Tag Archives: nations

Global Problem, Global Solution… Right?

One would think that if you have a global problem that there is always (and perhaps only) a global solution. But that way of looking at climate change has become naive and does not allow you to see the entire picture. So often we see states, provinces, and other subnational entities leading the charge with innovative climate policy and initiatives while the national governments sit back arguing over whether or not climate change is really even a problem. Despite the annual COPs, the UNFCCC stage for negotiations, and bilateral discussions (such as the one between US and China), national and international policies are very behind what these subnational actors have been doing for years.

I am not saying that climate change can be solved by a few states in America by creating an Emissions Trading Scheme. If only a few subnational actors make moves to combat climate change, the emissions reductions will never be large enough to solve our problem. But, what I am saying is that someone has to begin to make moves or we won’t ever see a solution. And, historically, it hasn’t been the national governments (or international agreements) that have taken the first steps towards a solution to climate change – it has been the subnational actors. To name just a few:

  • British Columbia has implemented a carbon tax in order to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and are a part of the Pacific Coast Collaborative Agreement with four other subnational parties.
  • California has consistently established itself as a leader in environmental protection, as it has much to lose from the effects of climate change. California has many standards and programs in place, but the most notable is likely the cap-and-trade program established by Assembly Bill 32, and recent linkage with Quebec. These linked programs just successfully held their first joint auction preceding COP20.
  • China has begun implementing pilot cap-and-trade programs in certain provinces, and if successful, might lead to a national cap-and-trade program in 2016.

As I was listening to the subnational leaders speak at the COP this week, I began to wonder why we even try so hard to get a global agreement if the implementation and practical solutions come from the local actors instead of national political leaders. But then, I realized: You can’t solve climate change alone and you can’t solve climate change in an annual conference. What needs to happen, instead of ignoring either the international or local roles in the fight against climate change, is a union between all of these subnational groups to combine their efforts on an international level to reach the same goal; essentially, working in tandem.

The international and subnational approaches to climate change should not conflict with each other but they also play different roles. The relationship between these methods should be more of a push-pull relationship and where one lacks the other leads. Subnational actors have led the charge with innovative policy solutions to climate change but they cannot fight the problem alone. For those countries who cannot be influenced by subnational groups, we also have the international community influencing how we deal with climate change. If these two approaches were to work in tandem, global climate change would be that much easier to protect ourselves against. The international agreement, then, becomes more than just an agreement between nations. An international agreement is the platform for which national and local actors can build upon to implement real effective solutions that are right for their own people.

So, you see? We need a global agreement. This is a global problem, which requires a global effort and a universal solution. Okay, let’s say we do get a solid agreement out of COP21 in Paris. This would be fantastic. But, we need to continue to look beyond the agreement: we need each and every local, indigenous, state, subnational, and national party to act or we will not be able to stand a chance against climate change. That said, I think my last post requires a title change. How about: Global Problem, Global Solution, Local Action.


Which Way Does Your Moral Compass Point? (Part I)

We know that climate change is a problem and we have a decent understanding of how the changes will affect us. What you may not know is that the World Bank lists 137 nations (65% of all countries in the world) as “developing countries.” Furthermore, according to the United Nations, 1.4 billion people worldwide do not have access to electricity. One of the major goals of the UNFCCC is to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions, as they are one of the main drivers of climate change. However, bringing cheap and affordable electricity to those without may require heavy use of fossil fuels and, in general, higher GDP (economic growth) results in increased greenhouse gas emissions. What this means is that we have a great conundrum: Developing nations need to develop and climate change is exacerbated by development.

With these statements in mind, I pose a few questions: How do we weigh the costs and benefits of solving each of these problems? Can we solve these problems simultaneously, and if so, how? Do we have to choose which problem is more important?

As with any conflict, this great conundrum comes with several different solutions (extremes and compromises) born from opposing arguments and viewpoints. In no way can I explain all of these in one post, but I can provide a brief overview of the major themes and explain what the UNFCCC is doing to address these challenges.

Common arguments for the reduction in greenhouse gas emissions (and inherently fossil fuels) include: resource depletion, pollution, climate change, and preservation for future generations. These arguments all have a long-term view that focus both on human and environmental well-being. We currently know that fossil fuels can provide affordable and reliable energy, but at a major cost in the long term because fossil fuels are a major instigator of human-induced climate change.

As you would expect, there are moral arguments for inducing economic development and providing electricity to developing countries without concern for environmental impacts. These arguments are centralized around the short-term human condition. For example: Many argue that the use of fossil fuels provides reliable energy, which actually protects us from climate.

But what about the small island nations that will be under water in the near future because of the sea level rise? What about the rapid spread of diseases, like malaria, due to the warming climate? Fossil fuels can help resolve many issues but climate change issues are not among those. It is not human nature to live without some impact on the earth, however, these impacts must be minimized so that we don’t have to sacrifice long term benefits for the short term.

So, how does the UNFCCC address the role of developing nations in the midst of climate change? Simple: Sustainable Development. Except, it isn’t that simple. ‘Sustainable development’, in the broadest sense means, “Development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” As you can see, this language is not conducive to any real application in a climate change agreement.

For the sake of brevity, I will pause here and let you meditate on where your moral compass points in this conundrum. Next week, I will continue to expand this idea of sustainable development and what it means for developing nations and future COPs in “Which Way Does Your Moral Compass Point? (Part II)”.


Moral Compass png
‘Moral Compass’ Image Source: http://www.premcenter.org/sustainability



Loss & Damage in Paradise

“When island nations drown, who owns their seas?”

That’s the question both posed by, and is also the title of an article that ran on the Boston Globe website last month.

The article dissects the complexities of such a question by asking more questions: who gets to decide whether or not island nations legally retain the rights to their exclusive economic zone—an economic radius that extends 200-miles from a country’s coast? How would the drowned country be able to monitor and patrol their historic exclusive economic zone (EEZ) even if they retained the rights? What if the government of the underwater nation has been absorbed into another country?

For low-lying atoll nations like Kiribati, Tuvalu and the Maldives these are pressing questions. The president of Kiribati has already spent millions of dollars purchasing land in Fiji to provide a new home for a large portion of the nation’s 100,000 citizens. The article, written by Latif Nesser, outlines strategies several law experts recommend the island nations pursue in order to maintain rights to their historical EEZ, even after they are submerged:

  • Fred Soons of the Utrecht University School of Law offered one of the earliest proposals that the legal definition of “naturally formed” islands be broadened to include man-made barriers and other adaptation efforts such as artificial islets. This means as long as an island was originally considered “natural,” it should be able to keep this designation even with physical extensions that keep it above water. However, Soons recognizes that such physical modifications can only keep an island above water for so long, especially considering that many island nations can’t afford such expensive artificial fortifications.
  • Several legal scholars, including Professor David Caron of the UC Berkeley School of Law, have suggested “freezing” current boundaries in place, especially considering many nations will be faced with shrinking coastlines, not just island states. This would prevent a constant redrawing of maps and ensure that future drowned islands retain the economic benefits from their current coastal waters.
  • Rosemary Rayfuse of the University of New South Wales in Australia proposes another way for islands to retain their rights, even when they’ve been forced to relocate. She argues for the recognition of a new category of state by international law as the “de-territorialized state.” She points to the historic case of the Knights of Malta as a precedent. This group, which is a 900-year-old-lay Catholic order, is landless today but still has a nonvoting seat at the United Nations.
  • The fourth strategy rests on the assumption that strategies 2 and 3 are near impossible to realize due to the sluggish pace of international law and how cumbersome it is to enforce, especially for island nations with historically little geopolitical power. Rayfuse puts forth this final strategy, and she considers it the most appealing option. Just as Kiribati has purchased land from Fiji in preparation for “migrating with dignity,” each drowning island nation can find a neighbor willing to sell some of its territory. In this way the fleeing island state can still operate its maritime zones (as long as some part of it is still above water).

Each of these potential strategies leaves much to be desired, and in the end, Nasser points out that—given there were enough willing countries to absorb these populations—the final strategy would likely result in island nation’s trading economic access to their EEZs for a place to call home.

While not all island states will meet this extreme fate, at least within the foreseeable future, the article highlights the contentious issue of recompense for developing countries who are hit hardest by climate change impacts. On the whole, developing countries have demanded they be compensated for the irreversible economic and cultural losses they suffer due to the effects of climate change, as well as climate change-related damages that must be repaired from things like storms and flooding.

However, developed nations generally don’t want to admit responsibility for their historic and current emissions or pay for the resultant loss and damage. Besides the lack of political will, logistics of such reparations make a compensation mechanism tricky. How much should each developed nation be required to pay? Who gets to decide and who enforces it?

These are all questions that are being addressed through the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The nations that are part of the UN negotiating block of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) and the unique challenges they face have shaped the specific outcomes they seek within the UNFCCC negotiations. The issue of loss and damage is one they’ve pursued within Working Group II that addresses impacts, adaptation and vulnerability. In 2011 at COP17 in Durban, South Africa, negotiators came to a consensus on elements to include in the Subsidiary Body of Implementation’s (SBI) Work Program on Loss and Damage, which formalized this topic as one to be addressed under the convention framework.

Since 2011, loss and damage has gathered steam as AOSIS and the Least Developing Countries (LDCs) seek reparation for the significant economic and cultural loss they’ve endured due to rising seas, warming and acidifying oceans, stronger storms, and increasing drought and desertification. Last year at COP19 in Warsaw, Poland, the topic of loss and damage garnered global attention on the heals of Typhoon Haiyan hitting the Philippines, when 132 country delegations walked out of the talks after developed Annex I nations refused to negotiate text on compensation until 2015.

The walk out was orchestrated by the G77 plus China negotiating bloc and the media amplified the story worldwide. G77 plus China, AOSIS and the LDCs felt Australia’s move to block changes to text that would have established loss and damage as a separate working group, rather than a topic of focus within Working Group II, demonstrated that Australia and other Annex I countries were being too dismissive of this serious issue. By the end of the COP, the countries were able to agree to what is now known as the Warsaw Mechanism on Loss and Damage, though it was weaker in nature than the version supported by developing nations.

In preparation for COP20, AOSIS has drafted a submission on what they deem an acceptable loss and damage mechanism to the UNFCCC, which they will present in Lima. The document outlines four key needs that the mechanism should fulfill including: 1) enhancing knowledge and understanding of how to address loss and damage associated with climate change, especially slow onset impacts; 2) preventing and reducing loss and damage from climate impacts; 3) providing support for loss and damage when it can be rehabilitated; 4) compensating for loss and damage when it is unavoidable and unrecoverable.

Additionally, the submission outlines how the institutional structure that supports the mechanism should be designed. It states that the international mechanism should be governed by an executive board under the guidance of and reporting to the Conference of the Parties of the UNFCCC and should have two operational arms. The first arm would be a technical facility to address gaps in knowledge, provide financial support, and provide assistance to develop technology that could help prevent and reduce loss and damage. The second arm would be a financial facility that could develop and manage the dedicated funding sources of the mechanism.

AOSIS closes the document by stating that loss and damage is a matter of highest priority as it directly impacts their long-term survival as nations “including for some through the loss of territory.” There is no doubt in my mind that as the Boston Globe article foretells, the loss of island nation’s EEZs will be a hot issue at COP20 and will increase in importance at future COPs to come. Too much is at stake to ignore it.

Comic by Wesley Bedrosian. Boston Globe 10/19/14: http://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2014/10/18/when-island-nations-drown-who-owns-their-seas/hyH9W5b1mCAyTVgwlFh7qO/story.html#
Comic by Wesley Bedrosian. Boston Globe 10/19/14: http://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2014/10/18/when-island-nations-drown-who-owns-their-seas/hyH9W5b1mCAyTVgwlFh7qO/story.html#