Globalisation, Transnational Political Mobilisation, and Networks of Violence

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Abstract This article examines how globalisation processes provide new incentives and opportunities for non-state political entrepreneurs to build transnational political movements. Drawing on the literatures on non-violent social movements and transnational networks, the article examines terrorism and political violence as components of the ‘repertoires of contention’ used by radical transnational groups seeking political change. Examples from both the pre- and post-9/11 periods are provided, and the implications for traditional models of state security are discussed. The article concludes by contending that the combination of increased levels of globalisation and the emergence of new networks of violence is creating a fundamental shift in the international security environment, in which the distinction between internal and external security threats is increasingly blurred. While state security strategies are reflecting these changes, less attention has been paid to the political implications of these changes. New security responses need to also be matched by new sets of political strategies at the global level.

The existence of transnational networks—including transnational networks that use political violence—is certainly not a historically new phenomenon. Yet, as in earlier periods of globalisation, recent increases in the mobility of people, capital, goods and ideas have also helped to provide new opportunities for would-be political entrepreneurs to construct transnational and global political strategies by drawing on new types of transnational networks and resource

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2 Anarchist and nationalist networks in the late 19th and early 20th century and anti-colonial movements of the 20th century are prominent examples of earlier manifestations of transnational networks that have employed political violence. See Adamson (2002) and Rapoport (2003).

3 I do not attempt to survey the vast literature on ‘globalisation’ in this article, nor am I making a claim that all processes associated with the current phase of globalisation are historically unprecedented. My use of the term throughout this article is informed broadly by works that take a ‘transformationalist’ position on globalisation. In other words, while recognising that globalisation is an ongoing historical process, this position nevertheless claims that the current stage of globalisation is unique in terms of both the quantity and quality of interactions and integration that are occurring on a global scale. For a discussion of this position and a review of the literature on globalisation, see Held et al. (1999, 1-28).
bases. As such, globalisation is transforming the international security environment by stimulating shifts in the resources, infrastructure and capacities available to non-state political entrepreneurs to engage in political mobilisation transnationally and globally. While this does not necessarily lead to an overall change in the balance of power between states and non-state actors, it does alter the security environment in which states operate.

In this article I examine the activities of non-state political entrepreneurs under changing conditions of globalisation as an example of how the overall effects of globalisation are challenging traditional notions of national security. I treat political actors who openly espouse political violence, and use tactics of terrorism, insurgency and other forms of violence within their ‘repertoires of contention’ as one subset of the broader category of non-state political entrepreneurs who engage in transnational political mobilisation. Much has been written in the field of international relations (IR) and elsewhere on the importance of analysing transnational networks as independent forces in world politics. However, to date, the bulk of this work has examined the global dimensions of transnational networks of human rights, environmental and anti-globalisation activists (see, for example, Guidry et al., 2001; Khagram et al., 2002; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Smith et al., 1997; O’Brien et al., 2000). Insights gleaned from the study of largely non-violent transnational movements have not been adequately applied to transnational networks of political entrepreneurs who are willing to use violence to achieve their aims.

In my definition, a network (or loose affiliation of networks) such as al-Qaeda certainly counts as a radical and violent transnational network of political entrepreneurs. In addition, though, I count numerous other transnationally organised violent political opposition movements and nationalist-separatist movements that were active in the 1990s and earlier—such as the Tamil Tigers, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party or the Kosovo Liberation Army—as members of this same subset of transnational networks willing to employ tactics of violence to achieve their goals. By examining the use of terrorism and other forms of political violence not in isolation, but rather as part of the repertoires of contention that are employed in broader political and ideological campaigns, I show how some of the insights that have been generated by scholars of social movements are useful for...
understanding the changing nature of the international security environment under contemporary conditions of globalisation.

The rest of this article is organised into three main sections. In the first section, I discuss how globalisation creates incentives and opportunities for political entrepreneurs to operate transnationally, focusing on how the mobility of people, capital and ideas provides resources for building new forms of transnational networks. In section two, I provide various empirical examples of how political entrepreneurs have drawn on these various global circuits and ‘flows of flows’ to build transnational network organisations that employ tactics of political violence to achieve their goals. In the third section of the article, I use the argument made in sections one and two to discuss four distinct ways in which the emergence of new transnational networks of violence affect traditional conceptualisations of national security interests and policies. I focus particularly on the blurring of distinctions between matters of internal and external security that accompanies processes of globalisation. Finally, in the conclusion, I argue that domestic analogies are useful for thinking about security and stability in an international system that increasingly resembles an imperfectly institutionalised global polity, rather than a system of functionally alike states in anarchy.

Globalisation and Incentives for Transnational Political Mobilisation

Globalisation processes are marked by an increased mobility of people, capital and goods, and ideas and information across national borders. Whether such processes are historically novel or not, the structural conditions that lead to increased mobility and interactivity across territory also create a number of pull factors for political entrepreneurs by facilitating the creation of transnational networks and resource bases that emerge independently but can then be harnessed by political entrepreneurs during the process of political mobilisation. Just as globalisation creates incentives for economic actors, such as firms and corporations, to move their production facilities overseas, and to operate transnationally and globally, so too does globalisation affect the calculations of would-be non-state political entrepreneurs by providing incentives for political entrepreneurs to move beyond the state and to engage in processes of political mobilisation that stretch across national boundaries. The globalisation of political mobilisation and contention, like the globalisation of economic production, transforms the interests of, and the international environment inhabited by, states. Political resources become partially deterritorialised, accessible to non-state actors beyond the state and open to mobilisation by organisational structures that stretch across national boundaries. As I outline below, the mobility of people, capital and goods, and ideas and information all combine to produce transnational resource bases and constituencies that can be tapped into by non-state political entrepreneurs in the process of political mobilisation.

Footnote 7 continued

Tilly (2003, 30) notes that ‘some contentious claims-making ... takes the form of damage to persons or objects; rebels kill rulers, revolutionaries sack palaces’.

8 For discussions of how the globalisation of production has affected state interests, see Mittelman (2000), Rosecrance (2000) and Reich (1992).
Mobility of People—Migration and Migration-Based Networks

The world has become increasingly mobile. According to the United Nations, there are now 180 million people living outside their country of birth, which is up from 80 million three decades ago. The percentage of the world’s population that can be classified as ‘migrants’ has been steadily increasing over the last thirty years, with one out of every 35 persons in the world now a migrant (International Organisation for Migration [IOM] 2003a, 5). Migration to both Europe and the United States has continued to increase over the past two decades and, as Held et al. (1999, 297) note, ‘there is now almost no state or part of the world that is not importing or exporting labour’.

The impetus for migration can be economic or political or, often, a combination of both. Economic migrants leave their countries in search of economic opportunities and employment. Refugees and asylum seekers leave their countries to avoid the trauma of war or political persecution. As opportunities for economic migration have been restricted in Europe, the number of those attempting to enter European states via the asylum process has increased. In reality, it is often difficult to disentangle the political and economic factors that contribute to the production of migration flows (Zolberg et al., 1989, 30–33).

A number of factors have contributed to overall increases in migration rates in the 1990s—continuing levels of economic inequality among states; levels of foreign direct investment (Sassen 1988); declining transportation costs; the fall of the Iron Curtain and the opening up of borders in the former Soviet bloc; conflict and violence, such as the Balkan wars, which have produced a number of refugee crises; state policies of forced migration; and the growth in human smuggling as a form of organised crime. The IOM estimates that approximately four million people are smuggled across borders every year, about half of all illegal migrants entering the European Union being the victims or clients of human-trafficking networks (Koslowski 2000, 205).

In addition to increases in overall levels of migration, there is also an increased connectivity between migrants in their new ‘host states’ and other migrants, as well as populations in their states of origin or ‘home states’. Decreasing costs of transportation and new communication technologies such as the internet, fax and satellite communications mean that networks of relations between migrants in their new homes and those who have either stayed at home or migrated to yet another locale can be maintained with relative ease and at a relatively reasonable cost (Basch et al. 1994). This means that migrants can maintain dense social networks that stretch across national borders, are rich in social capital and can be used for a variety of purposes—including political mobilisation (Faist 2000, 96–123).

Migrant communities across Europe, for example, are connected by transnational social networks that can be activated by political entrepreneurs during processes of political mobilisation. Soysal (1994) has noted that migrant communities in Europe increasingly engage in political activities at the supranational level, their activities responding to the dynamics of European integration processes and being geared towards effecting change at the European-wide level, in addition to the national level. The fact that migrant communities are linked by transnational social networks facilitates the process of recruiting members of immigrant communities into transnational organisational structures. Studies of organisations ranging from non-violent social movements to religious
sects to terrorist networks have shown that one of the strongest predictors of participation in an organisation is one's location within a given social network—for example, various studies of recruitment patterns among extremist political and religious groups show that recruitment is usually based initially on friendship ties, personal acquaintances or family connections. 9

**Mobility of Capital—Tapping into Grey Economy Networks**

Much has been written about the mobility of capital in global financial markets as a feature of globalisation. Increasingly, there is also greater attention being paid to the global market in illicit capital flows and illicit flows of goods across borders (e.g. Taylor 2002). Many of these flows are facilitated by the activities of transnational informal economic networks, which are often intertwined, to greater or lesser extents, with migration networks. These informal economic networks are embedded in existing social configurations, in that they rely heavily on personal relations between members, rather than formal or impersonal organisational structures. As MacGaffey and Bazenguissa-Ganga (2000, 3) phrase it, in their study of illicit trading between migrant communities in Paris and their home communities in the Congo, ‘Globalisation is generally thought of in terms of multinational companies and the changing relations between nation states and peoples as they become enmeshed in the world economy, [but a study of transnational informal economic networks] focuses instead on individuals operating at the interstices of these larger entities, and on how they manage to take advantage of the way the world economy now works.’

The opportunities for transnational mobilisation of economic resources via informal networks have greatly increased along with increases in migration, new communication technologies that allow for instant transmission of funds around the globe, the availability of a global financial infrastructure, and increased flows of licit trade between states. The transnational flow of labour remittances, for example, is estimated to be up to US$100 billion annually (Gammeltoft 2002, cited in IOM 2003a, 310). Labour remittances from migration make up more than half of all total financial inflows in a number of countries. In Morocco, labour remittances make up 66 per cent of the country’s total financial inflows. In both Egypt and Tunisia the figure is 51 per cent (IOM 2003b). Labour remittances can be put to use for a variety of purposes. They play important roles in stimulating economic development in their community of origin (Van Hear 2002). They also represent a transnational resource base, embedded in social networks, which can be harnessed by political entrepreneurs.

In addition to labour remittances, there are a number of other examples of the informal or illicit flow of money across borders. Smuggling and organised crime both generate billions of dollars of revenue a year. According to one estimate, global revenues from transnational organised crime are as high as US$1 trillion annually—the size of the entire United States Federal Budget in 1993. Drug smuggling alone generates approximately US$500 billion in illicit revenue per year, and trafficking in human beings is estimated to bring in approximately US$9 billion annually (Castells 1998, 169; Carruthers 1999). Many organised crime networks define themselves on the basis of ethnicity or nationality, a form of social

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capital that can be drawn upon to generate informal transnational economic networks, which in turn are drawn upon by political entrepreneurs (Mittelman and Johnston 1999). Examples include the Italian and Russia mafias, Albanian organised crime groups engaged in human smuggling and trafficking activities in Eastern Europe during the 1990s, and the informal economic activities of global networks of ethnic Chinese (see, for example, Koslowski 2000; Lupsha 1999).

Such material resource bases are becoming more important to non-state opposition groups as a source of financing, especially at the end of the Cold War, which largely brought an end to the financing of local non-state opposition groups around the world by the US and USSR. Increasingly, non-state actors have had to turn to other sources of funding for their political movements. Across a wide variety of cases, non-state political actors intent on pursuing violent strategies have turned to fundraising in and taxation of activated transnational networks and political constituencies, such as diasporas; taxing unreported labour remittances; tapping into grey economy networks and international organised crime; relying on individual donors; and harnessing skilled and unskilled labour in the form of recruits (Byman et al. 2001; Kaldor 1999).

Mobility of Ideas, Information, and Identities—The Emergence of New Political Categories

The increased mobility of people and capital in the global economy is accompanied by the mobility of ideas, information and identities. It has become commonplace to associate globalisation with cultural changes ranging from the emergence of increasingly cosmopolitan global cities, to changes in consumption habits around the world, to the rise of mass popular culture and the homogenisation or Americanisation of global culture. Information and communication technologies allow for the instantaneous dissemination of ideas and information around the world.

Scholars of nationalism have pointed to the role that print capitalism, the development of vernacular languages, and nationally bounded communication infrastructures have had on the rise of nationalism and the development of homogeneous national identities (Anderson 1983). Yet with new forms of global communication technologies, the fit between national cultures and territorial spaces becomes more tenuous. Satellite dishes and the internet allow individuals access to the media and information sources of their choice. Viewers around the globe during the war in Iraq could choose to receive their information from a variety of different news providers, whether CNN, the BBC or al-Jazeera. The availability of satellite television and other media outlets means that immigrants, travellers or tourists can remain linked to a virtual identity community that transcends any particular geographic locale. Thus, for example, Turkish migrants in Germany are able to stay linked to developments in Turkey by watching Turkish television, buying Turkish newspapers and logging into Turkish websites. Despite being physically removed from Turkish territory, they experience the simultaneity of information that, as Anderson argues, creates ‘imagined communities’.

The global marketplace of ideas and identities also provides resources for non-state political entrepreneurs. It is relatively easy, for example, to set up a website as a virtual gathering place for a transnationally defined community, and to use it to market a new identity category to a virtual community. The internet has become
used by a number of different Islamist groups to bypass imams and other traditional authority figures, allowing new independent actors to disseminate their own interpretations of Islam to transnational constituencies around the globe (Mandaville 2001). Satellite broadcast television stations challenge state monopolies over the provision of information and the articulation of a national identity. Al-Jazeera and al-Arabiya are currently doing this in the Arab world. In the 1990s independently run Kurdish television stations had a similar effect in Turkey when they broadcast banned Kurdish-language programming, including Kurdish language lessons, into Turkey from Europe (Hassanpour 1988).

Transnational Political Mobilisation and Networks of Violence

New resources that arise due to processes of globalisation are part of a number of ‘pull factors’ that provide incentives to non-state political entrepreneurs to operate transnationally. Such pull factors are accompanied by ‘push factors’, such as the lack of political opportunities and resources within a state to pursue a given political project. Keck and Sikkink (1998, 13) have coined the term ‘boomerang pattern’ to describe the process by which activists can bypass the blocked institutions of a state, and directly connect with transnational networks located in other states as a means of pursuing their political goals. By doing so, political entrepreneurs can engage in political activities, such as making connections with international NGOs and international organisations (IOs), that are designed, in turn, to effect political change in the target state. In the process of doing so, local political entrepreneurs attempt to market their political cause abroad, engaging in framing activities that will link their local political concerns with existing discourses that can bring them both political and material support (Bob 2001; Brysk 2000).

Yet, while liberal constructivists have elucidated this pattern as it relates to liberal groups that do not use violence, less attention has been paid to how similar patterns define the activities of non-state actors that include violence in their repertoire of strategies of contention. In actuality, non-violent and violent tactics are often intermingled as part of a larger grand strategy that seeks to effect political change by drawing on resources and opportunities at the level of the international system. Conflicts that have been viewed in the literature as internal conflicts or civil wars are often organised transnationally by non-state actors that make identity claims to actors beyond the state, and that raise funds for their political projects by drawing on transnational networks (Kaldor 1999).

Political entrepreneurs operating transnationally build up cross-border organisational structures that command political loyalties and mobilise resources. Groups such as the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), Hamas and even al-Qaeda, in some respects, fall somewhere on the continuum of transnational social movements and networks of violence, terror and crime. They are not just involved in violence, but also promote a political agenda, as well as providing goods and services—such as welfare, policing, education, employment, membership, identity and existential meanings—to constituencies that are marginalised within the given political order.

Within the broader context of transnational mobilisation in the pursuit of political goals, strategies of terrorism and violence can be one component of an overall agenda that is designed to challenge the status quo. In addition to
inflicting pain and damage and weakening the existing political order, terrorism, writes Hoffman (1998, 4), ‘is designed to create power where there is none or to consolidate power where there is very little. Through the publicity generated by their violence, terrorists seek to obtain the leverage, influence and power they otherwise lack to effect political change on either a local or an international scale.’ As a ‘weapon of the weak’, terrorism is deployed by groups to gain media attention and visibility as the first step in gaining ‘name recognition’ within the international community (Nacos 1994). Even if acts of terrorism are universally condemned, they stimulate media coverage of an issue and often provide an opening for more moderate organisations to ask the public to consider the legitimacy of the cause as separate from the tactics with which the cause is being promoted. In this regard, one must note that one of the observable outcomes of 9/11 has indeed been a spotlight of media attention on the Middle East and Islam, and the provision of more opportunities for moderate voices to have their grievances at least publicly considered and deliberated, to a much greater extent than was possible prior to 9/11.

The Intertwining of Transnational Political Mobilisation and Violence Prior to 9/11

Examples of how these various factors come together in transnationally organised violent political movements can be seen in a number of examples taken from the 1990s. An examination of violent transnational networks in the 1990s is useful for putting the post-9/11 period in context, demonstrating a degree of continuity in the international security stemming from broader globalisation trends—if not in the level of state response, which has drastically changed since 9/11. The Kosovar nationalist movement, for example, provides an example of how political entrepreneurs bypassed the state and drew on transnational migration networks and grey economy networks in order to construct a Kosovar nationalist movement. Indeed, it is interesting to reflect on the extent to which NATO would have characterised the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) as a self-determination movement to be supported as opposed to a terrorist organisation to be suppressed if the 9/11 attacks had occurred in the mid-1990s (Howard 2003).

During the 1990s, almost a third of the Kosovar Albanian population spent time working or living abroad, with approximately 400,000 Kosovar Albanians migrating to Western Europe (Independent International Commission on Kosovo 2000, 45–47). This meant that dense transnational social networks connected Kosovo with diaspora networks in Western Europe. These diaspora networks were drawn upon by Ibrahim Rugova’s League for a Democratic Kosovo (LDK) as a means of mobilising counter-hegemonic identities and as a source of revenue to fund the establishment of parallel political structures in Yugoslavia. The LDK had its headquarters first in Ljubljana and then in Bonn. Ninety per cent of the funds it raised abroad were spent on promoting a parallel education system and cultural activities. These transnational networks also contributed to funding an independent grey economy sector in Kosovo (ibid.).

In the early 1990s, it was estimated that remittances and grey economy networks accounted for 70 per cent of all economic activity in Kosovo (ibid., 47). In 1996, the KLA was formed in Switzerland and began to broadcast
Albanian-language programming from Switzerland that was beamed into Kosovo and tuned into by the local population. Simultaneously, activists in the Western European Kosovar diaspora launched a political lobbying campaign in European capitals—targeting states, NGOs and IOs, such as the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the EU and NATO.

The KLA raised money from a transnational diaspora through its international ‘Homeland Calling’ fund, as well as allegedly from revenues from the sale of narcotics funnelled to the KLA through transnational networks of organised crime (ibid., 51–52). Even the KLA ‘army’ in Kosovo consisted largely of hastily trained recruits from the diaspora in Western Europe who spoke ‘better German than Albanian,’ and who were able to take advantage of the partial collapse of the Albanian state in 1997 to obtain weapons and establish training camps (Hedges 1998; 1999). The decision to use violence as part of their overall strategy was also, some have claimed, directly linked to international pull factors that existed beyond the Yugoslav state. Kuperman (2003), for example, argues that the KLA deliberately used violence to incite a Serbian retaliation as a means of gaining the attention and sympathies of the international community, in the hope of provoking an international intervention that would benefit Kosovar nationalists.

Another example from the 1990s is the Kurdish nationalist movement in Turkey. During the 1980s and 1990s, while expressions of Kurdish language, identity and politics were banned in Turkey, a number of Kurdish political entrepreneurs emigrated from Turkey and began to directly mobilise ‘Turkish’ immigrant communities in Europe. They promoted a Kurdish identity and language, established cultural organisations, publishing houses and numerous Kurdish newspapers in Europe. Many, but not all, of the political entrepreneurs were somehow linked to the PKK, which was headed by Abdullah Öcalan, who had established his headquarters in Damascus after leaving Turkey following the 1980 military coup. From Syria, the PKK simultaneously undertook an armed conflict in southeastern Turkey, using tactics of both insurgency and terrorism, and engaged in political mobilisation activities throughout Europe (Adamson 2002).

Exiles in Germany and other countries in Europe set out to build a pan-European counterpart to the PKK’s political wing beginning in 1985, and successfully created a transnational structure that was organised as a network of local cells (see Bundesamt fuer Verfassungsschutz 1996, 7) which, in the words of van Bruinessen (1996, 14), became ‘an almost invisible network spread around the globe’. The PKK organisational structure within Western Europe was headed up by a European Central Committee, with headquarters in Cologne and Brussels and national organisations in Germany, Belgium, France, The Netherlands, Britain, Switzerland, Italy and the Scandinavian countries (Stein 1994, 91; Barkey and Fuller 1998, 38). Throughout the mid-1980s to early 1990s the political wing of the PKK operated legally in most of Europe, with its above-ground cultural, social and political organisations existing side by side with a parallel covert and tightly organised underground structure (Stein 1994, 86).

There are also at least 25 Kurdish publishing houses based in Sweden, Switzerland, Germany and elsewhere. See Watts (2004).
The organisational structure included student groups, women’s organisations and youth clubs (Stein 1994, 96–98). The PKK organised cultural festivals and political demonstrations, Kurdish language courses, immigrant support groups, youth camps and parents’ clubs. Political demonstrations and cultural festivals organised by the PKK in Germany regularly attracted crowds of between 50,000 and 70,000, and were filmed and converted into videotapes that were circulated throughout the diaspora (White 2001, 175). The PKK published a daily Turkish-language newspaper, Özgür Politika, which reported on events in Turkey and in the Kurdish diaspora in Europe. This all occurred simultaneously with the pursuit of a violent armed strategy within Turkey, occasional terrorist threats directed at European tourists in Turkey, and threats to undertake terrorist actions, including suicide bombing campaigns, within Europe.

The PKK was particularly active in raising money within immigrant communities in Germany, where it harnessed material resources from the community by collecting voluntary donations and ‘taxes’ of up to 20% of individual salaries and business profits. It also relied on extortion and protection money, business investments, criminal activity and the drug trade as other sources of revenue (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 8 August 1997, 6). Money raised by the PKK in Europe from donations and criminal activities was used to purchase arms for the conflict in the southeast of Turkey, and the PKK, like the KLA, also recruited in the diaspora. Recruits would take up positions as guerrilla fighters following a period of training in Lebanon, and others worked as ‘organizers, diplomats, technicians of various sorts’ (van Bruinessen 1998, 45).

These two examples of the transnational structure of both the Kosovar and Kurdish movements could be supplemented with many other examples from the 1990s and earlier. For example, Tamil nationalists have been able to construct a transnational movement that functions both as a political movement and as an organisation that supports terrorism (Wayland 2004). Operating in Canada, the United Kingdom and other European states, Tamil nationalist groups, often associated with the Tamil Tigers (LTTE), had some of the most effective transnational fundraising organisations of non-state groups during the 1990s. Their US$50 million annual budget was acquired through a combination of direct donations by Tamil migrant communities, money skimmed off from the budgets of Tamil NGOs around the globe, human-smuggling operations and Tamil-run businesses. Tamil diaspora communities in the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia are estimated to have provided US$1.5 million a month via donations and informal taxes (Byman et al., 2001). Until recently, Hamas operated openly in Europe as a transnational political organisation, and openly engaged in fundraising activities there. Similarly, Kashmiri groups have engaged in both fundraising and political lobbying of their local MPs in the United Kingdom, while simultaneously pursuing an armed strategy in Kashmir (Ellis and Khan 2002).

In short, the combination of political entrepreneurs operating transnationally, activating members of the diaspora as a source of revenue and political support and drawing on transnational grey economy networks to fund armed struggles in their ‘home countries’ was a common feature of the international political landscape during the 1990s. A number of scholars expressed alarm at the growth of this new form of ‘long-distance nationalism’ in which,
‘positioned in the First World, [the political entrepreneur] can send money and guns, circulate propaganda, and build intercontinental computer information circuits, all of which can have incalculable consequences in the zones of their ultimate destinations’ (Anderson 1998, 74; see also Collier 2000; Hockenos 2003). By 2000, it was beginning to be recognised that this transnational political activity might actually be having a measurable effect on the course of violent conflicts around the world. A World Bank report noted a correlation between the existence of a significant diaspora population abroad and the probability of recurrent violence in a state that has already experienced violent conflict. Whereas countries with no or insignificant diasporas experience a 6 per cent chance of the recurrence of violent conflict, the probability of renewed violence goes up to 36 per cent in countries that have unusually large diasporas abroad (Collier 2000, 6).

Most of the examples above are of political entrepreneurs who used the ideology of nationalism, and drew on national categories as a means of mobilising transnational networks and engaging in processes of transnational political mobilisation. Yet the phenomenon was not limited to political entrepreneurs pursuing nationalist political projects—in many places political entrepreneurs armed with religiously defined political categories and ideologies were directly competing with nationalists for constituents. This was the case, for example, in immigrant communities in Western Europe. In Germany, Turkish Islamists mobilised second-generation Turks; in France, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and other violent Islamist extremist organisations engaged in recruiting activities. By the late 1990s, there was increasing concern about the mobilisation activities of Islamists in Europe. During the 1990s, as well, networks connected to a greater or lesser extent with Osama bin Laden’s organisation al-Qaeda began to carry out violent attacks around the world, and it became increasingly clear that in many conflicts around the world there were links between militant Islamist fighters which stretched back to their common experience of training in Pakistan and Afghanistan, first in camps organised by the CIA and then in camps organised by Osama bin Laden and his cohorts (Cooley 1999).

Indeed, al-Qaeda’s transnational organisational structure, mobilisation activities, fundraising activities and recruiting and training techniques are not unique or anomalous—they follow the basic pattern of many other groups from the 1990s, including the fact that they are embedded in a larger political movement. The transnational fundraising techniques of al-Qaeda, which include the use of informal networks, legitimate businesses, such as the honey trade, criminal enterprises, such as the drug trade, and global fundraising via donations and skimming money off NGOs and charity organisations, follow a common pattern of transnational resource mobilisation that has been used frequently by non-state actors mounting a violent challenge to the political status quo. The difference with al-Qaeda is largely their target and in the scale of violence they have been willing to use to achieve their political aims. 

11 Although, it must be remembered, for example, that the GIA had planned to fly a hijacked Air France plane into the Eiffel Tower in the 1990s. They also engaged in subway bombing campaigns in Paris. The PKK threatened to use suicide bombing campaigns in Germany, as well as Turkey, as part of their struggle.
Globalisation, Transnational Political Mobilisation, and International Security

I have argued so far that globalisation provides new incentives and opportunities for political entrepreneurs to operate transnationally, and that the use of terrorism and other forms of violence is best understood as a violent component of broader political movements. Yet, what are the implications of this for our understanding of the nature of the international security environment? In this section, I briefly address this question by identifying four areas in which the security challenges posed by violent transnational networks challenge mainstream paradigms of international security.

Transnational Networks of Violence and the Blurring of Internal and External Security

The use of violence to achieve political goals by non-state actors that operate transnationally challenges the traditional distinctions that are made between what constitutes a state’s internal and external security concerns. Traditional IR security paradigms—which have never been empirically accurate for states outside Europe and the industrialised world—have assumed that states must primarily defend themselves against external threats arising from other states. In order to do so, they must mobilise internally in order to project military power externally. These assumptions do not hold when security threats emanate from transnational non-state actors rather than territorially defined states.

A transnational network such as al-Qaeda simultaneously constitutes an ‘internal’ and an ‘external’ security threat to the United States and other states. Similarly, the GIA constituted both an internal and external security threat to France, and the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) was perceived to be both an internal and external security threat to Germany and other states during the 1990s. This distinguishes such groups from domestically organised political movements or terrorist organisations such as, for example, the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA) in the United States in the 1970s.

Transnationally organised movements that employ political violence present unique political and security challenges to states, because both their grievances and their strategies are shaped by a combination of domestic and international factors. In the case of the PKK, for example, grievances included the suppression of Kurdish identity and rights in Turkey, German policies of military assistance to Turkey, and the lack of recognition of Kurdish identity and rights in Germany and internationally. In the case of al-Qaeda, bin Laden was involved in opposition politics within Saudi Arabia before he fought in Afghanistan, and the articulated grievances of al-Qaeda combine grievances against regimes in the Arab world and against US foreign policy (Anonymous 2002).

Transnational Political Mobilisation and State Institutional Responses: Less Distinction Between Internal and External Security Institutions

As governments respond to security threats from non-state actors that transcend the physical boundaries of individual states, their security institutions are under pressure to undertake new functional tasks that blur the functional differentiation

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12 For useful critiques, see David (1991) and Ayoob (1995).
that has existed between agencies and institutions responsible for internal vs. external security. One example of this is the trend in militaries to undertake more actions that resemble civilian policing operations—such as the role that NATO forces played in post-conflict Kosovo or Afghanistan, or the role of US forces in post-conflict reconstruction in Iraq. Similarly, domestic police units are increasingly engaged in multilateral operations or international missions. For example, the Ministry of Defence in the UK has recently put together an elite police rapid response team that can be sent to trouble spots around the globe. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police has an extensive international programme, which includes international operations and the training of participants in UN civilian police missions.\footnote{On the former, see ‘Elite “Rapid Response Team” to Be Sent to World’s Trouble-Spots’, Jane’s Police Review, 24 November 2004, (www.policereview.com). On the latter, see the homepage of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police: (http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/intpolicing/intpolicing_e.htm) (accessed 28 November 2004). On the internationalisation of US civilian policing, see Nadelmann (1993). On the policing role of the US military see Andreas and Price (2001).} When security threats emanate from non-state actors and transnational networks, there is a structural imperative for both domestically oriented and internationally oriented state security institutions to respond by converging on policing methods that are geared to managing security threats from diverse and diffuse societal threats, rather than from unitary state actors.

Andreas, for example, has noted how military technologies have been adopted by police and border control units since the end of the Cold War, and how policing is an increasing component of security (2000). In Europe, policing also increasingly transcends borders and is multilateral (Anderson \textit{et al.}, 1995). There is routine police cooperation, for example, between German and Turkish police in responding to common security threats from either criminal groups or political actors willing to use violence whose networks stretch across both states.

In the wake of 9/11 in the United States it became clear that the functional differentiation between agencies responsible for internal and external intelligence gathering and surveillance had become increasingly dysfunctional, leading to calls for closer cooperation between the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The creation of a Department of Homeland Security is symptomatic of the pressures for institutional restructuring which accompany globalisation and the increased threat posed by transnational networks of political entrepreneurs who are willing to use violence (Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States 2004).

\section*{Violent Transnational Networks and the Emergence of Weak States as Security Threats}

Whereas in traditional state-centric balance-of-power security paradigms, security threats are thought to emanate primarily from strong states in the international system, globalisation produces conditions in which weakly institutionalised states also become the sources of security threats. This is because weakly institutionalised states lack the political channels for non-state political entrepreneurs to channel political demands and grievances domestically, thus contributing to the push factors that create incentives for political entrepreneurs to turn to transnational political mobilisation. Additionally, states that are weakly institutionalised have many of the characteristics of anarchy, thus creating...
pressures for political actors to engage in self-help strategies that emphasise the use of violence and force to achieve political objectives, rather than strategies that emphasise institutional channelling, bargaining and accommodation (Snyder & Jervis 1999).

Krasner (1995, 258) notes that, ‘the character of transnational actors will reflect the institutional environment within which they must function’. Transnational political movements that emanate from anarchic or weakly institutionalised environments develop organisational structures and strategies that are rooted in the political logic of anarchy. At the same time, in order to operate transnationally, they must partially adapt to the political logic of hierarchy—hence the emergence of hybrid political movements that partially resemble the social movements that are found in highly institutionalised political settings, and partially resemble mafia-style networks of terror, organised violence and crime. Because weakly institutionalised settings provide institutional incentives both for transnational political mobilisation and for the use of violence as a political tool by non-state actors, the weakness of states (including the lack of participatory institutions) comes to be seen as not simply a domestic problem for those states, but as a security threat. State weakness emerges as an international security issue (Rotberg 2002).

**Transnational Mobilisation and the ‘Domesticisation’ of the Global Security Environment**

Transnational political mobilisation, the blurring of distinctions between internal and external security threats, and the increasing convergence of internal and external security strategies all combine to lead to what might be referred to as the ‘domesticisation’ of the global security environment. In fact, whether one agrees with the policy implications or not, The 9/11 Commission Report (Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004, 362) explicitly recognised the significance of this fundamental geopolitical change when it stated that ‘the American homeland is the planet’. It has become common in the literature on transnational social movements to point to how politics at the level of the international system increasingly resembles aspects of domestic politics. The transnational activities of non-state actors are commonly thought to contribute to the development of a ‘global civil society’, and the interaction between non-state transnational networks and international institutions leads to the emergence of new patterns of authority in international politics and embryonic forms of ‘global governance’ (see, for example, Deudney 1993; Kaldor 2003; Colas 2002; Keane 2003; Hall and Biersteker 2002).

In a similar fashion, the effect of globalisation on international security is one in which threats to international security and stability increasingly resemble the types of domestic security challenges that are found within weakly institutionalised domestic settings. Indeed, a number of analysts (Anonymous 2002; Crenshaw 2001; Tonnesson 2002) have described the conflict between the US and al-Qaeda as resembling an insurgency or civil war occurring on a global scale. Networks that use violence or political violence to achieve their goals are common to states that lack either institutional development or legitimacy. As Huntington (1968) observed, increased political mobilisation in settings that lack adequate institutionalisation creates conditions of instability and political violence. One could make the case that the current international system resembles a developing
world polity that is as yet weakly and unevenly institutionalised, lacking an institutional infrastructure that can produce the required levels of legitimacy and authority for stability. Politically motivated violence by transnational non-state networks is one symptom of this lack of political development at the global level.

Conclusions

Globalisation brings with it both dangers and opportunities. This is well illustrated by examining the phenomenon of transnational political mobilisation by non-state actors and the emergence of global networks of violence. The increased mobility of people, capital and goods, and ideas and information creates incentives for political entrepreneurs to engage in transnational political mobilisation and to build social and political movements that stretch across state boundaries. Such activities can, on the one hand, contribute to the emergence of a global civil society defined by cross-cutting cleavages and interests, and thus, as liberals have argued, increase levels of stability in the international system. On the other hand, an increase in transnational political mobilisation by non-state actors that use political violence and terrorism to pursue their goals is obviously a destabilising factor, not just for individual states, but for the international system as a whole.

I have argued in this article that it is more useful to view non-violent and violent forms of transnational social movements as existing on a continuum, rather than being wholly different categories of political action. Acts of political violence, including acts of terrorism and the use of insurgency techniques, are extreme tactics, but nevertheless still tactics that belong to broader repertoires of contention which political actors use to achieve political ends. As such, al-Qaeda differs from other transnational groups that were active in the 1990s in terms of the scale of violence used and the chosen targets, but not necessarily in terms of its fundamental organisational logic or structure.

Like other types of global political movements—whether global human rights movements, environmental movements or the anti-globalisation movement—the activities of non-state actors that employ violence produce broader patterns of change in the international system. Both non-violent and violent transnational political movements contribute to increased levels of dynamic density and interaction in the international system as a whole, and to the emergence of a global civil (and uncivil) society.

Increasingly, the international system begins to take on some of the features of domestic political systems across a number of realms, including in the realm of security. The international security environment inhabited by states looks less and less like a system of unitary state actors operating in anarchy, and more and more like an emerging, yet unevenly developed and weakly institutionalised, global polity. Of course, this emerging global polity is characterised by vast political and economic inequalities and is dominated by American hegemony. Yet, if the international system more closely resembles a global polity than a system of territorial states operating under anarchy, this would indicate that new security strategies of global policing, surveillance and nation-building that emerge in response to this new environment will need to be accompanied by a set of new political strategies. When threats to international stability take on the character of...
threats to domestic stability, one means of promoting security is to encourage greater degrees of governance at the international level. A key policy challenge of the future will therefore be to devise ways to transpose the factors that make for stable domestic political systems, such as robust political institutions that channel political participation and have a high degree of popular legitimacy, to the level of the international system.

References


Globalisation, Mobilisation, and Violence


