1. Left and Right Polarization and Fragmentation of Party Systems

1.1. A Simpleton’s Guide to the Politics of Advanced Capitalist Democracies

Herbert Kitschelt (Duke University)

Building on Beramendi/Häusermann/Kitschelt/Kriesi 2015, the paper lays out a set of hypotheses about the space of variation within which postindustrial democracies experience a transformation of political parties and their constituency alignments. Starting from shared basic political-economic features, the paper introduces successive elements of variation: political-economic institutions and welfare states; democratic institutions; and the international embeddedness of national political economies. Populist parties of the “left” and the “right” face different opportunities in each of these distinctive settings.

1.2. Generational Misfortunes and Support for Extreme Parties

Pablo Beramendi (Duke University), David Rueda (Nuffield College, University of Oxford) and Ignacio Sánchez Cuenca (University Carlos III)

This paper aims to contribute to a better understanding of the politico-economic foundations of the rise of two types of off-center parties: radical right and left-wing neopopulist parties. We refer to these two types of parties as two faces of populism. We argue that the relative success of each of these subfamilies reflects in part the age-labor market profile of the losers in different political economy regimes. The divide cuts across generations. Right-wing populism tends to be more successful in political economies where labor market opportunities are especially lacking for older, relatively unskilled manufacturing workers. Left-wing populism tends to be more successful in highly dualized political economies where labor market opportunities are especially lacking for the younger and relatively skilled. To assess this contention we combine macro-political economy data (at the national and regional level) with micro-electoral data in a wide range of European countries.

1.3. Positional Deprivation and the Economic Roots of Radical Right and Radical Left Voting

Brian Burgoon (University of Amsterdam)

This paper explores how support and voting for radical-populist parties of the left and right may be shaped by new measures of economic hardship that I call “positional deprivation.” In existing studies of
radical voting to have given attention to economic conditions, the focus has been on individual-level and aggregate-level economic factors like poverty, inequality or unemployment that capture either dynamic (over-time) OR positional (between-group) misfortune, not both. The paper argues that this misses the distinct combination of dynamic and positional misfortunes that qualitative studies suggest loom large in the ferment associated with radical left and radical right populism. Positional deprivation more directly captures this combination of dynamic and positional misfortune, by measuring the growth in disposable household income across a country’s income deciles and calculating a given decile’s gains relative to the gains of other deciles. The paper argues that positional deprivation hereby captures important drivers of resentments and frustrations relevant to radical-populist voting of the left and right. It hypothesizes, in particular, that support for radical-right and radical-left parties is more likely among individuals facing higher “positional deprivation,” those in deciles whose gains are smaller than the gains of the average, richest or poorest deciles in their own country. Analysis of European Social Survey (ESS) data on individual-level support and voting for radical left and right parties in sixteen European countries supports these claims. Net of familiar political and economic drivers, positional deprivation appears to be important to how economic experience shapes radical-left and radical-right politics.

1.4. Populism: Demand and Supply, within and outside the Eurozone.

Helios Herrera (University of Warwick)

Using individual data on voting in European countries, we show that key features of the demand for populism as well as its supply heavily depend on turnout incentives, previously neglected in the populism literature. Once turnout effects are taken into account, economic insecurity drives consensus to populist policies directly as well as through indirect negative effects on trust and attitudes towards immigrants. On the supply side, populist parties are more likely to emerge and prosper when countries are faced with a systemic crisis of economic security that incumbent parties (whether left-leaning, relying on government, or right-leaning, relying on markets) find hard to address, disappointing voters who lose faith in them and abstain. The orientation choice of populist parties, i.e., whether they arise on left or right of the political spectrum, is determined by the availability of political space. The typical non-populist policy response is to reduce the distance of their platform from that of new populist entrants, amplifying the aggregate supply of populist policies.

Institutional constraints, which limit the possible actions in the face of shocks, result in poorer performance and frustration among voters who turn to populist movements. We rely on this logic to explain the different support of populist parties among European countries in response to the globalization shock and to the 2008-2011 financial and sovereign debt crisis. We predict a greater success of populist parties in response to these shocks in Euro zone countries, and our empirical analysis confirms this prediction. This is consistent with voters’ frustration for the greater inability of the Euro zone governments to react to difficult-to-manage globalization shocks and financial crises. Our evidence has implications for the speed of construction of political unions. A slow, staged process of political unification can expose the EU to a risk of political backlash if hard to manage shocks hit the economies during the integration process.

1.5. From balance of payments crisis to crisis of representation

Luis Guirola (Duke University)
In this paper I propose an argument that relates balance of payment crisis to changes in party systems. While large macroeconomic shocks coincide with party realignments and the emergence of populist parties, economic explanations are usually rejected as voters of new parties are not those objectives materially economically worse off. Instead arguments based on corruption or crisis of representation are retained instead. In contrast, I suggest that economic crisis and crisis of representation are two faces of the same coin. While in a bubble environment political competition leads party to promise future higher living standards, a reversal of the current account drastically changes the capacity of mainstream parties’ government to fulfill the demands of voters. In turn, voters may perceive this failure as evidence of a corrupt elite or a failure of representation and if the number of discontents is large enough, it may open a window of opportunity for new political entrepreneurs which may mobilize discontents into a new coalition. Using a pseudo panel approach (Deaton 1985) which pools a large electoral dataset and household budget surveys in Spain, I find evidence that those groups which suffer a biggest draw back from their expected consumptions are more likely to shift party lines.

2. Radical Parties’ Strategic Moves I: Selective Competition and Blurriness of Policy

2.1. When Do Radical Right Parties Politicize New Issues? The Impact of Losing Power

Tarik Abou-Chadi (University of Zurich), Daniel Bischof (University of Zurich), and Markus Wagner (University of Vienna)

This paper investigates how the prospect of losing power affects parties’ willingness to act as issue entrepreneurs, especially on the radical right. The question of when parties politicize new issues has become increasingly important in the study of party competition. For example, radical-right parties have challenged established patterns of party competition by emphasizing the issues of European integration and, in particular, immigration. In this paper, we examine whether parties act as issue entrepreneurs as defined by Hobolt and De Vries (2015), i.e. do they politicize new issues because they are losers on the dominant political dimension. In particular, we (1) analyzing data on EU and immigration issues from the CMP and (2) use a measure of electoral risk introduced by Abou-Chadi and Orlowski (2016), which captures the risk that parties will lose power in upcoming elections. In our analysis, we compare radical-right parties to mainstream parties in their issue emphasis strategies, especially in reaction to electoral risk. We conclude by using the insights from our analysis to discuss the role of issue strategies in shaping the niche status of radical-right parties.

2.2. Fuzzy or Veering? Party Positioning, Voter Congruence, and Electoral Support for Radical Right Parties in Western Europe

Jan Rovny (Science Po, Paris) & Jonathan Polk (University of Gothenburg)

Do radical right parties present blurry economic stances, or have they clarified their positions while moving towards the economic left? This paper questions the strategic behavior of radical right parties in Western Europe. We show that although expert placements of this party family on the economic dimension have become more centrist over time, the uncertainty surrounding these placements continues to be higher for the radical right than any other party family in Europe. We then move on to examine to
what extent voter-party congruence on redistribution, immigration, and other issues of social lifestyle predict an individual's propensity to vote for the radical right compared to other parties. Although redistribution is the component of economic policy where the radical right has most substantially moved to the centre, our findings indicate that it remains party-voter congruence on immigration that drives support for radical right parties, while congruence levels for redistribution has an insignificant effect. The paper concludes that while radical right parties seem to have included some clearly left-leaning economic proposals, which shifted the general expert views of these parties to the economic center, their overall economic profiles remain as blurry as ever.

2.3. Disentangling blurring: Party Strategy in a Multidimensional Environment

Jelle Koedam (UNC Chapel Hill)

Theories of party competition are typically based on the assumption that parties’ policy positions are a given. In a multidimensional environment, however, parties may occasionally have an incentive to obscure their stances. This paper expands on a growing literature about so-called position blurring, and studies what strategies parties adopt, and when, to achieve this end. Particular attention is paid to the blurring behavior of niche, or radical right, parties. I argue that parties can blur by either avoiding an issue altogether or by taking up conflicting positions, but that the effectiveness of either strategy varies by party and ideological dimension. Using a combination of expert and manifesto data across fourteen Western European countries from 1999-2014, I find partial evidence to support my hypotheses. This paper has important implications for our theories of political contestation and representation.

2.4. Blurring along issue dimensions: Strategic campaigning or unintended sign of division?

Stephanie N. Shady (UNC Chapel Hill)

Abstract

Recent literature has postulated that in a multidimensional electoral arena, parties position themselves firmly along their primary dimension and less clearly along their secondary dimension in order maximize their vote share. However, it has paid little attention to the question of whether, or under what conditions, blurring is strategic or unintentional. In this paper, I make use of a new survey item in the 2017 Chapel Hill Expert Survey to operationalize blurriness more directly than previous research. With this improved measure, I examine party characteristics that shape the blurriness of position along the GAL-TAN dimension. I find evidence to corroborate Rovny’s (2013) blurring hypothesis; however, dimension salience to the party does not explain all of the variation. After controlling for dimension salience, I find strong, positive relationships between the degree of blurriness on the GAL-TAN dimension and two key party characteristics: 1) the salience of populism to the party, and 2) the degree of intraparty dissent on immigration policy. The results of this paper indicate that blurriness along the GAL-TAN dimension is not unique to a single party family, but rather relates to a party’s populist appeals independent of family. Furthermore, although some blurring is strategic, it can also be an unintended consequence of divisions within parties over a major issue in the blurry dimension. This paper has implications for future strategy of party leadership vis à vis its members, as the source of blurry positions carries potential consequences for its impact on voter preferences.
3. Radical Parties’ Strategic Moves II: Position Taking on Economic and Socio-economic Policy

3.1. From whispering to shouting: a taxonomy of RRPs’ blurring strategies on economic policy after 1990.

Matteo Cavallaro (Centre d’économie de l’Université Paris Nord (CEPN))

Our research aims to provide a global analysis of the differences between European RRPs’ positions on economic matters with a specific focus to the attention paid by the different RRPs to these issues. We do so by analysing data from the MARPOR project database that has been treated according to Lowe et al.’s (2011) transformation. We cover 35 different RRPs across twenty European countries for a period from 1990 to 2014. Our findings show that economic issues are still less important in RRPs programmes than in those of other political families. However, the gap has been reducing as RRPs, in their programmes, talk more about the economy than before.

The article then describes RRPs’ heterogeneity on economic issues. We draw a cartography of the ‘economic policy space’ within the radical right party family. We do so by the means of various statistical methods (PCA, Ward’s method, and Additive trees) applied to manifestos data from the MARPOR project database. We find four dimensions that can describe large part of the differences between RRPs on economic matters. These dimensions all describe the “salience” of a set issues and we labelled them ‘Welfare’, ‘Economic Liberalism’, ‘Economic Management’ and ‘Protectionism”’ Our results show that RRPs are still very different in their economic programmes in terms of contents and, using Ward’s clustering method, we regroup RRPs in four classes: ‘neo-liberal’, ‘pro-welfare’, ‘blurring-by-muting’, and ‘blurring-by-multiplying’. In particular, we highlight a trend from a ‘blurring-by-muting’ towards a ‘blurring-by-multiplying’ strategy by most RRPs on economic matters. We conclude with a preliminary account of the possible determinants of this change of strategy and find that the economic situation does not seem to be a valid explanation, while the adoption of similar strategies by non-RR parties appears to be the strongest predictor.

3.2. The New Working Class Party? The Impact of Radical Right Parties’ Economic Positions on Working Class Support

Eelco Harteveld (University of Amsterdam), Stefan Dahlberg (University of Gothenburg), Andrej Kokkonen (University of Gothenburg), Rune Stubager (Aarhus University),

A lot of recent academic and journalistic interest has focused on the question whether Radical Right-wing Populist (RRP) parties are becoming the (main) political voice of the working class. Allegedly, this results from the fact that RRP parties not only promise cultural but increasingly also economic protection to the working class. However, to what extent does the latter matter to working class voters? In this study, we investigate the extent to which RRP parties’ support among this group depends on the economic positions they take. First, we track European RRP parties’ positions on economic issues through space and time (based on manifesto’s) and link this to these parties’ support among the working class (using CSES). Second, we conduct a survey experiment in which Norwegian, Swedish and Danish respondents are confronted with either an economically right-wing or an economically left-wing element taken from the national RRP party’s program. We test whether this matters to working class respondents. Together, this
design allows to test the relation between party stance and working class with relatively high levels of both generalizability and causal leverage.

3.3. Coalition Signals and the Perception of Radical Right and Left Parties

Ida Hjermitslev (Duke University)

How are populist radical right and left parties’ electoral appeal affected by government participation? One of the defining characteristics of these parties is opposition towards economic and cultural elites generally and the government particularly. This rhetoric can result in both ambiguous and extreme positions on the left-right dimension. Can a radical party maintain this type of ideological profile if it starts cooperating with establishment? Or is it a contradiction in terms to talk about radical parties in office? One of the ways voters estimate party positions is by using a coalition heuristic. Voters perceive parties that serve together in cabinet to be more ideologically similar. Whether a radical party joins a coalition government or not, thus have a large impact on how the party is perceived by voters. Using survey data from the European Election Study (1989-2014) and the Comparative Study of Election Systems (1999-2015), I examine how voters perceive the ideological position of populist parties both in and out of government. I find support for the inclusion-moderation hypothesis: while radical parties in government might not alter their manifesto positions, they are perceived by voters as more ideologically moderate.

3.4. It’s a Family Affair: Gender Ideologies, the Political Economy of the Family and the Radical Right

Andreas Jozwiak (UNC Chapel Hill)

This paper makes two contributions by examining the effect of gender ideologies and family dynamics on men’s and women’s voting preferences for radical right parties. I build upon existing literature suggesting that men and women have different characteristics and that these characteristics have differential importance for predicting vote choices. Radical right and conservative parties have historically taken traditionalist stances on family and social issues; potentially alienating progressive individuals and attracting very conservative ones. I use Swiss household panel data from 2000-2014 and find that gender ideologies are a significant predictor of voting preferences after other attitudinal and socio-structural factors are considered. However, the size of and the gender differences in the effect vary over time, reflecting parties’ changing messages on gender as well as shifting support bases. Given significant gender gaps in radical right voting, I also examine the extent to which voting is a family affair. The Becker model of familial preferences suggests that where women have conservative gender ideologies and/or have little economic independence, they will inherit their partner’s political preferences. I use the same household panel data from Switzerland to show that household level characteristics of gender ideologies and partner’s preferences explain why some women vote for the radical right. My results suggest that taking into account these household level are important predictors of vote choice.
3.5. Not So Radical After All: Ideological Diversity among Radical Right Voters and Its Implications for Party Competition

Caroline Lancaster (UNC Chapel Hill)

Traditionally, parties on the radical right in Western Europe have espoused socially conservative, pro-family values, strongly opposing women's rights, reproductive rights, and LGBT rights, in addition to their broader, authoritarian orientations. Radical right voters have been assumed to be similar. However, in light of more progressive radical right parties such as the Dutch Party for Freedom, as well as the fact that others, such as the French Front National, have moderated some of their strongest-held positions on these issues, I ask, “What are the ideological characteristics of radical right voters, and what are the implications of this for party competition?” Using latent class analysis and the 8th wave of the European Social Survey, this article is the first to find that only a minority of radical right voters conform to the traditional conceptualization – the remainder are either moderate or progressive nativists. Second, using logistic regression, I argue that radical right parties lose votes as their positions become more extreme and that generally, more moderate parties exist in countries with more moderate voters. Conditioned on the ideological makeup of their country, radical right parties face a trade-off between moderating and staying extreme.

4. Strategic Moves of Mainstream Parties Faced with Radical Challengers


Katelyn Mehling (Duke University)

The results of the 2010 midterm elections transformed the legislative landscape for the House of Representatives; 63 seats shifted hands from the Democrat to Republican party. In a time where the public was displeased with the state of the nation, the grassroots Tea Party movement caught fire. The Tea Party supported a conservative social agenda and economic policies focused on cutting programs. As a result of highly visible protests, extant political organizations seized on the ebullience of the Tea Party movement, soliciting donations from the grassroots and organizing to aid candidates reflective of their political preferences. As the movement gained national attention, many political hopefuls began to associate themselves with Tea Party. Despite the splash made by the Tea Party in 2010, I argue that Tea Party affiliation provided challengers no greater probability of defeating the incumbent in the primary election, and instead demonstrate that prior political experience is the trait critical to electoral success. In examining challengers, I find mixed results for my expectations. In races where incumbents run for reelection, I find that the Tea Party effect is not statistically significant, whereas I do find a statistically significant difference across quality and non-quality challengers. In open seat races however, having a Tea Party affiliation does offer a statistically significant advantage over non-Tea Party challengers.

4.2. The Absence of a Japanese Radical Right. Consistent with Current Theory of the Radical Right?

Harunobu Saijo (Duke University)
Whereas "Radical Right" parties in a subset of post-industrial late capitalist regimes in Western Europe enjoy a degree of success, Japan stands as a possible exception to this trend; no party more extreme than the LDP has ever been electorally successful. This paper first explores possible explanations for its absence by applying the existing literature's explanations. The LDP in Japan is able to subsume positions held by the "Radical Right" in Europe, such that those in Japan who would have voted for "Radical Right" in European systems already vote for existing parties, suggesting that the virulence of western radical right parties could be partly explained by the expulsion of such elements from the mainstream right.

4.3. Voting Against the Establishment. The Effect of Government Composition on Voting for Challenger Parties

Tarik Abou-Chadi (University of Zurich) and Eelco Harteveld (University of Amsterdam)

We investigate how the composition of governments affects voting for challenger parties. While a growing body of research has identified supply-side conditions under which the policy appeals of challenger parties are more successful, no such comparative work exists for their anti-establishment appeals. We argue that the composition of governments plays a crucial role for challenger parties’ capacity to mobilize anti-elite sentiment and investigate two mechanisms: representation and contestation. If voters feel that their policy preferences are not represented in government and that changing their vote has only little effect on the composition of governments, then this will increase the credibility of challenger parties’ anti-establishment appeal. Analyzing data on voting behavior from the CSES for 13 countries between 1996 and 2011, we find that the congruence of consecutive governments, the policy range of positions in government, and policy distance to government all affect individuals’ likelihood to vote for a challenger party.

4.4. The better, the worse? The impact of macro-economic performance on populist anti-immigrant success

Sergi Pardos-Prado (Merton College, Oxford University)

While the recent success of anti-immigrant parties has been prominent in well-performing Western democracies, some countries particularly hit by the Global Financial Crisis have proved to be surprisingly resilient to populist appeals. This observation is at odds with longstanding theories in the radical right literature expecting macro-economic hardship to boost anti-immigrant and anti-systemic ideologies. This paper presents a new theory based on the homogeneity of ideological spaces (i.e. variance of issue positions in the ideological spectrum) and issue constraint (i.e. correlation between issue opinions and partisanship) to account for this puzzle. More specifically, this paper argues that in a context with high immigration levels and bad macro-economic performance, mainstream voters are expected to be more unanimously against redistribution and immigration, therefore constraining the ideological space and limiting the opportunity structure of populist entrepreneurs to divide mainstream electorates. I combine two analytical strategies to validate this claim. First, a 2x2 survey experiment in the US manipulating (low/high) immigration threat and (good/bad) economic conditions. Second, hierarchical random-effects models and instrumental variables using ESS and Chapel Hill party positions data.