poetry, and as a result, automatization of the *ehoie*-formula occurs. Somewhere in this stage the genre is "appropriated" by the poet of the *Odyssey*.

c. The classic, canonical phase: This is represented by the Hesiodic GK.
d. A later stage of creative reuse: GK becomes a model for certain types of Hellenistic erotic elegy.

CHAPTER FIVE

Herodotus's Genre(s)

DEBORAH BOEDEKER

Introduction

The Father of History is embroiled in paternity suits. Herodotus is both hailed as the single parent of a new genre and considered but one of many contributors to a variety of prose subgenres. He is charged with falsely claiming to report investigations into history and ethnography, and yet is defended as the first serious researcher interested primarily in discovering facts about past human experience. He is portrayed as a transmitter of traditional cultural values conveyed in stories about the past but also described as struggling to master unwieldy traditions and to give them a stable form.[1]

Such controversies demonstrate the vibrancy of contemporary Herodotean studies. By analyzing the *Histories'* rhetoric and cultural context as attentively as its subject matter, recent scholarship has made great progress in interpreting this complex and puzzling work for its current readers. No longer is it appropriate, at the beginning of a study such as this one, to call up as a straw man Herodotus the charming but naive storyteller: this view of him no longer prevails among Herodoteans.[2]

The nature of the *Histories* is still far from settled, however, as the "charges" just listed make clear. We cannot know, generally speaking, how Herodotus's material compares with what his sources reported, or how he decided what to include (and in what order) and what to leave out, or how and for whom his work was "published." To what degree is the *Histories* concerned with accurately reporting past events and foreign customs, with their significance for a contemporary or even future audience, or with establishing its own authority and superiority over other narratives? Should we look for significance in each story in-

dependently or in meaningful *patterns* of stories?[3] We cannot even be confident that we know how to read Herodotus's apparently autobiographical statements.[4] Nor is it likely that the answers to these questions would be the same for all parts of the *Histories*.

I do not expect to address, let alone solve, all these issues in this brief chapter. Rather, after surveying the major debate about the nature of the *Histories*, I will focus on what the work has to say about various kinds of narrative—including its own. Occasionally Herodotus speaks of other texts in terms of the narrative strategies or critical methods that limit them; as we shall see, he claims to transcend their limitations with a different kind of logos. The concern to distinguish his logos from others helps point out the avowed parameters, methods, and intentions of the *Histories*, and suggests that Herodotus was concerned with what can be called differences in genre.

The Debate: Is Herodotus a Historian?

What becomes clear when we consider Herodotus's discussion of other genres is that his own genre is very much in question: this situation is what gives rise to most of the uncertainties just listed. Donald Lateiner solves the problem neatly by calling the *Histories* a genre of its own, one that stimulated later practitioners but was never reproduced.[5] On the other hand, it could be argued that the remarkably wide range of the work in its contents, in the role of its narrator, perhaps even in its chronological range from remote to recent past, comprises more than a single genre:[6] its contents include political/military events, ethnography and local history, and geography; its discourses include those of historical fiction (the tale of Candaules, his wife, and Gyges: 1.8–12), rationalistic demythologizing (Helen was not really at Troy: 2.120), critical oral history (Spartans versus Samians on what happened to a valuable gift: 1.70), and scientific historiography (why Herodotus concludes that it was Ephialtes who showed Xerxes the path at Thermopylae: 7.214). It is difficult to subsume all these kinds of materials and authorial voices under one generic umbrella.

For the moment though, we can begin with the fact that Herodotus was deemed a "historian" (*historikos* and writer of *historia*) by Aristotle (*Poetics* 9), about a century after his time, and "father of history" (*pater historiae*) by Cicero much later. These titles, necessarily bestowed in retrospect,[7] indicate that Herodotus's work became one of those successful "possible solutions" attempted by authors that, according to Gian Biagio Conte, eventually gain authority and are accepted by tradition as contributing to a norm, a new genre.[8] I will be concerned in part with the degree to which Herodotus shows himself aware of engaging in the process of finding a new discursive form.

In particular, there are instructive points of contact between Herodotus and his closest successor (who never mentions him by name); Thucydides took Herodotus's work as a starting point (chronologically and otherwise) and as both a positive and a negative model. For example, as John Moles has recently demonstrated, Thucydides' prologue bears a very close relationship to Herodotus's. Moles argues that Thucydides' aims and methods are more similar to those of his predecessor than have been generally assumed—probably because the later historian's strong claims for originality and superiority tend to persuade his readers, as well as to mask his text's many resemblances to the *Histories*.[9] It is appropriate, then, for us to consider Herodotus an early practitioner of what would be defined as *historia*, even while acknowledging that his work may predate any formal awareness of such a genre.

As soon as we grant all this, however, a serious problem arises, for a great deal of material presented in the *Histories*, both historical and descriptive, simply cannot be accurate. In considering how Herodotus conceived of his work "generically," we must ask about the extent to which he was concerned with discovering and presenting facts. This issue is a subject of much recent debate. One version of the controversy, an ancient but still vital one, frames the problem as one of "truth versus lies," and focuses on the accuracy and credibility of the *Histories*: did Herodotus simply make things up? A more recent and equally fundamental version of the question is concerned rather with "history versus rhetoric": given the impossibility of fully re-creating the past, is it fruitful to approach "history" as a (more or less accurate) representation of past events and processes, rather than as an author's literary creation?[10] I will summarize these two aspects of the debate, before turning to what Herodotus's text may be able to tell us about genres.

In a series of studies published between 1977 and 1985, O. Kimball Armayor argued that Herodotus must never have seen a number of sites in the Near East, Egypt, and Thrace for which he claims personal autopsy, such as the great labyrinth near Lake Moeris in the Egyptian Fayyum (2.148). Armayor maintains not only that Herodotus's description of the lake is highly inaccurate but also that his description of the labyrinth derives from a Pythagorean model and from Homer.[11]

Armayor's critique of Herodotus's claims was approved by Detlev Fehling, when his 1971 book on Herodotus's alleged sources (not cited by Armayor) was expanded and translated into English in 1989. Fehling fundamentally attacks Herodotus's trustworthiness, arguing that his entire system of named sources and claims of personal autopsy is essentially a fiction. He charges, for example, that in order to establish credibility, the author puts words into the mouths only

of those who would be the most likely informants for each part of his "history."[12] Like Armayor, Fehling too charges that Herodotus claims to have observed places he badly misdescribes, such as the pyramids at Giza (2.126.2).[13]

Fehling asserts, in effect, that Herodotus wrote as if he were a serious historian before the mechanisms for historiographical research were developed. To explain this paradox, Fehling argues that Herodotus must have imagined how, in ideal circumstances of which he had no personal experience, one would go about getting good sources of information—and that he constructed the *Histories* on this "as-if" basis.[14] Fehling's position of course has very unsettling consequences: Herodotus is our major source for the political and military events of a crucial historical period, and indeed for a great deal of our earliest and most coherent information about the ancient world.[15] If we cannot take the narrator of the *Histories* at face value, this inability affects not only our assessment of his literary role and his work's intended function, but also, in a different interpretive realm, our evaluation of its historical usefulness.[16]

François Hartog's book *The Mirror of Herodotus*, published in 1980 and translated into English in 1988, also casts doubt on Herodotus as a straightforward transmitter of what was reported to him. Hartog argues that Herodotus's description of the ancient Scythians is based not only on data available to him (some of which—supported by archaeological findings—Hartog accepts as accurate), but on a rhetorical strategy to describe Scythia as the "other" with respect to both Persia and Greece. It is possible to judge Hartog's conclusions as a reflection more of his own structuralist approach, which influenced his selection and emphasis of certain elements, than of Herodotus's text itself.[17] Yet the "rhetoric of otherness," as Hartog characterizes the *Histories'* description of foreign customs in terms that recall their Greek opposites, is not merely the predetermined result of Hartog's methodology. Scholars with quite different approaches to the *Histories* also conclude that Herodotus's Greek perspective determined how he described foreign cultures.[18]

Stephanie West presents a thesis related to Fehling's, with regard to Herodotus's often very inaccurate reports of inscriptions both Greek and foreign.[19] In noting that the speaker sometimes claims to have seen these inscriptions himself, West suggests, "[W]e perhaps do [Herodotus] an injustice by taking at face-value a use of the first person which may have been understood by his original audience as a literary convention without any necessary connection with the author's autobiography."[20] This remark raises questions related to literary genre, but West does not pursue them here.

On the other side of the debate from Armayor, Fehling, Hartog, and West are Herodotus's "apologists," including especially W. Kendrick Pritchett, who sharply delineates the opposing positions and vigorously defends Herodotus against all charges of prevarication.[21] Pritchett marshals evidence from many disciplines to disprove the charge that Herodotus was anything other than a serious historian doing his best to obtain and report information. Independent written sources, archaeological material, and comparative evidence from other cultures indicate that apparently far-fetched reports in the *Histories* may often be based on real practices.[22]

Pritchett describes a Herodotus who writes with high standards of veracity and accuracy, one who approaches his task as we would expect a modern historian to do,[23] while also acknowledging that the author of the *Histories* is primarily an *oral* historian using sources of varied reliability (as Herodotus himself repeatedly emphasizes), and naturally sharing a fifth-century worldview.[24] Pritchett's view of the *Histories*—ironically not unlike Fehling's in this respect—assumes that the work follows (Fehling would say, "purports to follow") the norms of an established genre of historiography: "the claims and objective of one who is writing history are quite different from those of one who is writing a work of fiction."[25] Pritchett's point is well taken: many of the alleged "lies" in Herodotus's work derive from other sources, Greek and non-Greek, and were believed by other ancient authors. In general, however, I do not share Pritchett's position that everything Herodotus says must be true (or as "true" as he can make it) in order for us to trust and respect him as an author: I will argue that the *Histories* includes too many different kinds of writing for this to be the case.

Gordon Shrimpton has more recently studied the question of Herodotus's attribution of material to various sources. Shrimpton's main concern is not whether Herodotus "got it right"—whether extra-Herodotean data can confirm material in the text. Rather, he is interested in the functions of historical memory within cultures, and with corresponding differences between ancient and contemporary historical writing. Directly confronting Fehling's charges, Shrimpton and his collaborator Kathryn Gillis provide a statistical analysis of all of Herodotus's source citations—a study that points to conclusions very different from those drawn by Fehling. In particular, they find that most citations of specific sources correlate with an indication that Herodotus *doubts* the information conveyed.[26]

I agree with Shrimpton that the question of Herodotean fictions cannot be simply resolved. Not every single discrepancy cited by the "liar school" has been successfully contested. One of few discrepancies that Pritchett cannot explain, for example, is the very lengthy inscription that Themistocles is supposed to have had cut in the rocks at Artemisium, asking the Ionians in Xerxes' fleet not to engage in battle against fellow Hellenes (8.22). At least Herodotus does not

say that he saw these inscriptions personally, although he does purport to quote what they said.[27] It is more illuminating to consider Herodotus's narrative strategy in this passage, rather than the literal truth of what he says. Instead of merely labeling the rock-carved message a fabrication, we can more appropriately regard it as a device used to dramatize an important strategic and moral issue: with Themistocles' inscription, Herodotus expresses what he believes must have been at stake in the confrontation between mainland Greeks and the Greeks in Xerxes' armada. Many of the speeches in Herodotus, it is widely recognized, have comparable functions. Like the alleged inscriptions, these passages use fabricated speeches to set forth what the historian sees as underlying issues.

Fehling correctly observes that Herodotus takes pains to *present* himself as a serious gatherer of evidence; yet the fact that he does so of course need not preclude his trying to report events and their causes as accurately as he can.[28] Moreover, evidence is increasing that the *Histories* presents a great deal of well-founded historical and ethnographic information—not, of course, without its share of cultural distortion. In the face of all the data that Pritchett and others[29] have brought to bear against a thesis of made-up source citations, as well as the conclusions of Shrimpton and Gillis's thorough analysis of Herodotus's source citations, Fehling's basic assertion appears weak.

The second, and related, part of the debate in Herodotean studies concerns whether the *Histories* can fruitfully be studied as history, or whether it should be confined to literary analysis. Taking an extreme position, A. J. Woodman (who considers Herodotus only tangentially) argues that ancient historiography should be considered essentially a rhetorical rather than a scientific genre: the past is beyond accurate recall even to eyewitnesses, and representations of it depend largely on decisions about what to include, as well as about how and where to present it in a narrative.[30] John Moles would modify Woodman's position, on the grounds that style and content cannot be separated but must be considered together.[31] Obviously the text of Herodotus, like any other literary text, is by no means innocent of rhetorical strategies. Claude Calame, for example, surveys how Herodotus indicates shifting levels of authority or credibility for his subject matter by varying his stance toward the material he reports: unlike the Homeric narrator, Herodotus shows some anxiety about his audience's acceptance of what he says.[32] Herodotus's construction of credibility and authority is an essential aspect of the genre he is developing.[33] In trying to understand how that incipient genre is imagined, we shall survey what the *Histories* has to say about how other texts relate to their subject matter and audiences.

Herodotus on Other Genres

As Conte has suggested and other contributions to this volume amply demonstrate, a literary genre is significant only in relation to other genres.[34] It is time, then, to move from considering basic characteristics of Herodotus's work as debated by modern scholars to analyzing what Herodotus himself says about "genres" (for want of a better term), in part as a way of clarifying the parameters of his own work.[35]

Of all the literary types cited by Herodotus, Homeric epic is by far the most frequently mentioned. Herodotus's debt to Homer has of course long been recognized.[36] His prologue recalls both *Iliad* and *Odyssey;* his primary subject, like that of the *Iliad,* is a mighty war fought between those who dwell in Greece and Asia, expanded by "Odyssean" tales of travels to distant places and strange sights.[37] Moreover, Herodotus's stated purpose, reminiscent of epic *kleos,* is to preserve the fame of great deeds. Even part of what he "knows" about the distant past depends on Homeric poetry.[38]

Notwithstanding these obvious points of contact, Herodotus by no means claims to be following Homeric and Hesiodic precedents; rather, as Herman Verdin has shown especially clearly, he freely criticizes epic poets as trustworthy sources.[39] He implicitly discounts the idea that reliable tradition, let alone a Muse, necessarily provided poets with their material. The only time Herodotus mentions a poet's divine inspiration is quite suspect: he says that Aristeas of Proconessus (4.13), "possessed by Apollo" (φοιβόλαμπτος γενόμενος), visited and made poems about wondrous inhabitants of the far north: one-eyed Arimaspians, gold-guarding griffins, and finally the Hyperboreans. The existence of the latter is soon amusingly thrown into doubt, when Herodotus claims that if there are Hyperboreans living beyond the North Wind, there must be Hypernotians living beyond the South (4.36).[40] Poetic inspiration such as Aristeas's is clearly not linked with veracity by Herodotus.[41]

Even though he sometimes uses it as a source, Herodotus is critical of epic narrative, seeing it as potentially fictional. This idea appears explicitly in a number of contexts (all in ethnographic sections of the *Histories*): Homer or an older poet "invented" the name Okeanos and introduced it into his poetry (2.23);[42] Homer and Hesiod "made" the Greek theogony (2.53.2); some poet "made" the (Greek) name of the Eridanus River—thus causing Herodotus to doubt the river's very existence (3.115.2). In this light, it is significant that the words *poêsis* "something made/poetry" and *poiêtes* "maker/poet" are first attested in the *Histories,* and are used there, together with the related verb *poieo,* to emphasize the "fabricated" nature of poetic narrative.[43]

When they do not "make" it themselves, Herodotus's poets "use"

(χράομαι) or even "seize/steal" (ἁρπάζω) material from other sources. He reports, for example, that some of the Greeks who are "in poetry" (presumably as opposed to prose logographers) use the Egyptian belief that one's birthdate affects one's life (2.82); similarly, Aeschylus stole (ἥρπασε) from an Egyptian logos when he, alone of earlier poets, "made" Artemis the daughter of Demeter (2.156.6).[44] Poets, however, and perhaps other authors as well, tend to conceal their sources: "There are some Greeks who have used this logos [the allegedly Egyptian account of the transmigration of souls[45]] as if it were their own"; Herodotus disdains even to record their names (Empedocles? Pythagoras? Orpheus?) in his text (2.123).

Herodotus too must use accounts (*logoi*) from other sources, but unlike his poets, he often self-consciously reports where a story comes from.[46] As we have seen, this information is frequently intended to raise (and sometimes to dispel, as in 8.65.6) doubts about its credibility. This is his tendency whether the story comes from poets ("if you have to say what is used by epic poets," then Priam was losing several sons each time a battle was fought at Troy, and it was very unlikely that he would not have given Helen up to the Greeks if she had really been in his city [2.120]); or interested parties ("this is just what the Spartans would say," according to Herodotus, to exonerate themselves from the charge that they privately sold a great vessel that had been intended for delivery to Croesus [1.70.3]); or even whole peoples ("let him use the things said by the Egyptians [fabulous tales about Rhampsinitis] whoever finds them credible. It underlies my whole logos that I write the things said by various people to my hearing" [2.123.1]).

A logos thus is a commodity that can be appropriated, even stolen. As in the case of Aeschylus cited earlier, Herodotus sometimes applies standards to other authors' use of logoi that resemble later notions of intellectual property. In addition, logoi can be more or less credible, and also more or less biased by the self-interest of those who tell them. Herodotus's criteria of plausibility often sound "natural" to modern readers.

At times Herodotus applies to other texts (such as Homeric epic) the same standards of plausibility that he implicitly claims for himself in the remarks just quoted—and finds them wanting. These criteria could be merely a way to mark Herodotus's superiority to others, like Homer, assumed to be engaging in the same enterprise (or "genre")—telling what happened in other times and places. But as we have seen, Herodotus also distinguishes his goals from what Homer and other poets do.

The clearest example of this phenomenon is his argument with the Homeric version of Helen's whereabouts during the Trojan War (2.116–120, just

mentioned). Although Homer places Helen in Troy, Herodotus finds this scenario implausible: the Trojans would certainly have given her up, if indeed (as Homer himself indicates: 2.120) Priam was losing two or three of his own sons every time there was a battle. According to Herodotus, several remarks in the poems show that Homer knew the more likely variant of the story—that Helen was in Egypt the whole time—but the poet put her in Troy because this version was more suitable (εὐπρεπές) for epic-making (ἐποποιίην: 2.116). What is important here is not simply that Herodotus disagrees with Homer, but why he does so. Herodotus maintains that Homer was compelled for generic reasons to tell the story as he did: as a poet he had, so to speak, a different "narrative contract" with his audience.[47] The Helen passage, although unique in its explicitness, indicates very clearly that Herodotus attributes an important difference in narrative motives to different kinds of accounts.

In setting off his own work against that of others in this way, Herodotus is "staging" his genre, a term I borrow from Conte's analysis of the *recusationes* of Augustan poets—their famous poetic "refusals" to engage in writing epic. Conte finds the most characteristic element of Augustan poetry to be "the poet's insistence on letting us know that he could be doing something else. The genre 'stages' itself, becomes spectacle . . ."[48] Unlike Propertius or Horace, however, Herodotus is not ostensibly refusing to work in a genre that is beyond his gifts. Rather, in calling attention to the difference between the *Histories* and epic, he presents his own work as subject to other, more exacting criteria than Homer could appropriately employ.

Relevant to the lower level of credibility that Herodotus attributes to epic is Ewen Bowie's work linking different genres of archaic poetry—categorized by their performance context, as well as by their meter and other formal characteristics—to varying levels of expectation about their relation to historical or factual reality.[49] Bowie ranks ten kinds of archaic Greek poetry in descending order of truth claims. Hexameter oracles lead the list,[50] next come epitaphs and dedications, then various narrative genres—historical elegy and the iambic or trochaic narratives that purport to relate recent events. Homeric epic, dealing with more distant events, falls lower in Bowie's scale;[51] his list ends with epodes, such as Archilochus's famous seduction story reported by a first-person narrator (the "Cologne epode," fr. 196a West).

In addition to what we have just discussed for epic narrative, it is possible that the *Histories* may similarly attribute different levels of credibility to other poetic genres. Herodotus sometimes identifies poetic works by their meter as well as their composer; it is possible that such references incorporate generic assumptions, including the level of truth claim, for the works mentioned. When

Herodotus concludes the dramatic story of how Gyges became king of the Lydians, for example, he adds, "Archilochus commemorated his contemporary Gyges in iambic trimeters" (1.12.2). Here the designation "contemporary" (κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον γενόμενος) suggests the basic reliability of Archilochus's account. This impression may be reinforced by the meter cited (which ranks high in credibility in Bowie's list): Archilochus mentioned Gyges in a kind of poem associated with more "realistic" rather than "mythical" subjects.[52]

When recounting the failed Cypriot uprising against the Persians, Herodotus notes, "Those killed in Cyprus by the Persians included . . . Aristocyprus, son of Philocyprus, whom Solon the Athenian praised most of tyrants in dactylic verses (ἐν ἔπεσι) when he came to Cyprus" (5.113.2: Plut. *Solon* 26.4 indicates that the poem was an elegy[53]). Here, the point of mentioning Solon's elegy in this account of Hellenic freedom fighters is to suggest the accuracy of the report as well as its laudatory character. To Aristocyprus's noble death in battle against the Persians, Herodotus adds the cachet of the wise lawgiver's praise of his father in a genre more sober than, say, epinician or threnody. The way that Herodotus refers to these poetic sources thus would allow for, although it is too curtailed to prove, his assumption of certain "generic" differences among them.[54]

Evaluating the authority of prose authors in Herodotus poses a different set of problems. Felix Jacoby's paradigm of a step-by-step development of historiography—from Hecataeus to Herodotus to Hellanicus and beyond—has for generations dominated the study of early Greek historical prose.[55] It is no discredit to Jacoby's seminal work that scholars have begun to revise his evolutionary scheme. As Charles Fornara notes, all forms of early historiography "developed within the same creative matrix within a comparatively short span of time."[56] With specific reference to Herodotus, Robert Fowler challenges Jacoby's linear paradigm, postulating close intellectual ties between Herodotus and other prose writers such as Hellanicus and Charon, who, though listed by Jacoby as successors of Herodotus, may be more appropriately considered his contemporaries.[57]

Whatever cross-influences may have existed on a personal level, however, in the text of the *Histories,* Herodotus comes across as a competitor more than a collaborator with contemporary authors. An agonistic spirit is most recognizable when he mentions Hecataeus, as we shall see, but it can be detected elsewhere as well. A decade ago, Catherine Darbo-Peschanski and John Marincola independently asked why Herodotus refers to himself and his inquiry with unique frequency in Book 2, the Egyptian logos.[58] Both scholars concluded that he does this precisely because many other Greeks (including Hecataeus) had written on Egypt, and Herodotus wants to differentiate his voice and views from theirs.[59] Competition with other writers may well be a reason for authorial self-references in other parts of the *Histories* too, although naturally this possibility must remain conjectural for topics that we do not know were treated in other early prose texts. In positioning himself against logographoi working with similar material, Herodotus is not alone: the "good strife" of "bard-rivalling bard" is familiar already from Hesiod (*Works and Days* 24–26); examples closer in time can be found in the polemical claims made by classical medical writers and also by Herodotus's close successor Thucydides (as in 1.20.3).[60]

In contrast to the fifteen poets mentioned by Herodotus, Hecataeus is the only prose writer cited by name in the *Histories.* In two instances, Hecataeus is a historical actor, offering practical advice on how to deal with the Persians—once to the Ionians (5.36) and once to the rebel Aristagoras (5.125). In both cases, his good advice is not taken. Herodotus's comments on Hecataeus as a writer tend to be more negative; his criticism varies from more "generic" to more specific. In one passage, however, where Herodotus alludes to Hecataeus but does not mention him by name, he faults the generic practice of geographers: "I laugh (γελῶ) at the many (πολλούς) who have written (γράψαντας) 'tours around the world' (γῆς περιόδους—a title by which Hecataeus's most famous work was often known!) because of their symmetrical maps, drawn as if with a compass" (4.36.2). This is a jibe not only at Hecataeus's well-known work, but apparently at the whole "genre" of annotated maps. With the words just quoted, Herodotus turns against Hecataeus not only the title of the *Ges Periodos* but also, through precise verbal allusions, the first words of his *Genealogies* (or *Histories*), where Hecataeus declares, "I *write* (γράφω) as it appears to me to be true; for the logoi of the Greeks seem to me to be *many* (πολλοί) and *laughable* (γελοῖοι)" (*FGrH* 1.1 a).

A little later, Herodotus remarks, "I cannot tell the sources of the Borysthenes or Nile, and I think no one of *the Greeks* can" (4.53.5). This comment similarly alludes to Hecataeus, who had written about the sources of the Nile (*FGrH* 1.302 a). Here the earlier writer—working with the kind of subject matter that Herodotus does, but not properly acknowledging the limits of his knowledge—becomes one of "the Greeks" he himself had disparaged in that notorious opening sentence of the *Genealogies.* When Hecataeus appears briefly in the persona of a traveling inquirer much like himself, Herodotus makes him sound foolish: Hecataeus naively (or pretentiously) told Egyptian priests that he could trace his ancestry back to a god in a mere sixteen generations (2.143). Herodotus does not criticize Hecataeus's practice here, only his ignorance. But at least in one instance, an account of Hecataeus is allowed to stand on its own

merits: on the question of why the Pelasgians were driven out of Attica, Herodotus includes Hecataeus's version, which makes the Athenians look unjust, alongside an Athenian variant explaining that they behaved justly (6.137). These three references to Hecataeus as a compiler of historical and geographical information (again, much like the narrator of the *Histories*) are directed to specific rather than generic concerns. So too are Herodotus's objections to the foolish views of "the Ionians" on the geography and boundaries of Egypt (2.15–16)—probably another reference to Hecataeus.[61]

Herodotus on His Own Genre: Range

When Herodotus makes judgments about Hecataeus or Homer, he implies that his own account is free from their worst flaws—the generic limitations of subject matter "appropriate" for epic on the one hand, and on the other, the naïveté or speciousness on the part of insufficiently critical logographers. In some ways, moreover, Herodotus explicitly points out generic limits that he too must observe.

It is particularly within the areas of subject matter and critical judgment that Herodotus self-consciously describes the parameters of what he calls his "logos"—a notoriously polyvalent term, not least in Herodotus. Often it means an account, large or small, such as a "logos about Herakles" (2.43.1). But sometimes it seems to refer to the whole work and its manner of presentation: "it underlies my whole logos that I write the things said by various people to my hearing" (2.123.1). With "logos" in this sense, Herodotus comes close to talking explicitly about generic features of his work.

First, there are both positive and negative restrictions on his subject matter. He is bound to cover certain things and not to stray too far from the primary topic of human actions announced in the proem, "the great and wonderful things the Greeks and barbarians did, and especially why they fought with each other." At frequent intervals in the more digressive first half of the *Histories*,[62] Herodotus cites a need to follow the main path of his logos, sometimes sounding as if he were under compulsion. "Our logos must go on to inquire who this Cyrus was . . ." (1.95.1). "I go back to the earlier logos . . ." (1.140.3). "I will go back to the logos I was going to tell at the beginning" (4.82). "Now it is necessary to take up the logos I was going to tell from the beginning" (5.62). In these passages, the logos corresponds to the main thread of the *Histories*, the story building up to the conflict between Hellenes and barbarians.

Tolerant as it is of digressions ("my logos from the beginning seeks out supplements": 4.30), Herodotus's logos then does not allow any and all kinds of material.[63] Its aim is not to be comprehensive, but rather to select things he deems worthy of commemoration within the framework of Persian-Hellenic relations. Herodotus's restriction of his subject matter is sometimes signaled by statements indicating that he knows more on a subject but will confine his account to the most relevant or important details. For example, in describing the unsuccessful attempt led by Cleomenes to storm the Athenian Acropolis, he concludes, "Among them [the beseigers captured and condemned to death by the Athenians] was Timesitheos the Delphian, whose deeds of strength and spirit I would very well be able to describe" (5.72.4, see also 2.10, 2.40).[64] Certain events may be reported because they are unusual and wonderful: "we will pass over most of the Persians' conquests, but I will mention only the most laborious and most worthy of note" (1.177; compare 2.155, 2.35)—or omitted because they are indecorous. Thus the speaker chastely reports that Oroetes killed Polykrates "in a manner unworthy of telling" (3.125.3), and he refuses to record the name of the Samian who acquired the possessions of an escaped Persian eunuch: "I know it but have willingly forgotten it" (4.36). So too, Herodotus will not name the Phoenicians' native commanders in Xerxes' fleet, for, being more like slaves than generals, their names are not demanded "by the necessity of the inquiry's logos" (7.96, compare 7.99). Occasionally Herodotus omits giving information that would seem both ethically worthy and relevant to his subject matter. He says, for example, that he has learned the names of all three hundred noble Spartans who died with Leonidas—yet he does not list them (7.224.1). The reason for his silence may be that such a long catalog would be inappropriate in his narrative—another "generic" concern—but as Lateiner points out, simply by declaring that he has taken the trouble to learn their names, Herodotus gives tribute to the great deeds of these heroes.[65]

Herodotus also self-consciously claims to refrain from discussing religious material, especially with reference to Egypt (2.46, 2.47, 2.48, among others).[66] In several passages, however, what is necessary for the logos takes priority over what otherwise should not be said: "I will mention the gods only when forced to do so by my logos" (2.3); "I avoid getting into divine matters with my logos, and have done so only a little, when forced by necessity" (2.65). In these instances and others, Herodotus presents himself as bound to follow a requirement of his logos—although the strictures he attributes to it come not from an authority outside the *Histories*, but from the main outlines of the work as formulated by Herodotus himself in the proem.[67] Like the Spartans that his Demaratus describes to Xerxes (7.104.4), then, Herodotus is free but not entirely free. Just as they are bound to obey their *nomos* (7.104.4), so he must accede to the demands of his logos.

Unlike his Spartans, though, rather than following tradition, Herodotus

presents himself as wanting to bring something new into the world. He claims to avoid material that has been similarly treated in other accounts: "I do not describe the camel's shape since the Greeks know it, but I will tell something not known about it" (3.103). Nor will he repeat what is told by others about how Egyptians long ago became Dorian kings, but instead he will "make mention of things that others have not taken up" (6.55). Originality is thus another important, and not unpolemical, characteristic of Herodotus's logos. Here again, he is "staging" his genre, setting it off against the background of what others have done, reminding his audience that it would be possible for him to present something different—and inferior.

Herodotus will not write everything he knows,[68] but it does not follow that the *Histories* is therefore as restricted as Homeric epic by its adherence to what is generically appropriate (εὐπρεπές). For although Herodotus must restrict himself to the (broad) range of subjects that belongs in his logos, we have seen that this range is not limited to what makes an exciting or a heroic or even a credible story. Self-consciously transcending a single level of discourse, the narrator of the *Histories* is free both to record the heroic, memorable, improbable story and to propose a more pedestrian but plausible version. This happens, for example, with the story of the famous diver Scyllias of Scione, who was said to have swum underwater for eighty stades when he deserted to the Greeks at Artemisium: "let my opinion be set forth, that he came to Artemisium in a boat" (8.9).[69]

Herodotus's text thus has wide scope not only in subject matter but also in levels of truth claim; remarkably, the *Histories* appears to subsume in one text the varying degrees of veracity that Bowie has distributed among many kinds of archaic poetry. The narrator not only calls his sources into question, as we have seen, but otherwise indicates different levels of credibility (through indirect discourse, for example, or by attributing a report to sources at several removes from the narrator).

Herodotus can also simply leave an issue unresolved. Especially for exotic geographic and ethnographic matters, he often reports what he has heard without vouching for it—on the contrary, he raises doubts: "not even Aristeas knows exactly about the land this logos is starting to describe; he spoke by hearsay of those places, not by autopsy" (4.16).[70] The same is true for various dubious tales (such as what the Egyptian priests say about Rhampsinitus: 2.123.1, quoted earlier) and for beliefs about the gods and their actions (for example, Herodotus doubts the Chaldean priests' claim that Zeus/Bel really sleeps with a chosen woman in Babylon: 1.182).

Sometimes too, Herodotus tells us that he does *not* know something, such as the source of the Nile (2.28). Even in the freedom to admit ignorance, what Denniston called his "winning fallibility," the narrator displays the superiority of his logos; as Thomas Rosenmeyer has noted, poetry presents itself as complete and authoritative, but history, based as it is on the human knowledge that can be gathered by the narrator, gets its authority from being less certain.[71] Famously, Herodotus issues the general caveat, "I have to say what is said, but not at all to be persuaded by it" (7.152.3)!

Herodotus on His Own Genre: Authority and Audience

A related "generic" feature that receives attention in Herodotus's work is the narrator's representation of himself as judge of competing accounts. In describing recent events such as the invasion of Xerxes, the *Histories* makes a high claim to historical truth. But its truth claim is based on the speaker's judgment, not on his alleged involvement in the action described, as it is with some first-person narratives in archaic poetry. Thus when Herodotus decides that it was Ephialtes who betrayed the Greeks at Thermopylae, and not others who were so charged, he explains that he does so because the Pylagoroi—who must have known who was guilty—put a bounty on Ephialtes' head (7.214). Here a decision about a historical matter is reached on grounds of plausibility, of rationally weighing the available evidence: the price on Ephialtes' head becomes a sign of his guilt. It is Herodotus who takes responsibility for the inquiry into the matter—and incidentally who guarantees which name shall live in infamy.[72]

In a famous bid for authority, Herodotus declares that he sailed to Tyre to do research on the origins of Herakles, confidently concluding as a result of his inquiries that there are two figures with that name (2.44). The argument here relies on the speaker's claim of special knowledge, attained through autopsy, credible informants, and plausibility. On the other hand, as we have seen, some parts of the *Histories* are very skeptical about what they report (the tribes beyond the Scythians, for example). At both ends of the credibility spectrum, then, Herodotus may explicitly indicate the level of truth claim or disclaimer that he is making. He does so in many ways, sometimes straightforwardly (as with Ephialtes), sometimes ironically (as in the competing stories by Spartans and Samians about what happened to the bronze bowl on the way from Sparta to Croesus: 1.70[73]). Although Herodotus relies on many sources for his material, it is he who evaluates them, when evaluation is called for.[74] The mix of voices that comprises Herodotean *historia* is strongly marked by the judgment and authority of the author.[75]

Judging among different traditions is familiar in archaic poetry as well, especially Pindar's victory odes, in which the speaker both mentions the "law"

(τέθμος, *Nem.* 4.33) that governs his own poetry and criticizes accounts of myths as given by other poets. Both kinds of remarks differ from Herodotus's practice, however, in ways that illuminate the different aims of the *Histories* and the epinician odes. First, Pindar mentions the law that governs his own craft but does not differentiate his goals from those of others, as Herodotus does when he contrasts his own project to what poets do. Second, whereas Herodotus uses plausibility as a guide to the truth of a report, the epinician poet rejects other poetic accounts on ethical or theological grounds: if those accounts do not accord with praiseworthy beliefs about the gods or heroes, they must not be true (as in *Ol.* 1.28–55: it is a slanderous story that maintains that the gods ate Pelops's shoulder).[76] The narrator of the *Histories* thus takes a broader perspective on narrative genres, and judges truth by human-centered criteria.

The authority of Herodotus is tightly bound up with his use of the first person,[77] but the second person, the audience, is also important.[78] Here too generic considerations can be found in the text of the *Histories*, these also contrast to the practices of Herodotus's poetic predecessors in narrative. The speaker of epic occasionally addresses the Muse(s), still more rarely a character[79]—but Homeric epic includes no direct address to its audience. The poets of narrative elegy, however, often use the first and second persons with a group of implicit "insiders." Thus Mimnermus uses the historical "we" for his fellow Colophonians, in recounting their ancestors' migration to Ionia: "Aipy we left, and Neleus's city, Pylos, and came by ship to Asia's lovely coast. We settled at fair Colophon with rude aggression, . . . from there we crossed the river Asteis and took Aeolian Smyrna by gods' plan" (fr. 9.1–6 West). Similarly, Tyrtaeus refers to Spartans in the first person: "Our king, Theopompos dear to the gods, through whom *we* took broad-chorused Messenia . . . *our* fathers' fathers fought nineteen years for it . . ." (fr. 5.1–6 West). A well-known fragment of Archilochus (fr. 5 West) presents a self-deprecating anecdote in the voice of one who left his shield behind in battle but saved his skin. In all these examples, purported first-person experience is recounted by an "I" plausibly understood as addressing a familiar and empathetic audience (often assumed to be fellow-symposiasts of the speaker).[80]

Herodotus has a vast repertoire of first-person references, but none of them is addressed to such an intimate or a limited group: "I sailed to Tyre . . . I spoke to the priests . . . I judge this story to be more likely . . . I know but will not tell the names of the three hundred Spartans . . ." The audience is seldom forcefully confronted in the *Histories;* when a confrontation occurs, it is generally to anticipate their resistance to an account—when, for example, Herodotus argues that the Persian conspirators really did discuss what kind of constitution would be best (3.80.1), or when he advances the allegedly unpopular opinion that the Athenians saved Greece (7.139).

Indeed, in some ways, Herodotus establishes a certain distance from his performance situation—including, as Wolfgang Rösler has observed, an orientation toward future audiences that might more readily be associated with the text of Thucydides, who describes his narrative as a "possession for ever" (1.22.4). Rösler notes Herodotus's repeated comment that a monument or custom has endured "up to my time"—which suggests that his words will be heard in a later time as well; he also points out the remarkably detached statement (7.137) that an event occurred well after the narrative time, "at the time of the war between the Athenians and the Peloponnesians"—as if this were just any war, not the ongoing event of overriding concern for Herodotus's immediate audience.[81] Further, just as Herodotus avoids a specific time-bound perspective in his work, so too he addresses an audience at no specific *place* in the Greek world. For example, when he is explaining the shape of the Taurians' peninsula on the Black Sea, he compares it first with the area of Attica around Sounion, and then—for those not familiar with Attica—with a promontory in southern Italy (4.99).

Paradoxically, however impersonal it may be, the audience is constantly assumed and informally addressed throughout the *Histories*.[82] This practice is one of the most important ways that the *Histories* acquires its characteristically intimate tone that gives the text so much of its charm and even authority. The narrator constructs a sense of taking the audience into his confidence as he works through his disparate data. Herodotus's constant comments on where his material is coming from and how it is taking shape harmonize with the narrative digressions (some of them labeled as such), editorial comments of praise, blame, and wonder, and other examples of the narrator's constant presence. All these rhetorical characteristics contribute to give the *Histories* its uneven, anything-but-seamless character that places the audience in the position of confidante and even collaborator with the speaker.

Conclusions

A self-conscious critical engagement with other authors and/or literary kinds—incorporating, subsuming, arranging, and judging them—is one of the defining marks of the innovative and engaging genre developed by Herodotus. As Robert Fowler points out, what defines Herodotus's variegated work is in large measure this constant foregrounding of authorial issues, including sometimes a contrast between his own and other kinds of accounts.[83] As *logios*, Herodotus has heard many traditions, including poetic ones; as *histor*, he can critique

them; together, these two roles allow for the narrator's almost intrusive enunciative presence in the text.

It is just this flexible and self-conscious blend of truth claims, registers of discourse, and subject matter that makes the *Histories*, in retrospect at least, a new genre, marked by the critical voice of the performer-as-author. In its deliberately limited authority, as in the judgments of other texts and genres that it is so free to make, Herodotus's work can claim to transcend all previous genres.

Herodotus's new genre reflects in essential ways the politics he explicitly admires. First, his account—like the freedom of speech (ἰσηγορία) that he says made Athens successful (5.78)—gives many different voices their say,[84] even while showing that not all speak with equal veracity and wisdom. Second, his logos, unlike those of narrative poets or uncritical logographers, is aware of the constraints of likelihood and plausibility: people can say all kinds of things, but only some things are true. Similarly, in the realm of action, tyrants can decide to do what they will, but if they are proceeding from false assumptions or otherwise misguided, they will not be successful. Xerxes himself is the best example of this failure. As Herodotus tells the story, despite the advice of the exiled Spartan king Demaratus, Xerxes failed to anticipate the Spartans' courage at Thermopylae (the Persians won that battle, but only because of Ephialtes' treachery); more significantly, Xerxes failed to recognize the Greek disunity that could be exploited if he were to capture Cythera and threaten the Peloponnese from there.

As with the narrator, so too for his political actors: success depends on good information and a correct assessment of reality, of what is likely to happen.[85] For this, decision makers need knowledge and experience; they often are provided with good advisers but usually do not listen to them. Xerxes repeatedly follows the advice of flatterers instead of listening to advisers like Demaratus and Artemisia (both Greeks) who understand his enemies and the way to deal with them.

Herodotus, on the other hand, makes much of assessing the quality of his sources and allowing his readers to do the same; he teaches his audience to judge accounts critically, on the basis not only of their likelihood but also of their source, which can be biased because of the speaker's self-interest or the predispositions of a narrative genre. His new genre is dedicated both to commemorating human things that were said and done, *and* to commemorating and demonstrating the many processes by which those things are discovered and evaluated.

CHAPTER SIX

From Aristophanes to Menander? Genre Transformation in Greek Comedy

ERIC CSAPO

The genre transformation best represented by the remains of ancient Greek literature is that of comedy. Many consider the transformation so great that they speak of Old, New, or even Middle Comedy as separate genres rather than subgenres or styles. Saying "best represented" ought to cause alarm, because our ideas about the evolution of comedy are based on the partial remains of two authors, each surviving by separate processes and canons of preservation. I shall, therefore, in addition to the question of genre transformation, also address another question of importance to this volume: the role of authors in defining their genres, for ancient reception and for modern scholarship.

Old Comedy or New Comedy are not generic categories known to the audiences of Aristophanes or Menander. There is no evidence for a partition of the comic genre until well after Menander's lifetime, and then only in scholarly literature, never in theater inscriptions.[1] It is likely that the partition is the work of a scholar or scholars in the third or second century B.C.E.[2] For us, Old and New Comedy are by definition Aristophanocentric and Menandrocentric. Was it different for those scholars who first distinguished them as separate genres?

When Norwood writes that "Aristophanes was so unquestionably the finest comic playwright of the fifth century that not a single work even of Cratinus has survived" (1931:v), he makes the common and dangerous assumption that Aristophanes was uniquely superior, yet still somehow sufficiently typical of his genre to render his rivals both dull and redundant by comparison. It is comforting to think that all we have is all we need. But unless it can be shown that unique genius and representativity governed the formation of the comic canon,

43. The application of the terms *paradigmatic* and *syntagmatic* to poetry goes back to Roman Jakobson, e.g., Jakobson 1981.
44. Maera: Pausanias 10.30.5 = fr.6 Bernabe = F5Davies; Clymene = Pausanias 10.29.5 = 5 Bernabe = 4 Davies.
45. Tyro gets a better press in the GK: although the stories are much the same, the GK presents her in a better light by beginning by talking about her role in the story of her father Salmoneus (GK30–31). For the parallel, see Heubeck in Heubeck/Hoekstra 1992:92.
46. There may be other imitations also: it might be possible to argue that the epithet applied to Odysseus's wiles, πολύκροτα, in the catalog of Helen's suitors, is an imitation of one of the variant readings of the first line of the *Odyssey.* Something odd is going on apropos the section on Heracles also (GK25, 26–33; compare GK229); this is ascribed to Onomacritus in the *Odyssey* (1. 601ff.) and athetized in the *Theogony* (950–955), and in one of these passages the athetisis is ascribed to Musaios.
47. Roughly this point was made by Zutt 1894, and other sources mentioned by West 1985:32, n. 7. Page 1955:35ff. sees the GK as the model (with a Boeotian tradition). Heubeck in Heubeck/Hoekstra 1992 is skeptical. I am also reminded of Finkelberg's thesis about the relationship between the Iliadic Catalogue of Ships and the catalog of suitors in the GK; the GK preserved the older form. It is relevant to observe in this context that some regard the *Nekuia* as belonging to a late phase of the development of the *Odyssey:* see Sourvinou-Inwood 1995:71–75.
48. I notice that Most 1992 has recently argued that the Odyssean *Nekuia* refers to a number of epic genres: (1) the *Odyssey* itself and the *Telegony* (Elpenor, Teiresias, Anticleia); (2) the *Ehoiai;* (3) the *Iliad* and Iliadic *Cycle* (Agamemnon, Achilles, Ajax); and (4) moral-didactic epos such as Hesiod's *Theogony* (Minos, Orion, Tityus, Tantalus, Sisiphus, Hercules, Theseus, and Peitithoos). This thesis goes considerably beyond what is necessary for my argument.
49. Cf. Martin 1989:87–88.
50. Doherty 1995:112.
51. Odysseus himself, in disguise, praises Penelope's fame at *Od.*19.106.

5. Herodotus's Genre(s)

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1. Lateiner 1989:7, 214, 227; R. Fowler 1996; Fehling 1989 (1971); Pritchett 1993; Nagy 1987 and 1990:262–267; Dewald 1987.
2. For the older view see, e.g., Glover 1924:41–48.
3. Dewald 1987:169–170, Boedeker 1987a:201, Griffiths forthcoming.

4. See below, at n. 15.
5. Lateiner 1989:214.
6. But see Rosenmeyer 1985:74–75 on the difficulties of determining the criteria by which genres are to be defined, and Marincola 1999 on particular problems of establishing the genre and subgenres of ancient historiography.
7. Nagy 1990:223–234 argues that Herodotus would have defined himself rather as a *logios* "master of (oral) traditions" than as a historian.
8. See Conte 1994a:114–115 on the formation of new genres.
9. Moles 1993. See also Hunter 1982 and Hornblower 1992, 1994b:138–139 on close relationships between the texts of Thucydides and Herodotus.
10. See, e.g., White 1984, Woodman 1988, and the essays in Canary and Kozicki 1978.
11. Armayor 1985.
12. Fehling 1989:12–13, 88–93.
13. Fehling 1989:243.
14. Fehling 1989:252–253.
15. Hammond 1988, especially 555–557, shows how closely even very recent historical discussions of the Persian Wars follow the dramatic account of Herodotus (in this case, 7.215–224).
16. It should be said, however, that Fehling finds little to challenge in Herodotus's account of the Persian Wars themselves; most of his examples are drawn from the Egyptian and Scythian logoi.
17. As suggested by Lincoln 1987:267–268. Compare also Dewald in Dewald and Marincola 1987:23–25; Luraghi 1994.
18. See Harmatta 1990:121, quoted in Pritchett 1993:225 n. 186: "However rich and valuable the information and evidence collected by Herodotus [for] Scythian culture and history . . . , they are subordinated to his comprehensive world-concept . . ." Similarly, on Herodotus's presentation of Egypt, see A. Lloyd 1988, 1994a, 1994b, and especially 1994a:141–170.
19. S. West 1985.
20. S. West 1985:294; similarly, S. West 1991:151 doubts that Herodotus could have visited Egyptian Thebes and said so little about its wonders. Slings 1990 discusses the problem of a nonbiographical "I" in archaic poetry.
21. Pritchett 1993; see also Rhodes 1994, Luraghi 1994, R. Fowler 1996:80–82. For a critique of earlier apologists, see Fehling 1989:2–8.
22. E.g., Pritchett 1993:94–96: Herodotus says that women on an island off the Gyzantes are reported by Carthaginians to pan for lake gold with pitch-smeared quills (4.195); such a practice was attested by the Scottish explorer Mungo Park in the interior of Africa ca. 1800. Pritchett concludes (p. 96): "We have a firm basis for the Kathaginian story, although the location may be an error."
23. E.g., Pritchett 1993:9: "The claims and objective of one who is writing history [meaning Herodotus] are quite different from those of one who is writing a work of fiction."

24. Gould 1989:19–41 provides a good introduction to the subject of Herodotus and oral history; see also Hornblower 1994:5–6, 17–19.
25. Pritchett 1993:9. Lateiner 1989:219 provides a more nuanced characterization of Herodotus's originality as "the only historian before historiography."
26. Shrimpton and Gillis 1997. For a similar argument concerning first-person references, see also Marincola 1987 (below, n. 58).
27. Pritchett 1993:159–160, commenting on S. West 1985: 285–286.
28. Similarly, Hornblower 1994a:18–19. See Marincola 1997a on the construction of authority by ancient historians in general.
29. E.g., Burkert 1995 by Herodotus's use of Lydian king-lists; Ivantchik 2000 for Herodotus's accuracy in describing Scythian culture.
30. Woodman 1988; of special interest is the discussion of problems with eyewitness accounts and other forms of oral history, especially for reconstruction of battles (pp. 17–22). On rhetorical issues in "non-artistic" Greek scientific prose, see van der Eijk 1997.
31. Moles 1993, which relies heavily on the prologues of Herodotus and Thucydides to describe their authorial intentions.
32. Calame 1995:85–88.
33. Marincola 1997a describes the devices used by ancient historians from Herodotus to Ammianus to establish their authority and gain the attention and respect of their audiences, without suggesting that these rhetorical devices are necessarily at odds with historical truth.
34. Conte 1994a, especially 108–109, 115–125.
35. Compare Verdin 1977:54: ". . . en attirant l'attention sur les caractéristiques de la littérature poétique, les historiens peuvent nous fournir en même temps des indications précieuses sur ce qu'ils considéraient comme la spécificité de l'oeuvre historique."
36. Strasburger 1972, Woodman 1988, and Nagy 1990 emphasize the continuities, and Calame 1995 the differences between the Homeric and Herodotean projects.
37. See now Marincola 1997b for a rich discussion of Odysseus as protohistorian.
38. As I have suggested elsewhere (Boedeker 1996), poetry such as the recently published Simonides fragments on the Battle of Plataea may even have shaped Herodotus's understanding of the not-so-distant past.
39. In addition to Verdin 1977, see Lateiner 1989:99–100 for a concise summary of Herodotus on poets as historical sources.
40. For a contrasting view, see Marincola 1997b.
41. Marincola 1997b argues for a view of Aristeas as a more serious reporter.
42. Similarly, Verdin 1977:61.
43. The only other time poêsis is used in Herodotus is when the Ethiopian king, conversing with Cambyses' delegates, evaluates the Persian "manufacture" of myrrh and wine (3.22.3, used twice).

44. In Egypt, Herodotus tells us (2.156), Apollo (Horus) and Artemis (Bubastis) were said to be the children of Demeter (Isis) and Dionysos (Osiris), nursed by Leto.
45. According to A. Lloyd 1988:59, this is not an Egyptian belief.
46. For Herodotus's source citations, see most recently Shrimpton and Gillis in Shrimpton 1997:229–265.
47. On Herodotus's narrative contract, see Dewald 1987:147. Compare Verdin 1977:61, with reference to Herodotus's use of *εὐπρεπές*: ". . . une oeuvre littéraire doit se conformer à des lois intrinsèques, qui peuvent varier selon le genre." Pratt 1993:144–145 similarly finds that in his discussion of Helen, Herodotus "acknowledges a poetic standard different from his own." I note, however, that whatever he thinks of epic as an accurate source of history, Herodotus does appreciate Homer's "political" significance as a source of identity for Greeks: e.g., in arguing with Gelon, Spartans and Athenians refer to Homeric texts to support their claims to lead the Greek alliance (1.159 and 162); the tyrant Cleisthenes rids Sicyon of the performance of Homeric poems because of their pro-Argive bias (5.67).
48. Conte 1994a:123.
49. Bowie 1993.
50. Baffling oracles that prove truthful in the end is, of course, a well-known narrative motif in Herodotus; on the expectation of truth in clearly stated oracles, see Herodotus 8.77.
51. I would question Bowie's argument that the "fictional" quality of epic is recognized within epic itself, but as we shall see, it is surely recognized by Herodotus; on the general truth claim of oral epic, see Slings 1990:13.
52. Archilochus fr. 19 West, in which the speaker (who is not the poet but one Charon the carpenter) rejects the wealth of Gyges, is indeed composed in iambic trimeters.
53. On the use of *ἔπεα* for elegiacs as well as hexameters, see M. West 1974:7.
54. Generic considerations related to factual reliability are evident in a much later work, Plutarch *De Malig. Her.* 872E, which insists that Simonides gave a reliable account of the Corinthians' conduct at the battle of Plataea, since he wrote it not "training a chorus in Corinth" (*χορὸν ἐν Κορίνθῳ διδάσκων*), and not "making a lyric in honor of the city" (*ᾆσμα ποιῶν εἰς τὴν πόλιν*), but rather, "writing these deeds in an elegy, he reported them" (*τὰς πράξεις ἐκείνας ἐν ἐλεγείᾳ γράφων ἱστόρηκεν*).
55. Jacoby 1909.
56. Fornara 1983:4; see also p. 12: "Nothing in the nature of genealogy suggests that Jacoby was correct in declaring the work siminal of history as we know it from Herodotus."
57. R. Fowler 1996.
58. Marincola 1987:122–123 n. 5 (see also p. 137) lists 30 examples of "autobiographical statements" in Book 2, 6 in Book 4, and only 8 scattered among the other seven books of the *Histories*.

59. Marincola 1987:128–131; Darbo-Peschanski 1987:112, naming Thales, Anaximander, Xenophanes, and Pythagoras, as well as Hecataeus, as Greeks who had written on Egypt. More recently, Marincola 1997b argues that this high incidence of first-person statements may be a sign to the reader not to take things at face value.
60. For the medical writers, see G. Lloyd 1979:89–98 and 1987:85–91 and *passim*, Lateiner 1986, Hornblower 1987:20 (the latter on Thucydides as well).
61. A. Lloyd 1994b:78–79.
62. In contrast to Books 1–5, the second half of the work presents a fairly linear narrative of conflicts between Greeks and Persians.
63. See Cobet 1971 on Herodotean digressions, and Dewald 1987:165 for a concise summary of some of the kinds of material avoided.
64. Herodotus sometimes used *praeteritio* as well, e.g., at 4.36; compare Lateiner 1989:64–69 on *praeteritio* and omission.
65. Lateiner 1989:68.
66. This reticence can be attributed to the generic range set forth in the proem, where the speaker announces as his subject matter "things done by human beings," but the same degree of hesitation does not prevail when he describes the beliefs and rituals of other peoples, e.g., Scythians in 4.59–63. Such descriptions might be defended on the grounds that they focus on what people do or believe, not on what gods do. More in keeping with his stated practice, Herodotus does not divulge information on the (Greek) Samothracian mysteries (2.51: still within the Egyptian logos), and presents himself as very hesitant about mentioning Demeter's role at the battle of Plataea (9.65.2). On Herodotus and religious matters, see Gould 1994.
67. See also Lateiner 1989:224 on the demands of Herodotus's logos.
68. Dewald 1987:165–166 on the λόγων ὁδός, an image of the author picking his way among an unlimited number of routes.
69. See Lateiner 1989:76–90 for a valuable discussion and catalog of alternative versions of stories.
70. For a different evaluation of Aristeas, see Marincola 1997b.
71. Denniston 1960:491 n. 1, quoted with approval by Lateiner 1989:31; Rosenmeyer 1982:245. Lateiner 1989:61–62 concludes, "A Herodotean confession of ignorance may serve rhetorical as well as epistemological purposes." Fehling 1989:120–127, however, considers Herodotus's expression of ignorance to be a literary technique of "lying literature."
72. See Dewald 1987:159–163, Lateiner 1989:92, Nagy 1990:251–262, Calame 1995:86 on Herodotus as a *histor* in the sense of "judge."
73. Discussed earlier at n. 46.
74. Calame 1995:88–89 points out that the "I" of the speaker in Herodotus sometimes blends with, sometimes stands out from, the voices ("they") of his sources.

75. As indicated in Marincola 1997a, a study of the ways in which ancient historians establish their authority. Hornblower 1987:26 agrees with Eduard Meyer "that what distinguishes the keeping of a chronicle from the writing of history in the full sense is the [in Meyer's words] 'stamp of individuality.'"
76. Rossi 1971:75–76; Rosenmeyer 1982:80.
77. Compare Darbo-Peschanski 1987:107–112, Dewald 1987, Marincola 1987, Calame 1995 on the first person in Herodotus. Dewald 1987 in particular shows how a varied, stylized use of the first person makes the narrator of the *Histories* vigorously present, as if working with his unwieldy material in full view of the audience; he is an active *histor* in the sense of both "observer" and "judge" of logoi. On this last aspect, see also Connor 1993.
78. See Lateiner 1989:30–33 on Herodotus's colloquial address to the reader.
79. Boedeker 1998:235—238 on Homeric apostrophe.
80. For a differentiated view of the "I" in archaic poetry, ranging from biographical to fictional, see Slings 1990.
81. Rösler 1991:219. On the date of Herodotus's "publication," see Fornara 1971.
82. On the second person in Herodotus, see Lateiner 1989:30–33, Hornblower 1994:149.
83. R. Fowler 1996, especially 86. Thucydides too is concerned with his sources, particularly their veracity, but for the most part, he makes his authorial decisions privately, rather than sharing them with his audience.
84. On polyvocality in Herodotus, see Dewald forthcoming.
85. For a different kind of parallel between the *histor* and the politically powerful, see Christ 1994. On practical wisdom in Herodotus, see Dewald 1985.

6. From Aristophanes to Menander?

1. In inscriptions, *archaia* and (after the second century B.C.E.) *palaia*, when used of tragedy, comedy, or satyr play, refer, with remarkable regularity, to reperformed drama (hence "Old Comedy" is used of what the scholars call "New Comedy"). The term *kainê* is used of brand-new (i.e., not previously performed) drama (*IG* 7.1773 is no exception, despite *LSJ*). But note the unpublished inscription (reported by Stefanis 1988, no. 2814) in the Larissa museum of the second to first century B.C.E., where *nea komoidia* is used of what elsewhere is called *kainê* (I thank W. J. Slater for this information).
2. Henceforth all dates are B.C.E. unless otherwise marked. Janko 1984:244–249 attributes the tripartition to Aristotle, Nesselrath 1989:163–164 to Aristophanes of Byzantium. Neither claim is supported by strong argument; compare Wehrli 1936:12–20. On the assumption that the *Tractatus Coislinianus* epitomizes Aristotle's second book of the *Poetics*, Janko argues that a tripartite division of comedy existed before Menander (though the partition was of course different). In *Nicomachean Ethics* (1128a) Aristotle makes a stylistic (not a generic) distinction