Satisfaction with Democracy and Democratic Accountability Strategies*

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Abstract

Using both a cross-national data set on parties' accountability strategies and public opinion survey data, the paper sets forth a systematic analysis of how parties' reliance on clientelistic strategies affects citizen evaluations of regime performance. The analysis distinguishes between-country and within-country effects of parties' clientelistic efforts. The results suggest that citizens tend to show a lower level of satisfaction with democracy in countries where parties more heavily rely on clientelistic strategies. In addition, in countries where clientelism prevails, the political majority/minority gap in levels of satisfaction is larger. Within countries, supporters of parties that make substantial clientelistic efforts are more likely to evaluate the political system positively. The within-country positive effects of clientelism are strengthened if the clientelistic parties are large, have extensive external linkages, or in countries with lower democratic quality. Along with a preliminary analysis on citizens' regime preferences and protest potential, the results suggest that citizens of clientelistic democracies are generally more cynical about democracy, but within countries, it is the non-supporters of clientelistic parties who are especially dissatisfied and have the highest protest potential.

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Introduction

The principles of democratic political systems presume that all citizens have equal access to the political process, that laws and policies are applied fairly, and that politicians are accountable to their citizens. Systems that fall short of these principles may suffer from low levels of legitimacy. In contrast to political competition characterized by parties offering various programmatic platforms of policy bundles, clientelism, political competition based on direct contingent exchange between votes and targeted goods, has been portrayed as an accountability form that vitiates democracy by undermining these principles (Stokes 2007).

The literature has documented how clientelistic accountability form undermines democratic principles and how the undermined democratic principles may affect the levels of citizens' regime support. However, the literature has not systematically examined how parties' reliance on clientelism influences people's attitudes toward government. It is not very clear whether citizens living in countries where clientelism is the main form of accountability are cynical about the functioning of democracy, or are satisfied with the direct contingent exchange of benefits and, in turn, evaluate the system positively. This paper aims to bridge this gap and explore the effects of parties' clientelistic efforts on support for democracy, by utilizing data from the Democratic Accountability and Linkage Project, which provides cross-national measures on parties' accountability strategies across the world.

The next section discusses the current literature on regime support and parties' linkage strategies, and proposes hypotheses about the relationships between them. Then data and measures are specified. After presenting the empirical results, the last section discusses the implications of the results on the stability of clientelistic democracies.

Satisfaction with Democracy and Linkage Strategies

Literature has shown that the level of satisfaction with democracy is a function of citizens? evaluations of government output and their opportunities for input into the democratic process. Citizens base their evaluations of government output on the delivery of both economic and political goods. Scholars have found that the economic performance of a country and public perception of personal and national economic conditions relate to support for the political system in place (Anderson & Guillory 1997, Clarke, Dutt & Kornberg 1993, Finkel. Muller & Seligson 1989, Wells & Krieckhaus 2006). In terms of political goods, studies on new democracies have shown that perceived increase in freedom (Mishler & Rose 2001, Hofferbert & Klingemann 1999) and perceived government responsiveness (Evans & Whitefield 1995) are associated with a higher level of regime support. With regard to opportunities for political input, citizens' winner/loser status with respect to electoral outcomes (Anderson & Tverdova 2003, Anderson & Guillory 1997, Berggren et al. 2004, Blais & Gélineau 2007), the duration of democracy (Rose, Mishler & Haerpfer 1998), various aspects of party systems (Berggren et al. 2004, Miller & Listhaug 1990), and the majority-consensus features of democratic systems (Anderson & Guillory 1997) have been shown to impact citizens' levels of satisfaction.

Political parties' linkage strategies between voters and politicians may also influence citizens' evaluations of government output and their opportunities for input into the democratic process. Clientelistic modes of accountability, that is, the provision of targeted goods and services by politicians to voters in exchange for votes, have been portrayed as having pernicious effects on the quality of democracy (Bates 2008, Keefer 2005). Benefits to voters under a programmatic accountability mechanism take the form of broad policy packages; while voters in a clientelistic relationship may obtain particular party/candidate-sponsored goods. Literature has documented the negative consequences of clientelism on a country's economic conditions (Keefer & Vlaicu 2008). Parties and politicians may divert public resources to invest in cultivating patronage networks and developing monitoring mechanisms, which may lead to less public goods provision and inefficient spending. In addition, since the delivery of goods is contingent on citizens' votes for the winning party in a clientelistic relationship, clientelism undermines the principles of democratic equality. As clientelism prevails, democracy's ideals of procedural fairness are eroded, which, in turn, is likely to diminish the legitimacy of democracy.

The hypothesis that there is a negative relationship between parties' reliance on clientelism and satisfaction with democracy has yet to be tested systematically, given the limited measures and data on accountability strategies of parties. Among the few cross-sectional studies, Kitschelt (2007) has shown that across affluent capitalist democracies, citizens living in systems where parties tend to rely on clientelism show less confidence in governmental institutions. A comparative study of Latin American party competition by Kitschelt et al (2010) has suggested that citizens show lower levels of democratic regime support in countries where programmatic party competition is weak. Studies on a related phenomena, corruption, have suggested that citizens' and experts' perceptions of levels of corruption in a country are negatively correlated with public evaluations of regime performance (Anderson & Tverdova 2003, Seligson 2002). While presenting evidence in support of the negative correlation between clientelism and regime support, the existing studies are insufficient to characterize the relationship conclusively, since they either do not directly focus on parties' clientelistic strategies, or do not control for potential spurious associations. Based on the arguments and empirical evidence, a hypothesis is proposed:

Hypothesis 1: In societies where parties more heavily rely on clientelistic strategies, citizens show lower levels of satisfaction with democracy.

The clientelistic form of democratic accountability is also expected to enlarge the majority/minority gap in regime performance evaluations. As literature has pointed out, individuals who belong to the political majority are more likely to exhibit positive attitudes toward government than those in the minority. In a system where political competition is characterized by programmatic efforts, even a political minority could benefit from public goods delivered through broad policies; while in a system where parties mainly rely on clientelistic strategies, only supporters of the winning parties can obtain goods. Therefore, it is expected that the majority/minority gap is affected by parties' accountability strategies, and that the gap is larger in systems where clientelism prevails. Based on this expectation, a hypothesis is proposed:

Hypothesis 2: In societies where parties more heavily rely on clientelistic strategies, the differences in the level of satisfaction between the political majority and minority are greater.

The arguments in support of hypothesis 2 also imply that the effects of clientelism on attitudes toward government may not be uniform across a country. More specifically, supporters of parties that heavily rely on clientelistic strategies are likely to be beneficiaries of targeted goods distribution, and may view clientelism as an efficient way to hold their representatives accountable (Lindberg 2010, Lust-Okar 2009). Since system support is closely related to citizens' perceptions of government output, those with an allegiance to clientelistic parties are likely to be more satisfied with the functioning of democracy than their fellow citizens who have an allegiance to parties that distribute less targeted goods. Based on this notion, a hypothesis is proposed:

Hypothesis 3: Within countries, supporters of clientelistic parties tend to show higher levels of satisfaction than supporters of parties that make less clientelistic efforts.

It is also hypothesized that the within-country positive effects of parties' clientelistic efforts on evaluations of regime performance are strengthened or weakened, depending on party size and organization, and on the level of economic development and democratic quality of countries in which the parties are based. With regard to party size and organization, it is expected that larger parties have more access to resources, and that extensive party organizations facilitate the delivery of particular goods, both of which, in turn, should allow respective party supporters to obtain benefits more easily. Successful deployment of clientelism is especially likely to generate positive evaluations of regime performance. With regard to economic conditions, it is hypothesized that the positive effects of clientelistic practices are strengthened in countries with lower levels of economic development. In the context of low levels of economic development, infrastructure could be weak, and government could have little capacity to provide public goods. Under such conditions, clientelistic parties/politicians would act as substitutes for government to provide reliable welfare to their clients. Hence, the positive effects of clientelism are expected to be more pronounced in poorer countries. With regard to the quality of democracy, it is hypothesized that clientelistic efforts are more likely to generate satisfaction in countries with lower quality of democracy. In lower quality democracies, contestation and participation are restricted to a certain extent. With less political goods, such as perceived increase in freedom and human rights protection, and fewer opportunities for political input, material goods delivered in a clientelistic relationship could become a more important component of the government performance citizens use to evaluate a political system. Hence, it is expected that the within-country effects of clientelism should be strengthened in lower quality democracies. Summarizing these arguments, a hypothesis is proposed:

Hypothesis 4: Within countries, the effects of parties' clientelistic practices are contingent on the capacity of parties, and on countries' levels of development and democratic quality:

Hypothesis 4.1: The effects of parties' clientelistic practices on regime support are strengthened with party size.

Hypothesis 4.2: The effects of parties' clientelistic practices on regime support are strengthened if the parties have more extensive organizations.

Hypothesis 4.3: The effects of parties' clientelistic practices on regime support are strengthened in poorer countries.

Hypothesis 4.4: The effects of parties' clientelistic practices on regime support are strengthened in lower quality democracies.

Data and Measures

The party-level data on parties' accountability strategies and organizational features are taken from the Democratic Accountability and Linkage Project. The project contains expert judgement on electoral practices of politically relevant parties in 88 countries around the world. Countries are selected to reflect polities with minimally competitive democratic elections and with at least two million inhabitants. The project gives a sample of about 500 parties evaluated by country experts with respect to the parties' linkage strategies. The expert surveys were done in 2008-2009. The individual-level data are taken from surveys collected by the Afrobarometer in 2008 (12 countries), the Asianbarometer in 2005-2008 (8 countries), the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) in 2006-2011 (6 countries), the European Social Survey (ESS) in 2008 (30 countries), and the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) in 2008 (19 countries).

Dependent Variables

The main dependent variable is individual-level "satisfaction with democracy." As scholars have pointed out, this variable is not a measure of citizens' attitudes toward democracy as an ideal regime type, but is more correlated with citizens' responses to system performance (Canache, Mondak & Seligson 2001, Linde & Ekman 2003). Since the measure captures the levels of support for how the democratic system works in practice, it should relate to citizens' evaluations of regime output and opportunities for inputs in the democratic process, which are hypothesized to be affected by parties' linkage strategies. Another indicator closely related to citizens' evaluations of regime performance, "trust in parliament", is also included as the dependent variable to explore whether the hypothesized relationships hold for this additional dimension of regime support as well.

Independent Variables

Clientelism. The measure of the extent to which parties rely on clientelistic strategies is taken from the Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project. The indicator of clientelism (b15) is constructed based on experts' assessment of the effort parties make in offering five types of benefits to specific individuals or small groups of citizens in exchange for their votes. The five types of benefits include consumer goods (question b1), preferential access to social policy (b2), employment in the public sector (b3), government contracts (b4), and influence over the application of government regulations (b5). The answers to the five items are coded on a 1-4 scale, in which '1' refers to a negligible effort or no effort at all, while '4' means parties devote major effort to providing the benefit in question.

Recall that hypothesis 1 suggests a negative correlation between the prevalence of clientelism in a society and its citizens' level of satisfaction, while hypothesis 3 assumes a positive correlation between a party's clientelistic effort and its supporters' level of satisfaction within a country. To test these two hypotheses, the between-country and within-county effects of clientelism have to be distinguished. To construct the country-level scores on the clientelistic tendency of the entire party system, the averages of parties' scores on clientelism in each country, weighted by the vote share of each party in the most recent two elections, are computed (b15nwe). To measure whether a party is "more clientelistic" than other parties within the same country, the differences between a party's score on clientelism (b15) and the national average clientelism score (b15nwe) are calculated. The indicator of citizens' party support is created with the help of a survey question asking which party or presidential candidate the respondents had voted for in the last national election.

Interaction variables. Hypothesis 4 suggests that the positive correlation between parties' clientelistic effort and party supporters' evaluations of regime performance is contingent on the party's capacity to deliver targeted goods, and on the country's level of economic development and democratic quality. To measure party size, parties' vote share in the last parliamentary election before the surveys is coded. The measure of the extensiveness of party organization is also taken from the Democratic Accountability Project. Experts were asked to assess the extent to which parties rely on local intermediaries (question a3). This variable is coded on a three-point scale from 1 (no reliance on local intermediaries) to 3 (extensive reliance on local intermediaries). It is assumed that the network of local intermediaries facilitates the distribution of targeted goods. The indicator of a country's level of economic development is GDP per capita, and the indicator of democratic quality is the Polity IV scores.

Control Variables

At the individual level, survey respondents' demographic variables, including gender, age, and education, are controlled, along with individuals' electoral majority/minority status. Individuals' majority/minority status is measured based on their supported parties' vote share in the last parliamentary election before the survey. At the country level, level of

development (per capita GDP), quality of democracy (Polity IV scores), and experience with democracy (age of democracy) are included. Party size (majority/minority status), level of development, and experiences with democracy have been suggested to be related to both clientelism and regime support. Including these variables avoids omitted-variable bias. Coding procedures and descriptive statistics for all variables are listed in the appendix.

Empirical Results

Figure 1 displays the relationship between clientelism and the level of citizens' satisfaction with democracy. Both variables are country-level averages. This figure suggests that on average, citizens living in countries where clientelism prevails tend to show a lower level of regime satisfaction. Figure 2 shows the same relationship with variables averaged at the party level. Figure 2 also suggests a negative correlation between clientelism and satisfaction at the country level. It also suggests that in some countries, supporters of parties that more heavily rely on clientelism are more satisfied than supporters of less clientelistic parties. However, the positive within-country correlation is not entirely very clear in the figure. These two figures provide some evidence supporting the correlations proposed in hypotheses 1 and 3. To further examine whether the correlation results from other spurious variables, regression analysis is conducted.

Effects of Clientelism on Evaluations of System Performance

Table 1 shows the results of several models estimating the effects of country- and partylevel clientelism on the levels of citizens' satisfaction with democracy. These four models are multilevel mixed-effects linear regressions, estimated with maximum likelihood. Model 1 suggests that if the within-country and between-country effects of clientelism are not taken into account separately, there is no correlation between parties' accountability strategies and system satisfaction. The results of model 2 provide unambiguous evidence in support of hypotheses 1 and 3. In short, the between-country and within-country effects of clientelism are in opposite directions: while individuals in countries with generally high levels of clientelism evaluate the performance of the political system more negatively, supporters of parties making above (country) average efforts to provide targeted goods show a higher level of satisfaction. Model 2 shows that both the negative effects of a country's average level of clientelism, and the positive effects of a party's exceptional reliance on clientelism are significantly different from zero. To guard against the possibility that the results are driven by measurement error resulting from combining responses of different survey sources, the dependent variable is collapsed into two categories (1=satisfied; 0=dissatisfied) in model 3. For model 3, a multilevel logistic regression is fitted for the dichotomous dependent variable. The negative between-country and positive within-country effects of clientelism are still significant¹.

¹Including other control variables, such as survey source dummies, institutional variables (presidentialism, electoral system proportionality), an indicator of economic growth, and individuals' evaluations of national




Figure 1: Clientelism and satisfaction with democracy at country level

Model 4 in table 1 includes the interaction variable for individuals' majority/minority status and country-level clientelism to test hypothesis 2. The coefficient of the interaction term is significantly positive, which shows support for the hypothesis that in countries where clientelism prevails, the differences in satisfaction between the political majority and minority are greater. This also implies that the between-country negative effects of clientelism are attenuated among the political majority. The same regressions are estimated for "trust in parliament" as the dependent variables. These regressions are shown in table 5 in the appendix; the results suggest very similar patterns: the negative between-country and positive within-country effects of clientelism on confidence in a system.

Contingent Effects of Clientelism

To test whether within-country positive effects of clientelism are conditional on parties' organizational features and countries' levels of development and democracy, models in table 2 include indicators of these conditions, as well as the interactive effects of these variables.

economic performance, or substituting the indicator of parties' vote share with parties' government status does not change the results.




Figure 2: Clientelism and satisfaction with democracy at party level

Model 1 includes the interaction variable for party size and (country-mean centered) levels of clientelism. The left panel of figure 3 displays the estimated relationship between the extent to which parties rely on clientelism and party supporters' levels of satisfaction with different party sizes. The results show support for the hypothesis that within-country positive effects of clientelism are especially strong across large parties. The positive effects of clientelistic

		Satisfaction with	Democracy	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	with uncentered	with b15nwe	dichotomous	with interaction
	b15	and country-mean	DV	between b15nwe
		centered b15		and vote share
Party level IV				
Clientelism (b15)	.0098			
	[.0068]			
Vote share	.0067***	$.0058^{***}$.0071***	.0017
	[.0011]	[.0011]	[.0016]	[.0035]
Exceptional clientelism		.0217***	.0331***	
(country-mean centered b15 $)$		[.0073]	[.0107]	
Vote share				.0004*
*Clientelism (b15nwe)				[.0002]
Country level IV				
Clientelism (b15nwe)		0551***	0797***	0667***
(weighted country mean)		[.0143]	[.0190]	[.0151]
GDP pc (ln)	.0039	0308	0248	0286
	[.0263]	[.0242]	[.0321]	[.0241]
Polity	.0123	0032	0076	0031
	[.0211]	[.0189]	[.0251]	[.0188]
Age of democracy	.0068***	.0034	.0047	.0033
	[.0025]	[.0023]	[.0031]	[.0023]
Individual level IV				
Education	.0088***	.0086***	.0075*	.0084***
	[.0024]	[.0024]	[.0039]	[.0024]
Age	.0008***	.0008***	.0017***	.0008***
	[.0002]	[.0002]	[.0003]	[.0002]
Female	0406***	0407***	0478***	0407***
	[.0063]	[.0063]	[.0104]	[.0063]
_cons	1.829***	3.785^{***}	1.547^{*}	3.830***
	[.626]	[.676]	[.898]	[.6730]
Variance components				
Country level	.115***	$.0866^{***}$.1485	.0855***
	[.0214]	[.0160]	[.3853]	[.0158]
Party level	.0365***	.0359***	.0750	.0369***
	[.0037]	[.0037]	[.2738]	[.0037]
Residuals	.664***	.664***		.6636***
	[.0036]	[.0036]		[.0036]
N (individual)	68524	68524	68524	68524
N (country)	73	73	73	73
N (party)	364	364	364	364
11	-83632.9	-83622.1	-40035	-83625

Table 1: Regression analysis of satisfaction with democracy on clientelism

Standard errors in brackets; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

efforts on satisfaction are attenuated when the parties are smaller. This may suggest that the successful delivery of targeted goods, and in turn, positive evaluations of regime performance by citizens, requires the patron's access to various resources, which is more attainable for

large parties. In addition, the plot echoes the argument of hypothesis 2 and suggests that the majority/minority gap in satisfaction increases with parties' clientelistic efforts. If parties make little effort (below their national average) to provide clientelistic goods, being in the political majority or minority does not make much difference to individuals' evaluations of the political system. As parties more heavily rely on clientelism, the differences in levels of satisfaction between the majority and minority increase.




Figure 3: The contingent effects of clientelism

Model 2 in table 2 includes the interaction variable for parties' external organizational networks and (country-mean centered) levels of clientelism. Similar to model 1 that indicates the importance of party size, the results of model 2 show support for the hypothesis that the positive effects of parties' clientelistic efforts are especially pronounced when the parties have extensive associational linkages. Local intermediaries may serve as delivery mechanisms for clientelistic parties. Supporters of clientelistic parties with extensive linkage associations could obtain goods more easily, and in turn, are more likely to evaluate the political system positively.

Model 3 in table 2 includes the cross-level interaction variable of countries' levels of economic development and parties' clientelistic efforts. However, the coefficient of the interaction term is not significantly different from zero. The results do not support the hypothesis that targeted goods distribution is more likely to generate satisfaction in poorer countries. Model 4 in table 2 includes the cross-level interaction variable of countries' quality of democratic governance and parties' clientelstic efforts. The relationships between citizens' levels of satisfaction, parties' reliance on clientelism, and countries' Polity IV scores estimated in model 4 are displayed in the right panel of figure 3. The results show support for the hypothesis that the positive effects of targeted benefits on satisfaction are strengthened in lower quality democracies.

	Satisfaction with Democracy							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)		
Party level IV	0105	0010			010 5			
Exceptional clientelism	0125	0316	.0187	.0715***	.0185	.0245**		
(b15-b15nwe)	[.0104]	[.0184]	[.0725]	[.0185]	[.0244]	[0.0121]		
Vote share	.0053***	.0052***	.0058***	.0055***	.0045***	.0061**		
	[.0010]	[.0013]	[.0011]	[.0011]	[.0013]	[.0011]		
Reliance on		.0495			.0448			
intermediaries (a3)		[.0472]			[.0467]			
Programmaticism						352**		
$(CoSalPo_4)$						[.152]		
Exceptional clientelism	.0025***				.0020***			
*Vote share	[.0006]				[.0007]			
Exceptional clientelism		$.0458^{***}$.0139			
*Intermediaries (a3)		[.0143]			[.0184]			
Exceptional clientelism			.0001					
*GDP pc (\ln)			[.0029]					
Exceptional clientelism				0064***	0054**			
*Polity				[.0022]	[.0022]			
Exceptional clientelism						0203		
*Programmaticism						[.0370]		
Country level IV						[· -]		
Clientelism (b15nwe)	0571***	0559***	0551***	0555***	0579***	0601**		
	[.0144]	[.0145]	[.0143]	[.0144]	[.0146]	[.0144]		
GDP pc (ln)	0334	0308	0307	0306	0328	0213		
abi po (iii)	[.0243]	[.0244]	[.0243]	[.0244]	[.0246]	[.0244]		
Polity	0004	0031	0032	0082	0052	0012		
loney	[.0190]	[.0190]	[.0189]	[.0191]	[.0193]	[.0188]		
Age of democracy	.0036	.0036	.0034	.0033	.0036	.0033		
age of democracy	[.0023]	[.0023]	[.0023]	[.0033]	[.0030]	[.0033]		
ndividual level IV	[.0020]	[.0020]	[.0020]	[.0020]	[.0021]	[.0020]		
Education	.0085***	.0086***	.0086***	.0085***	.0085***	.0086**		
Saucation	[.0024]	[.0024]	[.0024]	[.0024]	[.0024]	[.0024]		
Age	.0008***	.0008***	.0008***	.0008***	.0008***	.0008**		
180	[.0002]	[.0002]	[.0002]	[.0002]	[.0002]	[.0002]		
Female	0407***	0407***	0407***	0407***	0407***	0408**		
remare	[.0063]				[.0063]	[.0063]		
aona	3.829^{***}	[.0063] 3.724^{***}	[.0063] 3.782^{***}	[.0063] 3.836^{***}	3.825^{***}	3.684**		
. cons	[.680]	[.683]	[.678]	[.682]	[.688]	[.673]		
Variance components	[.000]	[.005]	[.010]	[.002]	[.000]	[.010]		
Country level	.0886***	.0891***	.0866***	.0889***	.0909***	.0855**		
soundry level	[.0162]	[.0164]	[.0160]	[.0163]	[.0166]	[.0158]		
Party level	.0329***	.0341***	.0359***	.0345***	.0318***	.0352**		
	[.0034]	[.0035]	[.0037]	[.0035]	[.0033]	[.0036]		
Residuals	.664***	.664***	.664***	.664***	.664***	.664***		
	[.0036]	[.0036]	[.0036]	[.0036]	[.0036]	[.0036]		
N (individual)	68524	68524	68524	68524	68524	68524		
N (country)	73	73	73	73	73	73		
N (party)	364	364	364	364	364	364		
			-83622.1	-83618.0	-83609.1	-83619.		
1	-83612.3	-83617.1	-836777	-8301811	-X36HU I	-83010		

Table 2: Regression analysis of satisfaction with democracy on clientelism

Model 5 in table 2 includes the interactive effects of party size, the extensiveness of parties' external linkages, and the quality of democracy. It shows that the positive within-country effects of clietelism are contingent on party size and democratic quality. The significance of the contingent effects of the reliance on local intermediaries disappear, since large parties tend to also have more extensive organizations². The result that the positive within-country effects of clientelism are conditional on party size raises the question of whether people are satisfied with regime performance because these large clientelistic parties are also more capable of delivering programmatic goods, and it is the reliance on both strategies that especially generates satisfaction. To explore whether the positive effects of parties' clientelistic efforts are due to the fact that these parties also make substantial programmatic efforts, model 6 includes a measure of parties' reliance on programmatic strategies and the interaction variable for parties' clientelistic and programmatic efforts. The measure of parties' programmatic efforts, CoSalPo_4, is created by Freeze and Kitschelt (2010) to capture parties' issue cohesion, salience, and distinctiveness. The results from model 6 suggest that the within-country positive effects of clientelism are not contingent on parties' programmatic efforts³.

The Stability of Clientelistic Democracies?

Building on studies that have documented the negative effects of clientelism on economic performance and democratic principles, this paper demonstrates a systematic analysis of how parties' reliance on clientelistic strategies affects citizens' and party supporters' evaluations of regime performance. The analysis distinguishes between the between-country and within-country effects of parties' clientelistic efforts. The results suggest that citizens tend to show a lower level of satisfaction with democracy in countries where parties more heavily rely on clientelistic strategies. In addition, in systems in which clientelism prevails, the majority/minority differences in levels of satisfaction are greater. Within countries, supporters of parties that make substantial clientelistic efforts are more likely to evaluate the political system positively. The within-country positive effects of clientelism are strengthened when the parties are large, have extensive external linkages, or in countries with lower democratic quality.

The empirical analysis suggests that clientelism is an important component of government performance that citizens use to evaluate a political system, which may be due to the fact that clientelism undermines democratic principles but party supporters benefit from targeted goods distribution. The results indicate that the extent to which parties rely on clientelistic linkages may have important consequences for the legitimacy of democracy. Do these results imply that democracies in which clientelism prevails are more vulnerable than

²The Pearson's correlation coefficient between party size and the extensiveness of external linkages is .65

³Table 6 in the appendix shows regressions exploring the effects of programmaticism and the effects of a clientelistic-programmatic linkage combination on satisfaction with democracy. The results suggest that parties' reliance on programmatic strategies is not correlated with levels of satisfaction. Supporters of large parties that make both programmatic and clientelistic efforts do show higher levels of satisfaction, but the within-country positive effects of clientelism are not contingent on whether the parties also make programmatic promises.

systems in which parties make mainly programmatic efforts? As the literature has suggested, the "satisfaction with democracy" variable is at best an imperfect predictor of citizens' "diffuse support," whether citizens support democracy as the best form of government against alternative regime types. In addition, negative evaluations of regime performance do not directly lead to actions that challenge democracy. Table 3 shows a preliminary analysis exploring how clientelism is associated with citizens' regime preferences and protest potential. The second column of table 3 shows the effects of clientelism on whether individuals think democracy is the best form of government. The dependent variable is collapsed into two categories $(1=yes; 0=no, or it does not matter for the respondents)^4$. The results suggest that parties' clientelistic efforts do not affect citizens' regime preferences. The first and the third columns in table 3 examine the effects of clientelism on political action potential. In the first column, the dependent variable is interest in politics, which has been shown to be significantly correlated to participation in political action. The variable is coded on a 1-4 scale (1=not at all interested; 4=very interested). In the third column, the dependent variable is whether the respondents had ever attended a demonstration or protest (1=yes; 0=no). The results suggest that citizens living in countries in which clientelism prevails and supporters of clientelistic parties are less interested in politics, which may imply less political action potential. In terms of past experience, controlling for quality of democracy, majority/minority status, and demographic variables, the results show that clientelistic democracies had more protest, while supporters of clientelistic parties are less likely to participate in contentious political action.

Along with the analysis on satisfaction with democracy, these preliminary models do not provide conclusive arguments about whether clientelistic democracies are less stable. In general, parties' reliance on clientelism does not seem to affect citizens' regime preferences. However, citizens in countries where clientelism prevails are less satisfied with regime performance, have more protest, but are also less interested in politics. Within countries, supporters of clientelistic parties are more satisfied, less interested in politics, and less likely to attend protests. This implies that citizens of clientelistic democracies are generally more cynical about democracy, but within clientelistic countries, it is the non-supporters of clientelistic parties who are especially dissatisfied and have the highest protest potential.

⁴This is still not a perfect measure of regime preferences, since respondents' different conceptions of "democracy" may result in bias.

	Interest in politics	Democracy is the	Attended protest		
		best regime type			
Party level IV					
Exceptional clientelism	0176***	.0123	0663***		
(country-mean centered b15)	[.0048]	[.0209]	[.0227]		
Vote share	.0025***	0050	0022		
	[.0007]	[.0030]	[.0034]		
Country level IV					
Clientelism (b15nwe)	0328**	.1636	.1352***		
(weighted country mean)	[.0137]	[.1135]	[.0452]		
GDP pc (ln)	0530**	.2237*	0033		
	[.0242]	[.1239]	[.0796]		
Polity	0788***	.1958**	0643		
	[.0176]	[.0855]	[.0579]		
Age of democracy	.0028	.0415***	.0094		
Ç V	[.0022]	[.0146]	[.0073]		
Individual level IV					
Education	.1290***	.0723***	.1929***		
	[.0026]	[.0110]	[.0104]		
Age	.0059 * * *	.0087***	0076***		
-	[.0002]	[.0012]	[.0010]		
Female	2437***	0356	2005***		
	[.0069]	[.0322]	[.0291]		
_ cons	4.286***	-10.39***	-3.823*		
	[.679]	[3.90]	[2.237]		
Variance components					
Country level	.0790***	1.500	.7983		
	[.0146]	[1.225]	[.8935]		
Party level	.0092***	.0645	.2447		
	[.0015]	[.2539]	[.4947]		
Residuals	.7479***				
	[.0042]				
N (individual)	63587	27957	58999		
N (country)	66	36	65		
N (party)	326	130	321		
	-81256.8	-12475	-17093		

Table 3: Regression analysis of regime preferences and protest potential on clientelism

Standard errors in brackets; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

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Appendix

Measures and Coding

Satisfaction with democracy. "Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in your country?" Very satisfied (4), fairly satisfied (3), not very satisfied (2), not at all satisfied (1).

Clientelism (b15). Sum of experts' evaluations of "How much effort do candidates and parties expend to attract voters by providing consumer goods?"; "How much effort do candidates and parties expend to attract voters by providing preferential public benefits?"; "How much effort do candidates or parties expend to attract voters by providing preferential access to employment opportunities?"; "How much effort do candidates or parties expend to attract voters by offering them preferential access to government contracts or procurement opportunities?"; "How much effort do candidates or parties expend to attract voters and the businesses for which they work by influencing regulatory proceedings in their favor?" A major effort (4), a moderate effort (3), a minor effort (2), a negligible effort or none at all (1).

Reliance on intermediaries (a3). "Do the following parties have local intermediaries who operate in local constituencies on the parties' behalf, and perform a variety of important tasks such as maintaining contact with large groups of voters, organizing electoral support and voter turnout, and distributing party resources to voters and supporters?" Yes, they have local representatives in MOST constituencies (3); Yes, they have local representatives in SOME constituencies (2); No, they have almost no local representatives (1).

Vote share (%). Party vote share in the most recent national parliamentary election before the survey.

Education. "What is the highest level of education that you attained?" Respondents were coded on a 0 to 5 scale, where 5 denotes the highest level of education.

Age. Actual age of respondent.

Female. Male (0), female (1).

Trust in parliament. "How much do you trust Parliament?" Not at all (0), just a little (1), somewhat (2), a lot (3).

Democracy is the best regime. "Which of these three statements is closest to your own opinion?" Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government (1); In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable (0); For someone like me, it doesn't matter what kind of government we have (0).

Interest in politics. "How interested would you say you are in public affairs?" Very interested

(4), somewhat interested (3), not very interested (2), not at all interested (0).

Attended protest. "Please tell me whether you, personally, have attended a demonstration or protest march during the past year?" Yes (1), no (0).

Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Satisfaction with democracy	2.562	.921	1	4
Clientelism (b15)	12.122	3.795	5.167	19.857
Reliance on intermediaries (a3)	1.790	.454	1	3
Vote share $(\%)$	14.923	14.693	0	78.7
Polity IV	7.349	3.684	-6	10
GDP pc (ln)	24.588	1.989	20.945	30.016
Age of democracy	31.093	22.520	0	63
Education	2.524	1.617	0	5
Age	43.608	17.664	15	97
Female	.528	.499	0	1
Trust in parliament	1.307	1.029	0	3
Programmaticism (CoSalPo_4)	.238	.154	0	.883
Democracy is the best regime	.545	.498	0	1
Interest in politics	2.339	.974	1	4
Attended protest	.096	.295	0	1

Table 4: Descriptive statistics of all variables

Regression Analysis

		Trust in Par	liament	
	(1) with uncentered b15	(2) with b15nwe and country-mean centered b15	(3) dichotomous DV	(4) with interaction between b15nwe and vote share
Party level IV				
Clientelism (b15) Vote share	.0062 [.0074] .0065*** [.0012]	.0058*** [.0012]	$.0066^{***}$ [.0015]	0029 [.0040]
Exceptional clientelism		.0161**	.0242**	
(country-mean centered b15) Vote share *Clientelism (b15nwe)		[.0077]	[.0102]	.0008*** [.0003]
Country level IV				
Clientelism (b15nwe)		0690***	1075***	0862***
(weighted country mean)	0000	[.0177]	[.0225]	[.0183]
GDP pc (ln)	.0039	0423	0585	0384
Polity	[.0332] 0451*	[.0312] 0633***	[.0397] 0755***	[.0307] 0634***
Age of democracy	[.0251] $.0063^{**}$ [.0031]	[.0227] .0028 [.0029]	[.0288] .0037 [.0036]	[.0222] .0025 [.0028]
Individual level IV	L			
Education	.0134***	.0131***	.0173***	.0130***
Age	[.0028] .0016***	[.0028] .0016***	[.0004] $.0023^{***}$	[.0028] $.0016^{***}$
	[.0002]	[.0002]	[.0040]	[.0002]
Female	0102 [.0074]	0103 [.0074]	.0044 [.0108]	0103 [.0074]
_cons	1.094 [.789]	3.492^{***} [.877]	2.921^{***} [1.115]	3.588^{***} [.8616]
Variance components	[]	[]	[0]	[]
Country level	$.163^{***}$ $[.0315]$	$.126^{***}$ $[.0239]$.2032 $[.4507]$	$.1213^{***}$ $[.0230]$
Party level	.0364***	.0356***	.0577	.0356***
Residuals	[.0042] .830*** [.0047]	[.0041] .830*** [.0047]	[.2403]	[.0041] .8297*** .0047
N (individual)	61959	61959	61959	61959
N (country)	66	66	66	66
N (party)	326	326	326	326
	-82519.9	-82510.8	-37281	-82509.5

	Regression	1 .	c		•	1. ,		1. 1.
Table by	Rorroggion	919917010	Δt	truct	ın	norliomont	on	chontoligm
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Standard errors in brackets; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

	Satisfaction with Democracy							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)		
Party level IV								
Programmaticism	311**							
$(coposal_4)$	[.147]							
Both strategies				0125				
$(b15*coposal_4)$				[.0109]				
Vote share	.0076***	.0076***	.0077***	.0078***	.0077***	.0081***		
	[.0009]	[.0009]	[.0009]	[.0009]	[.0009]	[.0009]		
Exceptional programmaticism	. ,	402**	475	. ,				
(country-mean centered)		[0.163]	[0.297]					
Both strategies		[]	[]		0075	0522**		
(country-mean centered)					[.0121]	[.0250]		
Exceptional programmaticism			.0046		[]	[.0_00]		
*Vote share			[.0157]					
Both strategies (country-mean			[.0101]			.0025**		
centered)*Vote share						[.0012]		
Country level IV						[.0012]		
Programmaticism		.0944	.0959					
(weighted country mean)								
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		[.345]	[.345]		0254	0267		
Both strategies					0354	0367		
(weighted country mean)	0100	0020	0020	0004	[.0255]	[.0258]		
GDP pc (ln)	.0100	0038	0038	.0024	.0091	.0088		
	[.0261]	[.0280]	[.0280]	[.0254]	[.0261]	[.0263]		
Polity	.0134	.0098	.0098	.0117	.0137	.0140		
	[.0207]	[.0207]	[.0207]	[.0204]	[.0204]	[.0206]		
Age of democracy	.0066***	.0063***	.0063***	.0063***	.0061**	.0061**		
	[.0025]	[.0024]	[.0024]	[.0024]	[.0024]	[.0024]		
Individual level IV								
Education	.0087***	.0087***	.0087***	.0087***	.0087***	.0087***		
	[.0024]	[.0024]	[.0024]	[.0024]	[.0024]	[.0024]		
Age	.0008***	.0008***	.0008***	.0008***	.0008***	.0008***		
	[.0002]	[.0002]	[.0002]	[.0002]	[.0002]	[.0002]		
Female	0407***	0407***	0407***	0406***	0406***	0406***		
	[.0063]	[.0063]	[.0063]	[.0063]	[.0063]	[.0063]		
_ cons	1.856***	2.133***	2.130***	2.019***	1.917***	1.904***		
	[.598]	[.630]	[.630]	[.584]	[.589]	[.594]		
Variance components	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]		
Country level	.110***	.108***	.108***	.107***	.105***	.107***		
	[.0199]	[.0195]	[.0195]	[.0193]	[.0191]	[.0194]		
Party level	.0366***	.0366***	.0366***	.0374***	.0374***	.0366***		
1 ar by 10 v 01	[.0037]	[.0037]	[.0037]	[.0038]	[.0038]	[.0037]		
Residuals	[.0037] $.664^{***}$	[.0037] $.664^{***}$	[.0037] .664***	[.0038] .664***	[.0038] $.664^{***}$	$.664^{***}$		
INSIGUAIS	[.0036]	[.0036]	[.0036]	[.0036]	[.0036]	[.004]		
N (individual)								
N (individual)	68524 72	68524 72	68524 72	68524 72	68524 72	68524 72		
N (country)	73	73	73	73	73	73		
N (party)	364	364	364	364	364	364		
11	-83631.7	-83630.8	-83630.8	-83633.2	-83632.7	-83630.7		

Table 6: Regression analysis of satisfaction with democracy on clientelism and programmaticism

Standard errors in brackets; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01