By YAO Shengjie
This paper studies the effect of intrinsic motivation on the extrinsic incentives specified by tournament structure in tournament theory in the context of e-sports. It incorporates tournament theory and motivation crowding theory in the same framework, something that past literature have hinted towards but never formally done so. It also uses an e-sports dataset, a type of dataset that few academics in the past have dealt with, but one that offers many interesting potentials. Results weakly show that crowding-in occurs in e-sports, but the effects of tournament structure on performance are inconclusive in the context of this paper. Implications of this paper lie mainly in the possibility for future academics to utilise e-sports data for research.
Advisors: Professor Grace Kim | JEL Codes: J31, J33, J41, M51, M52, Z20
The New Landscape of the NBA: The 2011 Collective Bargaining Agreement’s Impact on Competitive Balance and Players’ Salaries
By Nicholas Yam
The National Basketball Association (NBA) passed a new Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) in 2011 that introduced many changes to the structure of the league. The purpose of those changes was to improve competitive balance among the league, allowing smaller market teams to better compete with larger market teams. Many of the changes targeted the league’s salary cap and teams’ ability to pay players. This paper aims to determine whether competitive balance in the NBA improved under the 2011 CBA. The paper also determines which types of players’ salaries were affected the most. The results showed that competitive balance did not improve under the 2011 CBA. However, the results showed that higher performing players were paid proportionally more money than lower performing players following 2011 CBA.
Advisor: Peter Arcidiacon | JEL Codes: Z2, Z20, Z22