 1; 595)
Note:	*p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01

[33] Sources: United Nations , 2017, www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates15.asp; Ondrej Dvoultey, https://www.researchgate.net/post/Corruption_perception_index_1995-2015_Excel_file_could_be_please_share_with_me_if_you_have_it.

Figure I shows the log of emigration and the CPI for 597 observations. The graph shows a weak but statistically significant relationship between corruption perception and emigration. Figure I has a negatively inclined slope, which indicates that most countries with high emigration rates have low CPI scores, meaning they are more corrupt and emigration rates decrease as CPI increases.

Table I supports the alternative hypothesis, that there is a statistically significant relationship between corruption and emigration. The small p-value, 0.001725, puts my model at the 95% significance level and indicates that there is strong evidence against Ho, so I reject the null hypothesis in favor of the alternative, that there is a statistically significant relationship between corruption and emigration. The 594 degrees of freedom gives the model high precision in estimating the total effect of corruption on emigration rates globally. Table I suggests that if there were a one degree increase in CPI the log of emigration should decrease by 12,128,300. If a country's CPI were 0, meaning it is completely corrupt, the log level of emigration should be 1,821,182. There is no country in the dataset with a CPI of 10. Stargazer marks both the y-intercept value and the slope with three stars. One star indicates a p-value less than 0.1, two stars indicates a p-value less than 0.05 and three stars indicates a p-value less than .01. The three stars on the y-intercept and slope shows that there is a big probability that my model accurately shows the relationship between corruption and emigration.

Table II add sPolity IV score to the regression in Table I, while maintaining CPI as the independent variable and log of emigration as the dependent variable. I chose to run a multiple regression in order to evaluate the relationship between corruption and log of emigration based on institutional strength, which I explored in Chapter I of this thesis. Table II shows the p-value of the F-statistic is highly significant at the 0.01 level. The highly significant F-statistic means that at

least one of the predictor variables is significantly related to the outcome variable: emigration. However, Polity IV does not have a statistically significant impact on emigration rates as the p-value is 0.26. Therefore, the table suggests that corruption has a statistically significant relationship with emigration, but Polity IV score does not.

Table III runs a multiple regression analysis of corruption and emigration while adding Gross Domestic Product Per Capita and subtracting Polity IV from the model. From the regression, GDP per capita has even less statistically significant association with emigration than Polity IV. The p-value is 0.8671, which means that the model predicts that it is very unlikely that GDP per capita has a strong association with the outcome variable. The only variable that shows a statistically significant relationship with emigration is corruption.

Table IV shows the statistics summary of a multiple regression which includes all four of the variables. Keeping log of emigration as the dependent variable and corruption as the independent variable while controlling for Polity IV score and GDP per capita further supports the finding that the only variable in this model that shows a statistically significant relationship with emigration is corruption. The model assigns a negative slope to GDP per capita but a positive slope to Polity IV score but is not at the significance level to interpret a significant relationship between either GDP per capita or Polity IV score and emigration.

Table II: Log of Emigration given CPI and Controlling for Polity IV

	Dependent Variable: emigration
	(Table 2)
corruption	-13,581.000***
	(4,062.765)
polity	6,929.460
	(6,168.887)
Constant	1,865,274.000***
	(189,753.600)
Observations	597
R^2	0.018
Adjusted R^2	0.015
Residual std. Error	2,015,861.000 (df = 594)
F-statistics	5.589*** (df = 2; 594)
Note:	*p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table III: Log of Emigration Given CPI and Controlling for GDP Per Capita

	Dependent Variable: emigration
	Table 3
corruption	-11,480.450*
gdp per capita	-1.290
	(7.705)
Constant	1,813,704.000***
	(227,451.500)
Observations	592
R^2	0.017
Adjusted R^2	0.013
Residual std. Error	2,025,547.000 (df = 589)
F-statistics	5.038*** (df=2; 589)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.5; ***p<0.01

Table IV: Log of Emigration Given CPI and Controlling for GDP Per Capita and Polity IV

	Dependent Variable: emigration
	(Table 4)
corruption	-13,451.550**
	(6,699.422)
gdp per capita	-0.477
	(7.736)
polity	7,662.273
	(6.772.636)
Constant	1,864,829.000***
	(231,844.000)
Observations	592
R^2	0.019
Adjusted R^2	0.014
Residual std. Error	2,025.066.000 (df = 588)
F-statistics	3.787*** (df = 3; 588)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.5; ***p<0.01

Limitations

This paper does not attempt to draw causal conclusions as many factors contribute to an individual's decision to migrate. There are examples of countries with a high perception of corruption and low emigration rates, and vice versa. In addition, CPI data is not available for many politically tumultuous countries, including Venezuela. This paper attempts to show a statistically significant relationship between corruption and emigration to reveal that this is an understudied topic in political science research.

Chapter IV: Case Studies

The following chapter includes case studies of Venezuela, Saudi Arabia and Kenya to further explore the relationship between corruption and emigration that I outline in the theory of Chapter I and the multiple regression models in Chapter III. I chose these three countries because they offer a broad range geographically but also with respect to governance patterns, natural resource endowment, corruption history and migration trends. Venezuela, which was once considered one of the most successful democracies in the world, is now the largest migratory crisis. Saudi Arabia, a country with more immigration than emigration, has the largest oil reserves in the world after Venezuela, under the control of a corrupt, authoritarian regime. Finally, corruption in Kenya undermines government institutions and faith in anti-corruption initiatives, encouraging citizens to look elsewhere for job opportunities, military training and education.

The three case studies reveal that corruption comes in many forms with disparate impacts given the political and economic context. While oil magnified the corruption problem in Venezuela and had disastrous affects for the nation's economy, the Saudi government has used oil to its advantage to quiet dissenters and solidify the monarch's authoritarian rule. Kenya clearly shows that the institutionalization of corruption has dangerous affects for a government's development and political strength. Although corruption on its own does not determine the migration trends of any country, the institutionalization of corruption entangles corruption with a country's economic opportunities and political strength, which has resulting effects on migration.

A. Venezuela

For about fifty years, Venezuela was considered an exception to the turmoil of Latin American politics and financial crises. While other governments in the region faced economic

collapses and military dictatorships, Venezuela enjoyed a relatively stable democracy from 1926 to 1979.[34] During this period, large oil reserves created a powerful political elite and a culture structured around oil. The situation changed in 1980, when the oil model collapsed, and the country fell into an economic recession in 1983. In 1999, former president Hugo Chávez enacted a new constitution which strengthened his power and limited checks and balances. Chávez's misguided oil policies and concentration of executive power magnified the impact of Venezuela's financial crisis and triggered a mass exodus of migrants. In 2016, Venezuela entered an economic recession with an inflation rate of 800%, the highest in its history.[35] With the state unable to cater to the basic necessities of its citizens, particularly with respect to medical attention, the number of Venezuelans soliciting asylum in the United States increased by 150 percent, with more asylum applications from Venezuela than any other country.[36] An estimated 4.5 million Venezuelans have left the country since 2014 with about 1.3 million going to Colombia.[37] The relationship between political stability and economic growth, followed by the collapse of the oil market with a weakening democracy, shows a strong correlation between financial standing and institutional integrity in Venezuela and the resulting impact on migration.

As seven million Venezuelan citizens have fled the country, more academics point to corruption and mismanagement of government enterprises as propellants of the current migratory problem.[38] Due to Venezuela's turbulent humanitarian and economic status, data on corruption

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[34] Briceno-Leon, Roberto. "Petroleum and Democracy in Venezuela." *Social Forces*, vol. 84 no. 1, 2005.
[35] Pons, Corina. "Venezuela 2016 Inflation Hits 800 Percent, GDP Shrinks 19 Percent: Document." *Reuters*, Thomas Reuters, 20 Jan. 2017, www. Reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-economy/venezuela-2016-inflation-hits-800-percent-gdp-shrinks-19-percent-document-idUSKBN154244
[36] McCarthy, Michael. "Venezuela's Crisis: Beyond Economic Explanations." *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 18, no. 2, 2017, pp. 129-136.
[37] Kennedy, Merrit. "U.N. Says More Than 4 Million People Have Left Venezuela." *NPR*, 7 June 2019, www.npr.org/2019/06/07/730687807/u-n-says-more-than-4-million-people-have-left-venezuela
[38] Alhadeff, Samuel. *Wilson Center*. 2018, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/publication/venezuela_explainer_final.pdf.

and emigration was incomplete for the multiple regression in Chapter III. Even though Venezuela is not included in the quantitative section of this thesis, I believe that the role of corruption in the current migration crisis warrants greater research and for this reason dedicate part of this chapter to Venezuela.

Democracy in Venezuela Prior to the 2016 Political Implosion

From 1958 to 1979, Venezuela enjoyed high growth and rising economic and social development. While Venezuela was viewed as more stable and democratic than its Latin American counterparts, beneath the surface "oil worked through a big central state and strong political parties to pay off clients and satisfy demands".[39] Political participation in Venezuela was organized around strong political parties which dominated unions for group members' benefit. While elections saw high voter turnout, electoral laws constricted the ability of other political parties to compete for power and made it more difficult for some people to vote. Pacts and compromises seen as integral to the stabilization of the democratic system came to restrict democracy.

The Petroleum Nationalization Law of 1976 transferred all power over to the state-owned oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela, PDVSA—making the beginning of the country's economic downfall. Economic stagnation and inflation in the 1980s triggered events such as Black Friday on February 18, 1983 and urban riots starting on February 27, 1989 as the government lost legitimacy.[40] The once dominant parties lost their control over civil society, voter abstention dramatically increased, and divisions arose within parties. The gradual deterioration of economic conditions weakened the party system in the early 1990s as citizens became disenchanted with politicians' ability to solve the country's problems—creating a conducive environment for

[39] Levine, Daniel H. "The Decline and Fall of Democracy in Venezuela: Ten Theses." *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, vol. 21, no. 2, 2002, pp. 248–269.
[40] Levine (2002), 251

antisystem candidates to run for presidency and replacing congressional bargaining with street politics.[41]

Hugo Chávez was elected President of Venezuela in December of 1998 as an anti-system candidate promising to increase social spending and reduce state corruption.[42] A 1996 survey showed that 87.8% of respondents blamed political elites for widespread poverty[43]. Chávez denounced Venezuela's political parties and the unpopular neoliberal reforms of the 1990s. Despite proposing a democratic platform, Chávez dissolved the national Congress, ignored judges and weakened opposition parties.[44] Once in power, Chávez used the country's crude oil reserves to fund extensive social programs.[45] He also hired family members and political allies, which expanded corruption and further entrenched criminal organizations in the state. In 1999, Venezuela received the lowest CPI score in the Americas for that year, going from the eighty-fourth percentile to the seventy-first percentile.[46] Lack of institutional checks and balances prompted high levels of impunity and more acts of corruption. Corrupt political elites in Venezuela used the significance of the country's natural resources to manipulate the general public and spark an economic downturn.

Despite the political corruption of the Chávez years, scholars sympathetic to Chávez view the administration as more democratic through its empowerment of the lower-class and creation

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[41] Flores-Macias, Gustavo. *After Neoliberalism?: the Left and Economic Reforms in Latin America*. Oxford University Press, 2012.

[42] Wiseman, Colin, and Daniel Béland. "The Politics of Institutional Change in Venezuela: Oil Policy during the Presidency of Hugo Chávez." *Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies / Revue Canadienne Des Études Latino-Américaines Et Caraïbes*, vol. 35, no. 70, 2010, pp. 141-164.

[43] Wiseman and Béland (2010), 153

[44] Lalander, Rickard. "The Unravelling of Representative Democracy in Venezuela."*Ibero-Americana*, vol. 35, no. 2, 2005, pp. 79-82.

[45] Hellinger, Daniel. "Oil and the Chávez Legacy." *Latin American Perspectives*, vol. 44, no. 1, Jan. 2017, pp. 54–77

[46] Morris, Stephan and Blake, Charles. *Corruption & Politics in Latin America: National and Regional Dynamics*. Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010.

of a more participatory democracy. Additionally, Chávez received a judiciary "that had been plagued for years by influence-peddling, political interference, and, above all, corruption".[47] Political scientists such as Gabriel Hetland view the problems of Chávez's administration as part of the paradox of participatory democracy.[48] Hetland highlights that Chávez's administration had the capacity of promoting democracy through the indirect effects of populist mobilization, such as a revival of the public sector and participatory rhetoric. However, as the government grew more involved in Venezuelan society, top-down control of popular organizations subverted grass-roots efforts for a more egalitarian Venezuela. The anti-liberal socialist ideology under the Chávez era destroyed institutional credibility and expanded corruption as the military elite took advantage of its autonomy to collaborate with criminal organizations.

Petroleum and Venezuela's Political Structure

The oil boom of the mid-1970s was first viewed as a blessing and later a curse for the Venezuelan government.[49] Petroleum dictated the social and economic relations of Venezuelan people and acted as a "rent".[50] As the political system was structured on the government's ability to bribe clients, this arrangement collapsed without goods to distribute. Corruption in the PDVSA involved "state actors embezzling funds for their own purposes or colluding with citizens to divert public resources for their mutual benefit".[51] Although oil funds allowed the Venezuelan government to support itself, it also created opportunities for corruption which eventually destroyed the Venezuelan economy.

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[47] Wilkinson, Daniel. "Rigging the Rule of Law: Judicial Independence Under Siege in Venezuela." *Human Rights Watch*, 2004

[48] Hetland, Gabriel. "The Crooked Line: From Populist Mobilization to Participatory Democracy in Chávez-Era Venezuela." *Qualitative Sociology*, vol. 37, no. 4, 2014, pp. 373-401.

[49] Levine (2002), 250

[50] Briceno-Leon (2005), 3

[51] Morris and Blake (2010), 173

The petroleum industry has also fueled corruption in Venezuela through its status as a state-owned enterprise. The petroleum industry relied on only 2% of the working age population in Venezuela, allowing the state to act independently of its critics.[52] Transparency International critiques PDVSA for failing to make available audited financial statements since 2002. Because oil revenue in Venezuela goes directly to the state and not to private individuals or companies, the government is less dependent on the economic standing of its own citizens and the ability to collect taxes.

The movement for democratic reform in the second half of the 20th century coincided with a popular demand that citizens benefit from their country's natural resources.[53] The majority of Venezuelans believed that government should play a role in managing national oil wealth. Chávez targeted the institutional power of the PDVSA and pledged that under his rule, this entity would fall completely subordinate to the state. The PDVSA labeled itself as a meritocracy, meaning promotions in the company would be based on performance within the company. However, during Chávez's campaign he vilified the PDVSA as a "state within a state" and blamed the company for making decisions contradictory to the welfare of the Venezuelan people.[54]

Institutional Corruption and the 2016 Crisis

Institutionalized corruption weakened the Venezuelan government and limited the state's ability to carry out basic functions and protect the well-being of its citizens. Levine (2002) states that during the Chávez years, "pacts and agreements negotiated by political parties and party elites knit the system together and were implemented on a day-to-day basis through a vast network of

[52] Briceno-Leon (2005), 4
[53] Wiseman and Béland (2010), 143
[54] Wiseman and Béland (2010), 143

formal and informal contacts and arrangements for sharing power and its spoils".[55] These networks constituted an informal, corrupt institution which undermined Venezuelan rule of law and created an uncertain future for the country. The deeply entrenched nature of institutional corruption created a political elite with a strong fear of losing power and facing persecution in U.S. and Venezuelan courts for human rights violations or drug trafficking.[56]

The 2016 Migration Crisis

Citing "security concerns", the government imposed strict economic controls in 2002 to fasten its control of the private sector.[57] These economic controls, coupled with years of leadership under corrupt actors committing rent-seeking and patronage, exacerbated the economic shock and led to a complete collapse of the Venezuelan health system. As of 2016, Venezuela was one of the most violent countries globally. In 2018, flows from Venezuela to the OECD increased by 59%, making Venezuela one of the top four countries of origin for asylum seekers, after Afghanistan, Syria and Iraq.[58] The migration history of Venezuela coincides with the creation of humanitarian and economic problems exacerbated by a string of corrupt rulers.

The Current Dilemma

Today, Venezuela is in a presidential crisis as two different leaders claim the title "Head of State". In trying to stay in office, the current president, Nicolas Maduro, has employed authoritarian measures to keep power, despite the popular election of Maduro's opponent, Juan Guaidó and continued the economic mismanagement of the Chávez era. When oil prices dropped

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[55] Levine (2002), 250

[56] Alarcón, Benigno, Ángel E. Álvarez, and Manuel Hidalgo. "Can Democracy Win in Venezuela?" *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 27, no. 2, 2016, pp. 20-34.

[57] McCarthy (2017), 129.

[58] OECD (2019), *International Migration Outlook 2019*, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/c3e35eec-en*.

from $112 to $62 in 2014, Maduro responded by printing money to finance the welfare state and decrease debt.[59] Oil wealth, the financial requirements for campaigning in a competitive democracy and weak police and judiciary systems weakened political institutions and led to the current crisis.[60] Despite common belief that Venezuela's institutional integrity suddenly plummeted in 2014, Venezuela's Corruption Perception Index by Transparency International has been going down since 2002.[61] The current CPI score for Venezuela is 16 out of 100, making it 173rd out of the 180 countries in the ranking.

Currently, many political scientists view Venezuela as a *criminal state*, one "run by groups and mafias dedicated to drug and human trafficking, money laundering, gold and arms smuggling, among other illicit businesses".[62] Insight Crime's 2019 reporting shows that homicide rate in Venezuela has reached 76 out of 100,000 inhabitants—a drop from 100 out of 100,000 inhabitants in 2018, but nonetheless a concerning rate.[63] Rather than allocating aid fairly, the military elite adopted emergency food supplies into the black market. As domestic problems worsen and people revolt, the government has adopted authoritarian measures to quiet dissenters and limit international involvement. Given the history of Venezuela's institutions and the factors which attributed to the current predicament, it is clear that an understanding the current migration crisis in Venezuela is incomplete without acknowledgement of the role of corrupt, informal institutions which undermined the formal system.

[59] Alhadeff (2018)
[60] Morris and Blake (2010), p. 165
[61] Morris and Blake (2010), p. 167
[62] Maya, Margarita L. "Populism, 21st-Century Socialism and Corruption in Venezuela." *Thesis Eleven*, vol. 149, no. 1, 2018, pp. 67-83.
[63] Navarette, Maria Alejandra, and Anastasia Austin. "Capital Murder: 2019 Homicide Rates in Latin America's Capital Cities." *InSight Crime*, 5 Mar. 2020.

B. Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia challenges the multiple regression results in Chapter III as it shows high corruption coupled with low emigration. The country differentiates itself from others in the model due to the importance of oil resources for the monarchy's authoritarian control. The monarchy is based on Islamic law with no written constitution, and lacks public participation in the government decision-making process and monitoring of public official's work.[64] Rulers are able to buy their constituents silence through offering a high standard of living due to the country's strong oil economy.[65] The opaque nature of public accounting prevents ordinary citizens from knowing how much of the state's income goes to the royal family and its clients, with the least transparent sectors of the state budget being royal allocations, military expenditure and foreign transfers.[66,67] The high-profile killing of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi demonstrates the risk of exit from an authoritarian state. The denial of the democratic right to exit one's country and the state's manipulation of oil reserves are two reasons why Saudi Arabia does not fit the model in Chapter III.

In the data table, Saudi Arabia averaged a CPI score of 45.5 for the years 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015 and 2017. For those years, the total emigration was 939,219 people and the average was 234,805 people per year for this timeframe. In 2017, Saudi Arabia had a net migration rate of -0.5 per 1,000 individuals, with immigrants making up 37% of the total population.[68] For 2019, Saudi Arabia ranks 51 out of 180 countries for CPI scores, making this a much less corrupt country than

[64] Albassam, Bassam Abdullah. "Political Reform in Saudi Arabia: Necessity or Luxury?" *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 35, no. 3, 2012, pp. 1–17.
[65] Albassam (2012), 5
[66] Freedom House (2019). "Freedom in the World: Saudi Arabia"
[67] Al-Shehabi, Omar. "Show Us The Money Oil Revenues, Undisclosed Allocations And Accountability". LSE Kuwait Programme Paper Series, vol. 44, 2017.
[68] "Saudi Arabia." *Migrationpolicy.org*, 20 Mar. 2019, www.migrationpolicy.org/country-resource/saudi-arabia.

Venezuela, but still a telling example for this thesis of why a corrupt country might have low emigration rates.

Corruption in Saudi Arabia

The main forms of corruption in Saudi Arabia are nepotism, patronage and clientelism. Nepotism is the use of power or influence to favor friends, family and allies. Regarding business culture in Saudi Arabia, Niblock (1982) states that "man's first loyalty is to his family, then his tribe, then his country. Nepotism is a virtue and it would shame a man to refuse to help or give a job to a close relative".[69] Because royal decisions are largely unconstrained by political opposition, nepotism, patronage and clientelism continue to affect the Saudi State. Anti-corruption laws are not adequately enforced and so abuse of power is relatively common. The Combating Bribery Law and the Civil Service Law criminalize forms of corruption such as bribery, but these laws are selectively enforced and do not address the major problem of facilitation payments—payments paid to government officials to expedite a business deal or other routine performance.[70]

Saudi Arabia is an absolute monarchy in which politics are not institutionalized but instead highly personal among the elite.[71] Political parties are outlawed and there are no general elections for national parties. Instead, the government has adopted a paternalistic relationship with the public, determining how citizens should behave and how resources will be allocated. In addition to limiting citizen participation in politics, the Saudi government demonstrates weak institutional integrity by placing certain ruling families above the law in judicial decisions. Modern Saudi Arabia is the third kingdom under the Saʿūd family, who in recent years has initiated non-transparent initiatives promising corruption reform.

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[69] Niblock, Tim. *State, Society and Economy in Saudi Arabia*, London: Croom Helm, 1982.
[70] Gain Business Anti-Corruption Portal, "Saudi Arabia Corruption Report", 2018, *Gain Integrity*.
[71] Haykel, Bernard, et al. "Introduction." *Saudi Arabia in Transition: Insights on Social, Political, Economic and Religious Change*, edited by Bernard Haykel et al., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2015, pp. 1–10.

Anti-Corruption Efforts Since 2011

Saudi Arabia's National Strategy for Maintaining Integrity and Combating Corruption strengthened its anti-corruption efforts in recent years with the recognition that corrupt practices cause widespread economic, social and security problems. There have been several high-profile measures to curb corruption, but many believe these actions are part of the crown prince's campaign to consolidate power.[72] Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman launched an anti-corruption purge in 2017 and claimed to recover about US$106 billion in stolen assets in this process. However, as Transparency International highlights in its 2019 Corruption Perception Index report, "there was no due process, transparent investigation or fair and free trial for suspects".[73] Transparency International even argues that since the crown prince took power in 2017, Saudi Arabia has grown more corrupt.

Saudi Arabia concluded its anti-corruption campaign in January 2019 after settlements with private businessmen and former officials.[74] Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman began the campaign as part of an economic reform program, but the lack of transparency in the process actually brought more distrust than security to foreign investors. Although Prince Salman formally concluded its campaign, the centralization of decision-making power indicates that corruption will continue to decide the rules of the campaign for Saudi politics, and as citizens continue to challenge the regime, the result will likely affect migration patterns.

Oil Dependency and Citizen Retention

[72] Kirkpatrick, David. "Saudis End Purge That Began With Hundreds Locked in the Ritz-Carlton". *The New York Times*, 2019.
[73] "Corruption Perceptions Index 2019." *Transparency International*, 2019.
[74] Omran, Ahmed Al. "Saudi Arabia Concludes Sweeping Anti-Corruption Campaign." *Financial Times*, 30 Jan. 2019

Oil and power are closely linked in Saudi Arabia's political system. 75% of revenue in Saudi Arabia comes from oil--forming 90% of the country's exports.[75] For the most part, the rulers have been able to use the country's oil to maintain a high standard of living and make the public complacent to their lack of political participation and the prevalence of institutional corruption. "Gift-giving" and regular stipends to government sympathizers are normal parts of the Saudi political system. In addition, oil wealth has allowed the government to co-opt dissenters and quiet political opposition.

Article 14 of the Kingdom's Basic Law explicitly states that oil is to be exploited for the interest of the state and not for the people. For this reason, Saudi Arabia is able to manipulate the price of oil through its own public banking system. Gause (2015) labels Saudi Arabia as an exception to the typical rentier state model because the government is able to avoid the political ramifications of oil price drops.[76] A rentier state is one which derives its revenue from selling the country's resources to clients in other states. The government is able to tap funds in the domestic banking system to avoid rentier fiscal crises as it did in the 1990s. Rentier states are less accountable to their citizens because they are not dependent on tax revenues as their main form of economic support, empowering the government to employ authoritarian means.[77]

Comparing the Politics of Oil in Saudi Arabia and Venezuela

The apolitization of oil in Saudi Arabia contrasts with the hyper-politicization of oil in Venezuela, especially during the Chávez years. In Saudi Arabia, oil is a non-political commodity

[75] Transparency International (2019), 19

[76] Haykel, Bernard, et al. "Oil and Political Mobilization in Saudi Arabia." *Saudi Arabia in Transition: Insights on Social, Political, Economic and Religious Change*, edited by Bernard Haykel et al., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2015, pp. 1–10.

[77] Gray, Matthew "Theorising Politics, Patronage and Corruption in the Arab Monarchies of the Gulf", in de Elvira, Schwartz and Weippert-Fenner (eds), *Clientelism and Patronage in the Middle East and North Africa*. Routledge, 2018.

controlled by the state to regulate the living standard for citizens. In Venezuela, Chávez targeted the PDVSA for undermining government and the state's ability to serve its citizens. In this way, while Venezuela and Saudi Arabia were two of the richest countries in the world with respect to oil reserves, their different management styles for the oil sector encouraged different regime types. Saudi Arabia avoids the political ramifications of oil prices dropping because the regime is able to manipulate the oil market and shield citizens from the economic blowback. In addition, citizens do not protest about oil because natural resources are largely accepted as the property of the government. In Venezuela, the collapse of the oil market signified the inability of the political system to care for its citizens. Whereas Saudi Arabia can use oil to pay rents and maintain the support of its citizens, Venezuela severely mismanaged its oil economy and in doing so lost the support of its citizens, resulting in high emigration.

Migration from Saudi Arabia and the Long Arm of Authoritarian States

The killing of Saudi Arabian journalist Jamal Khashoggi, who had emigrated to the United States but was later killed inside Saudi Arabia's Istanbul consulate, demonstrates the long arm of wealthy, authoritarian states and the potential risks for those who migrate.[78] Saudi Arabia uses western technology to target dissidents and control the information which other countries receive. The Royal family controls two of the three major pan-Arab daily newspapers: al-Sharq al-awsat and al-Hayat. Although the King has issued a few political reforms over the last few decades to promise tolerance towards domestic debates, the regime eventually closed down these short periods of political freedom and arrested political activists. Immigration from Saudi Arabia to the United States is a relatively recent phenomenon, with 74% of total migrants having arrived since 2010, mainly international students or employees in management, business science or the arts.

[78] Tsourapas, Gerasimos. "A Tightening Grip Abroad: Authoritarian Regimes Target Their Emigrant and Diaspora Communities." *Migrationpolicy.org*, 26 Sept. 2019

With the rise in political persecution, the number of Saudi asylum seekers doubled between 2015 and 2018.[79]

The Future Stability of Saudi Arabia

Grass roots organizations bring social and cultural consequences that will challenge the supremacy of the Saudi royal family and the impunity of the political elite. The Saudi government's anti-corruption commission recently announced a renewed crackdown of the initiative started in 2011. On March 16, 2020, the Anti-corruption commission announced the arrest of 298 government officials on accounts of bribery and embezzlement totaling 379 million riyals, or $101 million USD.[80] Anti-corruption initiatives can strengthen or challenge the country's ruling elite depending on their intentions. Successful anti-corruption initiatives would affect migration patterns as the government loses control over its civilian population and citizens choose to leave.

C. Kenya

Kenya suffers endemic corruption problems because those in power have little incentive to change a status-quo which they benefit from. Corruption deeply infiltrates culture in Kenya, with individuals shifting their loyalties to the ruling regime for personal survival. Migration from Kenya has historically been motivated by opportunities for better education and military training. In the data table, Kenya averaged a CPI score of 23.2 for the years 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015 and 2017. For those years the total emigration was 2,020,307 people and the average 404,061.4 people per year for this timeframe. The net migration rate for 2018 was -0.2 migrants out of 1,000 people in the population.[81] It is highly likely that emigration from Kenya is at least partly the result of weak

[79] Al-Dosari, Hala. "Its Monarchy Has Left Saudi Arabia Fragile and Unbalanced". *The Washington Post*, 2019.
[80] Salman, Mohammad Bin. "Saudi Arabia Detains Hundreds of Government Officials." *Al Jazeera*, 16 Mar. 2020, www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/03/saudi-arabia-detains-hundreds-government-officials-200316073516389.html.
[81] CIA World Factbook, "Net Migration Rate".

political institutions unable to provide basic public services. As former United Nations Secretary-General Annan describes, "Corruption hurts the poor disproportionately by diverting funds intended for development, undermining a government's ability to provide basic services, feeding inequality and injustice", Kenya strongly exemplifies this situation and the governance issues which fuel both corruption and emigration.[82] The failed anti-corruption commission of President Uhuru Kenyatta sowed greater doubt in the government's ability to implement meaningful reform.

Kenya's Corruption Problem

Dafir (2018) argues that the main corruption issues in Kenya are cronyism, ethnic rivalries exploited by political leaders, lack of public authority, centralized power and weak state agencies.[83] Cronyism is the appointment of friends, family and political allies to positions of authority. As a result of the personalized power of the president, institutions are undermined and neglected and the basic needs of citizens are not met, resulting in emigration. In addition, corruption limits public accountability and development projects for the Kenyan public. A 2015 *Afrobarometer* survey showed citizens believe the police, government officials, and lawmakers to be the most corrupt actors.[84] In addition to bribery, police undermine citizen's faith in the criminal process, use illegal force and abuse due process of law. Corruption is a systemic problem in Kenya that undermines formal institutions and corrupts norms of acceptance behavior.

President Uhuru Kenyatta embarked on an anti-corruption campaign, the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC), in 2018 that arrested current and former public officials and cost him supporters. In a 2015 speech addressing corruption, Kenyatta highlighted the role of

[82] Hope, Kempe R. "Kenya's Corruption Problem: Causes and Consequences." *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, vol. 52, no. 4, 2014, pp. 493-512

[83] Abdi Latif Dahir, "High-Profile Prosecutions Alone Won't Solve Kenya's Corruption Problem," *Quartz Africa*, 16 August 2018.

[84] Dahir (2018)

corruption not in the deterioration of institutions but in state security. He stated, "I believe that corruption is a standing threat to our national security. The bribe accepted by an official can lead to successful terrorist attacks that kill Kenyans. It can let a criminal off the hook for them to return to crime and harming Kenyans". His words and actions demonstrate lack of understanding of the institutional effects of corruption and lack of commitment to implementing effective corruption reform. Kenyatta claims he lost many supporters in the process, but corruption issues and high-profile cases of corruption continue to recur without much action in Kenya.

Push Factors of Migration from Kenya

Kenya was a major refugee hosting site for people from Ethiopia, Rwanda and Uganda in the 20th century. In 1988, there were about 12,000 refugees in Kenya, mainly from Uganda, living in the capital city Nairobi.[85] Historically, Kenyans who left the African continent migrated for education and further military training. The stories of working abroad from returnees to Kenya hugely incentivizes domestic members of the population to go abroad. An official of the Kenyan Plantation and Agricultural Workers' Union (KEPAW), states, "Labour migration to the GCC (The Gulf Cooperation Council) is mostly for domestic work. 80% of these are from the coastal region of Mombasa who are largely Moslems. The Moslem religion which has a link with the Gulf culture drives them to move".[86] The push factors to leave Kenya are mainly economic and a consequence of the country's slower development in comparison with its resource-heavy Middle Eastern neighbors. Corruption undermined the development of Kenyan political institutions and is an indirect push factor for migration.

[85] Naerssen, Ton Van et al. *International Migration and National Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: Viewpoints and Policy Initiatives in the Countries of Origin*. Brill, 2008.
[86] Atong, K., E. Mayah and K. Odigie, "*Africa Labour Migration to GCC States: The Case of Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and Uganda*. African Regional Organisation of the International Trade Union Confederation, 2018

In 2002, President Kibaki announced a number of measures aimed at pulling Kenyans who moved abroad for better economic opportunities back to Kenya. The main push factors that cause Kenyans to migrate include low salaries, lack of transport, discrimination in appointments and promotions, political conflicts and social unrest, and poor living conditions. Kibaki created about 50,000 jobs upon coming to power to incentivize the community abroad to come home. The tradeoff between international remittances, which have proven to alleviate poverty in Kenya, and the "brain drain" of skilled labor for careers in health, education and engineering presents a conundrum for Kenya's Ministry of Planning on handling the migration situation.[87] The brain drain increases the government's reliance on foreign technical assistance and widens the gap between the industrialization of Kenya and the developed world. However, the historical self-enrichment of corrupt actors limits the government's ability to invest in sectors such as health and education.

Venezuela, Saudi Arabia and Kenya

The distinct forms of corruption in Venezuela, Saudi Arabia and Kenya manifest themselves in the economic opportunities and political instability of each country. Through worsening these problems, corruption indirectly effects emigration in all three cases. In Venezuela, the consolidation of political power during the Chávez era and the corrupt handling of the oil economy contributed to the collapse of Venezuela's democracy and the resulting migration disaster. In Saudi Arabia, the corrupt actors of a wealthy authoritarian state pay rents to solidify public support and deter people from migrating. Finally, Kenya shows the impact of corruption in the deterioration of government agencies and underdevelopment of sectors such as education and health—prompting people to search for these opportunities elsewhere.

[87] Naerssen (2008), 198

In all three cases, corruption serves as informal institution which undermines the legitimacy and strength of formal government agencies and indirectly effects the push and pull factors for a citizen to migrate. For Venezuela, a democratic government plagued by corrupt actors, natural resources became a curse for the national economy and the government's ability to protect its citizens. In Saudi Arabia, an authoritarian government under the strong hand of a corrupt monarchy, oil is a blessing which allows the government to pay its citizens rent and maintain their support. Kenya, a country where corruption is a major contributor to poor development outcomes, citizens are pushed to search for opportunities elsewhere. Although corruption alone did not determine the migration trends of these three countries, corruption intensified issues of economic opportunity, institutional strength, and citizen satisfaction with clear results for international migration patterns.

Chapter V: Conclusions a/o Policy Implications of these Findings

The corruption-migration nexus has important implications for migration policymakers and communities both locally and globally impacted by migration. In addition to reducing government inefficiencies and strengthening public services, corruption reform can be instrumental for reducing emigration rates. Policies aimed at reducing corruption should be coupled with policies aimed at reducing inequality and strengthening political institutions.

While this paper does not find a statistically significant relationship between Polity IV score or Gross Domestic Product per capita and emigration rates, this may be a result of the mixed effects of regime type on the ability to migrate. Saudi Arabia presents a corrupt authoritarian regime where potential dissidents are punished. In addition, Saudi Arabia shows how a country with the highest GDP per capita in the Middle East is able to limit democratic freedoms. On the

other hand, Venezuela has only recently become more autocratic as it tries to control the current crisis and fend off international criticism. Regime type affects the ability of a person to get up and leave, but also opportunities of the state to influence this decision through influence-peddling or bribery. Institutional corruption in Kenya continues but anti-corruption reform has focused on punishing high-profile individuals, rather than the underlying corruption which weakens government institutions. Without political resolve to address these issues, corruption will continue to undermine Kenya's development and encourage citizens to migrate.

To mitigate corruption, Gupta et. al (2000) recommend "sound management of natural resources; broad-based, labor-intensive growth; efficient spending on education and health; effective targeting of social programs; and a low level of inequality in the access to education".[88] The measures that Gupta et. al present are also possible methods to deter emigration, because both emigration and corruption are dependent on comprehensive investment in social institutions. Further research should explore the relationship between corruption, migration and factors such as education and health.

Venezuela, Saudi Arabia and Kenya have all had high-profile anti-corruption missions, but still suffer from institutional corruption. The key problem is that the administrators in charge of fighting corruption are often the perpetrators themselves. As large-scale and petty corruption continue, it is important to address not just the high-profile cases but also the far-sweeping effects of corruption on all factors of human development, including emigration. Controlling corruption promotes good governance—boosting the welfare of people of all education levels and inspiring people to stay in the country.[89] This study finds a statistically significant relationship between

[88] Gupta et. al (2000), 40
[89] Cooray, Arusha, and Friedrich Schneider. "Does Corruption Promote Emigration? An Empirical Examination." *Journal of Population Economics*, vol. 29, no. 1, 2016, pp. 293-310

corruption and emigration, but further research should expand on these findings to draft comprehensive anti-corruption recommendations to alleviate the current international migration crisis.

Appendix

Regression Analysis Table:

year	country	destination	Total	emigration	corruption	polity	gdp
2000	Angola	WORLD	172604257	870514	17	-3	556.8363180865530
2000	Argentina	WORLD	172604257	554964	35	8	7708.100996054140
2000	Armenia	WORLD	172604257	876924	25	5	622.7421390634980
2000	Australia	WORLD	172604257	383959	83	10	21679.24784241470
2000	Austria	WORLD	172604257	475241	77	10	24564.45829484040
2000	Azerbaijan	WORLD	172604257	1629291	15	-7	655.097432602586
2000	Belarus	WORLD	172604257	1688476	41	-7	1276.2880341000000
2000	Belgium	WORLD	172604257	399911	61	10	23041.534729042800
2000	Botswana	WORLD	172604257	26393	60	8	3522.308678063960
2000	Brazil	WORLD	172604257	969161	39	8	3749.753249961680
2000	Bulgaria	WORLD	172604257	690700	35	8	1609.8824517858100
2000	Burkina Faso	WORLD	172604257	1234174	30	-3	226.47598136698000
2000	Cameroon	WORLD	172604257	161419	20	-4	649.9918454050480
2000	Canada	WORLD	172604257	1146883	92	10	24190.24961500450
2000	Chile	WORLD	172604257	508455	74	9	5074.901623750090
2000	China	WORLD	172604257	5786954	31	-7	959.3724836396910
2000	Colombia	WORLD	172604257	1434868	32	7	2520.480897959020
2000	Costa Rica	WORLD	172604257	105797	54	10	3772.8700115314900
2000	Croatia	WORLD	172604257	874432	37	8	4849.528815988070
2000	Denmark	WORLD	172604257	218614	98	10	30743.547681635400
2000	Ecuador	WORLD	172604257	445764	26	6	1445.279324429010
2000	El Salvador	WORLD	172604257	949091	41	7	2001.538009244670
2000	Estonia	WORLD	172604257	141917	57	9	4075.970638510710

2000	Ethiopia	WORLD	172604257	443926	32	1	124.46080027176200
2000	Finland	WORLD	172604257	316098	100	10	24285.466820516200
2000	France	WORLD	172604257	1527333	67	9	22364.029394340600
2000	Germany	WORLD	172604257	3350817	76	10	23635.929220397700
2000	Ghana	WORLD	172604257	468279	35	2	258.4709594878600
2000	Greece	WORLD	172604257	989021	49	10	12042.953731099500
2000	Hungary	WORLD	172604257	420151	52	10	4624.281656702950
2000	India	WORLD	172604257	7978365	28	9	443.31419339174000
2000	Indonesia	WORLD	172604257	2336494	17	6	780.1902009865790
2000	Ireland	WORLD	172604257	821372	72	10	26241.364614697300
2000	Israel	WORLD	172604257	302477	66	6	21043.57493224330
2000	Italy	WORLD	172604257	3115499	46	10	20087.591985879400
2000	Japan	WORLD	172604257	711513	64	10	38532.04087529350
2000	Jordan	WORLD	172604257	368463	46	-2	1674.8252612565500
2000	Kazakhstan	WORLD	172604257	3554534	30	-4	1229.0009584450100
2000	Kenya	WORLD	172604257	308199	21	-2	397.48265877751900
2000	Latvia	WORLD	172604257	238768	34	8	3351.2307056840100
2000	Lithuania	WORLD	172604257	348739	41	10	3297.354700841070
2000	Luxembourg	WORLD	172604257	32259	86	10	48735.99549218700
2000	Malawi	WORLD	172604257	184770	41	6	156.38571859991200
2000	Malaysia	WORLD	172604257	1203501	48	3	4043.6620514339100
2000	Mauritius	WORLD	172604257	115984	47	10	3929.075495033640
2000	Mexico	WORLD	172604257	9562278	33	8	7157.8144998573400
2000	Morocco	WORLD	172604257	1948424	47	-6	1334.94305104384
2000	Mozambique	WORLD	172604257	636775	22	5	313.56803414109700
2000	Namibia	WORLD	172604257	48723	54	6	2136.440242814890

2000	Netherlands	WORLD	172604257	756841	89	10	26149.411078290000
2000	New Zealand	WORLD	172604257	489759	94	10	13641.102718382200
2000	Nigeria	WORLD	172604257	599702	12	4	567.9307360095650
2000	Norway	WORLD	172604257	164229	91	10	38131.460611624200
2000	Philippines	WORLD	172604257	3065883	28	8	1038.9085398836200
2000	Poland	WORLD	172604257	2068437	41	9	4492.727603559380
2000	Portugal	WORLD	172604257	2004030	64	10	11497.753460452500
2000	Romania	WORLD	172604257	1139120	29	8	1659.9076395454800
2000	Senegal	WORLD	172604257	388250	35	8	604.6540660132110
2000	Singapore	WORLD	172604257	186440	91	-2	23852.327028597500
2000	Slovenia	WORLD	172604257	118891	55	10	10201.303536672700
2000	South Africa	WORLD	172604257	512309	50	9	3032.4271382046200
2000	Spain	WORLD	172604257	1298747	70	10	14713.065711151900
2000	Sweden	WORLD	172604257	258321	94	10	29456.068642048800
2000	Switzerland	WORLD	172604257	368350	86	10	37868.29600061200
2000	Thailand	WORLD	172604257	530891	32	9	2007.7363631179900
2000	Tunisia	WORLD	172604257	480276	52	-3	2211.826817285470
2000	Turkey	WORLD	172604257	2814023	38	7	4316.548907704770
2000	Uganda	WORLD	172604257	552835	23	-4	261.86899770102600
2000	Ukraine	WORLD	172604257	5596463	15	6	635.708963537223
2000	United Kingdom	WORLD	172604257	3866884	87	10	28149.87001078910
2000	Uzbekistan	WORLD	172604257	1599584	24	-9	558.2268023770000
2000	Zambia	WORLD	172604257	160252	34	1	345.6895543728490
2000	Zimbabwe	WORLD	172604257	310753	30	-3	563.0577410535740
2005	Albania	WORLD	190531600	965066	24	9	2673.787282531130
2005	Algeria	WORLD	190531600	1588723	28	2	3113.101094328140

2005	Angola	WORLD	190531600	680405	20	-2	1902.4223455462500
2005	Argentina	WORLD	190531600	813610	28	8	5109.851325226210
2005	Armenia	WORLD	190531600	899820	29	5	1643.7530293611000
2005	Australia	WORLD	190531600	428411	88	10	33999.242857583500
2005	Austria	WORLD	190531600	493066	87	10	38403.13387707150
2005	Azerbaijan	WORLD	190531600	1447059	22	-7	1578.4023902960300
2005	Bahrain	WORLD	190531600	52484	58	-7	17959.25544022850
2005	Bangladesh	WORLD	190531600	5765158	17	6	499.46194023915600
2005	Belarus	WORLD	190531600	1584067	26	-7	3125.8105350285300
2005	Belgium	WORLD	190531600	438642	74	10	36795.97688196390
2005	Benin	WORLD	190531600	490875	29	6	601.7999769588750
2005	Botswana	WORLD	190531600	30883	59	8	5520.124719725030
2005	Brazil	WORLD	190531600	1218233	37	8	4790.43708777366
2005	Bulgaria	WORLD	190531600	909442	40	9	3869.52945510511
2005	Burkina Faso	WORLD	190531600	1312349	34	0	406.9988070606230
2005	Burundi	WORLD	190531600	616738	23	6	151.68146336648500
2005	Cambodia	WORLD	190531600	672542	23	2	474.1112277900990
2005	Cameroon	WORLD	190531600	217615	22	-4	1011.8800727829600
2005	Canada	WORLD	190531600	1187046	84	10	36266.187123585300
2005	Chad	WORLD	190531600	210019	17	-2	658.3049578275850
2005	Chile	WORLD	190531600	539059	73	9	7598.525121088890
2005	China	WORLD	190531600	7242306	32	-7	1753.417829258230
2005	Colombia	WORLD	190531600	1880422	40	7	3404.1901897473600
2005	Costa Rica	WORLD	190531600	118544	42	10	4654.824822009800
2005	Croatia	WORLD	190531600	834830	34	9	10530.216009766000
2005	Cuba	WORLD	190531600	1160652	38	-7	3786.664795407960

2005	Cyprus	WORLD	190531600	153938	57	10	24959.2659053822
2005	Denmark	WORLD	190531600	225878	95	10	48799.825601127500
2005	Dominican Republic	WORLD	190531600	1023893	30	8	3970.322840409960
2005	Ecuador	WORLD	190531600	988017	25	6	3002.13686727475
2005	El Salvador	WORLD	190531600	1118900	42	7	2428.569511888640
2005	Equatorial Guinea	WORLD	190531600	67673	19	-6	10963.289362941300
2005	Eritrea	WORLD	190531600	289183	26	-7	388.5951226310480
2005	Estonia	WORLD	190531600	150507	64	9	10406.39687591760
2005	Ethiopia	WORLD	190531600	521088	22	-3	162.43272650035200
2005	Finland	WORLD	190531600	302910	96	10	39040.28888250520
2005	France	WORLD	190531600	1694057	75	9	34760.18776638660
2005	Gabon	WORLD	190531600	41038	29	-4	6888.627147270310
2005	Georgia	WORLD	190531600	885995	23	7	1642.760937563950
2005	Germany	WORLD	190531600	3585342	82	10	34507.36881423320
2005	Ghana	WORLD	190531600	616174	35	8	491.94637788410100
2005	Greece	WORLD	190531600	874489	43	10	22551.735744099000
2005	Guatemala	WORLD	190531600	736531	25	8	2077.83437141218
2005	Guyana	WORLD	190531600	393675	25	6	1105.4964536488200
2005	Honduras	WORLD	190531600	449102	26	7	1296.6959592220600
2005	Hungary	WORLD	190531600	466444	50	10	11200.576949626400
2005	India	WORLD	190531600	9649626	29	9	714.861013495661
2005	Indonesia	WORLD	190531600	2714351	22	8	1263.2873205457500
2005	Ireland	WORLD	190531600	771110	74	10	50878.22361163640
2005	Israel	WORLD	190531600	317081	63	6	20566.645489864200
2005	Italy	WORLD	190531600	2739747	50	10	32043.140368411900

2005	Jamaica	WORLD	190531600	906599	36	9	4089.1984424834600
2005	Japan	WORLD	190531600	720120	73	10	37217.64872791700
2005	Jordan	WORLD	190531600	433828	57	-2	2214.0178172519600
2005	Kazakhstan	WORLD	190531600	3718926	26	-6	3771.2789573384500
2005	Kenya	WORLD	190531600	344121	21	8	511.61642223943
2005	Kuwait	WORLD	190531600	126263	47	-7	35591.005778785100
2005	Latvia	WORLD	190531600	271278	42	8	7552.873894203350
2005	Lebanon	WORLD	190531600	612261	31	6	4573.536073132860
2005	Lesotho	WORLD	190531600	144122	34	8	842.8130531880040
2005	Libya	WORLD	190531600	98964	25	-7	8163.0107778197300
2005	Lithuania	WORLD	190531600	412811	48	10	7863.16200865166
2005	Luxembourg	WORLD	190531600	45397	85	10	80289.69640995400
2005	Madagascar	WORLD	190531600	147749	28	7	274.8197022992590
2005	Malawi	WORLD	190531600	224606	28	6	289.55516892051400
2005	Malaysia	WORLD	190531600	1380159	51	3	5587.025649623390
2005	Mali	WORLD	190531600	792284	29	7	488.82813735805900
2005	Mauritius	WORLD	190531600	127711	42	10	5282.90602155635
2005	Mexico	WORLD	190531600	10816544	35	8	8277.671251496040
2005	Mongolia	WORLD	190531600	42328	30	10	998.8313648108280
2005	Morocco	WORLD	190531600	2376184	32	-6	2018.02574307829
2005	Mozambique	WORLD	190531600	559674	28	5	415.34829102805100
2005	Namibia	WORLD	190531600	59385	43	6	3674.002200696680
2005	Nepal	WORLD	190531600	1125756	25	-6	315.80562999736100
2005	Netherlands	WORLD	190531600	801661	86	10	41979.05584578810
2005	New Zealand	WORLD	190531600	555519	96	10	27751.06547088590
2005	Nicaragua	WORLD	190531600	436584	26	8	1162.290112549590

2005	Niger	WORLD	190531600	285366	24	6	249.9279297935470
2005	Nigeria	WORLD	190531600	782992	19	4	1268.3834433169300
2005	Norway	WORLD	190531600	174988	89	10	66810.478520868
2005	Oman	WORLD	190531600	18058	63	-8	12377.06807379
2005	Pakistan	WORLD	190531600	3896494	21	-5	683.0902350918340
2005	Panama	WORLD	190531600	131870	35	9	4916.914993827730
2005	Papua New Guinea	WORLD	190531600	4400	23	4	749.1863962057560
2005	Paraguay	WORLD	190531600	544868	21	8	1843.6337910831700
2005	Peru	WORLD	190531600	986198	35	9	2729.498682383450
2005	Philippines	WORLD	190531600	3700591	25	8	1193.9772911017000
2005	Poland	WORLD	190531600	2907295	34	10	8021.003655337260
2005	Portugal	WORLD	190531600	1750702	65	10	18773.125361635400
2005	Qatar	WORLD	190531600	17760	59	-10	51455.59419457750
2005	Romania	WORLD	190531600	2106961	30	9	4617.929016432580
2005	Rwanda	WORLD	190531600	287089	31	-3	291.99668624408300
2005	Saudi Arabia	WORLD	190531600	177109	34	-10	13791.446293644600
2005	Senegal	WORLD	190531600	462698	32	8	993.9320410956390
2005	Sierra Leone	WORLD	190531600	147341	24	5	292.3493252470850
2005	Singapore	WORLD	190531600	226922	94	-2	29961.263277456900
2005	Slovenia	WORLD	190531600	119913	61	10	18098.908730500000
2005	South Africa	WORLD	190531600	618026	45	9	5383.656542509840
2005	Spain	WORLD	190531600	1121066	70	10	26419.29686382210
2005	Sri Lanka	WORLD	190531600	1136550	32	5	1248.6981851703400
2005	Sudan	WORLD	190531600	1175018	21	-4	689.209556966579
2005	Suriname	WORLD	190531600	252127	32	5	3590.626616315180
2005	Sweden	WORLD	190531600	270492	92	10	43163.99995898330

2005	Switzerland	WORLD	190531600	501091	91	10	54952.67548907510
2005	Tajikistan	WORLD	190531600	544945	21	-3	340.58303273889900
2005	Thailand	WORLD	190531600	631993	38	9	2894.0618958099700
2005	Trinidad and Tobago	WORLD	190531600	323024	38	10	12327.233172319500
2005	Tunisia	WORLD	190531600	572919	49	-4	3193.206569493730
2005	Turkey	WORLD	190531600	2693172	35	7	7384.251628383230
2005	Turkmenistan	WORLD	190531600	229241	18	-9	1704.4175310570400
2005	Uganda	WORLD	190531600	557486	25	-1	325.59037361089100
2005	Ukraine	WORLD	190531600	5567494	26	6	1826.93220561452
2005	United Kingdom	WORLD	190531600	4140641	86	10	42030.28661381360
2005	Uruguay	WORLD	190531600	297320	59	10	5226.93780602568
2005	Uzbekistan	WORLD	190531600	1752804	22	-9	546.7768501855520
2005	Zambia	WORLD	190531600	178057	26	5	702.7409406323750
2005	Zimbabwe	WORLD	190531600	478835	26	-4	476.555323602915
2010	Albania	WORLD	220019266	1129071	33	9	4094.362119244750
2010	Algeria	WORLD	220019266	1630181	29	2	4480.724539001130
2010	Angola	WORLD	220019266	624284	19	-2	3587.883798243960
2010	Argentina	WORLD	220019266	943685	29	8	10385.964431955500
2010	Armenia	WORLD	220019266	921753	26	5	3218.3727066056300
2010	Australia	WORLD	220019266	484511	87	10	52022.12559618760
2010	Austria	WORLD	220019266	515071	79	10	46858.043273371700
2010	Azerbaijan	WORLD	220019266	1177772	24	-7	5842.805783585760
2010	Bahrain	WORLD	220019266	53756	49	-5	20722.137289134800
2010	Bangladesh	WORLD	220019266	6742845	24	5	781.1535935570470
2010	Belarus	WORLD	220019266	1469332	25	-7	6181.399915687530

2010	Belgium	WORLD	220019266	491812	71	8	44141.87814157340
2010	Benin	WORLD	220019266	528120	28	7	758.4350828899890
2010	Bhutan	WORLD	220019266	86162	57	3	2258.18314084562
2010	Botswana	WORLD	220019266	47041	58	8	6434.815656884650
2010	Brazil	WORLD	220019266	1531491	37	8	11286.243016245700
2010	Bulgaria	WORLD	220019266	1127247	36	9	6843.266949758850
2010	Burkina Faso	WORLD	220019266	1387884	31	0	575.4464526877340
2010	Burundi	WORLD	220019266	281111	18	6	234.23564687499900
2010	Cambodia	WORLD	220019266	952002	21	2	785.5022828741130
2010	Cameroon	WORLD	220019266	278383	22	-4	1285.2617256558800
2010	Canada	WORLD	220019266	1268970	89	10	47450.31847007030
2010	Central African Republic	WORLD	220019266	238620	21	-1	487.94538328961400
2010	Chad	WORLD	220019266	198851	17	-2	891.6988173911140
2010	Chile	WORLD	220019266	565682	72	10	12808.034586422000
2010	China	WORLD	220019266	8648885	35	-7	4550.453595838570
2010	Colombia	WORLD	220019266	2518915	35	7	6326.549468619630
2010	Comoros	WORLD	220019266	108558	21	9	1315.2148064839400
2010	Costa Rica	WORLD	220019266	136721	53	10	8141.91312675461
2010	Croatia	WORLD	220019266	861928	41	9	13923.637052447800
2010	Cuba	WORLD	220019266	1310867	37	-7	5730.354774594880
2010	Cyprus	WORLD	220019266	163040	63	10	30818.4799259532
2010	Denmark	WORLD	220019266	237154	93	10	58041.39843633850
2010	Djibouti	WORLD	220019266	13531	32	2	1343.268729944370
2010	Dominican Republic	WORLD	220019266	1187731	30	8	5555.390949002380
2010	Ecuador	WORLD	220019266	1153899	25	5	4633.590358399050

2010	El Salvador	WORLD	220019266	1337703	36	8	2983.2427078490400
2010	Equatorial Guinea	WORLD	220019266	78268	19	-6	17272.009770681900
2010	Eritrea	WORLD	220019266	278086	26	-7	667.744177753249
2010	Estonia	WORLD	220019266	161840	65	9	14784.381080694900
2010	Ethiopia	WORLD	220019266	623562	27	-3	341.5541149051790
2010	Finland	WORLD	220019266	294562	92	10	46459.97325485430
2010	France	WORLD	220019266	1951895	68	9	40638.33400426000
2010	Gabon	WORLD	220019266	59450	28	3	8840.73066379785
2010	Georgia	WORLD	220019266	810934	38	6	3233.2959434742100
2010	Germany	WORLD	220019266	3850095	79	10	41531.93419786890
2010	Ghana	WORLD	220019266	716044	41	8	1298.436951592150
2010	Greece	WORLD	220019266	797195	35	10	26917.75897872540
2010	Guatemala	WORLD	220019266	924525	32	8	2825.4839634969200
2010	Guinea	WORLD	220019266	401766	20	1	672.4244025624430
2010	Guyana	WORLD	220019266	438888	27	6	3033.247724905360
2010	Honduras	WORLD	220019266	587662	24	7	1904.3464649688100
2010	Hungary	WORLD	220019266	527760	47	10	13113.525961727700
2010	India	WORLD	220019266	13321332	33	9	1357.5637191326200
2010	Indonesia	WORLD	220019266	3486506	28	8	3122.3628152164900
2010	Iraq	WORLD	220019266	2639101	15	3	4657.280425805360
2010	Ireland	WORLD	220019266	780843	80	10	48715.176855393300
2010	Israel	WORLD	220019266	334209	61	6	30693.593078687100
2010	Italy	WORLD	220019266	2612413	39	10	36000.520117925400
2010	Jamaica	WORLD	220019266	999819	33	9	4704.054454681660
2010	Japan	WORLD	220019266	757067	78	10	44507.676385917200
2010	Jordan	WORLD	220019266	597512	47	-3	3690.1132677867200

2010	Kazakhstan	WORLD	220019266	3811293	29	-6	9070.488252857470
2010	Kenya	WORLD	220019266	407446	21	8	951.6879611168790
2010	Kuwait	WORLD	220019266	181048	45	-7	38577.38165720310
2010	Latvia	WORLD	220019266	306309	43	8	11344.693369583700
2010	Lebanon	WORLD	220019266	703015	25	6	7756.744068768120
2010	Lesotho	WORLD	220019266	243782	35	8	1199.9517661177500
2010	Liberia	WORLD	220019266	264173	33	6	513.4456986202240
2010	Libya	WORLD	220019266	127168	22	-7	12064.780692421800
2010	Lithuania	WORLD	220019266	483907	50	10	11953.938441689100
2010	Luxembourg	WORLD	220019266	54335	85	10	104965.30607826700
2010	Madagascar	WORLD	220019266	157849	26	0	471.9592115844510
2010	Malawi	WORLD	220019266	275237	34	6	478.66858970452500
2010	Malaysia	WORLD	220019266	1606627	44	6	9040.566251171720
2010	Mali	WORLD	220019266	851520	27	7	709.5819645847710
2010	Mauritania	WORLD	220019266	113363	23	-2	1241.4287562161800
2010	Mauritius	WORLD	220019266	153279	54	10	8000.376431821540
2010	Mexico	WORLD	220019266	12413085	31	8	9271.39823324639
2010	Mongolia	WORLD	220019266	58362	27	10	2643.2929141676300
2010	Montenegro	WORLD	220019266	131352	37	9	6682.281157745750
2010	Morocco	WORLD	220019266	2766342	34	-6	2839.92516805933
2010	Mozambique	WORLD	220019266	587849	27	5	471.18169264589300
2010	Namibia	WORLD	220019266	99897	44	6	5324.617039539600
2010	Nepal	WORLD	220019266	1374835	22	6	592.4010974509290
2010	Netherlands	WORLD	220019266	888708	88	10	50950.034343518100
2010	New Zealand	WORLD	220019266	663434	93	10	33692.010834654300
2010	Nicaragua	WORLD	220019266	610957	25	9	1503.870423231360

2010	Niger	WORLD	220019266	311263	26	3	347.3430406546040
2010	Nigeria	WORLD	220019266	985865	24	4	2292.4451561908200
2010	Norway	WORLD	220019266	183332	86	10	87693.79006580990
2010	Oman	WORLD	220019266	20623	53	-8	19281.165633650200
2010	Pakistan	WORLD	220019266	5006753	23	6	987.4097230439230
2010	Panama	WORLD	220019266	139835	36	9	8082.02845866252
2010	Papua New Guinea	WORLD	220019266	4193	21	4	1949.352517069970
2010	Paraguay	WORLD	220019266	764182	22	8	4355.934938677350
2010	Peru	WORLD	220019266	1329786	35	9	5082.354756663510
2010	Philippines	WORLD	220019266	4704919	24	8	2124.05676974627
2010	Poland	WORLD	220019266	3855177	53	10	12599.533581870700
2010	Portugal	WORLD	220019266	1942186	60	10	22498.690858655700
2010	Qatar	WORLD	220019266	22327	77	-10	67403.1602978106
2010	Romania	WORLD	220019266	3274229	37	9	8209.919456216900
2010	Rwanda	WORLD	220019266	329189	40	-4	582.6941191272610
2010	Saudi Arabia	WORLD	220019266	213553	47	-10	19262.547681175700
2010	Senegal	WORLD	220019266	537339	29	7	1278.97775413162
2010	Serbia	WORLD	220019266	846196	35	8	5735.422856598490
2010	Sierra Leone	WORLD	220019266	135569	24	7	401.8350013668370
2010	Singapore	WORLD	220019266	281938	93	-2	47236.96023454210
2010	Slovenia	WORLD	220019266	124470	64	10	23509.543394149300
2010	Solomon Islands	WORLD	220019266	3351	28	8	1290.3987858591300
2010	South Africa	WORLD	220019266	740273	45	9	7328.615628939660
2010	Spain	WORLD	220019266	1099465	61	10	30502.71970807760
2010	Sri Lanka	WORLD	220019266	1432671	32	3	2799.6488761997200

2010	Sudan	WORLD	220019266	1197225	16	-2	1489.87691083872
2010	Sweden	WORLD	220019266	300113	92	10	52817.44136579400
2010	Switzerland	WORLD	220019266	626318	87	10	74605.77450914540
2010	Tajikistan	WORLD	220019266	581539	21	-3	749.5527110158420
2010	Thailand	WORLD	220019266	766543	35	4	5076.342992450770
2010	Togo	WORLD	220019266	383473	24	-2	533.5087919772330
2010	Trinidad and Tobago	WORLD	220019266	351329	36	10	16683.355378737600
2010	Tunisia	WORLD	220019266	599051	43	-4	4141.976353364600
2010	Turkey	WORLD	220019266	2695109	44	7	10672.389245216200
2010	Turkmenistan	WORLD	220019266	237009	16	-9	4439.20038235805
2010	Uganda	WORLD	220019266	702606	25	-1	622.4988457449840
2010	Ukraine	WORLD	220019266	5458664	24	6	2965.14236549771
2010	United Kingdom	WORLD	220019266	4461711	76	10	39435.83990185050
2010	Uruguay	WORLD	220019266	335034	69	10	11992.016626633500
2010	Uzbekistan	WORLD	220019266	1900634	16	-9	1634.31209539718
2010	Zambia	WORLD	220019266	213589	30	7	1489.4590698902700
2010	Zimbabwe	WORLD	220019266	813942	24	1	948.3318544592600
2015	Afghanistan	WORLD	247585744	4855376	11	-1	578.4663529417080
2015	Albania	WORLD	247585744	1137917	36	9	3952.8294583257800
2015	Algeria	WORLD	247585744	1785555	36	2	4177.8675171591300
2015	Angola	WORLD	247585744	611320	15	-2	4166.979683865010
2015	Argentina	WORLD	247585744	952965	32	9	13789.060424772000
2015	Armenia	WORLD	247585744	946246	35	5	3607.2966967227100
2015	Australia	WORLD	247585744	520982	79	10	56755.7217124249
2015	Austria	WORLD	247585744	532718	76	10	44178.047377743200

2015	Azerbaijan	WORLD	247585744	1145889	29	-7	5500.32049702735
2015	Bahrain	WORLD	247585744	56304	51	-10	22688.96378657340
2015	Bangladesh	WORLD	247585744	7246726	25	1	1248.4533977837100
2015	Belarus	WORLD	247585744	1473782	32	-7	5949.10630699748
2015	Belgium	WORLD	247585744	541558	77	8	40991.80813814320
2015	Benin	WORLD	247585744	608559	37	7	784.2784071827900
2015	Bhutan	WORLD	247585744	44041	65	5	2752.6642079576900
2015	Botswana	WORLD	247585744	76030	63	8	6799.875233527680
2015	Brazil	WORLD	247585744	1557293	38	8	8814.000986812610
2015	Bulgaria	WORLD	247585744	1166722	41	9	6993.7834826738700
2015	Burkina Faso	WORLD	247585744	1451286	38	6	575.3144541763110
2015	Burundi	WORLD	247585744	378702	21	-1	305.54977279744100
2015	Cambodia	WORLD	247585744	1034848	21	2	1162.9049199715100
2015	Cameroon	WORLD	247585744	325831	27	-4	1326.9692771802900
2015	Canada	WORLD	247585744	1313217	83	10	43495.05438699030
2015	Chad	WORLD	247585744	226437	22	-2	775.7075235147540
2015	Chile	WORLD	247585744	611004	70	10	13574.171830715600
2015	China	WORLD	247585744	9675209	37	-7	8033.3880431067900
2015	Colombia	WORLD	247585744	2671696	37	7	6175.876029702590
2015	Comoros	WORLD	247585744	115633	26	9	1242.1028847033100
2015	Costa Rica	WORLD	247585744	138822	55	10	11299.135542301100
2015	Croatia	WORLD	247585744	872057	51	9	11782.902548642800
2015	Cuba	WORLD	247585744	1511294	47	-7	7694.011919524100
2015	Cyprus	WORLD	247585744	155969	61	10	23217.4841507892
2015	Denmark	WORLD	247585744	250570	91	10	53254.85600396310
2015	Djibouti	WORLD	247585744	15518	34	3	2675.6053744962900

2015	Dominican Republic	WORLD	247585744	1402779	33	8	6921.517370752060
2015	Ecuador	WORLD	247585744	1105180	32	5	6124.491642620720
2015	El Salvador	WORLD	247585744	1509676	39	8	3705.54000206162
2015	Eritrea	WORLD	247585744	546158	18	-7	NA
2015	Estonia	WORLD	247585744	190954	70	9	17522.23018625200
2015	Ethiopia	WORLD	247585744	753241	33	-3	640.5418913136820
2015	Finland	WORLD	247585744	289031	90	10	42811.21299364350
2015	France	WORLD	247585744	2123574	70	9	36613.37521596130
2015	Gabon	WORLD	247585744	64922	34	3	7381.74674851952
2015	Georgia	WORLD	247585744	833305	52	7	4014.1859441932900
2015	Germany	WORLD	247585744	4032652	81	10	41139.544568553300
2015	Ghana	WORLD	247585744	826994	47	8	1766.005700997760
2015	Greece	WORLD	247585744	862150	46	10	18167.773716916200
2015	Guatemala	WORLD	247585744	1080720	28	8	3923.5733436471300
2015	Guinea	WORLD	247585744	417446	25	4	769.2560137460160
2015	Guyana	WORLD	247585744	472751	29	7	4166.128515598840
2015	Honduras	WORLD	247585744	700074	31	7	2302.2013793620400
2015	Hungary	WORLD	247585744	587121	51	10	12651.56834230040
2015	India	WORLD	247585744	15860056	38	9	1605.6054310902600
2015	Indonesia	WORLD	247585744	3974873	36	9	3331.6951275862800
2015	Iraq	WORLD	247585744	1668072	16	6	4989.803074730710
2015	Ireland	WORLD	247585744	766140	75	10	61995.422778992800
2015	Israel	WORLD	247585744	338246	61	6	35776.7951710172
2015	Italy	WORLD	247585744	2872034	44	10	30230.2263021296
2015	Jamaica	WORLD	247585744	1072825	41	9	4907.503719743160
2015	Japan	WORLD	247585744	801380	75	10	34524.46986093370

2015	Jordan	WORLD	247585744	698934	53	-3	4105.448960832380
2015	Kazakhstan	WORLD	247585744	3905768	28	-6	10510.771888414800
2015	Kenya	WORLD	247585744	459337	25	9	1336.8833490475000
2015	Kuwait	WORLD	247585744	197827	49	-7	29869.529390824800
2015	Latvia	WORLD	247585744	358622	56	8	13698.937947647600
2015	Lebanon	WORLD	247585744	773357	28	6	7649.832610862400
2015	Lesotho	WORLD	247585744	309073	44	8	1112.0814405471100
2015	Liberia	WORLD	247585744	252954	37	6	710.3838577175150
2015	Lithuania	WORLD	247585744	568406	59	10	14249.114966602600
2015	Luxembourg	WORLD	247585744	57800	85	10	101376.4965743390
2015	Madagascar	WORLD	247585744	171353	28	6	467.23527737358200
2015	Malawi	WORLD	247585744	331968	31	6	380.5970331409380
2015	Malaysia	WORLD	247585744	1795712	50	5	9955.242126536110
2015	Mali	WORLD	247585744	1057333	35	5	751.1705935170890
2015	Mauritania	WORLD	247585744	118570	31	-2	1193.4005959248600
2015	Mauritius	WORLD	247585744	161947	53	10	9260.447302506350
2015	Mexico	WORLD	247585744	12546537	31	8	9605.952351031390
2015	Mongolia	WORLD	247585744	66274	39	10	3918.579173895540
2015	Montenegro	WORLD	247585744	135539	44	9	6514.27269528653
2015	Morocco	WORLD	247585744	2852573	36	-4	2875.25798516781
2015	Mozambique	WORLD	247585744	636107	31	5	589.8590281498310
2015	Namibia	WORLD	247585744	180167	53	6	5032.889762281940
2015	Nepal	WORLD	247585744	1668329	27	6	792.5528905933810
2015	Netherlands	WORLD	247585744	962443	84	10	45175.23189337980
2015	New Zealand	WORLD	247585744	796553	91	10	38559.54703803650
2015	Nicaragua	WORLD	247585744	645309	27	9	2049.849689761490

2015	Niger	WORLD	247585744	353698	34	6	360.85338407094700
2015	Nigeria	WORLD	247585744	1180589	26	7	2730.4303237015000
2015	Norway	WORLD	247585744	188979	88	10	74355.51585756430
2015	Oman	WORLD	247585744	20359	45	-8	16150.88725759680
2015	Pakistan	WORLD	247585744	5922305	30	7	1356.6677558264900
2015	Panama	WORLD	247585744	144881	39	9	13630.307973794500
2015	Papua New Guinea	WORLD	247585744	4284	25	5	2679.345588911490
2015	Paraguay	WORLD	247585744	843512	27	9	5406.703857083380
2015	Peru	WORLD	247585744	1430187	36	9	6229.101696125960
2015	Philippines	WORLD	247585744	5423323	35	8	2867.151990221280
2015	Poland	WORLD	247585744	4258157	63	10	12572.3078809992
2015	Portugal	WORLD	247585744	2209237	64	10	19242.36647109810
2015	Qatar	WORLD	247585744	23506	71	-10	63039.01655480750
2015	Romania	WORLD	247585744	3412055	46	9	8977.498544251370
2015	Rwanda	WORLD	247585744	513648	54	-3	728.0818793889810
2015	Saudi Arabia	WORLD	247585744	269645	52	-10	20627.932782067500
2015	Senegal	WORLD	247585744	544791	44	7	1218.7642464081200
2015	Serbia	WORLD	247585744	931921	40	8	5585.117937784460
2015	Sierra Leone	WORLD	247585744	150017	29	7	588.2284527028490
2015	Singapore	WORLD	247585744	315717	85	-2	55646.618746950500
2015	Slovenia	WORLD	247585744	134338	60	10	20881.766768694700
2015	Somalia	WORLD	247585744	1924902	8	5	293.45523569695200
2015	South Africa	WORLD	247585744	862951	44	9	5734.633629153310
2015	Spain	WORLD	247585744	1289225	58	10	25732.018364745400
2015	Sri Lanka	WORLD	247585744	1625614	37	6	3843.780671844420
2015	Suriname	WORLD	247585744	278250	36	5	8561.974178551420

2015	Sweden	WORLD	247585744	328141	89	10	51397.1917561446
2015	Switzerland	WORLD	247585744	648999	86	10	82081.60920554180
2015	Tajikistan	WORLD	247585744	583704	26	-3	929.0958572237460
2015	Thailand	WORLD	247585744	861576	38	-3	5840.046947875930
2015	Togo	WORLD	247585744	438492	32	-2	570.6807370756190
2015	Trinidad and Tobago	WORLD	247585744	360896	39	10	18289.704340369000
2015	Tunisia	WORLD	247585744	752714	38	7	3861.688531134970
2015	Turkey	WORLD	247585744	3100282	42	3	10948.72460682360
2015	Turkmenistan	WORLD	247585744	241393	18	-8	6432.680701950190
2015	Uganda	WORLD	247585744	732235	25	-1	709.0210385891610
2015	Ukraine	WORLD	247585744	5842594	27	4	2124.66266591114
2015	United Kingdom	WORLD	247585744	4726208	81	10	44966.10192526650
2015	Uruguay	WORLD	247585744	348569	74	10	15613.764272656600
2015	Uzbekistan	WORLD	247585744	1973283	19	-9	2615.0251344870000
2015	Zambia	WORLD	247585744	263912	38	7	1337.79631513515
2015	Zimbabwe	WORLD	247585744	966782	21	4	1445.071061987980
2017	Afghanistan	WORLD	257715425	4826464	15	-1	556.3021385085080
2017	Albania	WORLD	257715425	1148144	38	9	4532.890162121240
2017	Algeria	WORLD	257715425	1792712	33	2	4044.2983722652300
2017	Angola	WORLD	257715425	632699	19	-2	4095.8129415585700
2017	Argentina	WORLD	257715425	977209	39	9	14591.863381054100
2017	Armenia	WORLD	257715425	951023	35	5	3914.501268412800
2017	Australia	WORLD	257715425	541616	77	10	54066.4712686117
2017	Austria	WORLD	257715425	586161	75	10	47431.630607607
2017	Azerbaijan	WORLD	257715425	1155381	31	-7	4147.089715691710

2017	Bahrain	WORLD	257715425	57749	36	-10	23715.482747315600
2017	Bangladesh	WORLD	257715425	7499919	28	1	1563.9940817866300
2017	Belarus	WORLD	257715425	1484875	44	-7	5761.747120230070
2017	Belgium	WORLD	257715425	562626	75	8	44219.561996011700
2017	Benin	WORLD	257715425	627997	39	7	829.4788027833150
2017	Bhutan	WORLD	257715425	43970	67	5	3286.574703783180
2017	Botswana	WORLD	257715425	80103	61	8	7893.210107711160
2017	Brazil	WORLD	257715425	1612860	37	8	9880.946543263240
2017	Bulgaria	WORLD	257715425	1291630	43	9	8228.011569726500
2017	Burkina Faso	WORLD	257715425	1472712	42	6	642.4298386501480
2017	Burundi	WORLD	257715425	435630	22	-1	292.99763068441500
2017	Cambodia	WORLD	257715425	1064840	21	-4	1385.4583625439600
2017	Cameroon	WORLD	257715425	333316	25	-4	1421.587492436880
2017	Canada	WORLD	257715425	1359585	82	10	45069.92725443240
2017	Central African Republic	WORLD	257715425	724669	23	6	449.7864235104240
2017	Chad	WORLD	257715425	246960	20	-2	664.303315726258
2017	Chile	WORLD	257715425	631832	67	10	15037.350280538500
2017	China	WORLD	257715425	9962058	41	-7	8759.041577750980
2017	Colombia	WORLD	257715425	2736230	37	7	6375.9320628531100
2017	Comoros	WORLD	257715425	116574	27	9	1320.5418666796100
2017	Costa Rica	WORLD	257715425	143465	59	10	11752.543401077100
2017	Croatia	WORLD	257715425	916824	49	9	13412.341950542600
2017	Cuba	WORLD	257715425	1558312	47	-7	8541.210673466410
2017	Cyprus	WORLD	257715425	163734	57	10	25760.7627043417
2017	Denmark	WORLD	257715425	262255	88	10	57141.05983504130
2017	Djibouti	WORLD	257715425	15823	31	3	2930.703171653420

2017	Dominican Republic	WORLD	257715425	1443030	29	7	7609.345491508640
2017	Ecuador	WORLD	257715425	1131427	32	5	6213.501276499210
2017	El Salvador	WORLD	257715425	1559924	33	8	3902.242317851790
2017	Equatorial Guinea	WORLD	257715425	95714	17	-6	9738.434224169260
2017	Eritrea	WORLD	257715425	607917	20	-7	NA
2017	Estonia	WORLD	257715425	199422	71	9	20337.849728944200
2017	Ethiopia	WORLD	257715425	800879	35	-3	768.4250255315320
2017	Finland	WORLD	257715425	294631	85	10	46191.93115576810
2017	France	WORLD	257715425	2207213	70	9	38679.127148241900
2017	Gabon	WORLD	257715425	66898	32	3	7212.535744306760
2017	Georgia	WORLD	257715425	838082	56	7	4357.011624530360
2017	Germany	WORLD	257715425	4208083	81	10	44240.044109960400
2017	Ghana	WORLD	257715425	857603	40	8	2025.8858571313300
2017	Greece	WORLD	257715425	933115	48	10	18883.460066928200
2017	Guatemala	WORLD	257715425	1117355	28	8	4470.60999392312
2017	Guinea	WORLD	257715425	426010	27	4	855.573639877367
2017	Guyana	WORLD	257715425	488324	38	7	4586.054571713120
2017	Haiti	WORLD	257715425	1281394	22	5	765.7272943242750
2017	Honduras	WORLD	257715425	722430	29	5	2449.964691081510
2017	Hungary	WORLD	257715425	636782	45	10	14457.608763614000
2017	India	WORLD	257715425	16587720	40	9	1981.2687060956100
2017	Indonesia	WORLD	257715425	4233973	37	9	3836.9138138927100
2017	Iraq	WORLD	257715425	1679040	18	6	5205.288254819480
2017	Ireland	WORLD	257715425	802084	74	10	69649.88273997430
2017	Israel	WORLD	257715425	350484	62	6	40541.86209070840

2017	Italy	WORLD	257715425	3029168	50	10	32326.84174639540
2017	Jamaica	WORLD	257715425	1112151	44	9	5069.183838107260
2017	Japan	WORLD	257715425	831868	73	10	38331.97939781040
2017	Jordan	WORLD	257715425	744582	48	-3	4162.820686572560
2017	Kazakhstan	WORLD	257715425	4074446	31	-6	9247.581331296260
2017	Kenya	WORLD	257715425	501204	28	9	1568.2015406641300
2017	Kuwait	WORLD	257715425	207920	39	-7	29759.532447140800
2017	Latvia	WORLD	257715425	374002	58	8	15548.082313057100
2017	Lebanon	WORLD	257715425	822300	28	6	7838.34338489943
2017	Lesotho	WORLD	257715425	326612	42	8	1226.6126297762000
2017	Liberia	WORLD	257715425	260155	31	6	698.70176435511
2017	Lithuania	WORLD	257715425	596856	59	10	16840.938567953000
2017	Luxembourg	WORLD	257715425	62054	82	10	107361.30694727100
2017	Madagascar	WORLD	257715425	172130	24	6	515.2927389703520
2017	Malawi	WORLD	257715425	342826	31	6	356.71757315336900
2017	Malaysia	WORLD	257715425	1855615	47	5	10254.234024258800
2017	Mali	WORLD	257715425	1066120	31	5	828.5119764015240
2017	Mauritania	WORLD	257715425	120433	28	-2	1145.5479472739100
2017	Mauritius	WORLD	257715425	167121	50	10	10484.908362041100
2017	Mexico	WORLD	257715425	12964882	29	8	9278.418168337630
2017	Mongolia	WORLD	257715425	67549	36	10	3669.417540403300
2017	Montenegro	WORLD	257715425	137589	46	9	7784.0652899655700
2017	Morocco	WORLD	257715425	2898721	40	-4	3036.17106160684
2017	Mozambique	WORLD	257715425	653251	25	5	461.4150941205890
2017	Namibia	WORLD	257715425	190132	51	6	5646.456008113440
2017	Nepal	WORLD	257715425	1738442	31	6	911.4442665086830

2017	Netherlands	WORLD	257715425	1015302	82	10	48554.99227617560
2017	New Zealand	WORLD	257715425	834433	89	10	42260.12517678530
2017	Nicaragua	WORLD	257715425	658203	26	6	2168.1952064635600
2017	Niger	WORLD	257715425	362955	33	5	375.8694896735220
2017	Nigeria	WORLD	257715425	1255425	27	7	1968.5595883057500
2017	Norway	WORLD	257715425	196814	85	10	75496.75405819980
2017	Oman	WORLD	257715425	20688	44	-8	15130.49782644050
2017	Pakistan	WORLD	257715425	5978635	32	7	1464.9933054685500
2017	Panama	WORLD	257715425	149220	37	9	15166.124432066000
2017	Papua New Guinea	WORLD	257715425	4400	29	5	2695.2518828029200
2017	Paraguay	WORLD	257715425	873410	29	9	5680.580768263530
2017	Peru	WORLD	257715425	1475532	37	9	6710.50802896038
2017	Philippines	WORLD	257715425	5680682	34	8	2981.9341514416200
2017	Poland	WORLD	257715425	4701465	60	10	13856.98238928450
2017	Portugal	WORLD	257715425	2266735	63	10	21437.347503679400
2017	Qatar	WORLD	257715425	24025	63	-10	61264.396477797900
2017	Romania	WORLD	257715425	3578504	48	9	10807.684484891700
2017	Rwanda	WORLD	257715425	568848	55	-3	762.9143745507880
2017	Saudi Arabia	WORLD	257715425	278912	49	-10	20803.742565732400
2017	Senegal	WORLD	257715425	559952	45	7	1367.2189480228400
2017	Serbia	WORLD	257715425	956455	41	8	6284.192671588000
2017	Sierra Leone	WORLD	257715425	159017	30	7	499.38070781976000
2017	Singapore	WORLD	257715425	327043	84	-2	60297.7937806208
2017	Slovenia	WORLD	257715425	143500	61	10	23442.70428187100
2017	Solomon Islands	WORLD	257715425	3913	39	8	2059.0454268884900

2017	Somalia	WORLD	257715425	1988458	9	5	309.05535477005600
2017	South Africa	WORLD	257715425	898407	43	9	6132.479840972100
2017	Spain	WORLD	257715425	1345862	57	10	28100.85228483030
2017	Sri Lanka	WORLD	257715425	1726900	38	6	4104.630983204350
2017	Suriname	WORLD	257715425	275716	41	5	5379.1194149535300
2017	Sweden	WORLD	257715425	348040	84	10	53744.42903214370
2017	Switzerland	WORLD	257715425	676687	85	10	80450.04581974130
2017	Tajikistan	WORLD	257715425	578529	21	-3	806.041573098044
2017	Thailand	WORLD	257715425	902928	37	-3	6578.188864935220
2017	Togo	WORLD	257715425	454396	32	-2	624.5449459301120
2017	Trinidad and Tobago	WORLD	257715425	373527	41	10	16238.193191667400
2017	Tunisia	WORLD	257715425	767155	42	7	3482.1867291863300
2017	Turkey	WORLD	257715425	3418932	40	-4	10513.648415266100
2017	Turkmenistan	WORLD	257715425	243202	19	-8	6587.090316286980
2017	Uganda	WORLD	257715425	739667	26	-1	631.5227197922780
2017	Ukraine	WORLD	257715425	5941653	30	4	2640.67567655839
2017	United Kingdom	WORLD	257715425	4921309	82	8	40361.417383215900
2017	Uruguay	WORLD	257715425	358723	70	10	16437.244869277800
2017	Uzbekistan	WORLD	257715425	1991941	22	-9	1826.5669192421600
2017	Zambia	WORLD	257715425	275089	37	6	1534.8653705224500
2017	Zimbabwe	WORLD	257715425	1025204	22	4	1602.4035069904800