Fuzzy or Veering?

Party Positioning, Voter Congruence, and Electoral Support for Radical Right Parties in Western Europe

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Abstract

Do radical right parties present blurry economic stances, or have they clarified their positions while moving towards the economic left? This paper questions the strategic behavior of radical right parties in western Europe. We show that although expert placements of this party family on the economic dimension have become more centrist over time, the uncertainty surrounding these placements continues to be higher for the radical right than any other party family in Europe. We then move on to examine to what extent voter-party congruence on redistribution, immigration, and other issues of social lifestyle predict an individual's propensity to vote for the radical right compared to other parties. Although redistribution is the component of economic policy where the radical right has most substantially moved to the centre, our findings indicate that it remains party-voter congruence on immigration that drives support for radical right parties, while congruence levels for redistribution has an insignificant effect. The paper concludes that while radical right parties seem to have included some clearly left-leaning economic proposals, which shifted the general expert views of these parties to the economic center, their overall economic profiles remain as blurry as ever.

Introduction

Where do radical right parties stand on economic politics? At first glance, it may seem obvious that a party family with 'right' in its name would be located on the right of the economic left-right spectrum. In their classic text on these parties, Kitschelt and McGann (1995) suggested that the party family's winning formula consisted of combining cultural authoritarianism with economic neo-liberalism. And while this may have been true in the 1980s, today this group of parties primarily shares a culturally conservative position, particularly on questions of immigration and supranational integration (Mudde 2007), rather than consistent positions on matters of economic policy (Afonso 2015). When it comes to economics, radical right parties may have shifted to take more centrist positions (De Lange 2007; Junger and Jupskås 2014), while other research suggests that they 'blur' their stances (Rovny 2013).

More recent evidence suggests that in some cases the radical right is actually adopting clearer left-wing economic profiles (Afonso and Rennwald 2018). Across western Europe, newspaper headlines such as "How the Nordic far-right has stolen the left's ground on welfare"¹ illustrate the point. Indeed, the current centre-right minority government in Denmark is under threat because the Danish People's Party resists tax cuts advocated by another government supporting party, the Liberal Alliance.²

This article thus addresses an empirical puzzle, asking whether the radical right has shifted and clarified its economic positions in the recent years, or whether it continues to present opaque economic profiles. The answer to this question has important implications for our theoretical understanding of partisan behavior and strategizing. The article finds that radical right parties have indeed shifted to the economic center, and that this shift is particularly associated with clarifying centrist redistribution stances. However, the overall economic placements of these parties by expert coders are as blurry as ever, and citizens vote for the radical right primarily when they agree with its anti-immigration stances, and not its economic proposals. This latter finding is consistent with single

 1 Coman, Julian (2015)July 26)"How Nordic the far-right has stolen the left's ground on welfare." TheGuardian. Retrieved from: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/26/scandinavia-far-right-stolen-leftground-welfare.

 $^{2}(2016 \text{ August 15})$ "Why Denmark's PM may have to call a new election. *The Local DK*. Retrieved from: http://www.thelocal.dk/20160815/why-denmarks-pm-may-have-to-call-a-new-election.

country analysis that radical right party support is not explained by its voters views on the economy (Aichholzer et al. 2014). Our findings also complement recent research that stresses the importance of including issue salience when analyzing the representational relationship between parties and voters from the perspective of ideological congruence (Lefkofridi and Casado-Asensio 2013; Giger and Lefkofridi 2014; Lefkofridi, Wagner, and Willmann 2014).

In the next section we review the literature on radical right economic placement, while considering the theoretical expectations concerning the strategic behavior of political parties, particularly the radical right. We then describe our data, explain our methodological approach, and present our empirical evidence based on party- and voter-level data spanning western European countries. The final section serves as a conclusion.

The Radical Right: Blurry or Moving?

The radical right is well known for its extreme views on cultural issues, particularly those pertaining to immigration, and law-and-order. Its economic positioning has, however, been contested both in the academic literature, and by more casual observers. While some evidence suggests that radical right parties are slowly but surely moving to the economic left, seeking to capture the support of the working class disenchanted with social democratic parties, other analysis suggest that the radical right is strategically vague about its economic proposals, seeking to avoid economic positioning that may prove divisive.

When candidates or political parties avoid taking a position on an issue, or take multiple positions, it obfuscates their policy stances and creates ambiguity. Much of the literature suggests that not taking a clear position carries electoral costs (Shepsle 1972; Enelow and Hinich 1981; Bartels 1986; Franklin 1991; Gill 2005), and finds that "the more uncertain a voter is about candidate positions, the less likely she is to support the candidate" (Alvarez 1998: 204). These works see ambiguity as a structural factor caused by an insufficient campaign which fails to engender candidate visibility, or by lack of political experience and prominence of the political candidate. This literature thus assumes that clarity is the core strategic aim of political campaigns, and that ambiguity is not a strategy, but rather an error.

However, a variety of recent works have illustrated the potential benefits of strategic obfuscation (Somer-Topcu 2015; Bräuninger and Giger 2016; Lo, Proksch and Slapin 2016). The logic of these works suggests that parties need to please their core, activist supporters who may be more extreme on certain issues, while also appealing to broader, centrist groups of voters. To do this, parties may use vague positioning in order to misrepresent distances between themselves and their various potential voters, thus building a broader support base and increasing their vote share.

Rovny (2012, 2013) presents a set of expectations concerning which types of parties are likely to obfuscate diverse political issues. Building on the insights from the issue competition literature that parties invest in issues that lie at the core of their identity (Budge and Fairlie 1983; Budge et al. 1987; Petrocik 1996; Green-Pedersen 2007), blurring theory expects that party's issue investment determines strategic actions. Parties emphasize and take clear stances on their primary issues, while strategically blurring positions on secondary issues. A blurred political stance allows parties to adjust their political message to varied audiences. It is an anti-deterrent tactic, aimed at blunting inconvenient political issues. The emphasis on primary issues, combined with blurring of secondary issues, allows political parties to potentially misrepresent the distance between the party and its voters, thus constructing broader support around their core interests, regardless of voters' views on secondary issues.

The radical right is deeply invested in the non-economic issue dimension. Questions of law and order, opposition to European integration, and particularly, immigration, have played a central role in their political discourses, defining their identity. These parties gain from attracting socially conservative voters, however, the economic preferences of these voters are rather eclectic (Ivarsflaten 2005). Consequently, Rovny (2013) demonstrated the clear and radical positioning of these parties on socio-cultural issues, combined with blurry – vague, muted and erratic – economic placements.

The original literature on radical right parties initially expected them to hold extreme right stances on economic issues (Ignazi 2003; Betz 1994; Kitschelt and McGann 1995). Later, observers suggested that radical right parties may not be on the economic extreme right, but rather closer to the center (Kitschelt 2004; De Lange 2007; Junger and Jupskås 2014). Finally, recent research suggests that some radical right parties may be moving towards more explicitly left-wing economic proposals (Ivaldi 2015; Afonso and Rennwald 2018) or welfare chauvinistic proposals (Schumacher and van Kersbergen 2016).

This raises the question whether there has been a (leftward) shift in economic positioning of radical right parties over the last decades, and whether such a shift towards more left-leaning economic preferences coincides with positional clarification. In other words, has Rovny's (2013) finding of ambiguous radical right economic placements simply captured a blurry snapshot of a positional shift?

This question can be assessed by analyzing radical right parties, and the evolution of

their stances. Furthermore, it can be addressed by looking at voters and evaluating their considerations when voting for different party types. If radical right parties strategically avoid economic positioning, we would expect voters to consider other political issues when voting for these parties. Conversely, if radical right parties are indeed shifting and clarifying their economic profiles, we should expect voters to notice, and consider economic matters more significantly when casting votes for the radical right. This discussion thus implies a set of opposing hypotheses:

- H1: Radical right parties have shifted their economic positions over time.
- H2: Radical right economic ambiguity has not decreased over time.
- H3: Vote for the radical right is not significantly determined by voter-party congruence on economic issues.

We anticipate that, taken as a whole, the radical right party family has shifted to the economic center over time. However, we further assert that this is not necessarily the product of clearly articulating centrist economic policies, but is likely a consequence of strategic ambiguity on the part of these parties, and an embrace of an 'all things to all people' style of economic politics. Finally, we expect that the choice to vote for radical right parties remains primarily driven by cultural rather than economic considerations. The next section describes the data and methods we use to test these hypotheses.

Data and Methods

To assess these hypotheses, we use two data sources in this paper: the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) measures the positions of political parties across Europe (Bakker et al. 2015), and the European Election Studies (EES) records the policy preferences of citizens in the Member States of the European Union (Schmitt, Hobolt, and Popa 2015; Schmitt et al. 2015).

We start by focusing on the party level, where we consider the expert placements of political parties. The policy positions of political parties are latent concepts that cannot be directly measured. Because of this, scholars have developed a variety of approaches to measuring party positions based on electoral manifestos (e.g. Merz, Regel, and Lewandowski 2016), roll-call votes (e.g. Hix, Noury, and Roland 2006), or surveying experts of the party politics of a country (e.g. Benoit and Laver 2006). Each method of measurement has strengths and limitations, but unlike manifestos, which are necessarily tied to the electoral calendar, expert surveys can be administered at any time, allow analysts to probe internal party dissent, and can examine topics that do not appear in manifestos (Steenbergen and Marks 2007).³ For the purposes of this paper, one of the most attractive features of the CHES data is the ability to detect expert uncertainty in party placements (See Rovny and Polk 2016 for a recent application). In particular, we expect that less agreement between experts in the placement of radical right parties on economic policies – as measured through standard deviations – will be indicative of vagueness or blurry positions, while more agreement between experts suggests concrete and clear economic positions.

The association between expert uncertainty and positional blurriness of parties is an assumption used by Rovny (2013). Fortunately, the 2017 Chapel Hill Expert Survey includes direct questions about the clarity of party positions on economic and cultural issues. We use this data to establish the extent to which expert uncertainty (standard deviations of expert placements) associate with direct expert assessment of positional clarity. Table 1 confirms the expectation that greater positional clarity is associated with lower expert uncertainty (lower standard deviations in expert placements). Interestingly, the association is stronger on the cultural dimension, suggesting that parties with clearly defined placements on cultural issues lead to significantly greater expert placement agreements. We suspect that this is driven by niche parties that tend to compete on non-economic issues, such as the greens and the radical right, whose respective social liberalism or conservatism is hardly questionable. Overall, the relationship between direct assessment of clarity and expert uncertainty, reported in the table, confirms the expectation that placement uncertainty is an imperfect, but reasonable proxy for capturing party position blurring. Given that expert uncertainty measures are available for all CHES rounds, we use it rather than the direct clarity measure available only in 2017. Figure 7 in the appendix summarizes expert evaluations of party clarity across diverse party families, confirming our expectations.

The second empirical part turns to the voter level, and the European Election Study, to address voters' calculus when supporting different party types in elections. In order

 $^{^{3}}$ See (Marks et al. 2007) for more detailed discussion on the strengths and limitations of various approaches to measuring party positions.

	economic SD	cultural SD
economic clarity	-0.345	0.191
cultural clarity	0.324	-0.509

Table 1: Correlations of positional clarity and expert uncertaintyNote: Clarity is measured with direct questions from CHES 2017. SDs are party-levelexpert standard deviations in placement.

to do this, we consider the congruence, that is the distance, between party and voter positions. Our data allow us to focus on three relevant political issues that were measured in the CHES and EES data in 2014. These issues are: redistribution; immigration; and individual lifestyle (which closely relates to questions of gay rights). Since these measures were on the same scale, we measure congruence as the absolute distance of the voter's position and her reported vote choice.

We then model how congruence on the three issues predicts voters' propensity to vote for different party families. The propensity to vote (PTV) for a particular party is measured in the EES survey by asking respondents how likely (on a scale from 1-11) it is that they would ever vote for each party in their party system. Championed by van der Eijk et al. (1996, 2006), PTVs have a significant advantage over the study of reported vote choice. This is because a reported vote choice is just one nominal piece of information, while PTVs give us (almost) a continuous scale of preference for all surveyed parties. In order to study PTVs, we stack our dataset so that the unit of observation is voter-party evaluation. Our N thus becomes the number of respondents times the number of parties they assess. Since each respondent's observation is multiplied by the number of times she evaluated a party, we correct our standard errors by clustering them by respondent.

An important challenge with PTV analysis is that control variables cannot be assessed in a normal additive manner, like in regular regression, given the stacked nature of the dataset. To overcome this, van der Eijk et al. (1996) suggest separately regressing each control variable on the PTV for every given party. The results of these regressions indicate the extent to which the given control variable predicts the propensity to support a given party. These regressions produce predicted values, or \hat{y} s for each individual and each party, and their centered values – that is the differences between the individual predicted values and the \hat{y} means – are then entered into the stacked dataset, where they are used as control variables (see van der Eijk et al. 1996: 348).

We proceed first by measuring the congruence (positional closeness) between the pref-

erences of individuals and party positions on three specific areas or policy issues: 1) redistribution, 2) immigration policy, 3) social lifestyle issues (such as the legality of gay marriage). In a second step we predict the reported propensity to vote for different party families as a function of the positional congruence on these four issues, the party family, and an interaction between positional congruence and family. This final term models our theoretical expectation that congruence on particular policy issues will matter differently across party families. Our models control for key socio-economic characteristics of the individual respondents: gender, age, religiosity, and social level. Our model can thus be generally mathematically expressed in the following way for individuals i and parties j:

$$\begin{split} Vote_propensity_{ij} &= \beta_0 + \beta_1 issue_congruence_{ij} + \beta_2 party_family_j \\ + \beta_3 issue_congruence_{ij} * party_family_j \\ + \beta_n controls_i + \epsilon_{ij} \end{split}$$

We now turn to discuss our results at the party and voter level.

Results

Party Level

Radical right parties have been systematically moving to the economic center over the last one and a half decade. Figure 1 demonstrates the shift of selected radical right parties from western Europe. Across a range of institutional and cultural contexts, the general tendency is for members of this party family to move from the right to the middle of the left-right economic continuum. This appears to be as true for radical right parties in the Nordic countries as it is for those in southern Europe. Interestingly, in the last period between 2014 and 2017, some radical right parties, such as the Sweden Democrats and the Dutch PVV, seem to reverse their move to the center.

Looking at aggregated party family data in figure 2 suggests an initial trend of the radical right towards the economic center. In 1999, the mean economic left-right position for the radical right party family in western Europe was 7.5 on a 0-10 scale, where 10 equals the most economically right-wing. By 2014 the mean position for the party family had moved to 5.5 on the same scale, while the last period between 2014 and 2017 sees a minor shift towards the economic right. It is questionable whether the radical right



Figure 1: Economic position change of selected Radical Right parties Note: VB =Vlaams Belang, FN = Front National, PVV = Party for Freedom, PS = Finns Party, DF = Danish People's Party, LN = Lega Nord, FPO = Freedom Party of Austria, SD = Sweden Democrats

positional oscillation in the later periods (2010-2017) is a function of true party shifts, or is rather a figment of random measurement error. Nevertheless, the data point to an overall economic moderation of radical right parties since the beginning of the millenium, a trend through which they pass from being to the right of major right parties to being left of them. Interestingly, the 2017 observations, particularly of the radical left and major right, suggest a certain economic polarization across the political spectrum.

A similar dynamic is observable when we consider one specific, but crucial, component of economic preferences: redistribution.⁴ While our data at this finer issue level is available only between 2006 and 2014, we note that radical right parties have been more

⁴Redistribution question wording: position on redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor. 0 = Strongly favors redistribution...10 = Strongly opposes redistribution.



Figure 2: Economic Position Change

redistributive than major right parties, which is visible in Figure 3. Across the three time periods for which we have data, the mean position of the radical right party family on redistribution is 5.2, whereas the mean position for the major right parties over this time period is 5.95. Further, Figure 3 also shows that the last available period from 2010 to 2014 witnessed a slight left turn in redistribution on the part of the radical right.

Simultaneously, while radical right parties move to the economic center, as placed by experts, the same experts express more uncertainty over the positioning of these parties on economic issues. Figure 4 shows that experts have always demonstrated higher levels of uncertainty when evaluating radical right party positions on economic issues, compared to other party families. The standard deviations associated with the radical right placements are always significantly above those of other party families. This indicates greater inconsistency in the expert placements of radical right parties on the economic dimension than for other party families. While there are no doubt several reasons that experts disagree more on radical right party positioning on economic issues than they do over other party families, our assessment of clarity and uncertainty above suggests that a significant com-



Figure 3: Redistribution position change

ponent of this uncertainty reflects the deliberately blurry nature of radical right economic propositions.

Interestingly, while expert uncertainty over radical right economic positions remains continuously high and shows little sign of abating, expert uncertainty over radical right redistribution preferences registers significant decline between 2010 and 2014, as figure 5 shows. It remains the highest of the four party families under consideration, but while in 2010 it is significantly distant from the others, by 2014 it is becoming comparable to their levels.

Overall, the evidence based on expert evaluations of radical right party placements over the last eighteen years suggests three key findings. First, radical right parties can no longer be described as decisively economically right-wing. Over this period they have shifted closer to the economic center. Second, despite this position shift, expert uncertainty over radical right economic placement remains stably high. While experts tend to place radical right parties near the center of the dimension, their uncertainty over the current centrist placement is comparable to their previous uncertainty over their right-wing placement in



Figure 4: Expert uncertainty over economic placements

the early 2000s⁵. Third, we may cautiously assume that radical right parties are moving in the direction of the economic left in terms of their redistributive prescriptions. Given the decreasing levels of expert disagreement over radical right placement on redistribution, we may conclude that redistribution is the one component of economic policy where radical right parties may be clarifying their stance. This suggests that additional research should continue probing the importance of welfare chauvinism for the radical right (following,

⁵This finding is additionally important from a measurement perspective. One might expect that centrist positions – unlike positions near the extremes of a measurement scale – are the product of high uncertainty. That is, if individual experts place radical right parties all over the scale, the aggregate placement of the radical right party family will be centrist with high uncertainty. However, the fact that expert uncertainty remains roughly the same, while the aggregate placement of the family shifts to the center, suggests that this shift is not a function of increasing uncertainty, but rather a function of a true positional shift.



Figure 5: Redistribution expert uncertainty

e.g., Schumacher and van Kersbergen 2016).

Voter Level

We now turn to consider the calculus of individuals when expressing their propensity to vote for radical right and other parties. The main aim is to explore the varying effects of issue congruence on radical right and other vote. It is reasonable to expect that voters support parties that are closer to them. However, the crucial question is, closer on what? We expect that the answer will differ across party families. As discussed above, we predict vote propensity for a range of party families, including the radical right, as a function of party-voter congruence on three key issues: 1) redistribution, 2) immigration policy, 3) social lifestyle issues (such as the legality of gay marriage), while controlling for gender, age, religiosity, and social level.

The results, presented in figure 6 and detailed in the appendix, demonstrate a striking discrepancy between the effects of issue congruence on the propensity to vote for different

party families. The top left panel of Figure 6 demonstrates that congruence with the radical right views on redistribution has no effect on the propensity to vote for the party family, while congruence on redistribution tends to predict vote propensity for most other party families very well. Thus agreeing with the radical right on questions of redistribution has no impact on the likelihood of ever voting for it.

The diametric opposite is true for the issue of immigration. As the top right panel of figure 6 shows, congruence on immigration with the radical right has a very strong positive effect on the propensity to vote for it. Only the greens – another party family defined by non-economic issues – has a comparable point estimate for immigration congruence. Thus agreeing with the radical right on questions of immigration makes one very likely to vote for a member of this party family.

Finally, the bottom left panel of figure 6 shows that the effect of social lifestyle congruence on the propensity to vote for the radical right is modest. While it is stronger than for regionalist parties it is significantly weaker than for green parties.

This analysis points to the important conclusion that the proximity, or congruence, of voters to parties tends to significantly determine the likelihood of voters supporting these parties. Crucially to our argument, this effect differs across policy issues and party families. While knowlege of proximity between a voter and a radical right party on the issue of immigration is a strong indication that this person is very likely to vote for the radical right, the same information has no predictive power if the policy issue under consideration is redistribution.

These results suggest that despite the fact that radical right parties are generally shifting their stances to the left by including more explicitly left-wing proposals in their economic discourse, this discourse remains blurry, at least in comparison with their vocal stances on issues of immigration. This is likely caused by the fact that explicit left-wing economic statements are still combined with other, more right-leaning proposals. For example, the Front National in its program, which includes various left-wing economic proposals, boldly asserts that taxes "must remain as low as possible ... [so as to] not [be] seen as a burden" (Front National 2016: 70, translated by authors). Similarly, the Sweden Democrats recently argued on behalf of an increase in the minimum guaranteed pension for retirees but also voted against a proposal that would have reduced the taxes





Note: Predicted marginal effect of the propensity to vote for each party family with 95% confidence intervals, while controls are held constant. RR= radical right; Con=conservative; L=liberal; Ch=Christian democratic; So=socialist/social democratic; RL=radical left; Gr=green; Re=regionalist; Conf=protestant confessional; Ag=agrarian; NF=no family. on pensions.⁶

Our analysis further demonstrates that voters of radical right parties completely discount the congruence between their economic positions and those of the parties they support – they are willing to support these parties no matter how close or distant on the issue of redistribution they are. The choice for the radical right is, as prior analyses suggest, firmly rooted in the ideological overlap on cultural issues, particularly immigration. Voters support the radical right when they agree with its anti-immigrant agenda, no matter their economic profiles.

Conclusion

This article departed from an empirical puzzle. Radical right parties are invested in cultural issues predominantly related to national sovereignty and opposition to immigration, and their economic platforms seem underspecified, contradictory and vague. Simultaneously, various analysts have observed the crystallization of more explicitly left-wing economic proposals on the part of some radical right parties, which raises the question whether the radical right is moving towards the economic left, and taking clearer economic stances.

Our theoretical expectations suggested that radical right parties face a strategic opportunity in blurring their economic stances, given that their primary focus rests on the cultural dimension, and that their potential supporters hold diverse economic preferences. Our analyses of party positioning and voting behavior support these expectations. First, we find that radical right parties have indeed generally moved from the right side of the economic spectrum to the center. We suspect that this shift, as perceived by party experts, has been caused by the increase of more explicitly left-wing proposals in the political discourse of radical right parties and their leaders. Our analysis, however, also suggests that, despite the general expert consensus that radical right parties are more centrist than right-wing on economics, these parties remain as vague as ever in their economic message. The relatively low level of expert agreement on radical right party economic placements has not changed. Clearly, the more explicitly leftist proposals of the radical right come amid other, right-leaning suggestions.

⁶(2016 August 28) "Sweden Democrats try to woo pensioners." *The Local SE.* Retrieved from: http://www.thelocal.se/20160828/sweden-democrats-try-to-woo-elderly-with-pensions.

Second, we find that voters do not seem to be systematically affected by the general economic shift of the radical right. The propensity to vote for the radical right is strongly predicted by voter-party congruence on immigration, while congruence on redistribution has no statistical effect. Voters continue to listen to the cultural message of the radical right, while ignoring the economic message with its blurry vagueness.

It is possible that our analysis based on data covering merely eighteen recent years are insufficient to capture the necessarily slow process of party positional evolution. Consequently, the future may see the radical right decisively shift to the economic left, standing up for the left-authoritarian quadrant of the political space which currently lacks political representation in western Europe (Lefkofridi, Wagner, and Willmann 2014). In the mean time, the radical right continues to be primarily a champion of cultural conservatism, while its economic profile remains strategically blurry.

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Appendix



Figure 7: Expert assessment of positional clarity - CHES 2017

(Std. Err.)	
redist_congr -0.020	
(0.017)	
1b.family 0.000	
(0.000)	
2.family -1.943*	k
(0.150)	
3.family -2.307*	k
(0.156)	
4.family -2.309*	k
(0.179)	
5.family -2.236*	k
(0.179)	
6.family -2.221*	k
(0.154)	
7.family -2.184*	k
(0.186)	
8.family -1.074*	k
(0.201)	
9.family -1.511*	k
(0.337)	
10.family -2.733*	k
(0.265)	
11.family -0.557*	k
(0.196)	
$1b.family#co.redist_congr$ 0.000	
(0.000)	

Table 2: Predicting PTVs with Redistribution congruence

Variable	Coefficient
	(Std. Err.)
$2.family \# c.redist_congr$	0.304^{**}
	(0.020)
$3.family#c.redist_congr$	0.328**
	(0.021)
$4.family \# c.redist_congr$	0.314^{**}
	(0.024)
$5.family#c.redist_congr$	0.286**
	(0.023)
$6. family \# c. redist_congr$	0.307**
	(0.021)
$7. family \# c. redist_congr$	0.281^{**}
	(0.024)
$8. family \# c. redist_congr$	0.149**
	(0.026)
$9.family \# c.redist_congr$	0.189**
	(0.042)
$10.family \# c.redist_congr$	0.362^{**}
	(0.035)
$11.family \# c.redist_congr$	0.080^{**}
	(0.026)
yhat_soc_level	0.379^{**}
	(0.032)
yhat_relig	0.610**
	(0.026)
yhat_female	-0.455**
	(0.041)

. table 2 continued

Coefficient
(Std. Err.)
0.510**
(0.028)
4.168**
(0.128)

Table 3: Predicting PTVs with Immigration congruence

Variable	Coefficient
	(Std. Err.)
immig_congr	0.255**
	(0.011)
1b.family	0.000
	(0.000)
2.family	0.768^{**}
	(0.127)
3.family	0.171
	(0.110)
4.family	0.360^{*}
	(0.168)
5.family	0.160
	(0.111)
6.family	0.416^{**}
	(0.107)
7.family	-0.156
	(0.098)

Variable	Coefficient
	(Std. Err.)
8.family	1.380^{**}
	(0.128)
9.family	-0.230
	(0.251)
10.family	0.564^{*}
	(0.223)
11.family	1.053^{**}
	(0.124)
$1b.family \# co.immig_congr$	0.000
	(0.000)
$2.family \# c.immig_congr$	-0.148**
	(0.018)
$3.family \# c.immig_congr$	-0.067**
	(0.016)
$4.family \# c.immig_congr$	-0.102**
	(0.023)
$5.family \# c.immig_congr$	-0.064**
	(0.016)
$6.family \# c.immig_congr$	-0.080**
	(0.016)
$7.family \# c.immig_congr$	0.015
	(0.015)
$8.family \# c.immig_congr$	-0.227**
	(0.020)
$9.family \# c.immig_congr$	-0.023
	(0.033)

table 3 continued	ble 3 continu	ed
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table 3 continued	
Variable	Coefficient
	(Std. Err.)
10.family#c.immig_congr	-0.129**
	(0.030)
$11.family \#c.immig_congr$	-0.171**
	(0.019)
yhat_soc_level	0.444^{**}
	(0.032)
yhat_relig	0.634^{**}
	(0.026)
yhat_female	-0.497**
	(0.041)
yhat_age	0.465^{**}
	(0.028)
Intercept	2.464^{**}
	(0.069)

Table 4: Predicting PTVs with Lifestyle congruence

Variable	Coefficient
	(Std. Err.)
lifestyle_congr	0.156**
	(0.010)
1b.family	0.000
	(0.000)
2.family	-0.077
	(0.102)

Variable	Coefficient
	(Std. Err.)
3.family	0.151
	(0.104)
4.family	0.009
	(0.123)
5.family	0.086
	(0.096)
6.family	-0.038
	(0.103)
7.family	-0.618**
	(0.091)
8.family	0.678**
	(0.107)
9.family	0.008
	(0.119)
10.family	0.282
v	(0.231)
11.family	0.362**
U U	(0.106)
1b.family#co.lifestyle_congr	0.000
	(0.000)
2.family#c.lifestyle_congr	-0.003
<i>911 9</i> 0	(0.016)
3.family#c.lifestyle_congr	-0.056**
	(0.015)
4.family#c.lifestyle_congr	-0.024
	(0.019)

. table 4 continued

	<u> </u>
Variable	Coefficient
	(Std. Err.)
$5.family \#c.lifestyle_congr$	-0.039**
	(0.015)
$6. family \# c. lifestyle_congr$	-0.023
	(0.015)
$7.family \# c.lifestyle_congr$	0.067^{**}
	(0.014)
$8.family \# c.lifestyle_congr$	-0.125**
	(0.016)
$9.family \# c.lifestyle_congr$	0.026
	(0.024)
$10.family \# c.lifestyle_congr$	-0.075*
	(0.032)
$11.family \# c.lifestyle_congr$	-0.069**
	(0.017)
yhat_soc_level	0.488**
	(0.033)
yhat_relig	0.600**
	(0.026)
yhat_female	-0.470**
	(0.042)
yhat_age	0.412**
	(0.029)
Intercept	3.126^{**}
	(0.064)

table 4 continued