Generational Misfortunes and the Two Faces of Radicalism*

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Abstract

This paper aims to contribute to a better understanding of the politico-economic foundations of the rise of two types of off-center parties: radical right and left-wing radical/neo-populist parties. We refer to these two types of parties as two faces of radicalism. We argue that the relative success of each of these subfamilies reflects in part the age-labor market profile of the losers in different political economy regimes. The divide cuts across generations. Right-wing radicalism tends to be more successful in political economies where labor market opportunities are especially lacking for older, relatively unskilled manufacturing workers. Left-wing radicalism tends to be more successful in highly dualized political economies where labor market opportunities are especially lacking for the younger and relatively skilled. To assess this contention we combine macro-political economy data (at the national and regional level) with micro-electoral data in a wide range of European countries.

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Stretching the meaning of preliminary. Comments Welcome

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1 Introduction

European party systems have undergone significant changes in the aftermath of the Great Recession. In many instances, mainstream parties have suffered major setbacks in favor or radical parties at either end of the ideological spectrum. These patterns motivate a number of recent research efforts on the hollowing-out of democracy, the rise of populism, or the implications of excessive fragmentation/polarization.

Regardless of the specific terminological strategy one adopts to study these changes, there is little doubt that a number of significant transformations in European party systems deserve further scrutiny. In this paper, we avoid explicitly the term populist parties, which we find too protean. There is a growing body of research on the emergence of populism in developed countries Guiso et al. (2017); Inglehart and Norris (2016); Rodrik (2017); Van Kessel (2015). There have been several attempts to classify parties in the populist vs. non-populist dichotomy Inglehart and Norris (2016); Van Kessel (2015). We agree that some of the radical parties adopt a populist stance (the denunciation of the establishment in the name of the people, protectionist policies, rejection of cosmopolitism, a demand for regaining national sovereignty), but our interest lies mainly in the study of political radicalism.

Radicalism can be defined in terms of distance with regard to the status quo. This characterization is spatial, so that we can easily distinguish between right and left radicalism. We have considered that radical parties are those that hold ideological positions to the left of Socialdemocracy or to the right of conservative parties. The core ideological families in European politics that constitute the mainstream go from Socialdemocracy to centrist, liberal and conservative parties. Radical parties are those who place themselves out the core, defending views and policies that are more distant from the status quo than those of mainstream parties.

By way of illustration of the phenomenon of interest, Figure 1 displays the distribution of voting in the post-electoral survey for the 2014 European elections. [1]

[1] We have classified all the parties that obtained more than 3 per cent of the vote in the 2014 European elections into three categories, mainstream parties, radical right parties and radical left parties (for a list of radical parties in our coding, see table 9in the Appendix). It is worth noting that some parties run in European elections in coalitions that are not repeated in the general elections. Thus, there is a number of idiosyncratic party labels compared with the standard labels in general elections. The list of radical parties by country can be found in Table 1. The hardest decision was the coding of the Movimento 5 Stelle (Five Star Movement) in Italy. This party has a clear populist component (the people against a corrupted elite), but its position in the left-right axis is highly ambiguous. In its origins, the party attracted leftist, young and highly educated

Figure 1: The Puzzle:Post-recession European Party System Responses

The patterns displayed in figure 1 pose one puzzle: why does radicalism grow at different ends of the political spectrum across different political economies? Why does the discontent with mainstream parties translates on growing support for radical left parties in some instances (Spain), rapid endorsement of radical right wing platforms in others (Finland, UK, Netherlands) or both (France, Greece)?

In this paper we argue that voter's political responses, and by implication the electoral success of different types of radical parties, are filtered by the extent to which political economies structure the age-skill profile of their relative winners and losers. We conceive of voters as individuals with formed expectations about their long-term income profile, expectations that are mainly conditioned by age and prior skill investments. Crises shutter these prior expectations and lead citizens to experience a shift in the actual relative their expected income in the first place, and to revisit their beliefs about future income prospects. This process generates first significant levels of frustration and, eventually, a political response. Our

people. According to the Manifesto Project Database, the partys platform in 2013 was the most leftist platform ever recorded in Italy Bailo (2015). But the party does not hold consistent policies from an ideological point of view and rejects the very distinction between Left and Right. In any case, all our analyses below have been re-run the analyses deleting the Five Star Movement from the sample and results vary only marginally. In all the other cases, the codification was unproblematic. Green parties have been classified in every case to the left of socialdemocratic parties and therefore fall under the radical left.

argument is, quite straightforwardly, that both the *incidence* in terms of socio-demographic groups and the direction in which the frustration translates into a political response are structured by the organization of labor markets and economic/fiscal institutions as determinants of labor market institutions. In other words, how citizens update the shape of their life-earnings curve is institutionally constrained, thus leading to differential patterns of political frustration and political responses.

We are obviously not the first to point out the importance of unexpected economic deprivation and/or frustrated expectations in shaping political preferences and political reactions against incumbents or more generally, as a mechanism severing voter-party loyalties across democracies in the aftermath of an economic shock Guiso et al. (2017); Ivarsflaten (2008); Binzel and Carvalho; Kitschelt and McGann (1995). We join other political economy efforts to account for recent political patterns in Europe and contribute an analysis of the role of labor market dualization as a key to understand why political backlashes against mainstream parties concentrate on different sides of the political spectrum.

2 The Argument: How political economies shape electoral responses

This section elaborates this argument in detail. We begin by laying out the economic and political microfoundations we reason from. We then elaborate how the differential socio-demographic incidence of an economic shock varies across political economies.

2.1 Premises

Following the seminal contributions by Mincer (1958); Benabou and Ok (2001); Piketty (1995), we assume that each citizen/voter, at status quo, has formed an expectation of what her life-income curve is. The shape of these curves varies across individuals by level of skills/education. In figure 2, this is captured by the distance between the AB (low skill/education) and the CD (high skill/education) curves.

Intuitively, at any given point in time highly educated individuals tend to have higher incomes and expect such an income to grow at a faster rate than those by individuals with lower levels of education. Both subgroups anticipate the growth in income to slow down as productivity stabilizes (or in some cases declines) and retirement approaches; hence, the non-linearity in the relationship displayed in figure 2. As we compare individuals at different age points of their life-earnings curve, we can see the link between skills distributions

and pre-tax inequality. *Ceteris paribus*, the differential growth rate in earnings by low skilled individuals translates into higher levels of pre-tax inequality over time, only curbed down as both types of workers approach retirement age. This allows us to capture the link between income, income expectations, and political preferences and provides a framework to study the political implications of sudden changes to status-quo income expectations.

Figure 2: Economic Micro-foundations: Age-Income Curves



Assuming, for simplicity, a unidimensional political space where voters support policy platforms that maximize their expected life time income, political competition quickly falls into the normal playing field of partisan modelsHibbs (1977). Voters with high education, high income and an expectation of an even higher income will support parties offering less redistributive platforms[2]. Conversely, low education, low income voters with a flatter age-income curve will display the opposite political preferences.[3] Such is the socio-economic

[2]By platform we refer to a combination of regulation, taxes and transfers that differentially benefits different clusters of voters. A pro-redistributive platform includes wage regulations such as statutory minimum wages, progressive taxation, generous income transfers with high replacement rates (regardless of pretax income) and tax funded public goods/services.

[3]For the purposes of this paper, we make abstraction of the internal heterogeneity within poor and rich voters. A vast literature in recent years has set out to explain why *some* low (high) income voters support right (left) wing parties both in the United States and Europe (Rueda 2018). It should be clear that this rich body of research accounts for deviations from an otherwise well established pattern: across advanced democracies, income remains consistently a negative and significant predictor of redistributive preferences. Countries vary

background against which political competition between mainstream parties occurs. [4]

Under the status quo, mainstream parties use policy to build political coalitions. Each party tailors policy to keep its *core* voters and, if possible, to attract both new and/or potential *swing* voters. In normal times, as a result, party-voter linkages grow stable over time and loyal voters' blocks develop identities, thus solidifying political loyalties. in line with standard core voters models (Dixit and Londregan 1996) these loyalties are expected to be stable in so far as voters' expectations are reasonably satisfied by party and policy offerings. In the analytical context depicted in figure 2, this implies that party preferences and patterns of political competition will remain relatively stable insofar as:

1. voters' *expected* and *actual* life-earnings curves do not deviate drastically from one another. Our argument links directly these deviations to patterns of frustration and political responses.

2. parties do not deviate drastically from the policies anticipated by their constituents

These two conditions, taken for granted under normal *politico-economic* times, cease to apply during and afterwards major economic shocks. Age-income curves change drastically and unexpectedly due to the joint effect of unexpected worsening of key drivers of aggregate demand and the pressure on incumbents to manage scarcity and, often times, adopt unpopular economic policy responses. Our central argument is that the institutional heterogeneity among political economies before the crisis shapes the socio-demographic incidence of the unexpected deviations between expected and actual/updated age-earnings curves, thus fundamentally altering the demand side of political competition. In the next section we turn to analyze the nature of these institutional differences and how they shape these deviations across different sociodemographic groups.

2.2 How institutional differences across political economies moderate the socio-demographic incidence of economic shocks

There is no gainsaying that European political economies differ sharply in their economic and institutional outlook. The most frequently discussed contrast is one between northern,

in the extent to which this is the case, but the general pattern is quite robust.(Beramendi and Rehm 2016)

[4] By mainstream parties we refer to historically established center-left and center-right parties. Examples include the PSOE and the PP in Spain, the Conservative and Labor parties in the UK or the SPD and the CDU in Germany.

export oriented and southern, import oriented economies. A recent body of work has also shown that these differences shape the distributional impact of the crisis in fundamental ways (Iversen and Soskice 2016; De Grauwe 2013; Beramendi and Stegmueller 2018). From the perspective of the evolution of age-earnings curves, two dimensions are particularly important: the degree of labor market segmentation (dualization) and the nature of the fiscal contract prior to the crisis. The former determines the distribution of economic opportunities post-crisis; the latter, the patterns of compensation to be expected by those especially affected by the downturn.

There is a direct link between the scope of labor market segmentation and the distribution of economic opportunities. Consider first a labor market with low levels of dualization. Standard human capital theory implies that productivity reflects prior human capital investments and translates into wage levels. The main differences across workers are thus shaped by uneven levels of skills/education. In these non-dualized economies, workers fortunes reflect a process of skill biased technological change. High skill workers have both larger incomes and better incomes than their counterparts, as captured by the differential elasticity of income with respect to age between AB and CD in figure 2. Pre-tax inequality is a function of the distance between these two lines against the backdrop of a transition from manufacturing to service driven economies.

Skill biased technological change implies that labor market risks are especially concentrated among low skilled manufacturing workers (Rehm 2016), a pattern only reinforced by negative economic shocks. Figure 3 captures the implications of a crisis on the age-earnings curve in non-dualized political economies. High skilled workers entering the labor market do so at lower income levels than before. But they expect to catch over time as the business cycle recovers. The labor market is sufficiently flexible and the levels of mobility across firms sufficiently high for them to expect a convergence over time with previous patterns.

Prospects are grimmer for low education/skills labor market participants. In labor markets where productivity is both driven by skills and predict wages, former employees of manufacturing sectors stand to lose relatively more. Their skills are only transferable to low skilled service jobs, and their offspring has likely failed to invest in enough in human capital to catch the train upwards to high skill service jobs Landers and Heckman (2016). Accordingly, economic shocks imply a radical updating of age-earnings expectations: for people

entering the second half of their active life, earnings expectations decline precipitously. We expect political frustration to be particularly intense among these workers. For younger generations, there is also a sharp decline relative to the status quo in that the range of options to improve is also significantly reduced. [5] The updated blue line below AB in figure 3 captures the change in expectations.

Figure 3: The Impact of the Crisis on Age-Income Curves in Non-Dualized Political Economies



Age-earnings curves look rather different in dualized political economies. Labor market opportunities and salaries do not necessarily reflect gaps in productivity but differential levels of regulatory protection across sectors and within sectors, across generations. Dualized labor markets emerge primarily in late industrializers. In these cases, industrialization is not driven by private actors with a comparative technological advantage but largely by the governments trying to close the gap in terms of economic modernization through import substitution, as illustrated by the experiences of Southern Europe and Latin America most prominently. The results of these processes is the creation of a core of heavily protected

[5] In some instances, though, well designed social investments interventions may contribute to re-adjust the age-earning curves of the younger generations upwards.

and well compensated workers (insiders) in strategic sectors (both public and private). In some instances (public sector) workers feature as well high levels of education but in others (banking, manufacturing) that is not always the case. As economies evolve, the need to adjust labor demand to the fluctuations of the business cycle leads to reduce the levels of protection in the rest of the labor force (outsiders). These are characteristically younger and less skilled workers with fairly flat age-earning curves in the best of times. Accordingly, as reflected in figure 4, in dualized labor markets there is a sharp contrast between the income of a insiders (AB) and outsiders (CD). The dashed line around the AB curve captures the income fluctuations for outsiders associated with the business cycle, even during normal times.

Figure 4: The Impact of the Crisis on Age-Income Curves in Dualized Political Economies



In the aftermath of a major economic shock, such as the Great Recession, two major developments take place: first, younger, *aspiring*, well educated insiders see the stock of available protected jobs tightens and the number of attractive alternatives in new economic sectors is also limited as a result of the very legacy of protection at the core. As a consequence, their income projections frustrated and their age-earnings curve (CD) shifts downwards in an asymmetric way, as captured in figure 4. The asymmetry follows from the fact that the

same effects are much weaker for workers already protected before the start of the recession. Second, for low skilled outsiders, volatility turns into semi-permanent exclusion. The spells in unemployment become longer, and their ability to participate normally in the labor market suffers a major set-back, in no small part because of the increased competition from the downwardly mobile children of incumbent insiders. The intensity of deprivation within this particular group leads to sharp adjustment in their age-earning curves. Income levels decline sharply at first and income projections are adjusted downwards in a major way. At best, this sub-sector of the labor force can only expect stagnant income levels through a combination of low wages and social protection in the medium to long-run. We expect political frustration to be particularly intense in this specific socio-demographic group.

This brings us to the role of the fiscal contract in moderating rising levels of political frustration. A large tradition of research theorizes fiscal systems and welfare states as mechanisms that (1) smooth consumption over time and (2) facilitate labor market transitions through active investments in skill acquisition and work-family conciliation policy. By performing these two functions, fiscal systems are expected to consolidate political coalitions (Esping-Andersen 1988), thus contributing to a certain sense of stability within which mainstream politics takes place,and facilitate the adaptation to changing labor market circumstances by younger generations. As is well known, welfare states and fiscal systems vary widely in how effectively they perform these two functions.

For the purposes of our analysis below, we reason from a distinction between *open* and *restrictive* fiscal contracts. A *restrictive* fiscal contract is characterized by relatively lower levels to generate revenue and a limited degrees of freedom to redirect these resources to changing policy needs. This is the case when most funds are committed to policies that, by virtue of the electoral leverage of recipients, effectively operate as a fixed constraint on incumbents. By contrast, an *open* fiscal contract is one in which the state has relatively larger levels of revenue at its disposal and incumbents can afford to allocate resources to both welfare transfers and social investment policies. By investment policies we refer to efforts that are geared to increase future productivity, including policies aimed at facilitating labor market transitions by those falling into unemployment spells. Intuitively, open fiscal contracts have much more leverage to manage the anxieties associated with sudden changes in age-earnings curves than restrictive ones.

A critical point for our argument linking the institutional organization of political economies to off-center politics is that the degree of labor market segmentation and the nature of the fiscal contract are NOT orthogonal. Highly dualized political economies tend to feature more restrictive fiscal contracts. As discussed above, dualized labor markets tend to emerge in countries that industrialized late through import substitution and produced a relatively small *elite* of heavily protected workers(Altamirano et al. 2015). Part of the protection involves a privileged access/treatment by social insurance systems, which implies that a significant share of revenues cannot be redirected to changing policy needs. In turn, late industrialization is also linked to weaker fiscal systems through a variety of mechanisms, most notably relatively lower levels of intra-elite competition (Beramendi and Rogers 2018). As a result, it is those countries where the young are hit harder by the crisis where the government has a more limited capacity to reallocate resources from previous commitments, paving the way for inter-generational tensions. By contrast, in more open fiscal systems and less dualized economies the level of income smoothing is higher. As resource constraints bind though, the political conflict is about two issues:(1) how to regulate the access to an ever decreasing pool of jobs matching the skill set of the losers of the transition from manufacturing to service; and, relatedly, (2) how many fiscal resources are devoted to compensatory transfers to essentially unemployable, relatively older workers as opposed to social investment.

The contrast across political economies in terms of both differential incidence on age-earnings curves and the nature of the fiscal contract shapes political demand in important ways and, we argue, carries important implications for the nature of electoral responses. In the next section, we focus on this final step in our argument.

2.3 From frustration to differential political responses

The differential incidence across political economies in terms of frustrated expectations generates two distinctive pools in terms of dominant profile of political frustrations. We contend that when the profile of these pools is sufficiently distinctive, political supply will adjust endogenously.

Some systems constrain the possibility of a political expression of economic frustrations by limiting the range of feasible political alternatives (though even in these instances particularly concentrated pockets of discontent find expression in off center parties (Calvo and

Rodden), as illustrated by the UK experience). In those circumstances abstention is likely to capture rising levels of political frustration. Yet, as argued by Guiso et al. (2017), disillusioned voters who abstain constitute an appealing electoral target for either new entrants or existing radical parties to broader their basis of electoral support. Party offerings adjust to changes in the nature of political demand. In their framework,"the effectiveness of the [populist] rhetoric, in turn, depends on the magnitude of the country's cleavage: for instance whether they are more anti-austerity and anti-elite(left) or anti-immigrant(right) (p.13)". In our framework, the nature of the cleavages itself is endogenous with respect to the degree of dualization and the nature of the fiscal contract.

We contend that radical left parties will be more successful where the deviations in terms of age-earnings curve disproportionately hurt younger generations. This involves both educated younger generations that see their future prospects severed by a protracted economic shock (such as the participants in the social movements (15 M) that preceded Podemos in Spain) and low skilled individuals doomed to a work life between precarious employment and exclusion. Along the way, these new radical left parties frame politics precisely as a conflict between insiders (the *cast*) and those left out, between the older generations that have captured scarce resources according to their needs, and those whose future is in peril. Quite naturally, these new entrants provoke a reconfiguration within the left political spectrum, with the older radical left parties being forced to revisit their traditional position in support of (insider) manufacturing workers. How these internal tensions resolve is outside the scope of this paper. The outcome of this process is the emergence of a series of platforms promising a new social contract for outsiders and the young. This new social contract features, in abstract terms, the following components:

- An increase in welfare transfer generosity
- An increase in social investment policies, particularly public education, in an effort, arguably, towards the equalization of opportunities
- A increase in regulation of labor markets to prevent further 'exploitation' of the young outsiders
- A rise in taxes (often predicated to be imposed on "the rich")

Frustration takes a different contour in countries with open fiscal systems and non dualized labor markets. Age-earning curves deviations in these societies is concentrated among former manufacturing workers with no economic prospects in the new high skilled, export oriented economic model. The concern among these voters is about two things: (1) preservation of access to relatively generous social transfers; (2) limitation of entry of potential competitors (immigrants) for an ever declining pool of suitable jobs. The first point implies opposing fiscal reforms adjusting budgets from welfare transfers to social investment; the second, point implies supporting parties with a clear and strong anti-immigrant stance. This subset of political demand provides the breeding ground for (old and new) radical right wing parties to succeed. Their platforms, again, in rather abstract terms include:

- Restrictions, across all policy levels, against immigrants, painted as the cause of domestic economic misfortunes in domestic manufacturing sectors.
- Support for welfare effort and access to public goods to be restricted to nationals, sustaining/expanding existing levels of protection for old workers in declining sector.
- Economic policy is not about investment in human capital but about sheltering nationals from economic decline through various forms of protectionism.Opposition to social investment policies.

We pass no judgment on the internal consistency or potential efficiency implications of either of these platforms. The focus is on its explicit goal: targeting those perceived to be especially frustrated in across different political economies. Our argument is that parties will adjust the nature of their offerings to political demand in the expectation that their offerings will capture the attention of different pools of voters. To the extent that this is the case, we should see differential socio-demographic patterns of frustration and, ultimately, political support across European political economies.

2.4 Summary of Empirical Expectations:

In what follows, making use of the European Social Survey and the 2014 European Parliament Election Study (2014), we assess empirically the main implications from our argument. In particular, we would expect to observe the following patterns:

- In non-dualized economies (with open fiscal structures), we would expect:

1. Frustrated expectations to be concentrated among older and relatively less educated citizens/workers
2. This frustration to translate into relatively stronger support for radical right wing parties

- In dualized economies (with restrictive fiscal structures), we would expect:
  1. Frustrated expectations to be concentrated among younger (outsiders) citizens, including those highly educated
  2. This frustration to translate into relatively stronger support for radical left wing parties

3 European Social Survey analysis

The first set of analyses in this paper draws on individual-level data from the European Social Survey (ESS). The ESS is a large scale multi-country survey administered bi-annually in European countries starting in 2002.[6] Its target population are all individuals aged 15 or over, residing in private households (regardless of nationality, language, citizenship or legal status). Interviews are conducted face-to-face. While the number of participating countries varies between years, a core set of Western European countries is represented in most survey rounds. There are two key strengths that make the ESS the most adequate choice for our book.

First, the ESS is a truly comparative survey. Already in the design phase of each survey round, issues of cross-national comparability (such as question wording and translation, definition of target populations, and survey sampling) take center stage (Stoop et al. 2010). Second, the ESS provides consistent regional level identifiers following a harmonized classification established by the European Union, the NUTS system of territorial classification (Eurostat 2007). This allows us to match each respondent to his or her corresponding regional level of dualization.[7]

[6] For more information see `www.europeansocialsurvey.org`.

[7] An obvious competitor are surveys from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), which cover a longer time period than ESS surveys and include the US and other non-European advanced capitalist countries of interest. However, regional level identifiers are not consistently available.

Although the ESS is available starting in 2002, this paper's focus on the effects of the crisis means that we restrict the analysis to data starting after the fourth wave (2008, 2010, 2012 and 2014). For this paper's initial exploration, we also restrict the analysis to Western European countries. Recall that above we argue that conditions taken for granted under normal politico-economic times cease to apply during and after major economic shocks. Our central argument is that the institutional heterogeneity among political economies (which we will operationalize as regional levels of labor market dualization) shapes the socio-demographic incidence of *frustrated expectations* (the unexpected deviations between expected and actual/updated age-earnings curves) as well as their voting consequences. Western European regions during the Great Recession seem a good starting point for our initial empirical exploration.

3.1 Dependent variables

As suggested in the theoretical section above, there are two outcomes of interest to this paper's arguments. The first one is what we have called *frustrated expectations* and the second one is voting behavior. For the ESS analysis, we will capture frustrated expectations with a survey item asking respondents how they are feeling about their household's income nowadays. Respondents then choose whether they are finding living on present income "comfortable," "coping, "difficult," or "very difficult." Discarding don't-knows and non-responses (as we also do in the empirical analysis), Table 1 shows the overall distribution of responses in all the countries and years included in the analysis. There is a high level of positive responses in Table 1, around 80% of the respondents feel that they are living comfortably or are coping. But about 20% feel that living within their household income is either difficult or very difficult. In the analyses below, we put these two last categories together as defining individuals with frustrated expectations.

Table 1: Feelings about household's income

Living comfortably	Coping	Difficult	Very difficult
36%	44%	15%	5%

Notes: Average percentages per category. ESS, Rounds 4-7.

While Table 1 is informative, it does not illustrate one of the main things this paper's

argument is about: the existence of regional variation in frustrated expectation. Figure 5 shows the averages for frustration (measured as feelings about household income) in each of the regions in the sample. Figure 5 reflects a remarkable amount of cross-regional variation. Frustration is generally high in countries like Spain, France, Italy and Portugal. It is generally low in countries like Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway. Within-country regional differences are also interesting. In Spain, for example, frustration is high in Andalucia but lower in Asturias.

Figure 5: Frustrated expectations in Western Europe



The second set of dependent variables in our analysis relate to political behavior. We argued above that frustration would give way to different voting outcomes in contexts of high or low labor market segmentation. To explore this hypotheses, we need to focus on the role of frustration in determining voting for radical Left and radical Right parties. This is firstly because it is of course understood that a number of other factors influence voting and are, in turn, potentially affected by different levels of population heterogeneity. To the extent that this is the case, it is beyond the scope of this paper to explore these effects. The question of relevance to the arguments in this paper then is whether the patterns of frustration in

Figure 5 have consequences for voting behavior. In other words, first we will demonstrate that dualization affects the relationship between income and redistribution preferences, and then we will explore whether frustration matters to voting.

The vote choice variable in the analysis reported below is based on a retrospective statement from each ESS respondent about the party he or she voted for in the last national election. We create two indicator variables equal to 1 if the vote was cast for a radical Left party or a radical Right party (and 0 if any other party was chosen). As in other analyses of voting,[8] respondents who abstained are not included in the sample. The reason for this is that an appropriately unified model of turnout and party choice is much more complex than simply including abstention as another "party" (see, e.g., Adams et al. 2006). Two additional clarifications about the analysis of voting must be made. The first one about the need to choose ESS waves in which voting data coincide with the frustration data. The second one about the definition of radical Left and radical Right parties, which is not uncontentious.

The influence of individual-level frustration is the main focus in the analysis of voting presented below. For this reason, it is of paramount importance that the voting data coincides with the measure of frustration. As mentioned above, respondents are asked about the parties they voted for in the previous national election. At the time of the survey, these elections have taken place in the past while frustration is measured in the present. It is important therefore to restrict the analysis to ESS waves when this coincidence of data is reasonable.[9] This also requires special attention to when the surveys were actually conducted. The ESS surveys are fielded over a period of months, often starting at the end of the wave year and running into the following one. In the analysis, we only include ESS surveys when a national election has been held the same year of the wave or the year before (so that redistribution preferences are plausibly connected with voting behavior). We also eliminate surveys that were conducted in months that include an election (and therefore may contain voting choices for different elections depending on the respondent's interview date). In practical terms, this means the analysis includes the following ESS surveys: Austria (2014); Belgium (2008, 2010, 2014); Denmark (2008, 2012); Germany (2010, 2014); Spain (2008, 2012); Finland (2008, 2012); France (2008, 2012); UK (2010); Greece (2010); Ireland (2008, 2012); Italy

[8] In the US case, see Gelman et al. 2008 or Hersh and Nall 2015.

[9] The same considerations apply to measures of dualization, education, etc.

(2012); Netherlands (2010, 2014); Norway (2010, 2014); and Portugal (2010, 2012).[10]

We follow the lead of a number of previous analyses.[11] While the analysis of the determinants of frustration examines the full sample of region-years, the one for radical Right party voting is limited to 10 countries. We code the following parties as radical Right: FPÖ, BZÖ (Austria); Vlaams Belang, Front National (Belgium); Dansk Folkeparti (Denmark); True Finns (Finland); Front National, Mouvement pour la France (France); Alternative for Germany (Germany); LAOS (Greece); Lega Nord,Fratelli d'Italia (Italy); PVV–List Wilders, PVV, TON–List Verdonk (Netherlands); and Progress Party (Norway).

For our measure of radical Left parties, we also have a sample of 10 countries. We code the following parties as radical Left: Socialist People's Party (Denmark); Parti Communiste, Front de Gauche (France); Die Linke (Germany); SYRIZA, Communist Party (Greece); Rivoluzione Civile, Movimento 5 Stelle (Italy); Socialist Party (Netherlands); Socialist Left Party (Norway); Coligacao Democratica Unitaria, PCP-PEV, Bloco de Esquerda (Portugal); Izquierda Unida (Spain); and Socialist Left Party (Norway).

Figure 6 shows the averages for radical Right party voting in each of the regions in the sample. Figure 6 makes clear which countries lack a radical Right party in the elections in our sample (Ireland, the UK, Spain and Portugal). Like Figure 5, Figure 6 reflects a remarkable amount of cross-regional variation. But, with the exception of the very South of Italy, regions to the North seem more likely to have strong electoral support for the radical Right.

Figure 7 shows the averages for radical Left party voting in each of the regions in the sample. The figure shows that Ireland, the UK, Austria and Belgium lack a radical Left party in the elections in our sample. When compared to Figure 6, Figure 7 shows stronger support for the radical Left in the South. But we will explore the determinants of these patterns in more detail below.

[10]Greece 2012 cannot be used because it is not in the ESS. Sweden 2014 cannot be used as the survey was fielded before and after the general election and Sweden 2012 cannot be used because it does not provide NUTS-2 identifiers (it provides NUTS-3). We use Netherlands 2014, instead of 2012 which was fielded before and after the election. And Greece 2010 instead of 2008 (which was actually fielded around the Greek election of 4 October 2009).

[11]See Ivarsflaten (2008), Oesch (2008), Rovny (2013) or Afonso and Rennwald (Forthcoming).

Figure 6: Radical Right Voting in Western Europe



3.2 Dualization, age, insiders and outsiders

As suggested by our theoretical intuitions, part of the connection between frustration and political is concerned with the labor market status of insiders and outsiders. "Insiders" have stable and protected employment whereas "outsiders" have insecure jobs or no jobs at all. Recent work in comparative political economy has identified the increasing political and economic relevance of this distinction.[12] We argue that the distinction between insiders and outsiders is essential to understanding the politics of industrialized democracies during times of crisis.[13] Like much of the dualization literature, our argument relies on the disaggregation of the working class, broadly defined, into "insiders" and "outsiders." Theoretically, we define insiders as wage earners with protected jobs and outsiders as individuals who are either unemployed or hold jobs with low levels of protection and employment rights. As in

[12]See, for example, the work of Rueda (2005), Mares (2006), Rueda (2007), Martin and Thelen (2007), Iversen and Stephens (2008), Palier and Thelen (2010), the contributions in Emmenegger et al. (2012), Thelen (2014), and Alt and Iversen (2017).

[13]For a more detailed analysis, see Rueda (2014).

Figure 7: Radical Left Voting in Western Europe



Lindvall and Rueda (2014), our argument implies that if mainstream parties emphasize the interests of insiders in highly dualized labor markets, outsiders will tend to vote for radical Left parties (or abandon the political process). Conversely, we argue that insiders may feel more frustrated in non-dualized labor markets and tend to vote to radical Right parties.

Once dualization is accepted as an important theoretical factor affecting the political responses to crisis, the remaining challenge is to measure it empirically. In spite of the abundance of work using insider-outsider differences as a concept, there is very little guidance in the literature about how to measure dualization *per se*. Although there are many impressionistic and case-specific treatments of dualization, it is difficult to find systematic measures that would allow us to assess whether particular countries are more dualized than others (or whether these national differences have changed over time). In this paper we focus on the lower vulnerability of insiders to unemployment as a key factor, and define dualization as a measure of the difference between the unemployment rate of young people (15-24 years) and that of ”prime working life” people (25-54 years). This logic also makes clear that age may be an important constituent element of labor market status and therefore we also study

the effects of the interaction between age and regional levels of dualization.

Figure 8: Dualization in Western Europe



Figure 8 provides the averages for labor market dualization (measured as the difference between youth and prime working life unemployment) in each of the regions in the sample. The figure shows a high level of within-country regional variation, but it makes clear that higher levels of dualization are more common in the South. Once again, we will explore the political consequences of these patterns in more detail below.

3.3 Results

As mentioned above, the dependent variables used in this paper's analysis take the value of 1 if the respondent either (i) indicates frustration (as feeling "difficult" or "very difficult" about living on their household's income nowadays) or (ii) endorses a retrospective statement about voting for a radical Right or Left party in the last national election. We estimate a logistic model and report odds ratios. We also report significance tests for the odds ratios.

The data used in the analysis has a multi-level structure (one level, the individual, is nested within the other, the region). To address potential complications (clustering, non-

constant variance, underestimation of standard errors, etc), we estimate logit models with random country intercepts via maximum likelihood. These mixed-effects models contain both fixed effects (analogous to standard regression estimates) and a country-specific random intercept that is a function of the macro variable (dualization as the difference between youth and non-youth unemployment).[14] Common contemporary shocks affecting all countries and individuals, such as aggregated changes in economic conditions, are capture by year fixed effects (estimated in all models). The systematic differences between regions are captured by the region-specific random constants (which implies that region effects are drawn from a common normal distribution with estimated variance).

In what follows, we present the results of estimating a model including the most commonly used individual-level control variables in analyses of voting. This model introduces age (measured in years), gender (a dummy for female), years of education, union membership, church attendance (a dummy equal to 1 if respondent attends religious services at least once a week) and domicile (a categorical variable distinguishing among big cities, suburbs, towns, country villages and the country side).

3.3.1 The determinants of frustration

Table 2 reports the results of the analyses. The most important finding concerns insider/outsider status and age (and their interactions with regional levels of dualization). Given the complexities of the interaction, we will analyze what these results mean in more detail below but, at this stage, suffice it to say that being an insider reduces an individual's likelihood of being frustrated by 40% while being an outsider it increases it by more than double. Similarly, each additional year of age decreases the likelihood of being frustrated by almost 1%.

Although not the focus of this paper's analysis, the results in Table 2 also show the individual control variables to be significant determinants of frustration. Being a woman and attending religious services are associated with an increase in the likelihood of being frustrated. While education, being a union member and living in city (the base category of the domicile variable) are all factors that decrease the probability of being frustrated.

To illustrate the effects of the interaction between insider/outsider status and age (on the one hand) and regional dualization (on the other), we calculate the average predicted prob-

[14] For more details about maximum likelihood estimation of random intercept multilevel models, see Rabe-Hesketh et al. (2005).

Table 2: The determinants of frustration

Individual Level Variables:	
Insider/Outsider (other)	
Insider	0.599**
Outsider	2.304**
Age	0.989**
Gender	1.260**
Education	0.887**
Attends Religious Services	1.071*
Union Member	0.885**
Domicile (big city)	
Suburbs	0.803**
Town	0.890**
Country village	0.744**
Farm/Countryside	0.789**
Macro-Variable:	
Dualization	1.004
Micro-Macro Interactions:	
Insider/Outsider*Dualization	
Insider	1.019**
Outsider	1.004
Age*Dualization	1.001**
Observations	66,440
Regions	122
Year fixed effects	yes

Notes: Logit results. Numbers are odds ratios. * if statistically significant at 95% level of confidence, ** at 99% level (two-tailed tests). See text for details.

Table 3: The determinants of frustration: Average Predicted Probabilities

	Insider	*Outsider*	Diff
Low Dualization	9.6**	27.2**	17.6**
High Dualization	17.3**	35.7**	18.4**
Diff	7.7**	8.5**	

Notes: Logit results. Average predicted probabilities (and their differences)
* if statistically significant at 95% level of confidence,
** at 99% level (two-tailed tests). See text for details.

ability that an individual with a particular status or age feels frustrated at different macro-levels of dualization. "Simple" predicted probabilities are calculated by setting the variables of interest to some chosen values (e.g., insider or outsider) while holding all other variables at one observed value (e.g., the mean). The average predicted probabilities reported bellow, however, are calculated by setting the variables of interest to some chosen values (i.e., insider or outsider, young or old) while holding all other variables at all their observed values. The reported estimates are the average of these predictions. To better illustrate the theorized effects, therefore, we present the average predicted probabilities of feeling frustrated for insiders and outsider, young and old, when the levels of regional dualization are either low or high. We define the young as 20 years old, and the old and 60. Low regional dualization is a difference of 3 points between prime age and youth unemployment, and high regional dualization is a difference of 22 points (neither of these are extreme values in our sample).

The calculations in Table 3 make clear that the probability of frustration is generally higher in highly dualized regions. More importantly for this paper's arguments, the table also shows that (as hypothesized) the highest likelihood of feeling frustrated about present household income is shared by outsiders in highly dualized labor markets. Also consistent with our arguments, insiders in regions with low levels of dualization, on the other hand, have the lowest likelihood of feeling frustrated. The increase in the likelihood of feeling frustrated is statistically significant no matter the level of regional dualization and, again more importantly for this paper's arguments, the differences between levels of dualization for both insiders and outsiders are also statistically significant.

The calculations in Table 4 provide a similar picture. As those in Table 3, they make clear that the probability of frustration is generally higher in highly dualized regions. But again more importantly for this paper's arguments, the table shows that (as hypothesized)

Table 4: The determinants of frustration: Average Predicted Probabilities

	Young	*Old*	Diff
Low Dualization	18.3**	13.3**	5.0**
High Dualization	22.8**	19.5**	3.3**
Diff	4.5**	6.2**	

Notes: Logit results. Average predicted probabilities (and their differences)
* if statistically significant at 95% level of confidence,
** at 99% level (two-tailed tests). See text for details.

the highest likelihood of feeling frustrated about present household income is shared by the young in highly dualized labor markets. Also consistent with our arguments, the old in regions with low levels of dualization have the lowest likelihood of feeling frustrated. As in Table 3, the increase in the likelihood of feeling frustrated is statistically significant no matter the level of regional dualization and the differences between levels of dualization for both the young and the old are also statistically significant.

3.3.2 The determinants of radical Left and radical Right voting

We now turn to the second set of dependent variables this paper is interested in. Table 5 reports the results of the analyses. This time the most important findings concerns frustration as a predictor of voting (and its interaction with regional levels of dualization). Once again, we will analyze what these results mean in more detail below, given the complexities of the interaction. But Table 5 shows that being frustrated increases an individual's likelihood of voting for a radical Right party by 45% and of voting for a radical Left party by 41%. The regional level of dualization generally decreases the probability of voting for a radical Right party (by 10%) but has no significant direct effect on voting for radical Left parties.

Table 5 also contains estimates for the effect of insider/outsider status and age (controlling from frustration). Being an insider or an outsider promotes a higher likelihood of voting for radical Right parties, but only being an outsider makes an individual more likely to vote for a radical Left party. Although not the focus of this paper's analysis, the results in Table 5 also show some individual control variables to be significant determinants of voting for radical parties. Being a woman, attending religious services and education are associated with a lower likelihood of voting for a radical Right party (while being a union member increases an individual's likelihood to vote for a radical Right party). Education and being a union

Table 5: The determinants of radical Right and radical Left voting

	Radical Right	*Radical Left*
Individual Level Variables:		
Frustration	1.447*	1.406*
Insider/Outsider (other)		
Insider	1.318**	1.170
Outsider	1.277*	1.405**
Age	1.003	1.009**
Gender	0.786**	1.029
Education	0.961**	1.069**
Attends Religious Services	0.482**	0.416**
Union Member	1.159*	1.980**
Domicile (big city)		
Suburbs	1.149	0.945
Town	1.165	1.083
Country village	1.245*	0.973
Farm/Countryside	1.253	0.706
Macro-Variable:		
Dualization	0.906**	1.043
Micro-Macro Interactions:		
Frustration*Dualization	1.007	0.995
Observations	19,942	18,128
Regions	79	77
Year fixed effects	yes	yes

Notes: Logit results. Numbers are odds ratios. * if statistically significant at 95% level of confidence, ** at 99% level (two-tailed tests). See text for details.

Table 6: The determinants of radical Right and radical Left voting: Average Predicted Probabilities

	Radical Right			*Radical Left*		
	Not frustrated	*Frustrated*	Diff	*Not frustrated*	*Frustrated*	Diff
Low Dualization	10.5**	14.6**	4.1**	3.4**	4.6**	1.2*
High Dualization	1.8**	2.9**	1.1	7.2**	8.9**	1.7
Diff	4.5**	6.2**		3.8	4.3	

Notes: Logit results. Average predicted probabilities (and their differences)
* if statistically significant at 95% level of confidence,
** at 99% level (two-tailed tests). See text for details.

member increase the likelihood of voting for a radical Left party, and attending religious services decreases it (by almost 60%).

To illustrate the effects of the interaction between frustration and regional dualization, we once again calculate the average predicted probability of for voting radical parties for an individual with a particular level of frustration at different macro-levels of dualization. As before, low regional dualization is a difference of 3 points between prime age and youth unemployment, and high regional dualization is a difference of 22 points.

Table 6 make clear that the probability of voting for radical Right parties is generally higher in regions with low levels of dualization while the probability of voting for radical Left parties is generally higher in highly dualized regions. More importantly for this paper's arguments, the table also shows that (as hypothesized) the highest likelihood of voting for radical Right parties is shared among individuals who are frustrated about their present income in regions with low levels of dualization. Also consistent with our arguments, both those who are frustrated and those who are not frustrated in regions with highly dualized labor markets have a very low likelihood of voting for radical Right parties. The increase in the likelihood of voting for a radical Right party associated with feeling frustrated is only statistically significant when regional dualization is low and the differences between levels of dualization for both frustrated and not frustrated individuals are also statistically significant.

The results for voting radical Left parties in Table 6, however, are less supportive of our theoretical intuitions. The point estimates very much support our arguments. The table shows that (as hypothesized) the highest likelihood of voting for radical Left parties is shared among individuals who are frustrated about their present income in regions with

high levels of dualization. Also consistent with our arguments, both those who are frustrated and those who are not frustrated in regions with not dualized labor markets have a low likelihood of voting for radical Left parties. But the increase in the likelihood of voting for a radical Left party associated with feeling frustrated is only statistically significant when regional dualization is low and the differences between levels of dualization for both frustrated and not frustrated individuals are statistically insignificant.

4 European Parliament Election Study 2014

In this section we analyze the post-electoral survey of the 2014 European elections. The analysis of European elections has a number of advantages. Firstly, strategic considerations are minor compared with national elections. Since the European Parliament (EP) does not elect an executive, people may feel they can express their political preferences not caring too much about the consequences of their choices. As our main interest lies in the determinants of preferences for radical parties, we think that European elections are a perfect setting for our study. Relatedly, a proportional system is employed everywhere, so that expressive concerns have greater chance to be voiced. For instance, UKIP obtained 27.5 per cent of the vote in the 2014 European elections but only 12.6 per cent in the general elections of 2015. Part of this huge difference may be due to the fact that the general elections are majoritarian. Lastly, the elections are synchronized in all member states. Thus, we can analyze voting behavior in a cross-section of countries without much concern for period effects.

The EP elections of May 2014 took place at the end of the global crisis. The countries had experienced a long period of recession or very low rates of growth. Unemployment in the EU reached a peak level in 2013. It is no surprise that euro-skeptical parties obtained their best result ever in the 2014 elections, gaining 28 per cent of all seats (Hobolt & De Vries 2016). The political consequences of the crisis are still unfolding. In this regard, the EU elections of 2014 were only a first warning. These were the first elections in which Podemos run, obtaining 8 per cent of the vote in Spain. In the general elections of December 2015, Podemos jumped to 20.7 per cent. Syriza won the European elections of 2014 with 26.5 of the vote, but in the January 2015 general elections it won again with 36.3 per cent of the vote. The Freedom Party of Austria got 19.7 per cent of the vote in the 2014 European elections, reaching 26 per cent in the 2017 general elections. These are just examples showing that the political earthquake that is shattering European party systems was only starting to be

felt in 2014. In this regard, the analysis of 2014 is but a conservative estimation of the deep transformation brought about by the expansion of radical parties.

We work with the European Election Survey 2014 (Schmitt et al. 2015). It covers the 28 EU countries, with samples of around 1,000 individuals in each country and a total sample size of 30,064 respondents. We focus only on 15 Western European countries. On the one hand, these are the countries with stable party-systems. On the other, politics is organized around a left-right axis. Given these conditions, the expansion of radical parties in the Left and in the Right implies a clear breakdown with the dominance of more moderate ideological families. Our interest is not restricted to newly formed parties such as Alternative fr Deutschland in Germany or Podemos in Spain. Rather, our aim is to study popular support for radical parties regardless of their age. We think that the real challenge is to understand the increase of support for radical parties and the fall of mainstream or moderate parties.

As outlined in the opening section, our dependent variable has four values: abstention, vote for mainstream parties, vote for radical right parties and vote for radical left parties. In the sample of 15 countries, abstention is 40 per cent, vote for mainstream parties 42.9 per cent, vote for radical right 6.1 per cent and vote for the radical left 11 per cent. Figure 1 shows the distribution by country.

To explain the variation in voters choices, we take into consideration a battery of individual and regional covariates that capture much of our theoretical argument. Regarding individual variables, we have focused on three different indicators of economic hardship: (i) whether someone has lost the job in the household, (ii) whether someones income has been reduced in the household, and (iii) whether the individual has problems to pay the bills at the end of the month. Through factor analysis, a latent variable has been created out of the three indicators; it measures the extent to which the household has been hit by the crisis (we call it "crisis impact.") In principle, we expect that thsoe more severely hit by the crisis will be more likely to opt for radical parties or abstention.

Apart from the crisis impact, we analyze the effect of occupation (self-employed, managers, other white collar, manual workers, house person, unemployed, retired, and students). Here, our main theoretical expectation is that manual workers will be more inclined to opt for radical right parties. We also take into account whether the respondent has the safety net provided by house ownsership (it is measured through two dummy variables,

whether the person owns a house and has already paid for it and whether the person owns a house and is still paying for it). The hypothesis is that house ownsership makes radical options less attractive.

We include also a battery of socio-demographic variables: gender, age, education (four values: no education, less than 15 years of education, between 16 and 19 years of education, 20 or more years of education), occupation (self-employed, managers, other white collar workers, manual workers, house person, unemployed, retired, and students), habitat (rural area, small town, and large town). Regarding age,younger voters will be more inclined to the radical left than to the radical right; likewise, more educated voters will be more attracted by the radical left than by the radical right; manual workers will be more likely to vote for the radical right; and, finally, support for the radical left will be more intense in large urban centers.

We have added an important attitudinal variable that measures whether, in general, things in the country are going in the right or the wrong direction. We contend that the pessimistic feeling about the national course of events is a key motivation for the rejection of mainstream parties and the support for radical ones. We hypothesize that this variable should have a positive effect on support for radical parties in general. The reasons why the voter opts for the radical left or the radical right have to do with the economic and sociodemographic variables, as well as with the political economy of the region. The variable about the course of events captures the downfall in expectations caused by the crisis.

As for variables measured at the regional level, we have the level of economic development (the log of the regional GDP per capita) and the percentage of youth unemployment (15-24 year old). According to our argument, youth unemployment should be significant to explain the support for radical left parties. High levels of youth unemployment are a symptom of a dualized economy under hard circumstances.

Our main hypothesis is that there is an interaction effect between the individual and the regional levels. Specifically, we contemplate a multiplicative effect of crisis impact and youth unemployment with regard to support for radical left parties. The interaction should not be significant for radical right parties.

The estimation is done through a number of multilevel logit models (mixed effects logit). The empirical strategy is the following. First, we analyze the vote for radical left parties

using different base comparisons: radical left vs. all other groups (abstention, mainstream and radical right) and radical left vs. each of these groups separately. Second, we replicate the same pattern for radical right parties. By doing so, we can compare the different effect of the independent variables with regard to the various possible comparisons. For instance, we expect that the coefficient of age should be negative for the comparison between radical left and mainstream parties, but positive for the comparison between radical left and abstention (abstention is more frequent among the youngest).

Results appear in Table 7.

Table 7: Individual and regional determinants of vote for radical left and radical right parties. Mixed effects logit estimation

	Rad. left all others	Rad. left abstention	Rad. left mainstream	Rad. left rad. right	Rad. right all others	Rad. right abstention	Rad. right mainstream
Age	-0.00	0.01***	-0.02***	-0.01**	0.01	0.02***	-0.01*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education	0.30***	0.56***	0.21***	0.50***	-0.08	0.20***	-0.19***
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.10)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Female	0.04	-0.01	0.01	0.77***	-0.52***	-0.51***	-0.53***
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.13)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Habitat	0.24***	0.25***	0.24***	0.14	0.10	0.16**	0.11
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.10)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Self-employed	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Managers	0.04	0.07	-0.03	-0.05	-0.22	-0.21	-0.32
	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.28)	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.21)
Other white collars	-0.10	-0.01	-0.10	-0.58**	0.22	0.24	0.22
	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.28)	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.20)
Manual workers	-0.05	-0.24	0.22	-0.55**	0.35**	0.08	0.59***
	(0.13)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.26)	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.19)
House person	-0.07	-0.09	0.02	-0.39	0.14	0.01	0.27
	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.37)	(0.25)	(0.27)	(0.28)
Unemployed	-0.14	-0.35**	-0.01	-0.26	0.01	-0.21	0.18
	(0.15)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.34)	(0.22)	(0.24)	(0.25)
Retired	-0.07	-0.17	-0.02	-0.11	-0.01	-0.22	0.14
	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.27)	(0.17)	(0.20)	(0.19)
Students	-0.13	-0.29	-0.12	0.12	-0.34	-0.63**	-0.26
	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.39)	(0.28)	(0.30)	(0.31)
House ownsership	-0.13	0.14	-0.27***	-0.23	0.23**	0.46***	0.08
	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.17)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)
House ownership	-0.11	0.07	-0.24***	-0.05	0.08	0.25**	-0.05
(Still paying)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.17)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Direction of things	0.22***	0.14***	0.35***	-0.05	0.19***	0.10*	0.35***
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Crisis impact	-0.15	-0.31***	0.03	-0.68***	0.27*	0.03	0.58***
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.23)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.18)
Youth unemp rate	0.02	0.08	-0.05	0.72***	-0.52***	-0.45***	-0.57***
	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.25)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.14)
Crisis X Youth	0.08**	0.10***	0.07*	0.23**	-0.07	-0.03	-0.11
unemp rate	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Regional GDPpc	-0.26	-0.01	-0.63	-0.33	-0.05	0.08	-0.32
	(0.43)	(0.54)	(0.43)	(1.09)	(0.56)	(0.57)	(0.58)
intercept	-1.27	-4.22	4.53	1.10	-1.75	-3.44	2.93
	(4.58)	(5.76)	(4.66)	(11.69)	(6.02)	(6.09)	(6.29)
NUTS number							
Intercept	0.98***	1.61***	0.98***	6.57***	1.49***	1.48***	1.60***
	(0.21)	(0.32)	(0.21)	(1.56)	(0.31)	(0.32)	(0.33)
No. of individuals	14353	6207	6890	2070	14353	5653	6336
No. of regions	118	118	117	115	118	118	117

Table 7 nicely confirms the main hypothesis. The interaction between crisis impact and youth unemployment is positive and significant when value 1 of the dependent variable is support for radical left parties. When value 1 is support for radical right parties, the interaction effect is never significant (and has a negative sign). The interaction effect says that the effect of the impact of the crisis is higher the higher the level of youth unemployment

is. In dualized economies, those who are more severely hit by the crisis are more likely to vote for the radical left.

The interaction effect is particularly strong for the radical left / radical right comparison. Figure 5 shows the different combinations of crisis impact and youth unemployment for the radical left / radical right comparison.The closer the individual is to the north east of the square, the higher the probability of voting for the radical left. Clearly, youth unemployment rate is a more important variable than the impact of the crisis on the individual. This suggests that the main mechanism for the activation of radical left support is through expectations: people see no prospects of improvement and channel their frustration voting for parties that promise a deep transformation of the economy. Actually, the individual experience of the crisis has, by itself, a negative coefficient in the radical left / right comparison, meaning that everything else equal, those who have experienced more deeply the consequences of the crisis, are more likely to vote for the radical right than for the radical left.

FIGURE 5

These results are consistent with the coefficients of age: when radical left is value 1 of the dependent variable, age is negative and significant except for the radical left / abstention model (abstentionsits are even younger). The radical left is more tempting for youn people with bleak expectations, whereas the radical right is more attractive for older people.

The effect of education works as expected. Those with higher education tend to vote for the radical left (whatever the base comparison is). By contrast, for the radical right, higher education is either not significant or negative with regard to mainstream parties (it is only positive with regard to people who do not vote). This confirms that the frustratrion of expectations among those with higher education lead into vote for the radical left.

In the case of occupation, the most important result is that manual workers are less likely to vote for the radical left and more likely to support the radical right.

Support for the radical left is concentrated in large towns compared with abstention and mainstream parties, though, curiously, the habitat is not significant when compared with the radical right.

Gender is negatively associated with support for the radical right. The coefficient for woman in Table 1 is significant for the three models in which value 1 corresponds to the

Table 8: Table Caption

	Rad. Left Rad. Right	Rad. Left Mainstream	Rad. Right Mainstream
	$\frac{dy}{dx}$	$\frac{dy}{dx}$	$\frac{dy}{dx}$
Age	-.015**	-.002***	-.001
Education	.059***	.027***	-.017***
Female	.090***	.001	-.047***
Manual worker	-.064**	.029	.057***
Direction things are going	.006	.046***	.031***
Crisis impact	-.019	.266***	.030***
Youth unemployment	.082***	-.008	-.049***

Marginal effects for numerical variables (age, education, crisis impact and youth unemployment, directions things are going) and 0-1 change for categorical variables (female, manual worker)

radical right.

Results about home ownsership are interesting, though not systematic. In the radical left / mainstream parties comparison, home ownership has a depressing effect on the radical left. People who are "protected" by house ownership are more likely to vote for mainstream parties.

Lastly, we would like to emphasize the large effect that the attitudinal variable has. It is highly significant in every model except in the radical left / radical right comparison, which is what we expected. This can be interpreted as follows: whenever the individual thinks that things are going in the wrong direction in her country, she is more likely to vote for a radical option. Hence, when the two radical options are compared, this variable is not significant.

Table 2 summarizes the main findings of the regression analysis: it reports the marginal effects of the main explanatory variables. Marginal effects allow us to calibrate the effects on the probability of voting for the radical left or the radical right. Column 1 in Table 2 shows marginal effects for the comparison between radical left and radical left, whereas columns 2 and 3 present the marginal effects for the comparisons between radical left and mainstream parties on the one hand and radical right and mainstream parties on the other.

Based on these results, we can reconstruct the general profile of voters who opt for either radical right or radical left. Both tend to think that their country is going in the wrong direction. If the voter has higher education, lives in a large town, and is young, and the region is marked by high youth unemployment, the probability of voting for a radical left

party is considerably high. By contrast, if the voter is male and older, has lower education, is a manual worker, and has been severely hit by the crisis in economic terms, the probability of voting for the radical right is very high.

Figure 9



5 Conclusion

To be completed after workshop

Appendix

Table 9: Radical parties / coalitions in the 2014 European elections that obtained more than 3% of the vote at the national level

	Radical Right	Radical Left
Austria	Austrian Freedom Party	The Greens
Belgium	Flemish Interest	The Greens Workers' Party of Belgium
Denmark	Danish People's Party	Socialist People's Party
Finland	True Finns	
France	National Front	European Ecology Left Front
Germany	Alternative for Germany	The Left Alliance 90
Greece	Independent Greeks Popular Orthodox Rally Golden Dawn	Communist Party of Greece Syriza
Ireland		Green Party Ourselves Alone
Italy	Northern League Brothers of Italy	Left Ecology Movement Five Star Movement
Luxembourg	Alternative Democratic Reform Party	The Greens
Netherlands	Party of Freedom	Socialist Party
Portugal		Left Bloc
Spain		United Left Podemos
Sweden	Sweden Deomocrats	Green Ecology Party
UK	UKIP	

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