Tilly Goes to Church: The Religious and Medieval Roots of The European State

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Abstract

The medieval Church was a critical force in state formation in Europe, as the most powerful challenger to secular rulers. The papacy wielded its wealth, spiritual weapons, and temporal alliances and targeted the Holy Roman Empire to ensure its own autonomy and preclude the rise of a powerful rival. Analysis of new data on religious rivalry in medieval Europe shows that medieval papal conflict is closely associated with the fragmentation of territorial authority and the rise of self-governing cities, more so than the secular conflict highlighted by "bellicist" explanations. States did not uniformly consolidate, and fragmentation persisted into the modern period. This analysis specifies the secular and temporal tactics used by the church, compares the impact of the church to other sources of fragmentation, and draws our attention to the mechanisms that helped to fragment territorial authority in medieval Europe. The roots of European state development are thus more religious, older, and more intentional than the literature has often assumed.

1 Introduction

The medieval church was a powerful, if neglected, force in European state formation. Canonical accounts of state building focus on war and violent conflict between secular rulers in the early modern era (1500-1800 CE.) Taking the territorial fragmentation of Europe as a starting point, this "bellicist" literature agrees that early modern warfare consolidated the state system into fewer, larger states. The need to fund these wars also necessitated the rise of state institutions. Rulers who succeeded in waging war and extracting taxes went on to consolidate their territorial gains and ensure the survival and sovereignty of their states. Charles Tilly's summary is as succinct as it is well-known: "war made the state and the state made war" (Tilly 1975, 42.)

Yet empirical incongruities challenge this account. First, the fragmentation of Europe was extraordinarily persistent. It lasted well through the mid-19th century, contrary to the bellicist argument that early modern warfare winnowed out and consolidated states (Spruyt 2017.) Second, many of the institutions that the bellicists claim were the inadvertent result of early modern warfare, such as taxation, courts, central administrations, or parliaments, arose long before the pressures of war supposedly made them necessary (Blaydes and Paik 2016, Stasavage 2010 and 2016.) Third, conflict has not uniformly led states to consolidate. The early onset of military competition translated into a primitive and patrimonial administrations in Europe, rather than more effective and formalized ones (Ertman 1997). Wars produced crises: *ancien regime* France was exhausted by its military ventures, as was 18th century Poland, so that "war unmade these states"(Teschke 2017, 45). More broadly, war has *hindered* state formation, ending intensive economic growth, spreading disease, and depleting the labor supply (Ober 2015, Fouquet and Broadberry 2015, Voigtländer and Voth 2013, Saylor and Wheeler 2017). State formation and warfare did not go hand in hand in other regions (Herbst 2000, Centeno 2002, Doner, Ritchie, and Slater 2005, Tin-Bor Hui 2005, Thies 2005, Kang 2021, Mazzucca 2021.)

To explain these anomalies, we need to look beyond early modern warfare. The foundational era of European state formation[1] goes back centuries earlier, to the medieval period (1000-1350 CE.)

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[1]State formation is the process by which rulers amass authority over territory and populations. The "state" is an anachronism in the middle ages, when "lordship" would have been more intelligible (Davies 2003.) Nonetheless, we can still meaningfully discuss the stated goals of these rulers: a) a more effective set of mechanisms through which they could exercise authority, such as the nomination of officials, a legal apparatus, and taxation and resource extraction (state building) and b) the assertion of that authority over

The Roman Catholic Church (or "the Church") was the dominant political actor in the Middle Ages, at its most powerful from 1100-1300.[2] As a result, the strongest rival for an ambitious medieval ruler was not another monarch, but the Church. The Church wielded its enormous wealth, human capital, and moral authority to ensure its own autonomy and preclude the rise of a rival dominant power. It sought to fragment those rulers it saw as a direct threat to its autonomy by using spiritual weapons, ideology, and secular proxies. It challenged would-be hegemons and indirectly gave local notables and independent cities opportunities to grab authority.

As a result, the territorial fragmentation we observe is no accident: instead, it was deliberately instigated by the Church, in an attempt to protect its autonomy. Constant conflict with the papacy contributed to the fragmentation of authority in Europe. The church's chief target and rival was the Holy Roman Empire.[3] There, papal conflict meant that central state power could not consolidate: while German emperors were frequently abroad fighting, local princes and cities assumed control over their local territories. In other areas of Europe, such as England or France, rulers could consolidate central authority more easily, either because they were left alone or aided by the papacy. The material resources and institutional innovations of the Church also provided models for secular taxation, legal frameworks, and administrative division of labor; but the church could also hinder the adoption of these institutions by fragmenting the central authority of rulers.

In short, I argue that the Church fragmented the territorial authority of powers it saw as hostile (chiefly the Holy Roman Empire), and helped to consolidate centralized states in other areas. By emphasizing the role of medieval religious authorities, this analysis also contributes to a more recent literature that has emphasized the deep (and secular) history of the European state: the influence of the Crusades (Blaydes and Paik 2016), the development of legal systems (Cantoni and Yuchtman 2014, Møller 2019), cities and communes (Abramson 2017 and Møller 2018), representative assemblies (Stasavage 2010, Boucoyannis 2021) and urban self–government and interdependence (Bosker, Buringh, and Van Zanden 2013, Møller and Doucette 2021.) This

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people and territory, free from internal rivals or external interference (sovereignty.)

[2]Not coincidentally, this was also the critical period for the rise of cities, the growth of commerce and trade networks (including the founding of the Hanseatic League and the expansion of trade to Asia), the development of law and reinterpretation of Roman law, the rise of universities, and new scientific and technological advances.

[3]In Voltaire's famous dictum, the Holy Roman Empire was none of those things. The empire became "Holy" under Barbarossa, and "Roman" in 1254 (Sulovsky 2019.) "Of the German Nation" was added in the 15th century.

study extends the framework first developed by Otto Hintze (1931/ 1975) on the role of the Church in transmitting Roman precedents of the rule of law and the formalization of assemblies, as well as subsequent work exploring how the Church promoted the rule of law and diffused self-government (Hintze 1931/ 1975, Kiernan 1965, Bendix 1978, Ergang 1971, Poggi 1990, Fukuyama 2011, Møller 2019, Doucette and Møller 2021, Møller and Doucette 2021.)

Scholars have noted the importance of the conflict with the Church, but there has been far less focus on the church's direct role in fragmenting territorial authority. Thus Møller 2019 focuses on the crisis of church and state as critical to subsequent rise of Europe (by which he means the multistate system, medieval parliaments, and early bureaucratic institutions) but devotes less attention to the mechanisms by which the papacy fragmented territorial rule. Møller and Doucette 2021 focus on urban self-government, and how it led both to fragmentation and the rise of national assemblies. My argument here is that papal effort was the antecedent, leading to fragmentation, communes, and institutional adaptation.

Below, I argue that the Church was a critical force in medieval state formation in Europe. I first review the dominant "bellicist" account of state formation. I then take Charles Tilly to church, and examine the medieval papacy as a powerful player and adversary. The church wielded its wealth, spiritual weapons, and military alliances to deliberately fragment territorial authority and ensure its own autonomy. I examine two alternative explanations: the rise of communes and primogeniture. I conclude that the church contributed to the lasting fragmentation of authority—and the rise of a European state system characterized by multiple competing states.

2   The Bellicist Accounts

The august and powerful bellicist accounts share several attributes. First, these analyses start with the fragmentation of territory and authority in post-Carolingian Europe, and view the decline of fragmentation as evidence for state consolidation. The starting point for state formation in Europe is the territorial fragmentation after the collapse of the Carolingian dynasty in 888 (Mitterauer 2010; Wickham 2016; Ertman 2017, 63; Gorski & Sharma 2017, 99, Teschke 2003, ch. 3.) Europe was a raft of principalities, ill-defined kingdoms, and territories controlled by local warlords. No empire arose in Europe that could compare to the Roman one: it was simply too difficult to sustain

(Scheidel 2019.) The potential causes of this initial fragmentation vary. Scholars have pointed to the uneven emergence of urban life (Abramson 2017), the rise of local warlords and bands of knights (Bisson 1994), and the low levels of religious legitimation that made European rulers weak (Rubin 2017, see also Fischer 1992.)

Second, this fragmentation declined thanks to constant interstate conflict, according to the bellicists. The relentless pressures of warfare eventually meant fewer and bigger states, a change from as many as 500 independent states in Europe in the year 1500 to 30 four centuries later (Tilly 1992, 45-46; Bean 1973, 204.) Repeated invasions and conflicts winnowed out weaker states and led to vigorous new efforts to tax and extract resources. Favorable geographic location meant that some states, such as Switzerland or England, could forego a military buildup. Those without such advantages, such as Poland, eventually disappeared (Downing 1992.)

More broadly, bellicists emphasize that secular conflict drove state formation. Kings, princes, and emperors fought to consolidate territory and control people and resources. Those who succeeded developed as states. War consolidated larger states and forced the building of state institutions. Following in the footsteps of Otto Hintze, who argued that the threat of war led to the consolidation and centralization of European states, historians, sociologists, and political scientists such as Bean (1973), Anderson (1974), McNeill (1982), Mann (1986), Downing (1992), and Tilly (1992) emphasized the fierce pressures of military competition.[4]

Third, the bellicist approach tends to view state institutions as the incidental "byproducts" of these preparations for war (Tilly 1992, 26, 75.) With the Military Revolution of the 16-17th century, war became increasingly costly, and necessitated the formation of state administrations to extract resources (Tilly 1992, Downing 1992, Mann 1986, 486.)[5] Taxes, tributes, and rents then allowed these states to wage war with greater force and success.[6] The collection of these taxes

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[4]Thomas Ertman differentiates Hintze's earlier work, with its emphasis on the geopolitical context and war, from his later scholarship, which emphasized uneven state development: rulers in the core of the former Carolingian empire, such as France, built bureaucratic administrative institutions with which they could challenge local lords. The periphery developed strong local governments and lords that could either accompany a powerful monarch (as in England) or dominate weak ones (as in Poland, Hungary, or Bohemia.) (Ertman 2017, 63-5.) This balance of power and local assemblies leading to the emergence of representative institutions are important themes in Kiernan 1965, Ergang 1971, Downing 1992, and Ertman 1997.

[5]Tilly and Mann both also examine the interplay of capital and war, acknowledging that bargaining processes with social classes, most notably capitalists, were critical in generating revenue and thus variation in state building. See also Anderson 1974/2013.

[6]Historians working in this multidisciplinary tradition focused on the intentional development of specific

required surveillance, which in turn prompted the growth of state administrations (Tilly 1992) and the rise of national assemblies as sites of negotiation about taxes (North and Weingast 1989.) In more fine-grained bellicist accounts, the timing and context of war shaped regime development: early military competition led to patrimonial administrations and relatively weak local governance facilitated absolutist regimes (Ertman 1997). Geopolitically exposed areas such as France or Russia required massive economic mobilization, and thus abolished medieval constitutionalism in favor of militarized absolutism (Downing 1992.)

Finally, the prevailing view is that the peak of state building took place in the early modern era, from roughly 1500 to 1800, also characterized by the rise of sovereignty and institutions such as parliaments. Thus, "the state" was invented as a corporate entity only in early modern Europe. That is when war became both costly and intense, increasing the pressures to consolidate and to extract resources. In the conventional periodization, state formation dates to the early modern era, from the mid-16th to late 18th centuries, taking off only after 1600 (Tilly 1975, 170; Ertman 2017, 54.) Scholars of international relations often echo these claims, and argue that the modern state arose with the Treaties of Augsburg (1555) and Westphalia (1648), which established the principle of state sovereignty.[7] Thus, states grew and strengthened in Europe as a result of vicious early modern warfare, the competition for land and people that it entailed, and the mobilization of resources and people that war demanded.

3   The Medieval Church as a Force in State Formation

Shifting the focus to the medieval era reveals distinct aspects of state formation that the bellicose perspective may obscure: the fragmentation was persistent and not reduced by warfare, the relevant rivalry involved religious authorities, not just secular ones, and state institutions of taxation, parliaments, and justice arose long before the early modern era, often patterned on church models. As a result, many aspects of state formation date back to the medieval period, rather than the early modern era.

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institutions of the fiscal state, analyzing the early modern regimes of taxation, extraction, and war-making, rather than viewing them as incidental. (Brewer 1989, Stone 1994, Bonney 1999, Glete 2002.)

[7]See Morgenthau (1985), Ruggie (1992), Watson (1992), Held (1995), and Philpott (2001.) Others dispute the idea that Westphalia marked the rise of state sovereignty (see Krasner 1993, Osiander 2001, Teschke 2003.) Yet, as Carvalho et al. (2011) note, the textbook consensus on the importance of 1648 remains.

Figure 1:   The fragmentation of Europe 1100-1900.

First, territorial fragmentation took off in the 12th century, it was persistent, and it was unevenly distributed. Figure 1 shows the overwhelming and persistent fragmentation of the former Holy Roman Empire in comparison to the rest of Europe. The graph plots the number of states that existed over the 12th through 20th centuries in Europe. I take the 1900 borders of Europe, and calculate the number of states that existed within these borders over time. To construct this measure, I added historical European country borders to data on state size from Abramson 2017.[8]

Contrary to the bellicists, this fragmentation did not end in the early modern era with the onset of intense warfare. The fragmentation of the Holy Roman Empire was exceptionally durable.[9] Tilly's observation that the number of states decreased from 500 in 1500 to 20 in 1900 may need a broader context: two enormous territories, Germany and Italy, remained fractured until their political unification in the 1870s (Spruyt 2017, 87.) This fragmentation persisted because local princes and cities gained in power during and precluded the assertion of central authority in these territories. As a result, there is no steady pattern of consolidation of ever-larger states through the warfare of the early modern era.

Second, religious rivalry, not interstate conflict, was critical in this earlier period of state

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[8]Data from the Mosaic historical maps project: https://censusmosaic.demog.berkeley.edu/data/historical-gis-files, accessed August 2021.

[9]The one dip is in the aftermath of the Thirty Years War, when Sweden temporarily conquered large swathes of German territory.

formation. The Church, rather than any secular monarch, was a powerful geopolitical force in the medieval Western Christendom, as we will see below. It assiduously sought to foment fragmentation. As a consequence, the fundamental rivalry of the medieval era was the struggle between popes and rulers over authority and supremacy (and its converse, sovereignty.) The conflicts between the Church and various monarchs in the early medieval era were recurrent and unrelenting. Church efforts thus helped to prevent the rise of a hegemon in Europe, and instead maintained a more polycentric equilibrium. In maintaining this balance of power, the Church targeted what it saw as hostile rulers, allowing others, such as the Capetians in France or the Normans in England, to consolidate their power (see also Downing 1989, 214.) Both popes and monarchs were as ambitious as they were relatively weak: neither could fully enforce laws or agreements, nor claim full control of territory.[10] Moreover, spiritual and secular authorities were intermingled, as were morality and law. As a result, these conflicts were not interstate rivalries, but personalized struggles over authority.

Third, state institutions arose much earlier than required by early modern warfare. Figure 2 summarizes the pattern of institutional development across several European political entities. The bands summarize when several major state institutions arose: chanceries, cameras (accounting chambers), taxation, legal courts, national assemblies, and the census. Several patterns are evident. First, the church was an institutional pioneer, developing these institutions as early as the 11th century. Second, the Holy Roman Empire stands out as a late adopter. No central taxation, parliament, courts or chancery emerged in the Empire until 1500, and they were weak and unstable once they arose. The Empire developed these institutions even after late-developing peripheral countries, such as Sweden and Poland. Italian institutions arose relatively early on–but these were not on the level of central government, but on the level of *communes*. Finally, where the pope needed rulers as allies, monarchs had more opportunity to develop state institutions in the late 12th and 13th centuries. For example, successive popes relied on English kings to remain neutral in the papal conflicts on the continent, if not to aid the papacy outright. Accordingly, central state institutions in England, including a judiciary and court system, taxation, and local governance emerged in the 12th century with little papal interference. Monarchs favored by the papacy could more easily adopt church templates for courts, chanceries, and tax collection, and we see steady

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[10]As Sharma 2017 and Gorski and Sharma 2017 point out, rulers struggled over authority and control of people more than over territory per se.

Figure 2: The emergence of central state institutions in Europe

institutional gains in England, Spain, and France.

The church itself was the source of multiple institutional templates: legal advances, administrative precedents, and conceptual innovations. The extensive history of institutional borrowing from the Church is explored elsewhere,[11] but to give a few examples: canon scholars preserved and reinterpreted Roman law, and the idea of a state based on law. The papacy showed rulers how to collect taxes, answer the flood of petitions, and keep records and accounts. Concepts such as proctorial representation, supermajority rules, and binding consent all followed from church conciliar practice and theory. In short, the papacy and the church provided valuable institutional prototypes. The church also provided the conduits: these templates were transmitted through church documents and legal innovations, by clerics serving in the courts and chanceries, and by bishops, who regularly sat in the royal councils and national assemblies, served as judges and chancellors, and who had both the training and the access to effectively transmit these templates.[12]

Yet only some rulers could adopt and develop these institutional models: in areas targeted by the papacy, such as the Holy Roman Empire, these central state institutions did not develop. This precocious institutional development also suggests that "contractarian" accounts of institutional formation also may need revision. In these accounts, institutions arise as a result of bargaining

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[11]In a series of works, Møller (2014, 2015, 2017a, 2017b, 2018) emphasizes how modern legal institutions and parliamentary practices are rooted in the Middle Ages. Grzymala-Busse 2020 traces at the adoption of other state institutions, such as chanceries, cameras, and judiciaries.

[12]These templates did not comprise a wholesale importation, as earlier work might have suggested (Strayer 1970, Ullmann 1965.) As Hintze notes, "procedures and ideas of these chancelleries passed from country to country, from court to court, and that in this way a certain uniformity of thinking about politics and administration was established which gave way only much later to the advancing differentiation of national characters (Hintze 1975, 318)

among elites in the early modern era. Specifically, these accounts argue that fiscal and representatives institutions arose as commitment devices: when nobles could withdraw resources, monarchs and spending were constrained through institutions. Thus, early modern parliaments gained powers of consent and imposed constraints on the rulers in exchange for taxation and revenue (North and Weingast 1989, Levi 1988, Hoffman and Rosenthal 1997, Barzel and Kiser 2002, Blaydes and Chaney 2013.) Yet many of these institutions predate the early modern era: for example, medieval parliaments were powerful sites of consent, legitimation, and judgment (Boucoyannis 2021 and Stasavage 2016.)[13]

3.1 The Church Gains Autonomy

The Church gained autonomy and power in the late 11th-early 12th century. Until then, under the system of proprietary churches, lords and kings built churches, named clergy, and profited from church lands and revenues on their territory. The system made churches a lucrative source of income, and provided rulers with both with revenue and military support (Joachimsen 1978, 13.) These relations were especially prevalent in the Holy Roman Empire. The Emperor also claimed the right to name the Pope: Henry III (r. 1045-1056) had essentially appointed four loyalists as popes. After his death and the ensuing succession struggles, a power vacuum opened up at Rome, which the papal reformists used to ensure in 1059 that cardinals, not emperors, would now elect the pope in the newly founded College of Cardinals.

Starting in the 1050s, the papacy asserted its power within the Church (Morris 1989, 33.) The arrival of Pope Gregory VII (r. 1073-1085) heralded a new era of reform, Church autonomy, and papal authority. Gregory quickly launched an ambitious reform program that freed the church from secular interference and instilled greater discipline among the clergy. Papal power grew immensely during the 12th and 13th centuries. As the papacy consolidated power within the church, popes gained new confidence in demanding autonomy and even obedience from secular rulers.

A major, and defining, episode, was the Investiture Conflict (1075 to 1122), a conflict over papal and imperial authority that was nominally a dispute over the naming of bishops. (The "investitures"

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[13]That said, the rise of administrative institutions is not equivalent to the rise of the state (Sharma 2017, 217), and state capacity is distinct from the territorial state (Spruyt 2017, 84.)

in question were the rights to name bishops.)[14] Bishops were important agents for both rulers and popes. They served as administrators for secular monarchs and the spiritual emissaries of the pope. They held high spiritual and secular office, kept order and defended territory, collected taxes, issued local judgments and petitions, mediated disputes, and served as papal emissaries. The bishops' loyalty thus was of paramount importance to both monarchs and popes: and naming bishops was an exercise in ensuring both fealty and effective administration.

The goal of the struggle for the medieval papacy was both an assertion of papal power, and a liberation of the Church from secular interference (Schatz 1996, 81.) Pope Gregory VII prohibited investiture by lay rulers as part of his reforms. Meanwhile, for the new German King Henry IV, controlling the bishoprics was critical to consolidating authority in Germany. The stakes were fundamental: "much of the emperor's power depended on his investiture right, since it linked high church officials to the crown as a counterweight against German territorial nobles" (Clark 1986, 668.) When Henry IV began to name bishops, the Pope excommunicated him in 1075 and called on his lords to abandon Henry. Five decades of multiple excommunications, conflict, and negotiations over investiture and the rightful sphere of temporal and ecclesiastical authority ensued.

The Concordat of Worms formally settled the controversy in 1122. The fundamental consequence of Worms was that it differentiated church from state, and helped the church to gain relative autonomy from temporal rulers. The Church selected the bishops and invested them with spiritual authority: the monarch could confer secular (but not spiritual) privileges (Robinson 1990, 437.) The pope did not enforce the investiture agreements equally: outside of Germany, Italy, Burgundy, and France, Pope Gregory VII did not enforce lay investiture, since "he had no wish to alienate powerful rulers of the periphery" (Cowdrey 1998, 550.)[15] Neither the papacy nor secular rulers could claim a decisive victory: but the church now gained formal autonomy.

Having liberated the church, the papacy now assumed a new "power of intervention and di-

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[14]Popes endowed bishops with their spiritual powers, while secular rulers endowed the clergy, bishops and abbots as vassals to monarchs. As part of the ceremony, the king would present a bishop with the symbols of religious office: the staff and the ring, and with rights and privileges (regalia.) The clergy would then swear fealty to the ruler who named them.

[15]In contrast, Bueno de Mesquita 2022 argues that Worms and lay investiture drove a permanent wedge between kings and popes, by incentivizing the former to promote economic development and the latter to hamper growth. Yet the struggle between popes and kings continued, and lay investiture itself applied inconsistently and unevenly. For example, some kings, such as the French Louis VII in 1149 or Philip in 1203, voluntarily withdrew their rights to name bishops (Baldwin 2004, 518 and 524.)

rection in both spiritual and secular affairs" (Southern 1970, 34.) A spectacular example is Pope Innocent III (r. 1198-1216.) A proponent of papal supremacy and an ambitious leader, Innocent III threw himself into temporal politics, crowning and deposing kings, and settling disputes. His successors asserted even more authority: Innocent IV (r. 1243-1254) argued that popes were above human law, and Boniface VIII (r. 1295-1303) proclaimed papal authority that extended over all beings. Popes used this power to assert the autonomy of the church and prevent the rise of another imperial threat.[16] Papal power eventually peaked in the 14th century, starting with the conflict between Philip IV the Fair (r. 1285-1314) and Pope Boniface VIII (r. 1295-1303) and the Great Schism that followed (1378-1417.)[17] It then waned both because the popes demanded ever more resources and jurisdiction from various monarchs, and because in the meantime, state capacity had increased thanks to the adoption of institutional models from the church.For over two centuries, however, from roughly 1100 to 1300, the church exercised unparalleled power in European politics.

3.2   Sources of Church Power

The medieval church was so powerful because it had considerable resources. First, there was its wealth. The medieval Church was the single biggest landowner in Europe (Spruyt 1994, 44.) A large portion of central Italy was a papal domain. By the time of the Reformation, over half the land in Germany held by the Church and by the ecclesiastical princes (Goody 1983, 131.) Immediately before Henry VIII dissolved the monasteries in 1536-41, the English church held 25% of English land, while the crown had only 6%. These enormous land holdings were the result of earlier accumulation, in the 7th through 10h centuries, with voluntary offerings, property transfers, and bequests. Tithing entitled the Church to collect a 10% tax on all income, generating huge revenues (Morris 1989, 388.) Given this wealth, "one can hardly overestimate the importance of the Church as an economic entity in preindustrial Europe" (Cipolla 1993, 45.)

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[16]That said, the church was not a monolithic institution. Clergy initially opposed the elimination of clerical marriage and concubinage introduced by Gregory VII in the late 11th century (though they came around by the II Lateran Council of 1139.) Several schisms racked the Church, as competing popes emerged in 1130 and 1159 and famously during the Great Schism of 1378-1417. Bishops often interpreted papal requests or declarations in their favor (Dorin 2021.)

[17]The eventual consequence of this conflict was the exile of the papacy to Avignon, an area firmly under Philip's control, where it remained for from 1309 to 1376.The Great Schism then ensued from 1378 to 1417, forty years that saw competing papacies, highly politicized claims, and the eventual resolution of the crisis by *secular* rulers, rather than councils or clergy (Kaminsky 2000, 680.)

A second resource for the church was its human capital: literate clerks, legal expertise, extensive documentation and archives, and administrative experience. Taxation required both authority and administrative capacity, and the church developed financial and accounting offices, as well as a network of enforcement officers. Popes sent legates across Christendom to monitor religious and fiscal discipline (Riley-Smith 2005, 175.) Clergy served at royal courts, writing letters and writs, and keeping accounts. Clergy enforced local contracts, collected taxes, and recorded births, deaths, and wills in cathedral records. Cathedral chapters founded schools to study canon law, and kept records and relied on written documents, lowering transaction costs and allowing information to spread (Blum and Dudley 2003.) Monasteries were a source of theological advances, a literate culture, and reformist zeal (Doucette and Møller 2021.)The church further chartered universities and promoted the study of law starting in the late 11th century.

Bishops were especially important. They held both high secular and ecclesiastical office, "providing both sacral authority and literate clerics for his chancellery, backing his judicial authority with legitimacy and efficiency" (Mann 1986, 382-3.) They served as imperial administrators and judges (Angelov and Herrin 2012, 170, see also Robinson 1990, 423.) Throughout the middle ages, bishops also governed many towns (Møller and Doucette 2021.) As late as the 14th century, English bishops exercised discretionary justice in parliaments, councils, and chanceries (Dodd 2014, 216.) There was no "clear area of separate governmental responsibilities that could be termed secular" (Morris 1989, 18.) The Church provided legal arbitration and judgments for both clerics and lay people (Gilchrist 1969, 9) In short, the "great achievement of medieval civilization of the 11th to 13th centuries would not have been possible but for the learning, example, and progressive character of the clergy and monks of the time" (Gilchrist 1969, 69.) These advantages also meant that the church would be an institutional pioneer–and that secular rulers would adopt ecclesiastical models.

Finally, the Church's power derived from its moral authority. The Church was deeply present in everyday life as both a religious and secular authority (Mann 1986, 380.) It "governed birth, marriage, and death, sex, and eating, made the rules for law and medicine, gave philosophy and scholarship their subject matter. Membership in the Church was mandatory: expulsion was tantamount to a social death." (Tuchman 1978, 32.) Above all, the Church offered salvation: the promise of an eternal life and divine mercy that no secular ruler could possibly match. Conversely,

the church could also exclude the faithful from this ultimate benefit, through excommunication and interdicts.

In short, its wealth, administrative capacity, and its spiritual authority made the medieval church uniquely powerful. Popes anointed emperors, raised funds, governed the very rhythms of daily life. The church became an ambitious and powerful political actor, and it fought to retain its autonomy, preclude the rise of rival superpowers, and consolidate its own administration over souls and territory. It formed alliances with secular rulers and deployed spiritual weapons. The result was the peculiar pattern of the fragmentation of territorial authority in some areas of Europe, and the early consolidation of central states in others.

4   The Impact of Papal Rivalry: Fragmentation of Europe

The fragmentation of territorial authority is the foundation for subsequent political and economic modernity in Europe, a point of departure for state formation and economic development, for a wide consensus of scholars.[18]

This fragmentation was no accident, and it was deliberately sustained. The papacy sought first to free the Church from secular influence, and then to prevent imperial resurgence. A special target of the popes was the Holy Roman Empire, and its ruling dynasty, the Hohenstaufens, who greatly expanded its territory from 1138 to 1254. These emperors repeatedly sought to rebuild the Carolingian empire by controlling both northern Italy and Sicily. Had they succeeded in this pincer movement, they would leave the papal states surrounded by a powerful rival, and the church again under imperial control. The papacy sought to ensure that Germany would remain fragmented and Italy under papal control.

The Church marshaled its material, human, and spiritual resources to gain an advantage against its rivals. It deliberately played rulers against each other, and used both spiritual weapons and wars by proxy to ensure that no powerful rival could arise that might threaten its political or territorial interests. Popes tried to take successive states out of Emperor's sphere and into their

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[18]See Hintze 1905, Jones 1981, Mann 1986, Landes 1998, van Zanden 2009, Stasavage 2010, Rosenthal and Wong 2011, Voigtlnder and Voth 2013; Vries 2013, Hoffman 2015, Dincecco and Onorato 2016, Dincecco and Wang 2018, and Scheidel 2019.

own. These efforts drained the resources and attention of imperial rulers, hindering their ability to consolidate central power. These papal campaigns were so successful that Innocent IV (r. 1243-54) destroyed the imperial authority in Italy that had been already atomized in Germany: the final the Hohenstaufen dynasty collapsed in 1268. Both Italy and Germany remained politically fragmented until the 19th century (Ozment 1980, 144, Oakley 2012, Stollberg-Rilinger 2018.)

This fragmentation persisted because newly ascendant cities and princes precluded the consolidation of central authority long after the church's power declined. Distracted by their attempts to annex territory in Italy, successive emperors failed to consolidate their central power. Instead, princes and cities gained regional authority relative to the emperor. First, the power vacuum after Henry III's death in 1056 meant twenty years without a ruler in Italy, giving the initial impetus to the communal revolution and the rise of increasingly autonomous cities in Italy, such as Pisa, Milan, or Lucca (Hyde 1973, 49.) These cities then began to control neighboring territory and in effect became regional powers. Second, local lords grew in power, gaining greater control over serfs and taxation at the expense of the emperor (Mitteraurer 2010: chapter 5, Clark 1986, 668.) Bishops and abbots used the political and financial authority bestowed upon them by church to strengthen their lordship rights (Stollberg-Rilinger 2018, 22.) While the German emperors focused on the conflict with Rome, they had neither the time nor the resources to stem this leakage of authority. Communes and powerful regional princes who "grew in strength as a result of the conflict between kings and popes...could defeat any imperial plans to centralize administration or tax collection" (Hay 1995, 317.) The emperor lost power to princes, towns, and bishops, who had a vested interest in maintaining fragmentation and preventing the imposition of central state authority or institutions.

In contrast, where popes sought the cooperation of rulers, monarchs could consolidate territorial authority more easily. The papacy supported the Spanish unification and reconquista. It sought English neutrality in its conflicts on the continent, and largely left English politics alone.Medieval England was able to centralize the state and develop its own endogenous institutions, such common law. France until the late 13th century cooperated with, and benefited from, the papacy. In France, popes supported the unification and consolidation efforts of Louis VI (1108–37), Louis VII, (1137–80) and Philip Augustus, (11791223) (Baldwin 2004, 510.) Since French monarchs tended

to be allied with the Pope, the nobles could not challenge the monarch as successfully in the 12th and 13th centuries, and a more centralized French administrative state could develop. The French monarchs proved recalcitrant in the late 13th-early 14th century, but the papacy had grown weaker (and had moved to Avignon, from where it supported the French monarchy.) In areas where the rulers posed little threat to the papacy, such as the Spanish territories, France until the end of the 13th century, Scandinavia, or East Central Europe, the church was more influential in transmitting institutional templatesbut also had less interest in fragmentation.

The general pattern is of fragmentation and hindering of central state development in Germany, Burgundy, and Italy, endogenous state development in England, and lower fragmentation and higher transmission of church templates elsewhere. Fischer (1992) argues that the church failed to maintain European unity (Fischer 1992, 438.) Rubin (2017) agrees that Europe was fragmented because rulers were weak, the result of the religious legitimation of monarchs by relatively weak religious "propagating agents." But this has the historical record backwards: it is not that the Church failed to legitimate monarchs—it is that the Church deliberately sought to balance them against each other and precluded any from gaining too much authority. Its main target and enemy was the Holy Roman Empire, which kept Italy and Germany fragmented, even as it allowed other states, such as England or Spain, to consolidate.

4.1 Weapons of the Meek? Spiritual weapons and temporal papal conflict

To protect the church's autonomy from secular powers and ensure its status within Europe, popes relied both on spiritual weapons and armed conflict to target individual rulers and to undermine their authority over territory and people. They excommunicated and deposed monarchs, princes, and nobles, cutting off hostile or disloyal rulers from the community of the faithful and releasing them from loyalty to the monarch. They also allied with secular rulers, using favors, financial subsidies, exemptions and dispensations to cement these coalitions. They funded armies and joint ventures, including the Crusades, to attack their enemies. And they launched ideological salvos against imperial hierarchy and hereditary monarchy. In short, the papacy used a full range of privileges and prerogatives to punish imperial holdouts and reward papal loyalists (Whalen 2019, 180.) These strategies destabilized some rulers, maintained the fragmentation of Europe, and

affected the development of central state institutions.

4.1.1 Spiritual Weapons: Ideology and excommunications

Popes used their authority to launch ideological salvos. First, they used law as a political weapon. Using new interpretations of Roman law, Pope Gregory VII fought with legal arguments, using the papal archives to buttress his arguments. When the law faculty at Bologna was founded at 1088, both popes and emperors then invested heavily in furthering legal expertise (Zacour 1976, 224.) Second, popes articulated early concepts of state sovereignty,[19] or a ruler's right alone to control his territory and defend it from external demands, even if no ruler at the time could actually exercise this sovereignty. Second, drawing on precedents from Roman law, papal decrees and canonical reinterpretations underlined the principle that a ruler need not recognize any superior, including emperors. Pope Innocent III declared in his 1202 decretal *Per Venerabile* that "every king [is] an emperor in his kingdom." This doctrine was a move against imperial ambition, effectively replacing imperial hierarchy and deference with the equal standing of states. By the 13th century, drawing on Roman precedents and canon law, jurists recognized the sovereignty of the French, English, and Spanish kingdoms and the practical sovereignty of many city states (Canning 1983, 4, Rigaudere 1995, 21.) These concepts thus arose long before the their 16th century articulation by early modern theorists such as Jean Bodin or their supposed statement at Westphalia in 1648.

More directly, popes could target rulers with excommunications. Papal excommunication was a serious sanction, since the church held the monopoly on salvation (Helmholz 2015, 402.) Excommunications punish by excluding individuals from the sacraments and the religious communion. Vassals and subjects of excommunicated rulers are also released from fealty to the ruler. Excommunication could also mean deposition, or removal from public office, as well as loss of access to sacraments.[20] Popes excommunicated rulers, monarchs, and emperors for political reasons at least 109 times from the 3rd to the 20th century.[21] Of these, 47 such excommunications took place from

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[19]Concepts of medieval political authority, statehood, and sovereignty (autonomy from outside interference and control over internal affairs) are debated extensively (Hall and Kratochwil 1993, Buzan and Little 2002, Friedrichs 2001, Costa Lopez 2020.)

[20]Both the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215 and the Council of Lyon in 1245 confirmed that excommunication of a ruler also meant his removal from office.

[21]"Political reasons" consist of disobedience to papal orders, refusal to go on crusade, failure to pay taxes, the appointment or removal of bishops contrary to papal wishes, and so on. Papal excommunications were

Figure 3: Papal excommunications for political reasons by century

1050 to 1303. (The record holder was Emperor Henry IV (r. 1054-1105), who was excommunicated five times by three different popes.)

Figure 3 shows that excommunications began to rise in the 11th century, peaking in the 13th, just as the papacy consolidated and centralized its power. Boniface VIII, the last of the powerful popes, led the papal record with no fewer than seven political excommunications of kings. They drop off rapidly after the 14th century, as a papacy greatly weakened by the Great Schism stopped sanctioning leaders.

Excommunications targeted particular rulers, and should therefore shorten the duration of their rule. Yet despite their ill repute, these were not particularly powerful weapons. Excommunications destabilized monarchical rule and made it less predictable–but threatened only newer, more vulnerable rulers, and only weakly. Figure 4 shows the duration of rule for excommunicated and other rulers. Blaydes and Chaney (2013) identify a steady increase in the duration of West European rulers in office from 700 to 1500. I augment the same data set (taken from Bosworth 1996 and Morby 1989) with new data I collected on dynasties in Eastern Europe and papal excom-

coded as such only if the pope deliberately pronounced sentence on the ruler, as opposed to automatic excommunication for certain sins, the *latae sententiae* The data comes from the Catholic Encyclopedia and the Cambridge Medieval History.

Figure 4: Duration in office for excommunicated and other rulers

munications, and calculate the duration of rule for both excommunicated and non-excommunicated rulers. Figure 4 shows that rulers who avoided excommunication exemplify the pattern identified by Blaydes and Chaney. In contrast, excommunicated rulers vary enormously in the duration of their rule until the mid 1300s and the loss of papal authority.

Excommunications also destabilized vulnerable medieval rulers somewhat. Figure 5 shows the results of a Kaplan-Meier survival analysis for excommunicated and non-excommunicated rulers. Rulers in their first 15 years of rule are more threatened by excommunication. However, if these rulers survived beyond the first fifteen years of their rule, they were actually *more* likely to last in office than non-excommunicated leaders.

Excommunications could undermine ruler tenure, but they were not decisive weapons. They did not consistently weaken rulers or remove them from office. This is partly because to impose excommunications successfully, popes still had to rely on secular compliance: the "consent and cooperation of [other] secular rulers" (Southern 1970, 20.) And these supporters could be fickle: for example, when German emperor Henry IV was excommunicated for the first time in 1076, his nobles began to abandon him and his enemies elected an anti-king. He had to beg forgiveness of the pope. However, when he was excommunicated a second time in 1080, his princes stayed

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Figure 5: The impact of medieval excommunication

loyal–and he began to again encroach on papal territories in earnest. As Møller 2019 points out, excommunications are only only effective if it creates opposition against the targeted ruler (2019, 217).

In short, excommunications were weak weapons. Their success depended on secular support: which is why papal wars by proxy, crusades, and alliances were so much more effective.

4.1.2 Papal conflict: Wars by Proxy and Alliances

Papal conflict comprised several tactics: wars by proxy, alliances, and crusades. The medieval papacy allied with secular rulers, offered protection, and subsidized joint ventures, pitting monarchs against each other and hindering the consolidation of any larger territorial or authority claims.[22]

Popes and rulers entered into strategic coalitions, which shifted as the balance of power changed. The papacy was opportunistic: the Lombard League of city-states was traditionally an enemy, but Pope Alexander III allied with the League to prevent Frederick I from taking over

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[22]The few direct military campaigns led by medieval popes ended in disaster. When Leo IX (r. 1049-54) fought the Normans in Southern Italy in 1053, the Normans easily defeated his army and took him prisoner (Jordan 2001, 87). When Innocent II took the field himself against Roger of Sicily in 1139, he, too, was taken prisoner and had to accede to Rogers demand for control of Sicily and Apulia (Brooke 1938, 276.) History repeated in 1156 (Robinson 1990, 367.)

Italy, and again to battle Frederick II under Pope Gregory IX. Urban II (r. 1088-1099) and Pascal II (r. 1099-1118) found it expedient to favor the Normans: when Roger I conquered Sicily, Urban recognized him and named him the papal deputy on the island (Fried 2015, 195.) Despite its overall hostility to the Hohenstaufens, the papacy could even ally with the German emperors: after the Concordat of Worms, hostilities ceased and the pope broke their costly alliance with the Normans and instead allied with the Empire (Brooke 1938, 264.) Similarly, popes sought German help subsequently to contain Angevin ambitions in Sicily.

Popes offered protection and legitimation to allied rulers. Monarchs entered into a feudal relationship by surrendering land to pope, and receiving it back as a fief. The benefit was that a vassal kingdom could not be legitimately offered to another ruler, and any injury to king or country was an injury to the church (Ullmann 1965, 336.) In return, kings then had to pay annual tribute or perform military duties. At different points in time, Scandinavia, Hungary, Poland, Bohemia, and the British Isles were under papal lordship (Mundy 2000, 200.) Popes also recognized the territorial grabs of their allies, but not the conquests of their foes (Hoffman 2015, 132.)

Popes invested heavily in their defense, and subsidized their allies. Pope Gregory IX (r. 1227-1241) excommunicated Frederick II on multiple occasions, but for good measure, both he and Innocent IV (r. 1243-1251) raised armies to fight the emperor and to prevent the union of Sicily with the Empire that would have consolidated imperial power on the Italian peninsula. Innocent IV sold the rights to invade Sicily to the English King Henry III for the ungodly sum of 90,000 pounds. When Henry III failed to come up with the money, the papacy negated the sale and let Charles of Anjou take Sicily instead. The papacy then supported Charles in his fight against the Empire, and the Hohenstaufen line ended in defeat in 1268. The result was continued violent hostilities in Italy and the eventual retreat of imperial ambition beyond the Alps, leaving behind a fractured Italy and an atomized Holy Roman Empire (Watts 2009, 65.)

The Crusades were also an exercise in exercising political power—and fragmenting of authority. Blaydes and Paik 2016 argue that these expeditions contributed to state formation by promoting the emergence of taxation, sales of feudal land to finance the expeditions, the reintegration of Europe into global trade networks, and the elimination of rivals to ruling monarchs (Blaydes and Paik 2016.) Yet these joint ventures between popes and monarchs also had explicitly temporal and local

aims. Popes summoned the Crusades to defeat their rivals, rather than to defend the faith.[23] The Baltic Crusades, designed to convert Northern Europe to Christianity and to gain the pope political influence, began in 1147 and lasted through the 16th century. The papacy subsequently blessed the Stedinger crusade against peasants who refused to pay the tithe (1233-4), and the political crusade against the Colonna, their enemies in Rome, in 1298. In 1241, shortly before his death, Gregory IX (r. 1227-1241) commissioned a crusade against German Emperor Frederick II. Pope Innocent IV (r. 1243-1254) also launched a crusade against Frederick II and then against Frederick's son, Conrad IV, excommunicating and deposing both. He summoned Germany, Lombardy, and Sicily, and offered indulgences to the crusaders as if they had been going on a crusade to the Holy Land, "creating an equivalency between the two theatres of holy war" (Whalen 2019, 186.) Subsequently, Pope Alexander VI and then Urban IV called for a crusade against Manfred, the last Hohenstaufen king of Sicily and son of Frederick II, who invaded papal territories in 1258. This crusade was launched in 1255 and lasted until 1266, with enormous privileges granted to Charles of Anjou, an ally of the pope (Jedin 1993, 166.) It became increasingly obvious that the aim of these military ventures, especially after the 13th century, became "less religious than hierarchical; it implied the domination of Church over State, and of clergy over laity, the demonstration of the civil power's derivation from ecclesiastical" (Smith 1964, 54.)

All of these weapons were deployed to defend a fundamental papal aim: hindering the rise of a hegemony that could once again subordinate the church. The outcome of these balancing tactics was the fragmentation of territorial authority in Europe.

5   Empirical Tests

To test the proposition that papal efforts undermined and fragmented territorial authority in Europe, I collected data on European states over time with data on the conflicts that took place over the years 1000-1800 within the boundaries of Western Christendom.[24] I also include existing data

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[23]Popes also launched crusades against domestic religious dissent. Thus, Innocent III (1198-1216) launched Crusades against in Muslim Spain and the Albigensian Crusade against the Cathars in 1209.

[24]The Great Schism of 1054 split the church into a Western and Eastern rite. The Church in the Eastern rite never gained its autonomy, did not function independently of the state, and instead continued to be controlled by the Byzantine emperor. The territories of modern Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Russia, and Serbia all followed the Eastern rite, and are not part of the analysis.

on cities (Bairoch et al 2016), crusades (Blaydes and Paik 2016), sites of conflict (Dincecco and Onorato 2016), primogeniture (Kokkonen and Sundell 2014) and parliaments (Van Zanden, Buringh and Bosker 2012). The data include over 30,000 city-year observations. (Please see Appendix for full description of the data set and sources.)

The measure of papal conflict consists of the number of clearly identifiable wars by proxy funded or directed by popes against papal enemies, papal depositions of secular rulers, political crusades, and attacks either led or financed by the popes directly, over a rolling five year period. The main sources are the Cambridge Medieval History and Dupuy and Dupuy 1993. The measures of secular conflict come from Dincecco and Onorato 2016, who code whether armed conflict occurred in a given site in the preceding 150 years among secular parties.[25]

Figure 6 plots the incidence of papal conflict with temporal rulers and secular conflict among temporal rulers.The rise in papal conflict in the 12th and 13th centuries coincides with the takeoff of fragmentation of territorial authority, as the papacy reached the acme of its ambitions. Papal conflict drops in the 14th century: during the Avignon papacy and then the Great Schism that lasted until 1417, the weakened papacy did not launch conflicts at anywhere near the same rates. The conflicts spike again in the 16th century, thanks both to proxy wars of the Reformation and to the ventures of militant popes such as Julius II (r. 1503-1513), who personally led armies to defend papal territories. Secular conflict, in contrast, takes off later, consistent with the bellicist account of more intense early modern warfare.

The main dependent variable is fragmentation, or the number of political authorities within a given territory. I proxy territorial fragmentation with the number of state boundaries in a given area. I divide Western Christian Europe into 100 x 100 km grid cells, and calculated the number of states within each grid cell.[26] The results are robust to other specifications of fragmentation, such as the number of states within a given radius of a centroid of a state or the number of states that existed over time within the 1900 borders of Europe. I use OLS regressions with two-way state

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[25]The lines between religious and secular authority were often blurred or overlapped (see the ecclesiastical princes in the Holy Roman Empire, or the consistories in early modern Protestant Europe.) By secular conflict, I mean only the actors involved: monarchs and princes, rather than popes or bishops, acting in their secular capacity as rulers.

[26]The data come from MPIDR [Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research] and CGG [Chair for Geodesy and Geoinformatics, University of Rostock] 2013: MPIDR Population History GIS Collection, Mosaic Census Collection

Figure 6: Papal and secular conflict by century

and year fixed effects, which approximate a difference-in-difference design with observational data and control for time- and space- invariant factors such as climate, elevation, agricultural suitability, and proximity to ports and coasts. To capture the theorized difference between the medieval and early modern periods in papal strength, I split the sample into medieval (1000-1350) and early modern (1450-1750) periods to capture the distinct periods of papal power. The periodization is substantiated by structural break tests (see the Appendix Section C.)

If the church deepened the fragmentation of territorial authority in Europe, we would expect conflict with the popes to be strongly and positively associated with the fragmentation of medieval authority. That is indeed the case, as Figure 7 reports. The lines represent 95% confidence interval. Papal conflict in the medieval era is represented by the top blue line: it is shows a clear positive association with territorial fragmentation. This is consistent with the proposition that medieval popes actively fragmented territorial authority. Its impact disappears in the early modern period. In contrast, secular conflict has no impact in the medieval period, but is positively associated with early modern fragmentation.

To examine this relationship more closely, I include several potential confounders and alternative explanations. The literature identifies the presence of parliaments and economic development

Figure 7: Territorial fragmentation: papal and secular conflict

as two important forces in medieval state development. First, parliaments may help to consolidate authority: parliaments constrain monarchs and lead to power sharing, thus stabilizing rule (Ertman 1997, Blaydes and Chaney 2013, Stasavage 2010.) I use the indicators of parliamentary presence from Van Zanden, Buringh, and Bosker 2012, which measure the number of years per century that parliaments met in a given state. Second, urbanization serves as a standard proxy used in the literature for economic development. Cities may also contribute to fragmentation, since the rise of cities drove the survival of smaller units in Europe (Abramson 2017), and dense urban populations drove both economic growth and institutional development (Abramson and Boix 2019.) I therefore use the average city population within a grid cell, using data from Bairoch 1988. I include whether or not a given cell belonged to the Holy Roman Empire, to ensure that the results are not simply driven by papal hostility to the emperor. I also include a coding for Protestant in the early modern period, in case the results are driven by the struggles of the Reformation.[27]

Table 1 reports the results. Papal conflict is strongly and positively associated with the fragmentation of territorial authority in the medieval era. These results are robust to the inclusion of

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[27]The spread of Protestantism itself may have been endogenous to fragmentation in the later early modern era: it took off in the fragmented territories of the Holy Roman Empire, the Low Countries, and East Central Europe. Various princes protected the nascent religious reforms within their territories, while others maintained a commitment to Catholicism.

both parliaments and urbanization. The coefficient on medieval papal conflict is even higher when these two variables are included, and retains its significance (see models 1 and 2).[28] Parliaments are negatively associated with fragmentation, and cities are positively associated, in keeping with the existing literature. Status as part of the Holy Roman Empire is not associated with fragmentation in the middle ages. These results are robust both to other measures of fragmentation, and to placebo tests (please see the Appendix.)

In the early modern period, papal conflict initially appears to be positively associated with fragmentation (model 3.) However, once we include status as Protestant for a given cell of territory, this relationship disappears in this and all other specifications (models 4-5). Papal conflict in the early modern era masks the effects of the Protestant Reformation. Instead, secular conflict becomes more closely associated with territorial fragmentation, once we control for the Protestant Reformation (models 4 and 5). However, it *increases* fragmentation, rather than consolidating states. Contrary to the bellicists, then, temporal warfare does not appear to consolidate states. This may be because many states either consolidated before the early modern period (England, Spain, Portugal) or long after (Germany, Italy, Poland.) Further, devastating early modern wars, such as the Thirty Years War (1618-1848) were fought mostly on the already fragmented territory of the Holy Roman Empire, and did little to consolidate it.

Conflict with the popes is thus closely associated with medieval fragmentation, consistent with the proposition that medieval popes actively fragmented territorial authority. An alternative interpretation may be that popes were more likely to enter into conflict with rulers in fragmented areas. Yet the historical evidence suggests that the medieval popes deliberately and consistently targeted what they considered to be their biggest threat at the time: the Holy Roman Empire. Moreover, the empire fragmented *after* papal efforts began in earnest in the 12th century, not before (see Figure 1.) Since smaller and weaker rulers did not pose a threat to church autonomy, they were not the main target of papal efforts.

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[28]Oster sensitivity tests report the delta, or the estimate of proportional bias due to unobservables. Oster proposes 1 as a conventional threshold. Negative signs suggest that the effect of the unobservables would have to run in the opposite reaction for the beta to be 0.

Table 1: Papal Conflict Increases Territorial Fragmentation

	(1) Medieval	(2) Medieval	(3) Early Modern	(4) Early Modern	(5) Early Modern
papal conflict	0.146**	0.175**	0.487***	.	.
	(0.046)	(0.054)	(0.077)		
secular conflict	-0.004	-0.045	0.032	0.290*	0.288*
	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.022)	(0.138)	(0.141)
parliaments		-0.153***			-0.539
		(0.042)			(1.025)
urbanization		0.718***			0.154
		(0.133)			(0.151)
HRE	-0.258	-0.244	0.412***	0.938***	1.052***
	(0.160)	(0.147)	(0.106)	(0.250)	(0.241)
protestant				-0.816	-0.879
				(0.701)	(0.728)
constant	2.018***	1.874***	1.511***	4.488***	4.482***
	(0.038)	(0.049)	(0.039)	(0.544)	(0.643)
$\delta=0=\beta$	-1.05	-1.34	18.78	.	.
N	1,650	1,650	3,665	548	548

$^*\ p < 0.05,\ ^{**}\ p < 0.01,\ ^{***}\ p < 0.001$

5.1 Alternative Explanations

The literature identifies two other potential sources of fragmentation (and consolidation.)

First, inheritance regimes may explain fragmentation. Specifically, primogeniture (the inheritance of all land and office by the oldest son) acts to prevent territorial fragmentation, while partible inheritance divides the land under a rulers control among several heirs. Primogeniture emerged around 1000, adopted by the Capetians in 12th century France and within many families within the Holy Roman Empire by the 13th-14th (Goody 1983, 118, Wilson 2016, 425.) Along with other changes in family law, primogeniture stabilized monarchical rule in Western Christendom and beyond (Goody 1983, Brundage 1990, Sharma 2015, Acharya and Lee 2019.) Kokkonen and Sundell 2014 find that primogeniture extended and stabilized ruler tenure. Since primogeniture is also the basis for dynastic unions of territory, we would expect it to lower fragmentation (Sharma 2015, 169, Teschke 2003, 225.)[29]

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[29]Others argue that despite prominent examples such as the union of Aragon and Castile through the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella, or the uxorious expansion of early modern Austria, the main reason for contracting such marriages were alliances rather than uniting territory. Further, territorial acquisition through dynastic unions only emerged after the 15th century, and could not be responsible for medieval territorial fragmentation or consolidation. Even in Habsburg Austria, the rapid accumulation of dynastic

Second, the rise of communes in the late 11th -12th century would preclude the easy consolidation of territorial authority. In the city belt that stretched from central Italy to North Germany, numerous and relatively strong cities prevented rulers from establishing and centralizing authority (Rokkan 1975, Tilly 1992, Blockmans and Tilly 1994, Wickham 2015, Wilson 2016, Abramson 2017.) Thus, it is no accident that the "city-studded center" (Rokkan 1975) arose precisely where rulers were preoccupied with papal conflict. I therefore include both communes (data from Van Zanden, Bosker, and Buringh 2012) and primogeniture (data from Kokkonen and Sundell 2014) in the analyses.

Table 2: Territorial Fragmentation: Communes and Primogeniture as Alternative Explanations

	(1) Medieval	(2) Medieval	(3) Early Modern	(4) Early Modern	(5) Early Modern
papal conflict	0.137**	-0.088	0.256***	.	.
	(0.046)	(0.090)	(0.059)		
secular conflict	-0.066	0.068	0.030	0.328*	0.486**
	(0.045)	(0.036)	(0.033)	(0.149)	(0.158)
parliaments	-0.283***	-0.085**	-0.223***	-0.637	-1.113
	(0.065)	(0.028)	(0.067)	(1.036)	(0.604)
urbanization	0.358**	0.202*	0.034	0.192	0.074
	(0.121)	(0.079)	(0.030)	(0.151)	(0.149)
primogeniture		-0.068			0.457
		(0.078)			(0.310)
communes	0.654***		0.530***	-1.241	
	(0.132)		(0.122)	(0.629)	
HRE	-0.365*	-0.016	-0.175	1.055***	0.635**
	(0.170)	(0.177)	(0.101)	(0.247)	(0.209)
protestant				-0.920	-0.148
				(0.765)	(0.686)
Constant	1.913***	1.941***	1.742***	5.210***	3.642***
	(0.052)	(0.055)	(0.043)	(0.764)	(0.661)
$\delta=0=\beta$	-1.21	3.89	17.49	.	.
N	1,650	1,081	6,123	548	486

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 2 reports the results. Papal conflict continues to have a positive association with medieval fragmentation. Primogeniture swamps out papal conflict, but it has no independent impact on fragmentation (models 2 and 5). Communes have a positive relationship with medieval frag-

possessions in 1477-1536 did not expand the empire. Finally, dynastic gains in the other most likely case, England, were not permanent and lost. (See Fichtner 1976, Sharp 2001, Bonner 2003, Joseph 2015 and Wilson 2016, 436.)

mentation, as the existing literature predicts (model 1.) If we include communes, belonging to the Holy Roman Empire has a negative effect.

In the early modern period, we once again see papal conflict have a strong and positive relationship with fragmentation (model 3), which drops out once we include status as Protestant. Papal conflict then disappears entirely as a factor in early modern fragmentation. Finally, secular conflict becomes important, but only in the early modern period, and only if we include Protestant (models 4 and 5.) The coefficient is positive, again suggesting that war breaks up states rather than consolidating them.

In short, medieval conflict with the papacy is strongly associated with territorial fragmentation, independently of parliaments, urbanization, and communes. In the early modern period, secular conflict becomes more closely associated with territorial fragmentation, once we control for the Protestant Reformation. However, it *increases* fragmentation, rather than consolidating states. Primogeniture does not appear to have an independent effect, but it greatly attenuates the impact of papal conflict.

Primogeniture and communes were themselves shaped by the papacy. Primogeniture and female inheritance can be traced back to earlier changes in the Church family and marriage laws designed to funnel wealth into the Church (Goody 1983, see also Møller 2019, 217.) The Church introduced changes in marriage law, beginning in earnest in the 10th century, including monogamy, stricter definitions of legitimate children, constraints on marriage among distant relatives, and prohibitions on adoption and divorce (Goody 1983, Acharya and Lee 2019, Gorski and Sharma 2017, 204.) Many of these allowed the church to benefit financially, since they limited the number of potential heirs—and increased the probability the assets would revert to the church. These changes in family law, in turn, prompted the rise of primogeniture (Kokkonen and Sundell 2014, Møller 2019.)

Communes themselves first arose in the late 11th century, filling the vacuum left behind by the withdrawal of imperial authority in Italy, and as such, can be seen as an indirect result of papal conflict with the emperors (Hyde 1973, Wickham 2016.) As Doucette and Møller show, self-governing towns arose where the central government was too weak to assert control (Doucette and Møller 2021, see also Stasavage 2010 and Stasavage 2020 ch. 5.) The Church itself diffused

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Table 3: Primogeniture mediates the impact of papal conflict but communes do not

	(1) Medieval Primogeniture	(2) Early Modern Primogeniture	(3) Medieval Communes	(4) Early Modern Communes
Avg Causal Mediation Effect	.16	.09	0.20	.18
	(.14-.17)	(.08-.10)	(-.02-.06)	(-.04-.42)
Avg Direct Effect	.32	.90	-.12	.43
	(.26-.37)	(.81-.98)	(-.33-.08)	(-.29-1.09)
Total Effect	.48	.99	-.09	-.61
	(.42-.53)	(.89-.107)	(-.31-.10)	(-.16-1.35)
% of effect mediated	33	9	14	27.5
	(.30-.38)	(.08-.09)	(-2.01-1.65)	(-1.1-2.82)

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

norms of local self-governance through bishops and monastic reform (Møller and Doucette 20201.) Thus, cities expanded greatly in the 13th and 14th centuries, *after* the fragmentation of the 11-12th century.[30]

As a result, one possibility is that the impact of papal conflict is mediated by primogeniture or communes. Table 4 shows the results of causal mediation analyses described in (Imai et al 2011), which suggest that while primogeniture mediates the impact of papal conflict, but communes do not. Primogeniture mediates roughly 33% of the causal effect of papal conflict in the medieval era and 9% in the early modern. In the case of communes in both the medieval and early modern periods, however, the confidence intervals include 0, and thus the mediated effect is unclear.

If communes do not mediate the impact of papal conflict, it may be that papal conflict led to *both* the fragmentation of territorial authority and the rise of communes. As Max Weber and Otto Hintze have already noted, towns seized autonomy and control during the conflict between popes and emperors in the late 11th century, and the subsequent imperial power vacuum (Ertman 2017, 61, Ringer 2004, 206, Weber 1958.) Cities could carve out a sphere of independent activity, of relative autonomy and burgher rights. Local self-governance started to take off after 1000, and then grew further in the shadow of imperial-papal conflict (see Møller and Doucette 2021, 84, Wickham 2015, 9, Wickham 2016, 148ff, Watts 2009, 99.) To curry local support, both popes and emperors granted new charters with substantial privileges to lay officials and new political rights, which "only

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[30]For example, Germany went from 250 cities in 1200 to over a thousand a century later. By 1400, 3,000 had city rights (Jedin 1993, 322ff.) Many of these were episcopal cities, where bishops sought to maintain their supremacy, resulting in constant conflict.

Figure 8: Communes

strengthened the sense of agency that the urban population felt," giving new agency, urgency, and responsibilities to communal self-government (Witt 2012, 206.)

For their part, bishops often cooperated with the creation of communes, and communal institutions then mirrored religious ones (Coleman 1999, 394-5, Schwartzberg 2014, 51, see especially Møller and Doucette 2021.) They could also have highly antagonistic relationship, one that could even erupt in violence and murder: the Roman commune arose in the 1140s to rebel against papal authority, also eventually resorting to violence. Communes often served as an instrument of liberation from the captivity of worldly and abusive bishops (Malegam 2013, 231.)

To test whether communes as they emerged in the middle ages are themselves associated with papal conflict and fragmentation, I use the same data and two-way fixed effects OLS regressions as above, but now the presence of communes (from Van Zander, Bosker, and Buringh 2012) is the dependent variable. I also include the presence of bishoprics in a given cell, to proxy for the influence of bishops.

Figure 7 shows that medieval conflict with popes is strongly and positively associated with communes. Secular conflict is not related to the emergence of communes in either the medieval or early modern eras. Bishops and fragmentation are strongly and positively related to the rise

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Medieval	Medieval	Medieval	Early Modern	Early Modern	Early Modern
papal conflict	0.13***	0.12***	0.05	0.10	0.10	0.13
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
secular conflict	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
bishops		0.39***	0.19**			
		(0.08)	(0.06)			
fragmentation		0.15***	0.11***		-0.01	-0.00
		(0.03)	(0.02)		(0.01)	(0.01)
parliaments			0.21***			0.10
			(0.05)			(0.08)
urbanization			0.44***			0.04***
			(0.06)			(0.01)
constant	0.21***	-1.11***	-0.69***	0.32***	0.34***	0.25***
	(0.01)	(0.20)	(0.15)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.04)
N	1,650	1,650	1,650	3,665	3,665	3,665

Table 4: Communes

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

of communes. This is consistent with the argument that the power vacuum associated with papal conflict and territorial fragmentation allowed medieval communes to flourish. Once we include parliaments and urbanization, bishops and fragmentation retain their relationship, but papal conflict does not. (Please see the Appendix for robustness tests.) In the early modern period, in contrast, none of these variables predict the rise of communes. Communes themselves changed: Italian communes became regional powers, expanding their authority over surrounding territory and ceding governance to prominent families and cartels. Elsewhere, communes fell under the renewed control of local nobles and princes.

These empirical regularities are consistent with the core argument of this paper: that the conflict between the papacy and secular monarchs, and especially the Holy Roman Empire, fragmented territorial authority. It also allowed other forms of autonomous governance to arise and escape imperial control, with papal conflict and bishops as the critical forces in the Middle Ages.

6 Conclusion: Missa Finita Est?

Bellicist accounts argue that the medieval fragmentation of Europe gave way to state consolidation through warfare. In these accounts, secular conflict winnowed out small states and institutions arose

in response to the pressures of war. Early modern warfare ended the territorial fragmentation of Europe and incidentally established state institutions.

This paper argues instead that the roots of the European state reach back further, to the medieval era. Fragmentation was deliberate, persistent, and popes helped to sustain it. States did not consolidate uniformly: the Church contributed to the fragmentation of territorial authority of powers it saw as hostile (chiefly the Holy Roman Empire), and helped to consolidate the development of the central state in other areas. War was neither necessary nor sufficient to build states, in both the medieval and early modern eras: some highly fragmented states survived until the 19th century, while others consolidated without the pressures of war. Indeed, papal conflict increased fragmentation in the medieval period, and secular conflict in the early modern. By the same token, state institutions arose centuries before early modern warfare would have necessitated them, in those lands medieval rulers could consolidate power and adopt ecclesiastical innovations.

Medieval state formation was shaped by religious authority. By shifting attention to the single most geopolitical rival of the medieval era, the Catholic Church, we gain a new perspective on state formation in Europe. State formation began earlier, and this medieval state development differed from early modern in the key protagonists, motivations, and mechanisms. Popes and bishops, rather than kings alone, were critical. The medieval papacy was consumed with preventing the resurrection of a rival superpower, the German Empire. It used both spiritual and secular instruments to fragment territorial authority, using ideology, legal arguments, proxy wars, and maledictions to achieve its aims. The motivation was church autonomy, which mean the key rival was the Holy Roman Empire. The mechanisms consisted of both rivalry and emulation, of both temporal alliances and spiritual weapons, rather than interstate conflict necessitating state institutions.

This argument builds on both an older tradition that notes how the Church helped to diffuse the rule of law and administrative norms throughout Europe, and more recent work that emphasizes the importance of the church to medieval state building and its legacies (Hintze 1931/ 1975, Kiernan 1965, Bendix 1978, Ergang 1971, Poggi 1990, Fukuyama 2011, Doucette and Møller 2021, Møller and Doucette 2021.) The contribution of this analysis is to compare the impact of the church to other sources of fragmentation, specify the secular and temporal tactics used by the church, and draw our attention to the direct mechanisms that helped to fragment territorial authority (papal

conflict) and the indirect ones (empowering nobles and communes.)

The irony is that with these successes, the church ordained its own fall from grace. The very political fragmentation that it fomented meant that subsequently, when the Protestant Reformation took off, individual princes and lords could protect the new rival religion from a reassertion of Catholic monopoly. It is no accident that the Reformation took off in fragmented Germany, or that Frederick III, the Elector of Saxony, could successfully protect Luther against the vengeance of both the Pope and the German Emperor. In battling monarchs with both laws and arms, the church led these rulers to sharpen their own legal arguments and buttress their own administrative and legal infrastructure. Secular nobles replaced bishops and clerics in the administration. Within kingdoms, rulers increasingly decided who would serve and who could govern the church.

In winning battles, the Church lost the war. Yet this eventual supremacy of the state would not be possible without the medieval church, the clashing ambitions of medieval popes and rulers, and the early state formation they engendered.

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1 Appendix

The analyses in this paper rely on two data sets. The first adds data on excommunications and reasons from the New Cambridge Medieval History volumes and the New Catholic Encyclopedia to an existing data set used by Blaydes and Chaney 2013, who rely on data on dynasties, rulers, and the duration of rule from Morby 1989 and Bosworth 1996.

The second data set spans the years from 1000 to 1850, and includes all European states for a total of 31,969 state-year observations (not all observations contain all variables.)

This data set builds on several existing sources of data from Abramson 2017, Bosker et al 2013, Blaydes and Chaney 2013, and Dincecco and Onorato 2016. Data on fragmentation and territorial boundaries comes from MPIDR [Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research] and CGG [Chair for Geodesy and Geoinformatics, University of Rostock] 2013: MPIDR Population History GIS Collection, Mosaic Census Collection.

I compiled data on monasteries, bishoprics, and cathedrals from the Digital Atlas of Medieval and Roman Civilizations (darmc.harvard.edu) and augmented these with new data on monasteries and bishoprics, especially in Eastern Europe.

The measure of papal conflict consists of the number of clearly identifiable wars by proxy against papal enemies, papal depositions of secular rulers, political crusades, and attacks either led or financed by the popes directly over a rolling five year period, collected from the Cambridge Medieval History and Dupuy and Dupuy 1993 (see also Brecke 2012.) The measures of secular conflict come from Dincecco and Onorato 2016, who code whether armed conflict occurred in a given site in the preceding 150 years. Data on communes and urbanization (specifically, the log of the city populations in a given year) comes from Bairoch 1988, Van Zander, Buringh, and Bosker 2012, and Dincecco and Onorato 2016.

Needless to say, the usual caveats apply: data reaching back to the 10th century is scarce, and it may be missing systematically thanks to subsequent destruction of documents and archives. It is unlikely to be fully reliable, as both medieval sources and their secondary collations often rely on post-hoc estimates rather than contemporary data collection.

2   Variable Summary

	count	mean	sd	min	max
		(1)			
fragmentation	105111	1.825213	2.439251	1	33
secular conflict	6123	.2531439	.9971887	0	13
papal conflict	105111	.0658161	.311769	0	9
parliaments	105111	.4888166	1.355119	0	14
urbanization	105111	.5324467	1.440717	0	35
communes	6123	.3078556	.8031191	0	9
primogeniture	67482	.649309	.4678887	0	1
bishops	105111	2.218664	4.552118	0	40
HRE	105111	.9292748	.2563665	0	1
protestant	18034	.7226252	.4116617	0	1
Observations	105111				

3   Periodization

The analyses are split into two time periods: 1000-1400 and 1450-1800, to reflect the prevailing periodization for the medieval and early modern eras. These are fuzzy boundaries: nonetheless, they coincide with the peak of papal power, and the post-Reformation period, which suggests that we would expect different the papacy to have a much stronger impact in the first period than in the second.

To further substantiate this break, I used Chow tests this periodization. These confirm the validity of this periodization: We cannot reject the null hypothesis of stable coefficients before 1350 or after 1500 for both the fragmentation and commune regressions, further justifying this break in the analysis. In all subsequent tables, the analysis is split into these two time periods: Medieval (M) and Early Modern (EM).

Below, I include two sets of robustness tests: a) different specifications of the dependent variables and/ or controls, and c) placebo tests using the papal conflict variable with a 150 year lead.

4   Different Specifications

Table 1 shows the results of two-way fixed effects regressions for different specifications of fragmentation as a) the number of states within a 250km centroid of a state, and b) within the 1900 borders of states. Papal conflict remains significant and positive in the middle ages, in keeping with the argument of presented in the paper. I include the controls from the original regressions:

parliaments and urbanization.

Table 1: Papal Conflict Increases Territorial Fragmentation

	(1) 250km Medieval	(2) 1900 Medieval	(3) 250km Early Modern	(4) 1900 Early Modern
papal conflict	2.004***	7.703*	0.941	12.715**
	(0.498)	(3.837)	(0.786)	(3.823)
secular conflict	0.936	-0.968	3.023	1.303
	(1.301)	(9.906)	(1.826)	(2.385)
parliaments	-0.083*	-0.586**	0.071	0.007
	(0.037)	(0.203)	(0.051)	(0.139)
urbanization	-0.089	-0.254	-0.053	-0.113
	(0.125)	(0.622)	(0.035)	(0.106)
constant	9.689***	39.623***	20.050***	126.887***
	(0.189)	(1.043)	(0.370)	(0.877)
$\beta = \delta = 0$	-2.04	-1.08	-.98	-3.21
N	235	231	250	241

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 1 shows that papal conflict remains a consistent predictor of territorial fragmentation proxied by these different measures.

5   Placebo Tests

This section presents the results of placebo tests for the fragmentation regressions. I take a 150 year lead of the papal conflict variable, and regress it on measures of fragmentation. The logic is that papal conflict should predict contemporary or future fragmentation, but not the *past* values. I run several specifications that include both the medieval and early modern eras, and find that future papal conflict is highly unstable (signs are positive and negative, even within the same eras), and it is never statistically significant in the medieval era.

Table 2 reports the results of the same regressions as in Table 1 in the main text, but with a papal conflict lead.

Table 3 reports the same results as Table 2 in the main text, but with a papal conflict lead.

The placebo tests in the grid cell data show that the association between the placebo and fragmentation falls out entirely in the medieval period, and shows no association with fragmentation in the early modern. We see the same non-relationship between the placebos and fragmentation when alternative explanations are included.

Finally, Table 4 reports the results of the placebo tests for communes:

Table 2: Placebo Tests for Papal Conflict

	(1) Medieval	(2) Medieval	(3) Early Modern	(4) Early Modern	(5) Early Modern
papal conflict lead			-0.009	0.089	0.103
			(0.037)	(0.360)	(0.338)
secular conflict	0.000	-0.040	0.036	0.284*	0.284*
	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.023)	(0.138)	(0.143)
parliaments		-0.141***			-0.566
		(0.040)			(1.022)
urbanization		0.716***			0.148
		(0.134)			(0.147)
HRE	-0.221	-0.198	0.435***	0.915**	1.019***
	(0.166)	(0.156)	(0.107)	(0.306)	(0.296)
protestant				-0.835	-0.901
				(0.704)	(0.728)
Constant	2.028***	1.881***	1.506***	4.513***	4.529***
	(0.040)	(0.050)	(0.039)	(0.566)	(0.655)
N	1,650	1,650	3,662	548	548

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 3: Placebo Tests for Papal Conflict: alternative explanations

	(1) Medieval	(2) Medieval	(3) Early Modern	(4) Early Modern	(5) Early Modern
papal conflict lead			-0.004	0.119	0.213
			(0.037)	(0.333)	(0.328)
secular conflict	-0.062	0.038	0.039	0.323*	0.565***
	(0.045)	(0.036)	(0.023)	(0.150)	(0.163)
parliaments	-0.275***	-0.139**	-0.136	-0.669	-1.318*
	(0.063)	(0.044)	(0.155)	(1.032)	(0.640)
urbanization	0.353**	0.052	-0.012	0.185	0.121
	(0.122)	(0.079)	(0.013)	(0.148)	(0.151)
communes	0.661***	0.298**	-0.025	-1.254	-1.641*
	(0.133)	(0.111)	(0.064)	(0.643)	(0.685)
primogeniture		-0.047			0.518
		(0.077)			(0.273)
HRE	-0.330	-0.076	0.420***	1.017***	0.567*
	(0.177)	(0.183)	(0.104)	(0.300)	(0.235)
protestant				-0.946	-0.293
				(0.763)	(0.741)
Constant	1.919***	1.939***	1.601***	5.271***	4.582***
	(0.053)	(0.056)	(0.084)	(0.786)	(0.792)
N	1,650	1,081	3,662	548	486

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 4: Communes Placebo Tests

	(1) All	(2) Medieval	(3) 250km medieval	(4) 500km medieval	(5) c5	(6) Bf
papal conflict lead	.	.	.	0.02	0.02	0.01
				(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
secular conflict	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
bishops		0.39***	0.18**			
		(0.08)	(0.06)			
fragmentation		0.15***	0.11***		-0.01	-0.00
		(0.03)	(0.02)		(0.01)	(0.01)
parliaments			0.21***			0.09
			(0.05)			(0.08)
urbanization			0.44***			0.04***
			(0.06)			(0.01)
Constant	0.23***	-1.09***	-0.68***	0.32***	0.33***	0.25***
	(0.01)	(0.20)	(0.15)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.04)
N	1,650	1,650	1,650	3,662	3,662	3,662

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$