Linkage Strategies of Authoritarian Successor Parties

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Do political parties that are steeped in the personnel, practices, and regime party organization of authoritarian regimes give new democracies a distinctive dynamic of party competition? In this chapter, we examine the linkage strategies of authoritarian successor parties, focusing on those parties whose operatives are affiliated with political networks that were rooted in the party governance of durable authoritarian regimes before the advent of the most recent spell of competitive party democracy. Our goal is to explore whether such parties, which correspond to the subtype of authoritarian successor parties called *former authoritarian ruling parties* (FARPs) in Chapter 1 (Loxton, this volume), develop distinctive citizen-politician linkage profiles in their quest to establish or maintain political hegemony. And, in fact, they do. We find that FARPs mount a greater effort to develop targeted clientelistic appeals to electoral constituencies than other parties. More specifically, FARPs appear to have particular advantages when it comes to cultivating clientelistic transactions with individuals via their extensive preexisting networks that continue from the authoritarian period.

The same advantages do not apply to the other subtype of authoritarian successor parties discussed in Chapter 1 (Loxton, this volume), namely *reactive authoritarian successor parties* (RASPs). We do not dwell empirically on this contrast later in the chapter, but many RASPs simply lack the strength and continuity of personnel and organization that gives FARPs their unique capacity to promote clientelistic partisan linkages into the democratic era.

While FARPs develop a robust and unique effort at clientelistic linkage building, they do not promote particularly high levels of programmatic clarity and cohesion. Nor are they particularly adept at embracing strategies of "linkage differentiation" to deliver both clientelistic and programmatic benefits to distinct constituencies (cf. Kitschelt and Singer 2016). The emergence of programmatic representation seems to reflect the development of state capacity to deliver on policy promises and the emergence of an electorate that cannot be easily mobilized through material inducements, not the kinds of networks that FARPs inherit from the authoritarian period.

We begin with theoretical considerations of what may enable parties to choose among different linkage strategies to attract electoral constituencies. Against this backdrop, the first section develops our conception of FARPs as a subset of the authoritarian successor parties (ASPs) that are the focus of this volume, and hypothesizes about whether and how such parties may have particular advantages in crafting certain electoral linkages. Crucially, we do not believe that all ASPs will have access to these resources. In particular, we do not expect that RASPs founded by former autocrats after the transition will possess the same advantages, nor will ASPs that were ruling dictatorial parties for only a short period of time. Finally, we expect that the head start that FARPs enjoy will fade over time as other parties develop their own networks and as generational turnover in party leadership occurs. In the second section, we introduce the data to measure parties' linkage strategies and organizational capabilities. In the third section, we present results for parties' efforts to engage in clientelistic targeted exchanges and in programmatic ones. In the conclusion, we speculate about how the dynamics of FARP linkage building may also make these parties particularly vulnerable to electoral decline.

1. **General Conditions for the Formation of Citizen-Politician Linkages and the Unique Advantages of Former Authoritarian Ruling Parties**

Aldrich (1995) argues that parties often manage to master two tasks, but typically after a historical period of trial and error. First, they solve collective action problems for politicians and voters. By pooling resources, politicians use parties to develop brand recognition and economies of scale in reaching out to voters, while also reducing voters' costs in comparing alternative vote options and helping them to turn out to the polls. Second, parties may also enable politicians to work out common policy positions in legislatures and campaigns (policy platforms, programs, manifestos, etc.). This enables them to speak on policy in a collective single voice, cutting through the cacophony of individual politicians' diverse preferences and enabling voters to take simple programmatic cues that constitute credible partisan policy signals.

Aldrich's historical work on U.S. party formation illustrates that solving collective action and social choice problems under conditions of electoral competition is no mean feat. It involves heavy investments in time, money and psychic energy, and does not bear fruit overnight. As a first cut, this suggests a model of party careers through *long-term maturation through stages, if not whole life cycles, involving the construction of party organization and citizen linkages*. At the aggregate level, whole party systems may pass through this trajectory in tandem as democracies age and continue through multiple rounds of party competition.[1] We introduce this model as a foil to highlight how FARPs can shortcut this developmental stage model:

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[1] For a life cycle interpretation of party building, see Panebianco (1988: chapter 4).

- In *founding democratic elections*, when new parties have no time to make these investments, they and voters will be compelled to rely on simple clues to build linkages such as (1) descriptive representativeness of parties (whether in terms of class, ethnicity, religion, language, gender or other markers), or (2) the personal charisma and pre-partisan professional and civic achievements of candidates (this is why successful soldiers win presidential office), or (3) the momentary intense salience of a single issue and the valence advantage of a party (or particular candidate) on that issue because of its issue entrepreneurship in the founding election campaigns.

- Next, in subsequent rounds of party competition, as parties begin to *accumulate a track record in the eyes of voters beyond the initial rounds of elections,* citizens may choose among them retrospectively based on (4) their ability to deliver benefits, whether in terms of large-scale collective and club goods (such as improving one's relative and absolute income) or (5) localized, small-group, restricted and specific pork and constituency service.

- Only if parties go through a *further cumulation of rounds of competition*, however, can they achieve the *organizational investments* that enable them to generate (6) clientelistic linkages and/or (7) programmatic commitments that crystallize their electoral appeals in the competitive game.

- Ultimately, these practices may in turn help them to nurture (8) the *emergence of party identifications* that establish affective bonds between citizens and party alternatives. Whether a running tally of past clientelistic or programmatic services

or an emotional bond, party identification results from cumulative partisan histories, crystallized around a record of political action and rhetoric.

- Life cycles sometimes end with the decomposition of party organization, the withering of activists, and the decline of electoral support. The remaining participants eventually have to choose between disbanding the effort or fundamentally reconceiving the party's mission and electorate. This is the process that many agrarian, some religious, and most former communist parties have undergone.

In later rounds of the electoral game, the "primitive" and "early" forms of linkage (candidate personality, descriptive representation, single issue valence) will not entirely go away, but the more complex forms may additionally become available. And depending on the context, some will even then not entirely kick in. For the purposes of our analysis, it is important to note that clientelistic linkage presupposes organizational capabilities and thus takes time to be established (see Hicken 2011 for an overview). Clientelism, after all, involves a double contingency, governed by the temporal sequence of the interaction. Voters may accept benefits, but then defect and not deliver their votes and other commitments to make partisan contributions. Politicians may do likewise: they may accept support, but not deliver benefits. Incorporating partisan supporters into lasting formal party organizations and informal networks lowers the need for costly monitoring and sanctioning voters who might opportunistically defect from clientelistic, contingent exchange. By insertion in long-term networks, subtle mutual observation, gossiping, and normative commitments resulting from interactive reciprocity may substitute for heavy-

handed enforcement of spot-market contracts that is difficult to engineer, particularly in a context where the universal vote is effectively secret.

Because clientelistic exchange requires time to build complex organizational networks, we believe that the influential claim that clientelism is predominantly a linkage practice of "young" democracies (Keefer 2007) does not withstand close scrutiny—or at the very least needs to be qualified. At the aggregate level of comparing entire party systems, there is, if anything, a *curvilinear relationship between democratic stock, understood as the cumulative experience of politicians with democratic party competition, and parties' clientelistic linkage efforts* (Kitschelt and Kselman 2013).

There is one critical condition, however, under which the appearance of clientelism in early stages of democratic partisan competition seems warranted: if former authoritarian ruling parties (FARPs) are present. Political parties that ruled and mobilized regime support during an authoritarian period and then compete after a subsequent democratic transition typically have already made heavy organizational investments in personnel, party infrastructure, and linkages to administrative, economic, and social associational networks, especially in local settings. At least some of these networks and organizational capacities are likely to have survived the transition. As a consequence, these FARPs, unlike RASPs, enjoy a "flying start" into the era of democratic competition and may have capabilities to establish clientelistic linkages. The maturation or life cycle model therefore does not apply to these parties and party systems dominated by them. Our first hypothesis, therefore, states:

H1: All else equal, former authoritarian ruling parties (FARPs) will display greater clientelistic effort than the average of rival parties not formerly entrenched in the governance of an authoritarian regime.

However, FARPs are not likely to enjoy a similar advantage when it comes to developing a programmatic profile. First, in many emerging democracies, the conditions for the development of programmatic party competition may not be that promising for any political party. Let us just state a few adverse conditions that tend to undercut programmatic partisan appeals:

- Only in the presence of a sizeable proportion of citizens with elevated education and occupational skills is there a chance for strong programmatic policy demands.[2]

- Even in middle-income countries with strong developmental states,[3] the emergence of high state capacities may promote programmatic party competition and the provision of collective goods (Shefter 1977; Piattoni 2001; Besley and Persson 2012), but this applies only to a certain extent. Politicians in such polities have rapidly growing economic resources at their political discretion and may succumb to the temptation to use them for clientelistic linkage building. Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan were famously developmental states with high state capacity, yet also exhibited entrenched clientelistic parties in order to pay off the losers of rapid economic change.

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[2] The development paradigm loomed large over the early literature on clientelism in the 1960s and 1970s (see Schmidt, Guasti, Landé, and Scott 1977). More recently, what is disputed are the mechanisms through which development affects linkage strategies (for a review, see Hicken 2011: 209-214; Lyne 2007, 2008).

[3] On the developmental state, see Amsden (1989), Doner et al. (2005), Evans (1995), Haggard (1990), Haggard and Kaufman (2008), Johnson (1982), Rodrik (2011), Wade (1990), and Woo-Cumings (1999).

Parties in developmental states therefore sometimes engage in dual clientelistic-programmatic "product diversification" (cf. Díaz-Cayeros et al. 2016; Kitschelt and Singer 2016; Magaloni 2006; and Magaloni et al. 2007). When developmental states move closer to the global innovation frontier, their forms of economic governance become inefficient and costly. The crisis of developmental states therefore typically also precipitates a crisis of clientelism.[4] FARPs in middle-income developmental states are thus not predestined to be particularly programmatic.

- Under some conditions, ethnic group divisions may deepen and perpetuate the viability of clientelistic partisan linkages to a certain extent (Kolev and Wang 2010).

- Democratic institutions *per se* are surprisingly weak determinants of parties' predominant linkage strategies (cf. Kitschelt 2011b; Lyne 2007, 2008). If demand for clientelism is high, parties can counteract the programmatic incentives encouraged, for example, by closed-list proportional representation electoral rules (e.g., Carey and Shugart 1995; Harmel and Janda 1982; Samuels and Shugart 2010) by building compensatory party organizations that sustain clientelism. Conversely, programmatic parties may overcome clientelism-nurturing institutional incentives, as the emergence of programmatic parties in Brazil beginning in the 1990s demonstrates (Hagopian et al. 2008; Hunter 2010; Samuels 2004).

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[4] For a development of this argument and empirical evidence, see Greene (2007) and Kitschelt (2007), as well as Kitschelt with Wang (2012), Kitschelt with Wang et al. (2013), and Kitschelt and Wang (2014).

Second, even in the circumstances, where FARPs encounter a receptive context and opportunity structure of state capacities and political-economic development trajectories, they are likely to be in no better a position to devise a program than other more novel democratic parties. In some ways, in fact, FARPs are worse off. Just like other parties, they face the burden of devising a new programmatic formula in an environment for which they were not built. And often enough, FARPs did not subscribe to a clear ideology while serving as pillars of dictatorship. Even where they did, most citizens are likely to have discounted the ideology, as occurred, for example, under communism, where most citizens lived in a state of "preference falsification" in their public lives (Kuran 1987a, 1987b, 1991). Moreover, their past spells of authoritarian dominance may have burdened them with programmatic baggage (and a reputation) that is difficult to unload. Such baggage constitutes a liability and exacerbates FARPs' programmatic challenges. This applies especially to post-communist parties, in particular to those with a legacy of an inflexible, rigid, doctrinal communism that did not permit any room for divergence.[5]

This generates a second hypothesis:

H2: All else equal, FARPs in democracies will be no more able to develop a programmatic profile than parties without a legacy of authoritarian governance.

Indeed, we find no evidence in our empirical analysis of FARPs standing out in terms of programmatic structuration of partisan appeals. We will therefore address the evidence supporting our claim in only a cursory fashion toward the end of the chapter.

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[5] For an overview of these different legacies, see Pop-Eleches (2008).

Overall, our argument is that FARPs in democratic polities where there are demand- and supply-side incentives for politicians to invest in clientelistic linkages can "jump the queue" postulated by the life cycle model of linkage formation, according to which a full-fledged clientelistic effort becomes viable only after a number of rounds of party competition. From the beginning of democratic multi-party competition on a more or less level playing field, FARPs are spontaneously endowed with the resource- and organization-intensive linkage capabilities that facilitate clientelistic deployment.

In making this argument, we explicitly narrow our focus to a subset of the authoritarian successor parties that are the focus of this volume. In contrast to FARPs, many of the parties included in the other subtype of ASPs discussed in Chapter 1 (Loxton, this volume) did not play a role in maintaining support for the regime, but instead were created by regime incumbents in anticipation of an imminent transition to democracy or by former regime incumbents shortly thereafter. Since our analytical focus is on the importance of past organizational investment under authoritarianism for parties' later linkage strategies under democracy, we set aside reactive authoritarian successor parties that did not have this explicit authoritarian history.

We further restrict our qualification of authoritarian successor parties with two additional criteria. First, authoritarian ruling parties must have governed and acted as mobilizing agents for an extended period of time in order to entrench themselves and build the organizational residues that might give them an advantage in terms of clientelistic linkage building under democracy. *We propose here a minimum of ten years of authoritarian rule*. Like Svolik (2012: 42-43), we distinguish between the tenure of

individual authoritarian leaders and authoritarian ruling coalition spells that may embrace a succession of leaders.

Second, we believe that organizational investments have to be treated as a perishable asset. FARPs may have a head start, but these investments are degraded by continuous turnover of personnel and changing environmental conditions and shocks to the system. Consequently, the passage of time after the end of authoritarianism devalues the usefulness of the erstwhile organizational stock as party structures evolve and as other parties catch up. Eventually, and with a new generation of leaders and middle-level cadres in charge, it becomes difficult to recognize a party as a FARP. We have empirically played with different cutoff points for when a party ceases to be an FARP after the end of dictatorship. In an earlier draft, we employed a less charitable frame of 20 years, but that met resistance by knowledgeable students of FARPs. *We have therefore settled here for a more generous, longer framework of 30 years, a period of tenure achieved or exceeded by few party leaders.* It is fair to say that after a thirty-year window, parties will have gone through an all but complete generational turnover that allows new elites and middle cadres to work through the environmental shocks and stimuli to which the party has been exposed since the end of dictatorship. We therefore cease to code a party as an FARP if its spell of authoritarian rule ended more than thirty years before our point of observation.[6]

In the remainder of this theoretical elaboration of the chapter's empirical argument, let us go one step further in specifying FARPs' advantages in forming

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[6] Since our data on party organization and linkage strategies are from 2008-2009, our cutoff point is 1978, well before the full unfolding of most third-wave transitions to democracy. Again, we do not necessarily see this as a strict cutoff; we believe that legacy advantages will wane over time as parties evolve and either feed these networks or replace them. But for this first cut of the analysis, we needed a rule of thumb and 30 years seemed sufficient to us.

clientelistic linkage strategies by disaggregating the conception of clientelism. The organizational advantage of FARPs in projecting clientelistic efforts may be specified more precisely by distinguishing the channels through which clientelism actually occurs. Different techniques of clientelism may address the double contingency and opportunism of the exchange in different ways. Let us distinguish between a "temporal" and a "contractual" dimension along which clientelism can be organized in different ways.

On the *temporal dimension*, the exchange may be limited to a single transaction (vote buying, gifts, and one-off services, such as regulatory favors) or mark the opening of inter-temporally extended "relational" transactions (Nichter 2014). Relational clientelism may involve citizens' access to discretionary social benefits (disability insurance, health care, unemployment wage replacement, income subsidies, scholarships, etc.), as well as jobs in the public sector or in companies and non-profits ("patronage") that are regulated and funded by government agencies, such as procurement contracts to build and run infrastructure. On the *contractual dimension*, parties may target individuals and small groups for clientelistic benefits or they may rely on external intermediaries, such as owners/managers of large enterprises, community organizers and local intra-party or independent political brokers, or personnel of neighborhood non-profits as the recipient of benefits,[7] in exchange for the recipients' commitments to make the brokers' constituencies support their partisan benefactor. If parties contract with external intermediaries rather than voters directly, they *de facto* "delegate" or "contract out" the

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[7] There is now an extensive literature on political brokerage, particularly in Latin American countries, but also elsewhere. See, for example, Auyero (2001), Gay (1994), Stokes et al. (2013), Szwarcberg (2012, 2013, 2014), and Weitz-Shapiro (2014). But the concept of brokerage should not be confined to party-affiliated vote consolidators; they should also include independently operating political mobilizers and community-inserted notables. See, for example, Holland and Palmer-Rubin (2015).

task of partisan organization building to an external agent, or rely on an external organizational infrastructure that already exists for a different purpose. Thus, the entrepreneur who cajoles his workers into supporting a particular party or candidate does not create the organization for the purpose of electoral coordination. Parties acquire votes from an external contractor "wholesale," whereas in other instances they have to deal "retail" with individual voters and small groups.

In the empirical survey on which this chapter draws, respondents evaluated parties' efforts on five different clientelistic techniques (Table 1). The first, gifts and vote buying, is clearly a form of spot-market transaction targeted at individuals and small groups (e.g., families). The second and third, discretionary social benefits and employment patronage, involve relational exchanges, but are also targeted to individuals and small groups ("retail" level). The fourth, material favors through regulatory rulings, is harder to locate. For the most part, these are of a wholesale contractual nature, as they accrue to firms more than to individuals. However, they may be both spot-market or relational. Finally, procurement contracts are clearly in the realm of relational-contractual clientelism.

[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]

From the perspective of political parties, the effort the party organization has to make to counteract voter opportunism and defection is greater the more individualized ("retail"), short-term and single-shot the contract. In other words, spot-market vote buying exchanges are the most expensive transactions, requiring the most elaborate party organization and suffering the greatest dissipation of resources through the "leakiness" of the clientelistic bucket. The opposite applies across the diagonal, with iterated

"wholesale" group transactions, such as procurement grants to company towns. Individually geared relational clientelism (social program benefits, patronage) and wholesale spot-markets (e.g., some regulatory decisions) are somewhere in between.

Given that organizational networks—both within the formal organization of the party as well as the informal networks in the community—are FARPs' main strength in clientelistic linkage building compared to other parties, we would expect them to have the greatest comparative advantage with regard to the deployment of short-term "retail" clientelism, but less with regard to wholesale iterated clientelism. This yields our third hypothesis:

H3: The FARP advantage through channels of party organization affects specific clientelistic exchanges most. Mediated by their organizational and network capabilities, FARPs are expected to make greater efforts in providing "retail" and "spot-market" clientelistic transactions than other parties.

Because of their deeper and broader organizational infrastructure, FARPs are more prone to deliver spot-market clientelism (gifts and vote buying), as this requires more organized effort (monitoring, sanctioning of defectors) to counteract the ever-present opportunism of the clients to take the benefit but not deliver their votes. Even so, FARPs are also likely to devote most of their resources to iterative and corporate-wholesale clientelism. But sustaining these practices of relational exchange also involves the construction of rather elaborate social networks of supporters and often enough a

quite extensive organizational infrastructure (cf. Kitschelt and Kselman 2014).[8] These

may give FARPs an advantage as well.

Alternative Explanations

We will control for a range of rival explanations for clientelistic efforts, both at

the level of the individual party as well as that of features of the polity as a whole.

Electoral size of party and government incumbency are the obvious mechanisms that may

advance a party's capacity to build party organization quickly and thus compensate for

the disadvantages of having an authoritarian past. More difficult would be a party age

control, as it is obviously collinear with FARP status.

At the level of general features of the polity, we have to control for demand- and

supply-side conditions of clientelism. On the demand side, development plays a role, but

its relationship to clientelistic partisan linkage efforts is not linear but curvilinear.

Middle-income countries show the greatest prowess to promote clientelistic parties

(Kitschelt and Kselman 2013). Indeed, middle-income developmental states with a broad

scope of economic resources at the disposal of politicians embrace clientelism most

vigorously. We also control for democratic experience and its square term that take into

account Keefer's (2007) argument about age of democracy and linkage strategy. Finally,

we will control for the presence of a level playing field or the democratic openness of

political competition, as in the absence thereof FARPs' chances of producing clientelistic

and programmatic linkages would be shaped by authoritarian advantages and liabilities.

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[8] The literature on clientelistic party organization has proliferated, but because of its micro-focus it has been confined to a few highly studied empirical reference cases, such as Argentina (cf. Auyero 2001; Stokes et al. 2013; Szwarcberg 2012, 2013, 2014).

To summarize, we expect FARPs to shortcut the arduous pathway of organizational investments in clientelistic networks. But we see no theoretical grounds to expect them to promote highly programmatic appeals when compared to their competitors. In a similar vein, even in middle-income countries on a developmental state trajectory, it is unlikely that FARPs will be more vigorous programmatic or differentiated dual-track clientelistic and programmatic linkage builders, at least once we control for electoral size and government participation.

2. The Data

Most of the theoretically interesting variables and indicators are constructed from the Democratic Accountability and Linkage Project (DALP) and are publicly available online (http://sites.duke.edu/democracylinkage). Before we explain the construction of programmatic and clientelistic partisan linkage efforts, let us briefly discuss our empirical operationalization of FARPs.

Former Authoritarian Ruling Parties

As discussed above, for the purposes of exploring the role of prior investments in party organization on clientelistic and programmatic strategies, we focus on a subset of authoritarian successor parties: former authoritarian ruling parties. In addition, we constrain our classification of former authoritarian ruling parties by two criteria, namely (1) that they ruled for a minimum of 10 years, and (2) that the end of that rule predates the point at which we observe parties' linkage strategies by no more than 30 years.

But even with this definition, empirical classification of cases may not be entirely unambiguous. It is in the nature of constructing a dummy variable that some cases appear to be just below or just above the coding cutoff point, and reasonable minds may disagree on where to draw the precise line. This challenge concerns the question about which polities should be considered sufficiently democratic to qualify parties as "former" authoritarian ruling parties,[9] as well as the question about which parties in more or less competitive electoral polities have sufficiently strong organizational and personal ties to past authoritarian ruling parties to qualify as FARPs.

These borderline parties are located in Croatia, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. The main consideration here is not so much that three of the four candidates for FARP classification display substantially less clientelistic effort than most FARPs in the full set (see chapter appendix for a list of FARP codings). The critical question is their link to the former regime. In the case of Slovakia's Direction-Social Democracy (Smer-SD), the link is the most tenuous, as the party is a personalistic breakaway from the communist successor Party of the Democratic Left (SDL), which had already strayed far from its authoritarian origins in terms of personnel and organizational reach and had also undergone severe electoral decline. Slightly more plausible cases are the Social Democratic Party of Croatia (SDP), the Social Democrats (SD) in Slovenia, and the Democratic Labor Party of Lithuania (LDDP), which became part of the Social Democratic Party of Lithuania after merging with the Social Democratic Party in 2001.

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[9] Thus, we included in our count the somewhat problematic cases of Botswana and Senegal. However, we excluded the clearly authoritarian countries of Angola, Egypt, Malaysia, Morocco, Mozambique, Russia, and Tanzania, even though DALP data are available on parties in all of these polities. The results are similar if Botswana and Senegal are excluded as these cases are not outliers with respect to clientelism (Figure 1).

But several considerations weigh against including these parties. Even as regional ruling

communist parties in the 1980s, they were increasingly set against the federal ruling

parties of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, which imposed the will of the dominant

titular majorities (Russian, Serbian) on formally affiliated regional parties. These regional

parties effectively became strongholds of regional resistance and in that capacity tolerated

(if not nurtured) a range of ethnoregional civic associations, many of which later

transformed into parties in their own right. This configuration led to the almost complete

disappearance of former regional communist party affiliates in some countries (Estonia,

Latvia), and to very profound organizational, personnel, and programmatic ruptures with

the old regimes and their titular ethnic Russian or Serbian majorities in others. Unlike

Loxton's coding (Chapter 1, this volume), we therefore exclude the parties in these four

countries from our list of FARPs. However, we have also estimated our statistical

calculations with his coding to ensure that the basic pattern of associations is robust and

the substantive conclusions are the same.[10]

We identify a total of 25 FARPs in an equal number of countries. FARPs appear

in 25 of the 82 democratic polities covered by the DALP (30%) and make up 5.2 percent

of the 478 parties scored. The specific parties are listed in the appendix to this chapter.

Comparing this list to Loxton's FARPs, the DALP dataset does not have data on 8 of

Loxton's cases (Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho,

Malawi, Montenegro, Nepal, Sierra Leone). Moreover, in three instances former

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[10] The Party of Regions in the Ukraine also is a borderline case. While the party was founded in 1998, it attracted most of the former Communist Party apparatus and politicians following the Orange Revolution, as well as most of the Communist's voters (the Communist party went from 19.9% in 2002 to 3.7% in 2006). However, because of the indirect linkage to the Former Authoritarian Ruling Party, we do not code it as FARP in the analysis that follows. This coding choice does not affect the substantive interpretation of the statistical analysis.

authoritarian ruling parties were not entrenched for a sufficiently long time period to qualify for our FARP criterion (Bangladesh, Nicaragua, Peru).

To isolate the effect of a party's FARP background on clientelistic linkage, we must control for other conditions that affect parties' choice of linkage strategies and that display some at least mild correlation with the presence of FARPs. Clientelism tends to be more prominent in poorer and middle-income countries and among countries with less democratic experience, as measured by Gerring et al.'s (2005) index of democratic capital stock. Of course, by restricting our sample to only democracies there is little difference in the contemporary level of democracy in these countries (Table 2). While FARPs tend to be electorally more successful than their domestic competitors (Table 3), there is substantial variation in electoral success across FARPs at the time of the DALP survey. Four of them averaged less than 10 percent of the vote in the last two national legislative elections preceding the DALP survey, and only a handful of them command majorities in legislatures.

[TABLE 2 AND TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]

DALP Coded Variables: Clientelistic and Programmatic Partisan Linkage Efforts and Organizational Scope

The Democratic Accountability and Linkage Project (DALP) is an expert survey-based data collection effort implemented in 88 countries between 2007 and 2008.[11] In most countries, the DALP solicited responses from between 10 and 30 political scientists

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[11] As criteria for inclusion in the study, we chose democracies with a minimum of 2 million inhabitants. In this chapter, we exclude some countries in the DALP dataset that have not completed the transition to competitive democracy. The DALP was implemented with support from the World Bank, Duke University, and the Chilean National Research Agency.

with relevant expertise, along with a handful of journalists covering these processes for national newspapers.[12] The survey focuses on political parties' organization, clientelistic linkage strategies, and programmatic appeals. The unit of observation is the individual party, and summary indices can be created for each party's clientelistic effort and electoral effectiveness, as well as its organizational extensiveness, centralization and emergence in associational networks beyond its organizational boundaries, and the extent of its programmatic structuring and the substantive focus of its policy appeals. We provide here a sketch of critical indicator construction, while more information can be found on the project website.

Extensiveness of Party Organization

Given that our theory looks at the advantage that FARPs have a head start in deploying an organizational infrastructure of mobilization we first begin by looking at how they differ from comparable parties with regards to their organizational structure. The DALP survey offers a variety of indicators to measure a party's formal or informal organizational extensiveness and network ties. These measures all treat organizational size independently of parties' electoral support. (There is, of course, some correlation between the two. Some parties, however, have strong electoral support, yet minute organizations on the ground.) To generate an estimate of party organization, we focus on what Janda (1980) conceptualizes as a party's geographical extensiveness. It refers to the portion of a country's (inhabited) territory in which a party maintains active contact with

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[12] We enlarged the sample in India, where a total of 78 respondents completed the survey. However, they were regionally stratified, such that only a core set of approximately national parties were scored by all Indian experts, whereas regional parties were scored only by experts located in different regions. We also recruited a particularly large sample for Nigeria to code regional differences.

the local population. Contact with local populations may be maintained through formal branch offices staffed by supporters and activists who serve as the party's local voice and representatives (variable a1). However, such relations—especially in developing countries and younger democracies—may also be maintained through *informal* channels via personal, diffuse connections with local "notables," such as religious leaders, neighborhood captains, labor activists, merchants, etc.

Thus two questions from the DALP survey's first module tap the extent of a party's formal (a1) and informal (a3) geographical extensiveness. Both are prefaced with a short vignette, and then ask respondents to assess whether parties maintain formal and informal ties in "MOST" of a country's districts, in "SOME" of a country's districts, or in almost "NO" districts.[13] One of them asks about the rough share of a country's local districts in which the party has a presence through offices and staff (a1). The other asks for the rough share of local districts in which the party relies strongly on local intermediaries (a3). Informal and formal extensiveness are correlated at $r = .74$, i.e., parties that maintain formal ties to the local population also tend to maintain informal networks, and vice versa.

Clientelistic Effort

Our main hypotheses focus on the overall levels of clientelism that FARPs use (H1) and the specific forms of clientelism that they will be positioned to emphasize (H3).

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[13] The survey item on formal extensiveness had response options scaling whether local branches are present in most, some or none of the localities, and also had an option indicating that parties maintain local branches only during periods of electoral competition. We scale the option that local branches exist only temporarily as being between parties having offices in "none" of the districts and "some" of the districts. This choice has no bearing on subsequent results; other rescaling options yield indices correlated with ours at $r = .97$.

We test these hypotheses through a series of questions about the types of material

benefits that parties provide. The survey avoids the notion of "clientelism" because of its

negative semantic loading and vague connotations, at least among intellectuals. Instead, it

asks experts to score parties' use of various transactional practices, as listed above in

Table 1. A quasi-vignette at the opening of the survey section dealing with clientelistic

party efforts was meant to prime respondents to follow a specific interpretation of the

scoring scale, thus reducing the problem of differential item functioning (DIF). The

specific question wordings for the indicators are discussed in Kitschelt (2011a), but high

values represent parties making a major effort to secure support by offering each form of

goods. A summary indicator additively combines the scores on all five variables to

capture total levels of clientelistic effort.

Given that intellectuals assessed the parties, we suspect that there is an upward

bias in scoring clientelism across the board in the entire dataset. A problem for

comparative analysis, however, will result from this bias only if it affects different parties

and countries in distinctive ways. We checked whether experts scored parties for which

they indicated less sympathy higher on clientelistic effort, but this relationship surfaced

rarely and only in mild form. Construct validity tests suggest that there is only limited (if

any) bias resulting from DIF, the use of systematically different anchor points in scoring

parties across countries.[14]

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[14] One strategy of construct validation is to relate clientelistic effort to economic development, the most
robust predictor of this linkage strategy. Not finding an association between the two would not have cast
doubt on the theory of development so much as on the validity of the clientelism measures. The scoring of
parties is also generally in line with conventional wisdom, where detailed individual case studies are
available.

Programmatic Appeal

In the web appendix to this chapter, we provide more detail on the construction of the index of parties' programmatic structuration and voter appeal.[15] We follow a thoroughly Downsian spatial conception of programmatic appeals (Downs 1957). To enable voters to discern a party's program and make that program a criterion of choice among competing considerations, the party's appeal must simultaneously meet three standards. First, parties must exhibit a modicum of internal *cohesiveness* in their policy appeals, such that a party's key politicians pretty consistently support identical policy programs that enable experts to agree on the party's policy scores. Second, parties must attribute *salience* to the issue dimensions on which they take relatively cohesive positions. Voters discount partisans' policy pronouncements if they do not see parties making a credible effort to act on their positions. Third, voters can employ these party positions to choose among competitors only if parties support *positional alternatives*.

We develop a multiplicative term for each issue dimension, combining cohesion (Co) with salience (Sa) and positional differentiation (Po) of a party's program as a singular index score ("CoSalPo"), with each component running from 0 to 1.0, and therefore the whole index also covering the unit range. For each party, we then compute the average CoSalPo score over their four "best," most programmatic policy areas from a larger set of policy areas. Parties cannot score high on the index by being programmatically structured on just one issue (say, immigration). However, they need not be highly programmatic on all issue dimensions scored by experts.[16] For more details, as

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[15] The web appendix is available at https://sites.duke.edu/democracylinkage/papers/.

[16] In other words, our conception of parties' programmatic appeal does not accommodate a pure valence or (single) issue-ownership model of political party competition.

well as robustness tests and validation, see the web appendix and Kitschelt and Freeze (2010).

3. Analysis: Organizational Structures and Linkage Efforts

Let us state up front that with only cross-sectional observational data at hand, our analysis is confined to a "correlational" exercise, where no compelling conclusions can be drawn as to the direction of causality among the observed phenomena. Case study narratives and plausibility considerations about the historical flow of political developments may support some causal interpretations, yet supply no clinching proof. Nevertheless, the quest to establish causality becomes enticing only when the correlation between relevant phenomena has first been established. And that, as we will see, is hard enough to achieve for our chapter.

Former Authoritarian Ruling Parties Have Larger Networks

We have argued that FARPs are potentially able to take advantage of their roots in the previous regime to build more extensive formal and informal infrastructures than parties in similar developmental circumstances. Table 4 reveals that FARPs are more likely to have extensive formal networks, connections to informal networks and local notables, and ties with civil society organizations than other parties in our sample.[17] We

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[17] Raw variables were recoded on a 0-3 (a1), 0-2 (a3) and 0-6 (a8s) scale, with high scores always indicating greater organization and denser network relations. Unfortunately, expert coding instructions for some Latin American countries in DALP were at variance with those in other countries and consequently yield a different a8s count (see the DALP online codebook, p. 21, at http://sites.duke.edu/democracylinkage/files/2014/12/DALP_Codebook_2014-04_01.pdf). All relations hold, regardless of whether countries with divergent a8s coding are included or not. Data on this variable is missing for two parties, the Belgian FN and the Irish Sinn Fein.

also include a summary measure of network extensiveness that is based on a factor analysis of these three variables,[18] and we see that FARPs are more likely to have extensive networks than do other parties. Part of this gap reflects the FARPs' electoral support advantage. However, even if we restrict the sample to parties that averaged at least 15 percent of the vote in the last two elections, we see that the gap between FARPs and other parties remains substantial, even if their number of ties to civil society organizations is not quite significant at conventional levels.

[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]

Multivariate analysis confirms these basic descriptive patterns. In Table 5, a hierarchical linear model enters each of these three organizational variables with controls for the (logged) level of economic development, democratic experience or "capital stock" using Gerring et al.'s (2005) measure, and level of current democratic competitive openness. For each dependent variable, the first specification includes only national-level controls; the second also includes party-level controls (average electoral support in the two most recent legislative elections[19] and cabinet participation at the time of the survey). Given that the relationship between electoral success and parties' organizational structures is strongly endogenous, we want to ascertain whether FARP status makes an independent contribution when controlling for those factors. The estimated hierarchical linear model controls for clustering in the errors within country cases while adjusting for

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[18] This variable ranges in size from -2.78 to 1.68 and has a mean value of 0.

[19] Parties' electoral support is logged because we expect there to be diminishing returns to size. It is then centered to facilitate interpretation.

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the smaller number of degrees of freedom for the country-level variables. We use the same specification in all multivariate analyses in this chapter.

[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]

FARPs consistently have larger party networks in all but one specification for civil society associational ties. Interestingly, country-level controls explain little of the organizational variance, even in organizational structure, while party-level controls perform as expected.[20] Net of multi-level controls, FARPs invariably display greater organizational extensiveness, something we expect to position them well in launching clientelistic linkage building.[21] This picture also does not change when the five disputed borderline-FARPs are recoded (Slovakia, Croatia, Slovenia, and Lithuania, Ukraine). In analyses not shown here, we created a dummy for Loxton's (Chapter 1, this volume) other subset of ASPs, reactive authoritarian successor parties (RASPs). Some of them do have large networks, especially parties like ARENA in El Salvador that did not draw on a preexisting party but was able to activate other preexisting networks the authoritarian regime had used to manage their rule. Yet these handful of reactive ASPs do not have consistently larger organizational networks than equivalent non-ASPs in similar settings. There are so few of these parties that we should take care in interpreting that non-finding.

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[20] One exception is the additional dummy variable control "Latin American" in columns 5 and 6, Table 5. This delivers a distinctive negative impact on the presence of party ties to civil society associations, but does not disturb the relationship between the variables of theoretical interest and parties' organizational features. We had to enter the Latin American control for civil society organizations for a purely technical reason. In most Latin American countries, experts completing the DALP questionnaire could only single out a party's relationship to one set of civil society associations (e.g., labor, business, women, etc.), whereas everywhere else experts could indicate multiple ties. This generates a downward bias for the Latin American scores in case of the civil society association variable.

[21] We also checked whether expert sympathies could have biased these results. Do experts unsympathetic to FARPs systematically score them lower and those sympathetic score them higher and does it make a difference for the observed main effects? Whatever traces of bias we find is mild and does not affect the results of interest.

But the results are consistent with our expectations: having an authoritarian legacy before

democratization is associated with more extensive networks afterwards.

Former Authoritarian Ruling Parties Expend More Effort on Clientelism

Our next step is to determine whether FARPs also engage in more clientelistic

efforts and whether the mechanism through which this practice operates indeed involves

the availability of more organizational network capabilities. There is variation across

FARPs in how much they rely on clientelism (Figure 1). Yet the descriptive data confirm

that FARPs engage in more clientelistic mobilization than other parties on average, even

when we distinguish between electorally more or less successful parties (Table 6). In

spite of the variation in pursuing clientelism among FARPs, almost all of them make

more clientelistic effort than the average non-FARP.

[FIGURE 1 AND TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE]

A series of multivariate HLM models suggests that FARP status indeed

contributes to a party's clientelistic effort, and that this effort is (1) partially endogenous

to the FARPs' outsized (logged) electoral success in the two most recent legislative

elections,[22] but also (2) a function of its organizational network size. So organizational

capabilities are indeed the mediating factor through which FARPs arrive at greater

clientelistic targeting. Hence, when we enter either electoral size or organizational

network capabilities as controls (columns 3 and 4 in Table 7), the size of the direct effect

of a party being FARP is cut by more than half. When both variables are entered

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[22] In alternative specifications we have used the percentage of the vote received in the most recent election and, if anything, the difference between FARPs and their competitors is larger when this control is used to measure party size. Because there are a couple of parties that received less than 1 percent in the most recent election, we add 1 to the average vote total before logging it to facilitate its interpretation.

simultaneously (column 5, Table 7), that coefficient falls a little further, albeit remaining

statistically significant. FARPs may have other factors that make them prone to using

clientelism, but much of their reliance on clientelism is a function of their preexisting

networks and their success at reentering office. At the national level, the estimations

reproduce only the patterns familiar from and analyzed by Kitschelt and Kselman (2013),

with the prominent curvilinear effects of GDP and of democratic experience on parties'

clientelistic efforts.

[TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE]

With the data used in our regression set-up of Table 7, we can also again confirm

that FARPs, restrictively defined, are different from other authoritarian successor parties,

particularly the RASPs as Loxton's (Chapter 1, this volume) second subtype of ASPs. In

additional analyses in the web appendix, we have run the models in Table 7, adding an

additional dummy for being one of the FARPs on Loxton's list that we do not code as

FARP. We find no evidence that these parties diverge from other parties in the dataset,

even before party and country-level controls are applied. Authoritarian successor parties

that did not play a key role in the authoritarian regime in the relatively recent past and

thus did not inherit an advantage in building those networks do not seem to make any

special effort when it comes to establishing clientelistic mobilization structures.

Differentiating Between Types of Clientelism

In disaggregating clientelistic exchanges above, we hypothesized that former

authoritarian ruling parties' network assets should make more of a difference for linkages

with high transaction costs, such as single-shot "retail" clientelism (e.g., vote buying or

gift giving) rather than relational and/or "wholesale" targeted exchanges. FARPs should have especially few advantages in "wholesale" transactions where parties can contract out the capacity of voter mobilization and monitoring to external agents, such as firms or neighborhood political entrepreneurs (independent brokers). In operational terms, clientelism mediated through procurement contracts or regulatory decisions that accrue to companies and other collectives should be just as attractive a linkage strategy for parties with lesser organizational capabilities and shallower networks as for well-entrenched FARPs.

To explore this question, Table 8 replicates the HLM estimations of Table 7, column 4, but now without the roundabout consolidated measure of clientelistic effort, combining all forms of targeted exchange in one single category as dependent variable, but with each of the distinct contractual relations separated as a dependent variable on its own. We then want to compare the coefficients for the FARP dummy across the various clientelistic linkage techniques. What we find is that FARP status indeed makes little difference for targeted procurement (b4) and regulatory decisions (b5), but yields a much larger and robustly significant coefficient for the spot-market, "retail" transactions delivered as material goods (b1). In addition, one of the more often relational "retail" clientelistic techniques, social program benefits (b2), yields a substantively important and statistically significant coefficient. The difference between social program benefits (b2) with significant coefficient and patronage jobs (b3) without may be that, while both are at the retail level, politicians may make social program benefits more easily available on a spot market basis than patronage jobs.

[TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE]

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As we look at why FARPs have less dominance in the wholesale forms of clientelistic exchange, we note that the coefficient for "party in government" as a predictor of clientelistic practice rises from the high transaction cost forms of clientelism (b1, b2) to the low transaction cost forms (b4, b5). So here it is not FARP status that gives an advantage to a party in crafting clientelistic linkages, but the party's government incumbency, which grants it access to state resources that can be deployed for electoral purposes.

Former Authoritarian Ruling Parties and Programmatic Effort: No Distinctive Results

The data in the previous section confirm that FARPs with established formal and informal networks are better positioned to engage in clientelistic mobilization than parties that lack this legacy. Above we advanced the hypothesis that the same does not apply to programmatic politics. The programmatic policy challenges of a democracy are too different from those of authoritarian rule to give FARPs much of a head start. Indeed, the indicator of programmatic effort constructed from the DALP survey suggests that FARPs do not have any special advantages with regards to programmatic competition. On average, FARPs are less programmatic than other parties (Table 9). Yet this may reflect the relatively low levels of development in the kinds of countries where one encounters FARPs frequently. Once that and other confounding factors are controlled for, FARPs are neither more nor less programmatic than other parties of a similar size (Table 10 about here). Having an authoritarian legacy to draw upon does not, on average, make parties more programmatic, net of a country's level of development.

[TABLE 9 AND TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE]

Column 3 helps to provide some leverage on why FARPs are not necessarily programmatic. We noted that the collective action issues involved in clientelistic mobilization are different than those involved in building a common set of programmatic appeals. Clientelistic mobilization requires a large spatial network of brokers inside the party or across the community who distribute goods and at least indirectly monitor the behavior of recipients. Programmatic competition requires building a different set of mechanisms, namely channels within the party through which disputes about policy issues can be resolved and a common message may emerge. This may occur either through party supporters sorting into programmatically cohesive parties that reflect their preferences or party leaders disciplining candidates or factions who would deviate from the party line (cf. Kitschelt and Kselman 2015).

In model 3 we add a variable that measures one such form of discipline: national-level control of candidate nominations.[23] We also control for the large formal and informal networks that parties can develop using the latent variable measure used in previous analyses. Of these two variables, national party leadership control of nominations is mildly and positively associated with programmatic effort, while large formal and informal networks have no relationship with it. Moreover, in analyses not

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[23] Variable A5a: "More generally, the power to select candidates in national legislative elections is always divided between local/municipal party actors, regional/state-level party organizations, and national party leaders. Often one particular level of party organization dominates the selection process, while in other places candidate selection is the outcome of bargaining between the different levels of party organization. Which of the following four options best describes the following parties' balance of power in selecting candidates for national legislative elections? [3] National party leaders control the process of candidate selections. [2] Regional/state-level party organizations control the process of candidate selections. [1] Selection is the outcome of bargaining between different levels. [0] Local/municipal actors control the process of candidate selections."

reported here, we find that FARPs are no more likely to have national-level politicians control nominations than other parties of similar size.[24]

The more general implication is that the networks that we expect FARPs to inherit are useful for solving the collective action issues of distributing resources, but contribute nothing to solving internal coordination around programmatic appeals. This is because party and informal networks did not engage in such activities in many authoritarian states. Some FARPs started out as opposition movements and parties before taking power and expressed a strong commitment to programmatic ideals, such as communism. But many have seen those projects become discredited in the run-up to the transition to democracy. Thus even FARPs that championed a programmatic agenda when they ruled under authoritarianism may have incentives to pivot to clientelistic strategies that their preexisting networks left them well positioned to pursue. The upshot is that if a FARP wishes to make a programmatic appeal, it has no choice but to engage in the same arduous task of building internal consensus and coordination as any other party.

While FARPs are *more* clientelistic than other parties, they are *not* necessarily less programmatic than their competitors. Many FARPs exist in countries where low levels of development and state capacity restrict popular demand for programmatic competition and thus compete against other parties that also score low on programmatic appeals.

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[24] The purpose of our regression here is only to illustrate the irrelevance of FARP status for programmatic partisan appeals. A more sophisticated analysis of the relationship between organizational centralization and programmatic partisan effort, in fact, yields a more complicated (and theoretically interesting) relationship than a simple linear association (see Kitschelt and Kselman 2015).

Conclusion: The Limits of the Developmental State and the End of Former Authoritarian Ruling Parties' Advantages?

The most important message of our chapter is that former authoritarian ruling parties have a robust organizational advantage that allows them to build and service more intense clientelistic, targeted voter-politician exchanges than other parties. Whereas parties emerging from opposition to dictatorships have to undertake an often torturous process of investing in party organization, FARPs enjoy a flying start by inheriting a ready-made organizational infrastructure and associational ties to civil society. A number of our results, particularly those indicating the affinity between FARPs and particular types of clientelistic transactions, suggest that it may be both the *quantity* and the *quality* of party organizational structures and associational networks that jointly account for FARPs' advantages in building specific clientelistic linkages.

These historical advantages may be negligible, however, when it comes to the articulation of programmatic appeals. Too often the FARP's existing policy pitch has been discredited and becomes unusable under the changed circumstances of democratic party competition. Moreover, many authoritarian networks were not designed to solve social choice problems by identifying and communicating a common policy program that unites a party's stakeholders. In order to arrive at an electorally distinctive policy pitch, FARPs therefore must undergo lengthy programmatic deliberations, just like any other party.

In the long run, however, the organizational advantages enjoyed by FARPs in the early stages of democratic party competition and their reliance on clientelistic targeting constitute a double-edged sword, especially in middle- and upper-income countries.

Under conditions of successful economic growth, the economic governance and allocational mechanisms of a developmental state eventually become counterproductive for further economic advances, as countries approach the global economic innovation frontier. All developmental states with clientelistic citizen-politician linkages tend to privilege economic rentier groups. This is true not just under conditions of import substitution industrialization (ISI), but also under export-oriented industrialization (EOI), which had supposedly solved this problem by beefing up a professionalized and depoliticized state apparatus and by keeping economic interest groups at arm's length. But these forces reassert themselves in politics through clientelistic political parties. And clientelism in developed countries invariably runs into trouble when economic performance slows down and economic crises drain resources away from politicians that need them to feed their support networks (Kitschelt 2007).[25]

The slide into narrow economic special interest group politics, often with a clientelistic voter rapport, befell FARPs in the 1980s and 1990s under both ISI and EOI regimes. The experience of sudden economic ruptures may serve as catalyst to reconfigure parties' strategic appeals, however, as the reaction of Korean parties to the financial crisis of 1998 may illustrate (Wang 2013).

The unique affinity of FARPs to clientelistic efforts and their deployment of organizational capabilities in pursuit of that end, however, does not extend to RASPs, the second subtype of authoritarian successor parties discussed by Loxton (Chapter 1, this volume). In particular, it does not extend to parties that were founded by former

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[25] For further case studies, see Kitschelt with Wang et al. (2013).

authoritarian regime figures, but did not exist under dictatorship, or former regime parties that underwent very profound organizational and personnel renewal.

More generally, clientelistic parties, whether rooted in authoritarian regimes or not, tend to feel the pressure of change and begin to unravel not inevitably when democracy arrives, but only when a deep economic crisis provokes institutional change and a renewal of political linkage strategies. Clear examples include the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in Japan, Christian Democracy in Italy, and even the Social Democratic Party and the People's Party in Austria (Kitschelt 2007). Most recently, a similar fate appears to have caught up with initially successful communist successor parties such as the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) and the Polish Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), which were engulfed in scandals due to their coziness with special economic interests.[26]

When economic crises coincide with clientelistic practices of citizen-politician linkage building, they are likely to give rise to waves of corruption scandals, as citizen tolerance for the corruption that often goes hand in hand with clientelism (Singer 2011) suffers without strong economic performance to prop up incumbents' popularity (Zechmeister and Zizumbo-Colugna 2013; Carlin et al. 2014). When no longer delivering the results expected in the past, well-worn operating conventions of clientelistic exchange can be redescribed as scandalous. As the new interpretation begins to resonate with voters, mass media take the lead and amplify the new interpretative frame. The erosion of support for FARPs may give rise to new populist challengers of the economic right or the economic left, who demand more transparency and immediacy of political control.

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[26] On the decline of Hungary's MSZP and Poland's SLD, see Grzymala-Busse (this volume).

The one thing that may help FARPs under political pressure is the absence—or quick delegitimation—of whichever populist parties that may have presented themselves as initially plausible alternatives to incumbents. In recent democracies, party systems may not yet have developed a sufficient resilience to absorb and digest the disappearance of a major party without leaving a huge void that may be filled with threats to democracy itself. Yet the reliance of FARPs on clientelism without an alternative programmatic appeal means that they are vulnerable to precisely these types of challenges.

APPENDIX: List of Former Authoritarian Ruling Parties that Were in Power for 10+ Years and which Democratized Less than 30 Years Ago.

Albania   Socialist Party of Albania (PS)
Botswana   Botswana Democratic Party (BDP)
Brazil   Progressive Party (PP)
Bulgaria   Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP)
[Croatia   Social Democratic Party of Croatia (SDP)]*
Czech Rep.   Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM)
Dom. Rep.   Social Christian Reformist Party (PRSC)
El Salvador   National Conciliation Party (PCN)
Ghana   National Democratic Congress (NDC)
Hungary   Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP)
Indonesia   Golongan Karya (Golkar)
Kenya   Kenya African National Union (KANU)
               Democratic Labor Party of Lithuania (since 2001 merger,
[Lithuania   Social Democratic Party of Lithuania]*
Macedonia   Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM)
Mexico   Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)
Moldova   Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova (PCRM)
Mongolia   Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP)
Niger   National Movement for the Development of Society (MNSD)
Panama   Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD)
Paraguay   Colorado Party
Poland   Democratic Left Alliance (SLD)
Romania   Social Democratic Party (PSD)
Senegal   Socialist Party (PS)
Serbia   Socialist Party of Serbia (SBS)
[Slovakia   [Direction-Social Democracy (Smer-SD)]*
[Slovenia   Social Democrats (SD)]*
South Korea   Grand National Party (since 2012 Saenuri)
Taiwan   Kuomintang (KMT)

[Ukraine   Party of Regions]*
Zambia   United National Independence Party (UNIP)

* Borderline cases that may not be coded as former authoritarian ruling parties

Table 1: Typology of Clientelistic Exchange

		CONTRACTS	
		RETAIL	WHOLESALE
	SINGLE-SHOT	Vote buying (b1)	Regulatory rulings (b5)
	RELATIONAL	Social benefits + Patronage (b2+3)	Procurement contracts (b4)

Table 2: Characteristics of Countries with Each Type of Party (Standard Error in Parentheses)

	Per Capita GDP	Democracy Stock	Average Democracy Score (Polity)
Country Has Former Authoritarian Ruling Party (N=25)	9340 (1564)	-152 (24)	8.31 (0.24)
Countries Without Former Authoritarian Ruling Party (N=56)	18308 (1827)	198 (41)	8.13 (0.40)
T-Test of Equality (df=79)[27]	3.06 (p<0.01)	5.54 (p<0.001)	-0.30 (NS)

Table 3: Electoral Strength by Party Type (Standard Error in Parentheses)

	Average Vote in Last Two Elections	In Government at the Time of the Survey?

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[27] Two-tailed t-tests, NS=not significant at conventional levels.

Former Authoritarian Ruling Party (N=25)	28.5% (3.2)	56%
All Other Parties (N=453)	13.8% (0.6)	35.5%
T-Test of Equality (df=476)[28]	5.25 (p<0.001)	2.07 (p<0.05)

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[28] Two-tailed t-tests.

Table 4: Parties' Organizational Traits: Extensiveness and Social Networks (Standard Errors in Parentheses)

	Extensiveness of Local Offices (a1)	Ties to local Notables (a3)	Ties to Civil Society Organizations (a8)	Latent Variable of Network Size
	Among All Parties:			
Former Authoritarian Ruling Party (N=25)	2.64 (0.09)	1.58 (0.07)	2.27 (0.20)	0.76 (0.12)
All Other Parties (N=453)[29]	2.03 (0.03)	1.19 (0.02)	1.97 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.04)
T-Test of Equality (df=476)[30]	4.61 (p<0.001)	4.38 (p<0.001)	1.40 (NS)	4.74 (p<0.001)
	Among Parties Who Averaged More than 15 % in the Last Two Elections:			
Former Authoritarian Ruling Party (N=19)	2.78 (0.07)	1.68 (0.06)	2.44 (0.21)	0.97 (0.09)
All Other Parties (N=144)	2.45 (0.4)	1.54 (0.02)	2.21 (0.10)	0.59 (0.05)
T-Test of Equality (df=161)[31]	2.95 (p<0.01)	1.91 (p<0.10)	0.84 (NS)	2.80 (p<0.01)

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[29] Belgium's National Front and Ireland's Sinn Fein are missing information on the ties to civil society organization and Network size variables and so those measures are based on 450 parties.

[30] Two-tailed t-tests.

[31] Two-tailed t-tests.

Table 5: Organizational Characteristics of Political Parties

	Extensiveness of Local Offices (a1)		Ties to local Notables (a3)		Ties to Civil Society Organizations (a8)		Overall Network Size (Latent Variable)	
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]
	0.549***	0.209*	0.382***	0.113°	0.358*	0.067	0.781***	0.264*
	(0.120)	(0.089)	(0.091)	(0.068)	(0.150)	(0.132)	(0.172)	(0.124)
		0.915***		0.670***		0.737***		1.322***
		(0.053)		(0.040)		(0.079)		(0.073)
Party is in Government		0.068		0.084**		0.165**		0.150*
		(0.043)		(0.033)		(0.064)		(0.060)
Log(GDP)	0.352**	0.401**	-0.052	-0.033	-0.623***	-0.598**	0.134	0.193
	(0.129)	(0.128)	(0.070)	(0.066)	(0.189)	(0.199)	(0.145)	(0.143)
Democracy Stock	-0.001**	-0.001***	0.001	-0.001	0.001	0.001	-0.001	-0.001*
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Polity Democracy Score	0.009	-0.004	-0.014	-0.022*	0.022	0.015	-0.006	-0.024
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.024)	(0.023)
Latin American Country					-1.470***	-1.507***		
					(0.154)	(0.161)		
Constant	0.600	0.472	1.522***	1.480***	4.540***	4.428***	-0.512	-0.661
	(0.453)	(0.449)	(0.247)	(0.231)	(0.667)	(0.701)	(0.511)	(0.501)
Variance Components Country-Level	0.097	0.123	0.013	0.022	0.234	0.292	0.076	0.130
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.052)	(0.057)	(0.030)	(0.029)
Party-Level	0.301	0.154	0.179	0.093	0.461	0.339	0.635	0.307
	(0.021)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.033)	(0.024)	(0.045)	(0.022)
N Parties	478	478	478	478	476	476	476	476
N Countries	81	81	81	81	81	81	81	81
Wald χ^2	36.29***	436.05***	23.63***	418.22***	102.60***	227.35***	24.62***	472.37***
Hierarchical Linear Models, Standard Errors in Parentheses; ° $p<0.10$, * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$								

Figure 1: Clientelism Use by Former Authoritarian Ruling Parties

Table 6: Average Clientelistic Score (B15) by Party Size and Former Authoritarian Ruling Party Legacy (Standard Error and the Number of Cases in Parentheses)

	All Parties	Parties Whose Average Vote in Last Two Elections<15%	Parties Whose Average Vote in Last Two Elections>15%
Former Authoritarian Ruling Party	15.49 (SE=0.47, N=25)	14.16 (SE=0.88, N=6)	15.9 (SE=0.52, N=19)
All Other Parties	11.96 (SE=0.18, N=453)	11.5 (SE=0.21, N=309)	12.8 (SE=0.32, N=144)
T-Test of Equality[32]	4.62 (p<0.001)	1.73 (p<0.10)	3.39 (p<0.001)

[32] Two-tailed t-tests.

Table 7: Hierarchical Model of Clientelistic Effort

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]
Former Authoritarian Ruling Party	2.019*** (0.494)	1.937*** (0.489)	0.981* (0.445)	0.868* (0.420)	0.745° (0.419)
Network Size			1.230*** (0.119)		0.497*** (0.157)
				2.397*** (0.249)	1.725*** (0.324)
Party is in Government				0.801*** (0.201)	0.730*** (0.201)
Log(GDP)		32.633*** (6.992)	38.224*** (7.140)	34.213*** (7.399)	36.114*** (7.283)
Log(GDP)^2		-4.688*** (0.924)	-5.456*** (0.944)	-4.885*** (0.978)	-5.153*** (0.963)
Democracy Stock		0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Democracy Stock^2		-0.001*** (0.001)	-0.001** (0.001)	-0.001*** (0.001)	-0.001*** (0.001)
Polity Democracy Score		0.119 (0.088)	0.121 (0.090)	0.095 (0.094)	0.104 (0.092)
Constant	12.145*** (0.347)	-42.462*** (13.097)	-52.519*** (13.363)	-45.720*** (13.849)	-49.062*** (13.627)
Variance Components					
Country-Level	8.672 (1.512)	1.688 (0.437)	2.015 (0.455)	2.342 (0.485)	2.237 (0.469)
Party-Level	4.881 (0.346)	4.937 (0.353)	3.870 (0.277)	3.437 (0.245)	3.390 (0.242)
N Parties	478	478	476	478	476
N Countries	81	81	81	81	81
Wald χ^2	16.68***	239.2***	334.49***	375.57***	393.63***
Hierarchical Linear Models, Standard Errors in Parentheses; ° $p<0.10$, * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$					

Table 8: Hierarchical Model of Different Types of Clientelistic Effort

	Material Goods (B1)	Social Programs (B2)	Patronage Jobs (B3)	Procurement (B4)	Regulatory Decisions (B5)
	0.272**	0.244**	0.118	0.085	0.087
	(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.088)	(0.094)	(0.084)
	0.386***	0.451***	0.429***	0.570***	0.495***
	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.052)	(0.056)	(0.050)
Party is in Government	0.075°	0.121**	0.178***	0.215***	0.195***
	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.042)	(0.045)	(0.040)
Log(GDP)	6.314***	6.732***	6.745***	6.011***	7.172***
	(1.718)	(1.599)	(1.956)	(1.791)	(1.621)
Log(GDP)^2	-0.966***	-0.942***	-0.979***	-0.865***	-0.975***
	(0.227)	(0.211)	(0.258)	(0.237)	(0.214)
Democracy Stock	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Democracy Stock^2	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Polity Democracy Score	0.032	0.021	0.049*	0.015	-0.022
	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.021)
Constant	-7.446*	-9.189**	-8.923*	-7.544*	-10.208***
	(3.216)	(2.993)	(3.659)	(3.351)	(3.033)
Variance Components Country-Level	0.131	0.109	0.184	0.144	0.119
	(0.026)	(0.023)	(0.034)	(0.028)	(0.024)
Party-Level	0.162	0.163	0.148	0.170	0.136
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.010)
N Parties	478	478	478	478	478
N Countries	81	81	81	81	81
Wald χ^2	311.77***	231.58***	270.85***	365.46***	303.99***
Hierarchical Linear Models, Standard Errors in Parentheses; ° $p<0.10$, * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$					

Table 9: Levels of Programmatic Effort by Party Origin

	Average COSALPO
Former Authoritarian Ruling Party (N=25)	0.244 (0.027)
All Other Parties (N=453)	0.282 (0.007)
T-Test of Equality (df=476)[33]	-1.21 (NS)

Table 10: Hierarchical Model of Programmatic Effort

	[1]	[2]	[3]
	0.017	0.004	0.001
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
		0.031**	0.029*
		(0.010)	(0.014)
Party is in Government		0.008	0.007
		(0.008)	(0.008)
			0.018°
			(0.009)
Network Size			0.000
			(0.007)
Log(GDP)	0.204***	0.205***	0.207***
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Democracy Stock	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Polity Democracy Score	0.001	0.001	-0.001
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Constant	-0.548***	-0.554***	-0.569***
	(0.118)	(0.117)	(0.118)
Variance Components Country-Level	0.009	0.009	0.010
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Party-Level	0.006	0.006	0.006
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
N Parties	478	478	476
N Countries	81	81	81

[33] Two-tailed t-tests. NS=Not Significant.

Wald χ^2	78.32***	93.78***	96.20***
Hierarchical Linear Models, Standard Errors in Parentheses; ° p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001			

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