

Political Science 715: Core Seminar in Political Institutions

Prof. Giovanna Invernizzi
Prof. Georg Vanberg
Department of Political Science
Duke University

Class Room: Perkins LINK 065 (Classroom 2)

Class Time: M 8:45-11:15am

Prof. Invernizzi:

Email: giovanna.invernizzi@duke.edu

Website: www.giovannainvernizzi.com

Zoom: <https://duke.zoom.us/my/ginvernizzi>

Zoom Office Hours: Tue 9-10am
and by appt.

Prof. Vanberg:

Office: 219 Gross Hall

Website: <http://www.georgvanberg.com>

Zoom: <https://duke.zoom.us/my/gvanberg>

Email: georg.vanberg@duke.edu

Office Hours: M 1:30-2:30pm
and by appt.

COURSE OVERVIEW

This is the core graduate seminar for the Political Institutions field in Political Science. This field is concerned with the formal and informal rules, practices, and regularities that guide and constrain political choices and activities. It is concerned with the consequences of institutions, as well as with institutional emergence, stability, and change. The approach we will take is largely conceptual and theoretical. This will be especially true in the first half of the semester. In the second half, we will consider a number of specific institutional settings, including parties and electoral competition, legislative institutions, and authoritarian politics.

REQUIRED READINGS

The readings for this class consist largely of book chapters and papers. They are available electronically through the Sakai site for this course. For each week, the readings listed directly underneath the heading are required, and must be completed before class. Readings under the heading "Additional readings" are not required. Note that the additional readings do not represent a comprehensive list on a topic; they are merely suggestions offered as a starting point if you want to get deeper into the literature in a particular area. If you plan to concentrate in institutions, you might consider buying the following books, of which we will read significant portions:

- John Aldrich. 1997. *Why Parties?* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Gary Cox. 1997. *Making Votes Count.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- John Huber and Charles Shipan. 2002. *Deliberate Discretion*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lanny Martin and Georg Vanberg. 2011. *Parliaments and Coalitions*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Elinor Ostrom. 1990. *Governing the Commons*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Milan Svobik. 2012. *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Note that the reading load in this seminar is “lighter” than in many other graduate seminars, at least with respect to the number of articles/chapters/pages assigned each week. THIS DOES NOT IMPLY THAT THIS IS AN EASY OR LESS WORK-INTENSIVE COURSE. Rather, we expect you to read each assigned reading carefully, working through models and results as best you can, and that you will be prepared for a detailed discussion. We reserve the right to add or substitute readings depending on how our class discussions develop.

GRADES AND EVALUATION

This is a graduate seminar. This means that class will be conducted in a colloquium style. Because of this format, it is essential that every student has completed the assigned reading before class and is ready to participate in discussion. Your active and thoughtful participation is the key to making this seminar a success. Obviously, you should not miss class unless there are exceptional circumstances that keep you from being there.

Your grade will be based on the following:

- **(20 percent):** Class participation.
- **(40 percent):** One discussion paper (3 pages maximum) on the readings for a week. We will assign students to each of the weeks during the first session. For the week for which you are assigned, you must write a short discussion paper that provides a clear synopsis of the argument in each of the readings and compares and contrasts them (i.e., What are the problems/research questions addressed? How do the authors address this question? What are the main findings? How do the papers speak to one another?). Essays are due on Sunday afternoon, 5pm the day before class and must be submitted via Sakai. They will be posted for all students to read before class.
- **(40 percent):** Research paper (15-20 pages). Your assignment for this paper is (i) to identify the scholarly literature on a political institution of interest to you, (ii) within this literature, to locate a model, and (iii) to sketch an extension of this model that you believe to be substantively interesting and important. In order to do this, it is critical that you provide an overview of the relevant literature, and the place of the original model within it. You must then sketch your extension of the model, and explain why this extension is substantively important – that is, why it makes a worthwhile addition to our understanding of the institution being modeled. It is NOT necessary that you formalize your extension, and provide a fully-solved, analytical model. But your description should be rigorous and clear, and you

should provide well-reasoned arguments for your extension, and for the impact you expect from it. You must choose a topic by October 1, and submit a short abstract of the model and your proposed extension by October 15. The paper is due on the last day of class, November 26.

Course grades will be determined according to the following grading scale: **A:** 93-100 **A-:** 90-92 **B+:** 88-89 **B:** 83-87 **B-:** 80-82 **C+:** 78-79 **C:** 73-77 **C-:** 70-72 **D+:** 68-69 **D:** 63-67 **D-:** 60-62 **F:** 0-59

ACADEMIC DISHONESTY

Students and faculty at Duke are governed by the **Duke Community Standard**, and academic dishonesty will not be tolerated. If I suspect that a student has attempted to represent someone else's work as their own, or to cheat in any other manner on an exam or a written assignment, I will refer the case to the Office of Student Conduct in accordance with university policy. If a violation of the academic integrity policy is found to have occurred, the minimum penalty will be a zero (0) on the assignment/exam in question. If you have any questions about plagiarism and proper citation methods, please consult the **Duke Tutorial on Plagiarism**.

STUDENTS WITH CHALLENGES

Students with challenges who require individualized testing or other accommodations should identify themselves and express their needs during the first week of the semester. Where the challenge is not immediately apparent, verification will be required.

APPROXIMATE SEMESTER SCHEDULE

Week 1 (8/28): Approaches to the study of institutions

Reading:

- Douglass North. 1991. "Institutions." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 5: 97-112.
- Adam Przeworski. 2004. "Institutions Matter?" *Government and Opposition*. 39: 527-540.
- Steven Tadelis. 2013. **Game Theory: An Introduction**. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chapter 3.

Additional reading:

- David Kreps. 1990. **Game Theory and Economic Modelling**. Oxford: Oxford University Press. "Chapter 3: Basic notions of Non-cooperative game theory."
- Margaret Levi and Victor Menaldo. 2015. "The New Economic Institutionalism in Historical Perspective." In J. Ghandi and R. Ruiz-Rufino. *Handbook of Comparative Political Institutions*. London: Routledge.

- Daniel Diermeier and Keith Krehbiel. 2003. "Institutionalism as a Methodology." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 15: 123-144.
- Granovetter, Mark S. 2005. "The Impact of Social Structure on Economic Outcomes." *Journal of Economic Perspectives*. 19: 33-50.
- Hodgson, Geoffrey M. 1998. "The Approach of Institutional Economics." *Journal of Economic Literature*. 36: 166-92.
- March, James G., and Johan P. Olsen. 1984. "The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life." *American Political Science Review*. 78: 734-749.
- Peter Hall and Rosemary C.R. Taylor. 1996. "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms." *Political Studies* 44 (4): 936-57.
- Rothstein, Bo. 1996. "Political Institutions: An Overview." In Robert Goodin and Hans-Dieter Klingemann (eds.), *A New Handbook of Political Science*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Ken Shepsle. 2006. "Rational Choice Institutionalism." In S. Binder, R. Rhodes, B. Rockman. *Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Thelen, Kathleen. 1999. "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics." *Annual Review of Political Science*. 2: 369-404.
- Weingast, Barry R. 1996. "Political Institutions: Rational Choice Perspectives." In Robert Goodin and Hans-Dieter Klingemann (eds.), *A New Handbook of Political Science*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Week 2 (9/4): No class – Labor Day

Week 3 (9/11): Institutions as Equilibria

Reading:

- Randall Calvert. 1995. "The Rational Choice Theory of Social Institutions." In Jeff Banks and Eric Hanushek (eds.). *Modern Political Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- John Carey. 2000. "Parchment, Equilibria, and Institutions." *Comparative Political Studies* 33: 735-761.

Additional reading:

- Calvert, Randall. 1995. "Rational Actors, Equilibrium and Social Institutions." In Jack Knight and Itai Sened (eds.) *Explaining Social Institutions*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Chwe, Michael Suk-Young. 2001. *Rational Ritual*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Greif, Avner. 1998. "Historical and Comparative Institutional Analysis." *American Economic Review* 88: 80-94.

- Greif, Avner. 1994. "Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies." *The Journal of Political Economy*. 102: 912-50.
- Shepsle, Kenneth. 2007. "Old Questions and New Answers about Institutions: The Riker Objection Revisited." In Barry Weingast and Donald Wittman (eds.). *The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Week 4 (9/18): Institutional Emergence and Change

Reading:

- Avner Greif and David Laitin. 2004. "A Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change." *American Political Science Review* 98: 633-652.
- Jack Knight. 1992. *Institutions and Social Conflict*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 5.
- North, Douglass C., and Barry R. Weingast. "Constitutions and Commitment: the Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England." *The Journal of Economic History* 49.4 (1989): 803-832.

Additional reading:

- David, Paul A. 1994. "Why Are Institutions the 'Carriers of History'? Path-Dependence and the Evolution of Conventions, Organizations and Institutions." *Structural Change and Economic Dynamics*. 5: 205-20.
- Ensminger, Jean and Jack Knight. 1997. "Changing Social Norms: Common Property, Bridewealth, and Clan Exogamy." *Current Anthropology*. 38: 1-24.
- Gamm, Gerald and Ken Shepsle. 1989. "Emergence of Legislative Institutions: Standing Committees in the House and Senate, 1810-1825." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 14:39-66.
- Knight, Jack. 1995. "Models, Interpretations and Theories: Constructing Explanations of Institutional Emergence and Change." in Jack Knight and Itai Sened (eds.). *Explaining Social Institutions*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
- Kollman, Ken, John H. Miller, and Scott E. Page. 1997. "Political institutions and sorting in a Tiebout model." *The American Economic Review* 87: 977-992.
- Pierson, Paul. 2000. "The Limits of Design: Explaining Institutional Origins and Change." *Governance*. 13: 475-499.
- Pierson, Paul. 2000. "Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics." *American Political Science Review* 94: 251-67.
- Robert Sugden. 1989. "Spontaneous Order." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 3: 85-97.
- Ullmann-Margalit, Edna. 1978. "Invisible-Hand Explanations." *Synthese* 39: 263-291.
- Ullmann-Margalit, Edna. 1990. "Revision of Norms." *Ethics* 100: 756-767.

Week 5 (9/25): Preference Aggregation (This class falls on Yom Kippur; we will arrange a separate class for those who observe the holiday)

Reading:

- Krehbiel, Keith. 1988. "Spatial Models of Legislative Choice." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 13: 259-319. READ ONLY THROUGH P.382
- William Riker. 1980. "Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions." *American Political Science Review* 74: 432-446.

Additional reading:

- Arrow, Kenneth. 1983. "Values and Collective Decision-Making." In Ken Arrow. *Social Choice and Justice*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Buchanan, James M. 1954. "Social Choice, Democracy, and Free Markets." *The Journal of Political Economy* 62: 114-23.
- Cox, Gary and Ken Shepsle. 2007. "Majority cycling and agenda manipulation: Richard McKelvey's contributions and legacy." *Positive changes in political science: The legacy of Richard D. McKelvey's most influential writings*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Ferejohn, John and Charles Shipan. 1990. "Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy." *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 6: 1-20.
- McKelvey, Richard D. 1976. "Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control." *Journal of Economic Theory* 12: 472-482.
- Miller, David. 1992. "Deliberative Democracy and Social Choice." *Political Studies* 40: 54-67.
- Patty, John and Maggie Elizabeth Penn. 2014. *Social Choice and Legitimacy: The Possibilities of Impossibility*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Plott, Charles. 1967. "A notion of equilibrium and its possibility under majority rule." *American Economic Review* 57: 787-806.
- Riker, William. 1982. *Liberalism Against Populism*. Prospect Heights: Waveland Press.
- Romer, Thomas and Howard Rosenthal. 1978. "Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas, and the Status Quo." *Public Choice* 4: 27-43.
- Shepsle, Ken and Barry Weingast. 1981. "Structure-Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice." *Public Choice*. 37: 503-519.
- Sen, Amartya. 1995. "Rationality and Social Choice." *American Economic Review* 85: 1-24.
- Shepsle, Ken. 1979. "Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models." *American Journal of Political Science* 23: 27-59.
- Shepsle, Ken and Barry Weingast. 1984. "Uncovered Sets and Sophisticated Voting Outcomes with Implications for Agenda Institutions." *American Journal of Political Science* 28: 49-74.

Week 6 (10/2): Spatial Models of electoral competition

Reading:

- Calvert, Randall. 1985. "Robustness of the Multidimensional Voting Model: Candidate Motivations, Uncertainty, and Convergence." *American Journal of Political Science*. 29 (1):69-95.
- Ansolabehere, Stephen, James M. Snyder Jr, and Charles Stewart III. 2001. "Candidate positioning in US House elections." *American Journal of Political Science* 45(1):136-159.
- Gelbach, Formal Models of Domestic Politics, Chapters 1 and 2.

Week 7 (10/9): Delegation and the Principal-Agent Problem

Reading:

- Fearon, James D. 1999. "Electoral accountability and the control of politicians: selecting good types versus sanctioning poor performance," in *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation*, edited by Adam Przeworski, Susan C. Stokes, and Bernard Manin, Cambridge University Press, Chapter 2.
- Gelbach, Formal Models of Domestic Politics, Chapters 1 and 2.
- John Huber and Charles Shipan. 2002. *Deliberate Discretion*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 2 and 4.

Additional reading:

- Bendor, Jonathan, Amihai Glazer, and Thomas Hammond. 2001. "Theories of Delegation." *Annual Review of Political Science* 4: 234-269.
- Tim Besley. *Principled agents?* Chapter 3
- Mat McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz. 1984. "Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols vs. Fire Alarms." *American Journal of Political Science* 28: 165-179.
- McNollgast. 1987. "Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control." *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization*. 3: 243-277.
- Gary Miller. 2005. "The Political Evolution of Principal-Agent Models." *Annual Review of Political Science* 8: 203-225.
- Milgrom, Paul, Douglass North, and Barry Weingast. 1990. "The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs." *Economics and Politics* 2: 1-22.
- North, Douglass. 1990. *Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Williamson, Oliver E. 2000. "The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead." *Journal of Economic Literature*. 38: 595-613.

- Bendor, Jonathan and Adam Meirowitz. 2004. "Spatial Models of Delegation." *American Political Science Review*. 98: 293-310.
- Epstein, David and Sharyn O'Halloran. 1999. *Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making under Separate Powers*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Volden, Craig. 2002. "A Formal Model of the Politics of Delegation in a Separation of Powers System." *American Journal of Political Science* 46: 111-133.

Week 8 (10/16): No Class – Fall Break

Week 9 (10/23): Collective Action

Reading:

- Elinor Ostrom. 1990. *Governing the Commons*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1-3.
- Kuran, Timur. "Now out of never: The element of surprise in the East European revolution of 1989." *World politics* 44.1 (1991): 7-48.
- Shepsle, Kenneth A. *Analyzing politics: rationality, behavior, and institutions*. WW Norton, 2010. Chapter 9.

Additional reading:

- Bendor, Jonathan and Dilip Mookherjee. 1987. "Institutional Structure and the Logic of Ongoing Collective Action." *American Political Science Review*. 81: 129-154.
- Calvert, Randall. 1992. "Leadership and Its Basis in Problems of Social Coordination." *International Political Science Review*. 13: 7-24.
- Esteban, Joan, and Debraj Ray. 2001. "Collective Action and the Group Size Paradox." *American Political Science Review* 95(3):663-672.
- Karklins, Rasma and Roger Petersen. 1993. "Decision Calculus of Protestors and Regimes." *Journal of Politics*. 55:588-615.
- Laitin, David. 1994. "The Tower of Babel as a Coordination Game." *American Political Science Review*. 88:622-34.
- Lohmann, Suzanne. 1994. "The Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Monday Demonstrations in Leipzig, East Germany, 1989-91." *World Politics*. 47:42-101.
- Olson, Mancur. 1965. *The Logic of Collective Action*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Ostrom, Elinor, James Walker, and Roy Gardner. 1992. "Covenants With and Without a Sword: Self-Governance is Possible." *American Political Science Review*. 86: 404-417.
- Ostrom, Elinor. 1998. "A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action." *American Political Science Review*. 92: 1-22.

- Ostrom, Elinor. 1999. "Coping with Tragedies of the Commons." *Annual Review of Political Science*. 2: 493-535.

Week 10 (10/30): Political Parties

Reading:

- John Aldrich. 2011. *Why Parties? A Second Look*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Chapters 1 and 2 (through page 43).
- Levy, Gilat. 2004. "A model of political parties." *Journal of Economic Theory*. 115(2): 250-277.

Additional reading:

- Downs, Anthony. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York: Harper.
- Duverger, Maurice. 1954. *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State*. Methuen.
- Ferree, Karen, G. Bingham Powell, and Ethan Scheiner. 2014. "Context, Electoral Rules, and Party Systems." *Annual Review of Political Science* 17: 421-39.
- Hotelling, Harold. 1929. "Stability in Competition." *Economic Journal* 39: 41-57.

Week 11 (11/6): Electoral Systems

Reading:

- Gary Cox. 1997. *Making Votes Count*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1 and 2.
- Ronald Rogowski and Mark Kayser. 2002. "Majoritarian electoral systems and consumer power: price-level evidence from the OECD countries." *American Journal of Political Science* : 526-539.
- Charles Boix. 1999. "Setting the rules of the game: the choice of electoral systems in advanced democracies." *American political science review* 93: 609-624.

Additional reading:

- Bawn, Kathleen and Michael Thies. 2003. "A Comparative Theory of Electoral Incentives." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 15: 5-32.
- Bawn, Kathleen. 1993. "The logic of institutional preferences: German electoral law as a social choice outcome." *American Journal of Political Science* : 965-989.
- Chang, Eric and Miriam A. Golden. 2007. "Electoral Systems, District Magnitude and Corruption." *British Journal of Political Science* 37: 115-137.

- Gary Cox. 1990. "Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives in Electoral Systems." *American Journal of Political Science* 34: 903-935.
- Downs, Anthony. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York: Harper.
- Duverger, Maurice. 1954. *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State*. Methuen.
- Ferree, Karen, G. Bingham Powell, and Ethan Scheiner. 2014. "Context, Electoral Rules, and Party Systems." *Annual Review of Political Science* 17: 421-39.
- Hotelling, Harold. 1929. "Stability in Competition." *Economic Journal* 39: 41-57.
- Jones, Mark, Sebastian Saiegh, Pablo Spiller and Mariano Tommasi. 2002. "Amateur Legislators-Professional Politicians: The Consequences of Party-Centered Electoral Rules in a Federal System." *American Journal of Political Science* 46: 656-669.
- Remington, Thomas and Steven Smith. 1996. "Political Goals, Institutional Context, and the Choice of an Electoral System: The Russian Parliamentary Election Law." *American Journal of Political Science* 40: 1253-1279.

Week 12 (11/13): Legislative Institutions

Reading:

- Lanny Martin and Georg Vanberg. 2011. *Parliaments and Coalitions: The Role of Legislative Institutions in Multiparty Governance*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chapters 2, 3, and 5.
- Tsebelis, George. 1995. "Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism." *British Journal of Political Science* 25(3): 289-325.
- Giovanna Invernizzi and Michael Ting. 2023. "Institutions and Political Restraint." *American Journal of Political Science*.

Additional reading:

- Aldrich, John and David Rohde. 2000. "The Consequences of Party Organization in the House: The Role of the Majority and Minority Parties in Conditional Party Government." In Jon R. Bond and Richard Fleisher (eds.). *Polarized Politics: Congress and the President in a Partisan Era*. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.
- Baldez, Lisa and John Carey. 1999. "Presidential Agenda Control and Spending Policy: Lessons from General Pinochet's Constitutions." *American Journal of Political Science* 43: 29-55.
- Baron, David P., and John A. Ferejohn. 1989. "Bargaining in Legislatures." *American Political Science Review* 83 (4): 1181-1206.
- Cox, Gary and Mathew McCubbins. 2005. *Setting the Agenda*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Heller, William. 2001. "Making policy stick: why the government gets what it wants in multiparty parliaments." *American Journal of Political Science*. 45: 780-798.
- John Huber. 1996. "The Vote of Confidence in Parliamentary Democracies." *American Political Science Review* 90: 269-82.
- Huber, John D, and Nolan McCarty. 2001. "Cabinet Decision Rules and Political Uncertainty in Parliamentary Bargaining." *American Political Science Review* 95 (2): 345-360.
- Huber, John D. 1992. "Restrictive Legislative Procedures in France and the United States." *American Political Science Review* 86(3): 675-687.
- Linz, Juan. 1990. "The Perils of Presidentialism." *Journal of Democracy* 1: 51-69.
- Keith Krehbiel. 1998. *Pivotal Politics: A Theory of US Lawmaking*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Shugart. 1997. "Juan Linz, Presidentialism, and Democracy: A Critical Appraisal." *Comparative Politics* 29: 449-471.
- Martin, Lanny and Georg Vanberg. 2014. "Parties and Policymaking in Multiparty Governments: The Legislative Median, Ministerial Autonomy, and the Coalition Compromise." *American Journal of Political Science*. 58: 979-996.
- Roberts, Jason and Steven Smith. 2007. "The Evolution of Agenda-Setting Institutions in Congress: Path Dependency in House and Senate Institutional Development." In David Brady and Mathew McCubbins (eds.). *Party, Process, and Political Change in Congress*. Vol. 2.
- Rohde, David. 1994. "Parties and Committees in the House: Member Motivations, Issues, and Institutional Arrangements." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 19: 341-359.
- Samuels, David and Matthew Shugart. 2003. "Presidentialism, Elections, and Representation." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 15: 33-60.
- Shepsle, Kenneth A. and Barry R. Weingast. 1994. "Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions." *Legislative Studies Quarterly*. 19: 149-179.
- Strom, Kaare, Wolfgang Mueller and Torbjorn Bergman. 2008. *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies*. Oxford University Press.
- Shugart, Matthew and John Carey. 1992. *Presidents and Assemblies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Thies, Michael F. 2001. "Keeping Tabs on Partners: The Logic of Delegation in Coalition Governments." *American Journal of Political Science* 45(3): 580-98.

Week 13 (11/20): Coalition Bargaining

Reading:

- David Baron and John A. Ferejohn. 1989. "Bargaining in legislatures." *American Political Science Review* 83: 1181-1206.

- Michael Laver and Scott DeMarchi. 2020. "Government formation as logrolling in high-dimensional spaces." *Journal of Politics* 82: 543-558.
- Martin, Lanny W., and Georg Vanberg. 2020. *Models of Coalition Politics: Recent Developments and New Directions*. The SAGE Handbook of Research Methods in Political Science and International Relations: 244.

Additional reading:

- Bäck, Hanna, Marc Debus and Patrick Dumont. 2011. "Who Gets What in Coalition Governments? Predictors of Portfolio Allocation in Parliamentary Democracies." *European Journal of Political Research* 50(4):441-78.
- Bassi, Anna. 2013. "A Model of Endogenous Government Formation." *American Journal of Political Science* 57(4):777-93.
- Cutler, Josh, Scott de Marchi, Max Gallop, Florian Hollenbach, Michael Laver and Matthias Orlovski. 2016. "Cabinet Formation and Portfolio Distribution in European Multiparty Systems." *British Journal of Political Science* 46(1):31-43.
- Michael Laver and Scott DeMarchi. Forthcoming. "Government formation as logrolling in high-dimensional spaces." *Journal of Politics*.
- Falco-Gimeno, Albert and Indridi H. Indridason. 2013. "Uncertainty, Complexity, and Gamson's Law: Comparing Coalition Formation in Western Europe." *West European Politics* 36(1):221-47.
- Laver, Michael and Kenneth A. Shepsle. 1996. *Making and Breaking Governments: Cabinets and Legislatures in Parliamentary Democracies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Laver, Michael and Norman Schofield. 1990. *Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Laver, Michael, Scott de Marchi and Hande Mutlu. 2011. "Negotiation in Legislatures over Government Formation." *Public Choice* 147(3-4):285-304.
- Martin, Lanny W. and Randolph T. Stevenson. 2010. "The Conditional Impact of Incumbency on Government Formation." *American Political Science Review* 104(3):503-18.
- Lanny Martin and Georg Vanberg. 2020. "What you see is not always what you get: Bargaining before an audience under multiparty government." *American Political Science Review* 114: 1138-1154.
- Morelli, Massimo. 1999. "Demand Competition and Policy Compromise in Legislative Bargaining." *American Political Science Review* 93(4):809-20.

Week 14 (11/27): Authoritarian Institutions

Reading:

- Edmund Malesky, Paul Schuler, and Anh Tran. 2012. "The Adverse Effects of Sunshine: A Field Experiment on Legislative Transparency in an Authoritarian Assembly." *American Political Science Review*. 106: 762-786.

- Melanie Manion. 2014. "'Good Types' in Authoritarian Elections: The Selectoral Connection in Chinese Local Congresses." *Comparative Political Studies* 1-33.
- Milan Svobik. 2012. *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 2 and 6.

Additional reading:

- Albertus, Michael and Victor Menaldo. 2014. "Gaming Democracy: Elite Dominance during Transition and the Prospects for Redistribution." *British Journal of Political Science*. 44: 575-603.
- Gandhi, Jennifer and Adam Przeworski. 2006. "Cooperation, cooptation, and rebellion under dictatorships." *Economics and Politics*. 18:1-26.
- Wintrobe, Ronald. 1990. "The Tinpot and the Totalitarian: An Economic Theory of Dictatorship." *American Political Science Review* 84: 849-872.