

***The Influence of Class and Ethno-religious Identity on Voting Strategies: A Case of the Palestinian Minority in Israel***

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## Abstract

There have been several studies on the Palestinian citizens of Israel. However, most suffer from a serious limitation: they treat Palestinians in Israel as a homogeneous minority group. This paper explores the voting strategies of the heterogeneous Palestinian minority during the 1996 and 1999 Israeli elections. While population and geographic characteristics are controlled for, the main heterogeneous factors discussed in this paper are socio-economic conditions and ethno-religious identity. This study explores the voting strategies of Palestinian-Israelis in relation to their socio-economic conditions and their ethno-religious identity, as well as the factors that contribute to the socio-economic status of each ethno-religious identity group. Ethno-religious identities include Bedouins, Christians, Druses, and Muslims.

My hypothesis is that socio-economic disempowerment affects the voting strategies differentially across the various ethno-religious identities of Palestinian-Israelis. My findings conclude that while both ethno-religious identity and socio-economic variables are substantial determinants of voting behavior in 1996, only ethno-religious identity is significant in shaping the voting behavior of 1999. Intuitively, this can be attributed to the two contrasting political moments in 1996 and 1999: where 1996 was a time of optimism due to the signing of the Oslo Peace Accords in 1993 and 1995, 1999 was a moment of despair and disempowerment amongst most Palestinian-Israelis, following the collapse of Oslo. In 1996, though class distinctions are prevalent amongst Bedouins, Christians and Muslims in shaping voting behavior, this does *not* apply for the Druses, which can be partially explained by the privileged minority status given to them by the state. According to Kaufman (2004), they feel obliged to express their loyalty to Israel by voting for Jewish-Zionist establishment parties. Thus, class distinctions (amongst mostly Bedouins, Christians, and Muslims) and the institutionalized ethno-religious divisions by the state (*i.e.* the emergence of the Druze national identity as separate from and privileged in relation to Palestinian Arab identity) enable the Israeli government to prevent a cohesive internal Palestinian opposition from emerging.

## Section I-Overview

Due to the cyclical and escalating violence in the Israeli occupied territories, as well as the implementation of harsh policies by Israel in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, dialogue concerning the plight of another group of Palestinians has been all but forgotten: the Palestinian citizens of Israel. Indeed, the political influence of this group is underrated. Their citizenship status enables them to threaten two defining pillars of Israel- the Jewish character of the state and the state's claim to being a democracy. As a result of the relatively rapid growth of Palestinian-Israelis, there is growing controversy regarding how to preserve a Jewish majority in the state of Israel.<sup>1</sup> This concern is fueled by the fact that Palestinian-Israelis are growing at a rate of 3.4%, driven by one of the highest fertility rates in the world (Mossawa Center, 2002, p. 2). Though they are allowed to vote, Israeli democracy is believed to have been put to the test by them and it has not succeeded, due to lack of protection of [Palestinian] minority rights and "tyranny of the majority [Israeli Jews]" (Smooha, as cited in Zureik, 1993, p. 423).

Thus, a close examination of the dynamic relationship between Palestinian-Israelis and the state of Israel is a requirement for understanding Israeli policies towards the Palestinians, both in Israel and in the territories, as well as Israel's self-contradictory goal of attaining a Jewish democracy. This paper will address certain aspects of this relationship. This paper explores the voting strategies of the heterogeneous Palestinian minority during the 1996 and 1999 Israeli elections. While population and geographic characteristics are controlled for, the main heterogeneous factors discussed in this paper are socio-economic conditions and ethno-religious identity. This study explores the voting strategies of Palestinian-Israelis in relation to their socio-

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<sup>1</sup> Currently, Palestinian-Israelis make up approximately 19% (Mossawa Center, 2002, p.2) of Israel's population as opposed to 14% in 1948 (Mossawa Center, 2001, p. 7), when the state of Israel was established. Though this may not seem as a significant threat, one must keep in mind that this increase was in spite of the fact that since 1948, immigration of Jews (to Israel) from all over the world has been highly encouraged, pursued and funded by International Jewish and Zionist Organizations. These organizations succeeded in increasing the Jewish population of Israel until the mid 1990's (Mossawa Center, 2002, p.2). In the past decade, however, due to mounting violence, the emigration of Jews has exceeded the immigration of Jews, which is also a growing concern.

economic conditions and their ethno-religious identity, as well as the factors that contribute to the socio-economic status of each ethno-religious identity group. Ethno-religious identities include Bedouins, Christians, Druses, and Muslims.

By observing 69 Palestinian localities, this paper constructs a model which predicts the percentage of the Palestinian minority that will adopt each voting strategy. Voting behavior will be categorized into five major strategies: abstention, leftwing and rightwing instrumentalist, ethno-nationalist, and mixed strategies. Using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), each voting strategy is a function of economic, education, ethno-religious, population and geographic characteristics, as well as interaction terms between the economic or education variables and the ethno-religious variables.

My hypothesis is that socio-economic disempowerment and incentives affect the voting strategies differentially across the various ethno-religious identities of Palestinian-Israelis. My findings conclude that while both ethno-religious identity and socio-economic variables are substantial determinants of voting behavior in 1996, only ethno-religious identity is significant in shaping the voting behavior of 1999. Intuitively, this can be attributed to the two contrasting political moments in 1996 and 1999; where 1996 was a time of optimism due to the signing of the Oslo Peace Accords in 1993 and 1995, 1999 was a moment of despair and disempowerment amongst most Palestinian-Israelis, following the collapse of Oslo. In 1996, though class distinctions are prevalent amongst Bedouins, Christians and Muslims in shaping voting behavior, this does *not* apply for the Druses, which can be partially explained by the privileged minority status given to them by the state. According to Kaufman (2004), they feel obliged to express their loyalty to Israel by voting for Jewish-Zionist establishment parties.

Since class distinctions in 1996 are consistently influential amongst Bedouins, Christians, Muslims and *not* Druses, I extend my analysis to examine the impact of ethno-religious identity on socio-economic status. With respect to mono-religious Muslim localities, I find that both the actual percentage of high-earners and income per capita is lower than the predicted percentage of

high-earners and income per capita respectively, implying discrimination towards Muslims by the state. The exact opposite effect occurs for the percentage of high-earners in mono-religious Druze localities, implying positive discrimination towards Druses. However when examining income per capita in these same Druze localities, there is no positive or negative discrimination. Thus, this analysis not only provides an overall picture of the extent of discrimination experienced by each ethno-religious group but also if there are distinctions in the nature of the discrimination amongst the privileged subsets of each ethno-religious group.

I develop the analysis by first providing in section II, a brief but essential background of Palestinians in Israel and the major political events that may have affected some of their voting strategies. Then, section III includes a literature review that evaluates the relevant contemporaneous literature and thus provides context for the contribution of this paper. In section IV, a description of Israel's political system, voting strategies and economic voting theory is provided. Next, section V describes the data along with its sources, weaknesses and limitations. Section VI starts out with a description of the model and its limitations, which is followed by a discussion of the factors that are most significant in influencing each voting strategy. This section also explores the relationship between wealth or income and each of the four ethno-religious identities. Finally, Section VII offers conclusions and a discussion, which also includes policy implications and recommendations for future research.

## **Section II-Background**

This section will first present a concise yet sufficient historical background concerning the Palestinian citizens of Israel. Then, some aspects of Palestinian heterogeneity and major political events that may have possibly influenced voting strategies in the 1996 and 1999 elections will be provided.

### **A. History**

In 1947 a decision was made by the UN to partition historical Palestine into two states– a Jewish (55% of historical Palestine) and a Palestinian (45%) state (Peretz, 1996, p.36). At the

time, Palestinians comprised approximately 67% and Jews made up 33% of the population (Peretz, 1996, p.35). On May 14, 1948, the state of Israel was established, inciting the Arab-Israeli War, and causing five significant outcomes: 1.) the displacement of over 700,000 Palestinians into neighboring Arab countries, 2.) Israel gains an additional 25% of historical Palestine, 3.) the incorporation of the West Bank Palestinians under Jordanian rule, 4.) occupation of the Gaza Strip under Egyptian rule, and 5.) the creation of a new hybrid cultural identity, the Palestinian-Israeli. (Smith, 2001, p. 204 and Peretz, 1996, p.44)

After the war, only 156,000 Palestinians remained (Mossawa Center, 2002, p.2), becoming a minority overnight and comprising approximately 14% of Israel's total population. About 25% of those Palestinians experienced internal relocation, due to the destruction of their homes and villages during the war-within the borders of Israel (Arab Human Rights Association Introduction (HRA), N.D., p.1). Nearly all members of the Palestinian middle and upper classes--the urban landowning, politicians, professional and religious elite--were no longer present in Israel: if they had not left before the outbreak of hostilities, they did so during the war, while many others had been expelled (Al-Haj and Rosenfeld, 1990, p.24).

Thus, the Palestinians in Israel became economically, politically and socially disenfranchised and disorganized. In addition, they were viewed by Israelis as the "enemy within" and from 1948-1966, Palestinian Israelis lived under strict military rule, despite their possession of Israeli citizenship (Tessler, 1989, p.93). They continue to be marginalized by Israeli law in private and public sectors. These include Israel's political party system, military, education, employment opportunities, land planning policies, and much more. An example of direct discrimination against Palestinians is the preferential status of those Jewish organizations (i.e., the Jewish Agency) which aim to aid only Jews; these organizations are involved in land and housing projects as well as the provision of tax benefits. (HRA Direct Discrimination fact-sheet, para. 8)

## **B. Palestinian Heterogeneity**

This study will define heterogeneity by focusing on socio-economic status (economic and education), ethno-religious, geographic and population characteristics of 69 Palestinian localities. For each locality, socio-economic status will be measured by economic and education variables, namely income per capita, median wage, room density, the percentage of high-earners, matriculation rates and the percentage of academic degrees. Further divisions amongst Palestinians include the urban and rural characteristics of their immediate communities, the locations in which they live, and their ethno-religious identity.

Palestinian-Israelis live in one of five types of localities: mixed Arab-Jewish cities (24%), Arab cities, towns, and villages (72%) and unrecognized villages (4%). There are about eight mixed Arab-Jewish localities, where Jews are a decisive majority in each locality (The Mossawa Center, 2002, p.3) <sup>2</sup>. The distinction between a village, town and a city is defined by population. Cities will include localities with more than 25,000 people, villages comprise localities with less than 10,000 people and the remaining localities are designated as towns. The Southern Bedouin localities encompass the majority of unrecognized villages in Israel (Association of Forty, N.D.). The three main geographic locations consist of the Galilee, (Northern Israel), the Triangle (Central Israel) and the Negev (Southern Israel-desert region).

The ethno-religious groups include Sunni Muslims, Bedouins, Druses and Christians. Sunni Muslims make up 82% of the Palestinian Arab population, and more than half reside in small towns and villages in Galilee. (Mossawa Center, 2002, p.2) More than 60% of Christian Palestinians reside in urban Palestinian and mixed Palestinian-Jewish localities (Tessler, 1989, p.91). They make up about 9% of the Palestinian population, a large decrease from their proportion of 21% in the 1950's (Mossawa Center, 2002, p.2). Amongst the Palestinian minority, Christians are by far the most educated. The Bedouins are about 12% of the Muslim population.

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<sup>2</sup> In most instances, the academic literature identifies the Palestinians in Israel as Arabs. Stripping the Palestinians of their identity by referring to them as "Arabs" is one of the many reasons that several of their issues have not been addressed properly. Hereafter, in this paper, only the term Palestinian will be used when referring to the "Arab" citizens of Israel.

They live in the “unrecognized villages” in the Negev. The Bedouins live a nomadic life, which sets them apart culturally from the rest of the Muslim population. (Tessler, 1989, 91) Finally, the Druses comprise 9% of the Palestinians and their proportion has been relatively consistent since the 1950’s (Mossawa Center, 2002, p.2). The Druses are the most integrated into Israeli society. This has to do with their participation in the Israeli military (Tessler, 1989, 93).<sup>3</sup> Involvement in the Israeli military is crucial because it is required to get employment in numerous economic sectors, including a variety of occupations such as hi-tech, telecommunication, chemical and biological-based industries, military and security-based industries (Khattab, 2003, 279).

With the exception of Christians, all ethno-religious groups – Bedouins, Sunni Muslims and Druses – share the Islamic faith.<sup>4</sup> For the purpose of this study, I divided the Muslims into Bedouins, Sunni Muslims, and Druses because there is evidence to suggest that these groups are treated and viewed differently by the state of Israel. For instance, while Sunni Muslims are considered a high security risk, Druses have a privileged minority status in Israel (Kaufman, 2004, 74). These varying views will affect their voting strategies and economic status.

Though this will be elaborated on further in the data section, it may be useful to keep a few things in mind. First, Bedouins in this study refer to those who live in recognized villages only, for statistics on Bedouins living in unrecognized villages are excluded from Israeli statistical sources. Second, the Druze community in the Golan Heights is excluded from this study because socio-economic data were not reported for their localities and because they do not serve in the Israeli military, causing them to be systematically different from their Palestinian counterparts in Northern Israel.<sup>5</sup> Finally, Palestinian-Jewish localities are excluded from this study, directly implying that one-third of Christians and one-fourth of Muslims are not accounted for.

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<sup>3</sup> According to Tessler (1989), the Bedouin population is relatively active in military services (p. 93)

<sup>4</sup> The Druses practice a sect that is an offshoot of Ismaelism, itself, an offshoot of Shia Islam (Kaufman, 2004, 62).



The following table provides the population (in 1000) of each group (by religion) at the end of the each decade since the establishment of Israel.<sup>6</sup>

**Table 1-Religious Classification of Israeli Population**

	Grand Total <sup>7</sup>	Jews	Muslims	Christians	Druze
1950	1370.1	1,203.0	116.1	36.0	15.0
1960	2150.4	1,911.3	166.3	49.6	23.3
1970	3,022.1	2,582.0	328.6	75.5	35.9
1980	3,921.7	3,282.7	498.3	89.9	50.7
1990	4,821.7	3,946.7	677.7	114.7	82.6
2000	6,369.3 <sup>8</sup>	4,955.4	970.0	135.1	103.8

This table provides an idea of the growth of Palestinians in relation to the Jewish population since Israel was established. The largest increase in population is within Muslims, while the Christian population is the slowest growing population.

### **C. Major Political Events**

The Israeli elections of 1996 and 1999 are strategically chosen due to the numerous spontaneous episodes, causing either a time of peace and quiet, or frustration and anger. It is important to understand the major events of this time period because the political volatility of these few years will inevitably affect the political ideology as well as the voting strategies of the Palestinians.

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<sup>5</sup> Kaufman (2004) goes further and suggests that incorporating the Golan Druze into the Israeli citizenship regime was a total failure. She attributes part of this failure to the loyalty of the Druze to Syria.

<sup>6</sup> Data concerning the population of religious groups in Israel can be found in the Central Bureau of Statistics Population Census, 2001 for any year up to 2001. Bedouins are not considered their own religious group because they are Sunni Muslims but as I noted earlier, I make the distinction because they are systematically different.

<sup>7</sup> Until 1994, Christians included persons who are unclassified by religion. Thus, in addition to the population of Jews, Muslims, Christians and Druze, the grand total in 2000 includes 201,500 people who are unclassified by religion.

December 1987 witnessed the breakout of the first intifada or uprising, which lasted until 1993; starting September 1987, there were various riots and increasing hostilities between Palestinians and Israelis, triggering the first intifada (Smith, 2001, p. 421). However, it is generally understood that the intifada was not driven by short-run events. Rather, it was a reaction by Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza to the 20 years of harsh and oppressive Israeli policies in the territories, which range from water use restrictions and curfews, to heavy taxation and intense growth of Jewish settlements in the territories (Smith, 2001, p.414, 420). It was not tied to any governmental organizations, but only small communities and neighborhoods that chose to mobilize; the main goal of the intifada was to gain international attention and possibly affect world opinion through protests, limiting violence to stone-throwing (Smith, p.421).

In the early 1990's, an influx of Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet Union increased the population of Israel, including the West Bank and Gaza, by one million people, in only five years. This is significant because of the inevitable cultural, political and socio-economic changes that followed in Israel as well as the boost in Jewish settlers and settlements in the territories. In September 1993, the Oslo (I) Accords were signed between Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, US President Bill Clinton, and the leader of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) Yasir Arafat (Smith, p. 458). Two years later, Oslo (II) was signed, yet almost no progress was made regarding the growth of Jewish settlements as well as ongoing curfews and closures in the territories (Smith, p.469). As far as Palestinian sovereignty was concerned, the land was noncontiguous due to the rapid growth of settlements and bypass roads; in addition, the Palestinian Authority was not to control the borders of the Palestinian state (Roy, 2002, p.11).

Though the signing of the Oslo Accords was a sign of both hope and opportunity for most Israelis and Palestinians, there were many opponents on both sides. While some Palestinians felt

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<sup>8</sup> The immigration of Jews from the former Soviet Union is the main reason for the dramatic increase in the population between 1990 and 2000, and in particular, the Jewish population.

betrayed by the Palestinian Liberation Organization due to the lack of recognition of a Palestinian state by Israel, rightwing Jewish activists and settlers denounced Prime Minister Rabin for agreeing to withdraw from large sections of the West Bank and Gaza (Smith, p. 474).<sup>9</sup> Massive demonstrations and violent protests by settler networks and radical rabbis culminated in the assassination of Rabin on November 4, 1995 (Smith, p.474).

During November 1995 through May 1996, Labor's Shimon Peres served as prime minister. In May 1996, for the first time in Israel, the political system changed from one party one vote, to voting separately for a political party and a prime minister. Peres lost to Likud candidate Benjamin Netanyahu, who condemned the Oslo Accords, pledging that he would hand over no more land to the Palestinians (Smith, 2001, p.479). In October 1998, Netanyahu contradictorily signed the Wye River Accord, which required Israeli withdrawal from parts of the territories, sparking opposition amongst his supporters and the motion for early elections in December, 1998 (ed. Arian and Shamir, 2002, p.1). In May 1999, Labor's Ehud Barak won and became prime minister of Israel.

### **Section III-Literature Review**

Several studies discuss the economic and political conditions of Palestinians in Israel. Peled and Shafir (1996), for example, claim that even though the standard of living of Palestinian Israelis improved over time, the Palestinian minority is nevertheless disenfranchised socially, politically, and economically because the gap between the Jewish Israelis and the Palestinian-Israelis continues to widen (404). Zureik, Moughrabi, and Sacco (1993) made sociopolitical and socioeconomic observations, claiming that 46% of Palestinian-Israeli households fall below the poverty line, and that only 2% of the total budget allocated to local government in Israel is given to Palestinian local municipalities. Furthermore, Shipler (as cited in Haidar, 87) claims that even though the proportion of [Palestinian] Arabs in the population of Israel is about 1 in 6, only 1 in

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<sup>9</sup> Most of these Jewish activists referred to the West Bank and Gaza as the biblical sites of Judea and Samaria.

60 government posts and 1 in 300 university academic positions are held by Palestinians; in addition, 1 in 16 on the executive committee of the Histadut federation of labor unions is a Palestinian (71).

Although the studies just discussed provide crucial findings and observations, they suffer from a serious limitation: they treat Palestinians in Israel as a homogeneous minority group. Treating Palestinians as such is an inaccuracy, and this paper has already noted evidence to suggest that both the political strategies and socioeconomic conditions of the Palestinian minority vary immensely from one group to the next. For instance, a recent study conducted in 2002 by the Central Bureau of Statistics ranked 210 localities in Israel, placing each locality in one of 10 clusters (1 being lowest and 10 highest) according to their socioeconomic characteristics during the year 2001. Though most Palestinian towns are placed at or below cluster four, seven out of the 10 towns in the lowest socioeconomic cluster are Southern Bedouin towns (Adalah, 2001, para. 3). In addition to diverse socioeconomic conditions of Palestinian-Israelis, there are various dissimilar voting strategies amongst them. For instance, in 1992 considerably more members of the Druze and Bedouin community voted for right wing Zionist parties as well as religious Jewish parties than their Christian and Muslim counterparts (Alhaj, 1995. p.152-53).

Khattab (2003) conducts a study to analyze the effects of the non-Jewish labor market and internal ethno-religious segregation between Muslims, Christians and Druses on the occupational expectation of Palestinian students (p. 259). His main finding was that while segregation between Jewish and non-Jewish Palestinians increased students' expectations, internal segregation amongst Muslims, Christians, and Druses reduces the expectations of Muslims, due to their relatively low access to social and economic resources (p. 277). Relatively low expectations of Muslim Palestinian students in mono-religious Muslim localities is mainly attributed to the fact that Christians have access to better educational opportunities while Druze experience less discrimination in the Jewish labor market due to their military services (pp. 279, 280).

At this point, one may wonder, why is it that only the Druze are integrated in many of the dimensions of Israeli society? Kaufman (2004) reviews a historical record of the relationship between the Druze and the Jews while also addressing the construction of the Druze national identity separate from Arab-Palestinian citizens (53). I will only note a few important things relevant to the present study. First, according to Kaufman (2004), the Druze community viewed the Palestinian-Zionist conflict in the 1940's as a clash between Muslims and Jews and generally speaking the Druses were indifferent to the national conflict (69). Since the Druze are indifferent, they were selected by the state to play the role of the favorite Palestinian group in the policy of divide and conquer in order to prevent the Palestinian minority from coalescing into a group (69). Kaufman also claims that the state participated in ethnic manipulation, referring to the Druze as a separate national identity, so that the Hebrew cultural assimilation could be avoided and the Arab-Jewish dichotomy would not be violated (71).

Another set of sources discuss the political behavior and strategies of the Palestinians in Israel: *The Elections in Israel 1996* (ed. Arian and Shamir, 1999) and *The Elections in Israel 1999* (ed. Arian and Shamir, 2002). These two books each attempt to understand and analyze the voting patterns of the Palestinian-Israelis. In Arian and Shamir (2002), the behavior of Palestinians is usually discussed in relation to the socio-political events that have taken place in the region and the effect of these events on their voting strategies. Several of the religious, geographic, cultural, and socio-economic subdivisions within the Palestinian minority are not emphasized if addressed at all. For example, Ghanem and Ozacky-Lazar (2002) claim that the abstainers in the 1999 election were primarily traditional voters for the Labor party because the party made no attempt to appeal to the Palestinians (131). At the same time, there is no indication as to who these traditional Labor-supporters are. In fact, throughout the entire section, the Palestinians are referred to as Arabs with no reference to any of their heterogeneous characteristics.

In Arian and Shamir (1999), certain aspects of Palestinian heterogeneity are addressed but not fully integrated with other aspects. Kaufman and Israeli (1999) observe voting strategies of Palestinians according to ethno-religious identity, gender, age, income, education and region (p. 103).<sup>10</sup> Though voting patterns vary across ethno-religious identities, Kaufman and Israeli (1999) do not take into account the diverse ways in which these groups are treated by the state. On the same note, it is unclear whether or not there are specific ethno-religious groups that are *more* privileged, with higher levels of income or education. Thus, the impact of economic and education variables on voting behavior are not incorporated with the effects of ethno-religious identity on voting behavior. For instance, do rich Druze vote differently from the remaining Druze population, or, how do unemployed Christians vote?

In summary, understanding the voting strategies of Palestinian-Israelis as a heterogeneous community in relation to their socio-economic conditions and incentives, especially in terms of how particular groups are viewed by the state, was never the primary focus of the discussion by the above-mentioned academics, but is only mentioned in passing. In such instances when the link *is* made, the relevance of combined factors of Palestinian heterogeneity on voting strategies is obscure. This paper provides a fresh look at these issues, making them the focus of attention and treating Palestinian Israelis as a variegated group.

#### **Section IV-Theoretical Framework**

Instead of diving into the economic voting theory, this section will first speak to the peculiar but relevant nature of Israel's political system and second, the typical or dominant voting strategies within the Palestinian citizens of Israel.

##### **A. Israel's Political System<sup>11</sup>**

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<sup>10</sup> In addition, Bedouins are grouped with Muslims, though they are at a higher disadvantage.

<sup>11</sup> Information about Israel's political system in this paper is from the working paper of Abramson *et al* (N.D.).

Israel has one of the most unique and intriguing political systems. Since only the legislative and executive branches of this system are directly affected by the voting behavior of the state's citizens, these are the only branches that will be discussed in this paper. The legislative branch or Israel's parliament is driven by the Knesset, which has 120 seats. In order for a political party to gain one seat, it needs only 1.5% of the total number of votes. In addition, the number of seats a party possesses is calculated by the percentage of total votes that the party gained. Thus, many parties (currently about 17) are represented each election in the Knesset. The parties differ immensely in their political and economic agendas as well as ideologies.

Prior to the elections of 1996, each Israeli citizen voted for one political party, and the leader of this party became the prime minister of Israel. Starting with the 1996 elections, the prime minister of Israel was determined directly by the popular vote and Israeli citizens continued to vote for a political party to represent them in the Knesset (given the party gained at least 1.5% of the total votes) like before. Since there has never been a party to gain the majority of the seats in the Knesset (at minimum of 61 seats), the prime minister was required to form a coalition with other parties. The sum of the members of the coalition must be at least 61. The advantage of this system is that almost every opinion is represented. The drawback occurs when an unsatisfied party threatens to leave, destabilizing the coalition.

This relatively complicated political system provides a variety of voting strategies from which Israeli citizens can choose. More importantly, since the change of the Israeli political system, the choices have increased. A detailed description of these voting strategies, both before and after the 1996 elections will be given in the next part of this section.

### **B. Diversity in Voting Strategies<sup>12</sup>**

Prior to the 1996 elections, voting for a party in the Knesset by a Palestinian-Israeli consisted of the following voting strategies: abstention, ethno-nationalism, left-wing

instrumentalism, and right-wing instrumentalism.<sup>13</sup> Due to the additional vote for prime minister in the 1996 and 1999 elections however, the strategies of pure abstention, pure rightwing instrumentalism and pure left wing instrumentalism are introduced. They are consistent with the definitions of abstention, rightwing and leftwing instrumentalism. “Pure” means using the same strategy to vote for a political party in the Knesset and the prime minister. In almost all cases, a voter will practice pure rightwing instrumentalism or pure left wing instrumentalism if (s)he decides to vote for a rightwing or a leftwing Zionist party, respectively.<sup>14</sup> The reasoning for this is because, historically, the candidates for prime minister have always belonged to either a right wing or left wing Zionist party. Mixed strategies will be considered later in this section.

Abstainers are citizens of Israel who are eligible to vote but abstain. Abstention/pure abstention will be assumed to be a direct result of either indifference or alienation (Hinich and Munger, 1997, 141). Abstainers may choose not to vote as a form of protest because they do not prefer any party over another or because they do not expect their favorite party to succeed. Their favorite party might not succeed due to the fact that the party might not be able to gain 1.5% of the total number of votes, the hurdle necessary to gain seats in the Knesset. One might also abstain because though a particular party may be represented (in the Knesset) the party’s influence is limited nevertheless.

The instrumentalist option for the Palestinians involves being attached to an establishment group within the Jewish majority in the hope of advancing their views and interests from within. (Kaufman and Israeli, 99) Since Palestinian-Israelis have been viewed as the “enemy within” since the establishment of the state, this is one of the few ways in which Palestinians can

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<sup>12</sup>The terminology for describing voting strategies in this paper is primarily from Kaufman and Israeli (1999). Also, old and new instrumentalism strategies are replaced with right-wing and left-wing instrumentalism.

<sup>13</sup> I combined old and new ethno-nationalist in Kaufman’s article for simplicity and called this voting strategy ethno-nationalist.

<sup>14</sup> The population that consists of voters who simultaneously vote for a rightwing Zionist party and a candidate from a leftwing Zionist party or *vice-versa* make up a negligible percentage and so are not



express their loyalty to Israel. More importantly, cooperating with the mainstream can gain them social status as well as economic benefits. Factors related to economic incentives driving instrumentalism include the level of income, unemployment rates, degree of relevance of military involvement, matriculation rate, and labor competition from the Palestinians in the territories. Similar to the issues that affect the abstention rate, the factors of economic incentives will vary from one group to another. For instance, currently employment opportunities increase with military involvement or an alternative to military involvement such as in the case of Orthodox Jews. While unemployment risk may be a grave concern for Christian and Muslim Palestinians, the Druze and Bedouin are less affected because the Druze are required to join the military, while the Bedouin are at least welcomed, thereby greatly increasing employability. It is also worth noting that from an instrumentalist perspective, voting for an ethno-nationalist party is considered a “wasted vote” by some instrumental voters, given their low expectations regarding the nature of the distribution of power in the Knesset, which automatically marginalizes Palestinian ethno-nationalist parties.

The instrumentalist option split into rightwing and leftwing instrumentalist options in 1977 when Labor, a leftwing Zionist party, lost power for the first time and Likud, a rightwing Zionist party, won (Kaufman and Israeli, 1999, p.103). At this time, major challenges were presented before the instrumentalists. The first was whether to continue voting for Labor, not only for the possibility of assimilation with the mainstream, but also to avoid another victory for Likud. In other words, one might adopt a leftwing instrumentalist strategy solely for the purpose of avoiding the rise of power of the rightwing Zionists, who traditionally condone discrimination against Palestinian Israelis and Palestinians in the territories. The second possibility was to adopt the strategy of right wing instrumentalism by supporting Likud for the possibility of gaining

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accounted for in this paper. The only other possibility left for instrumentalists is to vote for a Zionist party (rightwing or leftwing) but then abstain for prime minister.

leverage. In other words, some voters might anticipate that the Palestinian vote could influence Likud to reduce its infamous practices of promoting inequality between Palestinians and Jews.

The crux of the ethno-nationalist argument lies in the fact that the instrumentalists and the abstainers disassociate themselves (whether directly or indirectly) from any attempt to influence policy on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict (p.88). The basic tenets of ethno-nationalism include 1) acculturation of the Palestinian minority by differentiating between integration and assimilation, where the former is encouraged but the latter is frowned upon; and 2) permanent and just solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, which is essential to ensure the equality of Palestinian Israelis and Israeli Jews. In summary, ethno-nationalists are concerned with the political volatility in the territories, aspire accurate political representation, and want to improve their citizenship rights/security.

Though ethno-nationalist voters are “going against the grain” in the sense that they are voting for the only anti-Zionist parties in the Knesset, they are driven by two main forces. First, these voters are motivated by the purely representational system of the Knesset and the fact that only 1.5% of the total number of votes is needed for representation. Thus, not only is there a high chance that the ethno-nationalist party(s) or list will be represented in the Knesset, but every additional vote is valuable, and may lead to an additional seat in the Knesset. This leads to the second driving force. If ethno-national lists and parties win a significant number of seats in the Knesset, they may be able to have more influence. This notion is especially dramatized if the party that is expected to win (the party that gains the most seats in the Knesset) is a relatively dovish party.

The change of Israel’s political system also introduced the notion of mixed strategies. Therefore, the preferences and expectations (for the Knesset and the Prime Ministerial candidates) of Palestinian voters with mixed strategies need consideration. Since there were never ethno-nationalist candidates for prime minister, a pure ethno-nationalist strategy does not exist. Voters of ethno-nationalist parties must practice mixed strategies, usually in the form of ethno-

nationalism plus abstention or ethno-nationalism combined with leftwing instrumentalism. The voters who adopted the mixed strategy of ethno-nationalism and rightwing instrumentalism are trivial in number and therefore are not considered further in this paper.

Palestinians who practiced the mixed strategy of voting ethno-nationalist (for the Knesset) and leftwing instrumentalism (for the prime minister) probably have conflicting beliefs with the prime ministerial candidate they supported. Otherwise, they would have voted for his leftwing instrumentalist party. Most likely, these voters do not support a particular candidate because they prefer the views and policies of this candidate over another candidate (whose views are even *more* problematic) but they also believe that he has a high chance of victory. In addition, if he becomes Prime Minister, this relatively dovish candidate might be more willing to form a governing coalition with Palestinian ethno-nationalist parties, whose platforms are more compatible to the platform of the Prime Minister's party than the right wing religious and rightwing Zionist parties. However, this reasoning goes both ways. Palestinians might choose to vote for an ethno-nationalist party because they *expect* a relatively dovish prime minister to win. This prime minister is more likely to respond to their requests and/or sympathize with them.

The other group of Palestinians that adopted a mixed strategy cast an ethno-nationalist (for the Knesset) vote and an absentee (for the prime minister) vote. This group clearly does not prefer any prime ministerial candidate over another. Moreover, this group probably expects the new elected prime minister (whoever he or she may be) to form a coalition with any party or list over a Palestinian party or list. This is a valid expectation, given that a governing coalition has never included Palestinian parties or lists.

### **C. Economic Voting Theory**

A working paper by Abramson *et al.* (N.D.) outlines the most relevant theory on voting strategies regarding the topic of my paper – the Multi-Candidate Calculus of Voting Theory – and applies it to the 1999 Israeli elections. Their paper explores the strategic considerations when two votes are cast – one for a prime minister elected by a majority and one for a parliamentary

representation selected by proportional representation – during the 1999 elections of Israel. Abramson et al. argue that correctly modeling the behavior of the voters requires the consideration of both votes and the nature of the strategies involved with both votes.

Duverger and Cox (as cited in Abramson, 2004) claim that strategic voting is most likely to occur when there is a winner-take-all election and least likely under rules of proportional representation. (p.1) With respect to the vote for the prime minister (a winner-take-all election) a strategic voter may not vote for his or her favorite candidate simply because the favorite candidate is unlikely to win. Instead, a strategic voter might want to avoid a particular candidate by voting for a candidate that is more likely to win. However, in relation to the vote for the party in the Knesset, strategic voting is slightly more complicated. No party has ever had the majority of seats (at least 61) in the Knesset and only 1.5% of the total population is need for a party to gain a seat in the Knesset. Thus, a strategic vote for a party involves the voter to consider the extent to which a party can influence the nature of the governing coalition as well as the lists that will cross the minimum threshold to gain seats in the Knesset.<sup>15</sup>

Since the prime minister forms the governing coalition, both considerations associated with the strategic vote for a political party depend on whom the prime minister will be. Therefore, the utility maximization model of voting must consider the voters' 1) preferences for Knesset representation, 2) expectations of the distribution of power in the Knesset, 3) preferences for the Prime Ministerial candidates and 4) expectations of the candidate who will win the direct election (Abramson *et al*, N.D., p. 4).

Following the example of Abramson *et al*, I will use the theoretical framework above to create my model. The framework is an extension of the multi-candidate calculus of voting theory, which assumes that all voters are sophisticated choosers who factor in, both preferences as well as the likelihood of the candidate in question to win, and make choices on the basis of expected

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<sup>15</sup> Voters have the option to vote for a list, consisting of one or more parties that choose to unite on the day of the elections.

utility maximization (Abramson *et al*, N.D.).<sup>16</sup> Assuming there are  $n$  candidates, the multi-candidate calculus of voting modeled by McKelvey and Ordeshook (as cited in Black, 1978) states the following:

$$U(k)-U_0 = \sum p_{ik}(u_k-u_i) -C +D \text{ given that } i \neq k, i,k \in \{1,2,\dots,n\} \quad (1)$$

where  $U(k)$  is the expected utility associated with voting for candidate  $k$ ,  $U_0$  is the utility associated with abstention,  $p_{ik}$  is the probability that the citizen's vote will make/break a tie between candidate  $i$  and  $k$  and  $(u_k-u_i)$  is the utility differential between the two candidates (p.612).

In addition,  $C$  represents the fixed cost associated with voting and  $D$  is the utility derived from voting. Black (1978) tests the probability components in the expected utility based multi-candidate calculus of voting and concluded that the probability terms played a crucial role in determining a voter's decision (p. 609). In Black's model  $D-C$  is assumed to be zero or a constant (p. 613). Similarly Abramson *et al* (1992) conclude that voting behavior amongst both Republicans and Democrats in the 1988 Presidential Primaries was consistent with sophisticated voting (p.55). Thus, the assumption that all voters are strategic or sophisticated is not a weak one.

The utility differential,  $u_k-u_i$ , can be expressed in a variety of ways. However class and cultural issues seem to be the most reasonable attempt to express the utility differential. The simple and widely accepted model by Downs (1957) and Lipset *et al* (1954) (as cited in Manza *et al*, 1995) claims that the leftist parties are supported by lower-class citizens who want to improve their economic status and are opposed by economically privileged citizens who want to maintain their economic advantages (140). This view is challenged by a new school of thought by political theorists such as Manza *et al* (1995) and Achterberg (N.D.), who asserted that recently cultural issues have gained salience over class in predicting voting behavior. For instance, Achterburg (N.D.) claims that after the 1970's there is a 'new political culture' where debatably, the influential issues concern the maintaining and expanding of individual freedom, specifically with

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<sup>16</sup> Voters who are not sophisticated are called sincere voters. They vote for the most preferred candidate regardless of the candidate's chances of winning.

respect to underprivileged minorities (6). This is especially relevant to the specific case of the Palestinians and thus ethno-religious identities need to be considered in order to properly grasp voting behavior in Palestinian localities.

However, both Manza *et al* (1995) and Achterberg (N.D.) agree that class voting is still relevant. Two additional studies confirm this. By conducting a study regarding abstention in the United States, Fugate (1996) demonstrates that education has a positive effect on voter turnout. Another study by Kinder and Kiewiet (1979) demonstrated that collectively, economically advantaged (or content) voters are more likely to vote for the incumbent than the remaining voters. Thus, my study will mainly explore the effects of ethno-religious identities and socio-economic characteristics, while also controlling for populated areas and regions, to capture the rational reasoning behind the decisions of representative voters in Palestinian localities.

### **Section V-Data**

There are three major data sets- one which reveals the voting strategy(s) of the localities, while the other two provide the socio-economic data. As noted earlier, 1996 and 1999 are the two election years in which the change in Israel's political system allows each voter to cast two ballots. The voting data used in this study reveal the percentage of votes attributed to each political party and prime ministerial candidate for every locality in the elections of 1996 and 1999. The data for the two elections are found in the "File of election results to the Knesset and the Premiership in 1996 and 1999 by localities and statistical areas, together with the 1995 Census Data". The source of this file is the Central Bureau of Statistics of Israel (CBS). The socioeconomic data include social and economic characteristics for each locality for the years of 1995 and 2001. The source for the 1995 socio-economic data is the 1995 CBS census of population and housing (2000). The socioeconomic data for 2001 was collected by CBS, National Insurance Institute (NII), the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (MLSA) and the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MRA). The study was conducted by the CBS and commissioned by the

Ministry of the Interior (2002). The following table summarizes the sources of the data sets and what each one offers.

**Table 2-Sources of Data**

	1995 Data	2001 Data	1996 & 1999 Data
Source	CBS Census of Population & Housing	CBS, NII,MLSA,MRA	CBS
Contents	Various social and economic characteristics of each locality in the year 1995	Various social and economic characteristics of each locality in the year 2001	% of votes received by each political party and prime ministerial candidate in each locality for both elections

The Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) of Israel is by far the most useful source for my data. Indeed it appears in all three data sets. According to the Handbook of Official Statistics, Israel has a centralized statistical system based on the CBS in the Prime Minister's Office where official demographic, social and economic statistics are published under the responsibility of the CBS; they are based on administrative records collected by various ministries and public agencies and on data collected directly by the CBS through censuses and sample surveys (UNECE, 1997, para. 1).

Since my aim is to explore the extent to which economic incentives affect voting strategies amongst Palestinian-Israelis as a heterogeneous community, the data are ideal for the purpose of this study. Most data sets supply information about socio-economic factors and voting strategies for regions or districts across Israel. However these data sets are exceptional because each one provides economic and voting characteristics for each locality in Israel. Socio-economic and voting data per locality are crucial for this study because localities are smaller and unlike regions or districts, each locality can be defined by size/population and regional location. Furthermore fifty-three out of the sixty nine Palestinian localities are essentially mono-religious

and can be characterized as Muslim, Christian, Druze or Bedouin.<sup>17</sup> Not the same can be said about the vast majority of districts and regions.

Though it would have been ideal if socioeconomic data were available during or slightly prior to the election years-1996 and 1999-the only available data on localities in Israel were for the years of 1995 and 2001. Whereas census data for 1995 will suffice, the lack of appropriate data for the years of 1998 or 1999 is a limitation. While this less than ideal, the economic environment of Israel in 1999 is comparable to that of 2001. For example the average income per capita for 1999 and 2001 are \$16,910 and \$17,141 respectively; in addition the unemployment rates for 1999 and 2001 are 8.9 and 9.3 percent respectively as well (“Israel, Syria and Iran”, 2005, see chart by Hilary Benn).

Another weakness worth noting is the exclusion of mixed Palestinian Jewish localities (since this study examines only Palestinian localities). The reason I did not include mixed Palestinian-Jewish localities is because Palestinians make up a small minority (ranging from 11-24%) in these localities. Since the socio-economic and voting data sets provide figures that characterize each locality, figures on mixed Palestinian-Jewish localities will not represent the Palestinian population (which is the focus of this study) in those localities. Ignoring this part of the Palestinian population is problematic for two main reasons. First, the Palestinian-Jewish localities are large urban areas, unlike the majority of their homogeneous (Palestinian-only localities) counterparts, which means the effect of urban life on voting strategies of Palestinians is not fully considered in this study. Second, one third of the Christian Palestinian-Israeli population as well as one fourth of the Muslim Palestinian-Israeli population live in mixed Palestinian-Jewish localities. Consequently, this may affect the study not only because Muslims and Christians who live in Palestinian-Jewish cities comprise such a significant proportion of all

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<sup>17</sup> For the remaining localities which are multi-religious, I will use the percentage of Muslims, Christians and Druze in each locality as a control variable. This will come up again in this section and the next one.



Palestinians (approximately 24%) but also because they may differ profoundly from their counterparts in terms of their voting behavior and socio-economic status.

The Bedouin population is also probably underrepresented because the only Bedouin localities in this study are those recognized by Israel. Unrecognized villages are where the majority of Bedouins live and more importantly, they are in drastically worse conditions than those that are recognized (Association of Forty, N.D.). Thus on average, this study portrays Bedouin localities to be more affluent than they really are. This inaccuracy may also produce erroneous results concerning the political strategies of Bedouins.

The 1996 election coupled with census data of 1995 will be examined separately from the 1999 election and 2001 socio-economic data. First, consider the 1996 election with the 1995 census data. The data concerning the voting strategies will provide us with the dependent variables. There were two prime ministerial candidates to choose from during the 1996 elections and twenty-one political parties for the Knesset party elections. Thus, there are three values in each locality for the prime ministerial elections for each of the seventy one localities: the percentage of those who voted for Peres, the percentage of those who voted for Netanyahu, and those who abstained. Similarly, the data reveal the percentage of people who voted for each party (and abstainers). During the Knesset party elections each of the twenty-one parties is classified into one of the following: Ethno-nationalist, Leftwing Instrumentalist and Rightwing Instrumentalist. There are four percentages for the Knesset party elections, the percentage of abstainers and then a percentage for each of the three categories. To find out more about which parties are considered ethno-nationalist, leftwing instrumentalist or rightwing instrumentalist or how these distinctions were made, see Appendix A.

This same procedure is applied to the 1999 elections. Though there are thirty-one parties running in the Knesset for this election, they are categorized into the same four groups that were used in the 1996 Knesset elections. The following table summarizes a chart for the dependent variables for the 1996 (row 1) and 1999 (row 2) elections.

**Table 3- Summary of Dependent Variables**

Dependent Variables (1996)	% who voted for Peres	% who voted for Netanyahu	% who abstained from Prime Minister elections	% who voted for an ethno-nationalist party	% who voted for a leftwing party	% who voted for a rightwing party	% who abstained from Knesset elections
Dependent Variables (1999)	% who voted for Barak	% who voted for Netanyahu	% who abstained from Prime Minister elections	% who voted for an ethno-nationalist party	% who voted for a leftwing party	% who voted for a rightwing party	% who abstained from Knesset elections

The sixty nine Palestinian localities of Israel in this study are defined by various socio-economic characteristics, the predominant religion(s), geographic region, urban/rural characteristics, or, in econometric work, a combination of these characteristics. For general information regarding the religion, region, urban/rural characteristics and population of the localities in this study, see Appendix B.

There are five socioeconomic variables used in this paper. Since the 1995 census was conducted differently than the 2001 data, the variables are distinct in what they measure and how they are calculated. Thus, the 1996 elections must be examined separately from the 1999 elections. Nonetheless in the end I will still attempt to compare the outcome of the two elections. In order to do this however, I need to be cautious as a result of the different interpretations and measurements of the socio-economic variables across the two data sets. In Appendix D, the socio-economic variables are outlined along with their description.

The five socio-economic characteristics [Academic, matriculation, work-seekers wage (1995), income (2001), roomdensity (1995), topearners (2001)] along with religion, region and populated area will serve as independent variables that are controlled in the model.<sup>18</sup> Each of the sixty nine localities will have a value for each of the five socio-economic characteristics provided

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<sup>18</sup> Matriculation certificate implies a high school diploma while academic refers to a university degree.

by the 1995 and 2001 census data. Similarly, each locality will be assigned values for religion, region and populated area.

In the case of religion, values for each of four independent variables (Bedouin, Christian, Druze and Muslim) will depend on the percentage of people who are affiliated with each religion. This applies solely for mixed localities. Since the Bedouins in Southern Israel are especially disenfranchised, they are treated separately from their counterparts in Northern and Central Israel. The Northern and Central Bedouins have been omitted from these regressions. At this point, I need to introduce six dummy variables, three for region and three for populated area. NORTH, CENTRAL, and SOUTH will represent the appropriate regions while CITY, TOWN and VILLAGE will correspond to the suitable populated areas. NORTH is dropped for both datasets, while CITY is dropped for the 1995/1996 dataset and TOWN is omitted for the 1999/2001 dataset. All of these independent variables and the appropriate interaction terms are summarized in the following chart.

**Table 4-Summary of Independent Variables**

<b>Socioeconomic</b> <sup>19</sup>	
Academic matriculation	=% of individuals in locality <i>n</i> who are seeking academic degrees
wage (1995)	=% of individuals in locality <i>n</i> who obtained a matriculation certificate
income (2001)	= the median wage for individuals in locality <i>n</i> in 1000 shekels.
work-seekers	= average income per capita in locality <i>n</i> in 1000 shekels.
roomdensity(1995)	=% of individuals in locality <i>n</i> are seeking jobs
top earners (2001)	= the average number of persons per room
	=% of individuals in locality <i>n</i> earn more than twice the average wage
<b>Region (dummy)</b>	
NORTH (dropped)	=1 if locality <i>n</i> is located in Northern Israel (Galilee)
CENTRAL	=1 if locality <i>n</i> is located in Central Israel (Triangle)
SOUTH	=1 if locality <i>n</i> is located in Southern Israel (Negev)
<b>Religion</b>	
Christian	=1 if 1% of locality <i>n</i> is Christian
Druze	=1 if 1% of locality <i>n</i> is Druze
Muslim	=1 if 1% of locality <i>n</i> is Muslim
Bedouin	=1 if 1% of locality <i>n</i> is Bedouin
Binsouth <sup>20</sup>	=1 if 1% of locality <i>n</i> is Bedouin and lives in Southern (Desert) Israel

<sup>19</sup> Take note that for each of the years 1995 and 2001 there are only five socio-economic variables. To know which variables correspond to which election and how these calculations are made see chart in Appendix D.

Otherbedouins (dropped)	=1 if 1% of locality $n$ is Bedouin and lives in Northern/Central Israel
<b>Population Area</b> CITY (dropped) <sup>21</sup> TOWN (dropped) VILLAGE	=1 if locality $n$ is a city (population > 25,000) =1 if locality $n$ is a town (10,000<population < 25,000) =1 if locality $n$ is a village (population <10,000)
<b>Interaction Terms</b> <b>1995/1996</b> broomdensity croomdensity droomdensity mwage cworkseekers mworkseekers	=bedouin*roomdensity =christian*roomdensity =druze*roomdensity =muslim*wage =christian*workseekers =muslim*workseekers
<b>1999/2001</b> cincome dincome mincome bincome(dropped) cmatric mmatric btopearners dtopearners	=christian*income =druze*income =muslim*income =bedouin*income =christian*matriculation =muslim*matriculation =bedouin*topearners =druze*topearners

Due to a broad voting literature that points to the influence of education and economic incentives on the outcome of elections (see section IVC-General Voting Theory), the education and economic variables are taken seriously in this study. In addition, since there is evidence that the state treats minority groups differently according to their ethno-religious identity, (ethno)-religion variables are crucial for the purpose this study. In other words, the religion variable can be thought of as an extension of the education and economic variables because the diverse ways in which Israel deals with these ethno-religious minority groups strongly affects their socio-economic status.<sup>22</sup> Since I am mostly concerned with the religion and socioeconomic variables, note that the each interaction term above is a product of an economic or education variable and a

<sup>20</sup> I divided the Bedouins by region because the Bedouins in the south are systematically different (less integrated in the society) from their counterparts.

<sup>21</sup> CITY is dropped for the 1995/1996 regressions while TOWN is dropped for the 1999/2001 regressions.

<sup>22</sup> One of the primary ways in which the state treats ethno-religious minorities differently concerns the prestigious nature of the military in the Israeli workforce. In 1998, Kraus et al (as cited in Khattab, 2003) states that de facto, this requirement has become one of the main mechanisms of discrimination against Palestinian workers within the Israeli labour market (279).

religion variable. It is clear that only a select few interaction terms are listed above. Partially, this has to do with some of the major weaknesses of the model mentioned in the next section; the small size of the sample, the few degrees of freedom, and the high correlation between socioeconomic and religion variables. However, this also has to do with the fact that some ethno-religious groups did not respond to a particular education or economic variable.

Though there are probably a variety of explanations for each exempted interaction term, I am making a modest attempt to partially explain the reasoning behind these exemptions. In the 1995 and 1996 regressions, *bworkseekers*, *dworkseekers*, *mroomdensity*, *bwage*, *cwage* and *dwage* are not listed above. One explanation for the relatively passivity amongst the Druze to the economic variable *workseekers* may be a direct result of the job security provided for by the military institution; in other words, though some Druses seek jobs outside the services, they are probably not as frustrated with finding a job as their Christian and Muslim counterparts. The majority of Bedouins also have a “backup” plan, since they are largely a subsistence farming community. Since *wage* measures the median wage of a locality, it is possible that for Christians, Bedouins and Druses this is an inaccurate measure of earnings. Since Christians and Muslims cannot serve in the army and are viewed by the state as a higher “security risk” (especially Muslims) than Bedouins and Druses, it is not surprising that they do not respond to the economically prestigious indicator “*topearner*”. On the other hand, most Druses and some Bedouins have the opportunity to reach esteemed positions in the army or positions in noteworthy economic sectors, which are banned from Palestinians who do not serve.<sup>23</sup>

To calculate summary statistics for socioeconomic characteristics and percentage of votes (dependent variables), the localities can be categorized into religion, region or populated area. The outcome of various summary statistics supports my prediction that religion is the most salient factor-of the three variables, religion, region and populated area-in determining trends in socio-

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<sup>23</sup> Unlike Druze, Bedouins are not required to serve, but there are Bedouin units and other recruitment efforts by the state allowing *some* Bedouins to serve or volunteer in the military.

economic status and political strategies. In other words, when the localities are categorized by religion, there are relatively consistent patterns demonstrated by summary statistics that do not exist otherwise. If you would like to see summary statistics for geographic region, populated area and religiously mixed Palestinian localities, see Appendix C. The next table shows the average socioeconomic level of unmixed localities in 1995 in conjunction with the average percentages for the 1996 election.

**Table 5-Averages across unmixed localities for 1995/1996**

	<b>Bedouin</b>	<b>Christian</b>	<b>Druze</b>	<b>Muslim</b>
<b>Number of Localities</b>	12	3	9	29
<b>Abstention (1996)</b>	9.52	4.94	3.47	6.57
<b>Peres</b>	84.87	92.98	61.49	91.13
<b>Netanyahu</b>	5.61	2.09	35.04	2.29
<b>(Knesset)</b>				
<b>Abstention (1996)</b>	3.36	2.21	1.91	2.75
<b>Ethno-nationalist</b>	63.85	46.79	5.73	67.69
<b>LW Instrumentalist</b>	27.47	45.91	52.69	26.36
<b>RW Instrumentalist</b>	5.21	5.11	39.66	3.40
<b>wage (in thousands)</b>	2.74	3.05	2.85	2.83
<b>% w/ matriculation certificate</b>	5.21	12.47	16.04	8.71
<b>% seeking academic degree</b>	3.28	11.77	4.43	5.32
<b>% work-seekers</b>	8.48	8.13	5.23	6.15
<b>Room Density</b>	3.3	.94	2.1	2.4

There are several noticeable trends here. The Bedouins are the most disadvantaged across all socio-economic sectors. The Christians have the highest median wage, followed by the Druze, then the Muslims, and finally the Bedouins. Given their competitive wages with the Christian community, it is interesting that the Druze community has the lowest unemployment rate while the Christian localities have relatively high unemployment rates. Though the Druze community has higher matriculation rates than the Christians, they have lower rates of academic degrees than both Christians and Muslims. Both, their low unemployment rates and low rates of academic

degrees may be attributed to the fact that they have higher employment opportunities since they are required to serve for the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF)

According to this study, about ninety-one percent of the Druze in 1996 voted for a rightwing or leftwing instrumentalist party. This can be explained by the obligation felt by the Druze community to be loyal to the state in return for being awarded high status, in relation to other Palestinians (Kaufman, 2004). On a similar note, the overwhelming support for establishment parties could have also stemmed from a desire to further integrate into Israeli society. Furthermore, the support of the Druze community for rightwing instrumentalist parties and Netanyahu stands out amongst the four religions. I find it very surprising, especially given Netanyahu's famous statement "Israel is for the Jews".

The Bedouins have the highest abstention rates for both the prime ministerial and Knesset elections. It is also worth noting that voting strategies for the Bedouin community resemble those of the Muslim community for both the Knesset and prime ministerial elections. In both instances, however, the Bedouin community is more supportive of rightwing Zionist ideology. As far as the prime ministerial elections are concerned, the Christian community is comparable to the Muslims as well. The relatively low ethno-nationalist vote amongst Christians is supported by Kaufman and Israeli (1999), who claim that the United Arab List-one of the major ethno-nationalist parties-made no attempt to appeal to the Christians or the Druze Palestinians (131).

Table 6 reveals the average socioeconomic level of unmixed localities in 2001 in conjunction with the average percentages for the 1999 election.

**Table 6-Averages across unmixed localities for 1999/2001**

	<b>Bedouin</b>	<b>Christian</b>	<b>Druze</b>	<b>Muslim</b>	<b>National Average</b>
<b>Number of Localities</b>	12	3	9	29	NA
<b>Abstention (1999)</b>	9.61	5.24	5.15	4.73	NA
<b>Barak</b>	82.65	92.56	67.57	92.48	NA
<b>Netanyahu (Knesset)</b>	7.73	2.20	27.28	2.78	NA

<b>Abstention (1999)</b>	4.23	2.43	2.64	2.61	NA
<b>Ethno-nationalist</b>	64.09	63.67	6.48	68.61	NA
<b>LW Instrumentalist</b>	20.71	23.62	44.46	19.26	NA
<b>RW Instrumentalist</b>	10.96	10.28	46.43	9.51	NA
<b>2001</b>					
<b>Income<sup>24</sup> per capita (in thousands)</b>	1.23	2.47	1.69	1.49	2.97
<b>% w/ matriculation certificate</b>	25.57	55.83	32.97	32.43	41.55
<b>% seeking academic degree</b>	3.44	17.04	6.60	5.45	13.57
<b>% work-seekers</b>	6.61	3.46	3.17	5.57	3.55
<b>% topearners</b>	1.43	3.47	3.44	1.78	8.95

The Christian localities are above the Israeli national average in their education levels but below average in average income per capita as well as the percentage of earners with greater than twice the average wage. For percentage of earners with greater than twice the average wage. For percentage of work-seekers, they are about average. The Christian community remains to be the most affluent of the four groups. The only factor where it does not dominate is the percentage of work-seekers. The Druze community still consists of the lowest percentage of work-seekers on average. These statistics are supported by Kaufman (2004), who suggests that the military provides job security for the Druze (74). The Druze localities are also second to the Christian localities in all socio-economic factors except for the proportion of work-seekers, and have much lower incomes and education rates on average. This corresponds to Atashe's analysis (as cited in Kaufman, 2004), who suggested that the secure but low-level jobs of the services for Druze men is one of the primary causes for the dependence of Druze men on the government as well as their low rates of education (74). It is clear that Christians would have a higher incentive of attending college than Druze, not only because they are more likely to financially afford college than the Druze but also because they cannot reap the benefits of serving in the prestigious Israeli military institution.

Next are the Muslims who have an average income per capita that is barely half of the national average income per capita. Though the educational level of Muslim localities on average



is similar to that of the Druze, there is a large gap in income per capita and unemployment. This is not to mention the fact that there are twice as many earners in the Druze community who receive more than twice the average wage. This gap in income per capita, unemployment and high-earners between Druses and Muslims may have resulted in the strikingly different voting strategies of each group. The most notable difference is the high total instrumentalist vote amongst the Druses and the relatively low instrumentalist vote amongst the Muslims in both elections, which is a measure of the loyalty of these two ethno-religious groups with respect to Israeli Zionist and/or establishment parties.

Abstention rates continue to be the highest amongst the Bedouin communities for the prime ministerial election as well as the Knesset elections. Since the Bedouin community in both time periods has experienced the worst socio-economic conditions, their relatively high abstention rates could possibly result from alienation or economic disempowerment. As noted in the theory section, (section IV) this concept is well articulated by Hinich and Munger (1997).

Though not significantly, the ethno-nationalist vote rose for all groups, while the support for leftwing instrumentalist parties dwindled by at least seven percent for all groups. The decrease in support for leftwing instrumentalist parties may be caused by Palestinian disappointment in these parties to carry out the terms of the Oslo Peace Accords. In addition, Ghanem and Lazar (2002) claim that the largest leftwing instrumentalist party, Labor, made no attempt to encourage Palestinians to vote for its list (131). The shift was most notable in the voting behavior for the Christian community. The Christians increased their ethno-nationalist vote by 17 percentage points and decreased their leftwing instrumentalist vote by 22 percentage points. The increase in the ethno-nationalist vote may involve the fact that Barak is a relatively dovish prime ministerial candidate who might have been expected to incorporate ethno-nationalist parties into his

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<sup>24</sup> This is measured in shekels-the Israeli currency.

governing coalition or at least address some of their issues.<sup>25</sup> Accordingly, an ethno-nationalist strategy would not be viewed as a “wasted” vote. Kaufman and Israeli (1999) communicated these ideas more thoroughly (as discussed earlier in section IV-B)

Though mildly, the Netanyahu vote increased for all groups except for the Druze; and the vote for the rightwing instrumentalist parties increased drastically for all groups. For Bedouins and Christians, this figure more than doubled and for Muslims it nearly tripled. One concern this paper attempts to address is the rise in support for rightwing instrumentalist parties amongst all groups. One explanation may be that members of the Bedouin, Christian and Muslim communities believed that the Druze community is better integrated in Israeli society and attributed this integration to the adoption of the instrumentalist voting strategy amongst the Druze community. Since leftwing instrumentalist parties were blamed for the collapse of the Oslo Peace Accords, Bedouins, Christians and Muslims whose primary concern was to improve their socio-economic conditions, may have sought to adopt a rightwing instrumentalist strategy.

## **Section VI- Empirical Specification**

This section is composed of five subsections. In subsection A, I provide a concise description of the model. Section B includes a brief analysis on abstention for both election years. Sections C and D scrutinize the Prime Ministerial and Knesset party elections, respectively. Finally section E will conclude this section by making a modest attempt to understand the results obtained from the previous subsections; namely how ethno-religious identity variables contribute to class divisions such as high-earnings and income for mono-religious Palestinian localities in Israel.

### **A.) The Model**

The relevant economic proposition/hypothesis is to assume all citizens are trying to maximize their personal welfare or expected direct utility function. Thus, as noted in section IVC,

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<sup>25</sup> Though Barak won the election, he formed a coalition with rightwing Zionist parties to avoid the ethno-nationalist parties. This was a huge turning point for many Palestinians who were optimistic about Barak.

the multi-candidate calculus of voting theory-modeled by McKelvey and Ordeshook (as cited in Black, 1978)-informs my work. However, some modifications are needed because this paper explores both candidates and parties. Each voting probability term will be comprised of two parts: the likelihood of the citizen's voting strategy ( $k$ ) affecting both other outcome of the direct prime ministerial election, as well as the distribution of power in the Knesset, relative to the impact of any other strategy ( $i$ ). The term  $(u_k - u_i)$  is the utility differential between the two strategies. Also, since abstention is a voting strategy,  $U_0$ , C and D will not be considered. Thus, the expected utility associated with choosing prime ministerial candidate  $k$  (or abstaining) or party  $k$  (or abstaining),  $Y_k$ ,  $k \in \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$  is

$$U(Y_k) = \sum p_{ik}(u_k - u_i)$$

In this paper, I assume that the utility differential is related to socioeconomic, religious, geographic and population characteristics, interaction terms and a noise term,  $\mu$ . Referring to the Independent Variable(s) table above (Table 4), the utility differential is

$$\begin{aligned} u_k - u_i = & a_0 + b_1(\text{median wage or income per capita}) + b_2(\text{matriculation rate}) + b_3(\text{academic} \\ & \text{degree}) + b_4(\text{work-seekers}) + b_5(\text{room density or individuals who earn more than twice} \\ & \text{the average wage}) + c_1\text{BEDOUIN} + c_2\text{DRUZE} + c_3\text{CHRISTIAN} + c_4\text{MUSLIM} \\ & + d_1\text{NORTH} + d_2\text{CENTRAL} + d_3\text{SOUTH} + e_1\text{CITY} + e_2\text{TOWN} + e_3\text{VILLAGE} + \mu \end{aligned}$$

The utility differential associated with voting for prime ministerial candidate  $k$  (or party  $k$ ) over candidate  $i$  (or party  $i$ ) can be interpreted as the percentage of people who voted for  $k$ . Thus, for each of the given fourteen dependent variables, there will be sixty nine observations with given independent variables to estimate at least fourteen coefficients.

There are four major parts to my hypothesis. First, abstention is a direct result of social and economic disempowerment and/or alienation, slightly extending on Hunich and Munger (1997). In addition, economic variables and religious divisions will highly influence the voter turnout for each prime ministerial candidate and party. Finally, I predict that the Druze will be the most likely to adopt instrumentalist strategies because of their special relationship with the state

and that the Bedouin will have the highest abstention rates. This is mainly due to the fact that the Bedouins are the least integrated in society while the Druze community is the most assimilated into Israeli culture as reflected in and strengthened by their compulsory service in the military (see Section II-Background and Section III-Literature Review).

I will test my hypotheses using the multivariate regression of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). My dependent variables will capture the percentage of votes for each candidate or party while my independent variables will be controlled linearly. Though I realize the imperfections of linearity, the few degrees of freedom limit my ability to use higher order terms that will further decrease the degrees of freedom. The method of OLS involves the usage of heteroskedastic robust standard errors to calculate the coefficients of the independent variables by minimizing the squared prediction errors (Stock and Watson, 2002).

Though OLS is a suitable method for capturing the influence of region, populated area, socioeconomic characteristics and religion on political strategies in the Palestinian localities of Israel, there are some notable weakness of the model given the nature and focus of this particular study. From tables 5 and 6 in the data section, it is clear that in several instances, religion and socio-economic status are highly correlated. In addition, several of the socio-economic variables are highly correlated amongst each other. Since the sample is relatively small with about 69 observations and approximately fifteen to twenty controlled variables of interest, there are only about 49 to 54 degrees of freedom. Therefore, the size of this sample coupled with the number of its controlled variables yields large variances for the coefficients in the regression, resulting in insignificant and inaccurate results. Thus, I decided to report the full regressions in Appendix E while presenting selected regressions in this section. Though the majority of the regressions in this section will have fewer variables than the full regressions in Appendix E, the value of  $R^2$  is highly comparable in each case.

## **B.) Abstention**

Since abstention is hypothetically a function of disempowerment, alienation and indifference, the social and economic characteristics of a locality are expected to play a vital role in the voter turnout of a locality. For each of the two election years in this study, socio-economic variables drove the abstention rate for both the prime ministerial elections and the Knesset party elections. However, unlike 1996, ethno-religious identity played a huge role in 1999 in grasping voter turnout. During the 1996 election year, matriculation rates and median wages yielded significant results for influencing voter turnout in the prime ministerial and Knesset Elections. This is shown in Tables 7a and 7b: Significant results at the 10% level are in italic bold.

**Table 7- The Affect of Socio-economic Characteristics on Abstention (1996)**

a.) Abstention in Prime Ministerial Election

regress abstention workseekers roomdensity wage matriculation academic city town village  
central south, robust

Regression with robust standard errors

Number of obs = 68  
F( 9, 58) = 3.05  
Prob > F = 0.0047  
R-squared = 0.3120  
Root MSE = 3.928

abstention	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
workseekers	.1710656	.1485908	1.15	0.254	-.1263712	.4685024
roomdensity	.1308128	.0809856	1.62	0.112	-.0312974	.2929231
<i>wage</i>	<b>4.098629</b>	<b>2.091087</b>	<b>1.96</b>	<b>0.055</b>	<b>-.0871366</b>	<b>8.284394</b>
<i>matriculation</i>	<b>-1.807122</b>	<b>.0777737</b>	<b>-2.32</b>	<b>0.024</b>	<b>-.3363931</b>	<b>-.0250312</b>
<i>academic</i>	<b>.3276106</b>	<b>.154865</b>	<b>2.12</b>	<b>0.039</b>	<b>.0176146</b>	<b>.6376066</b>
town	-.7748258	1.596	-0.49	0.629	-3.969566	2.419915
<i>village</i>	<b>-2.675288</b>	<b>1.373754</b>	<b>-1.95</b>	<b>0.056</b>	<b>-5.425156</b>	<b>-.0745806</b>
central	-.8479177	1.113891	-0.76	0.450	-3.077613	1.381778
south	2.255084	3.370446	0.67	0.506	-4.491596	9.001764
_cons	-7.32899	8.248735	-0.89	0.378	-23.84063	9.182647

b.) Abstention in Knesset Party Elections

regress abstentk workseekers roomdensity wage matriculation academic city town village  
central south, robust

Regression with robust standard errors

Number of obs = 68  
F( 9, 58) = 3.29  
Prob > F = 0.0027  
R-squared = 0.2742  
Root MSE = 1.154

abstentk	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
workseekers	.0470585	.0601356	0.78	0.437	-.0733161	.167433
<i>roomdensity</i>	<b>.0425452</b>	<b>.0200037</b>	<b>2.13</b>	<b>0.038</b>	<b>-.0025036</b>	<b>.0825869</b>
<i>wage</i>	<b>1.126411</b>	<b>.6068599</b>	<b>1.86</b>	<b>0.069</b>	<b>-.0883514</b>	<b>2.341173</b>
<i>matriculation</i>	<b>-1.0532928</b>	<b>.0265451</b>	<b>-2.01</b>	<b>0.049</b>	<b>-.1064287</b>	<b>-.0001569</b>
academic	.0463003	.0464907	1.00	0.323	-.046761	.1393616
town	.3390524	.3560721	0.95	0.345	-.3737034	1.051808
village	.1220044	.3533343	0.35	0.731	-.5852711	.8292799
central	.106306	.4526924	0.23	0.815	-.7998563	1.012468
south	.4971586	.6870854	0.72	0.472	-.8781922	1.872509
_cons	-1.759865	2.350942	-0.75	0.457	-6.465786	2.946056

The negative correlation between the abstention and matriculation rate supports Fugate (1996) findings. As mentioned earlier, Fugate demonstrates that education has a positive effect on voter turnout. Note that since the abstention rates for the prime minister are higher on average (refer to data section) per locality, it is not surprising that the magnitude of the coefficients for matriculation rates and wages are larger for Table 7a than 7b. The percentage of those seeking academic degrees is positively correlated with the prime ministerial abstention but not the Knesset abstention. This is consistent with the findings of Kaufman and Israeli (1999), who claimed that in the 1996 Israeli elections, Palestinian-Israelis who were academically trained or in highly educated circles voted for an ethno-nationalist party and abstained from the prime ministerial election. Abstaining from the Prime Ministerial election was probably justified through anti-Zionist rhetoric, suggesting that Palestinian representation was the key to their success as a minority community.

The fact that wages are positively correlated with abstention may be attributed to the notion that those who earn the highest wages received academic degrees when they were younger. For Palestinians in Israel, who are banned from several economic sectors in Israel, educated Palestinians probably earn relatively high wages. Thus, a possible explanation is that high-wage earners from the older generation that is not accounted for in the education variable, “academic”. Abstention from the Knesset Party elections by high earning Palestinians can be interpreted as a protest vote. The positive correlation between roomdensity and abstaining from the Knesset party elections can be explained by the effect of economic disempowerment or alienation on voter turnout. Notice that the coefficient for roomdensity is marginally significant for the 1996 prime ministerial election.

Though several (but immeasurable) factors that have not been accounted for in these regressions are needed to explain the abstention rate, such as socio-political factors and protest, in 1996 Israeli elections, the overall effect of religion on abstention rates in 1996 seems negligible.

Unlike the 1996 elections, the voter turnout for 1999 was not stimulated by the sole effect of socio-economic factors. As shown in Table 8, abstention was largely motivated by interaction terms involving a combination of an ethno-religious identity and a socio-economic factor:

**Table 8- The Impact of Religion with Socio-economic characteristics on Abstention (1999)**

a.) Abstention in Prime Ministerial Election

regress abstention binsouth mincome dincome cmatric city village central south, robust

Regression with robust standard errors

Number of obs = 69  
F( 7, 61) = 14.39  
Prob > F = 0.0000  
R-squared = 0.4806  
Root MSE = 2.2843

abstention	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
<i>binsouth</i>	.028354	.0128239	2.21	0.031	.002711	.053997
<i>mincome</i>	-.0214577	.0074723	-2.87	0.006	-.0363995	-.0065159
<i>dincome</i>	-.0201782	.0075895	-2.66	0.010	-.0353543	-.005002
<i>cmatric</i>	-.0006808	.0003041	-2.24	0.029	-.0012888	-.0000727
<i>city</i>	-1.367588	.7212626	-1.90	0.063	-2.809842	.0746656
village	.4565094	.5972981	0.76	0.448	-.7378619	1.650881
central	-1.202472	.8433849	-1.43	0.159	-2.888924	.4839803
_cons	8.237676	1.189522	6.93	0.000	5.85908	10.61627

b.) Abstention in Knesset Party Elections

regress abstentk binsouth druze muslims dwealthy cmatric city village central, robust

Regression with robust standard errors

Number of obs = 69  
F( 8, 60) = 10.40  
Prob > F = 0.0000  
R-squared = 0.5500  
Root MSE = 1.0892

abstentk	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
<i>binsouth</i>	.0163278	.0035017	4.66	0.000	.0093233	.0233322
<i>druze</i>	.0568242	.027646	2.06	0.044	.0015239	.1121245
<i>muslims</i>	-.0057182	.0027998	-2.04	0.046	-.0113186	-.0001178
<i>dtopearners</i>	-.0180556	.0072831	-2.48	0.016	-.032624	-.0034872
<i>cmatric</i>	-.0002655	.0000775	-3.43	0.001	-.0004205	-.0001105
city	-.2102405	.3347626	-0.63	0.532	-.8798654	.4593843
village	.4316986	.288566	1.50	0.140	-.1455192	1.008916
central	-.4897284	.3690931	-1.33	0.190	-1.228025	.2485678
_cons	3.124857	.3209134	9.74	0.000	2.482934	3.766779

Bedouins living in Southern Israel were positively (and significantly) correlated with abstention rates for both 1999 elections the regressions presented above. These citizens are by the far the most socially and economically disenfranchised of all communities in Israel. Clearly, this has stunted their political activity. They were probably not attended to by the ethno-nationalist

parties that they voted for in prior elections.<sup>26</sup> As expected, matriculation, income and wealth stimulated Christians, Muslims, and Druses respectively to vote in both 1999 elections.

The Druze abstention rate is mildly explained by Ghanem and Lazar (2002), who suggest that the majority of abstainers were traditional voters for the Labor party in 1996 because the party did not make an effort to appeal to the Palestinians at all (131). As can be seen in the data section, in 1996, the Druze voted for leftwing instrumentalist parties more than any other party. The negative but low correlation between the abstention rate and Muslims can be explained by the fact that the Islamic stream was split after the 1996 elections over the question of abstention and one of the wings joined one of the ethno-nationalist parties (Ghanem and Lazar, 2002)..

### C.) Prime Ministerial Elections

I expect socio-economic factors to play a vital role in the voter turnout for each candidate.<sup>27</sup> For the 1996 prime ministerial elections, with the exception of the Druze in the Peres regression, interaction terms involving a religion and an economic variable were used to achieve significant results for the Netanyahu and Peres vote. This is demonstrated in Table 9:

**Table 9- The Impact of Religion with Economic characteristics on PM Election (1996)**

a.) Netanyahu Vote

regress netanyahu cworkseekers droomdensity mwage town village central south, robust

Regression with robust standard errors

Number of obs = 68  
F( 7, 60) = 13.08  
Prob > F = 0.0000  
R-squared = 0.8153  
Root MSE = 4.2663

netanyahu	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
<i>cworkseekers</i>	<i>-.0098444</i>	<i>.0035959</i>	<i>-2.74</i>	<i>0.008</i>	<i>-.0170373</i>	<i>-.0026516</i>
<i>droomdensity</i>	<i>.0087858</i>	<i>.0016991</i>	<i>5.17</i>	<i>0.000</i>	<i>.005387</i>	<i>.0121846</i>
<i>mwage</i>	<i>-.0206646</i>	<i>.0084761</i>	<i>-2.44</i>	<i>0.018</i>	<i>-.0376194</i>	<i>-.0037098</i>
town	-.7512416	.8579913	-0.88	0.385	-2.46748	.9649964
village	1.141519	.8256199	1.38	0.172	-.5099665	2.793005
central	-.7040713	.9440853	-0.75	0.459	-2.592523	1.18438
south	-3.718767	2.82358	-1.32	0.193	-9.366768	1.929234

<sup>26</sup> Though this is relatively apparent from the data section, subsection D will address the adoption of the ethno-nationalist strategy by Southern Bedouins more thoroughly.

<sup>27</sup> Keep in mind that though there are two prime ministerial candidates, abstention is counted as a strategy in this study. Therefore, those who did not vote for Netanyahu in 1996 did not necessarily vote for Peres; they could have abstained. Thus each prime ministerial candidate regression is provided in this subsection. The same logic applies to the Knesset party elections.



```

-----
      _cons |   7.967318   2.092793   3.81   0.000   3.781108   12.15353
-----

```

b.) The Peres Vote

```

regress peres croomdensity broomdensity druze town village central south, robust

```

```

Regression with robust standard errors
Number of obs =      68
F( 7, 60) =      9.98
Prob > F      =      0.0000
R-squared     =      0.6184
Root MSE     =      6.27

```

```

-----
      peres |           Coef.   Robust
            |           Std. Err.   t   P>|t|   [95% Conf. Interval]
-----+-----
croomdensity | .0034207   .0016625   2.06 0.044   .0000952   .0067462
broomdensity | -.0024631 .0012106   -2.03 0.046   -.0048848 -.0000415
druze         | -.2108236 .0303655   -6.94 0.000   -.2715637 -.1500835
  town         |  1.542302   2.269422     0.68  0.499   -2.997218   6.081822
  village      |  1.254305   1.997654     0.63  0.532   -2.741598   5.250208
  central      |  1.898328   1.863313     1.02  0.312   -1.828853   5.625508
  south        |  3.116667   5.890165     0.53  0.599   -8.665417   14.89875
  _cons        |  89.13349   2.172559   41.03  0.000   84.78772   93.47925
-----

```

Though not many, there are some consistent and useful trends from this table. While lower class Christians (expressed by cworkseekers and croomdensity) are more likely to vote for Peres than Netanyahu, lower class Bedouins (broomdensity) are less apt to vote for Peres. Likewise, the collective Druze community does not support Peres. As before, this can be understood in the contexts of power and the ways in which the state treats different groups. Bedouins and especially Druze (as indicated by the magnitudes) are less likely to vote for dovish candidates than Muslims and Christians.

As for the 1999 prime ministerial elections, income was the most notable driving forces:

**Table 9- The Influence of Income on PM Election (1999)**

a.) The Netanyahu Vote

```

regress netanyahu income druze btopearners cincome dincome mincome city village central,
robust

```

```

Regression with robust standard errors
Number of obs =      69
F( 9, 59) =     23.88
Prob > F      =      0.0000
R-squared     =      0.8716
Root MSE     =      3.5265

```

```

-----
  netanyahu |           Coef.   Robust
            |           Std. Err.   t   P>|t|   [95% Conf. Interval]
-----+-----
  income    | 7.238399   2.535261   2.86 0.006   2.165354   12.31144
  druze     | .5251946   .1173308   4.48 0.000   .2904163   .7599729
btopearners | -.0342741 .0129628   -2.64 0.010   -.0602125 -.0083356
  cincome   | -.0847471 .0208415   -4.07 0.000   -.126451   -.0430433
  dincome   | -.2484388 .0674278   -3.68 0.000   -.3833616 -.113516
  mincome   | -.0785724 .0199859   -3.93 0.000   -.118564   -.0385807
  city       | -1.464821   1.813927    -0.81  0.423   -5.09448   2.164839
  village    | 2.317349   .925929   2.50 0.015   .4645696   4.170129
-----

```

central	- .5403793	1.266312	-0.43	0.671	-3.074264	1.993506
_cons	2.746616	2.476127	1.11	0.272	-2.208103	7.701336

## b. The Barak Vote

```
regress barak income druze mincome cincome dincome city village central, robust
```

```
Regression with robust standard errors
```

```
Number of obs = 69
F( 8, 60) = 25.05
Prob > F = 0.000
R-squared = 0.8252
Root MSE = 4.4737
```

barak	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
<i>income</i>	<b>-6.867581</b>	<b>3.361823</b>	<b>-2.04</b>	<b>0.045</b>	<b>-13.59223</b>	<b>-.1429336</b>
<i>druze</i>	<b>-.6570414</b>	<b>.1778409</b>	<b>-3.69</b>	<b>0.000</b>	<b>-1.012776</b>	<b>-.3013067</b>
<i>mincome</i>	<b>.0777331</b>	<b>.0168255</b>	<b>4.62</b>	<b>0.000</b>	<b>.0440772</b>	<b>.1113891</b>
<i>cincome</i>	<b>.0847672</b>	<b>.0228985</b>	<b>3.70</b>	<b>0.000</b>	<b>.0389633</b>	<b>.130571</b>
<i>dincome</i>	<b>.3238044</b>	<b>.0995416</b>	<b>3.25</b>	<b>0.002</b>	<b>.1246916</b>	<b>.5229172</b>
city	2.53715	2.091687	1.21	0.230	-1.646847	6.721147
village	<b>-2.711309</b>	<b>1.094818</b>	<b>-2.48</b>	<b>0.016</b>	<b>-4.901272</b>	<b>-.5213463</b>
central	2.046802	1.609321	1.27	0.208	-1.172318	5.265922
_cons	91.72603	3.554638	25.80	0.000	84.6157	98.83637

As noted in the theory section, Kinder and Kiewiet claim that economically privileged voters are more likely to vote for the incumbent than his opponent. Their analysis can be applied to the results of the 1999 prime ministerial election because Netanyahu won the position of prime minister in 1996. He ran again in 1999 as the incumbent that year. The fact that income is positively and significantly correlated with the Netanyahu vote does not only support my hypothesis that economic incentives affect voter turnout for a particular candidate but it also further substantiates the claim made by Kinder and Kiewiet that collectively wealthy individuals vote for the incumbent.

As before, though an augment in income may be expected to boost the overall Netanyahu vote, this is not true when looking at specific religious groups. An increase in income amongst individuals in the Bedouin, Christian and Muslim communities is expected to *decrease* the Netanyahu vote and increase the Barak vote. The fact that richer Druses (*dincome*) are less likely to vote for Netanyahu than the remaining Druses supports the findings by Manza et al (1995) and Achterberg (N.D.), who complicate the simple class voting model by adding cultural identity into the equation. The question of injustice is worth exploring. Since Netanyahu was hostile towards

the Palestinians, (Ghanem and Ozacky-Lazar, 2002) perhaps the high-status Druses were the most affected by his policies and had the most to lose.

I would like to conclude this subsection on the prime ministerial voting by pointing out that the Peres regression was not as adequately explained by the controlled variables (with an  $R^2=.61$ ) as both of the Netanyahu regressions and the Barak regression. Perhaps the hopeful time of the Oslo Peace Accord encouraged the Palestinian-Israelis to vote for a more dovish and promising candidate.

#### D.) The Knesset

This subsection explores the variables that impact the vote for the ethno-nationalist, rightwing instrumentalist and leftwing instrumentalist voting strategies. Though some religion and economic variables are significant, interaction terms between an economic variable and an ethno-religious identity variable of Muslim, Christian or Bedouin prove to yield the most significant results. Table 10 outlines the three types of parties and the variables that influence the vote for each one in 1996.

**Table 10- The Dominance of Economic Variables and Ethno-Religious Identity on Knesset Elections (1996)**

##### a.) The Rightwing Instrumentalist Vote

regress rwinstrument workseekers roomdensity wage matriculation academic binsouth  
christians druze muslims mwage town village central, robust

Regression with robust standard errors

Number of obs = 68  
F( 13, 54) = 16.47  
Prob > F = 0.0000  
R-squared = 0.8987  
Root MSE = 4.3778

	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
rwinstrument						
workseekers	-.479464	.3204208	-1.50	0.140	-1.121869	.162941
roomdensity	.1296211	.0958166	1.35	0.182	-.0624798	.3217219
<b>wage</b>	<b>-12.77452</b>	<b>4.888639</b>	<b>-2.61</b>	<b>0.012</b>	<b>-22.57565</b>	<b>-2.973387</b>
matriculation	.1668926	.2404749	0.69	0.491	-.3152305	.6490158
academic	-.161314	.291972	-0.55	0.583	-.7466826	.4240546
binsouth	-.0077686	.0315176	-0.25	0.806	-.0709575	.0554203
christians	.0233267	.0333578	0.70	0.487	-.0435516	.0902049
<b>druze</b>	<b>.3099839</b>	<b>.0391726</b>	<b>7.91</b>	<b>0.000</b>	<b>.2314475</b>	<b>.3885203</b>
<b>muslims</b>	<b>-.441493</b>	<b>.1553296</b>	<b>-2.84</b>	<b>0.006</b>	<b>-.75291</b>	<b>-.130076</b>
<b>mwage</b>	<b>.1495758</b>	<b>.0552191</b>	<b>2.71</b>	<b>0.009</b>	<b>.0388682</b>	<b>.2602835</b>
town	1.151576	.9513009	1.21	0.231	-.755668	3.058819
<b>village</b>	<b>4.168001</b>	<b>1.144266</b>	<b>3.64</b>	<b>0.001</b>	<b>1.873886</b>	<b>6.462115</b>
central	1.384355	1.372516	1.01	0.318	-1.367373	4.136084
_cons	37.3	15.00265	2.49	0.016	7.221487	67.37851

## b.) The Leftwing Instrumentalist Vote

regress lwinstrument workseekers roomdensity wage matriculation academic binsouth druze broomdensity croomdensity mworkseekers town village central, robust

Regression with robust standard errors

Number of obs = 68  
 F( 13, 54) = 7.74  
 Prob > F = 0.0000  
 R-squared = 0.5339  
 Root MSE = 16.704

lwinstrument	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
<i>workseekers</i> /	<b>-2.457432</b>	<b>1.015412</b>	<b>-2.42</b>	<b>0.019</b>	<b>-4.49321</b>	<b>-.4216549</b>
roomdensity	-.5821325	.3490512	-1.67	0.101	-1.281938	.117673
wage	-12.74747	8.484731	-1.50	0.139	-29.75833	4.263394
matriculation	-.1626127	.7188998	-0.23	0.822	-1.60392	1.278695
academic	-.2364819	1.151546	-0.21	0.838	-2.545192	2.072229
<i>binsouth</i> /	<b>-.3653385</b>	<b>.1458946</b>	<b>-2.50</b>	<b>0.015</b>	<b>-.6578396</b>	<b>-.0728374</b>
druze	<b>.3816643</b>	<b>.0948497</b>	<b>4.02</b>	<b>0.000</b>	<b>.1915021</b>	<b>.5718265</b>
<i>broomdensity</i> /	<b>.0155462</b>	<b>.0052529</b>	<b>2.96</b>	<b>0.005</b>	<b>.0050148</b>	<b>.0260776</b>
<i>croomdensity</i> /	<b>.047017</b>	<b>.0107596</b>	<b>4.37</b>	<b>0.000</b>	<b>.0254453</b>	<b>.0685886</b>
<i>mworkseekers</i> /	<b>.0477308</b>	<b>.0121673</b>	<b>3.92</b>	<b>0.000</b>	<b>.0233368</b>	<b>.0721248</b>
town	-7.701201	6.018892	-1.28	0.206	-19.76835	4.365952
village	-9.285545	5.902393	-1.57	0.122	-21.11913	2.54804
<i>central</i> /	<b>-19.01771</b>	<b>6.704106</b>	<b>-2.84</b>	<b>0.006</b>	<b>-32.45863</b>	<b>-5.576784</b>
_cons	83.36432	32.52344	2.56	0.013	18.15875	148.5699

## c.) The Ethno-nationalist Vote

regress ethnonationalist workseekers roomdensity wage matriculation academic binsouth christians druze muslims croomdensity broomdensity mworkseekers town village central, robust

Regression with robust standard errors

Number of obs = 68  
 F( 15, 52) = 16.18  
 Prob > F = 0.0000  
 R-squared = 0.6815  
 Root MSE = 17.481

ethnonational	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
<i>workseekers</i> /	<b>3.556363</b>	<b>1.289391</b>	<b>2.76</b>	<b>0.008</b>	<b>.9690105</b>	<b>6.143716</b>
roomdensity	.390407	.3648153	1.07	0.289	-.3416485	1.122462
wage	12.18033	9.211831	1.32	0.192	-6.304562	30.66522
matriculation	.1883311	.6844073	0.28	0.784	-1.185033	1.561695
academic	-.8710221	1.346249	-0.65	0.520	-3.572469	1.830424
<i>binsouth</i> /	<b>.4113825</b>	<b>.1466102</b>	<b>2.81</b>	<b>0.007</b>	<b>.1171875</b>	<b>.7055775</b>
christians	.2973209	.3055837	0.97	0.335	-.3158777	.9105195
<i>druze</i> /	<b>-.6207242</b>	<b>.1718286</b>	<b>-3.61</b>	<b>0.001</b>	<b>-.9655236</b>	<b>-.2759248</b>
muslims	.2133854	.2024295	1.05	0.297	-.192819	.6195898
<i>croomdensity</i> /	<b>-.0607441</b>	<b>.0194607</b>	<b>-3.12</b>	<b>0.003</b>	<b>-.0997949</b>	<b>-.0216933</b>
<i>broomdensity</i> /	<b>-.0156703</b>	<b>.0070153</b>	<b>-2.23</b>	<b>0.030</b>	<b>-.0297475</b>	<b>-.0015931</b>
<i>mworkseekers</i> /	<b>-.0670591</b>	<b>.0170159</b>	<b>-3.94</b>	<b>0.000</b>	<b>-.1012041</b>	<b>-.0329141</b>
town	7.864652	5.815994	1.35	0.182	-3.805993	19.5353
village	5.772227	5.731184	1.01	0.319	-5.728236	17.27269
<i>central</i> /	<b>21.41241</b>	<b>7.424599</b>	<b>2.88</b>	<b>0.006</b>	<b>6.513858</b>	<b>36.31095</b>
_cons	7.796037	35.51228	0.22	0.827	-63.46456	79.05664

The Druses are the only religious group that was significant for all three types of parties without being coupled with an economic characteristic. According to the regressions above, the Druses are much more likely to vote for a leftwing or rightwing instrumentalist party than an ethno-nationalist party, which is not surprising given their negative correlation with the vote of leftwing candidate Peres in Table 9b. If wage is a long-term indicator for education-which I noted

as a possibility in subsection B when discussing the abstention rates in 1996-then it makes sense that wage would be negatively correlated with rightwing instrumentalism because those in highly educated circles mostly voted for ethno-nationalist parties or abstained. Relatively wealthy Muslims (mwage) are more likely to vote for a rightwing instrumentalist party than their counterparts. Furthermore, according to Table 10b, Christians, Muslims and Bedouins who are of low socio-economic status are less likely to vote for an ethno-national party and more likely to cast a vote for a leftwing instrumentalist party. These results are consistent with the claim made by Kaufman and Israeli (1999) that Palestinians may choose the instrumentalist (leftwing/rightwing) option to attach themselves to an establishment group within the Jewish majority in order to advance their economic interests.

For the 1999 elections, as shown by the Table 11a, b, and c, the Knesset Party elections are mainly driven by ethno-religious identity variables:

**Table 11-The Salience of Ethno-religious Identity on the Knesset Party Elections (1999)**

a.) The Rightwing Instrumentalist Vote

```
regress rwinstrument wealthy income academic matriculation workseekers druze
binsouth muslim christian city village central, robust
```

Regression with robust standard errors

```
Number of obs = 69
F( 12, 56) = 35.12
Prob > F = 0.0000
R-squared = 0.8554
Root MSE = 6.0605
```

rwinstrument	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
<i>wealthy</i> /	<b>-2.373957</b>	<b>1.139055</b>	<b>-2.08</b>	<b>0.042</b>	<b>-4.655759</b>	<b>-.0921545</b>
income	2.182575	4.096705	0.53	0.596	-6.024111	10.38926
academic	.2782493	.3966148	0.70	0.486	-.5162655	1.072764
matriculat~n	-.0030149	.1166514	-0.03	0.979	-.2366957	.230666
workseekers	-.2715027	.4491935	-0.60	0.548	-1.171345	.62834
<i>druze</i> /	<b>.3399253</b>	<b>.0602321</b>	<b>5.64</b>	<b>0.000</b>	<b>.2192659</b>	<b>.4605846</b>
binsouth	-.0266323	.0598036	-0.45	0.658	-.1464333	.0931687
muslims	-.0393232	.0560874	-0.70	0.486	-.1516797	.0730332
christians	-.0908971	.0794434	-1.14	0.257	-.2500413	.0682471
city	-3.078375	1.898969	-1.62	0.111	-6.882468	.7257173
<i>village</i> /	<b>5.2267</b>	<b>1.644115</b>	<b>3.18</b>	<b>0.002</b>	<b>1.933142</b>	<b>8.520258</b>
central	-2.146489	2.611174	-0.82	0.415	-7.377298	3.08432
<i>_cons</i> /	<b>11.9715</b>	<b>5.760068</b>	<b>2.08</b>	<b>0.042</b>	<b>.4326999</b>	<b>23.5103</b>

b.) The Leftwing Instrumentalist Vote

```
regress lwinstrument topearners income workseekers academic matriculation binsouth druze
christian muslims city village central, robust
```

Regression with robust standard errors

```
Number of obs = 69
F( 12, 56) = 15.89
Prob > F = 0.0000
R-squared = 0.5419
Root MSE = 10.556
```

Instrument	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
topearners	-2.529887	2.637968	-0.96	0.342	-7.814372	2.754598
income	5.306481	6.465216	0.82	0.415	-7.644904	18.25787
workseekers	.1399844	.7043548	0.20	0.843	-1.271008	1.550977
academic	.3809397	.8279374	0.46	0.647	-1.277618	2.039497
matriculation	.1957976	.2497956	0.78	0.436	-.3046031	.6961983
<b>binsouth</b>	<b>-.129792</b>	<b>.0577919</b>	<b>-2.25</b>	<b>0.029</b>	<b>-.2455632</b>	<b>-.0140208</b>
<b>druze</b>	<b>.1502034</b>	<b>.0817987</b>	<b>1.84</b>	<b>0.072</b>	<b>-.0136591</b>	<b>.3140659</b>
<b>christians</b>	<b>-.2238394</b>	<b>.1092317</b>	<b>-2.05</b>	<b>0.045</b>	<b>-.4426567</b>	<b>-.0050221</b>
<b>muslims</b>	<b>-.1234962</b>	<b>.0522252</b>	<b>-2.36</b>	<b>0.022</b>	<b>-.2281159</b>	<b>-.0188766</b>
city	-1.828756	3.654062	-0.50	0.619	-9.148723	5.49121
<b>village</b>	<b>7.595482</b>	<b>3.329414</b>	<b>2.28</b>	<b>0.026</b>	<b>.9258646</b>	<b>14.2651</b>
central	-6.411517	4.163652	-0.15	0.878	-8.981948	7.699645
_cons	14.13147	10.58999	1.33	0.187	-7.082834	35.34577

## c.) The Ethno-nationalist Vote

```
regress ethnonationalist topearners income workseekers academic matriculation binsouth
druze christian muslims city village central, robust
```

Regression with robust standard errors

```
Number of obs =      69
F( 12,      56) =     70.03
Prob > F       =     0.0000
R-squared      =     0.8192
Root MSE     =     12.167
```

ethnonationalist	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
<b>topearners</b>	<b>5.663434</b>	<b>2.337863</b>	<b>2.42</b>	<b>0.019</b>	<b>.9801319</b>	<b>10.34674</b>
income	-7.718617	8.103077	-0.95	0.345	-23.95103	8.513798
workseekers	.1230511	.7710056	0.16	0.874	-1.421459	1.667561
academic	-.5372871	.8477319	-0.63	0.529	-2.235498	1.160924
matriculation	-.2535887	.2438076	-1.04	0.303	-.741994	.2348165
<b>binsouth</b>	<b>.1433896</b>	<b>.0746439</b>	<b>1.92</b>	<b>0.060</b>	<b>-.0061401</b>	<b>.2929194</b>
<b>druze</b>	<b>-.495656</b>	<b>.0650224</b>	<b>-7.62</b>	<b>0.000</b>	<b>-.6259114</b>	<b>-.3654005</b>
<b>christians</b>	<b>.3169</b>	<b>.116878</b>	<b>2.71</b>	<b>0.009</b>	<b>.0827652</b>	<b>.5510347</b>
<b>muslims</b>	<b>.1699656</b>	<b>.0636717</b>	<b>2.67</b>	<b>0.010</b>	<b>.0424158</b>	<b>.2975154</b>
city	5.193822	4.419711	1.18	0.245	-3.659923	14.04757
<b>village</b>	<b>-13.20498</b>	<b>3.686155</b>	<b>-3.58</b>	<b>0.001</b>	<b>-20.58923</b>	<b>-5.820719</b>
central	3.194727	5.431881	0.59	0.559	-7.686639	14.07609
_cons	70.92036	10.40323	6.82	0.000	50.08018	91.76054

As expected, the Druses are highly unlikely to vote for an ethno-nationalist party and are more likely to vote for a leftwing instrumentalist party. Though it is not obvious, perhaps the positive correlation between rich individuals and the ethno-nationalist vote is similar to what occurred with respect to wages in the previous Israeli election. In other words, those who are academically trained earn the highest incomes and thus tend to have voted for ethno-national parties. It can be assumed from the data section that the majority of these educated high wage and income earners, who are voting for ethno-nationalist parties are Christians. Keep in mind that the strong presence of these leftist upper-middle class citizens is also consistent with the results of

Manza et al (1995) and Achterberg (N.D.), who claim that the widely accepted notion of voting based on class is not always consistent.

Collectively, Southern Bedouins, Christians and Muslims would be more likely to vote for ethno-nationalist parties than leftwing instrumentalist parties. By the election year of 1999, Bedouin, Christian and Muslim citizens of Israel who hoped the leftwing Zionist parties (leftwing instrumentalist parties) would solve the Palestinian problem began to foresee the failure of the Oslo Peace Accords. By 1999, the growth of Jewish settlers in the West Bank and Gaza almost doubled and the optimism for a solution by Israeli Zionist parties to the 32 year conflict began to crumble amongst many Palestinians.<sup>28</sup>

From the analysis in the four subsections above, there are a few conclusions that we can draw. First, the fact that Druze Palestinians (independent of socio-economic status) consistently vote for leftwing and/or rightwing instrumentalist parties and avoid ethno-nationalist parties is a highly insensitive and robust result. According to Kaufman (2004), the Druze must express their loyalty to the state (especially because of their compulsory military service) in return for their privileged status as non-Arabs. The obligation of loyalty and compulsory military service explains the high vote amongst Druze for Zionist establishment parties.

Second, while both ethno-religious identity and socio-economic variables are substantial determinants of voting behavior in 1996, only ethno-religious identity is significant in shaping the voting behavior of the 1999 elections.<sup>29</sup> Intuitively, this can be attributed to the two contrasting political moments in 1996 and 1999; where 1996 was a time of optimism due to the signing of the Oslo (I) and (II) Peace Accords in 1993 and 1995 respectively, 1999 was a moment of despair and disempowerment amongst most Palestinian-Israelis, due to the recent and disappointing

---

<sup>28</sup> A dramatic increase in Jewish settlers in the West Bank and Gaza during the peace talks demonstrates not only the collapse of Oslo, but also the failure of Labor to improve the situation. This holds high prominence the settler population has always been a major complaint by the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. Palestinian land and water is used for the growing settler population.

<sup>29</sup> The only exception is the 1999 Netanyahu vote, which was largely driven by income. As stated earlier, this is due to the fact that Netanyahu ran as the incumbent in 1999.



collapse of Oslo. Since class distinctions in 1996 are consistently influential amongst Bedouins, Christians, Muslims and *not* Druses in determining voting behavior, I extend my analysis to examine the impact of ethno-religious identity on socio-economic status.

### **E.) The Factors that Shape Earnings**

We know from several of the previous regressions above that income and earnings influence various voting strategies, especially if interacted with the religion variables of Bedouins, Christians and Muslims. As noted earlier in the literature review, Khattab (2003) conducted a study to examine the effect of the local labor market and the internal ethnic/religious segregation between Muslims, Christians and Druze on students' occupational expectations. Khattab (2003) suggests that Druze localities are not only more likely to receive more state-based sources than other Palestinian localities but Druze men are also less likely to experience job discrimination within the Israeli Labor Market (279). He then suggests that Christian localities receive more resources than Muslim localities because the Jewish community views Christians as closer to Western culture (280).

Thus, if income and high earnings of individuals who live and work in mono-religious localities are economically influenced by state-enforced policies as is indicated above, then it is necessary to understand the extent of the role of these policies to better understand the voting strategies of Palestinian-Israelis. To measure "top-earners", I decided to introduce a new variable "age" as a proxy for "experience". Age measures the median age per locality. The percentage of top-earners can then be measured as a function of age and education (Naderi and Mace, N.D.), a measure of unemployment (Brunello, 2001) and ethnic identity. Though Khattab (2003) does not differentiate between Bedouin and non-Bedouin Muslims, the following graphs are consistent with his findings and analysis on the three main mono-religious communities.







For these two graphs, the x-axis measures the actual percentage of individuals who earned more than twice the average wage in Israel in 2001. If a 45 degree line is drawn for both of these graphs, it is clear that generally speaking, the actual percentage of top-earners is lower

than the predicted percentage in Muslim localities and the reverse is true for Druze localities. Thus, in theory there should be a higher percentage of rich individuals in Muslim localities and a lower percentage of rich individuals in Druze localities. However, there are probably less rich individuals in Muslim localities because of the allocation of resources to Muslim localities, discouragement on behalf of the Muslim population, and the strong stereotype against their loyalty to the state. It cannot be overstated that the Muslims in Israel are considered the number one enemy of the state, due to Islamic fundamentalist and terrorist groups, mostly in Gaza and the West Bank. Note in the data section, Druze and Muslim localities had similar education levels but Druze localities had on average, higher percentage of rich individuals, higher income per capita per locality and lower percentage of work-seekers.



Similarly, the following graphs show the predicted and actual top-earners in Bedouin and Christian localities.<sup>30</sup> Note that Christians have a fairly linear regression. This makes intuitive sense because, though they are not integrated in Israeli society to the degree of the Druze community, they also have access to better resources historically and are viewed by Israel to be more modernized and/or Western. As a result of British colonialism, Christian localities have better education opportunities and occupational status (Khattab, 2003). The most interesting and unexpected graph is that of the Bedouins. There is no clear trend of how the Bedouins are treated by the state if one controls for education and age.



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<sup>30</sup> Since there were only three mono-religious Christian localities, I included the localities where Christians were a majority and this was consistent with the mono-religious Christian graph.



In the graphs below, income per capita is used instead of top-earners. While the Christian and Muslim graphs for income are similar to their counterparts above, the graphs for the Bedouin and Druze graphs change drastically. The graphs below demonstrate this:





The Bedouin graph demonstrates that income per capita is more predictable than the percentage of rich people in Bedouin localities. In this case, state policies do not severely

harm or help economic conditions. The graph of the predicted income and high-earners of Druze localities mildly demonstrates the claim that the policies of the state were in the best interest of some Druze individuals but not the Druze community. The income per capita for these localities is fairly low; the privileged status of the Druze does not help most individuals but only a few that make it to the top income bracket. Kaufman (2004) explains this when she claims that the emergence of the Druze national identity from an ethno-religious identity by the State of Israel was a case of ethnic manipulation because the interests of the Druze community were sacrificed (p. 72). According to Kaufman, the Druze national identity was constructed to benefit the Jewish majority and not violate the Arab/Jewish dichotomy.

One way to view the ethno-religious variable is to recognize the ways in which the state treats these ethno-religious identities differently. For instance, according to Kanaaneh (2003) divisions were institutionalized in the military field: only the Druze were required to perform mandatory service, then there was the creation of Bedouin units, and next was the recruiting of Christians during the aftermath of the Christian-Muslim violence in Nazareth in 2001 (9). Since the military is such a prestigious institution in Israel, one can view the difference in status amongst different ethno-religious minorities in Israel through the ways in which the state recruits, encourages or requires particular groups to volunteer or serve. Another view is the distribution of wealth by government to these localities. The graphs above are fairly consistent with the claims made by both Khattab (2003) and Kanaaneh (2003).

## **Section VII-Conclusion and Discussion**

The main goal of the paper was to unravel the impact of socio-economic conditions on the voting behavior of the Palestinian-Israelis by observing mono-religious and multi-religious localities while also controlling for region and populated area. My findings conclude that while both ethno-religious identity and socio-economic variables are substantial determinants of voting behavior in 1996, only ethno-religious identity is significant in shaping the voting behavior of 1999.

In a politically volatile area such as Israel, voting strategies are much harder to predict. In 1996, when there was a time of peace and quiet in the occupied territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, class distinctions were crucial amongst the Bedouin, Christian and Muslim communities. Since most were hopeful and optimistic about regional political stability, social and economic stability was their next priority. However, during the 1999 elections, with the collapse of the Oslo Peace Accords and the negligence of Labor towards the Palestinians, most Palestinians seemed less concerned with socio-economic status and more concerned with avoiding leftwing instrumentalist parties. Though not explicitly, this was suggested by the new and emerging academics of political theory who claimed that though socio-economic status is crucial, cultural issues surrounding issues such as political freedom are becoming more prevalent in modeling modern voting behavior.

In addition to the immeasurable events of this specific time period, the general view of the various ethno-religious identities by the state also helps explain several patterns of voting behavior. For instance, the ethno-religious divisions institutionalized by the state (i.e. military involvement) cannot be overstated, for it strongly impacts economic conditions as shown in the previous subsection E. The most dramatic division by the state is the creation of the Druze national identity, a nationally recognized and privileged minority, which clearly sets them apart from the remaining Palestinian community. This probably contributes to the lack of significance in class distinctions amongst the Druze. It is safe to conclude that class distinctions amongst mostly Bedouins, Christians, and Muslims and the institutionalized ethno-religious divisions by the state (i.e. the emergence of the Druze national identity as separate from and privileged in relation to Palestinian Arab identity) enable the Israeli government to prevent a cohesive internal Palestinian opposition from emerging.

Though some ethno-religious groups are affected more than others, with the exception of Christians, the majority of all ethno-religious groups are disadvantaged, especially Muslims. In the case of the Druze, the dramatic difference between the income and high-earners graph reveal

that a few high-earning Druze men reap the benefits of the ethnically manipulated emergence of the Druze national identity, while the remaining Druze community remains relatively poor. As noted in the data section, the most affluent Palestinian locality is Mieliya, a Christian locality with an income per capita of 2718 shekels, while the national average for a locality is 2966 shekels. Thus while the Palestinian Christian masses may not be deprived relative to the other Palestinians, they are economically underprivileged given their high levels of education relative to their Jewish counterparts. Though the Bedouins are clearly destitute, any special treatment towards them by the state is unclear. In general, it is important to keep in mind that the privileged status of *some* Christians and Druses is only “privilege” in relation to the remaining Palestinians, and at best average on an Israeli national scale.

The growing Palestinian population in Israel is raising questions about how long Israel can remain a Jewish state with a Jewish majority. This may have motivated leaders such as Netanyahu, who claim that “Israel is for the Jews”, to actively discourage Palestinian Arabs from living in Israel in order to preserve its Jewish-Zionist character. However, the under-privileged minority status of Palestinians challenges the legitimacy of Israel as a democratic state. Some of the discriminatory policies by the state include the banning of most Palestinians from working in numerous economic sectors (due to their lack of military service) or not receiving adequate money and resources to build or improve educational and economic facilities in Palestinian localities.

For those who seek equality between Palestinians and Jews, I would recommend two major policy changes. The first would be to encourage the state to create an alternative activity to serving in the Israeli military for Palestinians and Jews who do not agree with the nature of the occupation. Otherwise, the system is strongly biased towards Jews who do not wish to serve as well. The alternative to serving in the military can be community service or a hi-tech job training program. Since Orthodox Jews do not have to serve, Jewish and Palestinian citizens of Israel should not have to serve in order to receive equal social, economic and political benefits. If this is



not permissible, then I would suggest that service in the military should not be a strong and sole determinant of attaining several of the occupations in the Israeli-Jewish labor market. Otherwise the military institution is used by the state as a form of *defacto discrimination*.

Though the incorporation of Palestinians in Israeli economic, political and social institutions is crucial to our modern ideals of democracy, one can think of this integration as a means to decrease the popularity of ethno-nationalist Arab parties. I bring this up because though I cannot make any policy implication towards voting, I have come across a variety of popular newspaper and magazine article readings from a wide variety of Israeli citizens, suggesting that ethno-nationalist parties are anti-Israel, anti-Zionist parties; this rhetoric also portrays ethno-nationalist parties to be traitors to the state of Israel, demonizing her principles of foundation and Jewish-Zionist character. If Palestinians did not truly experience acts of discrimination by both public and private sectors, they may not feel the *need* to vote for ethno-nationalist parties. Voting behavior, like in 1996 would likely be based more on class (and other reasons) rather than ethno-religious identity.

Though I did not include mixed Palestinian-Jewish localities, Khattab (2003) suggests that due to competition with the Jewish majority, on average, the Palestinians in mixed localities are in even worse conditions than the segregated Palestinians. For future research, I would suggest closely examining the economic status and political strategies of Palestinians residing in Palestinian-Jewish localities. On a similar note, though data on the Bedouins (in unrecognized villages) and the Golan Druze are rare, these two groups need to be explored as well. I would also encourage the enhancement of the limited OLS model with the grouped Multinomial Logit model. Other control variables that I would recommend including are gender, age and interaction terms using populated area and region.

## **Appendix A-Parties Running for the Knesset**

The following table (CBS) shows the Hebrew and English names, the platforms, and the number of votes and seats received for each of the parties that participated in the 1996 Knesset Elections. The ethno-nationalist parties were the Democratic Activist Organization (DAO), Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (DFPE), Arab Unity, Democratic Arab and United Arab List (UAL), and the Progressive Alliance. The platforms of these parties addressed citizenship and security rights for the Palestinian citizens of Israel and/or peaceful and just solution for the Palestinians in the territories (i.e. autonomy, sovereignty, etc.)

Labor, Meretz, Noise, and Age (pensioners of Israel) are clearly leftwing instrumentalist parties. They are concerned with returning the Golan Heights to Syria or the Oslo process. Labor, Meretz and Age support a two state solution based on the boundaries of 1967. While Noise does not have a clear platform with respect to the Palestinian question, they are viewed as a secular party. Thus I decided to group them with leftwing instrumentalist because they did not voice clear opposition towards negotiations with the Palestinians.

The remaining parties are rightwing instrumentalist parties because they do not support the two state solution or any negotiations with the Palestinians. Though Third-way is considered “Center”, I included them with the rightwing instrumentalists. Third-way was formed in 1995 and split from Labor during the Rabin-Peres peace talks (Jewish virtual library, 2004, para.1). (For more information regarding these parties see Jewish Virtual Library or Political Parties and Platforms in works cited)

## Results of the 1996 Knesset Elections (political parties and their valid votes)

Hebrew Name	English Name	Platform	Votes	Seats
Ha'Avodah	Labour	Center left	818741	34
Mafdal	National Religious p.	Religious Right	240271	9
Yahadut Ha'Thorah	Torah Judaism	Religious Ultra-Orthodox	98657	4
Da'am	Democratic Activist Organization	Socialist	1351	0
Mifleget Ha'hityashvuth	Settlers' Party	"Agrarian"	5533	0
Ha'Drech Hashlishit	Third Way	Center	96474	4
Hadash	Democratic Front for Peace and Equality	Communist led front	129455	5
Ra'ash	Noise	"Males' Rights"	2388	0
Moledet	Motherland	Nationalist Extreme Right	72002	2
Yemin Yisrael	Israel Right	Religious Right	2845	0
Yisrael Ba'Aliyah	Israel immigration/moving forward	Sharansky's "Russian" immigrants Center-Right	174994	7
Likud, Geshet, Tsomet	Likud (Unity) led bloc	Right	767401	32
Meretz-Yisrael Ha'democratit	Meretz-Democratic Israel	Left-dovish	226775	9
Ha'ichud Ha'Arvi	Arab unity led by Ahmed Tibi	Arab "left" secular party	2087	0
Mada-Ra'Am	Democratic Arab Party and United Arab list	Arab "left" Nationalist party and a Moslem party	89514	4
Gil – Gimlaei Yisrael	Age – the pensioners of Israel	Sectarian – left-center	14935	0
Ha'Brith Ha'mitkademet	The Progressive Alliance	left	13983	0
Ahdut Le'ma'an Aliyah	Unity for Immigration	Immigrants party (led by former Labor MK from Georgia)	22741	0
Shas	Shas	Religious Sephardi	259796	10
Telem-Emuna	"Way" of Faith	Led by a defector from Shas	12737	0

Similarly, the table below demonstrates the results of the 1999 Knesset elections. The platforms of the ethno-nationalist parties did not make any notable changes. These parties are the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), DFPE, UAL, DAO, and The New Arab. The Leftwing instrumentalist parties included several new parties such as the Greens, Natural Law party, Green Leave, the Center party, One People, and Shinui. All of these parties advocated at least negotiations with the Palestinians if not citizenship/security rights. The remaining parties are rightwing instrumentalist parties.

#### Results of the 1999 Knesset elections

Hebrew Name	English Name	Platform	Valid Votes	Seats
Yisrael Ahat-ha'Avoda, Geshet, Meimad	One Israel	Labour with two minor groups: one defected Likud, the other dovish religious	670484	26
Mafdal	National Religious Party	Religious – Right wing	140307	5
Yahadut Ha'thorah	Torah (Bible) Judaism	Ultra Orthodox - Center	125741	5
Balad	National Democratic Alliance	Arab Secular (left)	66103	2
Ha'Derech Ha'shlishit	The Third Way	Center (“Golan party”)	26290	0
Hadash	Peace and Equality Front	Communist led front – mainly Arab	87022	3
Ra'ash	Noise	Males' Rights	1257	0
Moreshet Avot	Ancestors' Heritage	Religious – Right wing	1164	0
Ha'Ikud Ha'Leumi	National Unity	Right wing front (nationalist)	100181	4
Lev	Heart (immigrants for Israel)	Immigrants party	6311	0
Shinui	Change	Center anti-clerical party	167748	6
Yisrael Ba'Aliyah	Israel in Immigration	Immigrants' Party led by Sharansky	171705	6
Yisrael Beitenu	Israel our home	Immigrants right wing party led by Liberman	86153	4
Am Ehad	One people	Left wing party for rights of workers and pensioners led by Amir Peretz	64143	2
Likud	Likud (unity) led by Netanyahu	Right wing	468103	19
Meretz yisrael hademocratit	Meretz – Democratic Israel	Dovish left wing	253525	10
Mifleget hamerkaz hademocratit	Center Democratic Party	Established by Romanian Immigrants	2797	0
Netz	Hawk	The Negev Party	4324	0

Ra'am	United Arab list	Arab - Moslem	114810	5
Pnina Rosenblum	Pnina Rosenblum	She is an owner of a cosmetics' factory – former model (people voted for her as a protest against all “other parties”)	44953	0
Mifleget Ha'Merkaz	The Center Party	Center (very much anti-Netanyahu)	165622	6
Koach La'Gimlaim	Power to Pensioners	Pensioners led by former Labour MK	37525	0
Tsomet	Crossroad	Right wing	4128	0
Mifleget Ha'Kazino	Casino party	For legal casinos in Israel	6540	0
Irgun Ha'Peula Ha'democrati	Democratic Action Organization	Socialist	2151	0
Aleh Yarok	Green Leave	Legalization of “soft” drugs	34029	0
Ha'Arvi Ha'Hadash	The New Arab	Arab	2042	0
Tikvah	Hope	I really do not remember. Strangely enough the letters of “hope” represented the word “end” (or even “end of all ends” in Hebrew)	7366	0
Mifleget Hok Ha'Teva	Nature Law Party	Naturalist “spiritualist”	2924	0
Ha'Yerukim	The Greens	Environment Party	13292	0
Shas	Shas	Religious Sephardi	430676	17

## APPENDIX B-Mixed and Unmixed Localities

All sixty nine localities in this study have a minimum of 2000 inhabitants, as defined by the Central Bureau of Statistics. Fifty three of these localities are homogeneous with respect to religion while sixteen are heterogeneous. A locality is heterogeneous with respect to religion if more than 500 of its inhabitants are classified as a religion other than the predominant religion.<sup>31</sup> Since all localities in this study have a minimum of 2000 inhabitants, 75% of the inhabitants in homogenous localities are guaranteed to be of the prevalent religion. However, in most cases the percentage of inhabitants that are classified under the major religion of a homogenous locality is about 97-100%.

The Druze are the majority of the population in twelve villages (three of which are mixed<sup>32</sup>) and all are located in the Galilee. There are only seven Palestinian localities where Christians are the majority (four of which are mixed) and all of these villages are also in Galilee. The Muslims are the majority in the forty nine remaining Palestinian localities (with nine mixed localities and twelve Bedouin localities) which are located in Galilee, the Triangle and the Negev.

Muslim localities do not only vary in location but also in their subcultures (Bedouin Muslim vs. non-Bedouin Muslim). Within the Muslim<sup>33</sup> population are the Bedouins, who according to the Association of Forty, represent about 10% of Muslims and have a total population of 70,000. Throughout hundreds of localities in Israel, 10,000 Bedouins live in the Galilee while 60,000 live in the Negev. The majority of these villages are not recognized by the state of Israel as localities. As far as I know, only twelve Bedouin localities have been recognized by the state and seven are in the Negev, three in Galilee and two in the Triangle.

The following tables provide a list of unmixed and mixed Palestinian localities. First these towns are categorized by their religion/subculture – Bedouin, Christian, Druze or Muslim. Then within each group, the localities are in alphabetical order. The populated area is figured out by the population. C, V, and T stand for city, village and town respectively. Cities have over 25,000 residents/citizens while the population of towns is greater than 10,000 (and <25,000) and the population of villages is less than 10,000 people respectively. Finally the region refers to the location of the Palestinian locality. N,C, and S stand for North, Central, and Southern Israel.

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<sup>31</sup> This is the definition given by the CBS for the 1995 census data.

<sup>32</sup> Mixed localities refer to the definition of heterogeneous locality stated above. This is to avoid the confusion that may arise since heterogeneity of Palestinians is the main focus of this paper.

<sup>33</sup> When Muslim is mentioned in this paper from this point onward, it is referring to Muslims who are not Bedouins.

<b>Name of Locality Unmixed</b>	<b>Code of Locality</b>	<b>Religion</b>	<b>Pop Area</b>	<b>Population</b>	<b>Region</b>
Aro'er	1192	B	T	10500	S
Hura	1303	B	V	6866	S
Kafar Qasem	634	B	T	15161	C
Kuseife	1059	B	V	7454	S
Laqye	1060	B	V	6100	S
Rahat	1161	B	C	32477	S
Segev-Shalom	1286	B	V	5005	S
Shibli	913	B	V	4277	N
Tayibe	2730	B	C	29595	C
Tel Sheva	1054	B	T	10621	S
Tuba-Zangariyye	962	B	V	4668	N
Zarzir	975	B	V	5619	N
<b>AVERAGE</b>					
Fassuta	535	C	V	2804	N
Jish	487	C	V	2514	N
Mi'elya	518	C	V	2525	N
<b>AVERAGE</b>					
Beit Jann	480	D	V	9261	N
Daliyat Al-Karmel	494	D	T	13099	N
Hurfeish	496	D	V	4821	N
Julis	485	D	V	4919	N
Kisra-Sumei	1296	D	V	5915	N
Majdal Shams	4201	D	V	8053	N
Sajur	525	D	V	3264	N
Yanuh-Jat	1295	D	V	4668	N
Yirka	502	D	T	11331	N
<b>AVERAGE</b>					
Abu Ghosh	472	M	V	5013	C
Ar'ara	637	M	T	13986	N
Arrabe	531	M	T	17356	C
Baqa Al-Gharbiyye	6000	M	T	19224	C
Basmat Tab'un	944	M	V	5549	N
Bi'ne	483	M	V	6535	N
Bir El-Maksur	998	M	V	6207	C
Dabburye	489	M	V	7478	C
Deir Hanna	492	M	V	7602	N
Deir-Al-Asad	490	M	V	8012	C
Ein Mahel	532	M	V	9564	N
Fureidis	537	M	V	9106	N
Iksal	478	M	T	10014	N
Jaljulye	627	M	V	6643	C
Jatt	628	M	V	8388	N
Jisr Az-Zarqa	541	M	V	9784	N
Kabul	504	M	V	8406	N
Kafar Kama	508	M	V	2647	N

Kafar Manda	510	M	T	13345	N
Kafar Qara	654	M	T	12791	N
Kaokab Abu Al-Hija	505	M	V	2507	N
Majd Al-Kurum	516	M	T	11125	N
Mazra'a	517	M	V	3205	N
Meshhed	520	M	V	6266	N
Nahef	522	M	V	8899	C
Qalansawe	638	M	T	14995	N
Sha'ab	538	M	V	5304	N
Tamra	8900	M	T	23329	C
Tire	2720	M	T	18835	N
Umm Al-Fahm	2710	M	C	36758	N

The following localities are diverse with respect to religion (mixed). The third column gives the percentage of Muslims, Christians and Druze respectively. The letter prior to these percentages gives the dominant religion of the locality-the religion practiced by the majority of citizens/residents in the locality.

<b>Localities Mixed</b>	<b>Code</b>	<b>(%M, %C, %D)</b>	<b>Pop. Area</b>	<b>Population</b>	<b>Region</b>
Eilabun	530	C(.244,.755,NA)	V	3937	N
I'Billin	529	C(.461,.539,NA)	V	9797	N
Kafar Yasif	507	C(.343,.634,NA)	V	7666	N
Rame	543	C(.134,.564,.3)	V	7166	N
Isifya	534	D(NA,.187,.753)	V	9381	N
Mughar	481	D(.183,.237,.574)	T	17549	N
Peqi'in	536	D(NA,.297,.682)	V	4644	N
Abu Sinan	473	M(.533,.209,.258)	T	10647	N
Judeide-Maker	1292	M(.894,.099,NA)	T	15709	N
Kafar Kanna	509	M(.856,.140,NA)	T	15612	N
Nazareth	7300	M(.601,.394,NA)	C	60600	N
Reine	542	M(.787,.211,NA)	T	13971	N
Sakhnin	7500	M(.933,.064,NA)	T	22087	N
Shefar'am	8800	M(.518,.319,.160)	C	29501	N
Tur'an	498	M(.840,.156,NA)	T	10022	N
Yafi	499	M(.720,.277,NA)	T	15123	N



## Appendix C-More Summary Statistics

The first two tables provide the mean for the dependent variables as well as the socio-economic variables for populated areas and geographic regions respectively. The socioeconomic data is based on the (socioeconomic) level of the localities in 1995 and the percentages of votes refer to the 1996 election.

<b>(Average % for populated areas)</b>	<b>Cities</b>	<b>Towns</b>	<b>Villages</b>
<b>Abstention</b>	8.654	7.517391	5.819756
<b>Peres</b>	87.49884	88.15433	84.21166
<b>Netanyahu</b>	3.847159	4.328274	9.968586
<b>Abstention (K)</b>	2.654	2.837391	2.594634
<b>LW Instrument</b>	20.72815	23.0994	37.67164
<b>Ethno-nationalist</b>	74.0019	68.31679	47.69843
<b>RW Instrument</b>	2.560642	5.713295	11.9985
<b>Median Wage (1995)</b>	2864.6	2835.478	2803.763
<b>Matriculation (1995)</b>	10.48	10.46522	9.715
<b>Academic</b>	5.18	5.082609	5.46
<b>% seeking jobs</b>	8	6.165217	6.955263
<b>Room Density</b>	23.82	23.82609	22.66
<b>(Average % for geographic region)</b>	<b>Central</b>	<b>North</b>	<b>South</b>
<b>Abstention</b>	5.831818	6.03	11.87143
<b>Peres</b>	91.58662	84.82691	83.44236
<b>Netanyahu</b>	2.581562	9.143088	4.686207
<b>Absten (K)</b>	2.61	2.490588	4.168571
<b>LW Instrument</b>	22.46046	35.28245	18.99916
<b>Ethno-nationalist</b>	72.29032	50.89846	72.27372
<b>RW Instrument</b>	2.6327	11.30044	4.409298
<b>Median Wage</b>	2905.455	2802.392	2800
<b>Matriculation rate</b>	12.26364	10.4	2.733
<b>Academic degrees</b>	5.854545	5.478431	2.9
<b>% seeking jobs</b>	6.181818	6.605882	10.3
<b>Room Density</b>	17.98182	22.06863	41.7

The socioeconomic data for the two tables below are based on the (socioeconomic) level of the localities in 2001 and the percentages of votes refer to the 1999 election. These tables calculate the average mean for the populated areas and geographic regions respectively.

<b>(Average % for populated areas)</b>	<b>Cities</b>	<b>Towns</b>	<b>Villages</b>
<b>Abstention</b>	5.472	5.516522	6.01561
<b>Barak</b>	90.69833	89.30527	84.58101
<b>Netanyahu</b>	3.829672	5.178212	9.403382
<b>Abstention (Knesset)</b>	2.814	2.736087	2.969756
<b>Ethnonationalist</b>	77.38463	69.25517	51.41972
<b>LW Instrument</b>	14.45602	17.79588	28.1716
<b>RW Instrument</b>	5.351245	10.21375	17.44063
<b>Avg Income per capita</b>	1486.8	1468.957	1622.19
<b>% w/ matriculation cert.</b>	29.946	32.81043	33.49048
<b>% seeking academic degree</b>	5.766	6.015217	6.675
<b>% workseekers</b>	4.77	6.177391	5.081429
<b>% of earners w&gt;2*avg wage</b>	1.64	1.973913	2.43

<b>(Average % for geographic region)</b>	<b>Central</b>	<b>North</b>	<b>South</b>
<b>Abstention</b>	4.471818	5.367059	11.13857
<b>Barak</b>	92.35376	86.31776	79.60526
<b>Netanyahu</b>	3.174425	8.315177	9.25617
<b>Abstention (Knesset)</b>	2.383636	2.700392	4.974286
<b>Ethnonationalist</b>	71.47334	55.31979	68.6407
<b>LW Instrument</b>	18.85367	25.76364	16.46931
<b>RW Instrument</b>	7.29116	16.21815	9.915712
<b>Avg Income per capita</b>	1442.818	1659.196	1266
<b>% w/ matriculation cert.</b>	29.82182	34.94961	28.64286
<b>% seeking academic degree</b>	4.360909	7.32	3.748571
<b>% workseekers</b>	4.273636	5.529412	7.191429
<b>% of earners w&gt;2*avg wage</b>	1.889091	2.442353	1.474286

The socioeconomic data for the two tables below are based on the (socioeconomic) level of mixed localities in 1995 and 2001 coupled with the 1996 and 1999 elections respectively.

<b>(Average % for different religions) (mixed localities)</b>	<b>Christian</b>	<b>Druze</b>	<b>Muslim</b>
<b>Abstention (1996)</b>	4.155	4.543333	8.178889
<b>Peres</b>	91.89109	85.67134	88.83359
<b>Netanyahu</b>	3.953905	9.785331	2.987517
<b>Abstention (Knesset) (1996)</b>	1.7325	2.146667	3.063333
<b>LW Instrumentalist</b>	31.24903	54.37372	21.34469
<b>Ethno-nationalist</b>	61.11268	28.80955	71.66851
<b>RW Instrumentalist</b>	5.895953	14.65702	3.925625
<b>Median Wage (1995)</b>	2700	2957	2769
<b>Matriculation</b>	13.2	16.13333	10.67778
<b>Academic</b>	7.65	5.233333	5.4
<b>% seeking jobs</b>	7.15	9.833333	6.777778
<b>Room Density</b>	14.225	16.2	21.36667
<b>(Average % for different religions) (mixed localities)</b>	<b>Christian</b>	<b>Druze</b>	<b>Muslim</b>
<b>Abstention (1999)</b>	4.05	5.823333	5.85
<b>Barak</b>	91.91776	79.53435	89.91591
<b>Netanyahu</b>	4.03224	14.64232	4.234089
<b>Abstention (Knesset) (1999)</b>	1.8975	2.716667	2.824444
<b>Ethno-nationalist</b>	68.90902	34.06689	77.977
<b>LW Instrumentalist</b>	18.43133	33.40269	12.49514
<b>RW Instrumentalist</b>	10.76948	29.80413	6.717505
<b>Average Income per capita (2001)</b>	1951.5	1899.667	1526.556
<b>% w/ matriculation cert.</b>	40.3275	38.24667	32.34556
<b>% seeking academic degree</b>	11.255	8.373333	6.876667
<b>% work-seekers</b>	5.3475	4.336667	6.606667
<b>% of earners w&gt;2*average wage</b>	2.985	4.54	2.005556

## Appendix D-Description of Socio-economic Variables

The following is a description of the socio-economic variables for 1995 and 2001.

<b>Socioeconomic Variables for 1995</b>	<b>Socioeconomic Variable for 2001</b>
Percentage of individuals with a <b>BA, MA or Doctoral degree</b> , calculated out of the total population aged 25-64.	Percent of students attending universities or colleges for an <b>academic degree</b> as a share of the total aged 20-29 in the local authority in 2000/2001.
Percentage of individuals with a <b>matriculation</b> certificate out of the total population aged 25-64.	Percent of persons entitled to <b>matriculation</b> certificate as a share of the relevant age-group (average of aged 17 and 18).
The <b>median wage</b> is calculated as the value where half of the employees in the country earn less, and half earn more.	Average <b>income per capita</b> -total income for the locality divided by 12 and then by the total number of residents in the local authority. <sup>34</sup>
Percentage of persons <b>searching for employment</b> calculated out of the total number of persons belonging to weekly civilian labor force. <sup>35</sup>	<b>Percent of work-seekers</b> with six or more days of unemployment, as a share of total aged 15 or more residing in the local authority in the year 2001.
Average number of <b>persons per room</b> , determined by dividing the total number of persons residing in the household by the total number of rooms used for living in the household.	<b>Percent of earners more than twice the average</b> wage in 2001 as a share of total employees in the local authority.

<sup>34</sup> Total income is computed by summing up the gross wages paid to employees during the year and the total income of the self-employed residing in the locality and total benefits paid by the NII and MRA in 2001.

<sup>35</sup> Weekly civilian labor force includes persons aged 15 and over who were employed in any job in Israel for at least one hour during the week preceding the enumeration; or persons who searched for employment during the four weeks preceding the enumeration.

## Appendix E-Full Regressions

### 1996 Abstention for Prime Minister and Knesset

regress abstention workseekers roomdensity wage matriculation academic binsouth  
christians druze muslims city town village north central, robust

Regression with robust standard errors

Number of obs = 68  
F( 12, 55) = 4.28  
Prob > F = 0.0001  
R-squared = 0.3506  
Root MSE = 3.9189

abstention	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
workseekers	.2270233	.1461943	1.55	0.126	-.0659567	.5200033
roomdensity	.1077888	.0892795	1.21	0.232	-.0711314	.286709
wage	3.652638	2.147425	1.70	0.095	-.6508981	7.956175
matriculat~n	-.0155135	.135708	-0.11	0.909	-.2874783	.2564513
academic	.3739984	.2306982	1.62	0.111	-.0883311	.8363278
binsouth	.0217763	.0338471	0.64	0.523	-.0460548	.0896073
christians	-.0397155	.0271917	-1.46	0.150	-.0942089	.0147779
druze	-.0358575	.0187016	-1.92	0.060	-.0733363	.0016212
muslims	-.0057396	.0139752	-0.41	0.683	-.0337467	.0222674
city	(dropped)					
town	-.9297102	1.555171	-0.60	0.552	-4.046343	2.186923
village	-2.493257	1.252802	-1.99	0.052	-5.003929	.0174142
north	(dropped)					
central	-1.950927	1.395115	-1.40	0.168	-4.7468	.8449462
_cons	-6.317202	8.31342	-0.76	0.451	-22.97767	10.34326

regress abstentk workseekers roomdensity wage matriculation academic binsouth christians  
druze muslims town village central, robust

Regression with robust standard errors

Number of obs = 68  
F( 12, 55) = 2.49  
Prob > F = 0.0111  
R-squared = 0.2895  
Root MSE = 1.1724

abstentk	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
workseekers	.0517284	.0588628	0.88	0.383	-.0662352	.169692
roomdensity	.0374095	.0229195	1.63	0.108	-.0085223	.0833413
wage	.9980882	.6315257	1.58	0.120	-.2675175	2.263694
matriculat~n	-.0245956	.0368414	-0.67	0.507	-.0984274	.0492361
academic	.0355731	.0639078	0.56	0.580	-.0925011	.1636472
binsouth	.0088879	.0077897	1.14	0.259	-.006723	.0244988
christians	-.0013235	.0072591	-0.18	0.856	-.0158711	.0132242
druze	-.002319	.0058873	-0.39	0.695	-.0141175	.0094795
muslims	.0034058	.0047075	0.72	0.472	-.0060282	.0128399
town	.2605863	.3805316	0.68	0.496	-.5020161	1.023189
village	.1277018	.3641766	0.35	0.727	-.6021245	.857528
central	-.0237559	.4914252	-0.05	0.962	-1.008594	.9610822
_cons	-1.669296	2.427636	-0.69	0.495	-6.534386	3.195795

### 1996 Vote for Netanyahu and Peres

regress netanyahu workseekers roomdensity wage matriculation academic binsouth christians  
druze muslims cworkseekers droomdensity mwage town village south central, robust

Regression with robust standard errors

Number of obs = 68  
F( 15, 52) = 8.74  
Prob > F = 0.0000  
R-squared = 0.8403  
Root MSE = 4.2608

netanyahu	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
workseekers	-.289246	.3513351	-0.82	0.414	-.9942513	.4157594
roomdensity	.0713953	.0721162	0.99	0.327	-.0733165	.216107
wage	-.7941483	5.669673	-0.14	0.889	-12.17118	10.58288
matriculat~n	.0045116	.19936	0.02	0.982	-.3955334	.4045567
academic	-.0190595	.2477089	-0.08	0.939	-.5161238	.4780048
binsouth	-.0246752	.0352673	-0.70	0.487	-.0954442	.0460937
christians	.0097655	.0616715	0.16	0.875	-.1139875	.1335185
druze	.1374571	.1205456	1.14	0.259	-.1044353	.3793494
muslims	-.0908432	.1761245	-0.52	0.608	-.4442628	.2625764
cworkseekers	-.0072078	.0085747	-0.84	0.404	-.0244142	.0099986
droomdensity	.0032735	.0047739	0.69	0.496	-.006306	.012853
mwage	.0158171	.0620863	0.25	0.800	-.1087682	.1404025
town	-1.079785	1.067242	-1.01	0.316	-3.221363	1.061793
village	1.174164	1.079038	1.09	0.282	-.9910835	3.339411
south	(dropped)					
central	.4670615	1.209222	0.39	0.701	-1.959419	2.893542
_cons	8.880917	18.0828	0.49	0.625	-27.40487	45.16671

regress peres workseekers roomdensity wage matriculation academic binsouth christians druze muslims croomdensity broomdensity town village south central, robust

Regression with robust standard errors

Number of obs = 68  
 F( 14, 53) = 7.59  
 Prob > F = 0.0000  
 R-squared = 0.6528  
 Root MSE = 6.3634

peres	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
workseekers	.3126259	.4231085	0.74	0.463	-.5360223	1.161274
roomdensity	-.1315893	.1398776	-0.94	0.351	-.4121481	.1489696
wage	-3.663572	3.260938	-1.12	0.266	-10.20419	2.877041
matriculat~n	.0022427	.2678996	0.01	0.993	-.5350959	.5395814
academic	-.3667755	.4032249	-0.91	0.367	-1.175542	.4419911
binsouth	.0845312	.0615997	1.37	0.176	-.0390223	.2080846
christians	-.0113572	.1082974	-0.10	0.917	-.2285744	.2058599
druze	-.2790439	.094284	-2.96	0.005	-.4681536	-.0899342
muslims	-.0615763	.0860634	-0.72	0.477	-.2341977	.1110451
croomdensity	-.0011275	.0051988	-0.22	0.829	-.011555	.0093
broomdensity	-.0053089	.0036096	-1.47	0.147	-.0125488	.0019309
town	1.777641	2.293817	0.77	0.442	-2.823174	6.378456
village	.7076832	2.331322	0.30	0.763	-3.968356	5.383722
south	(dropped)					
central	.5077433	2.340521	0.22	0.829	-4.186747	5.202233
_cons	109.1738	15.82409	6.90	0.000	77.4347	140.9129

## 1996 Vote for Ethno-nationalist, Leftwing & Rightwing Instrumentalist Parties

regress ethnonationalist workseekers roomdensity wage matriculation academic binsouth christians druze muslims croomdensity broomdensity mworkseekers town village central, robust

Regression with robust standard errors

Number of obs = 68  
 F( 15, 52) = 16.18  
 Prob > F = 0.0000  
 R-squared = 0.6815  
 Root MSE = 17.481

ethnonational	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
workseekers	3.556363	1.289391	2.76	0.008	.9690105	6.143716
roomdensity	.390407	.3648153	1.07	0.289	-.3416485	1.122462
wage	12.18033	9.211831	1.32	0.192	-6.304562	30.66522
matriculation	.1883311	.6844073	0.28	0.784	-1.185033	1.561695
academic	-.8710221	1.346249	-0.65	0.520	-3.572469	1.830424
binsouth	.4113825	.1466102	2.81	0.007	.1171875	.7055775
christians	.2973209	.3055837	0.97	0.335	-.3158777	.9105195
druze	-.6207242	.1718286	-3.61	0.001	-.9655236	-.2759248
muslims	.2133854	.2024295	1.05	0.297	-.192819	.6195898
croomdensity	-.0607441	.0194607	-3.12	0.003	-.0997949	-.0216933

broomdensity	-.0156703	.0070153	-2.23	0.030	-.0297475	-.0015931
mworkseekers	-.0670591	.0170159	-3.94	0.000	-.1012041	-.0329141
town	7.864652	5.815994	1.35	0.182	-3.805993	19.5353
village	5.772227	5.731184	1.01	0.319	-5.728236	17.27269
central	21.41241	7.424599	2.88	0.006	6.513858	36.31095
_cons	7.796037	35.51228	0.22	0.827	-63.46456	79.05664

regress lwinstrument workseekers roomdensity wage matriculation academic binsouth  
christians druze muslims croomdensity broomdensity mworkseekers town village central,  
robust

Regression with robust standard errors

Number of obs = 68  
F( 15, 52) = 6.29  
Prob > F = 0.0000  
R-squared = 0.5492  
Root MSE = 16.739

lwinstrument	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
workseekers	-2.29316	1.073979	-2.14	0.037	-4.448256	-.1380641
roomdensity	-.466602	.3496451	-1.33	0.188	-1.168216	.2350122
wage	-11.42655	8.661146	-1.32	0.193	-28.80642	5.953306
matriculation	-.2978352	.7046485	-0.42	0.674	-1.711816	1.116145
academic	.5101056	1.272739	0.40	0.690	-2.043832	3.064043
binsouth	-.291255	.1283569	-2.27	0.027	-.548822	-.033688
christians	-.3642502	.2887385	-1.26	0.213	-.9436464	.2151459
druze	.1786039	.1774795	1.01	0.319	-.1775348	.5347426
muslims	-.2521799	.2010507	-1.25	0.215	-.6556176	.1512578
croomdensity	.0562769	.0182694	3.08	0.003	.0196166	.0929372
broomdensity	.0078583	.0065758	1.20	0.237	-.005337	.0210536
mworkseekers	.0528224	.0142258	3.71	0.001	.0242764	.0813685
town	-7.969966	5.802224	-1.37	0.175	-19.61298	3.673048
village	-9.697738	5.710957	-1.70	0.095	-21.15761	1.762135
central	-21.39805	7.262535	-2.95	0.005	-35.97139	-6.824704
_cons	95.68899	36.1065	2.65	0.011	23.236	168.142

regress rwinstrument workseekers roomdensity wage matriculation academic binsouth  
christians druze muslims mwage town village central, robust

Regression with robust standard errors

Number of obs = 68  
F( 13, 54) = 16.47  
Prob > F = 0.0000  
R-squared = 0.8987  
Root MSE = 4.3778

rwinstrument	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
workseekers	-.479464	.3204208	-1.50	0.140	-1.121869	.162941
roomdensity	.1296211	.0958166	1.35	0.182	-.0624798	.3217219
wage	-12.77452	4.888639	-2.61	0.012	-22.57565	-2.973387
matriculation	.1668926	.2404749	0.69	0.491	-.3152305	.6490158
academic	-.161314	.291972	-0.55	0.583	-.7466826	.4240546
binsouth	-.0077686	.0315176	-0.25	0.806	-.0709575	.0554203
christians	.0233267	.0333578	0.70	0.487	-.0435516	.0902049
druze	.3099839	.0391726	7.91	0.000	.2314475	.3885203
muslims	-.441493	.1553296	-2.84	0.006	-.75291	-.130076
mwage	.1495758	.0552191	2.71	0.009	.0388682	.2602835
town	1.151576	.9513009	1.21	0.231	-.755668	3.058819
village	4.168001	1.144266	3.64	0.001	1.873886	6.462115
central	1.384355	1.372516	1.01	0.318	-1.367373	4.136084
_cons	37.3	15.00265	2.49	0.016	7.221487	67.37851

## 1999 Abstention for Prime Minister and Knesset

regress abstention topearners income workseekers academic matriculation binsouth druze  
christian muslims mincome dincome cmatric city village central, robust

Regression with robust standard errors

Number of obs = 69  
F( 15, 53) = 7.54

Prob > F = 0.0000  
R-squared = 0.5209  
Root MSE = 2.3535

abstention	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
topearners	-.2300824	.676555	-0.34	0.735	-1.58708	1.126915
income	.0745394	3.554895	0.02	0.983	-7.055678	7.204756
workseekers	-.0247736	.1253905	-0.20	0.844	-.2762752	.2267279
academic	-.0608097	.2124372	-0.29	0.776	-.4869048	.3652853
matriculation	-.0106796	.0449369	-0.24	0.813	-.1008116	.0794524
binsouth	.0328645	.0142432	2.31	0.025	.0042964	.0614327
druze	.0924364	.0950042	0.97	0.335	-.0981179	.2829907
christians	-.0114158	.0558801	-0.20	0.839	-.1234971	.1006656
muslims	-.0174079	.0673017	-0.26	0.797	-.152398	.1175823
mincome	-.0056544	.0484366	-0.12	0.908	-.102806	.0914971
dincome	-.0662328	.060828	-1.09	0.281	-.1882383	.0557727
cmatric	-.0001162	.0016898	-0.07	0.945	-.0035054	.0032731
city	-1.259942	.7308951	-1.72	0.091	-2.725932	.2060479
village	.4600488	.5930749	0.78	0.441	-.7295088	1.649606
central	-1.241376	.97688	-1.27	0.209	-3.200749	.7179974
_cons	8.726066	5.727648	1.52	0.134	-2.762141	20.21427

regress abstentk topearners income workseekers academic matriculation binsouth druze  
christian muslims dwealthy cmatric city village central, robust

Regression with robust standard errors

Number of obs = 69  
F( 14, 54) = 6.52  
Prob > F = 0.0000  
R-squared = 0.5829  
Root MSE = 1.1053

abstentk	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
topearners	-.1650421	.211828	-0.78	0.439	-.5897317	.2596474
income	.2734937	.8059119	0.34	0.736	-1.342262	1.88925
workseekers	.0439296	.0673653	0.65	0.517	-.0911298	.1789889
academic	-.0680707	.1212047	-0.56	0.577	-.3110714	.1749301
matriculation	.0389911	.0224035	1.74	0.087	-.0059251	.0839074
binsouth	.0131106	.0036744	3.57	0.001	.0057438	.0204774
druze	.0516129	.0263077	1.96	0.055	-.0011308	.1043567
christians	-.0035034	.0192104	-0.18	0.856	-.0420179	.0350112
muslims	-.0085282	.003874	-2.20	0.032	-.016295	-.0007613
dwealthy	-.0162966	.0070562	-2.31	0.025	-.0304434	-.0021497
cmatric	-.0002409	.0004274	-0.56	0.575	-.0010977	.000616
city	-.1383471	.3507453	-0.39	0.695	-.8415491	.5648548
village	.4499574	.3049715	1.48	0.146	-.1614737	1.061388
central	-.4333376	.4344091	-1.00	0.323	-1.304275	.4376003
_cons	2.145381	.9757212	2.20	0.032	.1891776	4.101584

## 1999 Vote for Barak and Netanyahu

regress barak topearners income workseekers academic matriculation binsouth druze  
christian muslims bwealthy cincome dincome mincome city village central, robust

Regression with robust standard errors

Number of obs = 69  
F( 16, 52) = 26.20  
Prob > F = 0.0000  
R-squared = 0.8629  
Root MSE = 4.2551

barak	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
topearners	.1370258	1.382095	0.10	0.921	-2.636351	2.910402
income	-12.98211	6.489311	-2.00	0.051	-26.00387	.0396455
workseekers	-.3219307	.3198483	-1.01	0.319	-.9637532	.3198918
academic	.4598907	.3588387	1.28	0.206	-.2601718	1.179953
matriculation	.0984381	.0914566	1.08	0.287	-.0850829	.2819592



binsouth	-.0649574	.0318516	-2.04	0.047	-.1288724	-.0010425
druze	-.7353368	.1922641	-3.82	0.000	-1.121143	-.3495308
christians	-.0260233	.151643	-0.17	0.864	-.3303172	.2782707
muslims	-.0536193	.1083543	-0.49	0.623	-.2710482	.1638096
bwealthy	.0161611	.0228153	0.71	0.482	-.0296212	.0619434
cincome	.0749686	.0924039	0.81	0.421	-.1104534	.2603906
dincome	.3552382	.1210643	2.93	0.005	.1123049	.5981715
mincome	.1013831	.0847032	1.20	0.237	-.0685862	.2713525
city	2.340422	2.21158	1.06	0.295	-2.097438	6.778283
village	-2.619157	1.145807	-2.29	0.026	-4.918387	-.3199258
central	.917098	1.647478	0.56	0.580	-2.388807	4.223003
_cons	98.88571	10.47958	9.44	0.000	77.85689	119.9145

regress netanyahu topearners income workseekers academic matriculation binsouth druze  
christian muslims bwealthy cincome dincome mincome city village central, robust

Regression with robust standard errors

Number of obs = 69  
F( 16, 52) = 23.88  
Prob > F = 0.0000  
R-squared = 0.8961  
Root MSE = 3.3784

netanyahu	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
topearners	.3470639	1.031748	0.34	0.738	-1.72329	2.417417
income	<b>10.90312</b>	<b>4.997499</b>	<b>2.18</b>	<b>0.034</b>	<b>.874904</b>	<b>20.93134</b>
workseekers	.3252803	.2753904	1.18	0.243	-.227331	.8778916
academic	-.444971	.2645172	-1.68	0.099	-.9757636	.0858217
matriculation	-.0859077	.0688399	-1.25	0.218	-.2240449	.0522296
binsouth	.0351521	.0253591	1.39	0.172	-.0157346	.0860389
druze	<b>.6014289</b>	<b>.1481391</b>	<b>4.06</b>	<b>0.000</b>	<b>.3041659</b>	<b>.8986918</b>
christians	-.0383801	.0861877	-0.45	0.658	-.2113284	.1345683
muslims	.0276776	.0734789	0.38	0.708	-.1197685	.1751238
bwealthy	-.0369052	.0166673	-2.21	0.031	-.0703505	-.0034598
cincome	-.0421349	.0565213	-0.75	0.459	-.1555532	.0712834
dincome	-.2782272	<b>.1018291</b>	<b>-2.73</b>	<b>0.009</b>	<b>-.4825623</b>	<b>-.0738921</b>
mincome	-.0814412	.0600596	-1.36	0.181	-.2019595	.0390772
city	-.8744607	1.822992	-0.48	0.633	-4.532562	2.78364
village	2.10617	1.000568	2.10	0.040	.098384	4.113957
central	.0126963	1.437972	0.01	0.993	-2.872806	2.898198
_cons	-2.422375	7.488485	-0.32	0.748	-17.44912	12.60437

## 1999 Vote for Ethno-nationalist, Leftwing & Rightwing Instrumentalist Parties

regress ethnonationalist wealthy income workseekers academic matriculation binsouth druze  
christian muslims city village central, robust

Regression with robust standard errors

Number of obs = 69  
F( 12, 56) = 70.03  
Prob > F = 0.0000  
R-squared = 0.8192  
Root MSE = 12.167

ethnonational	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
topearners	5.663434	2.337863	2.42	0.019	.9801319	10.34674
income	-7.718617	8.103077	-0.95	0.345	-23.95103	8.513798
workseekers	.1230511	.7710056	0.16	0.874	-1.421459	1.667561
academic	-.5372871	.8477319	-0.63	0.529	-2.235498	1.160924
matriculation	-.2535887	.2438076	-1.04	0.303	-.741994	.2348165
binsouth	.1433896	.0746439	1.92	0.060	-.0061401	.2929194
druze	-.495656	.0650224	-7.62	0.000	-.6259114	-.3654005
christians	.3169	.116878	2.71	0.009	.0827652	.5510347
muslims	.1699656	.0636717	2.67	0.010	.0424158	.2975154
city	5.193822	4.419711	1.18	0.245	-3.659923	14.04757
village	-13.20498	3.686155	-3.58	0.001	-20.58923	-5.820719
central	3.194727	5.431881	0.59	0.559	-7.686639	14.07609
_cons	70.92036	10.40323	6.82	0.000	50.08018	91.76054

regress lwinstrument topearners income workseekers academic matriculation binsouth druze  
christian muslims city village central, robust

Regression with robust standard errors

Number of obs = 69  
 F( 12, 56) = 15.89  
 Prob > F = 0.0000  
 R-squared = 0.5419  
 Root MSE = 10.556

lwinstrument	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
topearners	-2.529887	2.637968	-0.96	0.342	-7.814372	2.754598
income	5.306481	6.465216	0.82	0.415	-7.644904	18.25787
workseekers	.1399844	.7043548	0.20	0.843	-1.271008	1.550977
academic	.3809397	.8279374	0.46	0.647	-1.277618	2.039497
matriculation	.1957976	.2497956	0.78	0.436	-.3046031	.6961983
binsouth	-.129792	.0577919	-2.25	0.029	-.2455632	-.0140208
druze	.1502034	.0817987	1.84	0.072	-.0136591	.3140659
christians	-.2238394	.1092317	-2.05	0.045	-.4426567	-.0050221
muslims	-.1234962	.0522252	-2.36	0.022	-.2281159	-.0188766
city	-1.828756	3.654062	-0.50	0.619	-9.148723	5.49121
village	7.595482	3.329414	2.28	0.026	.9258646	14.2651
central	-.6411517	4.163652	-0.15	0.878	-8.981948	7.699645
_cons	14.13147	10.58999	1.33	0.187	-7.082834	35.34577

regress rwinstrument topearners income academic matriculation workseekers druze  
 > binsouth muslim christian city village central, robust

Regression with robust standard errors

Number of obs = 69  
 F( 12, 56) = 35.12  
 Prob > F = 0.0000  
 R-squared = 0.8554  
 Root MSE = 6.0605

rwinstrument	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
topearners	-2.373957	1.139055	-2.08	0.042	-4.655759	-.0921545
income	2.182575	4.096705	0.53	0.596	-6.024111	10.38926
academic	.2782493	.3966148	0.70	0.486	-.5162655	1.072764
matriculation	-.0030149	.1166514	-0.03	0.979	-.2366957	.230666
workseekers	-.2715027	.4491935	-0.60	0.548	-1.171345	.62834
druze	.3399253	.0602321	5.64	0.000	.2192659	.4605846
binsouth	-.0266323	.0598036	-0.45	0.658	-.1464333	.0931687
muslims	-.0393232	.0560874	-0.70	0.486	-.1516797	.0730332
christians	-.0908971	.0794434	-1.14	0.257	-.2500413	.0682471
city	-3.078375	1.898969	-1.62	0.111	-6.882468	.7257173
village	5.2267	1.644115	3.18	0.002	1.933142	8.520258
central	-2.146489	2.611174	-0.82	0.415	-7.377298	3.08432
_cons	11.9715	5.760068	2.08	0.042	.4326999	23.5103

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