Research and Dialogue on Programmatic Parties and Party Systems

Case Study Reports

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GENERAL FORMAT OF THE CASE STUDIES

To make the case studies usable for reference and comparison, each follows roughly the same format. The bulk of the case study describes the main features of national parties and party systems (section 1), followed by an analytical part that examines potential explanatory factors that may account for the features and change of features in the case.

The case studies proceed in the following format:

GENERAL CASE STUDY TEMPLATE

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A Case Study of Clientelistic vs. Programmatic Political Parties in Brazil

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1. Introduction

Brazil is an excellent case for exploring clientelistic vs. programmatic political parties and considering their relevance for democracy. During the development of national parties and competitive politics, clientelism and patronage was the norm. From an institutional perspective this an unlikely case for the emergence of programmatic political parties—the structure of the electoral system and the party system, as well as the history of inequality, poverty, and authoritarian rule militate against the emergence of disciplined and programmatic parties. Despite this, the two parties that have dominated Brazilian national politics for the past two decades are ideological, competitive, and in one case, partisan. In addition, since the democratic transition, parties have undertaken reforms that have made it consistently harder to use state resources for clientelism and patronage.

Programmatic linkages between voters and elected officials have historically been very weak in Brazil. While “pork” is still pervasive and corruption is still rampant, traditional forms of clientelism have become less and less common over the past few decades and parties have become more competitive along a policy-based rather than clientelistic model of voter linkage formation. There is a high degree of variation in the extent to which parties have shifted to more programmatic linkage strategies, with some parties still firmly rooted in clientelistic traditions and others that have been highly programmatic and cohesive since their inception. Cumulatively, the change over the past two decades has been considerable.

Several factors appear to have diminished both the supply and demand for clientelistic linkages over the past 20 years. Economic development has rapidly changed Brazilian society. The population of Brazil has nearly doubled since the 1950s, which has dramatically increased the size of electoral districts. The commodity boom, sustained economic growth, and massive expansion of primary education have created a large working-middle class (the so-called “Classe C”) from the formerly poor who are too expensive to have their votes purchased en masse and who also have more negative attitudes toward “corruption.” Levels of inequality continue to be some of the highest in the world and have remained relatively unchanged despite major improvements in poverty and other social indicators in recent years, which may hinder programmatic reform. There is broad agreement that Brazilian political and electoral institutions—presidentialism, bicameral federalism, open list proportional representation, and pooled electoral coalitions for legislative elections—have hindered the development of programmatic political parties. The exhaustion

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1 The first politically open and competitive period in Brazil came on the heels of World War II, from 1946-1964, before the bureaucratic authoritarian government from 1964-1985. The modern democratic period began in 1988 after the current constitution was enacted. National political parties began to organize during a brief period of opening in the 1930s. The focus here is on developments since democratization.

2 Decreased poverty is uncontested, but most outside observers believe that inequality has also improved because of lower Gini indexes based on household surveys of income. However, the former Minister of Finance and Professor of Economics, Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira, argues that inequality has in fact not improved (Bresser Pereira 2009). This view was consistently upheld in my interviews with experts in the field (Interview Bresser Pereira 2011; Interview Spink 2011) and by studies that show improvements in poverty without parallel improvements in access to human capital development (Portela Souza 2011).
of ISI and the onset of several decades of persistent economic crisis (high inflation, low growth, and balance of payment crises) created systemic challenges that provoked political response. Economic liberalization begun in the nineties created more intense external and internal pressures for a balanced budget with manageable debt. The only two moderately programmatic parties—the *Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira* (PSDB) and the *Partido dos Trabalhadores* (PT)—have been the parties in government since 1994 and have delivered on several of the most important policies for Brazilian voters: inflation, administrative reform, and social problems. The last period of crisis ended in 1994 and PSDB and PT governments have incrementally passed political and economic reforms that have made clientelistic linkages more difficult to maintain for all parties.

Legacies from before and during the military regime, as well as unique features of the 1988 democratic constitution, have impacted contemporary parties and politics. Electoral competition continues to be highly decentralized and the PT is the only political party that is ideologically and programmatically cohesive across the national territory. Politicians now rely more on personal charisma and mass media appeals, which has created a new set of challenges because of the lack of public campaign finance, and may compete with clientelistic strategies for scarce political resources. The most overt forms of clientelism have diminished across all parties, but there is little evidence that this has been the result of a “contagion effect” from the PT. Within the legislature, committees have become less powerful vis-à-vis party leaders, while PSDB and PT presidents have successfully maneuvered to increase the policy making power of the president vis-à-vis the legislature. The impact of these changes on the programmatic nature of political parties depends on a number of other factors and is far from being a settled question in the literature on Brazil.

Finally, the role of international organizations as agents in these transformative processes has been limited. For a number of reasons, Brazil has been fairly successful exerting its political autonomy when faced with pressures from international financial institutions, even during periods of crisis. Democracy promotion from international organizations was not a central part of the pressure for a transition in the eighties. While Brazil is regularly criticized for problems with corruption on the international scene, its economic and geopolitical strength have left these complaints largely toothless.

2. Descriptive Section

2.1. The Political Parties of Brazil

While there were only three major parties in the competitive period from 1945-1964, since 1988 political parties in Brazil have proliferated. Several reemerged after the dictatorship, several have roots in the official military party and official opposition, and several formed for the first time during and after the transition to democracy. In this section I
identify the Brazilian parties and their participation in the legislature from 1990-2010. The year 1986 is included for reference and the parties are listed in order of highest to lowest electoral support in the most recent election.

Table 1 about here

ARENA Successors

The PFL, Partido da Frente Liberal, formed in 1984 from dissidents of the PDS and changed its name in 2007 to Democratas. The PR, Partido da República, formed in 2006 with the fusion of the PL (formed in 1985) and PRONA (formed in 2002). The DEMS and the PR are right wing parties\(^3\) with roots in the ARENA and the military regime.

The new PP, Partido Progressista (formerly the PPB), was created in 1995 from a fusion of the PPR, PRP, and existing PP. It is a center right party with roots in the PDS, which also arose from the ARENA.

Official Opposition Under the Military Regime

The PMDB, Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro, was founded in 1980. The party has its roots in the MDB—the formal opposition under the military regime. It is a centrist party that was important during the transition and began to lose votes with the proliferation of parties afterward.

Successors of the Vargas Era

The PDT, Partido Democrático Trabalhista, was created in 1981 and is a center left party that took up many of the developmentalist goals of Getúlio Vargas. The PTB, Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro, was born from the urban working class organizations fomented by Vargas and was strong primarily in the state of Rio Grande do Sul (Soares 1973). It was refounded in 1979 by the daughter of Getúlio Vargas. The PTB is now a center right, nationalist party.

The New Center Right

The PSDB, Partido da Social-Democracia Brasileira, formed in 1989 by dissidents of the PMDB in São Paulo. The PSDB was a center left party until 1994 when it began to shift. By the beginning of Fernando Henrique Cardoso's second term, the party was right of center.

The New (Center) Left

The PT, Partido dos Trabalhadores, was founded in 1982 by union movement leaders and leftist academics, as well as dissidents from the PCB. The party was at the fore of the movement for democracy. It was a left wing party

\(^3\) Classifications of parties on a left right scale come from Coppedge (1997), Huber, et al (2008), and the DALP ideological placements.
historically but moderated to the center left by 2002 when it won the presidency with Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva at the helm.

The Historical Left

The PSB, *Partido Socialista Brasileiro*, was founded in 1947 and illegal from 1964-1985 and is a left wing party. The PCdoB, *Partido Comunista do Brasil*, was born in 1962 from the split in the PC-SBIC (*Partido Comunista-Seção Brasileira da Internacional Comunista*, founded in 1922). The PCdoB was illegal from 1964-1985 and was involved in guerrilla movements against the military regime. The PCdoB is a left wing party that promotes land reform and redistribution. The PPS, *Partido Popular Socialista*, is the former PCB (*Partido Comunista Brasileiro*), which had split from the PC-SBIC in 1962 to form a reformed communist party. It is a left wing party that was also illegal during the dictatorship and changed its name after the fall of the USSR to align with the Third Wave movement.

2.2. Programmatic Partisan Effort

The political parties associated with the ARENA and the old military regime (DEMS/PFL, PR, PP) have not shifted a great deal in terms of their programs, except to the extent that most have embraced economic liberalism more consistently than in the past. As the largest party on the right, the DEMS have historically been fairly disciplined in their ideological commitment, staying out of government from the time the PT came to power in 2002. However, as we will see in the case of the PSDB, the right in Brazil is hard pressed to differentiate itself programatically in a field in which the PT has moderated and proved itself capable of delivering economic growth and macroeconomic stability with moderate economic policies.

While the PMDB had gained credibility as the opposition party under the military regime, public dismay and anger over its performance in the first civilian government took a heavy toll. Voters supported the party with almost all the governorships in the country when the Cruzado Plan appeared to be succeeding and then punished it at the national level when the plan failed to contain inflation. This is a clear case of voters expressing partisan preferences associated with particular desired policy outcomes and holding parties accountable when they fail to deliver. Since the transition, the PMDB has become the quintessential catch-all party and is probably the best known for clientelistic practices, after the PFL/DEMS.

The parties associated with the Vargas era are different both in terms of ideology and programmaticness. The PDT is a left of center party that has a reputation as fairly programmatic, while the PTB is a nationalist, center right
party that is quite different from its predecessor and is not particularly programmatic. While little literature exists on these parties, this characterization is consistent with the DALP expert coding we will see below in Table 2.

Today, the primary party of the opposition is the PSDB. In 1994 the PSDB candidate, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, won the national presidency and governed for two terms in coalition with the right wing Partido da Frente Liberal (PFL, now the Democratas, DEMS). The party's approach to market reforms, lack of emphasis on redistribution, and oppositional relationship with the PT consolidated a programmatic position on the center right, while it differentiated itself from the DEMS on the far right by not relying on a party machine and founding the small scale social programs that were eventually expanded by Lula into the now famous Bolsa Família conditional cash transfer program. The challenge for the PSDB is that there is no room for it on the center left and it is not clear on what grounds it should differentiate itself to make a programmatic appeal on the right, particularly given that the PT has turned out to be fiscally responsible and a good steward of the economy. The PSDB was unwilling to adjust programatically for the 2006 and 2010 elections, remaining lukewarm to the PT’s expanded social programs despite wide popular support. The party is suffering from an identity crisis in the opposition, but has not had the ideological flexibility to respond to changing preferences on the part of the electorate and the moderation of the PT. This could certainly be viewed as ideologically coherent, though not a winning strategy.

For the PT, being a disciplined, ideological party dedicated to clean politics and transparency differentiated it early on and allowed candidates to separate themselves in a field of clientelistic, catch-all parties (Hunter 2010). The roots of the party lie in the new industrial areas around São Paulo with highly skilled industrial workers and civil servants (Lowy and Denner 1987). Its early membership base was educated, ideological, and did not expect the party to be electorally competitive at the national level in the near future (Keck 1992). As the party became more electorally competitive, it gradually moderated—removing the goal of socialism from its platform, adjusting its tone on Brazil’s relationship with the international economy and community. However, the PT has always identified itself as a working class party, despite the demographics of its early militants and voters. While the PT’s platform has always centered on anti-poverty policy and redistribution, it was only in government that it had to make unpopular decisions to achieve some of its programmatic goals. The decision of the PT to implement a major public pension reform while increasing social spending on the needy was a redistributive policy decision fully in line with the party’s programmatic position, but it directly challenged the economic interests of a large part of the PT’s base.

It was not surprising, therefore, that between the 2002 and 2006 elections, the profile of supporters of the PT changed substantially. Corruption scandals, ideological moderation, and pension reform caused a substantial loss of support among better-educated middle class voters. At the same time, the success of Bolsa Família caused a major upsurge in support from the poor—a voting group that the PT had always struggled to draw away from the patronage-

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4 Although the PSDB was originally viewed as farther left of center and had some policy differences with the PMDB, the reasons for the split were more pragmatic. A more conservative party leader with ties to rural elites in São Paulo had gained dominance over posts and resources, leaving little room within the party for the group that founded the PSDB (Roma 2002).

5 This program united four separate programs begun under the PSDB and greatly expanded their funding and coverage (now reaching nearly a quarter of Brazilians). Mothers receive small cash benefits each month in exchange for their children’s school attendance and regular clinic visits. The program has greatly reduced extreme poverty. Because of its design (public lists of recipients and a debit card sent directly from the federal government to the individual) and its tiny cash value (about $30 USD a month), the program has been found to be largely free of corruption and clientelistic manipulation.
based political machines of the northeastern region. Despite pragmatic moderation, PT ministers and their staff are generally highly committed to social goals of redistribution and equity (Borges Sugiyama 2008).

Like the Vargas’ era parties, the historical left has also changed over time. While the PCdoB is the most ideologically coherent of all the left parties and the PSB has not shifted dramatically, the PCB lost many of its militants to the formation of the PT and has proved to be an opportunistic party during the democratic period. None of the historical left parties have adopted internal policies like the PT to ensure ideological discipline among candidates, which has resulted in less coherence in the legislative arena.

In Table 2, below, I show the overall scores for programmaticness (CoSalPo) and those along the economic dimension (CoSalPo Econ), as well as ideological placement by the DALP experts and several other program areas of note. The CoSalPo measure combines the party’s cohesion, salience, and polarization scores to generate an overall indicator ranging from 0 (the programmatic minimum) to 1 (the maximum). For the DALP project as a whole, the mean is slightly under 0.30 for 506 parties. For party ideology (DW), the range is from 1 on the far left to 10 on the far right. The policy scales also have a ten-point range with 10 as the maximum. The questions on the (non-instrumental) value of democracy (D16) and level of Brazilian nationalism (D7) are on a ten point scale, low to high. Economic growth vs. income redistribution (D10), poverty reduction vs. citizen security (D12), and economic protectionism vs. economic openness (D14) place the first priority on the left and the second on the right on a ten point scale.

The CoSalPo scores are consistent with the historical assessment of these parties. The PFL appears to be more programmatic than most parties on the right (despite its high levels of clientelism) and the PT, PCdoB, and PDT on the left are the only parties to break 0.20. The ideological scores place the parties as expected. The value of democracy score shows a U-shaped relationship to ideology, also to be expected (since the question was about non-instrumental support for democracy). The farthest left and right parties are generally lower than the more moderate ones. This should not be taken as an assessment of commitment to the democratic process, by any means.

I include the nationalism variable because it lines up nicely with left right orientation, which is an interesting finding since Brazilian nationalism is not founded along ethno linguistic or religious cleavages, as in many OECD countries. Positions on economic protectionism vs. openness also line up generally along the left right dimension. Positions on growth vs. redistribution shows stark variation among parties, which is to be expected as questions of income distribution should be among the most polarizing, particularly where ethnic and religious cleavages are less salient. Finally, I include the question on citizen security because it highlights an important area of potential convergence. In Brazil, poverty and inequality are so extreme that most politicians, even those on the right, recognize the relationship between poverty and insecurity (even if their policy responses are distinct). In addition, parties of the left know that those who suffer most from violent crime are the poorest Brazilians. I would suggest that there is
somewhat less dispersion along this dimension because politicians generally recognize a link between the two and many would argue that insecurity cannot be addressed without addressing poverty and social exclusion.

Public opinion polls and demographic data on voters also give us some insight into the programmatic positioning and ideology of Brazilian parties. In 1990, voters for the PT and PSDB were significantly different from other voters and were clearly left and center, respectively. By 2007, however, this variation had diminished substantially and the differences between voters for the PT and the PSDB and other parties were much smaller (Carreirão 2008). Among several political parties, the level of education of voters dropped between 2002 and 2006, though most of all for the PT (Veiga 2007: 346). The median family income of voters for the PMDB and PFL increased sharply, while it remained the same for the PSDB and dropped for the PT. It seems likely that low-income voters shifted from the PMDB and PFL to the PT. If true, this would represent a shift from non-programmatic right wing parties using patronage to acquire the support of the poor to a programmatic party offering universal policy benefits.

The PT has long been the only major mass-based party in Brazil and party identification among its members drove the near 50 per cent rates of identification in the contemporary democratic period (Samuels 2006). It was largely due to disenchantment among PT party loyalists that overall party identification in Brazil dropped over ten points between 2002 and 2006 (Veiga 2007). Using public opinion data, Carreirão shows that between 1990 and 2007 the positive correlation between party identification and political opinions has disappeared. In 1990, there was a strong preference among voters of left parties for democratic, egalitarian, participatory, and socially liberal values compared to supporters of right and center parties, but by 2007 this relationship had diminished substantially (Carreirão 2008). In 2002, youth and leftist ideology were significantly correlated with support for the PT among voters, while by 2006 these relationships had evaporated (Veiga 2007: 354).

The vast majority of the PSDB's voters remain in the south and southeast (nearly 70 per cent), while the PFL, which had been somewhat balanced between the northeast and southeast became an almost exclusively northeastern party in terms of its voters between 2002 and 2006 (Veiga 2007: 349). The self identified ideology of the median PT voter remained precisely halfway between the scale of left and right from 2002 to 2006, though the average shifted from left to center. The voters of the PMDB moderated significantly from the right to the center, perhaps as a result of their national coalition with the PT, while the PFL voters shifted hard right, and the PSDB voters shifted from right to center right (Veiga 2007: 350), as the party tried to compete with the PT over the center. The result has been a substantial narrowing of the ideological space marked out by voters for themselves in relation to the parties, with the left end of the spectrum ceding substantial ground.

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6 Voting is mandatory in Brazil, with about 80% compliance, so these swings are probably not caused by changes in the overall voter profile.
2.3. Programmatic Responsiveness of Voters

In the second democratic period, small scale and national survey based studies showed lower levels of party identification among voters in the late eighties and early nineties than in the post-World War II period (Lavareda 1989; Kinzo 1992; Meneguello 1994). This is not surprising, as twenty years of authoritarian rule meant that new parties were emerging and that old parties were reshaping themselves. In addition, incorporation of illiterates into the electorate should be associated with lower levels of party identification, at least at the outset.

Studies highlighting the strength of populism and personalism in Brazilian politics, expressing pessimism regarding the prospects for programmatic party competition, were common through the mid-nineties (Singer 1990: 149; Meneguello 1994; 1995). Identified as part of a worldwide decline in party identification, scholars argued that in Brazil the inability of voters to channel their policy preferences through parties with meaningful programs had left voters disenchanted, engaging in “pragmatic” rather than programmatic political participation (Baquero 1996: 13).

Consistent with the transformations described above, by the end of the nineties the PT had eclipsed the PMDB as the party with the largest block of identified voters (Carreirão and Kinzo 2004). The PT drew more educated voters, while the PMDB drew less. Among college-educated voters, the PT has consistently been the most supported party with more than a fifth of such voters’ support. The PSDB, despite having less than 10 per cent of the electorate at large behind it, was the second most popular party among those with a college education, though this support dropped by half from 9 to 4 percent during Cardoso’s second term (Carreirão and Kinzo 2004: 150).

Since the return of democracy, party identification has never been greater than 54 per cent (Carreirão and Kinzo 2004), with little variation until the last two elections when the decline began. The levels of structured party preference that existed before the dictatorship have not returned. As I will discuss in the analysis, parties do appear to be abandoning clientelistic linkages with voters. However, the decrease in party identification among voters as well as the PT’s broadening government coalitions, ideological moderation, adaptation to the existing norms of national politics, and apparent electoral hegemony, raise important questions about the depth of these changes beyond overt vote-buying practices.

In recent years, the bases of societal support for particular parties are consistent with a party system where substantive policy differences exist, at least at the elite level. DALP experts clearly recognized the PT (and to a lesser extent the PDT and PCdoB) as having strong union linkages (A8_1), but none with business (A8_2). The PFL and PSDB were highly associated with support from business, and the PMDB and PP only slightly less so, while none of these were associated with links to unions. The PL is the only party viewed as having links to religious organizations (A8_3), no parties were generally seen as having notable ties to urban or rural movements (A8_4), and no parties were viewed by any experts as having ties to ethnic/racial or gender based groups (A8_4 and A8_6). In addition, DALP experts today see the PT as no different from all other parties in receiving at least half of their party finance (public and private) from illicit sources (A10/11).
These findings are historically consistent within the period we are exploring. The role of religion is probably somewhat recent, as the strength of evangelicals has grown in the past few decades throughout Latin America. Because of the importance of liberation theology and progressive Catholicism in Latin America, traditional catholic identification is not likely to show clear partisan divides on many issues. Most urban movements are union affiliated and the Movimiento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (MST, Landless Rural Workers Movement) has traditionally been unaligned politically, though with significant sympathy from the PT, which was involved in its founding in the late 1970s (Ondetti 2008). Women’s movements are not unimportant in Brazil, but have been very active within the organization of the PT itself and therefore might be less likely to appear as an external societal linkage. Race in Brazil is much less politicized than in the US, for example, and there are no parties that have traditionally focused on mobilizing around issues of race.

Table 3 shows the mean issue positions of various parties’ supporters, based on the World Value Survey 2005-7. Consistent with the transformation described above, voters for the PT and PSDB do not have significantly different positions on these issues. Compared to voters for other parties, PT’s supporters are not more likely to support the reduction of income inequality, the provision of social welfare, and the state intervention in economic affairs. PT’s supporters also do not identify themselves as more leftist. The standard deviations around voters’ mean issue positions are generally large, indicating there is little programmatic coherence among a party’s electorate. In addition, comparing party supporters’ attitudes and parties’ issue positions judged by the DALP experts, the correlations between these two (the last row of table 3) tend to be very low or even negative. Political elites do not share similar positions with their supporters.

2.4. Clientelistic Partisan Effort

While a great deal has been written about corruption in Brazil, there is no systematic work on the levels of clientelism across parties. Scholars have generally attempted to use proxies like poverty (Desposato 2001) or the variance in votes for candidates on the same party list (Epstein 2009) to indicate levels of clientelism—often by state

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7 Despite this lack of broad awareness and politicization, race and the history of slavery are clearly related to regional differences in the quality of democracy, political culture, and economic development, as in the United States southeast. To provide some context, Bahia is the largest state in the northeast region and 76 per cent of the population is directly descended from African slaves. Urban police violence and gang problems are also highly disproportionately concentrated in black communities in large metropolitan areas.
or region. While the analysis here is oriented around parties, it is important to note that a great deal of variation exists across regions, sometimes even within parties. The north, northeast, and center-west regions have traditionally had the highest levels of clientelism, corruption, oligarchic family rule, party hegemony, as well as poverty and inequality.

In the first competitive electoral period (1946-1964), clientelism appears to have been the norm across all parties. Vote monitoring was decentralized and heterogeneous (Lyne 2008: 80), as Brazilian politics has traditionally been in general. At the elite level, large-scale agriculture and industry were monitored by the commercial policy desk of the Banco de Brasil (CACEX), which controlled foreign exchange and reserves and kept a black list of uncooperative firms (Abranches 1978). Employer organizations and unions were corporatist and hierarchical, with their leaders appointed by the government (Schmitter 1971). These organizations coordinated the exchange of jobs and social benefits for the vote in urban areas (Malloy 1977; Erickson 1977) and nearly a quarter of votes were delivered in this manner (Lyne 2008: 81). Schemes for ensuring rural votes were varied and often direct. Small scale club benefits were sometimes taken away if a group did not organize collectively to ensure the vote—for example a paved road that was dug up again upon failure to deliver, one shoe before and one shoe after, or a pressure cooker without a lid until after the vote (Lyne 2008: 82).

The party that stands out as the most clientelistic in the democratic period has been the PFL/DEMS, which has traditionally had its support base in the family oligarchy of Antônio Carlos Magalhães in Bahia. The PMDB also continues to be known for its use of clientelism, though perhaps less geographically concentrated and less ideologically coherent than the PFL/DEMS. In most of Brazil the PSDB is not run by the kinds of clientelistic party machines used by the PFL, but there is regional variation. The PT has historically been known for a commitment to clean government and its members’ behavior has generally been consistent with this perception.

Arguably, where most Brazilian parties are most clientelistic is at the local level, where institutional resources are slim and accountability is low. Notably, this is the arena where the PT shines. Its reputation has developed over time because of its well run and honest municipal governments and the scandals it has suffered have mostly been at the national level and associated with vote buying within the national legislature or high level corruption of ministries (often not from the PT but from other coalition partners). The smaller parties vary and little information is available. Clearly, however, without controlling local, state, or national offices, these parties do not have access to the resources of the state.

In 2000 Ficha Limpa anti-corruption legislation was passed by the Brazilian congress based on legislation proposed through a citizen initiative headed by the NGO Movement to Combat Electoral Corruption (Movimento de Combate à Corrupção Eleitoral, MCCE). The MCCE began keeping tabs on the number of elected officials removed from office for illicit efforts to sway the vote. Table 4 shows the percent of officials removed from office from each party. I include in Table 4 the vote share of each party in the last election for comparison. These removals included cases in which “goods or advantages of a public or private nature were used to alter the will of voters or to strengthen campaigns illegally,” but did not include cases where the mandate was lost because of other criminal activity (MCCE 2007). From 2000 to 2007, 623 such cases were documented. While there are obvious limitations to this kind of data
(more anti-clientelist regions may have more activist investigators and produce more closed cases, among many other issues), it is illustrative nonetheless.

In less than seven years, 4 governors, 6 senators or alternates, 8 federal deputies, 13 state deputies, 508 mayors and vice mayors, and 84 city council people were removed from office for illegal practices related to clientelistic effort (MCCE 2007: 4). Because the number of city council people and deputies is related to population, the information on regional concentration is not especially telling. However, if we consider the percent of lost mandates compared to a rough average of the national seats controlled by these parties over the period, the clear outlier on one end is the PT, with many times fewer expulsions than their level of representation might suggest (perhaps more considering how much more successful the PT has been subnationally and how skewed the numbers are toward subnational officials). The PT’s expulsions were also concentrated in the later years, with no expulsions at all in 2000, despite the fact that this was the only time point in which the party was not in power, when the party could arguably have had some sway over investigations. Also of note is that the PCdoB had no expulsions at all. Parties of the center and right were far more likely to be in trouble for clientelistic efforts, even when the size of party support is taken into account.

The DALP survey results for exchange mechanisms show a noticeable difference between the behavior of left and right parties (though left parties are not “guiltless,” by any means). With the clientelism indicators ranging from 1 (negligible effort or none at all) to 4 (major effort), right parties are viewed as expending greater effort to offer voters consumer goods, preferential access to public benefits, jobs, government contracts, and favorable regulation (B1-5). The PSDB and PDT are important exceptions—the PSDB being much less clientelistic in its exchange mechanisms than other right parties (it is also the most moderate of the parties on the right) and the PDT being somewhat more clientelistic than other parties on the left. The general assessment of the experts was that a substantial effort was made by politicians across the board to attract voters through preferential treatment (B6) and that this situation is not particularly different than it was ten years ago (B7). The assessment of experts over time shows a small decrease in clientelism that is consistent with the literature reviewed here, showing that on average clientelism has probably declined in Brazil.

Table 4 about here

Though not displayed here, several other components of the DALP survey are also revealing. In keeping with theories that voters have a given “reserve price” (Lyne 2008) and clientelistic efforts are vote maximizing, experts did not find that any parties were targeting the rich with these inducements, while the PT was most consistent in targeting the poor and everyone targeted the middle class to some extent (B9). However, almost across the board experts felt that parties had few resources for punishing voters who were given inducements but did not vote the way they promised (C4) and saw their ability to monitor how individuals or small groups voted decrease over the past decade (C5). This is a clear change from the experience of the first electorally competitive period after World War II, when outright vote-buying with overt and institutionalized monitoring mechanisms was the norm.

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8 Though the number of expert respondents is small and variation large for this particular question.
Partisan tides—forces that impact the electoral success of all members of the same party—could be viewed as another indicator of programmatic voter choices (Cox and McCubbins 1993). Mona Lyne suggests that if voters were responding to clientelism, we would not expect to see partisan tides associated with the successful and popular ISI programs of Vargas and Kubitschek in the 1950s, the failure of Sarney's *Cruzado* stabilization plan in 1986, and the *Real Plan* of Cardoso in 1994 (2008: 83). The massive expansion of the *Bolsa Família* conditional cash transfer program under Lula beginning in 2004 could be added to this list.

In support of an argument about change over time away from clientelism, Lyne finds statistically significant evidence for a lack of partisan tides in the post-war period and their presence after\(^9\). In addition, Lyne finds that votes have become geographically deconcentrated over time, which suggests that neighborhoods or districts are not being targeted as successfully for votes in exchange for small scale club goods (2008). In his ground breaking book on Brazilian democracy, Barry Ames argues that this decrease in concentrated municipal domination is due to growing political education among voters, the increased population concentration in cities (which are harder to dominate), and the increasing presence of government bureaucrats and business people (rather than state and local politicians, who controlled local political machines) on party lists (2001: 271).

### 2.5. Party Organization in Brazil

Table 5 presents DALP indicators of party organization. Question A1, A3, and A4 are on a four-point scale where the lowest scores represent the most extensive presence or use. For A2 experts coded the party 1 for yes and 2 for no.

In keeping with the observation that the most successful national parties are articulated subnationally, the DALP expert survey offers support for the common assertion that the PT is the only coherent national party, as well as the one with the most extensive local roots, since it grew from the municipal level up. For example, it is the only party for which all experts in the DALP survey agreed that it maintains local party offices in most areas, maintains a permanent social presence, and has strong local intermediaries (A1-3). The PT was the strongest in allowing the rank and file membership to select candidates (A4). In addition the PT maintains a very unique set of internal institutions that seem likely to be important for understanding programmaticness. The PT requires that candidates have a history

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\(^9\) Lyne argues that because the Brazilian system is candidate-centered and highly decentralized after 1988, the presence of partisan tides during this period is more likely to represent policy-based voting rather than rewards for party-organized supply of clientelist benefits (2008: 87).
of social movement leadership or be founding members and requires that elected officials give between 20 and 30 per cent of their salary to the party (Hunter 2010).

The PSDB, arguably the other fairly national party, has more regional variation in ideology than does the PT. It is more conservative in the northeast, and in the state of Ceará is run by a local political machine that did not even back the national PSDB candidate for several presidential electoral cycles. Generally speaking, the findings of the DALP survey along dimension A are consistent with historical trends in party organization and behavior.

2.6. Legislative Organization of Party Caucuses

From the secondary literature we gain a complementary picture of legislative organization over time. In post-war Brazil legislative committees were powerful in agenda setting. All proposed legislation went through a constitutional committee and then on to the appropriate sub-committee. Parties could not force committee votes and committees decided what made it to the floor. Although parties had the power to remove members at any time, this was almost never done during legislatures. The president’s budget was always amended by the budget committee and if the president did not submit a budget, the committee could introduce legislation itself (Lyne 2008: 178). Parties appointed committee members, who in theory elected committee chairs, but in reality these were negotiated in advance and voting for the chosen candidate was a condition of appointment to the committee (Santos and Rennó 2004). During the post-war period, Lyne finds that party leaders’ appointments to the coveted budget committee were most significantly related to electoral success—those with the most votes got appointments. There appears to have been little punishment for lack of party loyalty, which Lyne argues is consistent with party behavior that rewarded clientelistic appeals rather than policy appeals as parties strove to encourage vote maximizing but not party loyalty (2008: 161).

In the current period, parties appear to have become much more powerful in relation to the committees. Party leaders can vote with the weight of their caucus and pass significant legislation using symbolic votes (Figueiredo and Limongi 2000). Party leaders and the president can bypass committees entirely through urgency requests (Santos and Rennó 2004). Committee members who threaten to vote out of line with party leaders are removed regularly (Pereira and Mueller 2000) and standing committees have been weakened by the ability of party leaders to form ad hoc committees to deal with legislation that falls under the jurisdiction of three or more committees (Santos and Rennó 2004).

Individual legislators formally submit budget amendment requests, with a maximum value of 200,000 reais, for locally targeted goods. The budget committee no longer plays a powerful gate-keeping role, as almost all of the amendments are approved. However, the president and the party leaders decide which will actually be funded and
when the money will be released. This process empowers party leaders and may moderate the candidate-centered
effects of OLPR. Parties appear to use committee appointments to reward those who vote with the party leadership
(Lyne 2008: 171).

The organization of the electoral system and political institutions, as well as the “pragmatic” behavior of
most parties except the PT (while in the opposition), strip meaning from party labels and make it hard for
programmatic politicians to gain traction within their parties or among the electorate, even when they eschew
clientelism. Low barriers to entry to all parties but the PT mean that candidates can easily switch parties, which
anywhere between one quarter and one third of national legislative candidates do at each election cycle (Samuels
2003; Desposato 2006)10. The strength of ministers and ministries in Brazil means that the policy initiatives of the
government in any given area can swing substantially depending on which ministries are part of horse-trading in the
legislature. Ministerial turnover is high, which has also contributed to a lack of programmatic cohesiveness in the
policies coming out of PT and PSDB governments in important policy areas.

2.7. Executive Participation and Government Coalitions

The coalition system discourages the organization of national political parties. Large district magnitudes and low
electoral thresholds have also contributed to party fragmentation (Samuels 2003). The result is that while some strong
parties exist at the municipal or state level, there are few truly “national” parties. In the DALP survey, the balance of
power in choosing national candidates within all parties, including the PT and PSDB, lay at the regional and state
level, and for some experts at the local level (A5). The fact that the most electorally successful parties in Brazil (PT,
PSDB, PMDB, and PFL/DEMS) have the most decentralized electoral strategies is also telling (A6).

The ability of parties to commit to a clear and cohesive program is made difficult both by opportunistic
coalition formation and by different party alliances at different levels. In 1994, while the PSDB was considered a
fairly programmatic left of center national party, it ran with a far right party that had a disciplined neoliberal wing
and a pork-politics wing, as well as with the PTB, which only operated on pork (Ames 2001). The PT has also made
opportunistic alliances, including with far right parties in some states (something it refused to do in the national
congress while in the opposition). There are also parties that are in the governing coalition at the national level but
are not in coalition with the same governing party in a particular state (for example the PMDB in Bahia).

10 Lyne (2008) argues that party switching is not a good indicator of lack of programmatic commitment because almost all
switching happens between parties within the same “side” of the coalition (inside or outside government).
The PT has become a very attractive coalition partner, which in the most recent elections has produced a cumbersome and broad coalition that includes the PMDB and has alienated many on the left of the PT\textsuperscript{1}. At the same time, while the PCdoB has run in coalition with the PT at every election, the PSB and PDT allied with the PT in 2010 for the first time since they entered government. The PCB has not run with the PT since the 2002 elections. As several recent papers have shown (Zucco 2009; Lyne 2008; Hagopian, et al 2009), discipline and party support are fairly high within the governing coalition, so it is likely that despite its compromises, the PT’s programmatic policy platform is coming out ahead in this bargain.

3. Analytical Section

3.1. Development

There is a consistent correlation between economic growth and other development indicators and the decline in clientelism over time in Brazil. Brazil’s economy stagnated through the sixties after the coup and then experienced a period of rapid economic growth led by domestic industry from 1968-1973. Growth continued throughout the seventies, financed by debt since the oil shock had severely reduced Brazil’s terms of trade. With the second oil shock in 1979 and the subsequent rise in interest rates, the Brazilian economy became mired in a balance of payments crisis. From 1979-1984 Brazil imposed an IMF austerity plan, which contributed to some causes of high inflation: exchange-rate devaluations, growing public deficit, and indexation of wages and prices (Baer 2001). Economic growth was negative during most of this period. Heterodox inflation control plans were instituted by a series of governments. First was the Cruzado Plan in 1986, which appeared successful early on but eventually failed miserably. The Bresser Plan in 1987 and the Summer Plan in 1989 also failed to contain inflation and return economic growth in large part because of their lack of attention to underlying political and institutional causes of the crises.

At the same time, radical economic and demographic changes took place during this period. The role of primary exports in the economy dwindled from 28% after WWII to 10% by the nineties, at the same time that population doubled and shifted from primarily rural to overwhelmingly urban (Baer 2001: 3). In contrast to the deindustrialization experienced in many OECD countries since the post-war period, as well as most of Latin America since the decline of ISI, the role of industry in GDP and employment has grown dramatically and steadily in Brazil over the same period. With population growth, electoral districts grew vastly in terms of number of voters, and in 1988 for the first time illiterates were extended the franchise. All of these factors increased the cost of purchasing votes (Lyne 2008).
Economic growth has been rapid since the mid-nineties, with the last inflationary crisis ending in 1994 (after the lasting success of the Real Plan implemented by then Finance Minister Fernando Henrique Cardoso) and the commodity boom beginning at the turn of the 21st century. The current crisis has been mild in Brazil by international standards. In combination with the economic growth, modernization, and industrialization that took place under ISI and the subsequent developmentalist strategies of both elected and authoritarian leaders, Brazil has been on a fairly steady upward economic trajectory for six decades, despite periods of serious crisis. There has been significant growth of the middle class, first in the mid-twentieth century and then with a major increase in the lower-middle class due to the combination of steady economic growth and employment and the anti-poverty programs of the last decade. This socio-economic shift has made vote-buying more expensive and brought a new class of voters out of the group that primarily worries about food on the table and into the group that also cares about whether politicians are honest. Mona Lyne refers to this as an increase in the “reserve price” of a voter, where the cost of foregoing clientelistic inducements has lowered for large swaths of the Brazilian population (2008).

3.2. Political Economy

The two parties that have governed since 1994 are the PSDB and the PT, which are generally considered the most programmatic political parties in Brazil. These parties formed without access to the resources of the state, which may explain their programmatic origins (Duverger 1954; Downs 1957; Shefter 1978). The PSDB formed precisely because its members had been shut out of access to the resources and power of the PMDB, while the PT formed out of newly mobilized industrial workers, academics, and civil servants who supported a leftist policy agenda and opposed the military regime as well as economic liberalization.

The electoral success of the parties, however, is strongly rooted in their responses to the failed reform efforts of the early democratic governments in the nineties. The inability of the ruling parties from 1985-1994 to implement reform in the face of serious economic crises created space for the PSDB and PT, outside of government, to differentiate themselves along programmatic lines. The PSDB hit the ground running with members who were known and influential in national politics. Their 1994 presidential candidate, Cardoso, was the author of the Real Plan, which had already had some success and became more and more popular throughout the electoral campaign. The PT, on the other hand, had risen from the ground up throughout the eighties, winning municipal elections primarily in the South and Southeast, though the party was well known for its ideological discipline, innovative governing techniques, and repeat presidential candidate—Lula. While the PT had begun the campaign far ahead of the PSDB in the polls, a corruption scandal involving Lula’s vice presidential running mate and his persistent opposition to the Real Plan in the face of broad popular support closed the gap.

The PT’s programmatic commitment to opposing the liberalizing reforms of the Real Plan was electorally costly in real time and represented a principled decision by the party, which had opposed the plan from the outset and
chose not to moderate its stance, even when the plan began to show positive results throughout the economy. The PSDB did not use machine politics, but had also not built a reputation upon a commitment to transparency, clean government, and ideological consistency, as the PT had. The party formed a coalition with the far right PFL, a union that was fiercely opposed by the more ideological members of the PSDB, which was at the time seen as a center-left party.

The 1994 election represented a turning point for both the PT and the PSDB. The PT had begun to see itself as a contender for the executive branch and watched that possibility slip away in the face of an ideological stance that did not fit the new economic reality or the preferences of the public. The loss in 1994 sparked accelerated programmatic moderation by the party (Hunter 2010). The newly formed PSDB on the other hand, faced with a need to expand its base beyond São Paulo, made a pragmatic alliance in 1994 that highlights the differences that existed between it and the PT at the time. The alliance with the PFL resulted in the party permanently losing whatever tenuous claim it had made to the center-left, which gave the PT electoral space to moderate later and still remain dominant on the left.

The impact on both parties of governing a major world economic power in the context of increasing openness and integration has clearly impacted the content of their programs. Brazil’s modernization, industrialization, and increasing integration in the international economy over the past half century have increased the salience of the global economy and the importance of stability to voters. International pressures are not sufficient to explain economic reform (Weyland 1996b), but they are certainly part of the story. While the military regime was slow to respond to the exhaustion of ISI, every government since democratization has instituted reforms that opened the economy and deepened integration. Although Brazil is large and geo-politically important, it cannot afford to appear fiscally or macroeconomically unstable to domestic or international investors. This has placed all parties that expect to govern in the position of needing to guarantee economic growth and stability and does not leave room for poor fiscal administration, rampant stealing from the state, regularly bailing out subnational governments that borrowed heavily to fund their local political machines, or funneling large amounts of money into patronage at the national level. The PT and PSDB have implemented reforms limiting the resources available for clientelism as a side effect of creating an institutional structure that would support economic growth and stability. These reforms have made it increasingly difficult for any party to use clientelism and patronage, forcing a shift toward greater programmatic politics for all parties.

These include:

- An end to subnational bailouts by both PSDB and PT since 1994;
- Banking reform under the PSDB;
- Full administrative reform of the state by the PSDB in 1995 under principles of cost savings, rationalization, and modernization;
- The 1996 Lei Camata, part of the administrative reform, which limited municipalities to spend no more then 60 per cent of revenues on personnel;
- The 2000 Lei de Responsabilidade Fiscal, which requires that all public revenue and expenses (at all three levels) go before a Tribunal de Contas, which, if rejected, requires an investigation of the
responsible executive and can impose fines as well as prohibit the official from future candidacy. The law also enables the firing of civil servants for poor job performance;

- The *Candidato Nato* rule that forced parties to place incumbents on the ballot gave individual politicians great scope for independence from the party. This law was eliminated in 2002;
- Judicial reform and bankruptcy reform under the PT;
- Social policy reforms to pensions and social assistance under the PT that created universal social benefits and eliminated special status for civil servants;
- Proposed reforms for exclusive public financing of campaigns is currently before the Chamber of Deputies;
- The *Ficha Limpa* law\(^{11}\) of 2010 that prohibits individuals who have been found guilty by high courts (with no further appeals open) from running for public office. This disqualifies a shockingly high number of important politicians in Brazil from running for office, but will not go into effect until 2012 because of a constitutional restriction that prevents election laws from going into effect sooner than a year before the next elections.

The economic challenges that faced the PSDB when it took office were intense and Cardoso expended significant political capital pushing through the administrative state reforms of 1995, which were opposed by the PT as “neo-loliberal” and “privatizing” reforms. However, the macroeconomic stability and improved fiscal house that the PT inherited when it took power in 2002 were largely owed to these reforms, which it has deepened and maintained.

The PT’s early reforms forced its traditional base of formal sector industrial workers and civil servants—part of the upper-middle class in Brazil, despite their leftist politics—to swallow a bitter pill. The expansion of social assistance and cutbacks to the fiscally unsustainable pension system were fully compatible with the core ideology of the party, which had always been oriented toward winning the support of the lower classes through “inverting” the priorities of the state to focus on the bottom instead of the top\(^{12}\). But in the opposition there had been no difficult trade-offs to make between the party’s base and its target constituency. In power, the reality of managing the economy tested the ideological mettle of the party’s old core. Subsequent corruption scandals and electorally-motivated ideological moderation further tested the loyalty of the remaining old core, while masses of new, poor voters flocked to the party in response to concrete and visible improvements in poverty and access to basic social services as a result of the PT’s social programs. As Hunter shows clearly in her careful assessment of the transformation of the PT in the past two decades (2010), the party has balanced clear programmatic moderation with the maintenance of a unique internal structure that suggests the PT will continue to be more disciplined and more programmatic than other parties, despite its moderation over time.

Both the governments of Cardoso and Lula increased the use of conditionalities to induce subnational governments to conform to their policy agendas, leading to a shift in the way municipal governments manage policy

\(^{11}\) The *Ficha Limpa* law, in particular, suggests that an important part of the shift in Brazil may be on the demand side. The initiative was generated at the popular level and spent a decade being discussed by anti-corruption NGOs and civil society organizations, which eventually collected 1.3 million signatures in order to send their legislation to the Chamber of Deputies.

\(^{12}\) Given that the Bolsa Família program represents a tiny fraction of public spending and wealth inequality appears not to have moved at all, the upper 40% of the economic ladder has arguably not been asked to give up much.
and perhaps to how local parties relate to voters. Extra financing for social policies was offered when certain best practice management and oversight policies were adopted, when transparency efforts were completed, and when successful programs were modeled in new localities. These economic carrots and sticks have been an important part of changing municipal and state government behavior and bringing it more in line with a policy-driven rather than a clientelistic approach to politics.

3.3. Institutions and Linkage Strategies

The emergence of programmatic political parties is of note precisely because Brazil has nearly the worst configuration of formal institutions possible to produce such parties. Political parties in Brazil have long been famed for lacking discipline and differentiable programs, problems that have been consistently laid at the doorstep of institutional characteristics (Sartori 1994; Shugart and Carey 1992; Geddes 1994; Geddes and Ribeiro Neto 1992; Mainwaring 1999; Mainwaring and Perez-Liñán 1997; Ames 2001; Hagopian 1996; Weyland 1996). The rise of the PT has accompanied a reconsideration of this assessment (recent examples are Hagopian, et al 2009; Lyne 2008), but most of these formal institutions continue to create challenges for the emergence of programmatic politics.

The open list proportional representation (OLPR) system in Brazil encourages intra-party competition and deters disciplined links between candidates and parties. Candidates compete geographically to win the support of local leaders who can deliver blocks of votes and generally arrive to national office representing a narrow set of private interests. In office, the OLPR system, large multi-member districts, subnational candidate selection, and immediate reelection long disincentivized ideological behavior (Ames 2001: 269-270)

The literature on federalism, malapportionment, and the functioning of the Brazilian congress is large (Stepan 2001; Souza 1997; Samuels and Mainwaring 2004, Samuels and Snyder 2001, among many others). We have already discussed the party and electoral system, as well as the territorially fragmented nature of politics. Subnational units can initiate the process of creating new states and the less populated north and northeast have increased their representation in the senate significantly in the past 30 years in this way. Congressional malapportionment is also high. Brazilian political careers are not hierarchically organized and deputies, senators, and ministers often aspire to politically important mayoral or gubernatorial seats, which keeps them tied to the preferences of local party bosses, local private interests, and local voters.

Brazil has a strong presidential system in which presidents have substantial decree power, ministers have a central role in determining policies in their arena, and the president is powerful in coordinating ministerial and coalition arrangements, as well as directing bureaucratic resources and creating and dissolving ministries. Attempts to limit the decree powers of the president have not been particularly effective and until 2001, 75 per cent of
legislation originated in the executive branch (Pereira, et al 2008). This may be due in part to the high incidence of split ticket voting, which occurs in almost 70 per cent of votes cast in recent elections (Ames, et al 2008).

The executive’s use of extra-legislative inducements are part of the reason that Brazilianists argue that the country is a much more centralized presidential system than it might seem at first glance based on formal legislative institutions and the constitution alone. Subnational governments—even those committed to clean government and democratic principles—feel that the use of conditionalities is a manipulation that undermines the territorial sovereignty of states and municipalities, an argument that has some juridical merit.

There can also be an important difference between the ideology of political parties and the legislative behavior of their members in congress, as recent work by Power and Zucco show (2009). While parties and individual legislators show substantive differences on a left right scale, the behavior of legislators once elected is highly contingent on the receipt of concrete benefits from the president (Zucco 2009). Brazilian parties in the legislature may be more coherent than the electoral system would suggest (Figueiredo and Limongi 1999), but this coherence is not necessarily around the policy platform and ideology of the party. Zucco makes a convincing argument that in fact the polarization of political party voting behavior in the legislature is not based on ideology but on their relationship to the governing coalition (2009).

In sum, institutional constraints to coherent policy making by governments and coherent policy platforms by parties are extreme in Brazil. It is perhaps not surprising, then, that presidents resort to using decree powers or buying legislative votes (with ministerial appointments or wads of cash) in order to pass their legislative agendas. On the electoral side, the behavior of legislators, even in the PSDB and PT, is mediated by coalition politics and the competition for resources from the executive, which means that voters choosing to vote in a programmatic manner may well not be rewarded for their commitment to policy13. In this context, the development and political economy explanations for the growing programmaticness of Brazilian parties appear especially powerful.

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13 In addition, the salaries of elected officials in Brazil are very high. There is little research on this issue, though because of the PT’s passage of laws guaranteeing transparency in public budgets, it is now a frequent topic of discussion in the press. The salaries of elected officials, even in poor states and some municipalities, are so high that they clearly make office attractive for its own sake. For example, in Bahia in 2011 city council members were earning approximately 9000 reais ($5600) a month and state legislators were earning between 14000 and 18000 ($8700-$11,200), with another 20,000 reais a month in expense accounts.
3.4. Party Organization

Internal political party organization has not received a particularly large share of scholarly attention, beyond the PT. The evidence in the case of the PT is very clear that the organization of the party has not changed much over time (Hunter 2010), even while the electoral fortunes of the party, its membership base, and its party program have shifted. Most parties have continued to be regionally based and, outside the PT and the PSDB (in most states), run by machine politics on the ground. The PT’s uniqueness in this arena is quite suggestive, but not conclusive lacking variation over time.

3.5. Changing Patterns of Party Competition

The structure of party competition in Brazil undoubtedly changed from the first competitive period through the military period and to full democracy in 1988, but it may be too early to tell how much it has changed in the democratic period. The party system remains weakly institutionalized and fragmented, as characterized by Mainwaring in 1999. In 2011 a new party, the PSD, was created and promises to be one of the largest in the legislature, having taken a massive number of representatives from the PFL/DEMS and a significant number from the PMDB and PSDB as well. The PT appears to be becoming hegemonic, with nearly all parties but the PSDB and DEMS attempting to join its coalition. These two parties are in full-blown identity crises, the DEMS having already disintegrated with the exodus to the PSD. The PT is still the only mass party, though Cardoso has recently made public appeals to the PSDB leadership to reach out to the lower-middle class in an effort to remain in the game. Institutional constraints persist and high inequality continues to create a major gap between party elites and the mass public for most parties.

Consistent with the conceptualization of Brazil’s parties as relatively programmatic and polarized at the elite level, Coppedge argues that Brazilian party polarization was “flat” (not as polarized as a bimodal distribution but more than a unimodal distribution) in the post-war competitive period and after 1982 (not polarized at all under the military regime), shifting steadily leftward during the eighties and becoming significantly more polarized in the 1994 elections (Coppedge 1998). Comparable data do not exist for the more recent period, but the analysis above suggests party polarization may have declined with the moderation of the PT, while the mean ideological orientation of parties has probably shifted a bit farther left. A recent study based on data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems gives Brazil a polarization score of 2.0, significantly toward the low end of the spectrum (Dalton 2006: 10).

To comprehend a fragmented, un-institutionalized system with very low (and decreasing) levels of party identification, which also displays decreasing electoral volatility, low political conflict, and identifiable party blocs over several decades, Cesar Zucco uses the term “stability without roots” (2009). So while there is clear evidence that
politics, writ large, has become more stable in Brazil, there is little evidence that the structure of party competition has stabilized.

Clientelism has become a more expensive and less viable electoral strategy, but other forms of non-programmatic linkages (such as charismatic mass media appeals) have gained importance as part of the meat and potatoes of party strategy. The PT has been the poster child for programmatic politics and clean government as a model for success. If it can maintain its identity after ideological moderation and acceptance of “pragmatic” political strategy, it may well have an impact on the structure of competition across the board, but it is still too early to tell.

3.6. Civil Society

Social movements in Brazil, particularly neighborhood associations and unions, have traditionally been quite strong. Because of the weakness of the national government during the transition period, organized social reformers were able to insert a broad set of citizenship rights into the constitution itself. Social movements were at the core of the formation of the PT, of their early municipal electoral successes, and of the success of the innovative experimental social and participatory budgeting policies that have since been adopted nationwide, to varying degrees. The 1988 constitution was a citizens’ constitution—it committed the state to concrete social outcomes deemed necessary for citizenship, for example good health and basic education.

It is difficult to measure precisely how and to what extent these changes matter for voter preferences, party linkage strategies, and policy, but Brazilians know that their constitution promises them a range of rights and benefits they did not have before and know that these are associated with their status as citizens, rather than as clients. The work of scholars like Wendy Hunter and Natasha Borges Sugiyama, detailing the way that new social rights have pulled marginalized people into active citizenship\textsuperscript{14}, suggests the legacy of democracy and the success of the PT may have an irrevocable impact on the preferences of the mass electorate, and that this change would be in the direction of greater programmatic demands of politicians. Certainly, the \textit{Bolsa Familia} experience has sent a clear message to other political parties that paying attention to the problems of the poor (as a social class, rather than as individuals) carries electoral rewards. Although Cardoso is clearly pushing the PSDB to pay more attention to the newly partisan lower-middle class before they become too strongly attached to the PT, it is unclear whether the party will heed his call.

\textsuperscript{14} Formally, by inducing them to register as citizens in order to obtain benefits (see for example Hunter 2011), or indirectly, by bringing them into contact with social workers and health care providers through the Bolsa Familia and Programa Saúde da Familia.
3.7. Role of International Advice and Initiatives?

One of the persistent questions in the literature on reform in Latin America is the role of international organizations. There is little evidence that in Brazil external influences have had a significant impact on democracy, for or against. During the Cold War, liberal market reforms associated with the Washington Consensus were supported by international financial institutions at the expense of almost all else, including, at times, democratic governance. However, Brazil has a unique position in Latin America—it is a big country with a big economy and is not as tightly tied to the United States as Mexico and Central America. While no country today escapes the influence of international markets, Brazil has been more independent of external pressures than most Latin American countries, for better or for worse. Unlike Chile, Brazil’s bureaucratic authoritarian regime remained developmentalist and did not implement sweeping privatization and market reform. There is little evidence of involvement from international organizations in the transition to democracy in Brazil, nor in subsequent reform processes.

The Carter Center has done limited work on indigenous health initiatives in the rainforest, mostly during the nineties. The World Bank has been involved in helping to fund health projects in the poor northeast, in partnership with the federal government in Brasília, with excellent results in reduced infant mortality and bolstering support for these programs to eventually become the national model for primary care provision. USAID and other aid organizations operate small-scale projects in health and education in Brazil, as they do in many developing countries. Organizations such as IDEA and the US National Democratic Institute have historically not worked in Brazil. As discussed above, the role of the international community has largely been the diffuse impact of international economic integration and opening that began after democratization, with roots in the ISI reforms that began mid-century. There are no clear failures of international efforts to support institutional reform, but no evidence that it was instrumental in the significant changes that have occurred either.

Brazil is a member of the World Trade Organization and is an active member of the United Nations. It has driven expansion of Mercosur, which is now a full customs union. Though important politically, membership and alliances have not become salient poles for structuring party competition or organization.

4. Conclusion

Brazil’s political parties have faced significant institutional barriers to becoming more programmatic, but structural and political factors have made significant reform possible. There is no doubt that political parties in Brazil today are forming linkages with voters that are more based upon policies with universal characteristics, as citizens, than based
on quid pro quo patron-client relationships. This shift appears to be the result of both slow moving, complex changes that would be difficult to impact from without, as well as concrete political reforms, the success of which can be traced to particular decisions by particular political actors at a given point in time.

The two most important enablers of reform—probably necessary but in neither case sufficient—seem to have been the economic crises that transformed existing networks of patron-client linkages at elite and mass levels and democratization with a citizens’ constitution that expanded citizenship rights and made the state responsible for a set of outcomes that could only be achieved through programmatic policies. Clearly, neither of these are sufficient for reform in and of themselves. Economic crises can restructure patron-client linkages without destroying them and the guarantees of democratic constitutions, without parties, judiciaries, and social movements to defend them, can remain hollow.

The jury may still be out, however, on how these developments in Brazilian politics impact the quality of democracy itself. The most direct impact that programmatic political parties have on democracy may be that they allow for accountability and for the democratic process to be meaningful in terms of citizen choice in the electoral arena. When parties do not stand for anything concrete or are not faithful to their ideological commitments, citizens may disengage from politics. Democracy can be undermined if the people choose a particular type of party and get something else.

In the case of Brazil, many of these challenges remain. Several features of the electoral system discourage programmatic parties, and these are unlikely to change. PSDB and PT presidents have resorted to the intensive use of decree powers and extra-legislative policy making in order to bypass some of the institutional hurdles to effective governance. Outside the PT, party labels are still not especially meaningful because of the ease of access to party lists and because of the candidate-centered nature of campaign finance. The PT label is arguably less meaningful than it was a decade ago because of the party’s decision to form ideologically broad coalitions that include parties like the PL and PMDB. The policy effects of these coalition decisions come not only in the form of legislative concessions, but in powerful ministerial posts given to less programmatic parties. In all three PT governments the majority of the corruption scandals have taken place among ministers from other parties and not from PT members themselves. But the party program pays a price for these scandals, beyond the electoral arena, when political capital and time are wasted managing crises of government and high ministerial turnover rates prevent substantive policy implementation from taking place.

Some of the most serious corruption scandals for the PT have been centered on the party itself and its efforts to solidify its coalition and implement its policy agenda. Both Hunter (2010) and Lyne (2008) argue that the implications of the legislative vote-buying scandal under Lula are mediated by the fact that their purpose was to implement programmatic policies, rather than for personal enrichment or gain. While this argument may be valid when assessing the existence or not of programmatic politics, it does not address concerns about democratic accountability. At the same time, the substantive content of policies that fight poverty, income inequality, urban

15 Substantial reform initiatives are still being proposed in Brazil, however. Closed list proportional representation was taken up in committee this year, for example, but did not make it out of the Senate.
warfare, and anti-gay violence may have positive implications for democracy in and of themselves.

How do we manage the contradiction of legislative vote buying and less “democratic” governance by decree, which appear to be successful strategies for programmatic policy making under perverse institutional incentives, but may undermine the faith of the electorate in the existence of programmatic politicians? This is a challenging question for theorists of democracy, but is one that Brazilians have been living with for a long time. The common Brazilian adage that a politician “rouba mas faz”—steals but gets thing done—illustrates the contradiction.

Institutions are not the only impediments to the spread of policy-oriented politics. Inequality and widespread poverty have posed challenges for the emergence of programmatic parties. Oligarchic family rule has persisted in the poor northeast, though this cycle has been broken in some areas with the wave of electoral success of the PT trickling down to the state level. These poor rural states are over-represented in the legislature. Family ties to business and politics are strong and politicians often appoint their cronies to judicial seats, ministries, and state enterprises. The poor and uneducated traditionally have had little information with which to make assessments about the qualifications of politicians, especially when clientelism was the norm among most parties.

In sum, the shift toward more programmatic political parties in Brazil, embodied by the rise of the PT and to a lesser extent, the PSDB, is likely due to the combination of several processes: democratization and the changes brought about by the 1988 constitution itself, prolonged economic crisis and the reforms instituted by the PSDB under Cardoso in the nineties, and the PT’s policies of transparency, participation, and universality in the social realm, as well as its continuation of the political economy reforms begun under the PSDB.

The 1988 constitution enshrined broad social and citizenship rights that have created formal obligations that politicians avoid with increasing difficulty, changing the expectations of the electorate regarding the responsibilities of the state and the role of political institutions. The management and economic reforms of the nineties under the PSDB limited the utility of clientelistic electoral strategies (by decreasing the availability of resources for patronage) and increased the professional/technical nature of the civil service. The PT instituted several important social programs that had clear universal access and were difficult to manipulate politically. The poor have become more mobilized and included in participatory processes that increase their level of political education and make them less susceptible to clientelistic appeals. The middle class has grown and views corruption and patronage politics more negatively than the desperately poor. The widespread availability of data on government spending under transparency laws has given the media the ability to act as a watchdog. Daunting challenges persist, structural limits to progress likely exist, and the space for outside support of reform processes is unclear, but Brazil is undoubtedly a positive case of progress away from clientelism and toward more programmatic parties and politics.
References


Bresser Pereira, Luiz Carlos. Personal Interview. Former Minister of Finance, Minister of Federal Administration and State Reform, and Minister of Science and Technology. May 19, 2011.


Hagopian, Frances, Carlos Gervasoni, and Juan Andres Moraes. 2009. “From Patronage to Program: The Emergence of Party-Oriented Legislators in Brazil.” *Comparative Political Studies March.42*(3): 360-391


Table 1: Electoral Party Support in Brazil  
(% of legislative seats)

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* Not included in the DALP

Source: Jairo Nicolau and Tribunal Supremo Eleitoral
Table 2: Issue Positions and Programmatic Effort of Brazilian Parties

(standard deviations in parentheses)

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<th>Party tendency or legacy</th>
<th>Party name</th>
<th>Overall Programmatic Structure (CoSalPo_4)</th>
<th>Programmatic Structure Economic Issues (CoSalPo_3econ)</th>
<th>Overall left-right (DW) 1=left; 10=right</th>
<th>Democracy (D16_bra) 1=value substantive accomplishments of democracy; 10=value democracy</th>
<th>Nationalism (D7_bra) 1=use nationalist rhetoric; 10=not use nationalist rhetoric</th>
<th>Growth vs. Redistribution (D10_bra) 1=support growth; 10= support redistribution</th>
<th>Poverty vs. Security (D12_bra) 1=support poverty reduction; 10= support citizen security</th>
<th>Protectionism vs. Openness (D14_bra) 1= support economic protectionism; 10= support openness</th>
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Source: DALP
Table 3: Issue Positions of Brazilian Voters

(standard deviations in parentheses)

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<th>State role in economy 1=support; 10=oppose</th>
<th>Public spending 1=support; 10=oppose</th>
<th>National identity 1=diversity; 10=nationalism</th>
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<td>6.09 (2.89)</td>
<td>5.28 (2.80)</td>
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<td>2.23 (1.70)</td>
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<td>PTR/PP</td>
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<td>6.31 (2.96)</td>
<td>6.01 (2.98)</td>
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<td>3.03 (2.39)</td>
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Source: WVS 2005-07
Table 4: Clientelistic Effort of Brazilian Parties

(standard deviations in parentheses)

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<th>Vote share 2010(%)</th>
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Source: DALP and MCCE
Table 5: Organizational Investments of Brazilian Parties  
(standard deviations in parentheses)

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<th>Mass organizations (A2)</th>
<th>Links to notables (A3)</th>
<th>Centralization of control over legislative candidate nomination (A4)</th>
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<td>1=extensive</td>
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<td>1.41 (0.51)</td>
<td>1.41 (0.62)</td>
<td>1.67 (0.72)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New (Center) Left</td>
<td>PT</td>
<td>1 (0.00)</td>
<td>1.06 (0.24)</td>
<td>1 (0.00)</td>
<td>1.29 (0.59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historical Left</td>
<td>PSB</td>
<td>2.09 (0.70)</td>
<td>1.46 (0.52)</td>
<td>1.75 (0.45)</td>
<td>1.62 (0.87)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PCdoB</td>
<td>2 (0.43)</td>
<td>1.33 (0.49)</td>
<td>1.86 (0.66)</td>
<td>1.69 (0.95)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PCB/PPS</td>
<td>2.18 (0.60)</td>
<td>1.8 (0.42)</td>
<td>2.09 (0.54)</td>
<td>1.91 (0.70)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DALP
Bulgaria: Electoral Volatility, Polarization and Financial Deficits Lead to Reduction in Clientelism

A Case Study on Parties’ Programmatic and/or Clientelistic Electoral Appeals

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1. Introduction

The origins of democracy in Bulgaria can be traced to the broad democratization processes in Central and Eastern Europe that were triggered by the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989. The first multiparty elections of 1990 established a bipolar system that was characterized by the juxtaposition of the ex-communist Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) and the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) – a loose coalition of reformist and anti-communist parties that opposed BSP. The political landscape was supplemented by the centrist and ethnically-oriented Movement of Rights and Freedoms (DPS).

Subsequent electoral cycles led to somewhat puzzling dynamics: BSP did not crumble under the weight of its connection with the communist regime, but rather solidified itself as the leading center-left political force in the country (Karasimeonov 1995). It won the 1994 and 2005 elections. DPS, on the other hand, managed to benefit from the inability of the proportional representation (PR) electoral system to produce majority governments and has been a coalition partner to most alternating leftist, centrist and rightist governments since the early 1990s. At the same time, SDS splintered in 1994, influenced by the combination of contentious politics and unpopular reforms.

The persistence of BSP, which maintained many links with pre-democratic stakeholders, the ethnically-focused and oligarchic DPS and the weak center-right contributed to the sluggish rise of programmatic politics in Bulgaria. Subsequently, electoral campaigns in the 1990-2009 period have been characterized by the capture of the state by powerful business interests and the important role of particularistic voter incentives. While alteration of power did occur – Bulgaria has had a tremendously volatile party system – this has hardly been due to ideological shifts. Rather, it is the result of weak party identification, non-programmatic electoral campaigns and quick voter disillusionment. In this environment, new actors in Bulgarian politics have been successful by taking over the same patronage-based linkage system that brought their predecessors to power, which subjected them to a quick collapse.

Since 2009, the country has shifted to more programmatic politics, due to three main factors: party adaptation and learning on the basis of past experience, a more restricted macroeconomic landscape and outside pressure. The incumbents from the centrist Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB) got formed around the charismatic persona of current Prime Minister Boiko Borissov in 2006, utilized patronage networks already in place in the country and enjoyed a quick victory in 2009. Instead of continuing with the familiar strategy of patronage and corruption, however, GERB seems to be much more conscious than its predecessors of the quick fall from grace associated with clientelism and has made a clear effort to become more programmatic, voicing its dislike of corruption and eagerly trying to position itself in the historically fragmented center-right.
2. Descriptive Section

2.1. The Political Parties of Bulgaria

The Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project (DALP) surveyed a total of seven political parties in 2007-2008. While all of them were considered to be important, they were at very different stages of their political lifecycle. Currently, only NDSV is no longer politically relevant and there haven’t been any new major additions, which makes this sample of parties representative of the political landscape in the country. The following paragraphs present the main political formations in Bulgaria, according to their longevity and current status: long-established and currently active, old-established and currently inactive or declining and newly-established.

The Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) is the seasoned veteran of Bulgarian politics. It came into existence in April 1990, shortly after the collapse of the communist regime. It was initially seen as a direct descendant of the totalitarian Bulgarian Communist Party (BKP) and indeed featured some of the key figures of the former regime. Since 1990, BSP was the leading political force in the country and formed governments on three occasions – in 1990, 1994, and 2005. In 1990, BSP took advantage of its vast organizational superiority over the reformist SDS. In 1994, it won after Bulgarians became disillusioned with the inability of the democratic system to deliver quick economic results. Yet, the economic downturn worsened further under BSP’s leadership in the mid-nineties, fueled by the collapse of numerous inefficient and formerly state-owned enterprises and the failure of the banking sector. In 1997, BSP reached its nadir, after hyperinflation and widespread unemployment resulted in numerous street protests, attack of the party headquarters and an imminent collapse of the government. BSP managed to resurface in 2005, after two consecutive governments with center-right ideology also failed to achieve the results the Bulgarian electorate wanted. Overall, BSP has proven to be exceptionally resilient by Bulgarian standards and has withstood challenges from other leftist parties. Over time, it transformed itself into a conventional social democratic party, which is currently affiliated with the Socialist International and the Party of European Socialists. In the European Parliament, it is a member of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats.

The Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) emerged in 1989 as a relatively loose coalition of anti-communist activists with a center-right ideology. Back then it united a multitude of nongovernmental movements and reestablished older parties, including dissident and human rights movements, environmental organizations and labor unions. It was seen as the main alternative to BSP until the early 2000s and functioned as a united and cohesive political force. It was particularly influential in 1997, when it took over the economically defunct state. The next four years constitute the most crucial period for SDS and the then-young Bulgarian democracy. It managed to get the economy back on its feet, but only after implementing a series of very unpopular reforms that reduced the size of government through the combination of a more rapid
privatization and the introduction of a currency board that followed strict recommendations by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Those austerity measures, as well as the significant charges of corruption, resulted in a quick fall from grace for SDS in 2001. Unlike BSP, which managed to regroup after the 1997 disaster, SDS has yet to recover its unity after losing in 2001. Shortly after being voted out of office, the party divided into four main factions, one of them being SDS, which temporarily adopted the name United Democratic Forces (ODS). The most notable alternative was established by SDS’s Prime Minister from 1997 Ivan Kostov – Democrats for Free Bulgaria (DSB). ODS and DSB coexisted and continually split the vote right of the center until 2009, when they again decided to run in tandem.

The last long-lasting party in Bulgaria is the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS). Led by the iron fist of Ahmed Dogan, it represents the sizeable minority of ethnic Turks and traces its roots to a dissident movement that emerged as early as 1985 as a response to the communist’s policy to “bulgarize” the Turkish minority in the country. While centrist in ideology, DPS has been a coalition partner in the 2001 NDSV government and the 2005 BSP government. In spite of turning in its best performance historically in 2009, DPS was denied any government positions by GERB, which has continued to draw a sharp contrast with Dogan’s party.

The National Movement for Stability and Progress (NDSV) is a political party that has already exited the Bulgarian political landscape, in spite of being the most influential force in the country in 2001. It was opportunistically established in April 2001 after broad disillusionment with existing electoral alternatives on behalf of the Bulgarian electorate. It won elections merely three months after being formed, thanks to the charismatic persona of the monarchy heir before communism Simeon Sakskoburggotski, who swiftly assumed the role of Prime Minister and led a government of Western-educated technocrats. NDSV never established a clear ideology and was associated with significant influence of business interests, as well as some doubts that Sakskoburggotski was more interested in reclaiming vast real estate property that once belonged to his father, Tsar Boris III, when Bulgaria was still a monarchy in the early 1940s. Consequently, NDSV lost its clout in 2005 and completely disappeared from the political scene by 2009.

GERB is the newest and currently most influential political party in Bulgaria. It was established in 2006 by the former Chief Secretary of the Interior Ministry under NDSV’s government Boyko Borisov. Borisov enjoyed a quick rise to prominence, in part because of his straightforward and often undiplomatic rhetoric towards the country’s persistent problems of corruption and special interest influence, which also turned into GERB’s most prominent pre-electoral promise. Borisov followed up on his commitment to reducing corruption and illegal activities by making a stop to OLAF (the European Anti-Fraud Office) within the first month of being elected. He has subsequently continued the emphasis on fighting illicit activities, including vote-buying. In addition, GERB has made significant progress towards establishing itself ideologically within the center-right political space of Bulgarian politics, as discussed in more detail later. Its ideology is characterized by improving efficiency, strengthening business and reducing the size of the state.
Ataka is a protest party that was established in 2005 in the runup to the legislative elections that took place that year. Its leader Volen Siderov is a seasoned participant in the political life of the country who started his career in SDS as the editor-in-chief of the party’s newspaper. Ataka is defined not so much by what it stands for but what it opposes. Its platform has decidedly nationalistic overtones that often speak against the gypsy or Turkish minorities or the European Union. Even though made very concrete statements against Ataka when it formed its current cabinet, Ataka members often support Prime Minister Borisov’s policies when voting.

2.2. Programmatic Partisan Effort

2.2.1. Party Left-Right Ideology

Table 2 presents how the parties in Bulgaria vary in terms of their ideology on five conventional issues (first five columns). It also includes assessments on the overall left-right dimension (column 6). For each question, the numbers can vary between 1 and 10. On the economic issues, lower values consistently represent a more leftist ideology, resulting in higher social spending, bigger role for the state in the economy, higher overall levels of public spending (corresponding to columns 1-3). In terms of national identity, lower scores indicate that a party advocates toleration and social and political equality for minority ethnic, linguistic and religious groups (column 4). Finally, lower scores in terms of traditional authority, institutions and customs indicate individual freedom from state interference in any issues such as religion, marriage, sexuality, occupation, family life, etc. (column 5). The numbers in parentheses represent the standard deviations across the experts who scored the parties. Higher scores reveal greater degree of uncertainty and could therefore be interpreted as demonstrating a lower level of crystallization for a given party on a particular issue.

The table presents some interesting similarities and differences among the main political parties in Bulgaria. On the three economic issues that have to do with the size of government, the parties that are most similar in terms of supporting big government are the socialist BSP and the protest Ataka. DPS is centrist, while GERB, ODS and especially NDSV are in favor of small government and low levels of redistribution. NDSV’s surprisingly conservative (in the economic sense) convictions are also associated with a higher degree of uncertainty, which might reveal that the party was simply not very good at establishing its position. At the same time, the rightist GERB, ODS/SDS and especially DSB seem to have very straightforward positions on those issues that are fittingly in favor of smaller government and lower redistribution.

While Ataka advocated big government, it was certainly very socially conservative, consistently with its role as a protest, pro-majority and anti-globalization party. It supports very high levels of government intervention to promote the majority national identity and is in favor
of government-enforced compliance of individuals with traditional authorities and values when it comes to religion, marriage and sexuality. In this respect, it is most similar to GERB and BSP, who are also emphasizing the role of the state in such matters, albeit to a much lower extent. Overall, most political parties in Bulgaria seem to be generally in favor of some government intervention in non-economic affairs, with the possible exception of ODS/SDS and NDSV.

2.2.2. Levels and Change rates of Programmatic Appeal

The seven parties listed in Table 1 were studied systematically by an expert survey conducted among Bulgarian academics and journalists in 2007-2008 as part of the Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project (DALP). The questionnaire asked specific questions about the organizational features of political parties, as well as the exchange mechanisms they use to attract voters and the extent to which they rely on programmatic and clientelistic appeals, among others. Data from this survey is used in this section with regards to clientelistic-programmatic efforts as well as the organizational and associational linkages parties in Bulgaria have developed. Table 3 summarizes the findings.

The extent to which political parties rely on clientelism in their electoral strategy (Column 2 in Table 3) is conveyed by assessing five different practices defined as clientelistic in the exchange mechanisms portion of the DALP survey. When answering them, Bulgarian political experts shared their opinion about whether a particular party promises consumer goods, preferential access to material advantages, preferential access to employment, government contracts, or preferential treatment when applying regulatory rules. The combination of the five practices yields an index ranging from 0 (no reliance on any of the five practices) to 20 (very high reliance on all five practices). The average for the full sample of countries was 12.12 with a standard deviation of 3.79. Three Bulgarian parties scored exceptionally high on this index. The socialists (BSP) benefitted from their long history and long-established network of local notables. DPS capitalized on its integration of special business interest and its ethnically homogeneous and geographically concentrated ethnic minority electorate. NDSV’s high score reflects their ability to take over a lot of the particularistic exchange mechanisms developed by BSP when they were voted into power in 2001. The center-right end of the political spectrum, however, seems to be pronouncedly less reliant on clientelism, as revealed by the low scores of ODS/SDS and DSB.

The level of programmatic appeal (Column 3 in Table 3) is measured according to an index combining three criteria: cohesion, salience of issues and issue polarization. When the survey was conducted in 2007-2008, the main Bulgarian parties were judged to be significantly less programmatic than the average political party in a sample of 88 at least minimally democratic countries worldwide, where the index has a mean of 0.236 with a standard deviation of 0.156. Age of party seems to have been the best predictor of the level of programmatic appeal. BSP had the highest score of 0.277, followed by the two heirs of the defunct SDS: ODS (0.233) and DSB (0.220). NDSV, which was just wrapping up its reign as the leading power in Bulgarian politics, registered a similar score of 0.221. The ethnic minority DPS had a score of 0.176 and the protest Ataka had an especially low level of programmatic appeal, registering a 0.159.
GERB, which at the time of the survey had no parliamentary presence and was recently established, had the lowest programmatic score of all: 0.101. The low score of GERB should obviously be interpreted with a grain of salt, since the party was very new and had no time to establish its ideological stances at the time the survey was conducted.

The extent to which parties maintain organizational and associational linkages at the local level is revealed by Question A8 from the DALP survey, which asked experts to evaluate whether they maintain strong connections with one or more of a list of six civil society associations. Those include unions, business and professional associations, ethnic and linguistic organizations, urban neighborhood or rural movements and women’s associations. According to the respondents BSP relies heavily on women’s organizations (92.3% of respondents claimed they maintain strong links) and business and professional organizations (69.2%). According to the survey respondents, on the other hand, BSP has no connections with religious and ethnic/linguistic movements. NDSV maintains strong linkages with two types of civil society formations: business associations and professional organizations (66.6%) and women’s movements (55.5%). DPS, to little surprise, has very strong connections with ethnic and religious (primarily Turkish) civil society organizations (81.8%) but has little other strong linkages. Ataka, a nationalist protest party, draws most of its civil society support from urban neighborhood or rural associations (62.5%), at the expense of the remaining five alternatives. In spite of its relatively young age at the time of the survey, GERB had already established substantial linkages with business and professional associations (72.7%), women’s organizations (72.7%) and urban and rural movements (54.5%). Similar linkages are observed among ODS: business associations and professional associations (66.7%), urban and rural movements (66.7%) and women’s organizations (77.7%). DSB, on the other hand, maintains strong linkages primarily with urban and rural movements and women’s organizations (57.1%). Generally speaking, then, most mainstream political parties in Bulgaria seem to emphasize strong linkages with business and professional associations, women’s organizations and, to a somewhat lesser extent, urban and rural movements. It is difficult to draw a parallel between the type of linkages and the electoral strategy of a particular party, since both parties that rely less on clientelism (ODS, DSB) and parties that engage in it to a great extent (BSP, NDSV) maintain similar types of civil society linkages. The one linkage that seems to be more associated with clientelism in the case of Bulgaria is ethnicity and religion, as illustrated by DPS.

Correlating some data from the World Values Surveys on respondent characteristic and party affiliation reveals several trends about political cleavages and party affiliation in Bulgaria. While social class does not vary substantially, several societal cleavages bundle together: education, income, age and ethnicity. BSP attracts the older working-class population that is mostly retired (and has low income) and has an average level of education. It also manages to be quite relevant among the ethnic Turks. The now-defunct NDSV has an especially young and educated voter base that has an average level of income. DPS has a somewhat young, very uneducated and poor voter base of predominantly Turkish ethnic origin. Ataka, consistently with its protest / ethnic majority appeal, seems to be relying primarily on male, ethnic Bulgarian and older voters, but is not differentiated from the rest in terms of education, class and income. The center-right (populated by ODS, DSB and GERB) is different from the center-left and extreme right. It does not rely on gender and encompasses voters that are of average age, have higher levels of education and have an average to high levels of income. ODS, the oldest of the three,
seems to be appealing to a slightly older subset of the population that also has a more moderate average income. It also attracts some of the non-majority and non-Turkish (mostly Roma) subset of the population.

Table 4 about here

The recent programmatic shift in Bulgarian politics is indeed due to a new party making the first move away from patronage. GERB is much more programmatic than the levels indicated by the survey when it first appeared. This is due to several inter-related reasons. GERB has had to deal with the impact of the global economic crisis. For instance, on May 10, 2009 the party released its anti-crisis program, which followed the logic of small government, lower corruption and higher efficiency (GERB 2009). The document suggested a general reduction of government spending, greater efficiency and less corruption for EU-funded programs, increase of government support for agriculture, reduction of taxation for business and a more thorough enforcement of tax collection from individuals. The business-friendly approach of the GERB government is also evident in its desire to tie government-sponsored educational programs to the demands for qualified labor dictated by Bulgarian business.

Ideologically, GERB has in effect decisively moved to the center-right political space, having initially entered as a largely centrist party. This process of ideological crystallization is also related to the quick development of exceptionally strong ties to the European People’s Party in 2007 (Business Post 2007). Initial accusations of lack of clear center-right ideology by the smaller ODS and DSB in 2007, which claimed GERB stood closer to the socialists on some issues, provided further impetus for GERB’s differentiation and movement to the right (Dnevnik 2007).

The rise of GERB has led to a greater ideological polarization of the Bulgarian political space, which was formerly characterized by a persistently weak center-right which was unable to challenge BSP since the collapse of the 1997 ODS government. BSP, currently in opposition to a much stronger ideological opponent, has consequently been emphasizing ideology at a high level by Bulgarian standards too. The response from BSP has been concentrated on trying to discredit GERB as clientelistic. Yet, on the whole, the political discourse in the country has decisively shifted towards greater programmatism and breaking away from the particularistic and patronage-based practices of previous governments.

2.3. Programmatic Responsiveness of Voters

Historically, Bulgaria has not displayed traditional cleavage-based linkage between voters and politicians (Kolarova 1996). This has been well-demonstrated by existing studies that rank Bulgaria as being very volatile in terms of votes and displaying very low polarization and differentiation, as revealed by party manifestos (Wessels and Klingemann 2006).

The latest public opinion poll by Alpha Research, one of the main polling organizations in Bulgaria, confirms the lack of clear ideological logic behind voter support (Alpha Research
The organization suggests that the main patterns of support follow the familiar incumbent-opposition logic, whereby the incumbents from GERB see a gradual decline in the public support, while the opposition from BSP sees a slight boost to theirs. The general tendency of an overall decline of the levels of support for politically viable political forces is also well-known in Bulgaria (Ibid, 22). Some 9.8 percent of the respondents indicated that they wanted to support “some other political party” – a significant jump from 6.5 percent from four months earlier, according to the agency.

The gloomy and non-ideological predisposition of the electorate seems to be guided not only by the historical tendency of non-programmatism, but also by the continuing economic crisis in the country. According to Alpha Research, 73.4 percent of the respondents said the economy is worsening and 77.6 percent claimed that they are unlikely to make large purchases in the near future.

Table 5 about here

Table 5 shows the mean issue positions of parties’ supporters, based on the World Value Survey 2005-7. On the left-right scale and on three economic issues, such as the reduction of income inequality, the state intervention in economic affairs, and the provision of welfare, supporters of BSP and DSP tend to take more leftist positions, while supporters of ODS and DSB are consistently more right-wing. GERB voters tend to hold relatively centrist positions on these issues. On the issue of ethno-cultural diversity, DPS supporters have significantly distinct attitude and tend to insist on tolerance for diversity. Comparing the WVS data and the DALP expert judgment, parties’ issue positions are generally highly correlated with their supporters’ attitudes, as the coefficients of correlation (the last row in table 5) show.

2.4. Party Organization in Bulgaria

The 2007-2008 Democratic Accountability Linkages survey revealed that BSP had the most extensive network of local offices, the highest level of social and community presence and was most likely to allow someone other than national party leaders to control the candidate selection process. The center-right ODS had similarly developed network of local and municipal offices and was also inclined to allow rank-and-file party members to select nominees for legislative office. Logically, ODS gave the most latitude to different levels to bargain when it came to the overall electoral strategy the party adopted. However, the questionnaire results revealed that Bulgarian parties were more centralized and hierarchical than the full sample of countries surveyed as part of the project. Furthermore, the extent to which parties were able to build extensive sub-national networks and offices seemed to be directly related to their age.

Table 6 about here
2.5. Legislative Organization of Party Caucuses

In terms of legislative organization, party discipline and leadership centralization tended to be rather low historically. The only exception was perhaps BSP, which inherited a rather well-developed and reliable hierarchy and discipline upon transition and was able to maintain it (Waller and Karasimeonov 1996). This was not the case with the center and center-right which was plagued by splintering and disunity as soon as the common purpose of transition to democracy was achieved (Ibid, 141). The practice of party switching that has been very high in Bulgaria was addressed by a piece of legislation adopted in 2009, which explicitly banned the creation of new parliamentary groups of MPs that have been elected under the banner of a different party. While representatives that no longer wish to identify with their original party are currently able to leave its parliamentary group, they can only remain in the legislature as independents and cannot form cohesive factions. Consequently, the major notable instance of party splintering in the new parliament came after the fringe RZS (Order, Legality, Justice) party had two members declare independence, which resulted in the party no longer having the ten MPs necessary for the maintenance of a separate legislative group.

The shift towards greater centralization and discipline is exemplified fairly well by the incumbents from GERB that frequently follow the party line set forward by Prime Minister and party leader Boyko Borisov. Upon assuming the post of Prime Minister in 2009, Borisov stated that the fight against corruption, a key prerogative of the new government, would not be possible without each party member and government official exhibiting a high level of ambition and discipline (Dnevnik 2009).

2.6. Party Finance in Bulgaria

Party finance has been a thorny subject for Bulgarian political parties, which have often been accused of being having a close partnership with business interests. The most famous related incident has to do with DPS leader Ahmed Dogan’s media statement that each major party in the country is financed and positioned within a wider structure of “business rings”. The public outcry following the initial statement in 2008 was substantial.

The problem of significant reliance on donations from the private sector was addressed with the amendment of the party finance law in 2009 (Government of Republic of Bulgaria 2009). It stipulated that donations from a single person over a period of one year cannot exceed BGN 10,000 (USD 6,900) and made it impossible for parties to accept anonymous donations, as well as contributions from commercial representatives. In addition, the law significantly boosted the government subsidy for political parties. It was set to the equivalent of 5 percent of the minimum wage per voter annually (Ibid, 8). In 2010, this led to each party getting BGN 12 (USD 8.3) for each vote it attracted at the 2009 poll, regardless of whether or not it made it to parliament. This was a significant change in comparison to older versions of the law. For instance, the 2001 version of the regulation gave public funding only to parties that crossed the 4 percent threshold and the subsidy was proportional to the number of parliamentary seats.
(Kostadinova 2007). In addition to the larger and more equitable distribution of state funds, the 2009 law introduced much more stringent registration, audit and reporting requirements.

There is agreement among political experts and observers in Bulgaria that the new regulations provided Bulgaria with a world-class party finance regulatory framework. Upon analyzing the finance reports by all political parties in 2010, experts concluded that the bulk of the income for political parties came from the state subsidy, rather than private donations (Capital 2011). The overall amount from private donations that GERB attracted dwindled to BGN 12,000 in 2010, down from BGN 417,000 in 2009 (which was also an election-year). At the same time, the party was able to attract over BGN 20,000,000 on the basis of its performance in the 2009 election. BSP, which lost in 2009, saw a net decrease in financial assets of BGN 800,000 and a threefold decrease in private donations. DPS, whose claims about business-politics relations started the big outrage, reported no private donations in 2010 – a finding that casts a bit of doubt on the accuracy of the financial reporting that parties engage in and their overall compliance with the audit requirements.

2.7. Executive Participation and Government Coalitions

Prior to the most recent government, Bulgaria consistently formed coalition governments. While the top vote-getter changed in terms of ideology, each one frequently coalesced with the ethnic DPS. This changed in 2009, when GERB was able to gain a near-majority of seats. Consequently, Prime Minister Boyko Borisov formed a cabinet that consisted exclusively of GERB officials.

Previous coalition governments were pronouncedly non-programmatic. They were put together primarily to manufacture parliamentary majorities in the context of highly fragmented party systems. Consequently, when forming governments, parties often disregarded pre-electoral platforms and promises and broader ideological commitments. A glaring example comes from the most recent reign of the center-left BSP. In 2005, it capitalized on the low popularity of the then-incumbent centrist NDSV and won the election. However, it then formed a coalition cabinet with NDSV and DPS to get parliamentary majority. NDSV, on the other hand, surprised many when it agreed to be part of the BSP cabinet, after repeatedly stating it had very few, if any, commonalities with this party and its other coalition partner, DPS, during the electoral campaign (Dnevnik 2005).

The so-called tripartite coalition of 2005 quickly lost credibility, in part because the parties were not able to follow through on some clear promises. One such example involved BSP’s decision to renege on its campaign promise to investigate NDSV’s leader and former Prime Minister Simeon Saksoburggotski, who had acquired massive real-estate property while in power (Dnevnik 2005).

In comparison to the previous several governments, GERB is exceptional in terms of its rare opportunity to rule alone. In spite of having gained 117 out of 240 seats in 2009 and needing a few more for an absolute majority, GERB swiftly rejected overtures by small parties like Ataka
and DPS to accept them as coalition partners, following through on campaign commitments and rhetoric. This has arguably allowed GERB to follow through with its anti-corruption commitments (at least in principle) and has been helpful as it has tried to build a crisper programmatic appeal. In practice, however, GERB often relies on Ataka’s votes that often come from a few MPs who have declared themselves independent recently.

3. Analytical Section

3.1. Development

Historically, the relationship between lack of programmatism and income status has been most pronounced among poor rural voters, especially when the low income status has been combined with ethnicity, as is the case with the Turkish and Roma minorities. DPS has capitalized on the Turkish voters, while most of the Roma’s vote has been controlled by BSP and DPS (Capital 2011). In this sense, it is possible to claim that economic underdevelopment, inequality and poverty, along with minority status, do play some role when parties decide between clientelistic and programmatic appeals and there is anecdotal evidence to support such thesis (Cook Forthcoming). For instance, DPS is known for paying the utility bills of Roma and Turkish citizens.

At the same time, the importance of such voter characteristics should not be overstated. The most predominant form of clientelism in Bulgaria has had to do with the distribution of large public contracts to certain influential entrepreneurs and firms.

3.2. Political Economy

As implied by the previous section, the most predominant form of clientelism in Bulgaria has been based on distribution of government contracts and resources to influential businesses. Two economic developments have restricted the resources for clientelism at the disposal of political parties. The more distant one has to do with the end of the privatization of state-owned enterprises in the early 2000s. The sheer number of companies eligible for privatization went down as more and more were transferred to the private sector. In addition, as accession to the European Union approached, Bulgarian legislators became sensitive to criticisms from the EU. One clear illustration comes from the EU annual accession report on Bulgaria from 2000-2001, when the organization was explicit about the existing link between clientelism and privatization, which led to significant transformation of the legal framework (Dnevnik 2002).

The second factor that limited clientelism in Bulgaria is the end of budget surpluses as a result of the global financial crisis that started in 2008. Throughout the 1998-2008 period, annual budgets were consistently designed to have sizeable surpluses, which peaked in 2007-2008. In 2008, there was a surplus of approximately BGN 4 billion (USD 2.9 billion), or some 22 percent of the planned expenditures of BGN 18 billion. The redistribution of this surplus has been the
topic of many accusations, since it has often been awarded at the discretion of the government in last-minute deals.

Bulgaria has maintained a very strict macroeconomic discipline since 2009 and currently ranks second in the European with a budget deficit of about 1 percent of GDP for the first eight months of 2011 (Novinite 2011). However, the lack of surpluses has taken away a lot of the discretionary spending that governments used to have and often used for political and electoral purposes.

3.3. Institutions and Linkage Strategies

The political institutions in Bulgaria have remained rather static throughout the entire democratic experience of the country. The institutional framework is characterized by a strong parliament and a relatively weak president that is nonetheless popularly elected and has veto powers. The 2009 parliamentary election was conducted under a reformed electoral formula that featured 209 seats that were elected via proportional representation and 31 elected via the first-past-the-post electoral formula. The majoritarian constituencies were a new element in a formerly purely proportional electoral system and were introduced by the incumbent BSP for electoral purposes. Shortly after the election, the GERB government restored the electoral formula to fully proportional, in spite of having swept 26 out of the 31 majoritarian seats. There is no reason to believe that the short-lived and marginal electoral formula reform had any systematic influence on the programmatic or clientelistic strategies of the main political parties.

3.4. Party Organization

The extent to which organization has fluctuated among the relevant Bulgarian parties depends on their age. In the case of the newly-formed GERB, change has been minimal, if any. The party appeared as a highly centralized structure centered on the charismatic and influential persona of Prime Minister Boyko Borisov. The most powerful internal institution of GERB is the Executive Committee, which is chaired by Borisov. It has the authority to call and cancel meetings at all levels. It also has the final say in terms of election strategy, member admission and expulsion, and determination of candidates for European, national, and local elections (Karasimeonov 2010). Consequently, the local organizations have tremendously low autonomy (Ibid, 175).

GERB’s competitors on the right, SDS, arose as a loose anti-communist coalition that was fittingly labeled “union” rather than “party” – a label that was not officially adopted until 2002. According to the most recent guidelines of the party, it is structured to encourage wide membership with “certain elements of decentralization” (Ibid, 190). DSB, itself a splinter from the original SDS, features a two-level setup, whereby the national and local structures have some autonomous functions. The local organizations of the party have a high degree of autonomy and any disputes are handled by a nation-wide arbitrage.
The main party on the left, BSP, has been using the same structural organization since 1994 (Ibid, 224). It is characterized by very strong center, which is dominated by the Executive Committee of the party. The local structures, however, have at least some degree of flexibility and autonomy.

The main centrist party, DPS, is ideologically weak (it has entered coalitions with parties from the right and left), personalistic and highly hierarchical and centralized. However, the very low mobility and high concentration of the electorate of the party in the South-Eastern region of the country has allowed it to heavily rely on clientelism throughout its existence (Ibid, 239).

When considering the party system as a whole, the fact that the incumbent party is somewhat more hierarchical than its predecessors could have definite implications for the ability and likelihood to rely on programmatic, rather than clientelistic, emphasis in terms of electoral strategy. Studies on this do not exist in the literature, so this statement is purely speculative.

### 3.5. Changing Patterns of Party Competition

The local elections of 2007 presented a very unusual tendency, which began as early as 2001. Most successful candidates for mayors and local legislatures were independent or associated with local clientelistic networks, rather than seeking the support of national parties. Even bigger cities had their own local “coalitions”, such as “Alliance for Sofia” in Sofia, “Coalition for Plovdiv” in Plovdiv, etc. In Varna, the third most populous municipality, the elected mayor was independent and 33 out of 51 seats on the local legislature went to non-affiliated politicians too. A similar situation was observed in Russe, Stara Zagora and elsewhere across the country.

In reaction to this process, the national parties started a reverse process of wooing those locally-affiliated politicians to the national structures. This could be seen as another reason for the reduction of clientelism, as the national parties have been emphasizing party identification at the expense of local appeals. At the same time, there is some limited information on major parties interacting with, rather than subsuming, local political structures. This practice is especially pronounced when attracting the Roma vote (Capital 2011), which is often organized along clan and family lines and is easy attracted via clientelism due to its homogeneity and the high poverty within the group. According to estimations by Dimiter Dimitrov, a professor of Sociology at Sofia University, between 100,000 and 150,000 (out of some 250,000) Roma votes are bought or otherwise controlled. This is most frequently accomplished by national parties through coopting local political notables and smaller regional political formations. This has historically been done by virtually all major parties, such as GERB, BSP and SDS.

### 3.6. Civil Society

Civil society and civic organizations, as well as unions have been very weak in Bulgaria ever since the country transitioned to democracy in 1989 and play no systematic role.
3.7. Role of International Advice and Initiatives?

3.7.1 Role of External NGOs

External non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have had a significant impact on the mode of political exchange in Bulgaria. Their evaluations of the political process in the country are often used by the opposition. Most recently, the leader of BSP and former Prime Minister Sergey Stanishev stated that he is working with NGOs to evaluate whether the government’s performance in the areas of border control and funding for Schengen area deregulations gives grounds for a no-confidence vote.

The GERB also uses international NGOs to bolster its credibility. The Konrad Adenauer foundation, for instance, facilitated a meeting between the GERB presidential candidate for 2011 Rosen Plevneliev and German Chancellor Angela Merkel. GERB then quickly released a press statement, highlighting the support Merkel gave to the party’s candidate and the government’s policies as a whole (Dnevnik 2011). Konrad Adenauer has been known to fund conference and meeting travel expenses for GERB officials.

In a broader sense, NGO influence is often directed to the political system as a whole. For instance, on September 20, Transparency International invited candidates for the November 2011 presidential election to sign a contract to implement measures against vote-buying. A similar document was signed by all political parties in the runup to the 2009 parliamentary elections, even though BSP and MRF did so “with reservations”. The agreement included specific measures against democracy-deteriorating practices and suggested fines for proven instances of vote-buying, vote-counting at the precinct level by volunteers, among other measures that attracted glowing reviews by some political experts.

3.7.2 Role of International Forces

The European Union is perhaps the most powerful exogenous factor. Its system of monitoring for member countries envisions progressively tougher sanctions for non-compliance. This curbed clientelistic practices that emerged shortly after EU accession that were especially widespread with regards to agriculture (especially tobacco) and infrastructure (roads, energy sector) subsidies. This led to fines or even complete discontinuation on funds from the EU in the case of the SAPARD agriculture and rural development program.

4. Conclusion

The current shift towards programmatic politics in Bulgaria can be attributed to three broad processes. First, parties have learned that being weak programmatically when in power leads precipitous falls in public support and a highly reduced probability for reelection. Consequently,
the current incumbents from GERB have made substantial efforts to establish their programmatic credibility and have issued strong anti-corruption and anti-clienteleism statements. Second, Bulgarian governments have not been able to rely on substantial budget surpluses since 2008, as a result of the global economic downturn. Prior to this year, redistribution of leftover funds was sometimes done in a discretionary fashion and used for political gains by incumbents. Finally, outside pressure has also been a substantial factor. It has come in two main forms. On the one hand, the European Union has used soft and hard incentives to restrict the degree of corruption and lack of implementation of government programs funded by the organization. On the other hand, non-governmental organizations and foundations have had substantial influence on the level of programmatic policies exhibited by parties and have pushed for cleaner electoral practices.

Some concrete instances that provide evidence about the programmatic shift in Bulgarian politics include new regulations that make it tougher for MPs to switch parties and new campaign finance laws that restrict private influence. In terms of internal organization, the main political parties have become more hierarchical and centralized and have made significant efforts to subsume local parties within the national ones. The overwhelming support that GERB gathered in 2009 allowed it the luxury of not forming a coalition government, while previous incumbents were often forced to compromise on their ideological appeals in favor of manufacturing majorities with parties they criticized heavily during the campaign period. The ability of GERB to single-handedly rule the country has been accompanied by an increase in the intensity of the party’s programmatic appeals, bolstered by its partnership with the European People’s Party, which has embraced Boyko Borisov’s party and has added to its credibility.

At the same time, there is little evidence that the programmatic responsiveness of voters has become higher. Civil organizations and associations have continued to be very weak. Finally, it is unclear if the changed rhetoric will translate into reduced clientelistic practices come election time. One such test would be the presidential election of November 27, 2011. A potential indication is that every television spot or newspaper ad in current presidential campaign ends with an unequivocal appeal to voters: “Buying and selling votes is a crime.” How deeply this statement has penetrated the minds of voters and politicians in the country is yet to be seen.
References


GERB. 2009. *Anti-Crisis Program of GERB*.


## Table 1: Electoral Party Support in Bulgaria
(legislative seats)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>BSP</td>
<td>Left</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDSV</td>
<td>Center</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPS</td>
<td>Center</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>23</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ataka</td>
<td>Protest</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GERB</td>
<td>Right</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODS/SDS</td>
<td>Right</td>
<td>15*</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>144</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSB</td>
<td>Right</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Ran as a coalition

## Table 2: Issue Positions of Bulgarian Parties
(standard deviations in parentheses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Spending on disadvantaged (D1) 1=support; 10=oppose</th>
<th>State role in economy (D2) 1=support; 10=oppose</th>
<th>Public spending (D3) 1=support; 10=oppose</th>
<th>National identity (D4) 1=diversity; 10=nationalism</th>
<th>Traditional authority (D5) 1=oppose; 10=support</th>
<th>Overall left-right (DW) 1=left; 10=right</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BSP</td>
<td>4.0 (2.6)</td>
<td>3.0 (2.1)</td>
<td>2.8 (2.1)</td>
<td>4.3 (1.9)</td>
<td>5.5 (3.0)</td>
<td>3.7 (2.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDSV</td>
<td>7.3 (2.3)</td>
<td>7.0 (2.7)</td>
<td>6.7 (2.7)</td>
<td>2.8 (1.6)</td>
<td>3.7 (2.8)</td>
<td>5.8 (1.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPS</td>
<td>4.6 (2.4)</td>
<td>5.3 (2.6)</td>
<td>4.2 (2.5)</td>
<td>3.3 (2.4)</td>
<td>5.4 (2.5)</td>
<td>4.0 (1.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ataka</td>
<td>3.7 (1.7)</td>
<td>3.7 (1.9)</td>
<td>3.2 (2.1)</td>
<td>8.7 (2.4)</td>
<td>8.0 (2.8)</td>
<td>5.8 (3.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GERB</td>
<td>6.6 (2.2)</td>
<td>7.2 (.9)</td>
<td>6.0 (1.8)</td>
<td>5.5 (2.6)</td>
<td>5.0 (3.5)</td>
<td>6.2 (2.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODS/SDS</td>
<td>6.7 (2.0)</td>
<td>7.5 (1.9)</td>
<td>6.7 (1.6)</td>
<td>3.5 (1.8)</td>
<td>3.7 (1.9)</td>
<td>6.6 (2.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSB</td>
<td>7.0 (1.8)</td>
<td>7.5 (1.0)</td>
<td>6.7 (1.5)</td>
<td>5.3 (2.6)</td>
<td>4.0 (2.1)</td>
<td>7.2 (2.2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: DALP*
Table 3: Exchange Mechanisms and Organizational Linkages of Bulgarian Parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Clientelistic Effort (B15)</th>
<th>Overall Programmatic Structure (CoSalPo_4)</th>
<th>Organization/associational linkages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BSP</td>
<td>17 (V. High)</td>
<td>0.277 (Average)</td>
<td>Women’s Business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDSV</td>
<td>16.5 (V. High)</td>
<td>0.221 (Average)</td>
<td>Business Women’s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPS</td>
<td>18.6 (V. High)</td>
<td>0.176 (V. Low)</td>
<td>Ethnic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ataka</td>
<td>11.8 (Average)</td>
<td>0.159 (V. Low)</td>
<td>Urban / rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GERB</td>
<td>14.8 (High)</td>
<td>0.101 (V. Low)</td>
<td>Business Women’s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODS/SDS</td>
<td>12.3 (Average)</td>
<td>0.233 (Average)</td>
<td>Women’s Business Urban/Rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSB</td>
<td>10.3 (Low)</td>
<td>0.22 (Average)</td>
<td>Urban/rural Women’s</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DALP
Table 4: Bulgarian Party Supporters - Differentiation of Socio-Demographic Profiles?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cleavage</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Age (mean)</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BSP</td>
<td>More Female</td>
<td>56.1</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>Working</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Bulgarian/ Turkish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDSV</td>
<td>More Female</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Lower Middle</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>Bulgarian / Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPS</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Working</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Turkish</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ataka</td>
<td>Significantly Male</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>Working</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>Bulgarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GERB</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Lower Middle</td>
<td>Average / High</td>
<td>Bulgarian</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODS</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>Average / High</td>
<td>Lower middle / Working</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>Bulgarian / Other</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSB</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>Average / High</td>
<td>Lower Middle</td>
<td>Average / High</td>
<td>Bulgarian</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: WVS 2005-07*
Table 5: Issue Positions of Bulgarian Voters

(standard deviations in parentheses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Overall left-right</th>
<th>Spending on disadvantaged</th>
<th>State role in economy</th>
<th>Public spending</th>
<th>National identity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1=left; 10=right</td>
<td>1=support; 10=oppose</td>
<td>1=support; 10=oppose</td>
<td>1=support; 10=oppose</td>
<td>1=diversity; 10=nationalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSP</td>
<td>3.12 (1.95)</td>
<td>5.02 (2.80)</td>
<td>4.20 (2.60)</td>
<td>3.60 (2.64)</td>
<td>5.52 (2.40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDSV</td>
<td>5.29 (1.33)</td>
<td>6.11 (2.61)</td>
<td>6.06 (2.55)</td>
<td>4.11 (2.42)</td>
<td>5.39 (2.62)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPS</td>
<td>4.55 (1.09)</td>
<td>5.44 (2.89)</td>
<td>5.27 (2.52)</td>
<td>4.04 (2.46)</td>
<td>3.44 (2.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ataka</td>
<td>6.14 (2.21)</td>
<td>5.85 (2.93)</td>
<td>4.72 (2.66)</td>
<td>3.60 (2.94)</td>
<td>6.20 (2.56)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GERB</td>
<td>5.74 (1.87)</td>
<td>6.64 (2.62)</td>
<td>5.87 (2.68)</td>
<td>4.37 (2.80)</td>
<td>5.88 (2.38)</td>
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<td>ODS/SDS</td>
<td>7.24 (2.40)</td>
<td>6.49 (3.17)</td>
<td>6.03 (2.91)</td>
<td>4.44 (2.99)</td>
<td>5.29 (2.40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSB</td>
<td>7.92 (1.44)</td>
<td>6.93 (2.53)</td>
<td>7.64 (1.98)</td>
<td>4.36 (2.56)</td>
<td>5.57 (2.74)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Average position</td>
<td>4.75 (2.18)</td>
<td>5.67 (2.77)</td>
<td>5.21 (2.69)</td>
<td>4.02 (2.67)</td>
<td>5.50 (2.42)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Test of independence</td>
<td>F=52.06***</td>
<td>F=6.25***</td>
<td>F=10.55***</td>
<td>F=1.68</td>
<td>F=6.53***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correlation between elite and mass positions</td>
<td>.94</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>.87</td>
<td>.91</td>
<td>.62</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: WVS 2005-07
### Table 6: Organizational Investments of Bulgarian Parties

<table>
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<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BSP</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDSV</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPS</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ataka</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GERB</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODS</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSB</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>World Average</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>3.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>3.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.27</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.43</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Interpretation**

- ODS and BSP have the most offices at the local or municipal level.
- BSP has the most social and community presence by holding social events or sustaining social groups.
- Ataka has the most local intermediaries in local constituencies.
- Rank-and-file party members from ODS are most likely to select nominees for legislative office, but the practice is generally not common in Bulgaria, as compared to the rest of the world.
- BSP is most likely to allow someone other than national party leaders to control the candidate selection process, but this practice is generally not common in Bulgaria and most selections are made by the national party leaders.
- National leaders control electoral strategy in general, but ODS is the one most likely to allow different levels to bargain.
- DSB is the one that complies the most with party finance legislation.
- BSP and DPS complies the least with donations from the public sector.

*Source: DALP*
Electoral Politics in the Dominican Republic: Low Levels of Programmatic Competition

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16 I am grateful to the various individuals who met with me in the process of compiling the Democratic Accountability survey and shared their insights both in it and in our interviews. Jonathan Hartlyn was helpful both in discussing the historical development of party dynamics and in facilitating contacts within the Dominican Republic. Ana Belén Benito Sánchez provided generous insights into the internal working of the legislative caucuses from her dissertation research. Andrea Milla shared information on International Idea’s recent activities to strengthen political parties and electoral authorities in the country. All interpretations and opinions expressed here are the responsibility of the author.
1. Introduction

Democratic electoral institutions in the Dominican Republic have deepened and been strengthened over time. For example, allegations of electoral fraud have been common in the past (Hartlyn 1998) but the previous four presidential and legislative electoral cycles have been relatively transparent, electoral violence is minimal, and there has been alternation in power between various parties. Yet a weakness of the Dominican political system is the lack of programmatic political competition. The Dominican Republic is dominated by three main political parties—the Dominican Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Dominicano or PRD), Social Christian Reformist Party (Partido Reformista Social Cristiano, PRSC), and the Dominican Liberation Party (Partido de la Liberación Dominicana, or PLD). These parties are divided by allegiances to their founding leader’s personalities and historical ties to various social groups. Yet they are neither internally cohesive in their ideological views nor are the ideologically distinct from each other. Thus their campaign appeals do not offer voters meaningful programmatic choices. Instead of ideology, Dominican parties emphasize the personal abilities of their leaders and also court supporters by offering material handouts. Moreover, it appears that the level of programmatic competition is declining over time and the emphasis given to clientelist exchange is increasing.

The essay proceeds in four parts. First, I describe the current state of party competition, emphasizing the weak role that programmatic competition plays in Dominican politics and the importance instead of leaders’ personalities and clientelism. Second, I describe the limited knowledge there is on internal party organization, emphasizing the combination of centralized party structures and weak party organizations. Third, I analyze some possible factors leading to weak programmatic competition in the Dominican Republic, including a robust economy in the last two decades that has not compelled a change in party strategies, a pattern of economic development that did not generate strong economic cleavages, the change in party identities after the death of their founding leaders, and institutional reforms that increased the role of personalities in political campaigns. Finally I review some recent projects that have been done with the intent of strengthening Dominican political parties. While it is too early in this process to evaluate their effects, the weak structural conditions for programmatic competition may give us pause in considering their likely outcomes.

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17 Multiple small parties compete in coalition with these three parties but have little independent influence.
2. Descriptive Section

2.1. The Political Parties of the Dominican Republic

The three main political parties have their birth in struggles for power after the death of strongman Rafael Trujillo in 1961. Trujillo’s erstwhile ally Joaquín Balaguer founded the Social Christian Reformist Party (Partido Reformista Social Cristiano, PRSC) while in exile in 1963 and used it as a mobilizing tool during his authoritarian rule from 1966-1978 as well as the basis of his election to the presidency in 1986 and 1990. Balaguer died in 2002, and the PRSC has seen its electoral support decline throughout the last decade (see table below). Its main historical rival was the Dominican Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Dominicano or PRD), founded by Juan Bosch prior to his winning the 1962 elections, the first free elections in Dominican history. Bosch was removed in a coup in 1963 and eventually left the party but the PRD won the first two elections after the return to democracy in 1978 and then again in 2000. The third party, the Dominican Liberation Party (Partido de la Liberación Dominicana, or PLD) was also founded by Juan Bosch after he split from the PRD in 1974 over questions of ideology and his continued leadership of the party (Hartlyn 1998, 116-7). The PLD would first win the presidency in 1996 following a pact between its candidate Leonel Fernandez and Balaguer despite a long history of contention between Balaguer and Bosch (Sagas 1997). Fernandez won the presidency again in 2004 and 2008. He is barred from seeking reelection in 2012.

The three main Dominican parties emerge out of different views about the role of the state and being with ties to different social groups. Balaguer and the PRSC endorsed a strong state role in development, including subsidies to domestic business and the military, and he also used subsidies to build support among agricultural interests (Lozano 2010, 22-3). In implementing these policies, wages were suppressed and unions repressed (Hartlyn 1998, Espinal and Hartlyn 1999). Bosch in contrast was interested in state-led social reform and redistribution, which led to charges of communism prior to his overthrow in 1963 (Lozano 2010, 24). Bosch thus based his support in the (very) limited urban labor movements that existed in the 1960s and 70s. The PRD kept the moderate wing of Bosch’s party after he left to form the PLD in 1973 and they further moderated to win support from domestic business organizations who had become dissatisfied with Balaguer’s ties to the military (and to avoid the disapproval of the United States during the cold war) in the 1978 elections. Yet while these parties were founded on different economic visions, these cleavages have faded over time as the economic model of the state has switched away from state led development to one emphasizing exports and tourism (UNDP 2005). The result is a shift in the ideological content of the parties.

\footnote{See Jimenez Polanco (1999), Cedeno (1999), and Duarte (2004) for histories of political parties in the Dominican Republic}
2.2. Programmatic Partisan Effort

Programmatic competition requires that parties are consistent in the policy message they give to voters and take divergent/distinctive policy stands that allow for voters to compare them (see Kitschelt and Freeze 2010 for a larger discussion of how programmatic competition can be conceptualized). Neither condition holds in the Dominican Republic. Dominican parties do not have a public profile that facilitates programmatic linkage.

2.2.1. Internal Party Cohesiveness

First, Dominican parties do not have a coherent ideological profile. This can be confirmed by data at several levels of analysis. The Parliamentaray Elites in Latin America (PELA) project at the University of Salamanca19 asks members of parliament in Latin America to place their party on a 10-point left-right scale. If a party is internally coherent in its ideology, there should be little variance in where its members place it on that scale. The average standard deviation in how parties with 10 or more members placed their parties across all of Latin America was 1.27. The standard deviation in Dominican legislators’ placements of their parties for the 2006-2010 legislature was greater than 1.6 for all three parties, with an average of 1.75 across the three. The disagreement within the parties on where their party stood on questions of general ideology in the Dominican Republic is larger than the regional average.20

Moreover, data from PELA suggest that internal cohesion may be weakening over time. In 1998, the standard deviation in how members of the PRD placed the party on the left-right scale was 1.09, for the PLD it was 1.54, and for the PRSC it was 1.41, with an average across the three of 1.35. In 2002 the average standard deviation was 1.41. In the 2006-2010 legislative period, the average had increased to 1.75. There is greater disagreement within parties about how to describe their party ideologically today than there was a decade ago.

The lack of internal cohesion in parties is also reflected in the Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project (DALP) expert survey data, in which academics, NGO employees, and journals with expertise on party competition were asked about parties’ characteristics.21 Respondents were asked to place parties on a 10-point left-right scale. If parties present a coherent ideology position to the electorate, there should be little disagreement among experts in how parties are described. The entire

19 http://americo.usal.es/oir/elites/index.htm
20 A test of different means is significant at p=0.05
21 http://www.duke.edu/web/democracy/
dataset considers 506 parties in 88 countries. The average standard deviation for how experts placed political parties an average party on the scale was 1.59. If we look only at developing countries, the average standard deviation goes up to 1.79, reflecting greater uncertainty about parties’ ideological positions in these contexts. All three Dominican parties had ideological standard deviations greater than 2 (see Table in the subsequent section), with little difference in how the three parties are perceived. These two studies together reflect the fundamental uncertainty among observers and participants of the political process about their ideology.22

2.2.2. Divergence in Policy Positions across Parties

Second, there is little ideological differentiation between parties. This is true if we look at the PELA elite survey or the DALP expert survey. For example, the chart below uses data from PELA to plot how members of Congress placed their party in 2006 on the left-right scale: the centers of the distribution are nearly identical. The PELA surveys also include a battery of questions about whether the state should take a larger role in a variety of policy areas, including controlling prices, providing an education, creating jobs, providing pensions, etc.23 The average response did not differ across the three parties in any of the 7 issue areas covered in the survey.24

The PELA data also suggests that the parties are becoming ideologically less distinct over time (see also Benito Sánchez 2010, 760). In 1998, the standard deviation of the three parties’ self-placement ideologically was 1.89. In 2002 the standard deviation in their average party placements was 1.20. In the 2006 survey, the standard deviation of the three party means was 0.24. Specifically, this shift reflects two trends. First, the PRSC has moved to the center since the death of Balaguer; in 1998 its members described the party as an 8 on the left-right scale whereas in the 2006 congress its members describe it as a 6. Second, while the PRD and PLD have been similar to each other with centrist ideologies, that gap has also shrunk over time such that in 2006 there was no difference in their average placement (both parties’ members placed their party at 5.58).

A similar pattern emerges from the DALP expert survey. Respondents to the DALP expert survey were more likely to position the parties to the right than the members of Congress were, but the total

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22 Similar conclusions are reached if one looks at questions about specific issues-the variance in the positions are higher than the regional and global averages.

23 Question 29. I analyze the ordinal response with dummies for two of the three parties and none of the joint significance tests were significant at conventional levels.

24 Test of means conducted by the author.
range between the three parties (1.2 points) was still small, e.g. compared to the degree of uncertainty in the estimates of party positions (see Table below). The DALP expert survey also asked experts to categorize political parties’ positions with respect to various policy debates. Specifically, questions asked experts to note the amount of disagreement on social spending for marginal groups, the state’s role in governing the economy, public versus private provision of services like health care and education, the importance of protection of a national identity at the expense of ethnic minority rights, and the state enforcement of traditional moral values. On four of these five issues, there was no significant difference on party stands.25 The exception is the question with respect to national identity and ethnic rights, which reflects divisions over the political rights of Haitians (Howard 2001). Thus there is little to no meaningful difference in how political experts assess the economic policies and most social policies of the three main Dominican parties.

Table 2 about here

2.2.3. Summary: Levels of Programmatic Competition

Kitschelt and Freeze (2010), using the DALP data, have created a summary measure of programmatic capacity that jointly measures the degree to which parties are internally cohesive and distinct from each other using the data highlighted in the previous section. Specifically, they have developed one indicator that looks at all issues on which experts were asked to place parties and one on which only looks at the three economic issues. Parties in the Dominican Republic are rated as being far away from the programmatic ideal. Both Kitschelt and Freeze indicators go from 0 to 1, with higher values representing higher levels of programmatic capacity. The average value on the overall programmatic measure for a party in the global sample is 0.27 and it is 0.23 for parties in developing countries. None of the Dominican parties has a score above 0.13. The Dominican Republic ranks as the country with the 6th lowest level of programmatic competition among the 88 countries in the DA dataset. The same trend emerges if we look only at economic issues. The Dominican political parties are neither seen as ideologically cohesive nor distinct from each other. The PLD is considered somewhat less programmatic than the other parties, but all three parties are well below the global average.

Table 3 about here

While the analysis has focused on the large parties, the small parties in the Dominican Republic seem to be guided little by ideology in their choice of allegiances. The PUN, PDQC, and PRN, for

25 Questions D1-D5. I analyze the ordinal response with dummies for two of the three parties and none of the joint significance tests were significant at conventional levels except for d4’s question on protection of a national identity, which has a p-value of 0.03.
example, allied with the ruling PRD in the 2004 election and then switched their loyalty to the PLD after it won the election and ran joint candidacies with it in 2008 (Benito Sánchez 2010, 754).

The summary data relies on a single cross-section. However, the PELA data reviewed above showed that the difference between the parties has shrunk over time while their internal disagreements have grown. The implication is that there is less programmatic competition today than even 15 years ago.

### 2.3. Programmatic Responsiveness of Voters

Interestingly, there is slightly more evidence of an ideological cleavage among party identifiers in the electorate. For example, when respondents to the 2010 Lapop survey in the Dominican Republic were asked to place themselves on a 10 point left-right scale, the average response among party-identifiers was 6.1, 7.2, and 7.6 for the PRD, PLD, and PRSC respectively. Only the gap between the PLD and PRSC is not significantly greater than 0. However, there are no differences among party identifiers about the economic role of the state (e.g. privatization, reducing inequality, public versus private provision of health care or education) or, more surprisingly, on political rights for Haitians. Thus the issue content of the left-right division uncovered by the survey does not seem to have any reflection in a differentiation of issue positions. Partisan divisions within the electorate do not seem to clearly reflect differences in issue positions. The 2006 Lapop survey data shown in table 4 also suggests similar patterns.

Using data from the Lapop surveys, we can also measure the factors that are significantly associated with who respondents would vote for if an election were held today. Most demographic characteristics (e.g. gender, age, and education) have no association with the vote. Class and income distinguish between the PRSC and the other two parties (support for the historically more conservative party is slightly higher among wealth/high class individuals) but there is no difference in income levels between PRD and PLD voters. Black and Mulato voters are slightly more likely to support the PRD than whites are. While partisanship did not predict attitudes on the role of the state, individuals who said they support a larger government economic role in providing welfare were slightly more likely to support the PLD (although attitudes about privatization of industry were not associated with the vote) Individuals who placed themselves on the right were more likely to support the PRSC, but there is no significant difference between the ideologies held by voters who support the PRD or PLD. Yet even this slight

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27 Questions ROS1-ROS6
28 Questions domhait1 and domhait2
evidence of structure within the electorate should be taken with the caveat that the overall explanatory power of demographic and issue positions is quite small; the pseudo-$R^2$ of the multinomial logit model predicting vote as a function of these demographic variables, ideology, and issue positions was 0.008.

2.4. Non-Programmatic Partisan Effort: Charisma and Clientelism

In the absence of programmatic competition, one might ask how parties maintain their political support. One answer is that the political history of the Dominican Republic, both during democratic and authoritarian periods, has been dominated by a strong political leaders. As Wiarda and Kryzanek (1982, 87), argue, “Dominican politics rests almost entirely on the quality of personal presidential leadership.” Hartlyn (1998) discusses these politics in terms of “patrimonialism” while Lozano (2002) lumps them under the label of “caudillos.” The close connection of political parties with their leaders is evident in the decline of support for the PRSC since Balaguer’s retirement and death (and at the current time the PRSC is given a low score for charismatic leadership because the party has not identified a similar replacement). The reliance upon leader’s personalities is also reflected in the DA expert surveys. Respondents were asked to rate parties based on the importance given to leader’s charisma and the Dominican Republic is scored as having the 18th highest Charisma score in the 88 country sample (see Table below). Yet while this is a high level of charismatic leadership, the Dominican Republic is less remarkable in this regard than it is with its lack of programmatic organization. This may reflect the fact that the founding figures of the three main parties are now dead (Bosch died in 2001, Balaguer in 2002, and José Francisco Peña Gomez, the leader of the PRD in the 1970s, died in 1998). However, the ruling PLD is one of 18 (out of 506 parties) that received the highest possible charisma score. Current president Leonel Fernández was able to assume the mantle of leadership from Bosch in winning the presidency in 1996 and then again in 2004 and 2008.

Where the Dominican Republic really stands out in global terms is in parties’ reliance on material handouts. Data from a variety of sources confirm the importance of clientelism. For example, the DA expert survey asked respondents to categorize the effort parties make to gain support through the distribution of 5 types of material goods: Consumer goods (food, clothes, etc), preferential access to social programs, employment in the public sector, government contracts, and favorable regulatory decisions (code enforcement, tax assessment, etc). For each type of good, parties could receive between 1 and 4 points depending upon the perceived effort to court supporters through the distribution of goods, with higher scores signifying more clientelism. The average party in the 88 countries included in the survey received a score of 12.1 on the clientelist effort indicator. The average for developing countries was slightly higher, with an average of 13.4. All three seat winning Dominican parties received scores of 17.6 or higher (See Table 5). That places them within the top 6 percent of parties globally in perceived clientelistic effort.
The above indicators of clientelist effort are measured at the party level. The DA dataset also uses those measures to generate aggregate level indicators of clientelist effort by taking a weighted average with the largest parties (in terms of average seat share in the last two elections) receiving the most weight. Because large parties tend to be more likely to be in government and to use clientelist strategies (Singer and Kitschelt 2011) the weighted average is higher than the unweighted average in most countries. The data again show the degree to which clientelism predominates in the Dominican Republic. The average clientelist effort score for the 88 countries in that study is 13.3. Clientelism is more frequent in developing countries. However, the clientelism score in the Dominican Republic is substantially above the mean for even developing countries; only two other countries (Senegal and Mongolia) have higher averages.29

A similar picture emerges if we look at survey data on how frequently citizens report parties having offered them material benefits in exchange for their votes (see Brusco et al 2004 for a discussion of these kinds of measures). The 2010 wave of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) Americas Barometer survey included a question asking “In recent years and thinking about election campaigns, has a candidate or someone from a political party offered you something, like a favor, food, or any other benefit or thing in return for your vote or support? Has this happened often, sometimes or never?” (see Faughnan and Zechmeister 2011). Just over 22 percent of respondents in the Dominican Republic said that parties sometimes or often offer material goods; no other Latin American or Caribbean country had more than 16.2 percent of respondents give the same response and the average for the region was 12.2 percent. Thus citizens also perceive parties in the Dominican Republic to be clientelist.

Clientelism has been dominant linkage strategy since the authoritarian period. While Trujillo and Balaguer both used military force to suppress dissent, they also used material handouts to solidify their bases. Trujillo used patronage appointments and gave material handouts to popular sectors (Crassweller

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29 While the data show that political parties are making extensive efforts to mobilize support via material handouts, experts surveyed are less confident in parties’ abilities to monitor voters to ensure that they vote as promised. Specifically, when asked “If parties try to check how specific individuals or small groups of citizens voted, how successful are they in getting that information?” experts on the Dominican Republic said parties would be “somewhat successful”, with an average score on this index that was in the 56th percentile among all 88 countries in the sample. The ruling PLD was deemed to be somewhat better able to monitor voter behavior than were the other parties, placing in the 87th percentile. Experts were also asked if “an individual or group of voters promises to vote for the parties but does not deliver on their promise, can parties assess any consequences to the individual/group?” and the overwhelming consensus was “no”, with the average level of perceived sanctioning in the Dominican Republic in the 33rd percentile among all 88 countries in the sample.
Balaguer continued the practice of using material resources. Prior to his return to power in 1966, he distributed “tricycles to street vendors, bicycles, and cash” (Lozano 2002, 275 translated by the author). During his 12 year dictatorship, he took advantage of state resources to enhance his clientelist machine. For example, the presidential office directly controlled over 95 percent of government construction expenditures instead of having these funds controlled by the ministry of public works, with which he used both to enrich himself and to channel resources to political supporters (Hartlyn 1998, 102-3). In the 1973-78 period he built a clientelist machine among the urban poor and systematically bought off union leaders (Lozano 2002, 283). He also dramatically expanded programs of public sector employment (CEPAL 1999).

Clientelism became less prevalent with the transition to democracy in 1978 (Harlyn 1998, 172), due in part to perhaps more programmatic ties between the PRD and social movements (Lozano 2002, 296-302) and an economic crisis in the 1980s that reduced the available state resources. The PRD also ran on an explicit clean-hands platform that promised internal democracy (Espinal 1999). Lozano writes hopefully of a “crisis of clientelism” in the 1990s that he argued was occurring because globalization had reduced the state’s economic role and because opposition parties had sufficient avenues of influence that the executive’s could not dominate state resources as he had in the past (2002, 303-7).

Yet while clientelism continued at a diminished rate under democracy, it remained an important part of parties’ governing strategies. Under the first two PRD administrations (1978-1982, 1982-1986) corruption whereby officials directed public projects to friends in exchange for kickbacks was a larger problem than clientelism was. However, political allies of both administrations received material concessions (e.g. favorable export/import certificates) in exchange for their continued support (Espinal 1990; Hartlyn 1998, 185; Espinal and Hartlyn 1999, 485). Moreover, the PRD was forced to implement an economic austerity program under IMF leadership and so it used handouts in an attempt to placate its base (ibid).

The failures of the PRD to generate either a good economy or a clean government led to Balaguer’s electoral victory in 1986. Once back in power, he resumed the practices of buying support through public works contracts (public construction increased in each of the first three years he was in office) (Espinal 1994). Hartlyn even provides a first hand account distribution of material goods (including cash) during Balaguer’s 1990 campaign at an event he attended as individuals would meet with the executive and request favors in exchange for their political support (1998, 220-1).

Clientelism has continued since Balaguer left office. Espinal and Hartlyn (1999, 505) argue that Leonel Fernandez’s first administration (1986-1990) was more free of clientelism than previous administrations had been. However, Lozano concedes that the reconfiguration of the PLD after its initial coalition with Balaguer (and the abandonment of previous leftist political positions) required the party adopt clientelist mobilization tactics to maintain the support of its militants (and to replace those that left) (2002, 311-12). Espinal (2005, 33) notes that the Mejilla administration (2000-2004) used clientelism to
maintain its popularity despite policy failures in a subsequent article notes that clientelism was also used to smooth over differences between factions on questions of reelection (2008, 148). Benito Sánchez (2010) argues that patronage spending under the current Fernandez administration increased by 40% leading up to the 2008 elections and remains high, as documented by the DA and Lapop surveys. Much of what the legislative parties do also involves targeted benefits. Roughly 50 percent of the bills introduced in the 2002-2006 congress were to provide pensions for specific individuals (Personal communication with Ana Benito Sánchez). In the 2006-2010 period, that number fell to 23 percent, but this remains remarkably high.

Thus there is little evidence that clientelism had a systematic crisis in the 1980s and 1990s—it has been a frequently used political tactic and is the dominant mode of political competition currently used in the Dominican Republic. Respondents in the DA expert survey do distinguish, however, between the levels of clientelism used now and those used in the 1990s. Specifically, they were asked whether “politicians nowadays make the same, greater or lesser efforts to provide preferential benefits to individuals and small groups of voters than they did about ten (10) years ago?” Response options included “A much lesser effort now”, “A somewhat lesser effort now”, “About the same effort now”, “A somewhat greater effort now”, and “A much greater effort now”. Not a single respondent said that clientelism was being done less now than in the past and only 15 percent of respondents said it was being done the same as in the past. Instead the modal response (chosen by 70 percent of respondents) was that clientelism was much more frequent than it had been even a decade ago.

In summary, parties do not present distinct or ideologically cohesive to voters and this trend away from programmatic competition has increased in the last decade. Charismatic leadership remains important, even after the death of the three parties’ main figureheads a decade ago. This is especially true for the PLD. Clientelism, however, is the main way in which politicians court popular support and clientelism has increased in frequency in the last decade.

2.5. Party Organization in the Dominican Republic

Political parties in the Dominican Republic have two defining internal features. First, they tend to be centralized and have political authority consolidated in the ruler, although they are not exceptionally centralized in a global perspective. Second, they have historically had a weak formal structure and local presence, although the latter may be changing somewhat over time. Instead they maintained discipline through loyalty to charismatic leaders (who controlled appointments within the party) and in recent years through control of the distribution of clientelist resources.
Historically, the PRSC and PLD were the most centralized, as befitting their leadership by two strong leaders. Even during his rule under democracy, “Balaguer never organized his party in such a way that allowed space for organizational input from its activists/leaders. The party’s leaders were bureaucrats who served the programs of the government and periodically worked to ensure electoral mobilization” (Lozano 2010, 23, translation by author). The PLD had a more extensive formal organization (described below) but “Juan Bosch organized the PLD as an organization with a vertical hierarchy on political/organizational matters, where the president and party leader served to unify the political apparatus and those close to the president wield formal power… not officially recognized in their formal roles” (ibid 24, translation by the author). The PLD has continued this practice under Leonel Fernandez, who controls appointments within the government so generate loyalty (Lozano 2010, Morgan et al 2011). Both parties centralized decisions about the allocation of power to ensure that there would be few challenges to their leadership (Lozano 2010, 30). The PRD in contrast was defined by a large number of factions who were initially united in popular discontent with the Balaguer dictatorship and so the party structure had more decentralized decision-making apparatuses. These organized factions compete for influence; these conflicts came to a head when members of the PRD opposed an initiative by President Hipólito Mejía (of the very same PRD) to eliminate term limits and seek reelection in 2002 (Lozano 2005).

The DA expert survey corroborates the differences in the control national leadership has over party strategy. Experts were asked to describe the relative control of national party leaders over candidate selection (A5) and electoral strategy and resources (A6). In terms of candidate selection, the PRD is less centralized than are the PRSC and the PLD; 42 percent of our experts said that national PRD leadership controlled nominations whereas 66 percent of respondents said that the national leadership of the PRSC and PLD controlled the selection process. With regard to election strategy, experts believed that the PLD was more centralized than the other two parties were; 83 percent of respondents said that the PLD national party leadership unilaterally set electoral strategy while 75 percent of respondents said the same thing about the PRD and PRSC. Thus the PRD is the least centralized party in the Dominican Republic while the PLD is the most.

Yet even the PLD is not extremely centralized if we consider parties in a global perspective. Among experts surveyed about parties in developing countries, the average percentage of respondents saying control over nominations and electoral strategy was centralized was 58 percent and 76 percent respectively. So while the PRSC and PLD are more centralized in their nominations and the PLD more centralized in its electoral strategizing than other parties in developing countries are, they are not much different from those means. For example, 48.1 percent of parties in developing countries had a higher percentage of respondents say that national leaders controlled electoral strategy more than the PLD does. Similarly 47.8 percent of parties in developing countries were more clearly centralized in their nominations than is the PLD.
Historically, Dominican parties have also had relatively weak formal structures. Wiarda and Kryzanek argue that the PRSC had little to no formal organization (1982, 101). Lozano argues that Balaguer eschewed formal organization outside of the structures of the state during his autocratic period and invested very little in party building during his democratic terms in office (2010, 23). The PRD and PLD had stronger organizations, but were top down with very little cellular structure (Jimenez Polanco 1999). This basic lack of organization did not change dramatically with democratization; Dix (1989) evaluates party system organization in Latin America during the 1980s and notes that Parties in the Dominican Republic (1) were noteworthy for their lack of structural development and complexity and (2) unlike most other countries in the hemisphere, they had not increased their formal institutionalization over time.

Yet over time Dominican parties have invested more effort in building party structures. That is especially true for the PRD and PLD. The DA expert survey asks respondents to describe whether parties maintain permanent local offices with paid staffs. The PRD is in the 76th percentile of local party organizations for the global sample and the PLD in the 70th. In contrast, the PRSC is in the 36th percentile globally. The two major parties have a formal presence in most parts of the country, which is a departure from Jimenez Polanco’s description of them in the early 1990s.

The PRD and PLD complement (or perhaps supplement) those formal local organizations by maintaining ties to local political notables. The DA surveys asks whether parties “have local intermediaries (e.g. neighborhood leaders, local notables, religious leaders) who operate in local constituencies on the parties’ behalf, and perform a variety of important tasks such as maintaining contact with large groups of voters, organizing electoral support and voter turnout, and distributing party resources to voters and supporters?” (A3). Parties in the Dominican Republic are considered to use these local intermediaries at a high rate; the Dominican Republic is in the 87th percentile overall. However, this ranking is greatly affected the weak structure or the PRSC—the PRD and PLD are both in the 94th percentile of reliance on local notables.

2.6. Party Finance in the Dominican Republic

Political parties in the Dominican Republic receive public financing in accordance with their size (Casas and Zovatto 2005). These subsidies are relatively generous in comparative terms (ibid 238, 247). Hartlyn and Espinal (2009) and Morgan et al (2011) argue that these guaranteed resources have reinforced clientelist machines by giving them a guaranteed stream of income, especially since they favor parties that are large to begin with. Yet parties have ways of supplementing that income through other channels. For example, one of the people I spoke to while in the Dominican Republic said that parties routinely ask
public officials to donate a percentage of their salary back to the party. Parties also draw on support networks among expatriates (Espinal and Jimenez Polanco 1998).

Party experts in the DA survey generally categorized the country’s party finance regulations as weak, ranking the Dominican Republic in the 88th percentile of the global sample with regards to not following campaign finance regulations. The JCE has little audit authority, there is no effective sanctioning regime for parties that break financial rules, and there are no spending limits (Casas and Zovatto 2005, 231). The ruling party in particular has been able to take advantage of financial advantages; the PLD outspent rivals 2:1 on publicity in 2008 elections (Participación Ciudadana 2008). As a result, the ruling party has a substantial advantage in the number of advertisements that are displayed publically, on television, and the radio.

2.7. Party Behavior in Government

Very little research has been done on the internal working of legislative parties in the Dominican Republic. Yet the existing evidence suggests that the pattern of centralization continues in how parties behave in the legislature. Specifically, the president’s party is strongly controlled by the executive. For example, a dissatisfied member of the ruling PRD (in 2001) said “there is not a single project in which the government and president has placed its interest that has been defeated in the Chamber of Deputies” (quoted in Benito Sánchez 2010, 756, translated by the author). Congressional party leaders are kept in line by promises of positions in the formal leadership of the congress or posts overseeing municipal finances or tax policy (Marstreintredt 2008, Benito Sánchez 2010). In particular, the minority PRSC has frequently been given leadership posts to support the previous PRD and PLD administrations. Under the PRD the president of the chamber of Deputies was a PRSC member while the PRSC has negotiated with the PLD in exchange for “government positions, mayorships, and Central American Congress seats” (Benito Sánchez 2010, 767). Interestingly, the amount of resources spent directly out of the office of the president has declined since Balaguer left office (Marstreintredt 2010), implying that Fernandez and Mejía have been more willing to work through their parties in the legislature than through their own initiative than their predecessor was.

Of course, there are limits on party discipline. For example, the recent drop in support for the PRSC since Balaguer’s death has led to a weakening of formal ties within the party. Five legislators elected in 2010 under the PRSC banner declared their alignment with the PRD upon taking their seats (Benito Sánchez 2010). The PLD has been the more frequent beneficiary of this kind of party evolution; 20% of the PLD legislators in the 2006-2010 legislature had begun their career as members of another party (PELA).
3. Analytical Section

In considering the weakness of programmatic competition in the Dominican Republic, three main factors stand out. First, economic circumstances are favorable for clientelist linkages. Second, the changing economic landscape has reduced the scope of debates about the role of the state in development, the major factor that underpinned the limited programmatic cleavage earlier in the Dominican Republic’s political history. Third, the changing of the guard with respect to party leadership in all three parties has undermined their identity, leaving them looking for an alternative form of political linkage.

3.1. Development

High levels of clientelism (and, correspondingly, low levels of programmatic competition) are frequently found in poor democracies (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). Poverty generates demands for clientelism as voters place value on the short-term security provided by a political machine. In contrast economic development makes clientelism more expensive to maintain as voters’ demands become more substantial. The Dominican Republic is a poor country, with per capita GDP around $8400 (2010 U.S. dollars, PPP). Income distributions in the Dominican Republic are highly unequal, with a Gini coefficient around 48 in 2007. As a result, there are lots of poor voters for whom clientelist appeals should be particularly effective.

Politicians in the Dominican Republic recognize the high levels of demand for clientelism. Several years ago, journalist Juan Bolivar Diaz presented President Leonel Fernandez with a list of local officials and local notables receiving payments from the government. Fernandez justified providing handouts to supporters, saying that “Governments [in the Dominican Republic] fall when they cannot provide people with survival mechanisms” (Quoted in Benito Sánchez 2010, 754). President Fernandez was speaking from personal experience. In that same interview he claims that when he came to office in 1996, he was presented with lists of individuals who were on the government payroll despite having no official function and so his party attempted to stop paying them. The result was that

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30 This and other economic data is from the World development Indicators unless otherwise noted.
31 The story is reported at [http://www.perspectivaciudadana.com/contenido.php?itemid=21809](http://www.perspectivaciudadana.com/contenido.php?itemid=21809) and was confirmed in personal communications with Juan Bolivar Diaz.
“in 1997 we faced 400 neighborhood strikes…. This began to be mitigated once we began to reintegrate people back [into government programs] and the strikes stopped. This helps us understand Dominican society.”

Despite a partial reestablishment of clientelist machines that had been used under Balaguer’s two administrations, his party lost the 2000 elections. Thus several journalists and academics I spoke to while doing fieldwork in the Dominican Republic said that the PLD learned a clear lesson from their difficulties in office and eventual defeat in 2000: winning elections without clientelism is difficult.

Similar evidence about the demand for clientelism comes from a 2003 study done by International Idea. Elite interviews were conducted in 6 Central American countries and the Dominican Republic and respondents were asked about the prevalence of patronage in their country and the consequences of it on politics. In all seven countries, elites confirmed that patronage was a frequently used political tactic. However, the Dominican Republic was one of two countries (Guatemala was the other) where its use was not considered problematic (Idea 2005, 97). For many political elites in the Dominican Republic, patronage is perceived as a stabilizing force.

Yet while the Dominican Republic is a poor country, it is not the poorest country in Latin America, which makes in some ways the heavy reliance of parties on clientelism surprising. Moreover, the drop in programmatic competition and the surge in clientelism over the past decade that I document in the initial section of this note have not occurred against the backdrop of growing poverty—per capita GDP has an average annual growth rate of 5.38 percent in the 2000-2010 decade, one of the fastest in the hemisphere, and growth rates in the 1990s were also robust. Thus while high levels of poverty explain the reliance of parties on clientelism, it does not explain why clientelism has been increasing over time.

3.2. Political Economy

3.2.1. The Lack of Economic Crises

As previously noted, the Dominican economy has enjoyed robust growth rates for the previous two decades. The growing economy may be one factor that has enabled parties to build clientelist relationships instead of programmatic ones. Economic crises destabilized clientelist regimes in other countries in the region as governments did not have the resources to continue funneling to supporters (Morgan forthcoming). In the 1980s, the Dominican Republic suffered through a financial crisis similar to the rest of Latin America, although the depth of the crisis was much smaller than in the rest of the
region. As a result of these challenges the Dominican Republic was forced to accept an IMF austerity program and engage in several privatizations. Most accounts of party competition in the 1980s acknowledge that clientelism existed but suggests that it occurred with less frequency than under the Balaguer regime of the 1970s. Part of the drop in clientelism in this period may be due to the introduction of democratic checks and balances and differences in party ideology and organization, but they may also reflect the lack of state resources facing a series of fiscal crises. In the 1990s, in contrast, per capita GDP growth averaged between 3-3.5% growth annually while the rest of the hemisphere has an average annual growth rate of 1.8-2.2%. Thus the more stable national economy has allowed for greater predictability in terms of income for the state.

In 2003, the government faced a fiscal crisis caused by the collapse of the Banco Intercontinental (BANINTER), which was nationalized by the Dominican Government as accounts of fraud surfaced. The resulting bailout resulted in inflation accelerating to 30 percent in 2003 and then 42 percent in 2004 and required an IMF loan, a large portion of which was used to reimburse all account holders of the bank. Growth rates also fell for below 2 percent in the 2003-2004 period. Yet by 2005 inflation levels had returned to their historical lows and per capita GDP rebounded with 9 percent growth. The scandal and recession likely cost the PRD the 2004 elections (Sagas 2005). However, the recession caused no structural changes that would change the government’s long term access to resources and the bailout itself was interpreted as a politically motivated transfer to rich Dominicans who had previously held their savings in the bank.

3.2.2. The Development Trajectory: A Narrowing of Programmatic Options

Moving beyond overall levels of development, several scholars link the choice of programmatic or clientelist appeals to the specific form that the economy takes. A large state sector may facilitate clientelist competition by providing political machines with resources (e.g. Mueller 2007). Programmatic competition may then replace clientelism when the state is forced to shrink and as government-owned industries being sued for patronage jobs are forced to downsize due to global competition (Kitschelt 2007). In contrast, a large state and in particular a large welfare state way increases the political stakes of political discourse and may facilitate the development of ideological cleavages around the use of those resources and the sustainability of welfare politics (Kitschelt et al 2010). The rapid shrinking of the state and the narrowing of policy choices by globalization/international financial markets should thus undo existing programmatic cleavages and leave parties looking for new ways to court support considering clientelism (Luna and Zechmeister 2005).

The Dominican Republic has never had a large public sector in terms of overall spending. Government consumption makes up 14.5 percent of GDP, a smaller percentage than every other country.
in Latin America except Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Haiti (Carrizosa 2007). In the 1960s and 1970s, the state used revenues from sugar exports (a majority of which were channeled through state owned enterprises) to subsidize industry and maintain an overvalued exchange rate. Yet the Dominican Republic was generally less committed to ISI than most other countries in Latin America were, due to both its small internal market and reliance on sugar exports (Roberts 2002). At its peak in the 1970s, the government was responsible for 12.2 percent of overall business investment, a lower level of state involvement than any other country in Latin America other than Colombia.

While the Dominican Republic has historically had a relatively small state sector, the last two decades have seen a further shrinking of the economic role of the state. Declining sugar exports (in both volume and prices) and slow growth in domestic industrial productivity undermined the country’s economic base in the late 1970s, creating problems that were further exacerbated by the Latin American financial crisis (World Bank 1985). In the 1980s the government began a series of economic reforms that accelerated through the 1990s (IMF 2001). Tax policy was streamlined and tax rates increased. The currency underwent several devaluations, especially in the second half of the 1980s. Tariff rates were reduced and free trade zones were expanded. Finally, several privatizations occurred, especially in the mining sector, although a partial privatization of electrical production that occurred in 1999 had to be reversed in 2002 due to viability concerns. As a result of these economic reforms, the state’s economic role has been further minimized.

The Dominican state has also traditionally played a small role in reducing market uncertainties via the welfare state. Expenditures on social policy in the Dominican Republic rank below the regional Latin American average for all periods in which data are available in Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo’s (2001) dataset. The share of GDP spent on social expenditures has decreased slightly since the 1970s. Segura-Ubiergo (2007, 275) thus labels the Dominican Republic as a country with a “non-welfare state.”

In summary, the Dominican economy was never organized in such a way to provide some of the traditional anchors of a programmatic party system. Specifically, the relatively small state role has prevented a strong cleavage from emerging over the role of the state. Then as the government was forced to enact economic reforms following the fiscal crises of the 1980s (starting in particular in 1986), the scope of ideological discourse narrowed. Moreover, economic reforms were carried out by all three parties during the 1990-2004 periods, which served to further compress their policy distinctiveness. Thus Rosas (2010) looks at PELA data finds no cleavage over the role of the state in regulating the market in 1997 and the small cleavage he found over social welfare policies (generally reflecting divergence

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32 However, government employment makes up 9.6 percent of total employment in the country, which is roughly the median level among Latin American countries (excluding the small states in the English speaking Caribbean). This suggests that while the state is not managing many resources, a large amount of them are being targeted on

33 Although
between the PRSC and the other parties) in 1997 no longer exists by the 2006 survey (calculation by the author).

### 3.3. Institutions and Linkage Strategies

In considering the institutional climate, two institutional changes have occurred in the last decade that may have affected party strategies. First, in 2002 the electoral system switched from closed-list proportional representation (PR) to open-list PR.34 This change should facilitate increased personalization of electoral campaigns and the reduction of internal party cohesion (Carey and Shugart 1995). Benito Sánchez’s data on the targeted nature of Dominican lawmakers’ bills is evidence of the first point and the timing of the reform coincides with the decrease in partisan distinctiveness observed in the DA data. Yet while getting data on the specific distribution of the votes from recent elections has proven difficult, most individuals I spoke with in the Dominican Republic suggest that most voters vote for the party list as it is presented instead of using the individual-vote option. Thus it is unlikely that the shift to open-list competition has greatly changed the incentives facing politicians.

The second major institutional reform in 2002 was a constitutional change to allow for immediate presidential election. Many observers of Dominican politics I spoke to argued that this change has led to increased personalization of the electoral process and clientelism at the expense of maintaining strong parties and putting issues at the front of the campaign. However, presidential reelection existed through the 1990s (Balaguer was elected in back-to-back terms in 1986 and 1990) and then abolished in the 1994 constitutional reforms and so it does not seem that this change was sufficient to explain the recent drop in programmatic completion—parties contested only 2 presidential elections where reelection was not possible and so it is unlikely that the incentives in the post 2002 era are much different from those in prior eras.

The last institutional variable that merits consideration is the national electoral agency (the Junta Central Electoral, JCE). Historically the JCE has been maligned by all parties, who accuse it of favoritism and not preventing fraud (Hartlyn 1999). The formal independence of the JCE is relatively low (Hartlyn et al 2008), and 2010 constitutional reforms further consolidated control over its members in the executive (Lozano 2010, 33). The JCE is also habitually underfunded.35 These three conditions

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34 However, last year the electoral court announced a change back to closed list. See [http://www.diariolibre.com/noticias_det.php?id=266517](http://www.diariolibre.com/noticias_det.php?id=266517) for press coverage.
35 In the newspaper article cited in the previous footnote the JCE notes that
create possibilities of manipulation by political actors. In the last month, in fact, a scandal has arisen within the JCE over whether computer analysts were manipulating the civil registry to benefit the ruling party for the upcoming elections. While it is unclear whether the control of clientelism would be within the purview of this body and there is little evidence that its quality has diminished over time, strengthening the electoral body may be one step that could be taken to strengthen the transparency of elections in the country overall.

3.4. Party Organization

One factor which has changed within Dominican politics in the last decade has been the nature of party competition. One main element driving this change has been a shift within party leadership. As Balaguer and Bosch faded from the political scene and then passed away, their parties have faced a form of identity crisis both in the lack of a figurehead around whom parties can organize and the worldview associated with these leaders. In the case of the PRSC, Balaguer’s passing has resulted in a large-scale diminution of the party’s electoral support as the party attempts to figure out a successful mix of appeals. In the case of the PLD, this has meant the reconstitution of the party around the charisma of Leonel Fernandez instead of the personality of Bosch, but Fernandez does not have the ideological cache that comes from leadership of the struggles of the democratization period. Fernandez also faces term limits himself leading up to the 2012 elections (although he briefly flirted with running again despite the constitutional provisions). In the case of the PRD, factional conflicts divide the party, as the debate over reelection showed. In all three cases, clientelism may be used to substitute for the charismatic ties that previously bound politicians to each other and voters to the party.

3.5. Changing Patterns of Party Competition

Another element of party change has been the development of more complete party structures detailed above with respect to opening local offices and building relationships with local notables. Clientelism requires strong parties to both manage the disbursement of goods, to collect demands for further services, and to monitor voters to ensure that they continue supporting the party that provided them with benefits (Stokes 2004, Kitschelt and Kselman 2011). Under the authoritarian period, clientelism was run through state structures which then acted as mobilization agents (Lozano 2010). The challenge under democracy was to build those networks outside of the state (although Balaguer’s two democratic terms proved that he
could run clientelism through state agencies under democracy as well). Thus it is not surprising that the increase in clientelism over the past decade has come at the same time as parties strengthening their local presence, both formally and in their informal connections.

3.6. Civil Society

Strong ties to civil society organizations are expected to help anchor party systems and generate programmatic priorities as parties represent their base. Changing civil society organizations may weaken programmatic structures. In particular, while labor-based parties have served to anchor programmatic competition by focusing debates on the economic role of the state (Luna and Zechmeister 2005), labor based parties facing the shrinking of the industrial sector have been shown to shift away from ideological appeals to clientelist ones (Levitsky 2003).

Labor unions have always had a minimal presence in Dominican politics. Roughly 12 percent of the workforce was unionized in 1985; within Latin America only Chile, Paraguay, Guatemala and El Salvador had smaller unionization rates (Blanchflower 2006). The traditional reliance on agriculture, reliance on Haitian immigrants for many low-level jobs, and recent emphasis on tourism have all contributed to low levels of union activity, but the Balaguer government also explicitly adopted policies against union activities (Murrillo 2001). Finally, the PRD and PLD saw the growing economy (and resulting nascent middle class) as a political opportunity and both parties shifted to the center to capitalize on this once electoral democracy was reestablished in 1978 (Espinal and Oviedo 1986; Rueschmeyer et al 1992, 248). Thus both Roberts (2002) and Kitschelt et al (2010) describe the Dominican Republic’s party system as having nearly no labor mobilization while Espinal argues that “the Dominican labor movement has been a weak political force, largely excluded from the economic and political benefits associated with industrialization and the modernization of the economy and the political system.” (1997, 183).

That is not to say that parties do not have relationships with civil society nor that civil society does not exist in the Dominican Republic. In particular, the DA survey respondents said that the PRD had slightly more formal ties to civil society than the other parties do and the PLD was also considered to have about the average level of civil society connections among the global sample of parties considered in the survey. However, Espinal et al (2010) show that individuals who participate in civil movements are also significantly more likely to have received material handouts from a party, suggesting that relationships between parties and interest groups resolve around clientelism more than programs.
Some commentators have also noted that government policies toward civil society and social changes have served to limit the pressures facing the electoral machines from growing wealth by disenfranchising voters that then do not need to be mobilized. Two forms of voter disenfranchisement are common in the Dominican Republic (Morgan et al 2011). Individuals with Haitian ancestry face difficulties in claiming political rights, due to both overt and informal racism. Many poor voters do not have the identity cards that serve as voting credentials. Finally, out migration has served to reduce the number of poor voters reliant on political machines. Thus by limiting the number of voters who parties need to target, the clientelist system has not reached the breaking point of not being able to meet demand that in other cases has triggered a switch to programmatic efforts (Kitschelt 2007).

3.7. Role of International Advice and Initiatives?

The international donor community is making a sustained investment in strengthening political parties in the Dominican Republic. The UNDP has one program strengthening the organizational and communication capacity of local party committees, with a particular focus on getting women involved in political committees.36 International Idea has worked with the Spanish Agency of International Cooperation for Development to strengthen election oversight, holding several regional workshops that included members of the JCE on the role of electoral authorities, designing party finance regulations, and working with the media.37 The Organization of American States has also held training meetings with election court members38 and the UNDP has worked with various civil groups to improve election monitoring.39 Finally, multiple donor agencies have had seminars with the political parties (both leadership and junior members), including International Idea40, USAID, and the UNDP41 have done seminars with the political parties themselves. Themes of these meetings have included the role of political parties, effective internal organization and budgeting, the importance of communication between parties to solve disputes over electoral processes, and ways of strengthening the regulatory framework for parties. In the case of the UNPD, a goal of the program is explicitly “strengthening the capacity of political parties to generate programmatic compromises” which comes from a recognition of a lack of

37 http://www.idea.int/americas/central/judge_training_dominican.cfm
40 http://www.idea.int/americas/dominican_rep.cfm,
http://www.idea.int/americas/dom_republic_parties.cfm
41 http://www.pnud.org.do/proyectos/gobernabilidad/61534,
http://www.pnud.org.do/paralapromocindeunademocraciadeciudadana
choice being offered by the parties and the lack of attention to campaign promises after the election, the same problems documented in this analysis.\(^{42}\)

Most of these programs are recent in origin and it is too early to evaluate their effectiveness. Instead, this report illustrates the difficult conditions which these programs face, both in terms of the weak demand for programmatic offerings and the weak supply of societal organizations and cleavages upon which ideological parties can be built. It is also worth asking (though at this stage of the research we cannot answer) whether investments in party structures will undermine clientelist machines and empower programmatic interests or result in newly strengthened machines that can then be sued as clientelist distribution and monitoring networks.\(^{43}\) In evaluating these programs it is thus necessary to track whether changes in the scope of party organizing also result in changes of the patterns of party organizing.

### 4. Conclusion

Electoral competition in the Dominican Republic has become institutionalized and regularized since the return to democracy in 1978. Yet there is little evidence that party competition focuses on programmatic issues. Instead, the previous decades have seen a narrowing of ideological debates, factionalism with parties, a continued strong reliance on charismatic leadership (with parties without leaders seeing their support drop), and an increase in the already high use of clientelist inducements.

Political parties in the Dominican Republic face large challenges in establishing a programmatic profile. They face large demands for clientelism and there are few strong social organizations on which they can form a mobilizing party on other means. The small role of the state (which has gotten smaller over time) has reduced the ideological stakes of politics. The death of party founders has created a vacuum of what the parties stand for. At the same time, financial stability and improved party organizations have proven conducive to strengthening clientelist machines.

\(^{42}\) [http://www.pnud.org.do/proyectos/gobernabilidad/61534](http://www.pnud.org.do/proyectos/gobernabilidad/61534) -the quote is taken from page 3 (translation by the author) and then the examples come from page 4.

\(^{43}\) Kitschelt and Kselman’s (2011) cross-sectional analysis suggests that clientelist parties tend to rely on informal linkages to local notables while programmatic parties tend to have more defined local presences and formal staff, yet it is unclear whether this current empirical regularity has any causal processes underlying it.
However, the one reassuring finding from this study is that programmatic divisions (albeit weak ones) exist within the electorate. Thus as donors consider the process of strengthening political parties, there are voters with whom ideological relationships can be built. The challenge is to build that vision within the party while negating the temptation to continue the mobilizational strategies that have won each of these parties office in the recent past.
References


Table 1: Electoral Party Support in the Dominican Republic
(% Seats, Chamber of Deputies)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PRD</td>
<td>27.5%</td>
<td>47.5%</td>
<td>55.7%</td>
<td>48.7%</td>
<td>33.7%</td>
<td>41.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRSC</td>
<td>34.2%</td>
<td>41.7%</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLD</td>
<td>36.7%</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
<td>32.9%</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
<td>53.9%</td>
<td>57.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Parties</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1: Left-Right Positions of Congress Members in the Dominican Republic

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The election results include the three dominant parties and their explicit allies in each election; results disaggregated between the coalition partners are not widely available.
Table 2: Issue Positions of the Dominican Parties

(standard deviations in parentheses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Spending on disadvantaged (D1)</th>
<th>State role in economy (D2)</th>
<th>Public spending (D3)</th>
<th>National identity (D4)</th>
<th>Traditional authority (D5)</th>
<th>Overall left-right (DW)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1=support; 10=oppose</td>
<td>1=support; 10=oppose</td>
<td>1=support; 10=oppose</td>
<td>1=diversity; 10=nationalism</td>
<td>1=oppose; 10=support</td>
<td>1=left; 10=right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRD</td>
<td>4.73 (2.10)</td>
<td>5.6 (1.26)</td>
<td>4.82 (1.99)</td>
<td>5.1 (2.73)</td>
<td>5 (1.73)</td>
<td>6.18 (2.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRSC</td>
<td>5.44 (2.01)</td>
<td>6.1 (1.10)</td>
<td>5.9 (1.59)</td>
<td>8 (1.12)</td>
<td>5.36 (2.94)</td>
<td>7.36 (2.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLD</td>
<td>5 (2.28)</td>
<td>5.82 (2.31)</td>
<td>5.36 (2.11)</td>
<td>6.22 (2.44)</td>
<td>5.09 (1.70)</td>
<td>7 (2.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-Test of Equality</td>
<td>0.28 (0.76)</td>
<td>0.22 (0.80)</td>
<td>0.83 (0.45)</td>
<td>4.04 (0.03)</td>
<td>0.08 (0.92)</td>
<td>0.85 (0.44)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DALP

45 This tests whether the estimated positions are significantly different from each other; the null hypothesis is no difference in mean assessments and the F statistic is drawn from a distribution with df(2,28).
Table 3: Programmatic Effort of the Dominican Parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Overall Programmatic Structure (CoSalPo_4)</th>
<th>Programmatic Structure Economic Issues (CoSalPo_3econ)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PRD</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRSC</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLD</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average-All Parties in Sample</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average-Parties in Developing Countries</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country Average (Weighted by Party Size):</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Dominican Republic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Countries</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing Countries</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DALP
Table 4: Issue Positions of the Dominican Voters

(standard deviations in parentheses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Overall left-right 1=left; 10=right</th>
<th>Spending on disadvantaged 1=support; 10=oppose</th>
<th>State role in economy 1=support; 10=oppose</th>
<th>Public spending 1=support; 10=oppose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PRD</td>
<td>6.52 (3.08)</td>
<td>1.88 (1.47)</td>
<td>3.68 (2.47)</td>
<td>1.76 (1.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRSC</td>
<td>7.04 (2.67)</td>
<td>1.62 (1.01)</td>
<td>3.39 (2.36)</td>
<td>1.68 (1.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLD</td>
<td>7.34 (2.72)</td>
<td>1.90 (1.41)</td>
<td>3.28 (2.27)</td>
<td>1.95 (1.44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average position</td>
<td>7.00 (2.85)</td>
<td>1.89 (1.45)</td>
<td>3.38 (2.31)</td>
<td>1.93 (1.44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Test of independence</td>
<td>F=6.39***</td>
<td>F=1.08</td>
<td>F=0.08*</td>
<td>F=2.39*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correlation between elite and mass positions</td>
<td>.78</td>
<td>-.89</td>
<td>-.65</td>
<td>-.26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: LAPOP 2006
### Table 5: Non-Programmatic Effort of the Dominican Parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Charismatic Effort (E1)</th>
<th>Clientelist Effort (B15)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>PRD</strong></td>
<td>3.08</td>
<td>17.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PRSC</strong></td>
<td>2.58</td>
<td>17.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PLD</strong></td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>18.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average-All Parties in Sample</strong></td>
<td>2.84</td>
<td>12.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average-Parties in Developing Countries</strong></td>
<td>2.92</td>
<td>13.42</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Country Average (Weighted by Party Size):</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Dominican Republic</td>
<td>3.36</td>
<td>17.92</td>
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<tr>
<td>All Countries</td>
<td>3.03</td>
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<tr>
<td>Developing Countries</td>
<td>3.12</td>
<td>14.72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: DALP*
I would like to thank Kanchan Chandra (New York University), Francesca Jensenius (UC Berkeley), Tariq Tachil (Yale University), Steven Wilkinson (Yale University) and Adam Ziegfeld (Oxford University) for conversations and correspondence about the state of parties in India. All interpretations and mis-interpretations in this report, of course, are my own.
1. Introduction

More than one quarter of all citizens on earth living under democracy, broadly defined, inhabit India, roughly 1,200 M out of 4,500 M. Yet there is vastly more research on democracy and representation, particularly with regard to political party competition and its modes of linkage building between citizens and politicians, on small and medium sized postindustrial democracies, such as Austria or Sweden, than on all of India taken together. On many subjects pertaining to political parties and elections in Indian democracy virtually nothing scholarly has been written based on thorough empirical research, such as on the internal governance of political parties or the internal coordination of party caucuses in the legislature. Even on major subjects such as the analysis of voter coalitions supporting parties the scientific quality level literature is thin and uneven. India scholars will have to make a major effort in the future to catch up on all these research frontiers.

Add to this objective constraint impeding a research report on the current state of Indian party politics the subjective limitations of the rapporteur who fills the role of writing this India case study only for want of finding a better suited author with more competence and a firmer grasp of the India literature in the short time allotted to this project. Hence, what I document here is nothing but a highly preliminary “proto-case study,” probably ridden with factual errors and leaving voids true experts of the subject would have been able to address much better. To avert at least the worst mistakes, in my role as case study author on Indian parties I have contacted a number of India experts and asked them for their general advice on aspects of the subject I am about to cover. Several of them responded to my inquiries in writing and in some detail for which I am deeply indebted to them. Nevertheless, given my limited knowledge of the subject matter and the need for simplifications in what is a comparatively short report on the politics of a whole subcontinent, I will refrain from attributing any specific assertions and statements to individual expert consultants by name, if only as a precaution against them finding me mis-interpreting and de-contextualizing their statements.

The risk of misinterpretation is aggravated by the fact that India is a complex compound republic consisting of states many of which are as large in population as the largest independent democracies on earth. With the gradual devolution of Indian political authority they have acquired a growing range of jurisdictions, particularly in those domestic policies that allocate large amounts of funds. Take a state like Uttar Pradesh and it would figure as fourth largest country on earth behind China, the United States and Indonesia, not counting India as a whole. Indian politics consequently varies a great deal across states, and parties carrying the same label may undertake rather different activities and be caught up in rather different strategic configurations of competition depending on the state in which they operate. The field of sub-national comparative studies across Indian states promises therefore to be highly fertile and it is wide open for research. But for the purposes of this short report, most of the time I will have to ignore substantial cross-state differences in reckless fashion and will emphasize between-state divergence in the conduct of political parties only in a very few instances.
With these provisos in place, the case study proceeds from empirical stock taking of Indian political parties, covering basic programmatic appeals, clientelistic efforts, and organizational aspects of partisan mobilization in the first part. The second part, then, discusses some plausible theoretical variables that may or may not account for the choice of democratic linkage mechanisms by politicians and voters over time and across space.

The basic message of the proto-case study is that India tends to have a polity—or a proliferation of polities—in which clientelistic exchange relations between politicians and voters dominate and in which none of the major or minor parties, with the possible partial exception of the communists, has perceived much strategic reason to move toward a different programmatic profile of political accountability over the past fifty or more years. If anything, parties’ clientelistic efforts have intensified over the decades and their programmatic appeals have declined when compared to the founding decades of the post-colonial independent Indian polity in the 1940s and 1950s. This applies although India went from a dominant party system, configured around the India National Congress, to a pluralistic field of multiple party alliances forced to combine in coalition governments at the national level to form viable executives. In this process, intensifying inter-party competition and competitiveness have gone hand-in-hand with clientelistic linkage practices.

Furthermore, this tendency toward clientelistic benefits for parties’ electoral constituencies has survived, if not been reinforced, by the gradual, but cautious and most of the time incremental opening and deregulation of the Indian economy and the dramatic increase in economic growth beyond the proverbial “Hindu rate of economic growth” that prevailed from the 1950s through the 1970s and much of the 1980s. After a brief and shallow break away from clientelism as the dominant vehicle for a party to acquire votes in the early 1990s, India’s politicians—across the board in almost all parties—appear to have concluded that currently there are few incentives for politicians to defect from clientelistic arrangements of voter-partisan rewards and services that work to their advantage. At least they have not seen a way to make the transition to party strategies that clearly does better for themselves.
2. Descriptive Section

India moved from a single dominant party system in the 1950s, configured around the Indian National Congress (INC) party, to a multi-polar and multi-level system in the 1990s and 2000s. In the eyes of most observers, the critical watershed in India’s party system was Indira Ghandi’s rule as INC prime minister from 1966 to 1977, the last two of those years under Emergency Laws that curtailed civil and political liberties, but gave the fractured opposition incentives to begin to coordinate around a new party, the Janata Party, that rallied against Indira’s incipient dictatorship. After an interlude of opposition rule 1977-80 she came back to govern from 1980 until her assassination by her Sikh body guards in fall of 1984. Her era was marked by a transformation of the INC into an instrument of her family’s rule through a populist-socialist economic appeal, after sidelining the party’s old guard that was adept at negotiating delicate compromises inter-regional and inter-group compromises. By polarizing India, her rule was also the catalyst an beginning for a proliferation of opposition parties that gradually whittled away the electoral dominance of Indira’s Congress Party.

Along the way, the electoral share of national parties that run in most major states rather than just one or few states has shrunk from around 90% of the vote in the national Lok Sabha elections in the 1950s to roughly 50-60% in the most recent 2009 election. The national parties are the cores of three current partisan blocs in the national legislature, each of which also attracts allied regional parties. The largest bloc, the United Progressive Alliance, consists of the INC and its regional allies. But even that commands barely a touch over one third of the national vote currently. The second largest bloc, the National Democratic Alliance, rallies around the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) with its regional allies and has crystallized as the major alternative to an INC led government with currently around one quarter of the national vote. The third bloc is an alliance of multiple small to medium-sized parties assembled under the Third Front umbrella in the national legislature with slightly more than one fifth of the vote. The Communist Party of India (M) and what was originally a regional (but not: regionalist) lower caste party, the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) are the comparatively largest constituents of that bloc. The remaining one sixth of the vote outside the three blocs divides up among an assortment of unaffiliated parties and a loose Fourth Front umbrella. This partisan sector consists primarily of regional parties, although also here the attribute is more a descriptor of the places where they compete than an indication of geographical interests they might advance.

2.1. The Political Parties and Party Blocs of India

I will briefly introduce the parties taking each bloc and its current members before moving on to an assessment of the parties’ programmatic and/or appeals. Table 1 depicts the electoral performance of today’s relevant political parties in critical watershed elections over the course of India’s political history as an independent country. It does not include the plethora of parties that existed in the 1950s through 1970s and complemented the national party system. Its most important elements that disappeared were several socialist parties as well as the Janata Dal,
precursor of the BJP, as well as many other Janata regional parties in the contemporary Indian party system.

Table 1 about here

India has currently hundreds of political parties many of which attract rather substantial followings, by the standards of smaller countries, at the local and regional state level. Here the 17 parties have been extracted that receive at least close to or more than 1% of the national vote, something that might mean for a regional party concentrating on a single state that it receives anywhere between 10% and 30% in its focal state with roughly, say 60 to 150 million inhabitants. Each party will be briefly introduced with its point of origin.

The 1952 election epitomizes the dominant party regime that lasted until the 1970s, with the INC receiving close to half of the popular vote, translating into 60% to 70% of legislative seats in a first-past-the-post single-member district electoral system. The 1977 election marked the occasion of the first major defeat of the INC after an episode in which the INC prime minister Indira Gandhi had ruled under emergency law without democratic legitimation. The 1984 election appeared to restore the “Congress system,” yet also betrayed the beginnings of a realignment in Indian partisan politics, with the rise of a large and credible challenger of the INC and the devolution of party strength to regional parties. 1998 constituted the high water mark for the rise of a powerful challenger to the INC, the BJP, a party that then became able to form its own government coalition as alternative to that of the INC, relegating the latter to the opposition benches. The most recent election of 2009, finally, signaled a certain reassertion of the INC and its regionalist allies, albeit embedded in a vastly changed and more fragmented party system than in the 20th century.

2.1.1. United Progressive Alliance: India Congress and Its Allies

2.1.1.1. Indian National Congress (INC)
The Indian National Congress was the country’s dominant party after independence in 1947 and goes back to 1885, when Indian intellectuals founded the Indian Independence Movement. For most of the time during independence since 1947, the party has been dominated by a single family, the Nehru-Gandhi clan, whose scions also held the prime minister’s office with great regularity for a total of 38 years. The current head of the family, the widow of assassinated prime minister Rajiv Gandhi, Sonja Gandhi, left the leadership of the INC government since 2004 to an Indian native, Manmohan Singh, because of her own Italian and decidedly non-Hindu ancestry and threats on her life, where she to succeed her assassinated husband in the office of prime minister. All the same, she has been the official head of the INC and as such heavily involved in directing Indian policy-making both overtly and from behind the scenes. Recently her oldest son becoming the heir apparent for the prime minister’s office, were the party to win the next general election, while Singh has already become the longest serving Prime Minister since Jawaharlal Nehru (1947-64) and Indira Gandhi (1966-77; 1980-4).

After being two to three times larger in terms of popular support and four to six times larger in terms of parliamentary representation than the next largest Indian party in the 1950s
through early 1970s, Congress went through a sequence of wrenching crises and reversals that involved deep internal divides and public political scandals. Nevertheless, it has continued to be the most resilient, albeit not necessarily institutionalized and nationally extensive party (see below), in the Indian polity.

2.1.1.2. Nationalist Congress Party (NCP)
The NCP emerged as an INC split-off in Maharashtra in May 1999 out of a conflict over political offices. A group of leaders who were expelled from the INC because they challenged Sonja Gandhi’s efforts to assume the party leadership after her husband’s assassination founded the new party. The new party absorbed some other splinters in its state.

2.1.1.3. All India Trinamool Congress
The All India Trinamool Congress (abbreviated AITC, TMC or Trinamool Congress) is the West Bengali subsidiary of the INC. Founded only in 1 January 1998, the party has been the second largest member of the governing United Progressive Alliance (UPA) coalition since 2004.

2.1.1.4. Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK)
The party literally labeled "Dravidian Progress Federation" operates in the Southern state of Tamil Nadu as regional-linguistic-ethnic representation. Originating from older predecessors, the party came into being already in 1949, i.e. decades earlier than the main wave of regional parties, and was swept into state power for the first time in the late 1960s. Its alliance with the INC dates from 2004. In Tamil Nadu, it has alternated in state executive office with its main rival, the Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (see below).

2.1.2. The National Democratic Alliance: the Baharatiya Janata Party and its Allies

2.1.2.1. Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
The BJP, formally founded in 1980, grows out of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS, Indian People’s Union) of the 1950s, extolling a stricter appeal to Hindu religion and Gandhian village socialism than the more secular INC. The BJS was one of the major opponents of the INC, but never reached the level of electoral support its successor, the BJP, achieved in the 1990s, when the BJP formed the core of the government coalition led by BJP leader Antal Bihari Vajpayee.

What might have helped to propel the party to center stage was its role in instigating the 1992 destruction of the Babri Mosque in Ayodhya, where Hindus claimed that Muslims had previously destroyed a temple in order to make room for the mosque, and in the religious riots of the same year that generated a large number of casualties, but resulted in the allegiance of conservative Hindus to the BJP’s political-economic modernization course. As leading element of the National Democratic Alliance, the party then gained electoral momentum, primarily through the catalyst of victories in state level electoral races, but also tried to broaden its intellectual appeal. It peaked in the national legislative election of 1999, when the party won 183 seats, among 303 seats for the entire NDA coalition. But in the 2004 Lok Sabha election, contrary to all expectations, the party (coalition) lost its legislative majority and gave up further ground in the 2009 national legislative elections.
2.1.2.2. Janata Dal (United) (JD(U))
The party is one of the regional split-offs of the old Janata Dal (JD), the party that first confronted and defeated the Congress party in the 1980s. The JDU’s presence is limited primarily to Bihar, as a large state in which the party sometimes furnishes the state level Chief Minister, and to Jharkhand. It is supposed to be set up against other splinters of the JD, especially the Rashtriya Janata Dal, also centered on Bihar.

2.1.2.3. Shiv Sena (alsoi Shivaji, or SHS)
The party dates back to the 1960s (founded 1966) and was originally formed as a sort of “self-defense” to increase self-control of the residence of Maharashtra, and particularly Mumbai, over its state. The party has tried to broaden its support base beyond the state, but still receives most of its votes within that state.

2.1.2.4. Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD)
This label stands more for a family and agglomeration of political currents and (Akali Dal) parties primarily in the state of Punjab that are dominated by Sikh politicians. Factionalism divided the Akali Dal parties, but in partisan politics the effective pursuit of Sikh political issues at times led to some coordination and alliance among the various groupings, evidenced by the Shiromani Akali Dal. It is therefore difficult to say when the SAD came into being. Sikh Akali Dals in Punjab go back at least until 1920.

2.1.3. The Third Front
This is the most recent incarnation of alliances among “progressive” parties with a more or less economically redistributive agenda. Its largest constituent is a nested alliance of the “Left Front,” configured around the two Indian communist parties, (but not the Maoist or Naxalite movement), as its most important members at the national level and in various states where these parties have sometimes become the anchors of state-led economic development (especially in Kerala and West Bengal where left fronts governed for more than 30 years each).

2.1.3.1. The Communist Party of India
This is the original Third International Communist party dating back to the 1920s, with disputed dates for its foundation. The party has gone through the various twists and turns of international communism over the decades since World War II. It has only minor electoral appeal, but is a “national” party that has always run under the same label and competes in all or most electoral constituencies. In addition to the other communist parties, it has allied at times with the INC and the partisan alliance the latter leads.

2.1.3.2. Communist Party of India (Marxist)
The CPI (M) split off the historical CPI in a factional fight in 1964, with obscure substantive stakes from the perspectives of the 21st century, but involving rival political personalities. The party emerged as leader of Left Fronts in a variety of states (Kerala and West Bengal especially) and in that capacity has taken in the historic CPI as ally. The CPI (M) was recently defeated in its stronghold of West Bengal. The party should not be mixed up with the Naxalite-Maoist
movement that itself split off the CPI (M) in 1967 to form, among other organizations, the CPI (ML) and also militant violent quasi-guerilla organizations in several states (e.g. West Bengal, Orissa).

2.1.3.3. Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP)
The party was founded in 1984 by an energetic political entrepreneur, Kanshi Ram, who recruited the party’s current leader and long-time prime minister of Uttar Pradesh, Mayawati, as a young woman and groomed her to become his successor. He constructed a new ethnic category of “Bahujan,” with the literal meaning of “majority” in Marathi and Hindi in order to reach an inclusive target audience capable of crafting electoral majorities (Chandra 2004: 147-9). The building blocks for this synthetic ethnic category consist of the Scheduled Castes (often referred to as “Dalits” or historically “untouchables”), the original core of the party’s constituency, but then also the Scheduled Tribes, Other Backward Castes, and even Intermediary Castes which Kanshi Ram and Mayawati added under the “Bahujan” umbrella. In the spirit of appealing to all those with a worse lot in life, the party entrepreneurs augmented this target group also by various religious minorities which the BSP identified as former Hindus escaping from the oppression of the caste system, uniting all under the umbrella of “victims of the system.” (Chandra 2004: 156-7). Given India’s electoral system and competitive structure, winning elections made it imperative for ambitious politicians to construct a more inclusive ethnic category.

The BSP is currently the third largest party in India, ahead of the CPI(M), with a total vote share of slightly more than 6 percent. Its main base remains Uttar Pradesh, where its leader, Mayawati, is in her fourth term (non-consecutive) as Chief Minister heading a single majority party government. The party understood well how to take votes from the traditional parties through its inclusive lower caste appeal.

2.1.3.4. All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK)
This is another Tamil Nadu based party and main local rival of the DMK which it defeated in the most recent state election. Originally founded by a movie star as a departure from the DMK after internal divisions in 1972, it was a charismatic one-man show during its founder’s life time. Congress Party national governments repeatedly dismissed AIADMK state-level administrations because of alleged corruption. The death of the party’s charismatic leader in 1987 triggered a period of internal fights, among others with and by his widow who became Chief Minister in Tamil Nadu. In the 1980s and 1990s, Ms. Jayalalitha served intermittently as Chief Minister, taking turns with the rival DMK. Her rule was always under a cloud of corruption scandals and allegations. Once again, in 2006 the DMK pushed her out of power, but she made a resounding comeback in the 2011 state elections.

In recent years, the AIADMK has extended its reach beyond Tamil Nadu into Kerala, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh and even to Mumbai and Delhi. What attracts followers is the focus of the party on the Tamil ethnic group and the personality of its leader.

2.1.3.5. Telugu Desam Party (TDP)
Founded by a film star as an alternative to the Congress Party in 1982 in Andhra Pradesh, the party has been in and out of state level government and national government numerous times. It
did survive the death of its founder, but the party has remained a family business to a considerable extent. It has switched is strategy and tactics multiple times (cf. Suri 2006).

2.1.3.6. The Biju Janata Dal (BJD)
This fission product of the Janata Dal (1988) came into existence in 1997 and has played a prominent and at times dominant role as state political party in Orissa in coalition governments. It also joined the government of the National Democratic Alliance at the federal level under leadership of the BJP.

2.1.3.7. Janata Dal (secular)
Janata Dal (S) is one of the larger of the many regional fission products of the Janata Dal alliance that swept V.P. Singh into national prominence and the Prime Minister’s office in 1988. The party emerged in 1999 and is based in Karnataka, but also has participated in governments in Kerala.

2.1.4. Fourth Front, Regional Parties and Independents

2.1.4.1. Samajwadi Party (SP)
Also another fission product of the 1988-Janata Dal, the Samajwadi Party emerged in 1992 in the state of Uttar Pradesh. The party appeared to cater to a particular caste base, the Other Backward Classes (OBC) to which also its leader belongs, one type of castes recognized by the Indian government as socially and economically disadvantaged. In 2009 the party was the third strongest in the Lok Sabha with 23 seats, behind INC and BJP from which it tries to set itself apart equally. The Samajwadi Party is thus a major competitor for the other influential Uttar Pradesh based party, the Bahujan Samj Party (BSP), with which it has alternated in state government.

2.1.4.2. Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD)
Like the SP, Rashtriya Janata Dal emerged toward the end of the 20th century (1997) from the Janata Dal of the 1980s, albeit in Bihar, not in Uttar Pradesh. Also akin to the SP, the RJD targets a specific lower caste base, namely the Other Scheduled Castes is completely centered around its leader. After a spell in government in Bihar, the party recently experienced disastrous electoral results both at the Bihar state level as well as in the 2009 general election.

2.2. Programmatic Partisan Effort
In reviewing qualitative assessments of Indian parties’ programmatic efforts, it applies here in even fuller force than in other countries that it is one thing to listen to what politicians and authoritative party statements say their parties wish to pursue, and quite another thing to observe how parties actually conduct themselves in legislatures and government executives. On paper,
Indian parties do aspire to a modicum of programmatic distinctiveness and commit to the provision of collective goods for all Indians or club goods as benefits for large and often deprived groups: end poverty, liberalize the economy, or bring about some income redistribution. What they pursue and achieve in legislative initiatives and especially in government, however, may be an entirely different matter, particularly in the ubiquitous and complex coalition governments that have become the rule.

Compared to parties’ and politicians own declarations, a survey that asks political scientists as experts to indicate where Indian parties “stand” on policies also taps what parties actually do: Expert judges “correct” for what parties say in light of their practice. Furthermore, the instrument of expert surveys makes possible an unobtrusive, indirect measure of a party’s programmatic appeals by not asking experts point blank to assess how programmatic the party is, but by inferring its programmatic commitment from the convergence or divergence of experts’ assessments of its policy positions. In addition, expert scores allow us to infer the salience of an issue for a party from the certainty with which experts can identify its position. A policy position cannot be very relevant for a party, if many experts signal that they do not know the party’s position on that issue.

As indicated in the introduction, a fundamental difficulty in assessing parties’ programmatic positions in India is the size and federalism of the country. Much of Indian politics unfolds at the state level, where large budget allocations are made (Chhibber and Kollman, 2004). And strategic configurations of political parties vary dramatically across Indian states and within them over time (cf. especially Yadav and Palshikar 2006). It is well possible that experts who have to score a party for all of India come up with one aggregate judgment score that reflects that party’s conduct only in certain Indian states, but not others. So, state-level developments of parties’ programmatic or clientelistic appeals may well diverge from national central tendencies.

Nevertheless, the general impression of most India experts is that programmatic partisan efforts are pretty weak all across the spectrum of parties with very few exceptions. This is a result that emerges from a formal survey conducted in 2008 among 80 Indian political scientists, distributed over ten states within the LOKNITI political research network, as part of a global Democratic Accountability and Political Linkages (DALP) survey in 88 countries some results of which will be reported below. But it also emerges from the informal exploration of the subject with U.S. based India specialists in political science in fall of 2011.

The 2008 survey did not have a temporal dimension asking experts to compare the current programmatic effort of political parties with their own or their predecessors’ efforts in the past. But the handful of experts approached in 2011 who volunteered a guess of over-time changes in Indian parties’ linkage strategies argued that, if anything, the programmatic content of party politics in India has declined over time, when compared to the immediate post-World War II decades. The only possible exception may have been a brief episode in the early 1990s we will return to in the analysis section.

In the early decades, the hegemonic INC under Nehru was building India’s vision of a democratic socialism as a planned economy with import substitution by local emerging
manufacturing industries protected from more advanced foreign competitors behind high tariff walls. In the sociocultural realm, the hegemonic INC pursued the project of a secular, universalistic unified Indian nationalism fighting the tendencies of caste, religious, ethnic, linguistic, or regional particularism that threatened the construction of an Indian national identity. By contrast, at least one of the INC’s contenders at the time, the *Bharatiya Jana Sangh* which can be seen as one predecessor of today’s BJP, articulated a combination of Hindu religious identity with Gandhian village socialism in a much more sharply contoured way than today’s successor parties. There were also distinctly market-liberal and socialist opposition parties at the time, even though also these engaged in political tactics often at variance with their programmatic appeals (e.g. coalitions across the programmatic spectrum).

Nevertheless, even in this early period of Indian democracy, Yadav and Palshikar (2006) diagnose a capacity of the hegemonic Congress party to impose on political debates its favorite interpretive frame of a political divisions between those forces that build the “nation” versus other forces that are steeped in “colonial rule.” This frame was meant to suffocate and silence a wide variety of other options to conceive cleavage dimensions in the Indian polity that could have given rise to programmatic divisions within the party system, such as class and redistribution, religious animosities, or ethnic relations. Because of the hegemony of the anti-colonial discourse, Yadav and Palshikar (2006: 95) argue, it became all but impossible to move to a system of programmatic divides:

“The central cleavage instituted by the nationalist movement (colonial rule vs the Indian nation) was aggregative in nature and strong enough to override almost all other divisions. The Congress project was the creation of a national political community that cut across all divisions. […] The Congress became a rainbow coalition precluding other cleavages from any significant space in the political arena. It must be noted however, that other cleavages were not, at least on the whole, denied legitimate existence; they were instead accommodated.”

While the nationalist discourse appears to have lost some, but not all, of its luster in subsequent decades, nothing else has been featured that could have occupied its central place and provided a programmatic anchor for the differentiation of partisan alternatives in India. For the early 21st century, then, the following assessment appears to be close to the mainstream perception of Indian political parties among experts:

“With a few exceptions, parties are fairly difficult to distinguish on policy grounds in any lasting way. Issues may arise on which parties sometimes take clear positions. But, they often change their positions, and it is usually difficult to guess ex ante based on some kind of ideological orientation where they will stand. That being said, there are some parties that take distinct positions from one another, though even there it is not clear to me that internal cohesion is all that high or that these are issues of particular salience to a broad swath of the party members.” (informant 9/15)

A very similar assessment also comes across in the grand interpretation of the sweep of Indian partisan politics from the 1950s to the new millennium by Yadav and Palshikar (2006: 113) who paint a picture “of stagnation or shrinkage in the choice set” among the parties in the last several decades:

46 Of course, even if these lines of cleavage had been invoked, they could have also given rise to clientelistic networks.
“Electoral politics does provide occasions for radical choices to be placed in the political menu. But such choices do not stay there for very long. The analysis offered above suggests something of a systemic ‘drag’ towards what we have called “convergence,” the tendency for the major players in the party political arena to become like one another and the gradual disappearance from the political agenda of issues with transformative potential.” (Yadav and Palshikar 2006: 113)

In this spirit, let us briefly run through the major Indian parties. By necessity, the account will emphasize the parties that run in a multiplicity of states with aspirations to articulate a national reach, even if with distinct local expressions. Many of the recently founded regional parties that resulted from the national “dealignment” of the Indian party system beginning in the late 1980s have preciously little in the way of distinct programmatic position. I will now abandon the format of discussing the parties by national electoral alliance, and rather move from the older and more national parties (INC, BJP, CPI, CPI(M)) to a more general assessment of different waves of regional parties. In light of this information about parties’ supply of programmatic alternatives, we can then examine what is known about citizens’ vote choices and the extent to which they might reflect programmatic political alignments with parties.

2.2.1. Indian National Congress Party

The INC is considered the archetypical “catch-all party,” building a national community that combined different castes, religious and ethnic groups and rallying the country under the national flag, but therefore creating ambiguity about its policy stances on just about everything else. The “old” Congress party of national liberation times incorporated highly diverse and conflictual groups within the party, so all of them could vie for inclusion inside the party without ever having to go beyond the party.

As indicated before, in the 1950s, the agenda of import substituting industrialization, state economic planning, and cultural integration of the new India may still have given Congress a modicum of programmatic focus. But even then, it was easier to place the non-Congress parties ideologically, because they did not have such an inclusive reach across Indian society. And since that time, whatever focus Congress might have had then has disappeared more recently, particularly with the personalization of intra-party control under Indira Gandhi in the 1970s. In the course of the 1990-91 financial crisis (see later), there was a brief moment of clarity about deregulatory economic reform, but the party went out of its way not to package economic policy into an electoral strategy clearly at variance with its earlier appeals, even though that new strategy resonated with elements of the emerging Indian middle strata. Some observers believe the party may have slightly moved toward programmatic appeals with some recent universalistic social policy initiatives during its 2004-9 term in executive office, particularly the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) which provides that each rural household below the poverty line will be granted one minimum wage job for 100 days. There is no evidence, however, that the party followed up on this trajectory after its victory in the 2009 Lok Sabha elections, and it may have embarked on it in the previous term only in order to secure the Communist parties’ external support for the INC led government.

What militates against programmatic cohesion is also the national coverage of the INC. The party’s electoral coalitions always varied across states, and this variance may have become
more pronounced in recent years. Thus, the caste coalitions configured around the INC are state specific and may have no obvious link to policy, as my expert informants assert.

2.2.2. Bharatiya Janata Party

In the early 1990s the party clearly defined itself through its religious-communal stance on Hinduism and against Islam, but it has become much vaguer since then, as other rivals have made a religious Hindu appeal as well and the BJP found it needed to diversify its electorate beyond those with whom the religious appeal had some purchase. In the early 1990s, the party also took a stance in favor of market liberalization, something that might have helped it earn its support by higher caste voters. But incremental market liberalization under a Congress prime minister in 1991 stole the party’s thunder on this issue dimension. Nevertheless, if there is any issue area left in which the BJP takes on sharper contours, it would be the advocacy of accelerated economic liberalization that resonates with the emerging Indian middle strata. As a consequence, in terms of its socio-demographic profile, the BJP’s support base is more distinctive in caste than religious terms.

Overall, the BJP blended together Indian nationalism, expressed in foreign policy, conservative market economics (individual self reliance, social policy restraint, free market deregulation) and religious Hindu conservatism at its programmatic high water mark. But when it found that this combination did not win elections, it reverted to a more traditional clientelistic approach, with state elections in 1994 providing the critical turning point. Experts agree that the BJP is now probably less programmatic and internally cohesive than when it was smaller in the 1980s.

2.2.3. Communist Parties (CPI, CPI/M)

The Communist parties are programmatic in the most unambiguous fashion, and on questions of economic redistribution (for) and market liberalization (against). The positions of the communist parties on economic and social affairs are certainly most differentiable from those of all the other parties, but there has been no sharp increase in that regard. The party’s support of the INC minority government in 2004-8 may have been instrumental in passing the NREGA reforms mentioned above.

Nevertheless, two major caveats have to be added. First, the Marxian class rhetoric of the Communist parties is out of step with an occupationally increasingly differentiated society that clearly does not make manufacturing workers, the core constituency of Marxian socialism, into the occupational center of the Indian labor markets, nor does it retain poor peasants, the workers’ traditional allies in Marxist coallitional strategies in developing countries, as a vigorous social force of economic progress. The decline of the peasantry, the conventional stronghold of the Indian CPIs in their most important states, may be reflected in the recent defeats of the CPIs in its core electoral preserves (West Bengal, Kerala) and at the national level.

Second, in their government practice, communist politicians often turned pragmatic and resorted to clientelistic techniques. For example, in West Bengal, only those tied to the party could reasonably expect benefits from communist rule. Several informants single out the West
Bengal Communists as highly clientelistic, even equipped with organizational capacity to monitor voters. Negotiating the tension between opposition to federal policies and a desire for state-level socialist change, communist state governments have often resorted to clientelistic benefits for their networks. Also, their overall success rate in providing policy benefits for the broad mass of the poor, whether in terms of literacy/education or health care, appear to be quite modest, when compared to the performance of states never governed by the communists (cf. Banerjee 2010). Maybe for this reason, one of the experts finds that the poor in Bengal or Kerala have started to side against the traditional left.

2.2.4. Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP)

As Chandra’s (2004) work explains in detail, the BSP is primarily an ethnic patronage party, build around a social construct of oppressed castes as a mobilizing tool in electoral campaigns. While the party’s effective programmatic achievement on behalf of Dalits and Scheduled Castes are modest, it has certainly developed a culture with a powerful discourse and symbols about caste that has strengthened the self-respect and assertiveness of the worst off in Indian society, among other things by the symbolic politics of the charismatic and flamboyant leader of the BSP and multiple term Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh, Mayawati. But it is doubtful that it has effected policy change materially benefiting the worst off in Indian society. It has even toned down its intense rhetoric against the upper castes in Hindu society and in this regard become less programmatic than in the 1980s and 1990s. At the mass level, its support base in the Scheduled Castes may not necessarily relate to its message, but to its clientelistic operational effectiveness.

The party is certainly not programmatic in a conceptually precise sense. At the elite level, internal cohesion is low. At least outside its core state of Uttar Pradesh, many legislative candidates have defected from other parties. Moreover, observers note the prominence of criminal elements on BSP party lists in recent years. This could be a consequence of supply and demand conditions. As my informants speculate, the BSP’s senior leadership may auction positions to the highest bidder, with criminals often having the deepest pockets, and/or voters taking a criminal record as a signal that someone may “get things done” in a ruthless fashion, a competence many Indian voters approve (see below).

2.2.5. Regionalist parties Affiliated with Different National Electoral Alliances

These parties proliferated with the breakdown of the “Congress system” and clearly involve the political mobilization of the hitherto marginalized lower castes (cf. Jaffrelot, 2007). This does not mean, however, that new regional parties mobilize the previously dormant caste conflicts with programmatic appeals. For the most part, the new electoral contenders build non-programmatic machine parties providing targeted, selective pay-offs for their voters. Nevertheless, different experts single different parties in particular states out as possible exceptions to the general rule. Thus state-level developments may well constitute a fountain for experimentation with new strategies of party competition.

47 For an interesting explanation and defense of her strategy vis-à-vis the actions of the other Indian parties, see Teltumbde (2010).
Thus, in Tamil Nadu, the intense competition and government alternation between DMK and AIADMK both of which are appealing to the Tamil linguistic majorities in their state may have fostered a somewhat more inclusive and more energetic pursuit of educational and health care objectives at the level of state policy (informant). The mode of competition here, however, may be closer to that of valence competition where all parties try to make plausible to voters that they are best prepared to pursue objectives on which everyone can agree.

There are a few exceptions to the generally unprogrammatic nature of regional parties. One informant nominates especially Nitish Kumar’s JD(U) in Bihar. Another example may be the Biju Janata Dal in Orissa where the state government has invested in local infrastructure. But in addition to idiosyncracies of the regional chief executive who is a bachelor and therefore has no large family to support, the state has a huge mining boom that creates a flow of revenue sustaining both universal policies (investment in infrastructure) as well as particularist side-payments through clientelistic networks and outright diversion of resources into the pockets of politicians (informant). For this reason, another informant explicitly rejects characterizing the Biju Janata Dal, or for that matter any other regional successor party of the old Janata Dal of the 1990s, as even remotely programmatic, although some have a bit of a caste-distinctive support base.48

Most of the other regionalist parties make a few regional demands for benefits, but have not acted to loosen the institutional integration of their region from Indian federalism by demanding more autonomy and or sub-national decentralization.

2.3. Programmatic Responsiveness of Voters

What do we know about the extent of programmatic voting at the level of electoral constituencies? If access to the 2009 Indian National Election (INES) were not so expensive and researchers external to the INES team could actually work with the raw survey data themselves, our knowledge might have progressed faster than under conditions of restricted data access.49 We do know from disclosures of univariate descriptive statistics on the INES website, however, that, when Indian voters were asked about the most important consideration motivating their vote choice, only 11% of respondents mention the “overall programme” of a party. That compares to 27.3% mentioning the individual candidate’s personality or the personal qualities of a party’s leadership as their overriding concern in vote choice. So candidate personality clearly beats programmatic partisan appeals.

48 That would include among the parties discussed here the Samajwadi Party, the Rashtriya Janata Dal, the Janata Dal (United), and finally the Janata Dal (Secular).

49 Access to the data is controlled by the LOKNITI political science research network. LOKNITI offers to prepare data tables upon external request, but does not permit direct access of the raw data. For non-South Asian applicants, preparation of each multivariate table costs between $ 100 per table (if more than 50 are ordered) and $ 160 (if fewer than 10 are ordered), clearly a prohibitive cost for most academic data analysis ventures. See http://www.lokniti.org/dataunit_accessing_data.htm.
It is more difficult to compare the relative weight of programmatic considerations to those of “clientelistic” inducements to choose a party and its candidate(s), as any of the following three reasons to vote for a candidate indicated in the INES may be involved with clientelistic exchange relations between elected politicians and voters more so than with programmatic politics:

- I/members of my family have benefited, or expect to benefit, from the party/candidate: This was mentioned by 7.9% of respondents.
- People of my caste/community support that party, mentioned by 9.8% of respondents.
- The group or the faction in the village/mohalla supported the candidate/party, indicated by 6.9% of respondents.

If all of these responses were counted as subtle revelations of clientelistic targeted exchange relations, then these would beat the importance of programmatic appeals in the electorate by a margin of 24% to 11% as crucial motivator of vote choice. Even if this approach overestimates the role of clientelistic exchanges, it is reasonable to conclude, however, that the weight of parties’ programmatic appeals for citizens’ subjective motivation to opt for the candidates of a party is relatively light in most INES respondents’ calculus of voting, when compared to considerations of candidate personality, valence (candidate and party), and clientelistic advantages. Of course, it would be preferable to demonstrate the particular weight of non-programmatic considerations in the calculus of vote choice in India through cross-national comparative evidence we currently do not have at our disposal.

We can, however, go back to the 2004-5 India population poll within the framework of the World Values Survey (WVS). Because of the small sample of the WVS (about 2,000 respondents in a population of 1.2 B), when compared to INES (with over 36,600 respondents on a core survey, but effectively over 7,000 respondents on most interesting survey modules), and the low quality of the sampling frame, however, these results must be taken with a grain of salt. Instead of high-end regressions of voters’ attributes and voters’ policy preferences on vote choice, let us engage in a more simplistic, but easily interpretable empirical analysis here, namely a comparison of whether there are differences between the socio-demographic support profiles of the Indian parties and between the average issue opinions to which the various parties’ electoral constituencies subscribe. In this context we can also analyze whether party elites’ perceived issue positions, as reflected in the party scores of the Indian political science experts, line up with the public opinion of their electoral constituencies (“representation”). Finally, I will then also report on the results of multinomial logistic regression analysis that employ voters’ policy opinions as predictors of their partisan choices, but only in a round about fashion.

The WVS survey data, however, do not let us explore one element of Indian politics that is clearly important across most Indian states, albeit in differential ways, yet does not have an equivalent elsewhere in the world, and that is the role of social caste in the system of socio-political stratification and access to political power. Examining simple cross-tables of caste, income, and education for most of the Indian states in the 2004 national election reveals that in many states the vote of the upper and middle castes over-proportionally accrues to the BJP and its regional allies. The same applies to the partial economic correlates of upper social caste status, higher income and education. Conversely, in most places, the vote of the lower castes,
less educated and lower earning people tends to concentrate on the Congress Party and its regional allies. Exceptions are the BSP in Uttar Pradesh and the party alliance configured around the communist party in West Bengal.50

The relative importance of caste for partisan preference, however, varies across states. For this reason, Heath (2009) performs a cluster analysis to determine how many clusters define caste and socio-culturally based partisan alternative alignments in a polity. Everywhere caste in India has considerable power to structure partisan alternatives, but according to Heath’s analysis (2005: 186-9), the power of caste to translate into partisan alignments is quite mild in Southern Indian states located beyond the Hindi language belt such as in the states of Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Karnataka and Kerala, as well as in the two states governed for long stretches of time by the Communists (Bihar, a component of the Hindi belt, and West Bengal). By contrast, in the big Hindi belt states of Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Rajasthan, caste-based partisan alignments assert themselves more clearly, and party systems tend to be more institutionalized and less volatile than outside the Hindi belt, where various regional and linguistic-cultural parties have made strong inroads into the electorates of the erstwhile national parties.

The fact that parties draw a great deal of their electoral constituencies from a specific profile of ethnic caste, linguistic, or religious support groups does not necessarily translate into distinctive partisan programmatic policy linkages between electoral constituencies and party elites. What if socio-demographic groups vote based on pure party identification, simply because group members and their forefathers always did so rather than because the party represents policy preferences endorsed by its electoral constituency? What if the policy preferences of a party’s electoral rank-and-file and those of the party’s leadership do not coincide? The WVS survey is too small to permit us a test of the convergence or divergence of a party elite’s issue positions compared to those of its voters all the way disaggregated to the level of the individual Indian states. Yet we can explore whether the average issue positions of a party’s voters coincide with positions the India experts attribute to the elites of that party, and we can also explore whether voters’ issue positions make a difference for their partisan choice.

Based on the World Values Survey 2005-7, Table 2 provides average scores of the various parties’ supporters on age, education, social class and income. Darker grey shading means that a party’s constituency is older, more educated, higher (self-assessed) social class and has higher income. Overall, there are some distinctions among parties that may track their differential caste support bases, but these differences are not very great. Among the large parties, the BJP attracts a slightly younger electorate with above average education and slightly higher social class and income than the INC as its main rival. The INC’s scores are all near the overall mean of the electorate, not surprising given that it is the largest party. At the other end of the socio-demographic distribution, the BSP as self-declared party of the Dalits and Scheduled Castes, assembles a rather young electorate with lower education, class and income. The Samajwadi Party has, on average, an even less educated electorate. Overall, these results give

50 State-level case studies with descriptive and bivariate statistics based on the 2004 Indian National Election Study for more states with more than two thirds of the Indian population that allow these inferences can be found in Shastri et al. (2009). The only big states not covered in this volume are Assam, Bihar, Delhi, Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, and Tamil Nadu.
testimony to the more inclusive character of India’s politics in recent years, achieving an electoral inclusion of the lower castes (see Yadav 2000).

Interestingly, more like the INC, the communist parties appeal to the broad middle of the electorate. Among the ethnic parties, those from Tamil Nadu (DMK and AIDMK) have a more educated, higher class and higher income electorate. Nevertheless, all of these distinctions are rather modest and would not add up to a strong statistical determination of the vote choice by basic electoral parameters. Socio-demographic distinctions certainly do not yield strong expectations for a programmatic differentiation of Indian political parties.

Table 2 about here

Table 3 explores the mean issue positions of Indian political parties and their electorates in three pairs of columns. In each pair, the first column provides the Indian experts’ average score for a given party on an issue dimension. The second column then gives the mean score of a party’s electorate on a similarly worded issue in the World Value Survey 2005-7, rescaled to the same metric as the experts’ survey. On the first pair of party scores, experts assessed how much parties are willing to spend on the disadvantaged. The second column gives survey respondents’ personal sense of whether the national government should reduce inequality between the rich and the poor. The second pair of columns concerns the evaluation of multiculturalism. Experts assess the extent to which parties advocate toleration and social and political equality for minority ethnic, linguistic, religious, and racial groups (low score) or demand priority and opposes state policies that require the defense and promotion of the majority national identity and culture (high score). WVS survey respondents indicated whether they feel that ethnic diversity enriches their lives or erodes a country’s unity. The third pair of columns does not provide a specific issue, but has experts score parties on a 10-point left-right scale and then reports WVS respondents’ left-right self-placement by party.

Table 3 about here

The economic issue of redistribution to the poor makes experts score party positions between vigorous (low score) and moderate pro-poor redistribution (intermediate score). No party receives a high score, opposing redistribution. In relative terms, several elements of the National Democratic Alliance, above all the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJD), receive comparatively conservative scores, while at the other extreme parties inside the Third Front and the Fourth Front receive scores that attribute to them vigorously redistributive positions (the BSP, CPI, CPI/M, the SP and the RJD). Nevertheless, the large standard deviations of the experts’ scores for each party indicate that there is a great deal of disagreement among experts about how vigorously parties are seen as pursuing redistribution. A standard deviation of more than 2.5 on a 10-point scale in experts’ scores for a party indicates almost random distribution of expert scores across the scale and/or some grave outlier scores. Only a handful of small parties manage somewhat lower standard deviations and thus higher programmatic cohesiveness.

In the WVS population survey, differences between the mean opinion scores of the various parties’ electorates are somewhat larger than at the elite level, but fraught by even greater heterogeneity in the opinions of each party’s electorates. The standard deviations now often
exceed 3.0, indicating virtually no programmatic coherence of a party’s electorate. At the same
time, there is virtually no correlation at all between the parties’ programmatic appeals, as scored
by experts, and the central tendency of each party’s preferences in terms of its supporters’ public
opinions. It is fair to conclude that on economic-distributive issues there is little programmatic
structuration going on in the Indian party system.

When it comes to questions of ethno-cultural diversity depicted in the two middle
columns of the table, programmatic constraints both at the elite and the mass level are somewhat
greater. Two members of the NDA bloc predictably come out as the most Hindu-Nationalist
parties, the BJP and Shiv Sena. At the other extreme, the BSP, the Communist parties, and the
Fourth Front SP socialists are most insistent on a culturally integrative position tolerant to
diversity. Standard deviations of the experts’ party scoring are distinctly smaller than in case of
the question about redistribution, indicating that experts had less trouble to identify parties’
positions on national identity and ethnic diversity.

Results at the population survey level from WVS are difficult to interpret for a technical
reason. The Indian survey gave respondents only three response options, endorse that culturalism
endorses one’s life, endorse that ethnic diversity erodes one’s quality of life, or choose the in-
tween option. Possibly because of the forced extreme choices, the electoral constituencies’
mean responses appear in a number of parties run directly counter to the positions attributed to
those parties’ political elites. This applies at least to the national and regional-ethnic parties of
the Third and the Fourth Front: While the CPI, CPI/M, SP, BJD, TDP, DMK, and JD(S) all
express strongly multicultural positions a the elite level, at the mass level their electorates appear
to back just the opposite positions viewing multiculturalism as eroding respondents’ quality of
life! In addition to problems with the score scaling, the social context in which the question was
asked may explain this result: If regional minority groups vote for these parties, as members of
such groups they might have accepted the statement “Ethnic diversity erodes a country’s unity”
as an expression of their own group’s struggle for recognition within an individual Indian state,
but not as blanket endorsement of Hindu nationalism. Given these problems with the survey
question, it is difficult to make sense of the partisan voters’ preference distributions on this issue.

Even setting these technical and semantic issues aside, while inter-party divides over
issues of multicultural tolerance and sometimes greater intra-party cohesiveness on such issues
certainly signal the possibility of programmatic politics, they are not ensuring it. Ethno-cultural
mobilization often proceeds not to create club goods and collective goods that accrue to every
citizen based on universalistic criteria of access and qualification, but through clientelistic
networks that reward the ethnic supporters of a party only. In that instance, ethnocultural
alignments give rise to a non-programmatic clientelistic partisanship.

A similar ambiguity may be suggested by the third pair of columns on parties’ and
voters’ left-right (self-)placement. While it might indicate programmatic competition, if issues
associate with left-right placements, it could also be just an affective identification with a party.
In general, experts place constituent parties of the United Progressive Alliance, led by the INC,
in the center of the 10-point scale, and this is also confirmed by their voters’ left-right self-

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51 When rescaled on the 10-point scale used in the expert survey, multi-culturalism was scored 1, rejection of
multiculturalism 7.5 and the in-between option 5.0.
placements. Experts place the member parties of the National Democratic Alliance, above all *BJP* and *Shiv Sena*, on the far right, and also the parties’ voters place themselves further on the right than do the voters of any other party. Conversely, several member parties of the Third and the Fourth front are not only placed by political scientist experts on the left, but their voters reciprocate and see themselves also on the (center-)left. Overall, the left-right placements of parties yield the greatest intra-party cohesion and cross-party differentiation of positions. Moreover, left-right positions of party sympathizers and party elites, as perceived by experts, correspond to one another quite well (r = .70). This is a robust association by any standard.

The catch, however, is that left-right placements do not necessarily indicate a substantive relationship of citizen-elite issue-based programmatic convergence. Such placements can also be purely symbolic and void of programmatic content, simply indicating different markers in the political space. In this instance, they only show that voters’ party identifications may be powerful, but not that they have policy preferences and that those line up with the appeals of the parties’ elites.

Overall, then, both qualitative-narrative evidence about the conduct of Indian political party politicians in state level and national political arenas as well as quantitative data about partisan voters and expert-scored elite partisan appeals suggest that the programmatic structuring of India’s political space of party competition is weak as best, when we examine direct evidence about parties’ and their supporters’ issue positions. Only general left-right positions suggest a measure of policy representation, but only indirectly and with big question marks. The weakness of substantive policy representation and programmatic structuration of elites and their electorates appears to apply to almost all of India’s parties, with the partial exception of the Indian communist parties. But for these parties, ideological formula appear to have become stale and detached from the realities of Indian politics and society to an extent that the parties are losing their erstwhile strongholds (cf. Banerjee 2010). Programmatic representation works, but for vanishingly small electorates.

### 2.4. Clientelistic Partisan Effort

At a very general level, empirical indications suggest that all parties in India in the early 21st century, with the partial exception of the various Communist parties, rely more on clientelistic than programmatic efforts to establish linkage to their electorates. Clientelism, in fact, has intensified since the 1960s with the increasing competitiveness of Indian politics, as the hegemony of the Congress party has been displaced by the proliferation of a myriad of regional parties, thus making government formation increasingly cumbersome and reducing the predictability of policy-making (cf. Wilkinson 2007).
This blanket assertion that clientelism trumps other forms of citizen-party linkages in India, however, has to be qualified in several regards. First of all, in addition to programmatic and clientelistic efforts, there are, of course, other linkage mechanisms that also come into play in the process of democratic accountability. A very important one in India is certainly the cult of the charismatic party leader that is so prominent in major as well as minor parties and shapes the party organization (see below). From the voters’ point of view as well, in the 2009 Indian National Election Study, no fewer than 24% of the respondents indicated that candidate qualities were more important than a consideration of the party (question Q10) and of the 62% for whom the party is more important almost a third justified it by endorsing that “the party has good leadership.”

Second, as elsewhere, parties make valence appeals: They present themselves as competent and effective representatives of their electorates who are able to make universally acclaimed “good things” happen. Both the emphasis on partisan leadership personality and valence may combine with clientelistic politics. Often enough, parties’ clientelistic efforts appear to be intertwined with charismatic projections of the leadership, something that comes to the fore also in the organization of Indian parties. Equally, valence credit claiming for the effective delivery of local benefits may go hand in hand with clientelistic targeted inducements to individuals and small groups of voters.

Third, where voter constituencies are large and voting is effectively secret, parties probably do not have the capacity to monitor the voting process closely. In the absence of comprehensive party organization, many voters may opportunistically defect from the implicit “bargain” with a party that involves clientelistic benefits in exchange for a citizen’s vote and continued support. With weak party organization, clientelism becomes a leaky bucket in the best of circumstances. In the INES survey in fact more than twice as many respondents as those who believe that recipients of clientelistic inducements feel obliged to support their benefactor party, actually believe the opposite, namely that voters who receive clientelistic benefits vote as they wish.

Still, there may be ways to check on voters’ choices in the ballot station, and actually more than one third of INES respondents, when prompted, volunteer the view that politicians sometimes/most of the time/always find out how citizens voted. Indeed, there may still be practices in place in at least some constituencies in India to determine the voting behavior of political clients. As one of my informants told me from a lunch conversation with one of India’s election commissioners, in the late 1970s Janata changed back the ballot counting process to the

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53 When asked, whether they would prefer as legislator someone who is accessible, but corrupt, compared to someone who is honest, but inaccessible, 24% of all respondents, and one third of those who gave a response, opted for the accessible, but corrupt politician (question C11a, INES 2009). Even more strikingly, a larger share of respondents would rather have a criminal, but reliable politician who “gets work done,” than a “gentleman” who cannot get work done (question C11b, INES 2009). This may indirectly say something about the prominence of clientelism in India, but also about the association between charisma and clientelism.

54 42.5% have no opinion, however, maybe because they do not see clientelistic exchanges or find it uncomfortable to answer the question. So among the remaining 57.5% the breakdown is 41.1% (no obligation) to 16.4% (yes, obligation).

55 In this question (C10 in the INES 2009), 33.8% don’t know, 41.9% respond that politicians cannot or can only rarely find out, and 24.2% responded with some higher estimate of politicians’ opportunities to left the vote secrecy.
level of small individual polling stations, presumably to facilitate clientelistic monitoring of voters on the ground. Politicians were displeased by the election commission’s proposal to field new electronic voting machines that ‘totalize’ votes at a higher level of district aggregation.

Beyond the general agreement that (1) clientelism is a common form of partisan linkage strategy in India, but (2) has become more difficult to implement and (3) occurs in conjunction with other linkage strategies, what can be said about clientelistic practices evidenced by the Indian parties? We really do not have comparative studies by party or by sub-national states that would allow us to get a handle on variance within India. The DALP expert survey in 2008 asked a panel of 80 political scientists, stratified by regions within India, to appraise the clientelistic efforts Indian politicians are making for the national parties as well as select regional parties in their geographical area on five types of clientelistic benefits and services offered to prospective voters. On each type of benefit, experts could award scores from 1, indicating that a party made no effort in providing that benefit, to 4, signaling that the party made a very strong effort to employ that benefit to cultivate its electoral constituency. Table 4 provides the mean scores experts awarded to each Indian party for each type of benefit, as well as the standard deviation of expert judgments, indicating how much agreement or disagreement there was among the experts on assessing a party’s effort with regard to a particular benefit. Mean effort scores are generally in the range of 3.00 to 3.50, indicating that experts attribute to Indian politicians a rather strong or a very strong effort to supply a certain type of benefit. Standard deviations below .80 suggest broad consensus among the experts about a party’s effort. Standard deviations above 1.10, by contrast, suggest that the experts see very different kinds of strategies enacted by the parties.

Table 4 about here

At the most general level, the figures in table 4 bear out the qualitative judgment of Indian partisan strategists already rendered from the interviews with regional experts: With rare exceptions, political parties make a very strong effort to provide clientelistic benefits to their electoral constituencies. The exceptions consistent across the range of benefits types are the two Communist Parties that generally operate less through clientelistic benefits than any of the other parties. Among the remaining 15 parties listed here, the large national parties—BJP, INC, and BSP—all make a very strong clientelistic effort. But especially several of the regional parties, and particularly those affiliated with the Third Front, are seen as the veritable leaders in clientelistic service efforts (Bijui Janata Dal, Telugu Desm Party, Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam and its adversary Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam).

Among the types of clientelistic provision, what appears to dominate in India is the provision of social policy benefits (column 2), such as access to disability pensions, health care, housing support, or educational scholarship benefits, followed by the provision of patronage jobs (column 3). Also handing out gifts and payments in exchange for citizens’ votes is still a widely perceived practice (column 1). At the same time, business-centered clientelistic benefits, such as the provision of procurement contracts and favorable regulatory decisions, are less prominent and more concentrated on large national or regional governing parties (columns 4 and 5). It is these kinds of benefits that also generate the greatest disagreements among expert judgments. As the last row in table 4 shows, the standard deviation of experts’ assessments of both parties’
efforts to provide procurement and regulatory benefits to electoral constituencies (columns 4 and 5) is a fairly substantial 1.02, whereas it is only .75 for social benefits.

Beyond these general tendencies, however, it would be dangerous to over-interpret differences in clientelistic effort among political parties. There is considerable measurement error in the expert assessments, as is suggested by the variability of individual parties’ assessments. Had we drawn a different sample of experts, or asked experts questions in slightly different ways, the ranking of parties may have been different at the margin. Taking this into account, the robust insight conveyed by the evidence is that, with the partial exception of the communist parties, all Indian parties are seen as highly clientelistic.

Table 5 summarizes the performance of Indian parties according to the DALP survey on both programmatic and clientelistic efforts to craft voter-party linkages. In spite of the inter-party variance, it bears out the generalization that programmatic structuring tends to be almost uniformly low, with index scores ranging from .09 to .23, compared to a global average among 506 parties in 88 countries of around .28. Conversely, parties’ clientelistic efforts are almost uniformly intense, with scores ranging from a bit higher than 14 to almost 18, compared to a global average of less than 13 and actual scores in Western democracies in the range of 6 to 9. Both with regard to programmatic and clientelistic effort, the partial, but consistent outliers are the two communist parties that score a bit higher on programmatic appeals, yet also lower on clientelistic effort. The substance of these two parties’ socialist programmatic platforms, however, appears to be increasingly sterile and out of step with the times, contributing to the parties inexorable decline.

Table 5 about here

It has been noted that the intensity of clientelism in India most recently has given rise to anti-corruption movements, primarily supported by a better-off, but socio-demographically and ideologically highly diverse and disjointed middle stratum in Indian society (Sitapati 2011). While these groups may yet be too limited in their societal support to effect a wholesale reversal of Indian partisan practices, it is likely that they will inspire political entrepreneurs in some quarters to attack business-as-usual in Indian democratic politics and bring about a greater diversification of partisan chances than seen so far.

2.5. Party Organization in India

Both programmatic as well as clientelistic linkage strategies benefit from extensive party organization. In the case of clientelism, that organization is critical to mobilize resources, to channel resources, and to provide a modicum of capacities to monitor and sanction defection from the contingent exchange of citizens’ support for parties’ targeted services. In the case of programmatic politics, party organization can serve as a commitment mechanism: By coordinating large numbers of people who voluntarily contribute around declared collective
objectives, party leaders “bind their hands” around objectives that become credible commitments to voters (cf. Caillaud and Tirole 2002).

Strongly programmatic and strongly clientelistic parties diverge, however, in a variety of regards (cf. Kitschelt and Kselman 2010). First of all, clientelistic parties rely more on informal networks of linkages, particularly between party elites and local webs of economic, social, or cultural notables who, among other things, may help politicians monitor citizens’ electoral compliance with clientelistic exchange. Programmatic parties, by contrast, rely more on formal organization to propagate their ideas and to rally people around them. Moreover, at least large clientelistic parties tend to be more hierarchically centralized and dominated by a single or a small clique of political leaders with absolute command than programmatic parties. Given that they churn through very large amounts of resources, they have to take care to keep agents or “brokers” on a short leash who handle these resources and are always tempted to divert some funds to themselves rather than maximizing resource utilization in pursuit of voters.

By contrast, large programmatic parties tend to rely more on formal procedures of participation by activists and a modicum of organizational decentralization together with procedural restraints imposed on party leaders (cf. Kitschelt and Kselman 2010). The organization provides participatory incentives to activists to contribute and help shape the goals of the party. What may be more important, however, is that the proceduralization of political power and the presence of veto-players restricting the degrees of freedom granted to the party leadership serve as a commitment mechanism to stabilize a party’s pursuit of policies over time and to improve its institutionalization and therewith the credibility of its commitments in the eyes of a party’s electoral constituencies.

There is no thorough empirical literature about party organization in India. But the few brief systematic treatments available convey the following basic parameters:56

- Most Indian parties claim a mass membership running into the millions, but the concept of party membership is ill-defined. Until recently parties had neither membership files nor systematic ways to collect dues from members. Only in the BJP and the communist parties the concept of membership had more organizational reality. De facto most parties may even be considered to lack an operational conception of party membership.

- Indian parties tend to be run in an autocratic fashion, configured around a single leader or a small cabal of leaders. “The leader exercises, to use Weber’s term, charismatic authority, or in Indian idiom, we might call it ‘glamor.’” (Suri 2005: 35) The autocratic leadership party type is particularly pronounced among the many newer parties that entered into electoral competition only in single states or a subset of states. Good examples are the DMK in Tamil Nadu or the Shiv Sena around Mumbai and more broadly in the state of Maharashtra (see Katzenstein et al. 2002), but the pattern applies pretty much across the board to most Indian regional parties. It has given rise to a theory of “dynastic” parties (Chhibber 2011).

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• Supreme leaders in non-programmatic parties need to solve the agency problem of keeping compliance of their lieutenants and brokers. In India, this is still often achieved by a “family-centered” organization. Parties are treated as “family owned” going concerns and can be “inherited” by the relatives, when the founder passes away. One of my informants reports back that more than half of all Indian MPs who visited his famous American university over the past five years are also children of politicians. The explanation for this arrangement in a clientelistic party is enlightening: It is, indeed, a way to solve the principal-agent problem of keeping the intermediate stratum of party operatives tightly aligned with the core leadership. It is worth citing Suri (2005: 37 for this point extensively:

“(a) Parties need to manage huge funds, especially for election expenditure. Huge party funds, especially when in government, are mobilized by the top leader. They need to be channeled through and managed by reliable and trustworthy persons and the leaders find such persons in the family and depend on them. (b) The party chief, who often happens to be the founder of the party, sees the party as his child, his creation, his own. Parties are conduits for political power and political power in the conduit through which personal wealth and party funds could be amassed.”

• A partial exception to the autocratic, family-centered party governance is still the Congress party, albeit to a lesser extent than in the 1950s and 1960s (Kothari 2006, in a famous article on the “Congress ‘System’” published originally in 1964). In order to acquire maximum reach and incorporation of a highly diverse variety of electorates in Indian society under the umbrella of the same party, Congress has maintained a more decentralized and factional organization than other parties. Even Indira Gandhi’s struggle in the 1970s and early 1980s to make the party more hierarchical, leader-centered and ultimately subject to control by her family succeeded only to a rather modest extent (Kochanek 2002). The party has maintained its factional and diverse internal governance, combined with elements of family leadership.

• In recent years, after its ideological surge and in the process of adding new electoral groups to its fold that are beyond the core groups of its original upper caste following (O. Heath 2002), also the BJP has moved in the direction of an only moderately centralized mass party.

• Finally, the communist parties have diverged from the family-dominated, entrepreneurial and dictatorial style of the Indian ethnocultural parties. They combine a more formal organizational concept of party membership with a bureaucratic rather than personalistic centralization of political authority under the old Leninist conception of “democratic centralism,” but modified by greater mass membership (Basu 2002: 343-4; Rodriguez 2006: 228-30).

Interestingly, the DALP survey on India pretty much confirms common expert views of Indian political parties and of organizational differences among them. What is more important, it also shows that none of the Indian parties has adopted organizational forms that would be conducive to a deliberative programmatic party format:
• Most parties tend to be too centralized and under the leadership spell of an individual, a family, or a clique to afford a projection of programmatic positions rather than personalistic authority.

• With the possible exception of the two large national parties (INC, BJP) and maybe the two communist parties (CPI, CPI/M), Indian parties do not have a formal organizational base that makes them able to organize a programmatic process of policy determination.

Let us now review the evidence gathered by the DALP expert survey on India and then compare it to a very recent study by Chhibber et al. (2011) using a very different methodology to characterize Indian party organizations. Generally, the two studies arrive at converging and complementary conclusions.

In the DALP study, experts scored parties on different elements of the extensiveness of party organization: How dense is the network of local district offices? Do they maintain ancillary social/community organizations for women, youth, etc.? How close are the parties’ ties to local notables (teachers, religious figures, prominent business people, etc.)? Table 6 renders this information, with the darker shaded squares indicating more extensive party organizations with lower scores closer to the maximum score of 1.0. The darkest shade covers cases that have an extensiveness attribute at least half a standard deviation above the mean for the entire cohort of Indian parties. No shade means very weak organization with more than half a standard deviation below the mean.

Table 6 about here

The table conveys that only the two national parties (INC, BJP) really have extensive organizations, and even their scores would not stand out by international comparative standards. They are followed by established parties with strong regional anchors, namely the two communist parties, the two Tamil Nadu regional parties and the regional parties from Maharashtra (Shiv Sena) and Andhra Pradesh (Telugu Desam Party). All the other regional parties have more or less very limited party organizations, although they often claim memberships in the millions.

Next, table 7 presents various aspects of parties’ organizational centralization. Grey shades have the same meaning and operationalization as in table 6, with dark grey meaning intense centralization (more than half a standard deviation above the mean) and no shades the opposite. In column 1, experts score the “charismatic” qualities of the leadership. By international standards, all Indian parties, as a group, score near the upper end of the global distribution, but among them some of the Indian regional parties actually reach close to the extreme score (4.0), with the major parties (INC, BJP) nearer to the middle of the national distribution (but very high scores by international standards). The communists are here, as with regard to the other two centralization measures, near the low end. The second column indicates the extent to which DALP Indian party experts see the parties’ leadership groups in charge of the nomination of legislative candidates, the third column indicates how much the leadership controls the parties’ strategies, e.g. in decisions about whether or not to join coalition governments.
The parties with the least charisma are also least centralized on questions of candidate nomination and strategy (the two communist parties), but the inverse does not apply. The most charismatic parties often tend to display only an intermediate centralization score on personnel and party strategy, something that might suggest that their structure is less institutionalized, and therefore potentially faction-ridden. It is some of the regional parties with intermediate deployment of charismatic authority, however, to whom experts attribute the greatest centralization of nominations and strategic powers.

Note the scoring of the two largest parties, INC and BJP, on organizational centralization. While the control of party leaders over strategic choices is scored in the lower-to-intermediate range when compared to other parties, experts attribute definitely precisely little control to the party leadership over the nomination of legislative candidates. Were it not for the intermediate to high scores on charismatic leadership authority, these two parties would signal some potential for developing a programmatic orientation, given their restraint on centralization. Since all Indian parties, regardless of intra-Indian variance, cluster at the high end of charismatic authority and political centralization by standards of international comparison, and all Indian parties fall well short even of the mean level of issuing global programmatic issue appeals in the global comparison, it is not surprising that inter-party variance on party centralization does not correlate with inter-party variance on programmatic appeal (last column in table 7).

Putting information about the deployment of charismatic authority, the extensiveness of party organization, and the centralization of strategic and nominations control together, we obtain six configurations of party organization in India (table 8). At the left-hand extreme we have parties with extensive organization and comparatively moderate centralization that use charismatic authority in a for India more limited (1.1.1.) or more unrestrained (1.1.2.) fashion. These more mass-bureaucratic parties include both of the largest Indian parties, BJP and INC, as well as the communists (CPI, CPI/M) and a couple of the Tamil Nadu regional parties. As we move to the right-hand side of the table, we get to progressively less extensive and more personalistic and centralized parties all of which are regional parties. The extreme is reached with organizations such as the Bahujan Samaj Party of Uttar Pradesh.

The relative lack of extensive organization in Indian parties, the high leadership-centeredness of parties and their centralization of authority is also confirmed by a very recent study undertaken by Chhibber, Jensenius, and Suryanarayan (2011). They are studying the “institutionalization” of political parties, a terminology introduced by Huntington (1968) and refined by Mainwaring and Scully (1995). In the language of the previous analysis, a party is more institutionalized when it separates the personality of the leader from the operational longevity of the organization, i.e. when it has (1) more extensive organization, (2) less reliance on charismatic authority and for the most part also (3) less centralization of decision-making capacities. Chhibber et al. code a party as more institutionalized, if it has a clear succession plan.

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57 Chandra (2004) how at times both the Congress Party (pp. 247-57) as well as the BJP (esp. pp. 272-4) were sufficiently open to assimilate new groups into the party and its leadership.
for the leadership, sustains a body of party functionaries with fixed roles in a division of labor, employed throughout election terms, and offers activists clear and open paths for upward political mobility, unimpeded by the arbitrary authority of a few leaders (ibid., pp. 6-8 and 10-11). While broad comparative studies reveal that not all institutionalized parties are programmatic, high institutionalization is a prerequisite for programmatic partisan appeals (cf. Kitschelt et al. 2010 on Latin American parties). If institutionalization implies the separation of the corporate fate of the party from that of its founding leader, it is vital for programmatic politics, as the latter draws attention to a party’s collective commitments to the production of goods and services and tones down the importance of unique personal appeals and qualities of its politicians.

For this reason, the absence of institutionalization can serve as a fairly reliable tracer of the absence of programmatic partisan appeals as well. In Chhibber et al.’s (2011) study, authors coded the organizational institutionalization of the largest four parties in the 15 most populous Indian states (with more than 90% of India’s total population) between the 1960s and 2004. The biggest and most general point to make about Chhibber et al’s data is that the organizational institutionalization of Indian parties is rather weak, regardless of time and place. Moving beyond this generalization, however, there is variance across time and states. At least for the nationally largest party, the INC, what surfaces is, on average, a decline of institutionalization at the state level over this period of time. The BJP, as second largest party a comparatively recent foundation of the 1980s, appears to have reached its peak institutionalization in the 1990s and since then has shown signs of organizational decline in at least some states. All the other parties’ institutionalization is always quite low.

Focusing just on the most recent post-2000 state election in the 15 states, the relatively most institutionalized party is the BJP. But on a crude ordinal scale going from almost no institutionalization (score 1) via some institutionalization (score 2) to a fair amount of institutionalization (score 3) even the BJP reaches the highest score only in 6 of 15 states (40% of the total) and the intermediate score in a further three states (20%), leaving the remaining 40% of states with BJP party units that qualify as more or less uninstitutionalized. The INC fares even worse. The team of investigators attributes a high score of institutionalization to the INC in only two states, Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh. The INC obtains an intermediate score in only five other states, thus leaving the majority of states with weakly institutionalized INC party units (8 of 15: 53%). Beyond these two parties, only the CPI(M) in two states and the RJD in one state receive a high score of 3! Chhibber et al. (2011) code altogether 51 parties in the 15 states for the most recent coded state election, occurring sometime between 2001 and 2004. Of these 51 parties, only 11 are awarded a high institutionalization score of 3, and only another 10 parties a lesser score of 2, leaving almost three fifth of all parties (30 of 51) with the lowest score of 1.

In only eight of the 15 states does more than a single party obtain a score of 2 or higher, namely in Bihar (RJD/3 and BJP/3), Gujarat (BJP/2 and INC/2), Karnataka (INC/2 and BJP/3), Kerala (INC/2 and CPI(M)/3), Madhya Pradesh (BJP/3 and INC/3), Maharashtra (INC/2 and SHS/2), Rajasthan (BJP/3 and INC/3), and West Bengal (CPI(M)/3 and BJP/2). In a few states not a single party reaches even one intermediate institutionalization score. Here all scores of parties’ organizational articulation are at their minimum: Haryana, Orissa, and Tamil Nadu.
While Chhibber et al’s (2011) Tamil Nadu results may be somewhat at variance with the DALP finding of centralized and often charismatic regional parties (DMK and AIADMK) that are organizationally also quite extensive by Indian standards, the overall picture of Indian party organizations emerging from Chhibber et al’s study make the system appear rather similar to what Indian party experts convey in the DALP survey for 2008. Indian parties tend to be personalistic and centralized, but not terribly well-set up in terms of organizational reach and penetration of Indian civil society. These are all facts that limit their programmatic potential.

2.6. Legislative Organization of Party Caucuses

There is appallingly little known about the organization and management of legislative party groups in the Indian Lok Sabha. I could not identify a single study devoted to this subject as its primary concern of empirical analysis. My own experts had mostly given this topic only very limited attention and had to inquire themselves about even a modicum of basic information concerning the internal workings of the Indian legislature.

One minimum necessary, but not sufficient condition for programmatic partisan efforts in legislatures is a certain discipline of the party caucuses. All members must at least vote along a partisan line, even if individual members do not agree with that line on every point. This also means that defections from a party should not be encouraged or facilitated. In Indian democracy MP defections from the party under whose label legislators were elected were quite common in the early decades, but party leaders then “fixed” this problem by a 1985 constitutional amendment requiring those legislators whose who defect from the party on whose ticket they were elected to face reelection in their constituencies immediately after shedding their erstwhile party affiliation.

Nevertheless, the limited coherence of Indian legislative parties comes to the fore in the fact that after the end of a legislative term many sitting MPs run for a seat in the subsequent term for a party featuring a different label than the one that earned them a seat in the previous term. As one informant calculated, about one fifth of all incumbents run for a different party in the subsequent election. This signals that partisan ties to legislative caucuses are quite tenuous and that parties have not managed to provide legislators with incentives for a progressive career within their party caucuses. This situation is likely to make programmatic coherence of parties’ legislative caucuses more difficult to achieve.

How then does parliamentary management affect minimum conditions of programmatic party conduct of the individual legislators? It appears that each major party has a member of the caucus leadership that exercises the role of the “whip” in the British House of Commons and, as floor manager, ensures that legislators are present at important votes and commit to the party line. Particularly given the personalistic nature of most Indian parties, defying the party leadership, represented by the whip, may therefore be a highly risky undertaking on the part of
an MP and may well end her political career in the party. Nevertheless, there is always the prospect of party switching at the closure of the electoral term.

There are apparently no studies of the Lok Sabha’s legislative committee system and its role and that of its individual members in the Indian legislative process. Experts suggest, however, that once again it is not so much the legislative institutions, but the party leaders that control the process, both in terms of appointments made to committees as well as the legislative work inside the committees and the behavior of individual MPs on committees. While both houses of the Indian legislature have elaborate systems of standing and select committees and while their members have some personal discretionary leeway in agenda setting and information requesting, experts have the impression that (1) committee membership is decided by party leaders and signals to MPs whether they are on a progressive career trajectory or not and that (2) for individual members, therefore, to make noises of non-compliance with the party leadership through committee activity is damaging to a member’s legislative career advancement.

More generally, it is the party caucus and its leadership that is the decisive governance mechanism in the legislature and it clearly trumps committee power. But this arrangement would strengthen parties’ collective programmatic effort only if legislators have incentives to develop policy competence on committees and prove their leadership mettle through committee work on policies and programs. At this time, there is simply too little information available to determine whether politicians’ career paths in the Lok Sabha involve incentives to contribute to programmatic initiatives through their party caucus and through the legislative committee system.

### 2.7. Party Finance in India

Election campaigns in India are expensive to stage because they involve the provision of clientelistic benefits. While initially a private affair situated in a space void of legal regulations, except a general expenditure ceiling on parties’ campaigns since the 1951 Representation of the People Act (RPA), party finance increasingly became a matter of public attention and debate, particularly in the 1980s with the unfolding of major corruption scandals implicating governing party politicians. Much of private finance comes from businesses, even thought that was illegal from 1969 to the mid-1980s, and in the 1990s domestic companies became sufficiently concerned about the heavy financial burden of their contributions to party coffers that they worried about an emerging comparative disadvantage vis-à-vis multinational companies simply because the latter would not get involved in party finance (Sridharan 2006: 321). 58

While a party finance act passed in the 1980s permitted company donations to parties, it required disclosure by donor and beneficiary. As a consequence, in general “the overwhelming majority of the contributions [to parties] have continued to be by the black money route.” (ibid. 320) Parties do not like to disclose their income and expenditure and avoid legal-regulatory

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58 In the 1980s, of course, there had been spectacular scandals with foreign armament industries paying bribes to Indian politicians.
provisions that allow them to obtain donations or spend more in exchange for finance disclosures. This propensity was not changed by another piece of reform legislation in 2003 that would have permitted the tax deductibility of some party donations in exchange for disclosure. The “black market” with secret movement of resources continues to dominate political finance.

In the 2008 DALP survey research, political science experts were invited to indicate (1) how important they thought public party financing is relative to private financing of Indian parties and (2) how transparent parties’ private finances are to external observers. Across the board, the respondents indicated that the relevance of public financing pales by comparison with private party finance. Moreover, with a partial exception made for the two communist parties, experts consider the financial conduct of all parties extremely opaque and intransparent. There is a general sense that whatever information parties reveal about their internal finances lacks credibility (see also Sridharan 2009).

Dynastic party organization and secretive party finance are intimately intertwined (cf. Chhibber 2011: 7-9). Clandestine party finance keeps a party’s leading family in charge as the switchboard directing funds to its vassals in the field. This mode of operation undercuts accountability and puts a premium on the value of private, idiosyncratic relations of acquaintance that can be cultivated by family networks. Given how many parties in India are dynastic, it is no wonder that they fight a reform of party finance.

For our purposes, it is most important that the highly personalistic, discreet treatment of finances also works against programmatic party orientation. It is opposite to any open, transparent, and explicit discourse about the rational allocation of resources that would most likely use party policy objectives as an argument to arbiter between alternative uses of scarce funds.

The only (partial?) exception to the practice of “black market” clandestine party finance through personalistic networks appears to be the communist parties (cf. Chhibber 2011; Sridharan 2006). Although they wielded state-level executive power, they have kept comparatively clean and transparent on the parties’ financial side. This perception of the communist parties is also confirmed by the DALP Indian party experts.

2.8. Executive Participation and Government Coalitions

At the most general level, India has experienced a tremendous upswing of political mobilization over the past thirty to fifty years, bringing previously marginal lower caste and class groups into the political process and incorporating them into partisan alternatives. In South India this process began already in the 1920s and 1930s and crystallized after independence around resilient alternatives to the Congress Party, such as the communist parties or the DMK in Tamil Nadu (Wilkinson 2004: chapter 6). In other places, the political incorporation of the lower castes took place much later in the 1970s and 1980s and destabilized previously hegemonic Congress

59 I am drawing on the broad analyses of Indian party politics offered by Yadav and Palshikar (2006; 2009).
party systems, prompting, among other things, strategically calculated violence against the Muslim religious minority, where inter-party competitiveness became particularly intense and volatile (Wilkinson 2004).

The process of lower caste political mobilization had several important consequences. First of all, it made it harder for existing parties, above all the Indian National Congress, to keep together the broad electoral coalitions to which they catered in the 1950s and 1960s and to expand them by newly mobilized constituencies. In the wake of these difficulties, the Indian party system began to fragment progressively into a multiplicity of medium-sized and rather small political parties, when measured in terms of vote shares, but still very large parties by global standards, when measured in terms of absolute voter support. A party that obtains one percent of the Indian national vote in the 2009 Lok Sabha election still received more than four million votes! Or, to put it another way: The CPI/M with a bare 5.3 percent of the national Indian vote in the 2009 Lok Sabha election received almost as many votes as the winner of the 2007 House of Councillors Diet election in Japan, the Democratic Party.

Second, the increasing mobilization of the electorate in India’s gigantic polity with now more than 700 million citizens and over 400 million actual voters in 2009 has made voters and political entrepreneurs shift their attention to units of governance that have a more manageable scale than the federal level, primarily the state governments presiding over territories of anywhere between a few hundred thousand and almost 170 million people, with each of the ten largest states accounting for more than 50 million inhabitants, and a grand total of almost 800 million people, almost twice as many inhabitants as in the European Union. Federalization of political decision making, devolution to the state level, has become a further force of decentralization (cf. Chhibber and Kollman 2004). The vigor of Indian federalism has made it attractive for citizens and politicians to focus on the state level as the prime site for political struggles over the allocation of scarce resources and regulatory decisions that affect the operation of markets and the personal lives of citizens. This decentralization of political power, however, often went hand in hand with an assertion of entrenched local elites and corporations, faced with governments less able to resist their resourcefulness than the central Indian state (Yadav and Palshikar 2009: 56-9). Thus, expansion of political participation to the poor through state-level political mobilization in regional parties has not translated into greater leverage of the poor in Indian politics.

Third, and most importantly for our concerns, the increasing fragmentation of the Indian party system has made the formation of governments, particularly at the federal level, progressively more difficult and reliant on a proliferation of veto players. This has precipitated a process of ideological “convergence” among Indian parties, as a broad and diverse set of parties is needed to assemble a viable government. Policy-based intransigence of individual parties in coalition negotiations is likely to undercut government formation. This applies above all to the federal level with its extreme party system fragmentation, but also to a number of the states where Yadav and Palshikar (2006: 87) identify processes of bipolar convergence (often involving a multiplicity of parties, albeit organized around bipolar coalition alternatives) or multipolar convergence within a more complex field of parties.
In these convergence scenarios, individual parties express great programmatic flexibility to participate in ever shifting coalitional arrangements. The plasticity of coalition politics thus comes at a price: In coalition bargaining, parties may need to be willing to bracket and sacrifice whatever programmatic concerns they might feature in order to carve out a distinctive electorate. Coalition bargaining must be entered based on considerations of expediency and office seeking alone. The exigencies of complex coalition politics thus generates a centripetal dynamic that undercuts the articulation of clearly identifiable policy positions and devalues the importance of partisan policy programs in the eyes of political tacticians (cf. also Suri 2005: 27).

It is thus the progressive fragmentation of the Indian party system itself that becomes an obstacle to the crystallization of programmatic alternatives: Whatever programmatic “identities” parties develop may have to be bargained away for them to be able to join coalition governments. Since there are so many party fragments and so many options to combine them in government coalition, no fragment ever accumulates enough bargaining power to make its programmatic priorities stick and impose them on the coalition partners. As the ultimate consequence of this process, politicians and voters discount programmatic stances and recognize that politics becomes a game about short-term tangible material advantages to be handed to each party’s electoral constituency. Complex coalition politics asserts clientelistic linkage strategies.

It would be difficult, however, to characterize the fragmentation of the party system as a “cause” of the dominance of clientelistic partisan linkage strategies in India, as they tend to be mutually endogenous: Fragmentation drives politicians’ choice of linkage strategies … and vice versa. Politicians and voters make choices over the coordination around party labels and linkage strategies simultaneously. For a causal analysis, we must search for conditions and mechanisms that are clearly exogenous to these contemporaneous choices in the process of party competition and temporally prior to that process. Let us turn now to a very tentative search for such patterns of causality in the Indian case.

3. Analytical Section

The outcome this case study tries to account for is the continued and more or less uniformly non-programmatic nature of Indian party politics. Trends and exceptions prove the general point. If anything, the programmatic nature of Indian party competition has declined over time. Moreover, the parties that most clearly provided a focus for programmatic politics in India—the socialists of the 1950s or the two communist parties until the present—are electorally on the decline or at least confined to a tightly insulated ghetto. And the brief blip of programmatic competition among the major parties—the INC and the BJP in the early1990s—primarily around the cultural issues of religious tolerance and coexistence, but also the question of economic market liberalization—appears to have vanished practically without a trace, when viewed from
the vantage point of the 2010s. How can one make sense of these facts and developments? Of course, examination of a single country case, even with intra-case variance over time and in space (sub-nationally), can never prove a general causal argument because the latter needs to show its resilience in many varied contexts. But the close scrutiny of the facts in one case can render some causal hypotheses more plausible than others. This is all the subsequent short discussion of potential causal processes involved in Indian parties’ linkage formation can accomplish.

3.1. Development and Democratic Political Experience

The dominant theoretical narrative of political linkage strategies in democratic politics has to do with development and democratic political experience: As people become richer, they value clientelistic benefits less, while politicians find it increasingly difficult to supply the selective, contingent benefits that still motivate people to support them and then to ensure that clientelistic effort effectively generates partisan votes (cf. Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). As voters and citizens gain greater experience with democratic politics, politicians can make credible programmatic commitments and shift from (expensive) clientelistic to (cheaper) programmatic linkage strategies (e.g. Keefer 2007). Neither of these stories comfortably fits all the Indian facts or at least does not appear to capture what is most striking about the dynamics of citizen-politician linkage building in India over the past generation.

Consistent with the development story, Indian partisan linkage strategies should be dominated by clientelistic rather than programmatic partisan efforts, as the country is still quite poor with a per capita GDP corrected for purchasing power parity of slightly less than $3,000 in 2007. This is, in fact, what we see in the data and the expert judgments of politicians’ linkage strategies across the range of Indian parties. The only moderate outliers are the Indian communist parties with a more stringent programmatic appeal, and even these two parties are seen as engaging in a moderate amount of clientelistic linkage in states where they have governed.

Emphasizing India’s level of development, then, could be the end of our quest for an explanation of Indian linkage strategies, were there not some interesting anomalies that prompt us to continue our investigation. These anomalies come into view in a longitudinal scrutiny of our case. If development is the explanation for the choice of linkage strategies, Indian parties should have shown signs of weakening clientelism and/or strengthening programmatic partisan appeals over the last generation, as India’s economic growth accelerated. Instead, if we believe the qualitative case studies and the DALP expert survey, clientelism has intensified and programmatic politics as subsided compared to the 1950s. In fact, in the DALP survey, the one question that asks experts to judge the intensity of clientelistic effort in a party system over time, experts give India one of the highest scores in the set of all 88 countries for parties intensifying their clientelistic linkage strategies over the past ten years. As poverty began to subside,
clientelism has not weakened, but instead is apparently practiced with ever greater vigor. This evidence is clearly inconsistent with the development argument. The same applies with even greater force to the observation that the BJP as the political party that draws more on upper caste and wealthier voters than any other party apparently has reinforced its clientelistic efforts since the early 1990s, while its programmatic efforts to promote Hindu religious-political dominance and economic market liberalization have weakened or subsided.

A similar anomaly occurs with regard to the argument that growing democratic experience would enable voters and politicians to shift to a programmatic linkage pattern. Along these lines, one should observe with each round of state and federal elections a shift toward more programmatic linkage strategies. But case study evidence suggests that, if anything, clientelism has entrenched itself with accumulating democratic experience. Clientelism may require investments in an infrastructure of party brokers and networks with local notables that does not spontaneously appear or disappear. As a consequence, up to a certain level of democratic experience, and net of economic growth, party competition should become more programmatic with each round of electoral contestation. But in India this is evidently not the case. Once again, the opposite to common wisdom appears to be borne out: Clientelistic politics becomes more dominant as time progresses. Under certain circumstance, clientelistic politics may benefit from accumulating democratic experience (Kitschelt and Kselman 2011a). Overall, then, theories of economic development and of democratic experience cumulation, throw only limited light on the trajectory of citizen-politician linkage construction in India.

3.2. Political Economy

If development and democratic experience do not exhaustively explain Indian politicians’ linkage strategies, maybe a study of political economy, or the institutional governance of markets through political rules and decisions, could help. Net of development level, one could argue that the greater is the scope of political discretion over the allocation of scarce resources compared to the spontaneous trading of free agents in the marketplace under the general rule of law, not amenable to case-by-case political intervention, the greater will be the politicians’ leverage to install and maintain clientelistic networks. The more economic resources can be moved, the more political favors can be solicited from targetable clients. Conversely, as economies “liberalize,” i.e. grant more leeway in contracting and resource allocation to the independent initiative of market participants, political linkage mechanisms will shift toward programmatic politics, as politicians lose opportunities to allocate scarce resources under their political authority.

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a steady continuation of clientelism over the past decade, and a score of 5 a sharp intensification of clientelistic partisan efforts. Of a total of 80 experts, 76 volunteered a score for India, with the balance of 4 opting for “don’t know” or “does not apply.” The average response was a score of 4.12, with a standard deviation of 1.03, one of the highest scores among all 88 countries, signaling that the overwhelming majority of respondents thought that clientelistic effort has intensified in India over the previous decade.
A political economy provides a broad scope of political intervention, and thus works against programmatic political competition, where some or all of the following conditions prevail:

- Governments run an array of state-owned companies directly or indirectly in what they deem to be “strategic” sectors of the economy from infrastructure (utilities, transportation, communication, energy, etc.) to investment and consumer industries.
- Governments own/run investments funds and banks and/or regulate the flow of capital into industries and/or individual businesses (e.g. through investment licenses).
- Governments restrict the cross-border flow of capital.
- Governments manipulate exchange rates and allocate scarce foreign currency among market participants.
- Governments impose differential tariffs on imports and/or provide a variety of export incentives (e.g. loan guarantees).
- Governments restrict the domestic operation of foreign firms.

If the array of measures is primarily skewed toward protecting fledgling domestic manufacturers from overwhelming, more advanced foreign competition, the political-economic development strategy is called an “import substituting industrialization” (ISI). It tends to rely on an overvalued currency, high tariffs with selective exceptions for investment goods that need to be imported, and a close political management of domestic capital allocation. If it is geared toward the promotion of exports, it would also embrace the political management of (scarce) capital markets, but combine such activities with an undervalued currency and more selective tariff and non-tariff protectionism that will keep other countries from retaliating against one’s own export sectors.

The dominant political-economic narrative about India is the following:

- The country ran an extreme mode of ISI from its inception in 1947 until the end of the 1980s, essentially a socialist planning regime in which an industrial licensing system strangulated the free play of entrepreneurial initiative.
- As a consequence, over thirty years India managed only the “Hindu rate of economic growth” of 3.5% GDP per year.
- Then, under the impact of a severe balance of payments crisis in 1990/91, triggered by a sky-rocketing trade deficit due to the global non-competitiveness of domestically protected Indian industries, the Congress-led government finally had to call for IMF assistance and eventually acquiesced to a far-reaching reversal of economic strategic, abandoning the ISI framework by dismantling the industrial licensing system and reducing tariff protection of Indian domestic industries and overvaluation of the Indian rupee.

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61 Without fully buying into the conventional story, a concise summary of the main points can be found in Dutt (2006), chapter 4 (“Economic development: from import-substitution industrialization to economic liberalization”), pp. 98-123.
• As a consequence of this sea change, the growth of the Indian economy began to accelerate beyond the Hindu rate of economic growth and became a global star performer.

If the conventional economic policy story is correct, what are the predictions of a political economic theory of democratic linkage strategies implied in the account?

• As long as the economy grows well under ISI tutelage, democratic party competition is likely to feature clientelistic linkage strategies as the dominant mode of political accountability. When ISI was initially instituted, essentially disempowering the wealthy proprietors in a political-economic regime relying on raw materials exports (agriculture or nonrenewable deposits), the parties establishing ISI were inspired by a programmatic vision, however, some elements of which, albeit in a diluted state, may linger on once the regime has come into full existence.

• But ISI never worked all that well in India and clearly began to deteriorate in the 1970s and 1980s. This should have created political forces challenging clientelistic practices. But India narratives do not provide much evidence of a powerful movement against the clientelistic practices of Indian party politics.

• When the break with ISI finally came in 1990/91, it should have been spearheaded by a “progressivist,” anti-clientelistic party and precipitated a thorough erosion of clientelistic linkage practices in Indian democratic politics. But no such dramatic movement was visible: The economic liberalization process was introduced under duress by a Congress Party-led government, and the party quickly managed to insulate its economic governance strategy from its appeals to mass publics. Conversely, the strongly emerging BJP added economic reform to its religious-nationalist appeals, but quickly let the topic slide into the background, although it resonated well with the private business element of its electoral constituency. The “break” of 1990-91 was neither led by programmatic parties, nor did programmatic parties emerge from the “break.”

• As economic growth began to skyrocket in the 1990s and the new millennium, elements of clientelism that had not been flushed out in 1990-91 should have stabilized, as the copious flow of resources into state coffers through economic growth should renew the political availability of discretionary funds, albeit at a lower level than during the heydays of ISI. Empirically, we have seen the continuation of clientelism in India beyond 1991, but not at a lower level than before. If expert observers are correct, clientelism in the 1990s and after has been more resourceful than ever before.

Something is wrong with the political-economic story of democratic linkage mechanisms. Either the politics part of the story is wrong, implying that ISI and its abandonment do not affect politicians’ choices of linkage strategies in the predicted fashion; or the economic part of the story is wrong, suggesting the pathways of economic growth and economic reform are inaccurately described in the “conventional” rendering of the story. It appears that this latter possibility may in fact be correct: Once we have revised and accurately specified India’s pathway of economic growth and its economic policy activities, the facts are consistent with a political-economic story of political linkage choice. The economic record then correctly predicts the continued hegemony of clientelistic over programmatic politics in India.
• The conventional story gets the facts wrong about economic growth in India. The shift over to a higher growth pattern occurred already in the 1980s before the financial crisis (Subramanian and Rodrik 2008a). Growth in the 1991-2000 decade was actually no higher than in the 1981-90 decade (3.7%/a in the 1980s, 3.6%/a per capita in the 1990s, compared to 1-2% per capita GDP growth in the 1950-1980 period). India reaches sustained very high growth rates (> 5% GDP/pc) only in the new millennium.62

• The conventional story also misrepresents the pathways of economic reform and changing political governance of the economy in India. Reforms began, in a modest way, before 1990/1, and after a brief burst in response to the balance of accounts crisis, there has been a rather gradual unwinding of the industrial licensing system and the regulation of labor markets. The sources of India’s economic strength must therefore be sought elsewhere. As Subramanian and Rodrik (2008a: 29-40) argue, even small pro-business policy changes led to big economic total factor productivity growth payoffs in the 1980s and 1990s, as India was operating far below its income possibility frontier (ibid., 34) and could quickly translate these policy changes into manufacturing growth. Moreover, compared to India’s still low per capita income, it under-performs relative to the quality of its institutions: democracy, rule of law, and resilience of property rights (Subramanian and Rodrik 2008b: 151).

For entrenched clientelism, the implications of the actual patterns of economic performance and policy reform in India from the 1980s to the 2000s are quite clear. The good economic performance of the 1980s reinforced clientelism. Moreover, the short and shallow crisis of the early 1990s, against the backdrop of a still very low per capita GDP, in no way could shake up the entrenched clientelistic partisan networks.63 Politicians fought successfully against an elimination of these networks and isolated the question of economic market liberalization from the agenda of electoral politics. While especially parts of the BJP’s electoral constituencies supported economic reform, it became clear quickly to the parties’ operatives that the appeal of market liberalization was too narrow in the Indian electoral landscape to generate an attractive electoral strategy. For these reasons, even the crisis of 1991 could not displace the clientelistic strategy.

After the moment of crisis and decision in the early 1990s had passed, India resumed strong economic growth, soon accelerating to an unprecedented pace that generated an increasing amount of public slack resources, even at low and falling rates of taxation (and low efficiency of tax collection). Governing parties at state and federal levels could now disburse new benefits for their constituencies and potentially broaden their electoral coalitions. They were in a position to keep feeding their clientelistic networks, while simultaneously conceding a modicum of more universalistic benefits, not tied into the contingent electoral exchange, such as

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62 That also means that McCartney’s (2010: 32) catchy chapter 2 headline—“A tale of two paradoxes: growth without liberalization after 1980 and liberalization without growth after 1991”—is somewhat misleading as well. 63 India’s economy contracted on a per capita basis by .93% in 1991, although total GDP still kept growing. Compare this to the economic crisis experienced by Korea (1998) at a much higher level of economic development with a democratic public already receptive to a challenge against clientelism: In Korea, GDP fell by no less than 7.56% on a per capita basis in 1998 and shook up the institutional fabric of political-economic governance, including the nature of linkages between parties and voters.
the minimum wage employment guarantee for 100 days to each rural household the communist coalition partner of the INC in the 2004-8 term pushed through the legislature. Indian news observers surmise that the good economic performance is now the basis from which the Congress Party’s general secretary and next “dynastic leader,” Rahul Gandhi, prepares a program of social reform that reaches out to dalits, scheduled tribes, and other marginalized groups in Indian society whose members have not benefited much from recent strong economic growth.

Thus, with an empirically correct restatement of economic development trajectory and its interplay with economic reform strategies by the government, the political economic perspective provides quite an adequate account of the continued preponderance of clientelistic political linkage and the weakness of programmatic linkage in India. Continued economic growth, from a base of still intense relative and absolute poverty, makes it still an uphill battle for politicians to build broad electoral constituencies through programmatic appeals. The still broad scope of state intervention along ISI lines reinforces the availability of resources politicians can deploy for targeted rewards to support group. The State of Democracy in South India research group therefore laconically concludes:

“In societies where the state plays a dominant role in the generation and distribution of resources and where other institutional mechanisms remain weak, as is generally true of South Asia, avenues for the distribution of patronage remain high.” (SDSA Study Group 2008: 88)

As a counter-factual, in order to witness a sharp surge of programmatic activities in Indian parties in the future, two developments would have to converge and interact. On one side, continued growth will have to broaden and strengthen an urban middle stratum that can no longer be satisfied with clientelistic payoffs, but is concerned about the weakness of collective and club goods provision by Indian governments, particularly the state of Indian infrastructure and social as well as educational services. On the other side, growing political restlessness about these deficiencies would have to be magnified by a failure of incremental economic reform resulting in an episode of sharp economic performance crisis, say akin to Korea’s financial crisis of the late 1990s, and/or a longer period of protracted economic stagnation with rising unemployment or underemployment. Actually, after open unemployment, net of difficult-to-measure rural hidden unemployment and under-employment, declined from 9.5 to about 7.2 percent from 2004 to 2008 in India, such open unemployment then shot back up to 10.8 percent by 2010 (average). A sustained spell of elevated and increasing unemployment may well disrupt what appears on the surface to be a happy equilibrium of clientelistic politics.

3.3. Institutions and Linkage Strategies

As long as democratic institutions stay the same and parties’ linkage strategies are pretty convergent and persist over time, we can only state a correlation of the two, but cannot draw any causal inference as to how one might affect the other. If we observe that institutions are uniform, but parties choose different linkage strategies, we could infer that institutions are not a plausible candidate to account for linkage strategies. The same applies, when parties’ linkage strategies
change over time, but institutions remain the same. Conversely, if institutions change, but parties’ linkage practices persist, the former cannot be causally efficacious. Institutions may play a causal role, however, when institutional change takes place, net of other changes, such as economic performance, and political parties follow up by changing their linkage strategies. Unfortunately, the Indian case gives us little leverage to explore this dynamic process, as institutions have remained quite stable over time, together with parties’ dominant clientelistic linkage strategies.

The three main formal institutional complexes the institutionalist literature has put center-stage are (1) electoral laws, (2) executive legislative arrangements and (3) rules to allocate the competence to make authoritative decisions at the level of the national government (“centralism”) or to delegate jurisdictions to sub-national democratically elected legislative and executive political authorities (“federalism”). Let us review each briefly in turn, taking a glance at international comparison, when falling short of observing intra-Indian diversity over time or across space (parties, states).

**Electoral laws:** India’s first-past-the-post plurality electoral formula within a setting of single-member election districts provides for only a modicum of personalized competition among candidates, as each candidate faces only candidates from other parties in her own district and candidates are nominated in a process very much under the control of each party’s leaders, not that of potential entrants into the electoral race. If personalization of electoral contests, in turn, facilitates clientelistic exchange and undercuts programmatic politics, we would expect in India a rather high level of programmatic party competition between the representatives of different labels. This, however, is evidently not the case. Electoral laws, therefore, cannot account well for the parties’ predominant profile of political linkage strategies.

**Executive Arrangements:** An independently elected presidential executive, with a wide range of powers associated with that office, tends to personalize political relations and undercut the value of partisan labels necessary, but not sufficient for the rise of programmatic party competition. India’s parliamentary democracy with a weak and indirectly elected presidency provides no basis for a strong clientelistic rather than programmatic partisan linkage strategy. Either executive institutions do not matter for linkage strategies, or India is an inexplicable outlier, or an alternative institutional theory is required that diverges from the run-of-the-mill arguments. The single case of India, at least, does not give us much insight an causal leverage here.

**Centralized versus federated distribution of executive jurisdictions:** If there is an institutional complex in India that has changed over time, it is the nature of Indian federalism. Chhibber and Kollman (2004) distinguish periods of political centralization and decentralization in the history of India’s political federalism, and the era that began in 1991 clearly counts as a time of decentralization, particularly in the area of state influence over economic development strategies (ibid., pp. 137-41). By 2001, citizens were much more likely to expect the delivery of universalistic services from local and state governments than from the federal government (ibid.,

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64 This inference is based on Carey and Shugart’s (1995) rightly famous article on election laws and the personalization of politics.
p. 201). If decentralized political authority, in turn, makes it easier to build contingent and particularistic clientelistic accountability relations between voters and politicians, then it is quite plausible that federalist devolution of political authority to subnational levels fostered clientelistic partisan politics. In India, federal decentralization and the intensification of clientelism appear to go hand in hand.

There are, however, two obstacles in the way of conceiving of federal institutions as a cause of politicians’ choice of party linkage strategies. First, it would be difficult to establish that in India the process of federalist devolution in fact occurred before the intensification of clientelistic politics. Second, in a purely cross-sectional, cross-national perspective, there is no evidence that federations are more clientelistic than centralized political regimes. In the DALP expert survey of democratic linkage strategies in 88 countries, for example, there is no evidence that centralized democracies are more programmatic and federalist systems more clientelistic. 65 If anything, it may be the reverse, but no stable statistical relations can be established. At least in bivariate analysis, polities where parties invest more in programmatic rather than clientelistic politics have a substantially higher chance to be also federalist. But these polities tend to be very affluent, and citizens also tend to have deep stocks of accumulated democratic experiences that militates against clientelistic linkage strategies. In multivariate analysis, the effect of federalism on partisan linkage strategies therefore washes out in most instances. Hence the effect of centralism and federalism on democratic linkage strategies remains statistically unproven.

Wrapping up the consideration of institutional design and parties’ programmatic linkage investments, for the Indian case, institutional arguments appear to contribute little to the explanation of partisan linkage strategies. This should provide food for thought for anyone placing a great deal of hope on institutional design as a way to improving democracies.

3.4. Party Organization, Finance, and Legislative Organization

In India, variance in party organizational features and linkage strategies is too limited to expect to see the emergence of clear-cut relations between parties’ linkage profiles and their organizational features that can be identified in broad cross-national comparison (Kitschelt and Kselman 2010; Kitschelt and Singer 2011). Nevertheless, the two relatively most programmatic and simultaneously least clientelistic Indian parties, the CPI and the CPI/M, highlight features that also stand out in international comparison for parties with this linkage profile. They tend to

- rely less on charismatic leadership authority;
- have weaker ties to local notables;
- institute less centralized control over candidate nominations processes and strategic decisions inside the parties;

65 At the simple bivariate level, the chance that a country with, on average, scores in excess of 12.0 on the summary index of clientelistic effort running from 5.0 to 20.0, is also a federal system is only 17% (11 countries out of 63), whereas the equivalent chance for less clientelistic polities to be federalist is 32%. (8 out of 25). Once holding constant for per capita GDP, any pretense of a non-random relationship between clientelistic effort and federalism vanishes.
• organize a less opaque, more transparent process of partisan financial resource acquisition and disbursement.

In other words, more programmatic parties look like what Chhibber et al. (2011) code as more institutionalized parties. Nevertheless, it would be difficult to declare party organization a “cause” of linkage strategies, and simply recommend to other Indian parties to adopt forms of organization similar to those of the Indian communists, if they desired to become more programmatic. Once again, clinching evidence for the causal efficacy of one phenomenon affecting the other would require a time series of observations that would allow us in an unambiguous way to determine what came first and what followed later. We simply do not have information sufficiently detailed to draw inferences about the causal efficacy of party organization and change in organizational structures. Only if one could combine Chhibber et al.’s (2011) innovative measure of Indian party organization (1967-2004) with a dataset on politicians’ linkage strategies and voters’ demand for clientelistic or programmatic accountability over the same time period, one might be able to identify the causal efficacy of party organization.

While it might be difficult to determine empirically whether party organization is or is not a causal factor in the choice of linkage profiles in India, I personally find it unlikely that organizational choices could lead linkage strategies. More likely, it is the nature of social constituency preferences—and the ability of politicians to develop coherent political ideologies that appeal to social constituencies—that makes parties able to lay out and pursue policy programs rather than clientelistic targeted and contingent exchange with their followers. And an ideological constituency strategy may become more plausible when countries fight economic hardship and not “all boats are rising” with a tide of economic growth.

Similar to the lack of inferences that can be drawn from Indian facts about party organization, it is at this time impossible to determine if and how legislative organization in India has any effect on the parties’ linkage strategies or is a reflection of such strategies. Some centralized management of party caucuses may be a necessary, but insufficient condition for programmatic party appeals, as it prepares the ground for a de-personalized party relationship to electoral constituencies in which politicians have little opportunity to compete for support by differentiating themselves from intra-party rivals through clientelistic benefits targeting personal supporters. But if the limited information about the Indian case suggests anything, centralized legislative caucus management can happily coexist with predominantly clientelistic party appeals.

3.5. Changing Patterns of Party Competition

The India case study did, however, identify changes in the patterns of competition within the Indian polity as a proximate cause of evolving linkage strategies. In a nutshell, the country went through political inclusion and mobilization of previously marginalized, poor strata from a one-country dominant party system with the Congress Party at its apex to a highly fragmented multi-party system with multiple loose pre-election coalitions among national and regional parties and two to four-party systems in the larger individual states of the union. Consistent with the
development argument, marginal groups, particularly the scheduled castes and tribes, were brought into democratic politics primarily through clientelistic exchange. The *Bahujan Samaj Party* epitomizes this development more so than any other partisan current in India (Chandra 2004). But many regional parties, as well as the national and state-level reconfiguration of the *Congress Party*’s appeals since Indira Gandhi, signal a similar trend.\(^6^6\)

Intensifying party competition in a comparatively poor country, in turn, have increased the efforts politicians have made to provide clientelistic linkage. In other words, the combination of strong competitiveness of rival partisan camps with a receptivity of the bulk of the electorate to clientelistic demands will militate against programmatic mobilization.\(^6^7\)

The literature on India, however, has identified one other pathway to depress programmatic politics discussed above that is related to party competition. Highly fragmented party systems necessitate the arrangement of complex coalition government in which parties are unlikely to prevail with policy principles and more likely to eke out special interest benefits to their individual electoral constituencies. Many of these are likely to be delivered through clientelistic exchange. Complex coalition politics therefore undermines programmatic party appeals and the electoral credibility of such appeals (cf. Betz 2006: 626). Now, if party organization had causal efficacy, and following Chhibber et al.’s (2011) empirical finding in India that more impersonal, institutionalized organization promotes less party system volatility and an intermediate level of fragmentation, maybe party organization could be employed to increase the programmatic structuring of Indian party competition.

### 3.6. Ethnocultural Divisions and Civil Society

India has a diversified menu of multiple ethnic markers all of which may be available for politicization, contingent upon configurations of party competition (Chandra 2004; Wilkinson 2004). Loosely speaking, dependent on whether invoking a group identity dimension may be electorally decisive for the victory or defeat of a partisan camp, politicians will selectively and in a calculated way invoke it. Thus, where a party may win office by rallying an all-Hindu majority, its politicians may play on the religious divide with Muslims. Where contesting Muslim support is the more likely winning strategy, they will tone down the divide.

India also has clear inter-group income divisions such that an individual’s ethnocultural group membership in terms of language, religion, caste, ethnicity, or region predicts her income level. To capture this phenomenon at the aggregate level, one may compute a “between-group-

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\(^6^6\) As empirical illustration, examine the caste support base of Indian state parties in the 2004 election, as detailed in the state-level case studies included in Shastri, Suri, and Yadav (2009).

\(^6^7\) More technically, there is an interaction effect between competitiveness and development, such that the direct and the interactive effects of the two terms have opposite signs and the coefficients creating the prediction of strongest clientelism under conditions of poverty and high competitiveness and strongest programmatic partisan appeal under conditions of high competitiveness and economic affluence (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). This general claim, and empirical evidence for India, stands in contrast to the more commonly accepted theory that under conditions of intense competition parties will try to attract marginal voters by making programmatic appeals.
income” (BGI) differential (Baldwin and Huber 2010). In cross-national comparison among electoral democracies, BGI is a fairly robust predictor of clientelistic politics (cf. Kolev and Wang, 2010), but not of programmatic politics. While in countries with substantial BGI differentials clientelistic citizen-party linkages are more common, the inverse does not apply to programmatic politics. Clientelism, after all, is not the only manner in which politicians may benefit the ethnocultural group they wish to represent and move it up relative to other groups. They may also feature universalistic, programmatic policy demands—such as to institute equal civil rights and treatment in labor markets or to redistribute income based on general policy principles (e.g. progressive income taxes)—that de facto help their own ethnic constituencies.

In cross-national comparison, India has one of the greatest between-group-income differentials (BGI) within a broad set of over 80 electoral democracies, ranking it only behind Guatemala, Turkey, Israel, and Bolivia.68 This may help to account for the intense clientelism of most Indian parties, but not automatically the feebleness of the parties’ programmatic appeals. Most Indian parties are affiliated either with religious or with ethnocultural group associations, and if one or both apply, they definitely make a strong clientelistic effort.69 The only two parties that have neither religious nor ethnocultural affiliations in India, however, also tend to be somewhat more programmatic than most Indian parties: the two communist parties. Nevertheless, the relationship between group affiliations and programmatic politics is not very pronounced. At least one other party in India, the socialist Samajwadi Party (SP) affiliated with the Fourth Front, tends to combine strong ethnocultural associations with both a moderate programmatic effort at about the same level as that of the communists (see table 4 above), but combined with a very strong clientelistic effort, quite unlike what experts attribute to the communists.

To sum up, India’s associational ties provide only weak clues about India’s riddle of weak programmatic effort and strong clientelism. This may have to do with the fact that the historically most powerful economic and political circumstances precipitating programmatic party formation during processes of economic development in Europe do not occur in countries’ development trajectories in the late 20th and early 21st century in general and India in particular. The rise of European programmatic parties was intimately intertwined with the growth of European working class movements and religious (Catholic) parties as a defensive counter-movement. What helped programmatic partisan mobilization in the European region is an array of factors clearly absent in India today, or for that matter in just about all of the other developing economies:

- the creation of a class of mostly low or unskilled urban wage earners, amounting to anywhere from 40 to 50 percent of the total labor force at the peak sometime between 1900 and 1960, together with
- the ethnic homogeneity of that social class;
- its incorporation in the economy under wage labor contracts in formal markets;
- its assembly in vast manufacturing plants that employed thousands and tens of thousands of workers in the very same place with

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68 I am drawing here on Kolev and Wang’s (2010) extension of Baldwin and Huber’s (2010) BGI dataset to more developing countries.
69 Based on DALP data analysis not shown here.
workers’ residences nearby in concentrated urban neighborhoods and
workers lacking opportunities for physical and cognitive/cultural mobility in the absence
of cheap means of long-distance transportation, communication/information technology,
and mass media entertainment (television, internet).

These conditions created a sense of broadly shared solidarity and collective identity,
combined with a sense of social entrapment, setting workers apart from other groups with more
prospects of individual income mobility. They constitute a mix of circumstances that do not
apply to India or any other 21st century trajectory of industrialization. Even as countries
industrialize now, manufacturing employment tends to peak out at a low 20-25% of the labor
force and most of the time takes place in what is by historical standards comparatively small
factories and work sites. Moreover, production is quite capital intensive and occupational skill
differentiation takes off quickly for tasks beyond the level of simple product assembly. In the
sphere of social reproduction, working class wage earners deal with mass media and cheap
transportation facilities that create entirely different life style and consumer experiences than in
Europe fifty to one hundred years earlier. And in most developing countries the new urban labor
force is ethnically diverse. All these conditions promote a fragmentation of collective identities
that makes programmatic political mobilization hard to achieve.

India has had historically a weakly organized and highly fragmented manufacturing
working class and the country’s rapid economic development now appears to rely only in part on
the expansion of the manufacturing sector, but already spills over to a substantial extent into
areas of skill-intensive, technologically sophisticated service industries. As a consequence, even
communist parties could never primarily rely on working class support, but tried to carve out a
base among small and medium sized peasants and the rural work force more generally (Betz
2006: 627). And now the novel sectoral and skill profile of Indian economic development may
relegate communist parties to comparatively laggard economic sectors. In other words, the
parties that currently express the greatest drive of programmatic mobilization may be nostalgia
parties for a future that never happened, as India’s economic development takes off in a different
direction.

3.7. Role of International Advice and Initiatives?

The research reports and data available in the production of this case study do not provide
evidence that Indian political parties were influenced in any material, substantive measure by
advice, activities, funding, or outright intervention from national or international actors and
organizations situated outside the country. India is, of course, a founding member and regular
contributor to International IDEA and IDEA has conducted a broad based survey of democracy
in South Asia in the mid-2000s that resulted in an Oxford University Press book publication (see
SDSA Research Team 2008). But these analytical activities, of course, are quite different from
efforts to advise politicians in upstart democracies on how to coordinate around partisan labels.

Among developing countries, and especially among relatively low income countries,
India has an unparalleled track record of continued democratic rule based on regular electoral
contests, if we disregard for a moment the brief episode of governance by state of emergency under Indira Gandhi in the 1970s. As such, India is likely to be more the source of advice for other countries than the recipient of advice from abroad.

Nevertheless, as the Research Team’s “State of Democracy in South Asia” report argues, this does not mean that local observers and investigators, as well as citizens themselves, are entirely comfortable with the development of political parties in the region in general or India more specifically. They note that party systems in the region have been able to include a greater diversity of electoral constituencies and have thus moved toward mapping diverse social groups and interests since the days of political independence (SDSA Research Team 2008: 82-6). In that process, the initially founding parties had to transform themselves from “catch all” parties to vehicles of more specific group representation, complemented by a proliferation of new parties also representing specialized social and geographical constituencies (ibid., p. 87). While this transformation of party systems had promoted a “deepening” of participatory democracy (ibid., p. 91), the research team does note as negatives the charismatic and personalistic character of many parties, becoming vehicles for amassing (family) wealth and building patronage machines without internal democratic political deliberation and often attracting criminal elements. These developments, in turn, prevent parties from expanding the programmatic choice set among which voters can choose and/or credibly pursuing such choices in a trustworthy and competent fashion (ibid., p. 89). As a consequence, the substantive political exclusion of the worst off in society may persist (ibid. pp. 142-3) and many citizens have ultimately become cynical about the functioning of democracy in their country, consequently expressing low trust in political parties (ibid., pp. 89-91).

Building awareness of these problems is evidently a first step toward addressing them. But it takes a sophisticated analysis to come to prescriptive recipes as to what needs to happen in order to change the current state of affairs.

4. Conclusion

The case study has argued that India’s political parties have undertaken relatively little effort to feature programmatic competition. If anything, the parties that have done so to a greater extent than their competitors remain electorally isolated and even see their voter support erode from already modest levels. In some ways, this state of affairs is to be expected at India’s level of economic development. At the same time, the case study identified contingencies that are more variable and available for political intervention in the short or medium run than is a country’s level of affluence or economic growth rate. These contingent conditions may at some point create an opening for existing or new political parties to attract large electorates with programmatic appeals.
Most importantly, great economic performance over the past twenty years, and especially the most recent decade, has put the question of political reform and especially reform of the parties’ clientelistic conduct and parties’ recruitment of new elites on the backburner. A protracted economic crisis, however, may make it possible for determined political entrepreneurs to develop programmatic messages that resonate with sizeable shares of the electorate, and particularly the better-off urban voters in cutting-edge industries and sectors. A deep, sudden economic rupture that exposes the deficiencies of institutional governance structures remaining from an era of ISI development strategies followed by incremental replacement strategies put in operation over the past decades, or a lingering and protracted economic crisis due to worsening unemployment may provide the environment in which programmatic politicians may make a move.

In a variety of other regards, the tentative inferences from the India case study are not so much to identify great potentials to move India quickly toward a party system with programmatic political contestation, but to argue that certain conditions at least are unlikely to turn into major impediments and stumbling blocks subverting such a change, if the impulse and initiatives come from somewhere else:

- In this vein, India’s democratic institutions appear not to constitute a big problem. Even if conventional institutional theory were correct, a single-member district first-past-the-post electoral system for legislative assemblies with firm party control over the nominations process offers relatively few opportunities to personalize electoral contests and thus undermine programmatic party appeals. Also a parliamentary system of political rule should be conducive to programmatic contestation. What may become an issue is India’s far-reaching federalism that compartmentalizes and particularizes policy-making. But even here, cross-national evidence suggests that a number of highly federal systems have also produced programmatic party systems. Even in sophisticated multivariate statistical analysis, federalism does not emerge as a robust candidate cause to undercut programmatic politics.

- What may also not be an impediment to programmatic politics is India’s ethnocultural divisions, particularly those based on religious doctrine or religious caste. While ethnocultural divides overlapping with economic inequality may promote clientelism, there is no evidence that they undercut programmatic politics. This is also confirmed by a comparison among Indian parties and their ethnic constituency bases.

- What may or may not constitute an obstacle or an opportunity to the programmatic reorientation of partisan contests in India is the organization of political parties within and outside legislatures. There is simply too little known about these matters and desperately needed over-time data on these organizational attributes are by and large missing (but see now Chhibber et al. 2011). Nevertheless, comparison among parties within India, but also across a broad international set of parties, suggests at least a robust correlation between partisan organizational and legislative structures, on the one hand, and parties’ citizen linkage strategies, on the other. What we do not know, however, is whether politicians first choose political linkage strategies for other unrelated reasons (voter demand, political-economic institutions, structures of party competition, etc.) and
the look for complementary organizational forms that permit the pursuit of exogenously set linkage strategies in the most expedient and efficient manner, or whether organizational choices in fact can “lead” politicians’ linkage strategies. If the in my personal view unlikely event that the latter was indeed the case, then organizational engineering could be deployed to change India’s parties toward the pursuit of more programmatic appeals.

- Given the size and experience of India’s democracy, it is unlikely that outside forces in the international advising community or foreign governments and parties can gain much leverage in changing the operation of parties within India, at least not without the invitation of and agenda setting of strong domestic forces who then may use outside advisers more as tactical moves in a chess game with their domestic adversaries.

Let me nevertheless close on two cautionary notes. There may be one impediment to the reorientation of political parties toward programmatic competition, and that has to do with the interaction between the competitiveness of the Indian party system and levels of development. To echo the findings of the SDSA Research Team (2008), Indian party politics has brought in many previously de facto disenfranchised groups in a process of party system fragmentation. In so far as these fragments are “bundled,” however, in alternative electoral alliances and thus increase the competitiveness of Indian electoral contestation, parties will make greater efforts to turn out and capture the votes of previously immobile citizens. Insofar as these citizens are poor, however, this increased competitiveness is likely to fuel more clientelistic effort rather than programmatic politics. And this, indeed, is the sense of the India experts surveyed in the 2008 DALP study. The interaction of economic poverty and high competitiveness creates additional incentives for clientelism only (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007).

A second cautionary note has to do with the interface between party competition, political economy, and government apparatus. Low levels of economic development coincide with weak state capacities to develop and implement policies (“governance”), as well as to extract resources from the private economy that make it possible to fund policies. A great deal of research has examined without finality whether governance fuels economic development or the other way round. A fact of the matter, however, is that both are empirically highly associated. And a modicum of capacities for governance is needed for parties to project programmatic commitments in a credible fashion. Without raising the level of political governance—embodied in institutions such as professionalized and well-trained civil services, autonomous, predictable and efficient judiciaries, or agency capabilities to extract taxes efficiently—in the course of economic development, it may therefore be difficult to move to programmatic party contestation in a resilient fashion. Whatever the short-term and medium term opportunities might arise to make India’s parties seize on opportunities for programmatic competition, in the long haul economic development intertwined with dramatic improvements of political governance is indispensable for a resilient move of the party system toward programmatic “responsible partisan government.”
References


Table 1: Electoral Party Support in India  
(% of voters, Lok Sabha elections)

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<th>Year party established</th>
<th>1951</th>
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<th>1984</th>
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<tr>
<td>Indian National Congress (INC)</td>
<td>1885</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>34.52</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td>25.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (Tamil Nadu)</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td>1.76</td>
<td>2.42</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>1.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All India Trinamool Congress (West Bengal)</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>2.42</td>
<td>3.20</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Nationalist Congress Party (Maharashtra)</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>2.04</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) (prev. BJS)</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>7.74</td>
<td>25.59</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shiromani Akali Dal (Punjab/Sikh)</td>
<td>(1920s?)</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Shiv Sena (SHS) (Maharashtra)</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>1.55</td>
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<tr>
<td>Janata Dal (United)</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>JP 6.9</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>1.52</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>THIRD FRONT</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Communist Party of India</td>
<td>1925?</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI (M))</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.33</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) (mainly Uttar Pradesh)</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>6.17</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) (Tamil Nadu)</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.67</td>
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<tr>
<td>Telugu Desam Party (Andhra Pradesh)</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.51</td>
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<tr>
<td>Biju Janata Dal (Orissa)</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.59</td>
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<tr>
<td>Janata Dal (secular) (Karnataka and Kerala)</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>0.82</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>FOURTH FRONT</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samajwadi Party (Uttar Pradesh)</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>4.93</td>
<td>3.42</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rashtriya Janata Dal (Bihar)</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>2.78</td>
<td>1.27</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>National Parties</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(INC, BJP/BJS, CPI (M), CPI, BSP)</td>
<td>82.9</td>
<td>71.8 +</td>
<td>JP = 78.7</td>
<td>71.3</td>
<td>60.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2: Indian Party Supporters - Differentiation of Socio-Demographic Profiles?

(means of positions on diverse scales, standard deviations in parentheses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Alliance</th>
<th>AGE (years)</th>
<th>EDUCA-TION 1=low; 8=high</th>
<th>SOCIAL CLASS 1=high; 5=low</th>
<th>INCOME 1=low; 10=high</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNITED PROGRESSIVE ALLIANCE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indian National Congress (INC)</strong></td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>3.60</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>3.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist Congress Party</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>4.18</td>
<td>3.45</td>
<td>3.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All India Trinamool Congress</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>4.80</td>
<td>3.20</td>
<td>3.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>5.42</td>
<td>3.32</td>
<td>4.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)</strong></td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>4.12</td>
<td>3.20</td>
<td>4.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Janata Dal (United)</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>3.21</td>
<td>3.78</td>
<td>3.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shiv Sena (SHS)</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>1.78</td>
<td>4.72</td>
<td>1.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shiromani Akali Dal</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>4.75</td>
<td>2.79</td>
<td>5.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>THIRD FRONT</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI (M))</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>3.73</td>
<td>3.48</td>
<td>3.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Party of India</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>5.43</td>
<td>3.41</td>
<td>3.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bhujian Samaj Party (BSP)</strong></td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>3.24</td>
<td>4.22</td>
<td>2.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biju Janata Dal</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>3.46</td>
<td>3.32</td>
<td>3.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telugu Desam Party</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>3.61</td>
<td>2.57</td>
<td>4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>5.18</td>
<td>3.45</td>
<td>4.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Janata Dal (secular)</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>2.52</td>
<td>3.07</td>
<td>3.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FOURTH FRONT</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samajwadi Party</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>2.77</td>
<td>4.11</td>
<td>2.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rashtrija Janata Dal</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>3.89</td>
<td>3.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average partisan effort</strong></td>
<td>42.6 (3.3)</td>
<td>3.76 (1.11)</td>
<td>3.50 (0.53)</td>
<td>3.61 (.89)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 2005-7 WVS
Table 3: Indian Party Elites and Voters: Issue Positions and Ambiguities
(issue means and standard deviations of positions on 1-10 scales)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARTY ELITES</th>
<th>PARTISAN VOTERS</th>
<th>PARTY ELITES</th>
<th>PARTISAN VOTERS</th>
<th>PARTY ELITES</th>
<th>PARTISAN VOTERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spending on disadvantaged (D1)</td>
<td>National identity (D4)</td>
<td>Overall left-right (DW)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1=support; 10=oppose</td>
<td>1=diversity; 10=nationalism</td>
<td>1=left; 10=right</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**UNITED PROGRESSIVE ALLIANCE**

- **Indian National Congress (INC)**
  - 4.10 (2.92) 4.81 (3.79)
  - 3.23 (2.24) 6.09 (3.73)
  - 5.51 (2.02) 4.46 (3.01)

- **Nationalist Congress Party**
  - 4.90 (2.20) 4.29 (3.50)
  - 3.44 (2.19) Too few cases
  - 5.26 (1.55) 5.00 (0.00)

- **All India Trinamool Congress**
  - 2.56 (1.81) 4.60 (4.93)
  - 2.90 (1.60) Too few cases
  - 5.15 (1.91) 2.60 (2.19)

- **Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam**
  - 3.62 (2.81) 4.67 (3.51)
  - 2.38 (1.19) 5.73 (3.19)
  - 4.33 (1.88) 5.72 (3.19)

**NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE**

- **Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) (prev. BJS)**
  - 6.11 (2.39) 5.10 (3.72)
  - 8.60 (2.17) 5.75 (3.91)
  - 9.22 (1.11) 5.41 (3.11)

- **Janata Dal (United)**
  - 4.24 (2.39) 6.90 (3.54)
  - 2.96 (1.66) 5.7 (4.19)
  - 4.86 (1.52) 6.21 (2.52)

- **Shiv Sena (SHS)**
  - 5.09 (1.45) 2.92 (2.96)
  - 7.79 (2.91) Too few cases
  - 8.50 (1.34) 6.25 (2.31)

- **Shiromani Akali Dal**
  - 5.38 (1.99) 3.00 (2.34)
  - 3.42 (2.73) 4.61 (2.56)
  - 7.95 (1.65) 5.42 (1.44)

**THIRD FRONT**

- **Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI (M))**
  - 2.83 (2.76) 3.58 (3.25)
  - 2.44 (2.26) 6.99 (3.78)
  - 1.64 (1.54) 1.63 (1.75)

- **Communist Party of India**
  - 2.82 (2.69) 4.01 (3.50)
  - 2.46 (2.26) 7.64 (3.21)
  - 1.61 (1.04) 2.08 (1.66)

- **Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP)**
  - 2.77 (2.53) 3.12 (2.87)
  - 2.47 (1.69) 6.83 (3.32)
  - 4.18 (1.04) 4.31 (2.77)

- **Biju Janata Dal**
  - 4.17 (1.72) 7.52 (3.51)
  - 3.88 (1.81) 7.54 (2.40)
  - 5.46 (1.45) 5.93 (3.79)

- **Telugu Desam Party**
  - 3.71 (2.88) 3.98 (3.15)
  - 3.53 (2.70) 8.03 (1.59)
  - 5.35 (2.23) 4.33 (2.97)

- **Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam**
  - 3.67 (2.74) 6.66 (3.55)
  - 2.77 (1.96) 5.50 (3.93)
  - 5.40 (1.64) 4.39 (1.91)

- **Janata Dal (secular)**
  - 4.00 (2.30) 1.44 (1.15)
  - 2.22 (1.80) 7.21 (2.76)
  - 4.77 (2.09) 2.17 (2.46)

**FOURTH FRONT**

- **Samajwadi Party**
  - 3.50 (2.36) 4.56 (3.43)
  - 2.03 (1.35) 6.81 (3.51)
  - 4.07 (1.80) 3.82 (2.48)

- **Rashtriya Janata Dal**
  - 3.53 (2.27) 5.87 (3.93)
  - 2.69 (1.85) 5.41 (3.74)
  - 4.24 (1.29) 4.09 (2.05)

**Average partisan effort (means, standard deviations)**

- 3.94 (99) 4.53 (1.57)
- 3.48 (1.85) 6.42 (1.02)
- 5.14 (2.01) 4.30 (1.44)
- <3.45/green or >4.44/red
- <2.55/green or >6.93/red
- <4.13/green or >5.06/red
- <3.74/green or >6.15/red
- 5.91/green or >6.15/red
- 5.91/green or >6.15/red

**Correlation between elite and mass positions**

- +.01
- -.18
- +.70

Source: DALP and 2005-7 WVS
## Table 4: Clientelistic Effort of Indian Political Parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Gift and payment (B1)</th>
<th>Social policy benefits (B2)</th>
<th>Patronage jobs (B3)</th>
<th>Procurement contracts (B4)</th>
<th>Regulatory favors (B5)</th>
<th>Effectiveness of clientelistic targeting (B11)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNITED PROGRESSIVE ALLIANCE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian National Congress (INC)</td>
<td>3.39 (.68)</td>
<td>3.41 (.79)</td>
<td>3.16 (.94)</td>
<td>3.17 (1.04)</td>
<td>3.26 (.97)</td>
<td>3.23 (.70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist Congress Party</td>
<td>3.22 (.80)</td>
<td>3.32 (.75)</td>
<td>3.00 (.85)</td>
<td>2.97 (.95)</td>
<td>2.97 (.94)</td>
<td>2.95 (.61)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All India Trinamool Congress</td>
<td>3.57 (.53)</td>
<td>3.50 (.76)</td>
<td>3.00 (1.26)</td>
<td>3.00 (1.10)</td>
<td>2.50 (.84)</td>
<td>2.71 (.95)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam</td>
<td>3.71 (.59)</td>
<td>3.73 (.59)</td>
<td>3.80 (.56)</td>
<td>3.19 (1.11)</td>
<td>3.43 (.94)</td>
<td>3.53 (.62)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) (prev. BJS)</td>
<td>3.18 (.73)</td>
<td>3.30 (.79)</td>
<td>2.96 (.94)</td>
<td>3.00 (1.05)</td>
<td>3.18 (1.02)</td>
<td>3.13 (.69)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Janata Dal (United)</td>
<td>2.75 (.79)</td>
<td>3.29 (.78)</td>
<td>2.77 (.97)</td>
<td>2.74 (1.02)</td>
<td>2.67 (1.02)</td>
<td>2.77 (.69)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shiv Sena (SHS)</td>
<td>3.29 (.73)</td>
<td>3.71 (.61)</td>
<td>3.21 (.89)</td>
<td>2.92 (1.19)</td>
<td>3.07 (1.10)</td>
<td>3.19 (.75)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shiromani Akali Dal</td>
<td>3.11 (.83)</td>
<td>3.45 (.91)</td>
<td>3.00 (1.14)</td>
<td>2.80 (1.06)</td>
<td>2.76 (1.00)</td>
<td>3.38 (.79)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>THIRD FRONT</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI/M)</td>
<td>2.20 (1.21)</td>
<td>3.00 (1.10)</td>
<td>2.84 (1.15)</td>
<td>2.18 (1.11)</td>
<td>2.26 (1.07)</td>
<td>3.00 (.81)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Party of India</td>
<td>2.00 (1.16)</td>
<td>2.76 (1.15)</td>
<td>2.65 (1.16)</td>
<td>2.00 (1.04)</td>
<td>2.17 (1.09)</td>
<td>2.86 (.85)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP)</td>
<td>3.18 (.97)</td>
<td>3.72 (.65)</td>
<td>3.33 (1.00)</td>
<td>2.98 (1.10)</td>
<td>2.72 (1.27)</td>
<td>3.51 (.63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biju Janata Dal</td>
<td>3.50 (.53)</td>
<td>3.40 (.52)</td>
<td>3.38 (.52)</td>
<td>3.43 (.54)</td>
<td>3.00 (.58)</td>
<td>2.89 (.78)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telugu Desam Party</td>
<td>3.50 (.62)</td>
<td>3.82 (.53)</td>
<td>3.53 (.72)</td>
<td>3.06 (1.12)</td>
<td>3.07 (1.28)</td>
<td>3.47 (.61)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam</td>
<td>3.60 (.63)</td>
<td>3.79 (.58)</td>
<td>3.79 (.58)</td>
<td>3.29 (.99)</td>
<td>3.38 (.96)</td>
<td>3.53 (.64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Janata Dal (secular)</td>
<td>3.33 (.78)</td>
<td>3.62 (.77)</td>
<td>3.58 (.79)</td>
<td>3.15 (.99)</td>
<td>3.27 (1.19)</td>
<td>3.33 (.65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FOURTH FRONT</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samajwadi Party</td>
<td>3.12 (.95)</td>
<td>3.59 (.68)</td>
<td>3.02 (.90)</td>
<td>3.08 (1.02)</td>
<td>2.84 (0.99)</td>
<td>3.31 (.76)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rashtriya Janata Dal</td>
<td>3.28 (.78)</td>
<td>3.51 (.71)</td>
<td>3.18 (.85)</td>
<td>3.29 (.86)</td>
<td>2.86 (1.08)</td>
<td>3.24 (.76)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mean score of clientelistic effort (and s.d.)</td>
<td>3.17 (.46)</td>
<td>3.47 (.28)</td>
<td>3.19 (.34)</td>
<td>2.96 (.37)</td>
<td>2.91 (.37)</td>
<td>3.18 (.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean standard deviation of clientelistic effort (uncertainty of expert judgments)</td>
<td>.78 (.20)</td>
<td>.75 (.18)</td>
<td>.90 (.22)</td>
<td>1.02 (.14)</td>
<td>1.02 (.16)</td>
<td>.72 (.09)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: DALP*
Table 5: Electoral Strength and Linkage Mechanisms in Indian Parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fronts (vote 2009)</th>
<th>Party (vote 2009 %)</th>
<th>Programmatic? (CoSalPo_4)</th>
<th>Clientelistic? (B15)</th>
<th>Program or ideology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Progressive Alliance 37.2%</td>
<td>India National Congress 28.6</td>
<td>.189</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>National party, formally nationalist, secular, democratic and socialist; no distinct policies, no internal cohesion; historically upper + lower caste support, Muslims, but varies across states, but caste base very state-specific now</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All India Trinamool Congress 3.2</td>
<td>.120</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>“nationalistic, secular, democratic,” regional party; not deemed programmatic by an expert; is a Congress splinter;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam 1.8</td>
<td>.205</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>Another Congress offshoot, this for Tamil Nadu; little information available on programmatic appeal, appears to be mostly to deliver goods to the state; local vote buying, my sources refer to Tamil Nadu “as a generally non-programmatic state”; but some speculation they might not even be good at distributing local public goods;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist Congress Party 2.0</td>
<td>.163</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>Regional splinter of INC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Democratic Alliance 24.6%</td>
<td>Bharatiya Janata Party 18.8</td>
<td>.088</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>Founded in 1980 out of remnants of the old Janata Dal, the party has become the focal point of the opposition to INC. Often described as nationalist, positive secularist, and pragmatic, the party has an anti-Muslim edge ans wants to revoke the special status of the Muslim majority state Jammu&amp;Kashmir. Support base is more upper castes, but (a) varies by state and (b) tried to branch out. Party will NOT take strong policy positions against its upper caste base (switch to pro-liberalization stances in the 1990s). Party not interested in programmatic public service delivery valued by the poor majorities. Low internal elite cohesion, as only one current is on the Hindutva wing. As it grew, it became less programmatic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Janata Dal (United) 1.5</td>
<td>.163</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>Regional Janata Dal fragment, new since 1999; some sort of “recognizable caste base,” but nothing programmatic;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shiv Sena 1.6</td>
<td>.120</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>(1966) Regional party in Maharashtra, originally began as an anti-migrant party and has morphed into pro-Maharashtra and anti-Muslim</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shiromani Akali Dal 1.0</td>
<td>.155</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>(1920) regional party in Punjab, really Sikh religious party; If anything: liberal, secular, and religious (!) (self-description); support basis mainly in farmers, numerous splits;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Front 21.5%</td>
<td>Communist Party of India (M) 5.5</td>
<td>.220</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>(1964) Marxist-Leninist (Maoist) in name; claims base of workers, peasants; against internal and external privatization and liberalization; against closer alliance with US; high internal cohesion, ideological screening; very clientelistic in West Bengal, but less so in its other stronghold, Kerala (where it has a distinct caste base). This also translates into class differences. All this seems to be absent in Bengal. MORE GENERALLY: The truly “poor” have sided against the CPs in recent elections.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Party of India 1.4</td>
<td>.221</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>(1925) Similar to CPM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Name</td>
<td>Score</td>
<td>Effort</td>
<td>Socialism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP)</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>.162</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1984) Claim: social justice, social democratic; based on Dalits, backward classes, adivasis and minorities; had open caste-based rhetoric, but shed much of it; message now less distinct; unclear whether appeal to Scheduled Castes (&quot;untouchables&quot;) really has policy implications; very low internal cohesion; key base: Uttar Pradesh; SCs may vote because of message … or clientelism, or SC support THROUGH clientelism; Chandra is expert on BSP; Golden: BSP is party with the largest % of criminals among MPs; evidence that senior leadership auctions positions to highest bidders, and criminals often have the most money; clearly no need for this party to articulate policies…</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biju Janata Dal</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>.101</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Janata Dal offshoot (1977); self-description: secular, nationalist; electorate catch-all;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>.181</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Tamil Nadu party (1972); self-description: socialist, secular, nationalist; appeals to socially backward classes (not SC);</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telugu Desam Party</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>.172</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional party in Andhra Pradesh(1982); self description: secular, socialist; appeals to socially backward classes (not SC), middle classes, farmers and business groups (i.e. pretty catch-all except Scheduled Classes/CS);</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Janata Dal (S)</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>.114</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Janta Dal offshoot (1999); self-description: secular, socialist, pragmatic; farmers, workers, dalits, depressed classes (what’s that?);</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth Front 5.1%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samajwadi Party</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>.233</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-description: secular, socialist; Janata Dal offshoot (1992); farmers, backwards classes (not CS), workers, and minorities;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rashtriya Janta Dal</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>.182</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Janata Dal offshoot (1998); self-description: socialist, secular; support from backward classes (not CS), peasants, landless labourers;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source of clientelism and programmatic effort scores: DALP
Table 6: Organizational Investments of Indian Parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Name</th>
<th>Extensive local units (A1)</th>
<th>Mass organizations (A2)</th>
<th>Links to notables (A3)</th>
<th>Combined Index of Organizational Extensiveness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indian National Congress (INC)</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>3.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>3.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI/M)</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>4.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Party of India</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>1.66</td>
<td>4.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam</td>
<td>1.73</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>4.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telugu Desam Party</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>4.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam</td>
<td>1.79</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>4.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shiv Sena (SHS)</td>
<td>1.93</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>4.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP)</td>
<td>2.22</td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>5.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biju Janata Dal</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>5.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Janata Dal (secular)</td>
<td>2.27</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>5.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samajwadi Party</td>
<td>2.30</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>5.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist Congress Party</td>
<td>2.46</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td>2.03</td>
<td>6.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shiromani Akali Dal</td>
<td>2.53</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>6.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All India Trinamool Congress</td>
<td>2.55</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>5.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rashtriya Janata Dal</td>
<td>2.76</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td>2.16</td>
<td>6.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Janata Dal (United)</td>
<td>2.77</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>7.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Means and standard deviations</td>
<td>2.06 (.48)</td>
<td>1.36 (.21)</td>
<td>1.73 (.37)</td>
<td>5.16 (1.04)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DALP
Table 7: Leadership Centralization and Programmatic Politics

*Source: DALP*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Name</th>
<th>Charismatic Leadership Authority (E1)</th>
<th>Leaders’ control of nominations for legislative candidates (A5)</th>
<th>Leaders’ control of party strategy (A6)</th>
<th>Overall Programmatic Structure (CoSalPo_4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam</td>
<td>3.88</td>
<td>3.08</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>.182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shiv Sena (SHS)</td>
<td>3.80</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>3.67</td>
<td>.121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam</td>
<td>3.78</td>
<td>2.92</td>
<td>3.31</td>
<td>.206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP)</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>3.46</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>.160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telugu Desam Party</td>
<td>3.67</td>
<td>2.94</td>
<td>3.24</td>
<td>.172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian National Congress (INC)</td>
<td>3.57</td>
<td>2.59</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>.189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biju Janata Dal</td>
<td>3.47</td>
<td>3.14</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>.101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rashtrija Janata Dal</td>
<td>3.40</td>
<td>3.16</td>
<td>3.70</td>
<td>.182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samajwadi Party (SP)</td>
<td>3.32</td>
<td>3.39</td>
<td>3.71</td>
<td>.233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)</td>
<td>3.31</td>
<td>2.49</td>
<td>3.29</td>
<td>.088</td>
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<tr>
<td>All India Trinamool Congress</td>
<td>3.31</td>
<td>3.43</td>
<td>3.63</td>
<td>.120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shiromani Akali Dal</td>
<td>3.09</td>
<td>3.31</td>
<td>3.62</td>
<td>.155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist Congress Party</td>
<td>2.80</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>3.32</td>
<td>.160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Janata Dal (United)</td>
<td>2.57</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>3.40</td>
<td>.170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Janata Dal (secular)</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>3.23</td>
<td>.113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI/M)</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>2.45</td>
<td>2.95</td>
<td>.220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Party of India</td>
<td>1.49</td>
<td>2.52</td>
<td>2.90</td>
<td>.221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Means and standard deviations</td>
<td>3.13 (.73)</td>
<td>2.97 (.34)</td>
<td>3.40 (.25)</td>
<td>.164 (.044)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 8: Organizational Configurations in Indian Parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Extensiveness of Party Organization?</th>
<th>STRONG</th>
<th>WEAK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>STRONG 1.1.</td>
<td>STRONG 1.2.</td>
<td>MODERATE 2.1.</td>
<td>MODERATE 2.2.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MODERATE 1.1.</td>
<td>EXTREME 1.2.</td>
<td>MODERATE 2.1.</td>
<td>EXTREME 2.2.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>*BJP</th>
<th>*CPI</th>
<th>*CPI/M</th>
<th>*INC</th>
<th>*DMK</th>
<th>*TDP</th>
<th>*AIADMK</th>
<th>*SHS</th>
<th>*NCP</th>
<th>*JD(S)</th>
<th>*AITC</th>
<th>*SHIR</th>
<th>*JD(U)</th>
<th>*BSP</th>
<th>*BJD</th>
<th>*RJD</th>
<th>*SP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mass bureaucratic parties</th>
<th>Bureau- cratic and charismatic mass party</th>
<th>Centralized charismatic mass party</th>
<th>Regional special interest parties</th>
<th>Regional special interest parties</th>
<th>Centralized charismatic parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

1. Extensiveness of Party Organization
2. Internal Power Centralization
3. Use of Leadership Charisma
A Case Study of Parties’ Programmatic and Clientelistic Electoral Appeals in South Korea

Yi-ting Wang
Duke University
yw48@duke.edu
1. Introduction

Since the late 1980s, after 26 years of uninterrupted military dictatorship led by Park Chung-Hee and Chun Doo-Hwan, South Korea began the process of democratic transition. The transfer of executive power to the opposition party was achieved in 1997. In the past two decades, political competition was characterized by the dominance of regionalism and personalism. Voters were divided into clear regional blocs. In addition, due to the history of the Korean War, leftist ideology was long marginalized in the society. Under these conditions, it appears that South Korean parties are less likely to make programmatic effort. However, since the late 1990s, parties of the two main camps, the conservative and the progressive camps, began to develop divergent positions on economic issues and on issues about inter-Korean relations. The importance of clientelism has declined in the past ten years. After the retirement of the “three-Kims” in politics in the early 2000s, parties have relied less heavily on charismatic appeals of leaders to mobilize support. Compared to countries with similar levels of economic development and experience with democracy, parties in South Korea develop more pronounced policy positions.

Several factors contribute to this development. Faced with the Asian financial crisis in 1997-98 and the changing international political environment regarding the inter-Korean relationship, the incumbent progressive camp initiated the expansion of social welfare and policies aimed to push reconciliation with the North. Responding to these policies, politicians of the conservative camp were then urged to defend their anticommunism position and propose alternative ideas of economic governance. The more decentralized party organization after the retirement of the “three-Kims” and the more transparent party financing regulations reinforced parties’ changing accountability strategies by raising the costs of clientelism. In addition, a more party-oriented electoral system was introduced in 2004, under which parties’ images play a more important role in campaigns.
2. Descriptive Section

2.1 The Political Parties of South Korea

Since the democratic transition began in 1987, four regionally based political groups and their changing alignments had a dominant influence on Korean party politics. Kim Dae-Jung and Kim Young-Sam, the leaders of the anti-authoritarian movement, established their support bases in their home regions, Cholla and Gwangju (known as the Honam region, located in the southwest), and south Kyongsang and Pusan (known as the Youngnam region, located in the southeast), respectively. Kim Jong-Pil, a core member of the military regime, had a stronghold in Chungchong. Kim Dae-Jung, Kim Young-Sam, and Kim Jong-Pil are known as the “three Kims.” The remnants of the military incumbents, led by Chun Doo-Hwan (and his successor, Roh Tae-Woo), had their support base in north Kyongsang and Taegu.

To establish a legislative majority, parties led by President Roh Tae-Woo (Democratic Justice Party), Kim Young-Sam (Reunification Democratic Party), and Kim Jong-Pil (New Democratic Republican Party) merged in 1990 to form the Democratic Liberal Party (DLP) and effectively created a two party system (Kim 1997). DLP united the moderate wing of civilian activists and military bureaucrats and served as a grand conservative coalition (Kim BK 2008). Kim Dae-Jung’s Party for Peace and Democracy (PPD) was excluded from the alliance. PPD and its successor parties represented the forces of democracy in the process of regime transition. These two camps have governed South Korea over the past twenty years of the country’s democracy (the conservative camp in 1987-97 and after 2007, and the progressive camp in 1998-2007). With Roh term limited, Kim Young-Sam emerged as the presidential candidate of DLP and defeated Kim Dae-Jung in the 1992 presidential election. In the process that Kim Young-Sam tried to consolidate his personal power over the nomination for the party’s 1997 presidential candidate, Kim Jong-Pil deserted DLP to form the United Liberal Democrats (ULD) (Kim 2000b). ULD and Kim Dae-Jung’s National Congress for New Politics (NCNP) forged a coalition for the 1997 presidential election, and defeated Kim Young-Sam’s successor, Lee Hoi-Chang, who ran under the name of the New Korea Party (NKP), which was renamed from DLP.

The 2002 presidential election marked the end of the “three Kims” era. As the financial crisis deepening in 1997, the presidential candidate of the ruling party, Lee Hoi-Chang tried to distance himself from the incumbent government in which he had held several high positions. Lee renamed the New Korean Party as the GNP to symbolize his independence from the Kim
Young-Sam administration (Kang & Jaung 1999). Lee lost to Roh Moo-Hyun of the Millennium Democratic Party (MDP), renamed from NCNP. To consolidate legislative support, President Roh then formed the Uri Party from MDP. For the 2007 presidential election, Uri merged with some members of the Democratic Party and formed the United Democratic Party (UDP). Its candidate lost to GNP’s Lee Myung-bak. Lee Hoi-Chang, the founder and the presidential nominee for the 1997 and 2002 elections of GNP, created Liberty Forward Party (LFP) after losing the 2007 presidential election in which he ran as an independent candidate. LFP further merged with the People First Party, the successor of Kim Jong-Pil’s ULD, in 2008. UDP was renamed as the Democratic Party (DP) in 2008.

In addition to the two main camps, the conservative camp, including DLP and its successor parties, and the progressive camp, including Kim Dae-Jung’s PPD and its successor parties, there have been several smaller parties. In 1992, Chung Ju-Yung, the founder of Hyundai, formed the United National Party (UNP) to contest legislative and presidential elections. UNP won 17.4 percent of the votes and was ranked as the third largest party in the National Assembly. However, after losing the 1992 presidential election and being accused of illegally transferring campaign funds, Chung Ju-Yung announced to leave politics. The remaining UNP legislators merged with Kim Jong-Pil’s ULD. The Democratic Labor Party (KDLP), which was formed in 2000 and received organizational support from the Korean Confederation of Trade Union, won 10 among the total 299 seats and was ranked as the third largest party in the 2004 legislative election. Until the 2004 reform of electoral system, individual non-partisan candidates received around 10 percent of the votes. Figure 1 shows the vote share of the main parties in legislative elections, and their splits and mergers since democratic transition.

Figure 1 about here

2.2. Programmatic Partisan Effort

Democratic-authoritarian cleavages, which had dominated Korean politics for a long period of time (Heo & Stockton 2005, Kim 1989), began losing power after regime transition and the formation of DLP as an alliance between former authoritarian leaders and democratic dissidents (Kim 2000b). Except for different attitudes toward the military regime, the four main political groups emerged on the eve of democratic transition did not have substantial ideological differences (Kang 2010). Political competition was largely based on regionalism and personal charisma of political leaders. Parties were more dependent on their leaders than on policy
platforms or formal organization. Parties were generally created by politicians in preparation for national elections, and were institutionally transient (Steinberg & Shin 2006). There was no substantial ideological difference among the key political elites in the 1990s (Kang 2010, Kim, Choi & Cho 2008, Steinberg & Shin 2006). Reflecting Korea's history in the war with the North and the regulations that prohibited labor unions from engaging in political activity and supporting candidates for elections (Steinberg & Shin 2006), there have not been leftist parties until 2000 (Kim, Choi & Cho 2008, Kim 2010).

As Kim Byung-Kook (2008) has pointed out, the conservative camp, DLP and its successor parties, roughly shares a common ground on two issue dimensions: one is maintaining alliance with the United States or having reconciliation with North Korea as alternative foreign policy objectives, and the other is growth or redistribution as different macroeconomic goals. On these two issue dimensions, the conservative camp advocates a robust alliance with the U.S. and a “trickle-down” strategy of economic growth. This position reflects its anticommunism ideology, which has its origin in the nation-building periods (Kang 2010). However, Kim Byung-Kook (2008) has also argued that except for anticommunism and the emphasis on economic growth and technocracy, the “conservative” camp did not develop distinct and cohesive conservative policies. For example, while supporting the program of economic deregulation, the conservative camp also advocated policies of developmental state and maintained the network of control over capital and labor. Valence appeals, such as the capacity of bringing political stability, economic growth, and clean politics, played an important role in their campaigns. In the 1992 presidential election, Kim Young-Sam portrayed himself as a reformist who would bring clean politics to South Korea. Kim Dae-Jung, the opponent of the conservative camp in the entire 1990s, was criticized as a radical leftist who would harm political stability (Kang & Jaung 1999). Even in the 1997 presidential election, the election under the shadow of financial crisis, parties did not provide distinct policy platforms on economic issues, nor did policies play a central role in the election (Kim 2000a).

Programmatic appeals have gradually gained importance, and parties began to provide distinguishable policy platforms after 1997 when the conservative camp lost power for the first time. In the 1990s, perception of North Korean threat has diminished as the country faced economic hardship. Moscow and Beijing recognized Seoul in 1990 and 1991 respectively. All these questioned South Korea’s Cold War consensus of anticommunism (Kim BK 2008). Following the 1997 election, president Kim Dae-Jung instituted the “Sunshine Policy” of engagement with North Korea, which included encouraging interaction and economic assistance. Since the policy fostered little positive reciprocation from Pyongyang, there was popular disillusionment with the degree of support to the North (Steinberg & Shin 2006). Parties’ different stances on this issue became salient in the 2002 presidential election campaigns. Lee
Hoi-Chang, the GNP candidate, advocated to provide conditional assistance to North Korea and use more forceful means to discourage its nuclear program. Related to the peninsula relations, issues about the U.S. troops and the future of the ROK-U.S. alliance also became crucial in campaigns (Lee 2003). GNP was more strongly in favor of the traditionally close relationship with the U.S. (Walker & Kang 2004).

The conservative camp has also developed distinct position on economic issues. In response to the expansion of social welfare and policies aimed to reduce chaebol’s dominance of the economy under NCNP’s Kim Dae-Jung and MDP/Uri’s Roh Moo-Hyun administrations, GNP proposed more market-oriented and pro-business policies in campaigns (Kwon 2008). In the 2007 presidential election, Lee Myung-Bak, the GNP candidate, regarded Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun as leftist and “pro-North” presidents, and labeled the decade ruled by them as a “lost decade of diminished economic growth (Doucette 2010).” Lee promised to bring economic growth, cut tax, trim public spending, and ease regulations on chaebol that introduced by the Roh administration (Hahm 2008, Kwon 2010).

The progressive camp, Kim Dae-Jung’s PPD and its successor parties, also did not provide specific policy platforms until the late 1990s. In the 1992 presidential election, Kim Dae-Jung promised to form a neutral, “pan-national” cabinet, which would include members of the Roh Tae-Woo administration (Lee 1993). In the 1997 presidential election, Kim Dae-Jung allied himself with Kim Jong-Pil by promising to change the government to a parliamentary system and nominate Kim Jong-Pil as the prime minister, to attract votes from Chungchong and moderate his image of being leftist and soft to Pyongyang. As Song (2003) has argued, though with a long record of speaking for the lower classes and industrial workers, Kim Dae-Jung did not campaign as a candidate of the left in 1997, because the forces of anti-left ideology were still strong with the memory of the Korean War. After winning the presidency, Kim initiated the “Sunshine Policy” that pushed reconciliation and cooperation with the North. The implementation of the policy included increasing political contact between the two sides, encouraging North-South cooperative business programs, and continuing to supply the North with humanitarian assistance. The Sunshine Policy became the defining policy of Kim’s administration and one that Roh Moo-Hyun, the MDP presidential candidate for the 2002 election, declared to follow (Hermanns 2009, Kim, Choi & Cho 2008, Steinberg & Shin 2006).

Kim Dae-Jung administration implemented the International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditionalities for financial rescue. The IMF neo-liberal reform package, including introducing foreign competition to the financial sector, establishing supervisory agencies that targeted the governance of the chaebol, and increasing labor market flexibility, was aimed to wrest control of
the national economy back from the *chaebol* (Hundt 2005). As labor markets became more flexible, the unemployment rate and income inequality, as well as the number of non-regular and temporary workers rapidly increased (Kim 2010, Kwon 2008). The issue of unemployment became especially salient (Kim 2010). To address the problem of economic insecurity felt by voters, Kim administration carried out social welfare reform. Along with a significant increase in social expenditure, the coverage of national social insurance programs, such as pensions, unemployment benefits, and health insurance was largely expanded. The efforts to expand social welfare were made by the Roh Moo-Hyun administration as well (Song 2003, Park 2011). As Kim Byung-Kook (2008) has pointed out, Roh’s rhetoric was more radical than Kim Dae-Jung on both the economic and North-South issues. In the 2002 presidential election, Roh committed to improve distributive justice through tax reform and an expansion of social protection programs for workers. Roh also promised to reduce the *chaebol*’s dominance of the economy.

In the past decade, the two main camps have developed divergent positions on inter Korean relations and socioeconomic issues. The conservative camp supports to maintain a robust alliance with the U.S. and advocates pro-market policies; while the progressive camp is in favor of reconciliation with the North and the expansion of social welfare and the reduction of income inequality. The emergence of KDLP, which was organized in 2000 to represent the working class, also further expanded the ideological spectrum of Korean politics (Steinberg & Shin 2006). Data from the Democratic Accountability and Linkage Project (DALP) also shows divergent positions of the main parties. As table 1 shows, experts consistently rate DP as more left than GNP on the left-right scale and on three socioeconomic issues, such as social spending to reduce income inequality, government responsibility in regulating economic activity, and welfare provision. The difference between the two parties’ positions on state role in governing the economic is less significant, which might reflect the history of developmental state policies enacted by the GNP/conservative camp. On a scale where 1 represents parties active in developing relationship with the North, and 10 represents parties passive in developing relationship with the North and supporting an alliance with the U.S. and Japan, the two parties are also scored as polarized. The positions of Lee Hoi-Chang’s LFP is rated as fairly close to those of GNP. Score of the aggregated indicator of parties’ programmatic effort, *CoSalPo_4* and *CoSalPo_3econ*, also suggest that GNP and DP both make substantial programmatic effort. The smaller and newly created LFP has not developed policy positions significantly divergent from those of GNP.

Table 1 about here
2.3. Programmatic Responsiveness of Voters

Public opinion survey in late 1980s and 1990s (Kim 1989, Steinberg & Shin 2006) indicated that Korean citizens voted mainly because of the leaders and the leaders’ places of origin rather than parties’ ideologies and policy platforms. Until the 2000s, the indicator of voters’ places of birth was the single most important factors affecting party support. Ideological differences across regions did not significantly explain variation in voting patterns (Kang 2010). Other variables such as age, gender, education, and occupational categories did not have significantly discernible effects (Kang 2010, Kim, Choi & Cho 2008, Kwon 2008). Table 2, which shows the percentage of National Assembly seats obtained by the main parties since the 1992 election, clearly exemplifies the importance of regionalism for electoral support. Based on Jones and Mainwaring’s (2003) measure of party nationalization, the nationalization scores of parties of the progressive camp have increased from around 0.38 in the 1990s to 0.74 and 0.62 in the 2004 and 2008 elections, respectively. Parties of the conservative camp have higher nationalization scores in the 1990s. Their party nationalization scores have decreased from around 0.75 in the 1990s to 0.5 in elections in the 2000s.

Since the 2000s, a new cleavage of generational differences appeared (Kang 2010, Kim BK 2008, Kim, Choi & Cho 2008, Kim HN 2000, Kim 2003). While the older, so-called 6-25 (the Korean War), generation were more suspicious of Pyongyang’s intention and tended to support GNP; Roh Moo-Hyun’s image as a reformist attracted the younger generation. In addition, Kim et al (2008) have found that the impacts of regionalism, though still significant, appeared to decline, while the influence of ideology on party support grew in the 2002 and 2004 elections. Class background and occupational categories generally did not have significant effects on electoral support in the 1990s. Based on the survey data collected in 2000 and 2004, Kim (2010) has found that compared to professionals and managers, respondents identified as self-employed and working class were less likely to support GNP.

Consistent with parties’ changing accountability strategies, research has found supporters of the main parties had significantly different policy positions since the 2000s. A survey conducted in 2000 has shown that voters perceived the main parties’ ideological positions
located on a very congested center-right space; while in 2004, respondents consistently ranked parties as clearly being on the left or right (Jou 2010). Based on survey data collected in 2004, Koo (2010) has found respondents’ self-placement on the left-right scale and an aggregated index based on respondents’ attitudes toward issues of relationships with North Korea and the U.S., growth versus redistribution, and industrial strike significantly explained variation in electoral support between GNP and Uri. Also using the data of 2002 legislative election, Moon (2005) has explained that regional voting became less prominent as the differences between the candidates’ ideological positions were more salient. Based on a survey conducted in 2007, table 3 shows party supporters’ attitudes toward two issues on which parties have divergent positions. The bivariate analysis suggests that supporters of different parties had significantly different attitudes toward the issue of inter Korean relations; but for the social welfare issue, the differences, though in the expected direction, are not statistically significant. Similar patterns are also showed in table 4, based on the World Value Survey 2005-07 data. GNP supporters perceived themselves as more right-wing, while UDL and KDLP voters identified themselves as relatively more left-wing. However, on the specific economic issues, party supporters’ mean positions are less different from each other. These two tables seem to suggest that since parties’ programmatic transformation was relatively recent development, the electorate has fallen behind in programmatic crystallization, compared to political elites.

Table 3 about here

Table 4 about here

2.4. Clientelistic Partisan Effort

Korea has a relatively homogeneous population, sharing language, ethnicity and historical tradition (Kim, Choi & Cho 2008). Until the late 1990s, party competition was largely based on regional divides and the persona of party leaders. The dominant conflicting regional line, the cleavage between the Honam and the Youngnam regions, originated from the southeasterner-led military regime, when the investment for industrialization was largely concentrated in the Youngnam region (Park BG 2003). Before democratic transition, both leaders of the anti-authoritarian movement had strong regional bases, and in the founding election of 1987, voters were already mobilized along regional lines. Voters were receptive to appeals for supporting
politicians who share with them a common geographical identification. Politicians were perceived as the “favorite sons” of regional voters, and were expected to be their protectors against other regions (Kang 2010).

Under the military regime, clientelistic exchanges were mainly between the state and business groups. Utilizing the control over investment resources, public enterprises, and regulations, the state deliver financial incentives to business groups in exchange of their support (Park 2006). These exchanges remained after democratization. In addition, clientelistic networks based on the sentiments of regional solidarity and primary ties, centered on political elites, among whom the most influential were the “three Kims,” were also constructed after regime transition (Park 2008). As research (Chon 1999, Kwon 2005, Park 2006) has indicated, politicians utilized primary group ties to build up local connections to deliver goods and mobilize support. The processes were not institutionalized at the party level, but remained informal and personalized transactions. Due to the strong presidential system and the under-institutionalized party system, clientelistic networks were centered on presidents and were likely to disintegrate once a president had completed his tenure.

As Chon’s (1999) research has pointed out, clientelistic exchange especially prevailed until 1992, as local elections had not been initiated and the implementation of party financing regulations was not strict. Local officials served as the agents of the ruling DLP to collect information about whom to contact and to bribe. Responding to a series of corruption scandals involving DLP politicians, regulations governing elections were more strictly enforced than in the past, and thus clientelistic exchange was reduced in the 1997 presidential election. Another factor contributing to the decline of clientelism is the eroding influence of the “three-Kims” since the early 2000s (Park 2006). Their successors of presidency, Roh Moo-hyun and Lee Ming-bak, were considered as outsiders, who were less embedded in the clientelistic networks centered on the “three-Kims” (Hellmann 2011).

Though clientelistic exchange targeting individual voters and corporates has been in decline since the late 1990s, the distribution of large-scale club goods targeting specific regions in exchange of support still prevails. Using subsidies distributed by the central government to each province as the indicator, Kwon (2005) has found the incumbent was more likely to allocate funds to the “swing” provinces in which elections were competitive and no parties had a stronghold. In a party’s home region, the promise of targeted spending was also framed as to reduce regional discrimination or to rescue one’s regional corporates. As Moon’s (2005) research has found, politicians’ typical strategy is appealing to regional benefits they claim to provide and regional costs incurred by the party or a rival region.
Data from DALP shown in table 5 suggests that DP and LFP slightly less rely on clientelism than GNP. The clientelistic effort of these parties is roughly around the global average, but is not very effective in mobilizing support. The importance of clientelistic appeals has decreased in the past ten years. Among the five types of material goods, all three parties especially rely on the provision of preferential access to social programs and favorable regulatory decisions, and less rely on the distribution of individual level consumer goods to mobilize votes. The differences in clientelistic effort between GNP and DP are most pronounced in the provision of procurement contracts and favorable regulatory decisions, which reflect GNP’s closer relationship with the chaebol. Compared to the global average, the newly formed LFP substantially relies on the charismatic appeals of its leader to attract votes.

Table 5 about here

2.5. Party Organization and Party Finance in South Korea

This section will describe several aspects of parties’ organization, including whether parties maintain formal and informal local branches, whether parties’ nomination and decision-making procedures are centralized, and what parties’ financial sources are.

The level of organizational complexity of Korean parties is low. Parties are not significantly different with each other in terms of organizational structure (Lee & Glasure 1995). Since the formation of DLP and DP, parties of both camps worked on organizing their local branches. Park (2010) has found that the central party leadership of the conservative camp had more control over the personnel of local branches than the leadership of the progressive camp. Parties of the progressive camp tended to rely on recruiting outsiders with higher winning potential to organize their local branches. Despite being organized in different ways, the local branches of both camps similarly did not play substantial roles in setting campaign strategy and raising funds. The local party branches are usually little more than personal support organizations for district representatives, staffed by their friends and relatives. (Chon 1999, Jaung 2000, Kim BK 2008). As Nemoto (2009) has pointed out, parties of these two camps do
not have strong party activists to mediate between the voter and the representatives, and individual candidates tend to rely on their personal networks to cultivate votes. This tendency has been strengthened since 2004, when party local branches were outlawed to prevent corruption. Parties are still allowed to have party councils at provincial and municipality levels, and most politicians use them as local branches as in the past (Hermanns 2009, Nemoto 2009). Since then, politicians more heavily rely on informal organizations, such as personal networks, alumni groups, kinship organizations (Chon 1999), and various leisure clubs (Nemoto 2009) to mobilize votes. Politicians spend great amount of resources in maintaining these informal organizations, although electoral regulations prohibit candidates from launching personal organizations for electoral purposes (Nemoto 2009). Since these informal organizations only serve for specific politicians, they tend to lack organizational continuity.

Party leaders and their close aides of both camps have dominant influence in setting campaign strategy, raising and distributing campaign funds, and nominating party candidates for offices (Chon 1999, Heo & Stockton 2005, Jaung 2000, Kim BK 2008, Shin et al. 2005), especially in the “three-Kims” era (Kang 2010). The strong centralization of power in the hands of party leaders encouraged the development of clientelistic networks around presidents or presidential candidates (Park 2008). The tightly knit relationship between the executive and the chaebol provided politicians with financial resources for campaigns (Chon 1999, Kang 2002). However, these channels were not institutionalized but remained informal and personalized transactions. As a president had completed his tenure, the transaction networks developed around him disintegrated (Chon 1999, Park 2008). Party members do not have substantial rights and obligations toward the parties. They are not required to attend regular party meetings or pay regular membership dues (Hellmann 2011).

Party leaders’ dominance over nomination procedures was changed in the 2000s. There is no institutionalized rule in Korean parties stating how to select presidential candidates. Before 2002, when there were several potential candidates in a party, the party nominees were usually chosen by National Assembly members and local party chapter chairs (Nemoto 2009). When Kim Dae-Jung announced his retirement from politics and left a power vacuum in the progressive camp in 2002, various factions within MDP agreed to implement a more inclusive nomination process that combined a closed and an open primary (Hellmann 2011). Similar method was also adopted to select UDP’s presidential candidate for the 2007 election. GNP also initiated a nomination procedure that combined party member votes and public opinion poll for the 2007 presidential election. Beginning from the 2004 legislative election, both GNP and Uri introduced primaries to choose their National Assembly candidates in some districts (Jaung 2005). However, as Nemoto (2009) has argued, it did not substantially lead to the decentralization and democratization of party organization, since both parties held primaries in
only less than a quarter of the districts. In addition, the primaries were rarely open to general voters. In some cases, primary voters were selected by primary candidates themselves.

Since democratic transition, the amounts of government subsidies provided to parties have steadily grown (Kim & Kim 2003, Kwak 2003). Parties have at least 20 seats in the National Assembly are entitled to share 50/100 of total government subsidies equally among themselves, parties with 5-19 seats are each subsidized with 5/100, and those with less than 5 seats are each given 2/100 of the total subsidies. Laws regulating donations to parties were largely modified in 1997, which specify that individuals and corporates are not allowed to directly make contributions to parties. Those who make donations must trust their contribution to the National Election Commission (NEC) first, and the NEC will deliver contribution to the specific parties. Individual donations cannot exceed 10 million KRW (8,660 USD) or 5% of personal income; while donations from each corporate are limited to 50 million KRW (43,300 USD) or 2% of its total income. A party member can contribute unlimited amount of membership fees. Almost all contributions to individual candidates have to go through their parties (Kim & Kim 2003, Shin et al. 2005).

Before the 1997 reform, the ruling conservative camp received large amounts of contributions from the chaebol; while the most stable source of funding for the opposition progressive camp came from the candidate nomination practice (Chon 1999). As Chon (1999) has indicated, nominees for the PR list of National Assembly were usually ranked in accordance with the amount of money they contributed to the party. Under the reformed party finance regulations, there has been a more equitable distribution of funds between the ruling and the main opposition parties (Chon 1999, Kwak 2003), and the transparency of political party funding has been significantly improved (Kim & Kim 2003). In addition, after a series of corruption scandals, regulations governing party finance have been more strictly enforced, reducing the direct contributions from chaebol (Chon 1999). The NEC data between 1996 and 2000 shows that the presidents’ parties received more contributions from corporates than opposition parties (Kim & Kim 2003). The 2000 NEC data shows that donations accounted for 53% of the ruling NCNP’s total earnings, but accounted for only 13% of GNP’s total income. Government subsidies amounted to 25% of NCNP’s and 61% of GNP’s total earnings. In 2000, the ruling NCNP earned nearly twice of GNP’s total income (Kim Y 2008). As Kim & Kim (2003) have pointed out, the regulation that a party member can donate unlimited amount of membership dues still causes intransparency of party finance, since usually membership dues are actually paid by politicians.

Table 6 shows the DALP indicators of several aspects of party organization. As described
above, GNP and DP are similar in many aspects: they maintain offices at the municipal level; the powers over nomination are centralized in the hands of party leaders; and they are adherent to financial regulations. GNP more heavily relies on informal local networks than DP. The organization of the newly created LFP is rated as less extensive, less centralized in setting party electoral strategies, and less adherent to financial regulations.

Table 6 about here

2.6. Legislative Organization of Party Caucuses

Park (2000) has argued the strong exercise of party discipline is the norm of legislative process in Korea. Nemoto has pointed out that to maintain party discipline, party leaders utilized several tools, including the distribution of perks, cabinet positions, and posts in public corporations, and their control over candidate nomination. As a result, his analysis of roll call votes of two National Assembly terms (2000-2004 and 2004-2008) shows that a legislator who was elected from his/her party’s stronghold or from the presidents’ parties (MDP/Uri before 2008 and GNP in 2008) is less likely to defect from his/her party. In terms of policy positions reflected in members’ roll call votes, Nemoto has found the two-dimensional ideal positions of legislators of the two camps (GNP and Uri/UDP) were especially cohesive in the 17th (2004-2008) and the 18th (2008-) National Assembly. The LFP members’ positions were much more diverse.

It has been pointed out that the National Assembly of Korea remains an immature policy making institution due to the limited policy expertise, legislators’ lack of experience, and the under-resources committees (Park 2000, Park CW 2003). In responding to the 1997 financial crisis, reforms in budget system laws initiated since 2002 have substantially enhanced the legislature’s capacity of budget review (Lienert & Jung 2004). The committees control their own agenda, and have the powers to block and initiate bills before floor debate. Committee seats are distributed in proportion to seat shares of parties, and party leaders determine the seat distribution within the party considering members’ preferences. It has been indicated that due to the amateurism of legislators, party leaders have the exclusive powers over committee assignments and decision making (Nemoto 2007, Park 2000). As Nemoto (2007) has found based on data between 1989 and 2007, committee assignments reflect party leaders’ incentives to maximize parties’ seat shares: electorally vulnerable and less experienced members are more
likely to assume posts in committees conducive to pork-barrel benefits, while senior legislators are more likely to sit in high-profile public policy committees. Whether the members belong to presidents’ parties does not affect this tendency.

2.7. Executive Participation and Governmental Coalition

Under South Korea’s presidential system, the president and the assembly both are independently directly elected. The president is elected for a single five-year term, and the National Assembly members are elected for a four-year term. Therefore, most of the presidential and legislative elections are not concurrent.

In the second half of the 13th (1990-1992), the 17th (2004-2008), and the 18th (2008-) National Assembly, the presidents’ parties, DLP, Uri, and GNP, respectively, held a legislative majority. During 1992 and 2004 when the presidents’ parties failed to gain the legislative majority, the presidents built working majorities by drawing unaffiliated and opposition members. These working majorities were not stable, and sometime were not formed based on ideological affinity, but on personal connections (Kim & Kim 2003, Park 2000).

3. Analytical Section

3.1. Development

South Korea enjoyed economic growth rates averaging approximately 8% per year between 1961 and 1996. As figure 2 shows, economic growth rates dropped considerably during the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998. Unemployment rates also rapidly increased since the crisis and consequent IMF bailout. In the 2000s, the overall economic performance has largely improved and stabilized. Per capita GDP has reached USD 21,633 (current prices) in 2007.
The Korean model of economic development favored large-scale chaebol. Labor’s demands were largely suppressed and excluded from the developmental state formula (Lee 2007). The repressive economic system resulted in labor militancy, and labor rights became one of the demands of the anti-authoritarian movement. After democratization, unions were still prohibited from engaging in political activity or supporting candidates in elections. These regulations were abolished in 1996 as Korea joined OECD and had to meet the labor requirements of the organization (Hermanns 2009, Steinberg & Shin 2006). In addition, due to the history of obtaining no support from parties under the military regime, labor movements were also reluctant to establish alliances with parties (Lee 2007, Park BG 2003). It has been indicated that the political underrepresentation of working class was conducive to the lack of ideological differentiation between parties until the 2000s (Kim 2010, Nemoto 2009, Park BG 2003, Steinberg & Shin 2006).

3.2. Political Economy

Under the developmental state framework implemented by the military regime, business and political elites exchanged bribes for political favors. Democratic transition weakened the state’s position in the exchange. As Kang (2002) has argued, as more politicians competing on providing political favors, the state was less able to resist or contain the demands of the business sector. In addition, Korea’s legal and corporate regulations remained underdeveloped in the 1990s, and thus fewer limits were placed on the behavior of the chaebol. Chon (1999) has pointed out these state-business exchanges were largely responsible for the 1997-1998 financial crisis. Government subsidized financing enabled the chaebol to take on high-risk projects, and the Korean economy, dominated by chaebol, started to collapse under the burden of huge debts in high-risk loans and investments.

Since the crisis and the consequent IMF bailout, IMF-recommended neoliberal reform package was implemented. The unemployment rate and income inequality, as well as the number
of non-regular and temporary workers rapidly increased (Kim 2010, Kwon 2008). To address these problems, Kim Dae-Jung administration largely expanded the social welfare system. Under this condition, the issue of unemployment became especially salient (Kim 2010) and the criticism of the anti-union chaebol was widespread (Steinberg & Shin 2006). Kwon (2008) has found responding to the increased salience of unemployment, voters became more likely to vote for the leftist candidates. In addition, the effects of unemployment salience on tendency of supporting leftist candidates are especially strong among low income voters.

Due to the Korean War and South Korea’s role in the subsequent Cold War, the leftist ideology had been marginalized in South Korea previously (Kim, Choi & Cho 2008, Kim 2010, Steinberg & Shin 2006). The crisis and the increased salience of unemployment and inequality made Kim’s “leftist” seem to be more acceptable. As Hahm (2008) has argued since the reforms did not result in the country turning communist, they have been accepted as legitimate alternative policies rather than a subversive ideology. As Roh Moo-hyun committed to further follow these policies, a recognizably left-wing platform was articulated. On the other hand, the leftist policies also raised the concern of business groups and chaebol leaders. As Chang (2008) has indicated, business groups united in defending market freedom and their role in economic growth by hosting seminars and publishing articles to inform the government and the public. Then a rightist position on economic governance, which was later adopted by GNP (Chang 2008), was more clearly illustrated.

3.3. Institutions and Linkage Strategies

Freer and fairer elections have mixed effects on parties’ clientelistic effort. More competitive elections initially increased politicians’ incentives to rely on clientelistic appeals, but also increased the costs of clientelistic strategies. As Stockton (1998) has found, during 1981-1995, the executive delivered the highest amount of targeted club goods in the form of sub-national subsidies to swing regions and their stronghold and swing regions in the post-transition period, 1992-1995. However, as Chon (1999) has pointed out, the establishment of local level elections in 1991 eliminated the ruling party’s local agents, who had helped the ruling party collect information about whom to contact and to bribe. In addition, the freer media environment was conducive to the disclosure of a series of corruption scandals, which then led to the stricter implementation of electoral regulations.
Before 2004, among the 299 National Assembly seats, 224 were filled through the FPTP system in single member districts, and the remaining was allocated in proportion to the share of the district seats won by each party. Since the 2004 legislative election, 243 seats are elected under the FPTP system in single member districts, and the rest are elected under the nationwide PR system separately. Voters can cast two votes, one for individual candidates and the other for parties. It has been argued that the emergence of KDLP, which does not have any regional base and makes substantial programmatic effort in representing the working class, was benefited from the change of electoral system (Lee 2007, Steinberg & Shin 2006). However, although increasing the importance of party label relative to regional and personal factors in elections, it is not very clear the extent to which the change of electoral system affect the two largest parties’ programmatic effort. Policy debate about inter Korean relations and social welfare provision has already emerged in the late 1990s. In addition, the electoral reform was initiated by Uri, the party initially formed of loyalists to president Roh Moo-hyun, who had stronger programmatic commitments (Hellmann 2011). It is also likely that parties’ changing accountability strategies led to their preferable electoral reforms.

3.4. Party Organization

Korean parties still lack local party activists. Individual candidates extensively use personal organization to mobilize support. As the “three-Kims” retired from politics in the early 2000s and left power vacuums in their respective parties, both GNP and DP began to institutionalize more decentralized candidate nomination procedures. Party finance has come to be more transparent, as the regulations became more comprehensive and the implementation of them became stricter since the late 1990s.

As research has indicated, Korean politicians’ clientelistic networks were not institutionalized at the party level, but remained informal and personalized transactions. As a president has completed his tenure, the transaction networks developed around him disintegrate (Chon 1999, Park 2008). The retirement of the “three-Kims” and the decentralization of party organization could thus partly explain the decreasing importance of clientelistic strategies. As Hellmann (2011) has argued, the more decentralized presidential candidate nomination process
benefited the more programmatic factions, those backed Roh Moo-hyun and Lee Myung-bak, within both parties. Roh and Lee were less embedded into the traditional clientelistic networks and less supported by party cadres.

3.5. Changing Patterns of Party Competition

Parties’ accountability strategies affect each other’s choices of strategies. As Chang (2008) has pointed out, responding to Kim Dae-jung’s Sunshine Policy and the expansion of social welfare, GNP was urged to defend their position of preserving national security and anticommunism, and propose alternative economic policies.

At the national level, electoral competition was especially fierce during 1997-2007. It is also the period when the largest two parties began to provide distinct policy platforms. In the 2007 and 2008 elections, the competitiveness was relatively lower. However, the importance of programmatic appeals was not in decline. Competitiveness may also increase parties’ incentives of relying on targeted goods distribution. At the regional level, Kwon’s (2005) research based on data of 1988-97 has shown, the government was more likely to allocate subsidies to regions where elections were more competitive.

3.6. Civil Society

Chang (2008) has indicated that responding to Kim Dae-jung’s economic policies, business groups and chaebol leaders united to carry out campaigns to inform citizens and the government of the virtues of market economy. These positions were later adopted by GNP, and were clearly articulated in Lee Ming-bak’s campaigns. As data from DALP shows, more than eighty-five percent of the experts thought GNP has explicit linkages to business associations, while only thirty-six percent of them thought UDP maintains such linkages. However, it is not very clear the
extent to which the activity of the business groups affected GNP’s choice of policy platforms.

Lee’s (2007) research has found due to the under-institutionalized party system and the developmental state policies that excluded labor from decision-making, Korean labor unions confronted the government directly and did not build relationships with established parties. Labor union established its own party, KDLP, in 2000. KDLP receives organizational support from the Korean Confederation of Trade Union, and has clear policy platforms proposing raising taxes and reducing inequality. However, it is not clear if the emergence of KDLP affected the two largest parties’ accountability strategies.

3.7. Role of International Advice and Initiatives?

Party assistance programs provided by external non-governmental organizations did not have significant impact on Korean parties’ accountability strategies.

4. Conclusion

Electoral competition has been institutionalized in South Korean since 1987. The dominance of regionalism, the anticommunism atmosphere, originated from the memory of the Korean War, and the lack of alliance between labor unions and political parties were conducive to the lack of ideological differentiation between parties until the 2000s. Parties’ shift toward programmatic politics since the late 1990s can be attributed to several conditions. First, economic insecurity among the electorate caused by the Asian financial crisis provided parties with incentives to compete for support based on divergent ideas of economic governance. Second, some party organizational features reinforced this programmatic transformation. The more decentralized candidate nomination process benefitted politicians who were less embedded into the traditional clientelistic networks within parties. The stricter implementation of party financing regulations
raised the costs of clientelistic strategies. The closer linkage with business associations might also affect the policy positions of the conservative camp. Finally, the reformed electoral system since 2004 has increased the importance of party label in elections.

South Korean politicians still face some challenges in relying on programmatic appeals to mobilize support. Parties do not have strong party activists to mediate between voters and representatives. Individual candidates heavily rely on personal networks. Though becoming more decentralized, legislative candidates nomination procedures have not been fully institutionalized. The presidents are powerful. Legislative party discipline is maintained by the distribution of offices and rents by party leaders, especially the presidents; there is not much room for programmatic deliberation. Voters’ programmatic crystallization has fallen behind political elites. Although ideological divides among the electorate have played a more important role in elections, regionalist sentiment is still prominent.
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Figure 1: Electoral Party Support in South Korea
(\% of votes in National Assembly elections, presidents’ parties are shaded)

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<td>United National Party 17.4</td>
<td>Democratic People’s Party 3.7</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1: Issue Positions and Programmatic Effort of South Korean Parties

(standard deviations in parentheses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overall Programmatic structure (CoSalPo_4)</th>
<th>Programmatic Structure Economic Issues (CoSalPo_3econ)</th>
<th>Spending on disadvantaged (D1)</th>
<th>State role in economy (D2)</th>
<th>Public spending (D3)</th>
<th>Overall left-right (DW)</th>
<th>Inter-Korean relations (D7_kor)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>.503</td>
<td>.459</td>
<td>8.13</td>
<td>6.93</td>
<td>7.87</td>
<td>7.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.13)</td>
<td>(1.79)</td>
<td>(1.64)</td>
<td>(1.55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>.493</td>
<td>.409</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>5.07</td>
<td>3.87</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.45)</td>
<td>(2.28)</td>
<td>(1.68)</td>
<td>(1.45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LFP</td>
<td>.368</td>
<td>.262</td>
<td>8.58</td>
<td>7.62</td>
<td>7.62</td>
<td>8.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.90)</td>
<td>(1.85)</td>
<td>(2.06)</td>
<td>(1.89)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global average</td>
<td>.277</td>
<td>.228</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DALP

Table 2: Seat Shares (%) of Parties in the National Assembly by Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Seoul-Gyonggi</th>
<th>Chungchong</th>
<th>Youngnam</th>
<th>Honam</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>DLP</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DP</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>NKP</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NCNP</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ULD</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MDP</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ULD</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Uri</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UDP</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LFP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 3: Issue Positions of South Korean Voters: Inter-Korean Relations and Welfare Provision

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Aid to North Korea? % (N)</th>
<th>Raising taxes to expand social welfare? % (N)</th>
<th>( \chi^2 )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>should limit</td>
<td>should maintain or expand</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>78.71 (828)</td>
<td>21.29 (224)</td>
<td>171.35***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDP</td>
<td>45.07 (192)</td>
<td>54.93 (234)</td>
<td>55.82 (120)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LFP</td>
<td>75 (159)</td>
<td>25 (53)</td>
<td>61.85 (60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>oppose</td>
<td>support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>65.82 (362)</td>
<td>34.19 (188)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>55.82 (120)</td>
<td>44.18 (95)</td>
<td>7.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>61.85 (60)</td>
<td>38.15 (37)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:** South Korean Presidential Election Panel Study (2007)

### Table 4: Issue Positions of South Korean Voters: Economic Issues

(standard deviations in parentheses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Overall left-right</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1=left; 10=right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>6.08 (2.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDP</td>
<td>5.36 (2.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KDLP</td>
<td>5.19 (1.95)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average position</td>
<td>5.69 (2.06)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Spending on disadvantaged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1=support; 10=oppose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>6.51 (2.53)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDP</td>
<td>6.58 (2.45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KDLP</td>
<td>6.80 (2.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average position</td>
<td>6.59 (2.45)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>State role in economy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1=support; 10=oppose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>5.51 (2.40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDP</td>
<td>5.28 (2.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KDLP</td>
<td>5.79 (2.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average position</td>
<td>5.46 (2.31)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Public spending</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1=support; 10=oppose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>3.76 (2.49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDP</td>
<td>3.61 (2.33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KDLP</td>
<td>3.26 (2.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average position</td>
<td>3.62 (2.40)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Test of independence**
- F=16.01***
- F=0.71
- F=2.27
- F=2.93**

**Correlation between elite and mass positions**
- 1
- -1
- 1
- 1

**Source:** WVS 2005-07
### Table 5: Non-Programmatic Effort of South Korean Parties  
(standard deviations in parentheses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Charismatic effort (E1)</th>
<th>Gift and payment (B1)</th>
<th>Social policy benefits (B2)</th>
<th>Patronage jobs (B3)</th>
<th>Procurement contracts (B4)</th>
<th>Regulatory favors (B5)</th>
<th>Change in clientelistic effort (B7)</th>
<th>Effectiveness of clientelistic targeting (B11)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>2.93 (0.88)</td>
<td>1.73 (0.80)</td>
<td>2.73 (1.28)</td>
<td>2.33 (1.23)</td>
<td>2.58 (1.16)</td>
<td>2.87 (1.13)</td>
<td>2.47 (0.99)</td>
<td>2.64 (0.74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>2.53 (0.83)</td>
<td>1.60 (0.74)</td>
<td>2.67 (1.29)</td>
<td>2.27 (1.22)</td>
<td>2.33 (0.98)</td>
<td>2.67 (1.11)</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.29 (0.27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LFP</td>
<td>3.36 (0.74)</td>
<td>1.54 (0.78)</td>
<td>2.46 (1.27)</td>
<td>2 (1.11)</td>
<td>2 (1)</td>
<td>2.25 (1.14)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.9 (0.57)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global average</td>
<td>2.84 (0.71)</td>
<td>2.29 (0.87)</td>
<td>2.57 (0.71)</td>
<td>2.44 (0.84)</td>
<td>2.43 (0.86)</td>
<td>2.41 (0.70)</td>
<td>3.26 (0.63)</td>
<td>2.62 (0.62)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DALP

### Table 6: Organizational Investments of South Korean Parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Extensive local units (A1)</th>
<th>Links to notables (A3)</th>
<th>Leaders’ control of nominations for legislative candidates (A5)</th>
<th>Leaders’ control of party strategy (A6)</th>
<th>Compliance with private funding regulations? (A10)</th>
<th>Compliance with public funding regulations? (A11)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1=extensive</td>
<td>1=extensive</td>
<td>4=strong</td>
<td>4=strong</td>
<td>1=most in compliance</td>
<td>1=most in compliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>3.87</td>
<td>3.27</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>3.87</td>
<td>3.27</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LFP</td>
<td>2.14</td>
<td>2.08</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.07</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Average</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>1.79</td>
<td>3.13</td>
<td>3.63</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DALP
Figure 2: Economic Performance in South Korea

Source: World Bank
A Case Study of Parties’ Programmatic and Clientelistic Electoral Appeals in Taiwan

Yi-ting Wang
Duke University
yw48@duke.edu
1. Introduction

Since the late 1980s, after four decades of one-party dictatorship under the Kuomintang (KMT), Taiwan began to gradually democratize. Democratic elections since the early 1990s have been characterized by a stable pattern of confrontations between the main competing parties: KMT and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Vote share of these two parties amounted to around 80% of total votes in national elections in the past two decades. Conflicting positions on issues about political/legal status of Taiwan and its relations with China have constituted the most important policy difference between KMT and DPP. Since the early 1990s, however, both parties have moderated and even obscured their positions on these issues, or have framed their positions in more symbolic and affective ways instead. These two parties have not developed consistently distinct policy platforms on economic issues. In addition to programmatic appeals, clientelistic and valence goods have also played an important role in elections. Compared to elections under the KMT authoritarianism, electoral competition relied much less heavily on the provision of targeted goods after regime transition; but this decreasing tendency was not strengthened in the past ten years. Compared to other countries with a similar level of economic development, parties in Taiwan rely on clientelistic appeals substantially more heavily but develop less pronounced policy positions.

Economic development, better democratic quality, and more competitive elections raised the costs of clientelism, but did not lead to more programmatic effort by Taiwanese parties. There was no major economic crisis, nor conflicts between the two parties on economic policies until the late 2000s when the economy becomes more deeply integrated with China. A more party-oriented electoral system was introduced in 2008, under which parties’ images seem to play a more important role in campaigns. More transparent party financing policies and more powerful legislative committees did not significantly encourage parties to make more programmatic effort. Some party organizational forms might still be more compatible with clientelistic strategies and less with programmatic politics. Such organizational arrangements include the reliance on local factional networks cultivated under authoritarianism in campaigns, the centralization of the decision-making process in the hands of party chair, weakly institutionalized candidate nomination procedures, and parties’ lack of control over nomination procedures.
2. Descriptive Section

2.1. The Political Parties of Taiwan

KMT took control of Taiwan in 1945 and established its government in exile on the island in 1949. The ruling stratum of KMT (and thus the government) was dominantly composed of *waishengren* who had moved to Taiwan with KMT and constitute less than twenty percent of the whole population\(^7\) (Wu 1987). Under the martial law instituted in 1948, KMT’s single-party authoritarianism consolidated its control by several means, including violently repressing dissidents and mobilizing support in local level elections. Before the first popular legislative election in 1992 and the presidential election in 1996, citizens could vote in the Taiwan Provincial Assembly, county level, and township level elections. However, political parties other than KMT were not allowed to form until 1987. Since 1983, the *Tangwai* (literally, “outside the party”) movement, which formally became DPP in 1986, escalated its confrontation with the regime on issues of democratic reform, ethnic cleavage and Taiwan’s future by organizing dissident movements and participating in local level elections.

Figure 1 about here

Responding to the challenge from the oppositions and the changing international political environment, several democratic reforms were initiated since the late 80’s. The conflict over political reforms and Taiwan’s status not only divided DPP and KMT, but also created a cleavage within KMT elites. In 1993, a group of primarily *waishengren*, junior elites, who more radically insisted the unification with China, left KMT and formed the New Party (NP). As figure 1 shows, after democratization, KMT still maintained control over the legislature and the presidency until 2000, when DPP’s candidate, Shui-bian Chen, won the presidency and ended more than half a century of KMT rule in Taiwan. In the 2000 presidential election, KMT’s former Secretary-General, James Soong, ran an independent bit and then formed the People First

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\(^7\) Based on the Asian Barometer Survey conducted in 2001, 79% of the respondents identifies themselves as “*benshengren*” (literally, home-province people), which including Hoklo speakers (70%) and Hakka speakers (9%), and the other 18% of the population identifies as “*waishengren*” (external-province people), which refers to immigrants and their descendants who moved from mainland China in 1940s during the civil war between CCP and KMT.
Party (PFP) with his supporters. Teng-hui Lee, the former president and KMT’s chairman from 1988 to 2000, who was accused of resulting in the split of the party, adopting pro-independence policies, and tacitly supporting the DPP administration, was expelled from KMT in 2001. Lee’s supporters then established the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU), which more radically advocates Taiwan independence than DPP. KMT formed electoral alliance with PFP and NP in the 2008 legislative and presidential elections. Suffered from the accusation of several corruption scandals surrounding Chen and his family, DPP was defeated in the 2008 elections by a wide margin. KMT has held the presidency and a majority of the legislature again since 2008.

2.2. Programmatic Partisan Effort

Before democratic transition, the authoritarian KMT, though claiming anti-communist and following Sun Yat-sen’s “Three People’s Principles,” did not hold a rigid left-right position, but tried to represent all social groups in a corporatist framework. In authoritarian elections, KMT’s local machines did not compete with each other on policy positions. Since the early 1980’s, the Tangwai movement and its successor, DPP, challenged the regime on issues of democratic reform, ethnic cleavage and Taiwan’s legal/political status. As described previously, the ruling stratum of KMT and the government was dominantly composed of waishengren who constitute a minority of the whole population. This power structure was justified on the basis of KMT’s “one-China principle,” which claims that there is only one China, Taiwan is a part of China, and the government of the Republic of China is the sole legitimate government representing the whole China. Therefore, under the martial law, there could not be a “national” legislative or presidential election until the regime recovers the mainland. The conflict over democratic reform was thus unavoidably intertwined with a redistribution of political power from waishengren to benshengren and issues about Taiwan’s legal status and its relations with China. The power disparity between waishengren and benshengren can only be redressed by democratic elections of the national leadership, which may involve the redefinition of Taiwan’s political status. In DPP’s party charter revised in 1991, the party should promote the protection of human rights, popular sovereignty, and the establishment of an independent “Republic of Taiwan” and a new constitution through referendum.

After the convocation of (national) founding elections in the early 1990s, DPP’s appeals to democratic ideals and a redistribution of political power gradually exhausted the electoral utility
(Chu, Hinich & Lin 1996). In addition, its stance of Taiwan independence was too distant from the median voter. DPP moderated its position on relations with China since the early 1990s. In the 1996 presidential election, the DPP candidate Ming-min Peng indicated he will not declare Taiwan independence if he gets elected. After the failure of the 1996 presidential election, DPP began to further modify its position on these issues. In 1999, DPP ratified the “Resolution on Taiwan’s Future,” in which it declared, “Taiwan is a sovereign and independent country... Taiwan, although named as the Republic of China under its current Constitution, is not subject to the jurisdiction of the People’s Republic of China. Any change in the independent status quo must be decided by all residents of Taiwan by means of plebiscite.” That is, DPP made the change from “active promoters of independence to passive defenders and protectors of the status quo as independence (Hsiao 1999).” The idea of self-determination has been continuously advocated by DPP’s nominees for the 2004, 2008, and 2012 presidential elections. Aside from the moderated stance on relations with China, DPP has consistently promoted a separate Taiwanese identity in campaigns. It has emphasized they represent Taiwanese, and at times accused KMT of planning to betray Taiwan to PRC.

Faced with the challenge from DPP, KMT heavily relies on valence appeals, and emphasized its government competence and the importance of prosperity, security and stability. In the 1990’s, KTM claimed an equation of “voting DPP = Taiwan independence = PRC invasion = destruction” (Fell 2004). To provide a legal framework for economic and social interactions with China, the KMT government adopted the “Guidelines for National Unification” in 1991, which declared that Taiwan and mainland are both the territories of China, and the unification of both sides should be the ultimate goal. In the 1990’s, KMT moderated its positions on the independence-unification issue. Though still advocating the “war equation,” KMT began to downplay its one-China principle in campaigns. The moderated stance intensified the rift within KMT, and resulted in the formation of NP, which explicitly opposes Taiwan independence and advocates the acceleration of unification with China. In 1999, president Teng-hui Lee, KMT chairman at that time, defined the cross-strait relation as a “special state-to-state” relation. It has been KMT’s most “pro-independence” declaration.

Since DPP won the presidency in 2000 and KMT’s prediction of cross strait war did not materialize, the “war equation” has gradually exhausted the electoral utility (Fell 2004). Since Lee stepped down from the chairship in 2000 and was expelled from KMT in 2001, KMT has continued to reclaim the “one China, with each side (Taiwan and PRC) having its own

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71 A public opinion survey conducted by National Chengchi University in 1994 suggests that only 11.1% of the respondents preferred Taiwan independence while 48.3% of the respondents wanted to maintain the status quo.  
72 Surveys conducted by National Chengchi University suggest that around 20%, 12.5%, and <10% of the respondents supported unification with China in 1994, 2004, and after 2008 respectively.
interpretation” policy. However, KMT has been very careful in using the “one-China” wording in campaigns. In addition, it has downplayed the pro-unification stance and underscored the need to maintain the status quo (Cheng 2006). In the 2004 presidential election, the KMT nominee did not mention the one-China principle and the possibilities of unification with China. In the 2008 and 2012 presidential election, the KMT candidate Ying-jeou Ma emphasized that “one-China” refers to the Republic of China. Ma advocated a closer economic relationship with China and declared a “three noes policy”: no independence, no unification, and no use of force. Contrary to DPP, which has consistently promoted a separate Taiwanese identity, KMT has more frequently adopted a middle ground position of dual identity (both Chinese and Taiwanese). While accusing DPP’s Taiwanese identity appeals of ethnic antagonism, KTM has also stressed its “love for Taiwan” since the late 1990s.

In addition to issues about relations with China and national identity, appeals for “clean politics” and social welfare have also played some role in elections of the past two decades. Since the early 1990s, DPP highlighted the assets of KMT-controlled companies and the corrupting tie among the KMT leadership, big business, and local factions (Cheng & Hsu 1996). Appeals for “clean politics” were framed as valence goods, and were not opposed by KMT in campaigns. In addition, since 2004, KMT has begun to have issue ownership of corruption, as the DPP president Shui-bian Chen and his family were accused of a number of donation scandals. As for the issues of social welfare, since the 1992 legislative election, DPP began to call for several policies of welfare state expansion, including universal health insurance, subsidizing housing, and universal pensions for citizens above the age of 65. After the 1993 and 1994 county/city major elections, the DPP majors began to deliver pensions for residents in their respective countries/cities. DPP’s position on social welfare issues reflected its alliance with various social movement groups, especially labor and environmental movement, in bargaining with the authoritarian ruler. Initially KMT strongly opposed the policies. However, both parties have not developed consistently distinct positions on social policies. A consensus between the two main parties enabled legislation of universal pensions to be passed in 2002 (Lin 2006). In addition, after winning the presidency in 2000, following KMT, DPP continued to push for economic liberalization and also established its own coalition with business groups, which distanced DPP from several movement groups. It was not until the late 2000s, when the increasing economic integration with China has harmed certain sectors and made DPP more easily to connect its position on independence-unification and socio-economic issues, that the need for social justice and reducing income inequality has been more frequently advocated by DPP.

The two main parties have not developed consistently distinct positions on socioeconomic issues, and since democratization, they have moderated/obscured their positions on issues about
cross strait relations in campaigns. Both parties differ in their interpretations of the “status quo” and the conditions under which the status quo can be changed, but they no longer actively campaign for unification with the mainland or the creation of a de jure independent country. These more polarized positions are promoted by other smaller parties: NP, PFP (KMT’s partners in the “pan-blue” coalition), and TSU (DPP’s partner in the “pan-green” coalition). Data from the Democratic Accountability and Linkage Project (DALP) also shows these tendencies. As table 2 shows, experts consistently rate DPP as more left than KMT on the left-right scale and on three socioeconomic issues, such as social spending to reduce income inequality, government responsibility in regulating economic activity, and welfare provision. However, the differences between the two parties’ positions are not statistically significant for two of the three issues. On a scale where 1 represents parties supporting “unification with China” and 10 represents parties supporting “Taiwan independence,” the two parties are scored as much more polarized, but the standard deviations of expert scores are substantial, which might indicate that party elites do not have very cohesive positions. Scores of the aggregated indicator of parties’ programmatic effort, $CoSalPo_{-4}$ and $CoSalPo_{-3econ}$, also suggest that these two parties do not heavily rely on programmatic appeals, compared to the global average.

Table 2 about here

2.3. Programmatic Responsiveness of Voters

The two parties’ distinct positions on national identity and Taiwan’s legal/political status are reflected on party supporters’ ethnic profiles and positions on the related issues. A survey conducted by Taiwan’s Election and Democratization Study (TEDS) after the 2008 presidential election suggests that around 96% of the DPP supporters are benshengren, while only 2% of them are waishengren. Among the KMT supporters, around 17% are waishengren. Based on public opinion survey data, this distribution has not largely changed since the early 1990s. Table 3 and 4 show party supporters’ positions on cross-strait relations and national identities. The tables suggest that supporters of the two parties have had significantly different positions on these issues. In 2008, the majority of KMT supporters think Taiwan should maintain the status quo and consider themselves as both Taiwanese and Chinese; while the majority of DPP supporters think Taiwan should be independent and identify themselves as Taiwanese. In addition to a tendency of “de-sinicization,” the chi-squared tests suggest that party supporters
have developed more distinct attitudes on these issues over time, in contrast to party elites’ moderated positions.

Table 3 about here

Table 4 about here

In contrary to the consistency of ethnic voting over time, the pattern of class voting has changed in the past two decades. Based on the research by Hu, Lin & Wong (2011), professionals and managers were more likely to support DPP in the early 90s, but tended to support KMT in the survey conducted in 2004. Farmers and manual workers, who once were strong supporters of KMT in the early 90s, are more likely to vote for DPP than the average in the 2000s. The self-employed have consistently tended to support DPP since democratization.

Consistent with the patterns at the elite level, Taiwanese voters for KMT and DPP do not hold distinct positions on economic issues. As table 5 shows, based on the World Value Survey 2005-07 data, party supporters’ mean positions on the left-right scale and on three economic issues are not significantly different. The correlation between parties’ positions and voters’ attitudes on these issues are fairly weak. In addition, the standard deviations around voters’ mean issue positions are generally large, indicating there is little programmatic coherence among a party’s electorate on economic issues.

Table 5 about here

2.4. Clientelistic Partisan Effort

Since taking control of Taiwan in 1945, KMT held local level elections to secure popular support and elicit cooperation from local elites on the alien island. To mobilize electoral support, KMT allied itself with small-scale sociopolitical networks, known as “local factions” (Wu 1987). Local factions were granted economic privileges such as control over credit unions and transportation
companies, and they distributed resources from KMT to members of their networks to win electoral support (Chen 1996, Wang & Kurzman 2007). Operating as KMT’s local machines, factions did not differ in their policy platforms (Bosco 1994). They mainly relied on the provision of targeted goods and service to attract followers. After democratic transition, some conditions supporting authoritarian clientelism, such as the lack of viable opposition, a controllable judiciary and military system, and the lack of freedom of the press, have been eroded. However, KMT politicians still rely on clientelistic mobilization even when it has become less effective. In the 2000 presidential election, KMT relied on local faction mobilization as its main campaign strategy (Wang 2004a).

Since the early 1990s, DPP members have won county/city executive positions to deliver resources for their own supporters. Then more and more local factions have allied themselves with DPP, and DPP politicians have also learned to maintain clientelistic networks (Chen 2009, Wang 2004b).

Interviews with legislators of the two parties conducted in 2010 in Yunlin, the county that has the largest agricultural population, suggest even though politicians of both parties believe party’s policy positions do play a role in their campaign, they still think constituency service and direct goods exchange through local networks are important for them to win elections (Chang & Lu 2011). Constituency service, including routinely attending constituents’ weddings and funerals and helping them solve individual problems, enables politicians to establish direct relationship with their constituents (Chen 2009). This direct relationship, which facilitates the reciprocity of favors and obligations, makes politicians’ valence appeals more convincing, and even constitutes a channel to communicate parties’ platforms (Chang & Lu 2011), is continuously important in Taiwan’s elections.

Data from DALP shown in table 6 suggests that DPP slightly less relies on clientelism than KMT. Compared to the global average, the two parties make substantial clientelistic effort, and have not lessened their reliance on clientelistic strategies in the past ten years. Among the five types of material goods, both parties especially rely on the provision of preferential access to social programs and favorable regulatory decisions to mobilize support. The differences in clientelistic effort between KMT and DPP are most pronounced in the distribution of individual level consumer goods. Experts judged that both parties have few resources to punish voters when they did not deliver on their promises to support the parties. Compared to the global average, however, parties’ clientelistic strategies are fairly effective, especially in mobilizing potential KMT voters.
2.5. Party Organization and Party Finance in Taiwan

This section will describe several aspects of these two parties’ organization, including whether parties maintain formal and informal local branches, whether parties’ nomination and decision-making procedures are centralized, and what parties’ financial sources are.

KMT has extensive formal and informal organization. In the authoritarian era, the strategy of allying with local factions enabled KMT to maintain its dominance in elections. Local notables became official KMT members and acted as its machines (Wu 1987). After democratic transition, competitive elections even enhanced the role of local factions in candidate recruitment and the mobilization of votes (Chao 1996, Hsu & Chen 2004). The election rates of faction-linked candidates began to decline since late 1990s, due to the more independent judiciary system, the stricter implementation of electoral regulation (especially after 2000, as DPP won the presidency) (Wang 2004a), and the liberalization of some local credit cooperatives, which has reduced factions’ financial resources. Some local factions collapsed when they lost the city/county major elections and could not obtain resources for a period of time, or when they failed to deal with the within-faction and between-faction coordination problem under the more competitive SNTV (single non-transferable vote) electoral system (Wang 2007). However, utilizing the opportunities when KMT tried to legalize their party-owned enterprises, some local factions extended their activities to financial sectors and increased their economic power (Chang 2008, Matsumoto 2002). In addition, in the process of the indigenization of KMT power structure, some leaders of local factions became KMT national party leadership. Under these conditions, local factions not only have been more autonomous to KMT, but also become more important components of KMT leadership. KMT has tried to nominate non-faction elites to weaken local factions73, but election results suggest that it is still difficult for KMT not to rely on the network of local factions to win elections in many districts (Wang & Huang 2010, Tsai 2005).

73 This “faction replacement” policy, nominating non-faction elites instead of rotating among factions, was adopted during 1968 and 1988 (Chen 1995), and has reemerged especially since 2009.
DPP also maintains extensive formal local branches. In addition, since the early 1990’s, DPP began to ally itself with local factions. Since local factions cultivated by KMT did not share a distinct ideological position; after democratic transition, they can be easily bought off by other parties and provide existing networks to distribute goods and mobilize votes. As research has indicated, at the organizational level, DPP has not developed a form of party clientelism. The distribution of targeted goods mostly operates on the level of individual politicians (Chang & Lu 2011, Wang 2004a). DPP then tries to ally itself with these local politicians through the distribution of offices and infrastructure funds (Chen 2009). In general, both parties rely on the network of local factions in at least some districts, but cannot guarantee cooperation from them, no matter they are formal party members or not. However, as party labels have gradually become more important in elections, factions also know they can win (county/city and national level) elections only by allying with one of the parties (Chang & Lu 2011).

KMT was organized on the model of the Soviet Communist party, but the organization has been largely changed during the process of democratic transition (Huang 1996). The party chair and the Central Standing Committee (CSC) is the center of KMT’s decision making. Until 2001, members of CSC were nominated by the party leader and approved by members of the Central Committee (CC), the candidates of which were either nominated by the party leader or provided by joint signature of party delegates and then elected by party delegates. KMT began to reform its organization after losing the presidency in 2000. Since then, the party chair is directly elected by all party members and can serve only two four-year terms. Members of CC are able to elect freely among themselves thirty-one CSC members. However, formal rules governing the CSC’s decision-making do not exist, and generally decisions are made by the party chair (Cheng 2008). KMT’s candidate selection procedure has also been institutionalized and decentralized over time since democratic transition. Before 2001, various nomination processes were adopted for different offices. Local party cadres and faction leaders controlled the nomination for county and township level elections. For city majors and national level elections, local branches, supervised by the national leadership, selected nominees with some of the following practices: public opinion polls, party members’ opinion polls, or evaluations from party cadres (Wu 2001). Since 2001, nominees are selected by party local branches based on the results of party member primaries (accounting for 50% before 2008, and 30% since then) and public opinion polls (accounting for the remaining), and then approved by the CSC. The results of primaries and public opinion polls are not binding, and there have been several cases in which the primary winners were removed by the party center (Fell 2006).

DPP’s organizational structure is based on that of KMT. The party chair, the CSC, and the
Central Executive Committee (CEC) constitute the center of DPP’s decision-making. The party chair is directly elected by party members, and can serve a maximum of two two-year terms. Members of CSC are elected from within by the thirty member CEC, plus legislative caucus leaders and municipal executives. CEC members are elected by party delegates. Since there are several stable and influential factions, who intend to play an important decision-making role by joining CEC and CSC, it is more difficult for DPP chairs to centralize power in their hands (Rigger 2001). DPP’s candidate nomination procedures have also been modified several times in the past two decades. Since 1989, DPP had adopted closed member primaries. A revised system, in which there were two equally weighted primary selectorates, party cadres and ordinary party members, had been introduced in 1994. Since 1997, nominees were selected using equally weighted party member primaries and public opinion survey. The weighting was further altered to 30% for party member primaries and 70% for public opinion polls. The results of primaries are generally treated as binding (Fell 2006). The decreasing weights for party primaries reflect both parties’ concern over the allegation of vote-buying at the primary stage. Such practice includes politicians paying membership dues for a large number of members that could be relied on as block vote in primaries.

Government began to provide subsidies for parties since 1997. Parties that gain more than 5 percent of votes in the legislative election get NTD 50 (USD 1.65) for each vote it attracts. Laws regulating donations to parties were initiated in 2004, which specify that donations from individuals cannot exceed NTD 300,000 (USD 9,900) per year, and donations from corporates cannot exceed NTD 3,000,000 (USD 99,003) per year. In addition, parties are required to report their financial transactions to the public.

KMT’s fortune mainly comes from its party-owned enterprises (POEs). It has been estimated that as of 1998 the net assets of POEs were over NTD 200 billion (around USD 6.5 billion) (Matsumoto 2002), accounting of more than 2% of GNP. Since the late 1980s, utilized the process of privatizing state-owned enterprises and deregularizing certain industry, KMT expanded its party business and was able to further patronized key business groups (Chang 2008). KMT established seven holding companies to control POEs and institutionalize its relations with business groups. POEs contributed to around 80% of KMT’s expense in the mid 1990s (Chang 2008). Being criticized for corruption, KMT claimed to put most of its assets into trust since the 2000’s. Based on the Ministry of Interior data, stock dividends still accounted for around 80% of its total earnings, while donations amounted to 7% of its earnings in 2010.

Until 1997, when the government began to provide subsidies for parties, DPP relied almost entirely on donations from its supporters, membership dues, and contributions from elected
officials (Rigger 2001). According to DPP’s charter, elected officials have to contribute certain percentage of their salaries to the party. Since 2000, elected officials and members of CEC and CSC are asked to do certain share of fund-raising for campaigns. During 2000 and 2008 when DPP held the presidency, utilizing the access to state resources and the process of financial reform, DPP was able to establish its own coalition with capitalists and gather financial resources for the party. As Lee and Chu (2008) have indicated, these networks were centered around the president, and DPP has not institutionalized these party-state connections. In 2010, donations and government subsidies each accounted for around 30% of its total earnings. On average, during 2006 and 2010, KMT earned above three times more than DPP annually.

Table 7 shows the DALP indicators of several aspects of party organization. Compared to the global average, both parties exhibit fairly high levels of organizational extensiveness combined with average levels of centralization in making electoral strategies. DPP has less extensive formal and informal local units, and is rated as less centralized in nominating candidates and more adherent to financial regulations. As described above, parties’ local branches, especially those allied with local factions, are crucial to parties’ clientelistic practices. KMT struggles to balance the goals of controlling local factions and winning elections, and has not established well-institutionalized nomination procedures. In DPP, the weights of primaries and public opinion polls frequently become the focus of controversy before elections. Both parties’ public finance is more transparent than their private finance. KMT’s private party finance is still rated as fairly opaque.

Table 7 about here

2.6. Legislative Organization of Party Caucuses

Based on the analysis of roll call votes during 1996 and 2008, Sheng (2008) has pointed out that DPP is more disciplined in legislative voting. Before 2000 when DPP won the presidency, KMT is scored 0.41 on Rice’s party cohesion index (1925), on which DPP is scored 0.71. Both parties

74 To address the allegation of “pocket party member” (or “nominal party member”), DPP has selected its nominees for the 2012 legislative election totally based on the results of public opinion polls. Whether the system will last and whether it will weaken DPP’s programmatic coordination require further observation.
are more disciplined since 2000: KMT is scored 0.63 and DPP is cored 0.88. KMT is most cohesive on bills relating to political reforms, and tends to vote less cohesively on issues related to cross-strait relations, social welfare, economy and fiscal policies, and environmental protection. Sheng has explained that the low cohesiveness on issues about cross-strait relations is due to the conflict between the “mainstream” (mainly constituted of benshengren) and the “non-mainstream” (primarily waishengren) factions within KMT. DPP is especially disciplined on issues about political reforms and cross-strait relations; and is less cohesive on bills relating to social welfare. In general, for bills that have distributive consequences for some districts, the two main parties tend to allow the rank-and-file legislators to vote freely to respond to the needs of their constituents.

Communities play a prominent role in the legislative process. They control their own agenda, and review bills before the floor. They can hold hearings, rewrite bills without restrictions except for the budget, and compel government officials to testify. Before 2002, these functions were weakened because committee members were assigned by a lottery system, under which legislators tended to switch committees too often and committees did not reflect the partisan balance on the floor. In addition, the legislature was institutionalized a stage of inter-party negotiations after the committee consideration on each bill, and committee decisions were frequently overturned by the inter-party negotiations (Yang & Chen 2004). A new system was institutionalized in 2002, under which committee seats are distributed to each party caucus in proportion to its seat share in the chamber, and each party caucus would determine the seat distribution within the party. The turnover rates of committee membership have decreased since then (Shiao 2005). Moreover, committees can decide which bills will be submitted to the stage of inter-party negotiations, and the inter-party negotiations should include members from the respective committees (Yang & Chen 2004). These revisions have strengthened the powers of committees.

Before 2002, under this self-selection and lottery system, legislators chose the committees that allowed them to best serve their reelection efforts. Batto (2007) found that legislators with concentrated votes, who are assumed to “use expensive organizational networks to make parochial appeals to their voters (p. 65),” preferred to sit on committees with more rent seeking potential. Under the new system, Shiao’s research (2005) has found that KMT assigns members to committees based on legislators’ demands. Party leaders control the process, and legislators showing more electoral strength have more bargaining power. DPP’s party charter stipulates that committee members are appointed based on seniority. Batto (2007) has found that under the new system, KMT legislators with highly concentrated votes still tend to sit on “money committees;” while the pattern has no longer existed among DPP legislators. As Batto explains, this difference may reflect that DPP tends to rely on clientelism less heavily than KMT, or may indicate that
2.7. Executive Participation and Government Coalitions

Under Taiwan’s semi-presidential system, the president and the assembly both are independently directly elected. The president can appoint the prime minister without the consent of the legislature, while the legislature can remove a prime minister via a vote of no-confidence. The prime minister takes charge of the government, and is responsible to the assembly. The president is granted various powers, including the power to appoint and remove many officials without the endorsement of the prime minister, the power to issue emergency decrees, and the power to institute the National Security Council.

In practice, the prime ministers have never been removed by a vote of no-confidence. Before 2000, KMT controlled both the presidency and the legislative majority. During 2000 and 2008, DPP led by president Chen Shui-bian held a minority government. During the two legislative terms of 2001-2007, DPP held the plurality, and controlled around 45% of the seats along with its “pan-green” ally, TSU; while the opposition parties, KMT and its “pan-blue” allies, PFP and NP, held a razor-thin majority (around 51% of the seats). Four prime ministers appointed by president Chen during this period were DPP politicians, and only the first prime minister under Chen’s presidency, Tang Fei, was from KMT. However, Tang was appointed personally rather than as a result of coalition with KMT, and served less than five months. Since 2008, KMT has held a single-party majority government.

The two coalitions are organized based on parties’ positions on issues related to Taiwan’s political status and cross-strait relations. Based on the analysis of roll call votes, Hawang (2003) has found that during 2000 and 2003, around 64% of the votes were contests between the two coalitions, which have been defined as the majority of one coalition voting against the majority of the other coalition.
3. Analytical Section

3.1. Development

Taiwan enjoyed economic growth rates averaging approximately 8% per year between 1951 and 1989. As figure 2 shows, the growth rates have decreased since the early 1990’s, but still amounted to around 5% until 2007 except in 2001. Per capita GDP has reached USD 17,122 (current prices) in 2007. Economic development has impacts on the effectiveness of clientelistic appeals. Chang and Lu (2011) have found that the process of modernization has undermined the influence of traditional social network, on which local factions are based. Younger generation and urban voters are less likely to be influenced by favors distributed from local factions. However, compared to countries with similar levels of economic development, Taiwanese parties still make more clientelistic but less programmatic effort.

Figure 2 about here

3.2. Political Economy

Democratic transition in Taiwan was not triggered by major socioeconomic crisis or external market shocks. Nor was it accompanied by popular demands for major socioeconomic reforms. In the late 1980’s, an export-oriented industrialization strategy had already been in place for more than two decades. As figure 2 shows, Taiwan’s economic performance is stable. The Asian financial crisis did not have significant influence. The unemployment rates and Gini coefficients have gradually increased in the past two decades, but are still around the average of countries with similar income levels.

Several developments in the 1990’s enabled DPP to briefly define a party cleavage on socioeconomic issues. First, economic liberalization beginning in late 1980s resulted in the concentration of business ownership and the increased entry barriers for small business. The increasing real estate and stock prices also deteriorated the income distribution (Chu, Hinich & Lin 1996). Second, utilizing the process of liberalization, KMT was able to patronize key economic groups (Chang 2008). It then became increasingly difficult for KMT to promote its
image as a classless political alliance. DPP began to attack KMT’s money politics and advocate several social welfare programs. However, as described above, issues of social welfare and corruption became valence issues in the 1990’s, and the main two parties have not developed distinct positions on them.

The economic liberalization policies initiated by KMT and followed by DPP since 2000, however, increased both parties’ financial latitude to fund increasingly expensive campaigns. As described above, KMT expanded its party business and patronized key business groups in the process of privatizing state-owned enterprises and deregularizing certain industry. Stock dividends of party assets still accounted for 80% of its total earnings in 2010. DPP continued to push for the policies, especially the liberalization of the financial industry, and also established its own coalition with business groups. Hsu (2009) has found, to compensate regions that mainly host low-end labor intensive industries and agriculture sectors, the DPP administration transfer resources by subsidizing infrastructure construction and community empowerment projects. There has been no evidence suggesting that the financial resources obtained by both parties in the process of economic liberalization led to the increasing use of clientelistic strategies. However, especially for DPP, the party-business connection reduced the party’s credibility of claiming to represent the disadvantaged and narrow income inequality.

In the late 2000s, Taiwan has experienced a mild economic downturn and increasing economic integration with China. It has been found class groups who are more likely to be benefited from the economic integration, including managers, professionals, and office clerks, tend to support more open trade with China and are more likely to support parties of the pan-blue coalition (Wong 2010). In the campaigns for the 2012 presidential election, there have been some signs that DPP is trying to raise the question of income inequality and elaborate more clearly the connection between national identity appeals and the distributive consequences. Whether the two parties will further compete on these issues requires further observations.

3.3. Institutions and Linkage Strategies

Freer and fairer elections increased the costs of clientelistic strategies. As Wang (2004a) has found, the more independent judiciary system and the military, the freer media environment, and the stricter implementation of electoral regulations all made it more difficult for the incumbent
parties to rely on clientelistic appeals. However, compared to countries of similar democratic experience, democratic reform did not significantly lead to more programmatic effort by Taiwanese parties.

Legislators were elected under the system of single, non-transferable voting in multi-member districts (SNTV) before 2008. Since the 2008 legislative election, two thirds of the members are elected under the FPTP system in single member districts, and the rest are elected under the nationwide PR system. Chang and Lu’s research (2011) has found, under the reformed system, politicians think parties’ policies and image play a more important role in elections. However, some politicians also point out, as the district magnitude becomes smaller, programmatic appeals are not enough for them to win elections, and constituency service and social networks are still important in attracting strategic voters. Since there has been only one legislative election under the reformed system, it requires further observations to determine the effects of electoral system on Taiwanese parties’ programmatic effort.

3.4. Party Organization

In the past two decades, the way to elect the decision-making center of KMT becomes more institutionalized and democratized, but decisions are still generally made by the party chair, which might make policy deliberation within party less likely. Some local factions collapsed, some become more autonomous from KMT, and leaders of some have joined KMT central leadership and not only behave as its local agents. Since the networks of local factions are still crucial in mobilizing votes in at least some districts, KMT is struggling to coopt them in the candidate nomination process, and the process has not been well institutionalized. Public party finance has become more transparent under the new donation regulation laws since 2004. However, as the DALP data suggests, KMT’s private financing is still quite murky, which continues to provide resources for clientelistic exchange. Legislative committees become more powerful and parties have more power to control committee assignments since 2002. However, it seems committee seats are still used by some legislators to gain resources for clientelistic purposes.

As for DPP, the cooption of local factions cultivated by KMT provided DPP existing networks to distribute goods and mobilize votes, but also harmed its programmatic cohesion.
During the past two decades, DPP leaders and local party cadres have gradually lost control over the candidate nomination process. This might also reduce the extent of its programmatic cohesiveness.

3.5. Changing Patterns of Party Competition

Parties’ accountability strategies affect each other’s choices of strategies. As Rigger (2001) has pointed out, KMT’s strategy of being a catch-all party since the authoritarian era largely de-radicalized the opposition and forced DPP to also become a catch-all party.

The increasing competitiveness of elections since democratization also affects parties’ choices of strategies in several ways. As DPP formed in 1986 and elections became more competitive, KMT relied on local factions more heavily to mobilize votes through vote buying. Research has found that the percentage of KMT’s nomination of faction-linked candidates rose during 1983-1992, but declined since 1995 (Hsu & Chen 2004). The increasing levels of competitiveness initially increased parties’ incentives to rely on clientelistic appeals, but then also raised the difficulty of clientelistic strategies. As Wang (2007) has pointed out, as elections become more competitive, parties can no longer monopolize political and economic resources in the locality, which are important in cultivating and coopting local factions. In addition, under Taiwan’s SNTV electoral system, coordination within parties is crucial in expanding parties’ seat shares. As elections become more competitive, coordination becomes more difficult and both inter-factional and intra-factional conflicts become more severe. These conflicts precipitated the breakdown of KMT’s centralized organizational structure of clientelism.

DPP began to make more clientelistic effort since the late 1990s and especially the 2000s, but it is not clear if the increased reliance on clientelism was due to a higher level of competitiveness or the availability of resources when DPP held local or national executive positions.
3.6. Ethnic-national Identity Division and Civil Society

The main politicized cleavage in Taiwan is the ethnic-national identity division. The ethnic-national identity division has not been framed as connecting to economic distribution issues, although research by Wu (1997) has shown there was more upward social mobility among waishengren, partly due to government subsidies on education for children of government employees. Waishengren, who had followed KMT to the island, have clustered in governmental employment. However, Wu (2002) has found that, based on public opinion survey data, the majority of benshengren did not think their economic status is lower than that of waishengren. In addition, Su and Yu’s research (2007) has indicated the ethnic gaps in education and occupational status have narrowed over time.

To attract votes from benshengren of different class groups, DPP has not developed a class-based policy platform. In the late 1980s, around 80% of the DPP votes came from working class, owners of small business, self-employed entrepreneurs, and professionals (Hsu 2009). The dominance of ethnic-national identity division also affected parties’ links to labor unions. As Lee (2010) has pointed out, under KMT’s authoritarianism, union officers were primarily waishengren. The official union established by KMT was thus viewed as representing waishengren’s privileges. Workers’ confrontational movement during democratization, which was later allied with DPP, saw ethnicity as the dominant form of inequality. As unions with different ethnic profiles sided with different parties, both KMT and DPP had fewer incentives to politicize the class cleavage and provide divergent economic policies. The dominance of ethnic-national divides does not solely explain the lack of parties’ distinct positions on economic issues. Shieh (1992) claims that class consciousness in Taiwan is weak, resulted from the small business dominated economy, in which most workers expect to become the bosses of their small workshops.

DPP’s alliance with various social movement groups in bargaining with the authoritarian ruler largely shaped its positions on several issues. Before 2000, many of DPP’s social welfare (Lin 2006), environmental (Ho 2003), and labor policies (Huang 2002) were initially proposed by respective social movement groups and then endorsed by DPP. As DPP held the presidency, its connection with business groups, its pursuit of economic liberalization, and the unfulfillment of policy promises disappointed many social movement groups. Social movement groups’ criticism severely reduced DPP’s credibility of continuously portraying itself as representing the disadvantaged and promoting more left policies.

75 Taiwan’s BGI is .025 (.28 standard deviation above the mean).
3.7. Role of International Advice and Initiatives?

External non-governmental organizations did not have significant impact on Taiwanese parties’ accountability strategies.

4. Conclusion

The party system in Taiwan is stable. The two main parties are generally institutionalized. They compete on issues related to Taiwan’s status and national identity. However, compared to countries with a similar level of economic development and democratic experience, they make substantially more clientelistic effort but develop less pronounced policy positions.

Several conditions that might affect parties’ accountability strategies are discussed in the paper. Economic development and better democratic quality raised the costs of clientelistic strategies, but did not significantly encourage Taiwanese parties to invest more in programmatic appeals. The dominance of issues of ethnic-national division, the cross-cutting structure of ethnic and class cleavages, and weak class consciousness in the small business dominated economy might explain why the two main parties have not developed consistently distinct positions on economic issues. The economic performance was generally stable, and parties did not diverge on economic reform programs until the late 2000s, when the increasing economic integration has harmed some sectors and parties can more easily connect their positions on ethnic-national and economic issues. The newly introduced more party-oriented electoral system seems to make parties’ images more important in elections. Whether the parties will continue to elaborate their positions on trade with China and other related issues and compete on them, whether the new electoral system will further encourage more programmatic effort, and whether parties will reform some of their organizational arrangements that are less compatible with programmatic politics require future observations.
References


Chen, Tai-yin. 2009. Taiwan’s local factions after democratization: a case study of the Lin


Table 1: Electoral Party Support in Taiwan
(% of votes in National Assembly elections, presidents’ parties are shaded)

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<td>Legislature</td>
<td>Lee Teng-hui</td>
<td>Lee Teng-hui</td>
<td>Chen Shui-bian</td>
<td>Chen Shui-bian</td>
<td>Ma Ying-jeou</td>
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<td>Pan-Green camp</td>
<td>DPP 31.0</td>
<td>DPP 33.2</td>
<td>DPP 29.6</td>
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<td>KMT 46.4</td>
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<td>NP 2.9</td>
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<td>3.4</td>
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<td>9.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
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### Table 2: Issue Positions and Programmatic Effort of Taiwanese Parties
(standard deviations in parentheses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Overall Programmatic structure (CoSalPo_4)</th>
<th>Programmatic Structure Economic Issues (CoSalPo_3econ)</th>
<th>Spending on disadvantaged (D1) 1=support; 10=oppose</th>
<th>State role in economy (D2) 1=support; 10=oppose</th>
<th>Public spending (D3) 1=support; 10=oppose</th>
<th>Overall left-right (DW) 1=left; 10=right</th>
<th>Cross strait relations (D7_twn) 1=unification; 10=independence</th>
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<td>KMT</td>
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<td>.179</td>
<td>6.44 (1.90)</td>
<td>4.89 (2.35)</td>
<td>4.78 (2.13)</td>
<td>7.17 (1.29)</td>
<td>3.58 (2.17)</td>
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<td>.180</td>
<td>4.53 (1.97)</td>
<td>4.31 (1.54)</td>
<td>3.67 (2.28)</td>
<td>4.89 (1.69)</td>
<td>7.68 (2.50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global average</td>
<td>.277</td>
<td>.228</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DALP

### Table 3: Issue Positions of Taiwanese Voters: Cross-Strait Relations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Taiwan should be independent or unify with the mainland? % (N)</th>
<th>Independence</th>
<th>Status quo</th>
<th>Unification</th>
<th>DK</th>
<th>$\chi^2$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>KMT</td>
<td>14.37 (101)</td>
<td>69.95 (492)</td>
<td>15.65 (110)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>178.83***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>39.55 (53)</td>
<td>44.03 (59)</td>
<td>16.41 (22)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>KMT</td>
<td>8.81 (55)</td>
<td>66.99 (417)</td>
<td>11.06 (69)</td>
<td>13.3 (83)</td>
<td></td>
<td>194.67***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>34.33 (138)</td>
<td>47.01 (189)</td>
<td>6.47 (26)</td>
<td>12.19 (49)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>KMT</td>
<td>22.1 (158)</td>
<td>35.38 (253)</td>
<td>40.28 (288)</td>
<td>2.24 (16)</td>
<td></td>
<td>463.99***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>66.78 (398)</td>
<td>20.3 (121)</td>
<td>10.24 (61)</td>
<td>2.69 (16)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>KMT</td>
<td>5.7 (22)</td>
<td>68.8 (266)</td>
<td>21.4 (83)</td>
<td>4.2 (16)</td>
<td></td>
<td>482.13***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>47.5 (118)</td>
<td>39.1 (97)</td>
<td>8.9 (22)</td>
<td>4.4 (11)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4: Issue Positions of Taiwanese Voters: National Identity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Taiwanese</th>
<th>Chinese</th>
<th>Both</th>
<th>Neither/DK</th>
<th>χ²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>KMT</td>
<td>14.94 (105)</td>
<td>31.72 (223)</td>
<td>51.92 (365)</td>
<td>1.43 (10)</td>
<td>115.48***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>35.99 (53)</td>
<td>9.7 (13)</td>
<td>49.25 (66)</td>
<td>1.5 (2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>KMT</td>
<td>31.89 (199)</td>
<td>15.22 (95)</td>
<td>51.12 (319)</td>
<td>1.76 (11)</td>
<td>105.57***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>59.45 (239)</td>
<td>5.97 (24)</td>
<td>33.83 (136)</td>
<td>0.75 (3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>KMT</td>
<td>41.82 (299)</td>
<td>16.22 (116)</td>
<td>41.54 (297)</td>
<td>0.42 (3)</td>
<td>267.94***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>83.05 (495)</td>
<td>3.36 (20)</td>
<td>12.92 (77)</td>
<td>0.67 (4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>KMT</td>
<td>26.4 (102)</td>
<td>7.8 (30)</td>
<td>63 (243)</td>
<td>2.9 (11)</td>
<td>373.32***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>80.7 (201)</td>
<td>1.6 (4)</td>
<td>16.1 (40)</td>
<td>1.6 (4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Issue Positions of Taiwanese Voters: Economic Issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Overall left-right 1=left; 10=right</th>
<th>Spending on disadvantaged 1=support; 10=oppose</th>
<th>State role in economy 1=support; 10=oppose</th>
<th>Public spending 1=support; 10=oppose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KMT</td>
<td>6.08 (2.11)</td>
<td>6.89 (2.20)</td>
<td>5.66 (2.29)</td>
<td>4.87 (2.60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>6.10</td>
<td>6.76</td>
<td>5.79</td>
<td>5.56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 6: Clientelistic Effort of Taiwanese Parties
(standard deviations in parentheses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source: WVS 2005-07</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Gift and payment (B1)</th>
<th>Social policy benefits (B2)</th>
<th>Patronage jobs (B3)</th>
<th>Procurement contracts (B4)</th>
<th>Regulatory favors (B5)</th>
<th>Change in clientelistic effort (B7)</th>
<th>Effectiveness of clientelistic targeting (B11)</th>
<th>Consequences of monitoring attempts (C4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>KMT</strong></td>
<td>3.12 (0.70)</td>
<td>3.56 (0.62)</td>
<td>2.63 (0.89)</td>
<td>2.69 (0.87)</td>
<td>3.67 (0.49)</td>
<td>3.39 (1.33)</td>
<td>3.56 (0.51)</td>
<td>1.63 (0.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DPP</strong></td>
<td>2.75 (0.68)</td>
<td>3.22 (0.81)</td>
<td>2.56 (0.89)</td>
<td>2.5 (0.89)</td>
<td>3.44 (0.62)</td>
<td>3.11 (0.58)</td>
<td>1.81 (0.40)</td>
<td>1.72 (0.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Global average</strong></td>
<td>2.29 (0.87)</td>
<td>2.57 (0.71)</td>
<td>2.44 (0.84)</td>
<td>2.43 (0.86)</td>
<td>2.41 (0.70)</td>
<td>3.26 (0.63)</td>
<td>2.62 (0.62)</td>
<td>1.72 (0.28)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DALP
Table 7: Organizational Investments of Taiwanese Parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Extensive local units (A1) 1=extensive</th>
<th>Links to notables (A3) 1=extensive</th>
<th>Leaders’ control of nominations for legislative candidates (A5) 4=strong</th>
<th>Leaders’ control of party strategy (A6) 4=strong</th>
<th>Compliance with private funding regulations? (A10) 1=most in compliance</th>
<th>Compliance with public funding regulations? (A11) 1=most in compliance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KMT</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.13</td>
<td>3.56</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>1.39</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>3.63</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Average</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>1.79</td>
<td>3.13</td>
<td>3.63</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DALP

Figure 2: Economic Performance in Taiwan

Source: National Statistics of Taiwan
The Evolution of Electoral Accountability in Turkey:
Cyclical Evolutions in Programmatic and Clientelistic Politics

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Juan March Institute; Madrid, Spain
dkselman@march.es
1. Introduction: Turkey as a Challenge to Conventional Wisdoms?

This paper outlines the evolution of clientelistic and programmatic modes of democratic accountability in Turkey. It provides both a broad-stroke presentation of changing accountability patterns between the transition to democracy in 1950 and the military intervention of 1980, as well more specific data on clientelism and programmatism for the period beginning with the re-establishment of parliamentary elections and governance in 1983. Historical analysis of Turkey’s party system, party organizations, and citizen-elite linkages forces one to question a series common wisdoms and implicit assumptions often brought to bear in studies of democratic linkage. Perhaps most basically, we see little systematic relationship between the syndrome of phenomena often referred to as ‘modernization’ (economic development, urbanization, communications integration, etc.) and the use of clientelist strategies in electoral politics. Indeed, the data below demonstrate that both the level of clientelism and its diversity of forms have recently been on the uptick, primarily due to the political ascension of parties with roots in the increasingly dense and effective business and neighborhood networks which arose with the revival of political Islam in the 1980’s and 1990’s.

This brings us to a second enigmatic aspect of Turkish political history, which again forces us to question an assumption implicit in many contemporary studies of clientelism and democratic accountability: namely, that clientelism and programmatism bear some degree of mutual exclusivity. In Turkey periods of programmatic coherence and intensity often develop parallel to advances in both the nature and prevalence of clientelistic strategies. This occurred in the 1960’s, when rapid urbanization and state-lead industrialization simultaneously generated new clientelistic and new programmatic opportunities for political parties. It occurred again over the past two decades, as the rise of political Islam has infused the party system with a measure of programmatic coherence and a plethora of new networks suitable for clientelism. Thus, rather than a linear trend in which programmatic politics slowly replaces clientelism as a society modernizes, we observe cycles of contraction and innovation in both programmatic and clientelistic electoral strategies.

Beyond bringing into question our empirical understanding of the relationship between modernization and democratic accountability, the Turkish case also suggests the need to revisit the conceptual and normative infrastructure on which studies of clientelism are commonly based. In both comparative political science and public policy discourse, programmatism is often considered to be a normatively superior form of democratic politics, associated with the provision of non-exclusive ‘public goods’ via impersonal and meritocratic rules (e.g. Keefer 2007). A careful look at Turkey’s political-economic history suggests the need to revisit this association, and to reevaluate the empirical and normative status often assigned to clientelism as a ‘perverse’ accountability which hinders development (e.g. Stokes 2005).

For example, both in the 1950’s and 2000’s, an uptick in clientelistic targeting was coterminous with the heightened provision of roads, schools, hospitals, and social services, which are often taken to be the hallmark of programmatic politics. In contrast, as the intensity of
programmatic competition increased over the course of the 1970’s, the provision of infrastructural and human development policies withered, while political violence reached at times frightening levels. This of course is not to say that clientelism is inherently ‘good’ and programmatism inherently ‘bad’. Rather, periods of stunted growth, static development, and political violence, such as that of the mid and late 1970’s, are generally characterized by a combination of unsavory forms of both programmatic and clientelistic strategies. Thus, as always, the devil is in the details. The goal of social scientists and policy-making bodies should not be to condemn a priori one form of accountability as compared to another, but rather to investigate the diversity of forms which each of these distinct linkage mechanisms may take, and to judge these diverse forms according their empirical merit rather than our own intellectual predispositions.

The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 begins by describing the evolution of clientelistic and programmatic modes of electoral accountability, beginning in each case with a review of developments from 1950 through 1980, and then moving to an analysis of the post-1983 party system. Section 3 then briefly explores a number of explanatory factors which may account for the developments described in Section 2. I suggest that one can understand the evolution of accountability mechanisms as driven primarily by responses to developments in Turkey’s political-economy (in particular to economic development, economic growth, and economic crisis), complemented at the margins by responses to institutional reform and the domestic presence of international actors. Section 4 concludes.

2. Descriptive Section

2.1. Political Parties in the Third Turkish Republic

Turkish democracy has been plagued by cyclical instability. Full-fledged military interventions occurred in 1960, 1971, and 1980, making the current period Turkey’s longest run of largely uninterrupted parliamentary governance. The most recent intervention, executed on September 12th, 1980, was organized in response to a rising-tide of economic crisis, political violence, and international pressure. As was the case after interventions in 1960 and 1971, the junta did not conceive of itself as a permanent governing body but rather as a temporary measure, necessary to re-establish order, which would eventually preside over the return to civilian governance. This ‘re-democratization’ occurred in 1983 when, in the first post-coup general election, the center-

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76 For example, the violence of the late 1970’s corresponded to a period of highly polarized programmatic stances with a pattern of clientelism grounded in the sole provision of civil service jobs (as opposed to the local-level provision of club goods, consumer goods, and social services). 77 I employ the qualifier ‘largely’ here in recognition of the fact that in 1997 the military did cause the fall of the then ruling coalition in response to Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan’s suspected disloyalty to the Turkish Republic’s secular nature.
right Motherland Party (MP) led by technocrat and economic liberalizer Turgut Özal won a resounding victory, taking 45% of the national vote.\footnote{This result was in many ways a repudiation of the junta, as from among the three viable partisan contenders the MP was most clearly autonomous from military influence: both the People’s Party and the Nationalist Democratic Party, which garnered 30% and 23% of the vote respectively, were created by the junta itself and had quite explicit ties to the military hierarchy. The latter two parties quickly disappeared from the political scene, formally disbanding in November of 1985 and May of 1986 respectively.}

Subsequently, on September 6th of 1987 the Turkish public supported by the narrowest of margins (50.2% in favor, 49.8% against) a referendum which granted well-known political personalities from the 1970’s the right to re-enter the political fray. Süleyman Demirel and Bülent Ecevit, leading protagonists of the political right and left during the 2nd Republic, quickly assumed control over the center-right True Path Party (TTP, formed 1983) and the center-left Democratic-Left Party (DLP, formed 1985) respectively. Also on the center-left, Erdal İnönü, son of Atatürk’s successor and historical icon İsmet İnönü, assumed control over the Social Democratic Populist Party (SDPP, formed in 1985). On the right Necmettin Erbakan, who in the late 1960’s founded Turkey’s first viable Islamic political party (the National Salvation Party), assumed tacit control over the Welfare Party (WP, formed 1983), while the arch-nationalist and pan-Turkist Alparslan Türkeş formed in 1985 the National Task Party.

These center-left, center-right, and right formations have experienced a good deal of organizational instability since the germinal period between 1983 and 1987. The SBPP merged in 1995 with Deniz Baykal’s Republican People’s Party (RPP), namesake to the party created by Atatürk in 1923, which played a seminal in democratic politics between 1950 and 1980. After two decades of fratricidal competition over the center-right electorate, the MP and TPP merged in 2007 to form the Democrat Party (DP), namesake to the party which ushered in the democratic era by winning the 1950 general elections. Türkeş’s National Task Party was renamed the Nationalist Action Party (NMP) in 1993 to reflect its connection to the identically-named extreme-right party from the 1960’s and 1970’s. As well, the military and courts twice forced the closure of Islamic Parties on the basis of their alleged threat the Republic’s secular foundations. This first such closure occurred in February of 1997 when the WP was dissolved, the second in in June of 2001 when the successor Virtue Party (VP) was dissolved. This latter event created a fissure in the Islamist camp, as Erbakan and his followers quickly re-established themselves as the Felicity Party (FP), while a group of dissidents and innovators formed the more centrist Justice and Development Party (JDP), which has subsequently governed Turkey since 2002.

Seven general elections have occurred in Turkey since 1987 (in 1987, 1991, 1995, 1999, 2002, 2007, and 2011). Figure 1a plots the two most prominent center-right parties’ vote shares over the time period, demonstrating a singular negative trend culminating in the DP’s (into which both the MP and TPP had merged) near total lack of support in 2007 and 2011. Throughout the 1990’s the two parties, whose leaders were seemingly perpetually engaged in rancorous personal disputes, split nearly evenly the support of center-right voters, receiving roughly identical support levels in the 1991, 1995, and 1999 general elections.
Figure 1a about here

Figure 1b plots the two most prominent center-left parties’ vote shares over the time period, using a single line to capture the SBBP-RPP trend, since prior to 1995 the RPP didn’t compete (it formed as a result of parliamentary defections from the SBBP between 1991 and 1995), and after 1995 they merged into a single organization (the RPP). In contrast to the two center-right parties, whose vote-share moved in unison throughout this period, the DLP and SBBP-RPP vote shares tend to move in opposite directions throughout the period, with the SBBP predominant in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, the DLP predominant in the mid- and late-1990’s, and the RPP predominant in the 21st century. In response to its unprecedented lack of support in 2007, the DLP in fact disbanded, leaving the RPP as the center-left’s sole organizational representative.

Figure 1b about here

Finally, Figure 1c plots the two most prominent right parties’ vote shares over the time period, using a single line to capture trends in support for Islamist parties (WP-VP-JDP), since the VP was an explicit successor to the VP, and the JDP has now successfully consolidated its position as the system’s predominant party of Islamic heritage (the Felicity Party gained roughly 2% of all votes in the 2007 and 2011 elections). The plot demonstrates a steady rise in support for political Islam, culminating in the JDP’s 49.6% showing in the 2011 contest. The NAP’s plot is somewhat distorted, due to the fact they formed an explicit alliance with the WP in 1991, running their candidates on WP lists in order to ensure some minimal level of parliamentary representation. Thus, while technically the NTP received no votes in the 1991 contest, they were in fact responsible for some small portion of the WP’s support. After changing their name in 1993, the NAP then begins to assert itself as an independent political force, peaking with a 19% showing in the 1999 general election, and remaining to this day the third viable party in Turkish politics, behind nearly hegemonic JDP and opposition-leader RPP.

Figure 1c about here

The message conveyed by these data is one of systemic fragmentation and volatility in the 1990’s, followed by concentration and stability since 2002. Indeed, since 2002 the party system has changed little, with the RPP having consolidated its position on the ‘secularist left’, and the JDP and having completely usurped the vote of former center-right formations. These patterns of volatility and fragmentation are correlated with the presence or not of coalition government. Both the beginning and end of this period were characterized by single-party governments, with the MP ruling alone during the 17th and 18th legislative sessions and the JDP ruling alone in the 22nd, 23rd, and now the 24th legislative session. In contrast, executive coalitions ruled throughout the more volatile and fragmented 1990’s. During the 20th legislative session the ruling coalition in fact changed hands three times.79

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79 Interestingly, these coalitions were often ideologically disparate, and never simultaneously included both parties of the center-right or center-left, which. This suggests an important caveat to the above discussion, namely the attribution of programmatic affiliations to Turkey’s parties, i.e. labeling them ‘center-right’, center-left’, etc. In doing so I’ve catered to convention, as these labels are commonly used when describing the parties in question.
Since 1995, parties representing the Kurdish minority have garnered a small percentage of the electoral vote. While this vote-share reached 50% in regions such as Diyarbakır, the de facto capital of Turkey’s Kurdish Southeast, these parties failed to gain parliamentary representation due to the strict 10% minimum electoral threshold for representation at the national-level. Since 2002, candidates representing both Kurdish and leftist currents have circumvented this threshold by running as ‘independents’ in their respective constituencies, as the threshold for independent candidates is 10% district-wide rather than 10% nation-wide. Thus, since 2002 these ‘independents’ have effectively constituted a fourth legislative voting bloc, and have generally caucused together as a party once entering parliament. In the 2011 election, 35 MP’s were elected as independents, and have since caucused together under the auspices of the Peace and Democracy Party (PDP).

2.2. Programmatic Partisan Effort

For programmatic politics to be effective political parties must adopt cohesive policy stances. If parties convey mixed messages, either because key internal actors send differing programmatic messages, or due to the lack of a consistent platform and performance over time, voters will be unable to make informed decisions based on a parties’ expected policy emphases. Effective programmatic politics also requires differentiation between political parties. If all parties adopt similar platforms, voters will be afforded little by way of programmatic choice, and will likely revert to distinct factors in making electoral decisions. The following sub-Section outlines the changing patterns of internal cohesion and external differentiation which characterized parties and the party system between 1950 and 1980.

2.2.1. Cohesion and Differentiation in the First and Second Republics

Turkey’s transition to democracy occurred with the general election of 1950 when the opposition Democratic Party (DP) surprised İsmet İnonu’s Republican People’s Party (RPP), which had ruled with little opposition from its founding (1923), by winning an absolute majority in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA). While the specifics of the transition process are beyond this paper’s scope, it is worth noting that the 1950 election was not characterized by high levels of programmatic cohesion or differentiation. However, the fact that coalitions in the 1990’s did not follow clear ideological lines suggests that programmatic affiliation itself may have had less than fully determining impact on party strategies and identities during this period. The labels center-left, center-right, and right are meant only to resonate with common usage, and not as positive statements about parties’ programmatic positions or coherence.

Kitschelt and Freeze (2010) provide a more complete discussion of the necessary conditions for effective programmatic accountability. Indeed, one reason that İsmet İnonu permitted the DP’s formation in 1946 was its basic commitment to the secularist and nationalist tenets of ‘Kemalist’ ideology, commitments made credible by the fact that the DP was not a ‘bottom-up’ mass creation but the result of high-level defections by four RPP legislators. These included Celal Bayar and Adnan Menders, both of
attracted the support of additional RPP dissidents, many of whom exhibited greater opposition and acrimony towards the RPP than moderates such as DP leader Celal Bayar.\textsuperscript{82} This internal heterogeneity eventually lead DP conservatives, in favor of a more radical break with the current regime on issues of ‘statism’ and religious expression, to breakaway and form the Nation Party in 1949. Even this defection did not lead to a situation of internal coherence within the DP, as Bayar and other moderates opposed the at times harsh ‘anti-statist’ rhetoric employed by some of their compatriots, including future Prime Minister Adnan Menderes (Zürcher 1993).\textsuperscript{83}

Bayar was careful not to allow the DP platform to differ greatly from that of the RPP, claiming that the parties’ key differences were in the realm of method rather than ultimate ends (Ahmad 1993). Furthermore, to the extent that the DP did attempt to portray itself as less dogmatically secularist and more friendly to the private-sector, the RPP quickly countered. At its 1947 Congress, RPP leaders developed a five-year economic plan which explicitly supported the role of free and private enterprise in Turkey’s economic development, and made overtures towards a muted form of state secularism, deciding among other things to allow religious education in primary schools, and to create a series of new preacher training programs (\textit{imam-hatip kursları}).\textsuperscript{84} The RPP itself was far from internally coherent, as hardliners led by former Prime Minister Recep Peker openly opposed these policy changes, along with the very notion of regime liberalization and parliamentary opposition (Tachau 1991; Karpat 1959). All of this created a situation in which two internally incoherent party organizations adopted formal platforms with significant overlap, not a situation ripe for programmatic competition. The DP’s victory resulted rather from an overwhelming expression of dissatisfaction with the one-party system, and the successful politicization of local-level conflicts.\textsuperscript{85}

The DP ruled Turkey from 1950 until 1960, during which time general elections were held in 1954 and 1957. In the early part of the decade programmatic linkage remained fairly

\textsuperscript{82} The best example is Fevzi Çakmak, who favored a much less conciliatory line, and who subsequently served as the newly formed Nation Party’s figurehead (Karpat 1959).

\textsuperscript{83} Even after the defection of its most conservative wing, Zürcher describes the DP as “…essentially bound together by their joint opposition to the RPP, not by a coherent political program of their own.” (Zürcher 1993, pg. 214).

\textsuperscript{84} These moves were complemented by İnönü’s choice of Şemsettin Gümaltay as Prime Minister in 1949, whose reputation as a theologian and pious individual was used to signal the RPP’s evolving attitudes towards secularism (see Karpat 1959, and Tachau 1991 for a discussion of the RPP’s strategy of moderation prior to the 1950 general election).

\textsuperscript{85} This absence of programmatic structuration is reinforced by the fact that local politics during the transition period seem to have been dominated by micro-level cleavages rather macro-level programmatic issues. Evidence suggests that pre-existing conflicts between families and clans were quickly politicized in the 1946-1950 period, as those local elements who had traditionally been excluded from power in the one-party era quickly affiliated themselves with DP branch structures; in turn, throughout the 1950’s vote choice in most constituencies followed fairly closely these micro-level divisions of clan and family (Şzyliowicz 1966; Sayarı 1975; Meeker 2002).
muted, with the both the DP and the RPP rather securing support on the basis of various forms of targeted clientelistic exchange (see Section 2.3.1 below). However, as the decade progressed the DP in particular began to express a more differentiated set of policy positions. After four years of strong growth between 1950 and 1954, as the economy began to sputter in 1954 the DP increasingly emphasized inflationary economic policies which favored the countryside (most importantly price supports on agricultural commodities); to the exclusion of the economic policies favored by their party’s urban commercial supporters. Perhaps even more marked was its increasingly differentiated stance on the issue of religious expression. While early in the decade the DP had demonstrated an explicit commitment to state secularism, as the decade progressed and the party system became more competitive, then-leader Menderes began to more freely play the religious card.

The increasingly differentiated policy stances promoted by upper-level DP officials were not necessarily a reflection of internal cohesion. Sayarı demonstrates that, throughout the 1950’s, the primary challenges faced by DP leader Menderes was not that of defeating the opposition, but rather that of maintaining discipline over and managing an unruly and heterogeneous organization. Internal dissension led to the defection, and subsequent formation of the Freedom Party in 1955, by a group of dissidents with ties to urban commercial interests. While this departure somewhat increased the DP’s internal coherence, and equation with rural interests in the area of economic policy, the DP remainder a fairly loose organization comprised of distinct and heterogeneous factions and interests. Indeed, the analysis in Section 3 suggests that increasing policy differentiation over the course of the 1950’s may in fact have been a tool used by DP leader to maintain party discipline when faced with a decreasing resource pool and a heterogeneous organization.

In addition to becoming increasingly programmatic, as its hold on government weakened the DP’s behavior in office became increasingly repressive and intolerant of opposition. Press laws were tightened, RPP assets were seized, and in 1960 began a series of targeted state investigations of opposition politicians (Sarıbay 1991). In 1960, increased repression and ideological discontent pushed thousands of students into the Istanbul streets in protest, which contributed to the eventual military intervention of May 27th, 1960. The military governed for only a single year, during which time a new constitution was written by a team of lawyers and academics. Parliamentary elections in 1961 thus ushered in the Second Turkish Republic, which lasted from 1961-1980. It was during this period that programmatic politics began to take shape

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86 For example, in June 1951 the DP arrested dozens of members of the Ticanis religious order for vandalizing statues of Atatürk, and then in September of the same year passed the ‘Atatürk’ bill which granted the state increased leeway in prosecuting contestation of Atatürk’s secularist and modernizing reforms (Sarıbay 1991).

87 Concrete examples of this included the expansion of preachers’ seminaries to 16 cities in 1954-1955, tolerating the revival of (and benefiting from the support of…) religious brotherhoods in 1956-1957, and openly employing religious symbolism for political gain, including the portrayal of Menderes’ survival of a plane wreck in 1959 as a matter of divine providence (Sarıbay 1991).
across the entirety of the political spectrum; many of the issue cleavages which appeared during this period remain important in contemporary Turkish elections.  

Perhaps the Second Republic’s most prominent programmatic development was the RPP’s transformation into an explicitly left-of-center party, whose internal cohesiveness and policy distinctiveness evolved incrementally over the 20-year span. This internal transition was led by Bülent Ecevit, who had previously served as the party’s Minister of Labor. The RPP platform for the 1965 general election made explicit reference to social issues, and was labeled ‘left of center’ (ortanın solu) by party officials. Importantly, this platform was not initially representative of a coherent set of interests within the RPP, and was adopted fairly contentiously. After the ‘left of center’ platform lead to a fairly disappointing electoral performance in 1965 (28.7%, while the Worker’s Party received 3%), critics of this leftist turn defected in 1967 to form the centrist Reliance Party (Sayarı 1975; Bektaş 1988), leaving the RPP temporarily weakened but also more internally homogeneous, a crucial step in becoming programmatically credible. While İnonu continued to serve as the party’s Chairman, Ecevit used his position as General-Secretary to further increase programmatic cohesiveness by reshaping the party’s organizational cadre, at times coming into direct conflict with traditional RPP actors over issues of candidate selection and branch staffing (Bektaş 1988). The RPP’s consummation as a cohesive left-of-center organization came at the Extraordinary Party Congress of 1972 when Ecevit, based on the support he had established among regional and local branch delegates, shockingly ousted the quasi-mythical İnonu as Chairman (Bektaş 1988).  

A similar evolution occurred within the Justice Party (JP), the DP’s more or less explicit successor and the party system’s dominant right organization during the second Republic. Throughout the early- to mid-1960’s the JP was characterized by fairly intense factional competition between representatives of distinct ideological tendencies. Over time party leader

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88 As we’ll see in Section 3, this evolution was aided not only socio-economic trends, but also by the Constitution of the Second Republic itself, which granted wide-ranging associational rights not present in the prior constitution, assigned the state an explicit role in generating growth, and put in place a proportional representation system which would facilitate the political rise of smaller and ideologically-driven organizations.

89 Ultimately, Ecevit convinced İnonu and other party leaders that the RPP’s best hope for future electoral success was by competing for support among left-leaning intellectuals and the urban squatter communities growing on the outskirts of big cities. His argument was aided by the appearance in 1963 of the Turkish Worker’s Party, which guaranteed that the left-right economic issue dimension would be politicized in 1965, and which threatened to be the main beneficiary of that shift. The RPP did not move fast (Tachau 1991).

90 This programmatic redefinition paid off in the 1973 election, when for the first time the RPP competed as an identifiably left-leaning organization, and won an electoral plurality (33.3%) based on shifting support in precisely the squatter communities where social justice and social security were becoming increasingly prominent issues (Özbudun 1976).

91 This competition crystallized in two camps, the ‘moderates’ led by Süleyman Demirel and comprised primarily of commercial and agricultural economic interests, and the ‘radicals’ led Saddettin Bilgiç and comprising more conservative members, often of Islamist and/or nationalist
Süleyman Demirel’s ability to control the JP’s disparate internal coalition waned, and a number of its pieces eventually broke away, which had the dual consequence of decreasing JP’s vote share but increasing its internal programmatic coherence. By the 1973 election, representatives of agricultural interests had defected to form the Democratic Party (aptly named in a bid for the DP’s legacy), proponents of political Islam led by Necmettin Erbakan had left the JP to form the National Salvation Party, and Turkish nationalists led by Alparslan Türkeş had formed the Nationalist Action Party. This left the JP a fairly coherent organization comprised of primarily commercial and industrial interests (Levi 1991).

Indeed, the post-coup election of 1973 was in many ways the most coherent programmatic contest to that point in Turkey’s democratic history. Both the RPP and JP had experienced the ideological ‘trimming’ and defections necessary for internal coherence, and the new centrist, Islamist, and Nationalist parties which resulted from this trimming process themselves presented the electorate fairly coherent and distinctive ideological profiles. As the election’s plurality winner, the RPP formed a fairly coherent coalition with the Islamist NSP, which in many ways was the RPP’s closest programmatic neighbor, sharing with it a criticism of rampant capitalism, a critical vision of international politics, and a belief in economic redistribution (Ahmad 1993).

Between 1973 and 1980 these trends to some extent undid themselves, as increasingly fierce electoral competition between the RPP and JP impelled each of them to court past dissidents back into their ranks, in the search for additional votes. The system’s small parties became steadily smaller and the RPP and JP each developed, once again, fairly sizeable and heterogeneous ‘internal markets’. Importantly, this increasing lack of programmatic coherence should not be mistaken for a lack of ideological polarization between the two parties. In fact, the absorption of ethnic and religious issues into the left-right economic cleavage created a partisan gulf between the JP and RPP which may not have existed on matters of economic governance alone (Ahmad 1993). As noted above, the polarization of the late 1970’s may have been a tool employed by both Demirel and Ecevit to instill party discipline in heterogeneous organizations when faced with sever resource constraints. A combination of economic crisis and increasing violence eventually ended with the coup on September 12th, 1980.

2.2.2. Programmatic Politics since 1983


92 By the late 1970’s the JP comprised not only commercial and agricultural interests but also Islamists and nationalists, many of whose attitudes towards the state and the economy were not perfectly in line with those of the JP’s established constituencies Similarly, the RPP had become a haven not only for industrial workers, urban squatters, and professionals, but also for activists from the budding Kurdish autonomy movement, as well as representatives of Turkey’s Alevi community, a Shi’a sect which comprises about 15% of Turkey’s population.
This internal heterogeneity was matched by programmatic inconsistencies in the MP’s economic policy-making. Despite its neo-liberal rhetoric, promotion of exports, and financial deregulation, the MP’s behavior with regards to the SOE-sector was hardly radical. Privatization proceeded fairly slowly, and the use of SOE’s for political purposes remained rampant (Rokrik 1990; see Section 2.3 below). Its victories in the 1983 and 1987 elections were due more to anti-military sentiment and protest, complemented by a good deal of clientelism, than to its programmatic platforms. Just as Demirel had trouble maintaining JP discipline in the 1960’s, Özal’s ability to manage this disparate coalition withered with time, and in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s’ key elements began to defect (Zürcher 1993; Kalaycıoğlu 2002). However, in contrast to developments in the late 1960’s, this ‘trimming’ down process did not generate a party system populated by internally cohesive parties with externally distinctive programmatic platforms. Rather, it ushered in a decade of electoral volatility in which competition centered as much on party leaders’ personalities as on instrumental/material considerations, whether of a clientelistic or programmatic nature.

The weakness of programmatic structure in the 1990’s is well-documented elsewhere (see the essays in Rubin and Heper 2002). As noted above, both the center-right and center-left in the 1990’s were divided between organizations with little to exhibit by way of policy difference. Leaders of all four parties engaged in an almost perpetual jockeying for policy differentiation. This jockeying was ultimately counterproductive, as the nearly constant change of tone and message undermined the credibility of programmatic messages. The highly disparate of nature coalition governments, which often contained parties with “…different, sometimes irreconcilable political zeal and agendas,” (Odekon 2005, pg. 29) provides an additional glimpse into the 1990’s programmatic weakness.

This lack of programmatic structure in elections structuration is also evident at the popular level. Not only were levels of voter volatility extremely high from one election to the next; furthermore, analysis of public opinion data from the World Values Survey (1994-1999) demonstrates that neither demographic traits nor policy attitudes had much predictive value for explaining voter choice in the 1995 election (results omitted for reasons of space). In short, politics in the 1990’s were largely dominated by parties of the center-right and center-left that exhibited very little by way programmatic differentiation from one another, and whose programmatic messages and organizational cadres were plagued by time inconsistency and volatility. This lack of coherence and differentiation was reflected at the popular level, where voter choice had little to do with the common demographic and attitudinal features typically associated with programmatic linkage.

93 In a description which could have been applied to leaders of any of the four center parties, Cizre describes Tansu Çiller, leader of the center-right True Path Party in the mid- and late-1990’s, as “…renowned for simultaneously subscribing to diametrically opposite positions and of embracing incompatible positions.” (Cizre 2002, pg. 90) In addition to this waffling at the leadership level, party cadres were highly volatile during the 1990’s, in particular within the legislature where levels of party-hopping reached astronomical proportions, with roughly 30% of all legislators during this period switching partisan affiliations at least once while in Parliament. While some of these switches were for genuine ideological reasons, a large majority occurred due to more mundane considerations of re-election and material reward.
That said, while elections in the 1990’s themselves were not driven by programmatic campaigns and voting, Turkish society at the time was undergoing a series of social processes which would, at the turn of the 21st century, be responsible for introducing a measure of programmatic cohesiveness and differentiation into the Turkish party system. The military junta of 1980-1983 conceived of a moderate and unifying form of political Islam, referred to as the *Turkish-Islamic synthesis*, as preferable the class- and ethnicity-based polarization of the late 1970’s. This new openness to religious confession, exhibited nowhere more explicitly than in the political predominance of Turgut Özal, whose family had explicit ties to religious brotherhoods, led to a cultural and intellectual flourishing of contemporary Islamic political thought and activity (White 2002; Yavuz 2003). Tied to this revival of cultural and political Islam was a steady rise in the prominence of neo-liberal attitudes and ideas regarding economic governance. Economic liberalization in the 1980’s lead to the appearance of a new class of entrepreneurs at the head of successful medium-sized firms, often labeled the ‘Anatolian tigers’. These new businessmen tended to combine conservative attitudes regarding religion and religious practice with highly non-interventionist views on matters of economic policy (Yavuz 2003). At the helm of professional associations such as MÜSİAD, a business association comprising primarily conservative heads of mid-level firms, as well as explicitly confessional charitable foundations (White 2002), they were able to use wealth, influence, and prestige to promote this programmatic profile at the popular level.94

In addition to the increasing prominence of Islamic and neo-liberal social currents, one can also point to the steadily increasing violence in the Kurdish Southeast as a source of programmatic experimentation, and eventually realignment. After a period of cease-fire, in the early 1990’s the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), which had been engaged in explicit conflict with the Turkish state since 1984, once again began dedicatedly attacking Turkish military and police installations, and engaging in large-scale skirmishes with the Turkish army. This impelled many ethnic majority Turks to assume increasingly nationalist positions, and to attach great levels of symbolic importance to events such as the capture of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in 1999.

As issues of political Islam, economic liberalism, and Kurdish separatism gained in prominence, the electorate also began to exhibit a strong rightward tendency. Data in Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu (2007; 2009) demonstrates a marked shift in voter’s self-identification: by 1996, a shocking 18% of voters self-identify as ‘far-right’, with the total share of voters self-identifying as somewhere on the right at 38.9%, up from 22.7% in 1990. Much of this evolution occurs as a result of voters moving shifting from the ‘center’, whose share of self-identifiers dropped from 43.5% in 1990 to 32.6% in 1996, while the percentage of respondents self-identifying as

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94 While individual-level attitudes towards the state’s role in economic governance are more difficult to track, there was undoubtedly a good deal of pent up hostility to the inept economic policy of the 1990’s: through the entire decade Turkey’s economy was in nearly perpetual crisis, resulting in over two-dozen IMF-imposed stabilization programs. It is likely that much of the ‘protest voting’ which was a feature of the 1999 and 2002 elections was economic in nature, resulting from dissatisfaction not only with incumbent performance but also basic features of Turkey’s political-economy (Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu 2007).
somewhere on the left stayed roughly the same (21.8% to 19.8%). Thus, although elections in the 1990’s did not generally turn on programmatic grounds, social evolutions in the realms of political Islam, political economy, and ethnic conflict seemed to be introducing a shift in programmatic self-identifications.

The Justice and Development Party’s (JDP) electoral landslide in 2002 ushered in a period of greater programmatic cohesiveness and differentiation, grounded in the aforementioned social processes. Three of the four centrist organizations predominant in the 1990’s have at this point all but disappeared from the party system, which is now populated by the near-hegemonic JDP, the contemporary RPP led by Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, the Nationalist Movement Party () lead by Develet Bahçeli, the Islamist Felicity Party (FP), and the Peace and Democracy Party (PDP) comprised of primarily Kurdish representatives. I now present a series of data from the recently released Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project (DALP) 95 which confirm that these parties exhibit a degree of cohesion and differentiation, and that this programmatic structuring occurs primarily along the political-Islamic, ethno-nationalist, and political-economic cleavage lines which became increasingly salient in the 1990’s.

The DALP is an expert survey put into the field in 88 contemporary states. One of its modules asked academics, NGO employees, and journalists with expertise on party competition were asked to identify parties’ programmatic stances on a variety of issues using a 10-point scale. If parties present a coherent ideology position to the electorate, there should be little disagreement among experts in how parties are described. Furthermore, if parties exhibit genuinely distinct policy programs then experts’ placement of these parties should be fairly dispersed on the 1-10 scale. Table 1 presents the mean positions and standard deviations of parties on six distinct programmatic issues.

Table 1 about here

Begin with the Table’s final column, which presents the mean placement and standard deviations of expert judgments for parties on a generic ‘left-right’ continuum, where lower scores imply greater leftism. The first thing to notice is that parties are fairly well dispersed on this continuum, with the DSP holding down the left, the JDP and RPP occupying center-right and center positions respectively, and the NAP and FP assuming right positions. Moving to cohesiveness, in the entire data set, which contains of 506 political parties in 88 countries, the average standard deviation of expert placements on this index 1.59; if we look only at developing countries, the average standard deviation goes up to 1.79, reflecting greater uncertainty about parties’ ideological positions in these contexts. This suggests that, on the whole, Turkish parties seem to be reasonably coherent, though this is less so for the two largest parties, the JDP and RPP. However, these two parties exhibit a high degree of internal coherence and policy differentiation on the issue measured in column six, which asked respondents to code party positions on the right to wear headscarves in public places.

95 http://www.duke.edu/web/democracy/
At first glance, a number of the standard deviations of assessments on specific issues are at or above 3 units, suggesting that on the specifics Turkish political formations are fairly incoherent programmatically. However, a closer look demonstrates that most of these extremely high variances occur either: a.) for the Democratic Society Party (DSP), since renamed the Peace and Democracy Party (PDP), which is essentially a single-issue Kurdish party comprised of former independents which did not run a coherent platform in the preceding election; or b.) for the issue item in column 1. With regards to the later item, the JDP’s high variance likely reflects a strategic dilemma the JDP faces: the party wants to liberalize, but must compensate the potential losers of liberalization, and primarily poor voters. The ambivalent and confused scores of the experts reflect this. This dilemma may generate some genuine policy disagreement within JDP ranks as to how much public-sector compensation is needed, and how much of this compensation clientelistically, via the deployment of civil society networks funded by private-sector actors.

Overall, if one puts aside the PDP cells (row 4) as well as the cells from column 1, both of which are subject to natural confusion, the picture painted by Table 1 is one of reasonable programmatic coherence and differentiation. Interestingly, issues related to traditional authority (column 4), national identity (column 5), and public religiosity (column 6) more closely correlate with parties’ left-right placement than economic issues (columns 1-3). An economic divide does however exist, distinguishing the staunchly pro-market JDP and the remaining four parties, all of which are willing to countenance a great role for the state in economic affairs. Given that party I positions on social and cultural issues correlate more strongly with their placement on a simple ‘left-right’ scale, one might assume that the economic cleavage which distinguishes the JDP from opposition parties is perhaps not terribly salient. I can report based on a series of recent visits that, nearly to an individual, opposition supporters criticize the JDP for ‘selling their country’ while JDP supporters praise their party for ‘attracting international investment’. The current party system thus exhibits some degree two-dimensionality, though the two largest parties find themselves at opposite ends on BOTH dimensions, whereas only two small parties justify the characterization of Turkish party competition as cross-cutting.

2.3. Programmatic Responsiveness of Voters

Table 2 shows the mean issue positions of parties’ supporters, based on the World Value Survey 2005-7. On the left-right scale, consistent with the DALP experts’ placement, supporters of DSP tend to identify themselves as more left wing, while NAP and FP voters hold more right-wing attitudes. However, differences between the mean left-right positions of JDP and RPP’s electorate are larger than at the elite level. On specific economic issues, party supporters’ positions are less distinguishable, and the standard deviations around the mean positions are generally larger. Compared to supporters of other four parties, JDP voters do not take a more pro-market stance. Consistent with the patterns at the elite level, voters’ attitudes on the issue of national identity are more closely correlated with their left-right placement.
2.4. Clientelistic Partisan Effort

The previous Section described programmatic politics since 1950, identifying cycles of internal cohesiveness and external differentiation in parties’ programmatic appeals. How do parties maintain their support during periods of programmatic weakness when parties fail to announce cohesive and distinct platforms, as occurred in the early 1950’s and the entire 1990’s? Furthermore, during periods of more or less effective programmatic structuring, are there nonetheless other tools that politicians may use to secure popular support and participation? In response: non-programmatic, personalized exchange is an enduring feature of Turkish politics. This sub-Section describes the evolution of clientelistic linkages, grounded in the direct exchange of goods and services for political support, since the democratic transition in 1950.

2.4.1. Clientelism in the First and Second Turkish Republics (1950-1980)

The one-party RPP regime which ruled from 1923 until 1950 was grounded in an explicit coalition between the modernizing republican elite, comprised primarily of bureaucrats, military officers, and upper-level party cadre, and local notables who served as the state’s representatives in the Anatolian periphery (Karpat 1964). Prior to democratization in 1950, the relationship between these local notables and their client populations in the countryside was largely hierarchical and uni-directional. Clientelist exchange was of a traditional nature: large landholders and/or powerful local merchants provided scarce products, such as seed and equipment, in return for which they extracted from client populations any agricultural surplus at or beyond bare subsistence (Zürcher 1993, pg. 210). To the extent that local patrons did serve to bridge the ‘center-periphery’ gap, it was most often to ensure that tax and extraction policies emanating from the state apparatus were implemented at the local-level, rather than to ensure that local interests were given political voice in Ankara (Tachau 1991; Zürcher 2003). Put quite simply, the peasant population received little by way of political representation or material benefit from clientelistic arrangements during the one-party regime.

Things changed drastically with the advent of democratic competition. Beginning with its formation in 1946, the DP’s ranks at the local-level quickly filled with a new class of notables, comprised in many regions of merchants, businessmen, and professionals whose economic and social status had risen during the one-party regime without a parallel increase in their access to political power (Szyliowicz 1966; Sayarı 1975; Meeker 2002; see fn 10). With the DP victory in 1950, this new elite found itself vaulted to the apex of local hierarchies, replacing former RPP notables in their privileged access to the state. Concerned as much with their newfound local status as with national developments, these DP notables understood the role that privileged

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96 “The first group consisted of ‘civilianized’ military men, intellectuals, and professionals closely associated with the government…. The second power group – the one at the local level – consisted of landlords, ex officials or religious orders and government, some craft groups, and a variety of individuals who led leading religious or cultural positions in the traditionalist era.” (Karpat 1964, pgs. 51-52) This alliance dated in fact to the War of Independence itself, in which the need to organize all of Anatolia in local defense committees forced Republican leaders to, reluctantly, rely on local power brokers whose world-view was often not in-line with their own brand of modernizing positivism (Karpat 1959).
access to material and bureaucratic resources could play in cementing their local status. Targeted material exchange thus represented an attractive strategy for both national-level DP leaders and local-level DP representatives, as the resulting political support contributed to both the party’s national vote share and to the notable’s local status.

Beginning in the early 1950’s, the primary services which the DP offered its supporters were privileged access to community-level development projects and individual-level ombudsman services (Sayarı 1975; 1977). As noted in Karpat (1973), one result of the shift to a more responsive form of clientelism after the transition to democracy was the transfer of state investment from railroads to roads, which were much higher on villagers’ list of requests. Anthropological evidence in Szylowaicz (1966) identifies the clientelistic logic in road building decisions, demonstrating in a comparison of two communities that having a DP majority and a powerful DP broker was which the determining factor for access to road development projects. Beyond highways and roads, the DP also distributed community development projects in the form of schools and Mosques, providing public funds for Mosque construction in over 15,000 communities during their tenure in office (Sarıbay 1991). DP brokers also provided individual-level ombudsman services, helping local constituents secure access to in agricultural credit, hospital treatment in the regional capital, and other public resources. By the decade’s end, a period of low growth, increasing inflation, and eventual IMF intervention left the DP without the fiscal flexibility to engage in extensive rural development projects. This reduced clientelistic capacity may have much to do with the increased deployment of programmatic policies such as commodity price floors and the support of Islamic practice and expression (Section 3).

Throughout the 1950’s the RPP remained largely aloof from this form of decentralized and contingent accountability, in part due to the fact that, as an opposition party, they simply could not match the DP’s access to state largesse; but also in part to an inherent inertia inside the party which was reluctant to transcend their own political elitism (Bektaş 1988; Sayarı 1975). However, this is not to say that clientelistic relations were non-existent in the RPP ranks. On the contrary, the one area of Turkey in which the RPP was able to maintain a stronghold throughout the 1950’s was the highly under-developed Southeast, where a more traditional form of patron-client relationship still held sway (Özbudun 1976; Tachau 1991). These were communities in which, at the moment of democratization, the lack of economic and social development implied the absence of a local alternative to the traditional elite, who still delivered entire villages to the RPP in exchange for legislative candidacy and other spoils.

Heightened urbanization, industrialization, and economic planning during the Second Republic presented new tools and settings for the development of clientelistic relationships. Beginning in the 1960’s, accelerating urbanization led to the rapid growth of urban squatter settlements (gecekondu). Throughout the early 1960’s the JP was the primary operator in these communities, providing benefits such as electrification or land deeds in exchange for a community’s political support; and shoring this support at the individual-level with a network of local representatives, capable of securing work, lodging, German work Visas, and other scarce

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97 Özbudun (1981) notes that the DP often under-funded road projects prior to elections or other political events, ensuring their support by promising to make up the difference, as long as they were provided the requisite electoral and political support.
resources for community residents (Sherwood 1967; Karpat 1976; Sayarı 1977). While never able to match the DP in countryside, by 1973 the RPP under Ecevit had also established itself as a viable competitor for clientelist loyalties in the squatter settlements, and in the 1973 election for the first time gained more support in urban districts than in the under-developed Southeast.

Beyond urbanization, a newly adopted policy of state led Import-Substituting-Industrialization (ISI), consonant with explicit economic planning commitments forged in the 1960 Constitution, also provided new avenues for clientelastic exchange. It generated for the first time a genuine working class and working-class organizations such as the trade union federation Türk-İş, whose policy of non-partisanship was maintained expressly to be able to secure resources from distinct parties (Ecevit 1972), and whose cadre were granted list positions on both parties’ candidate slates (Sayarı 1975). It also created a large sector of State-Operated-Enterprises (SOE’s) whose ranks could be filled according to clientelist logic. These public-sector corporations provided a flexible tool for consummating clientelist linkages. Unlike community-development projects, which require some measure of logistical organization and planning, enticements such as public sector employment and wage hikes could be arranged with a phone-call or a flick of the pen. This flexibility was further enhanced by the fact that budgetary procedures for SOE’s were often non-transparent, and granted elected officials access to pools of resources which were not subject to legislative oversight (Waterbury 1993).

Through the 1960’s and early 1970’s, first the JP and then the RPP developed a fairly diverse clientelistic profile, devoting effort to the provision of community-level projects, individual-level benefits, ombudsman services, and access to public employment. The mid-1970’s saw the onset of economic crisis, caused both by a combination of internal inefficiencies and external events (such as the oil shocks of 1973). This crisis reduced political parties’ fiscal flexibility, naturally pushing them to emphasize the use of ‘easy’ clientelistic mechanisms, and in particular public sector employment, which could manipulated with minimal organization, investment, and oversight. While SOE’s had since their inception been subject to some politically driven turnover, these turnover rates increased exponentially in the mid 1970’s, such that entire firms and thousands of workers routinely changed hands according to political cycles. Waterbury (1993) reports that, when the JP took over government from the RPP in 1979, 90% of SOE’s upper-level management changed hands, confirming a trend by which an SOE manager’s average term dropped from 3.5 to 1.7 years over the 1973-1980 period (pg. 165). Beyond perverse manipulation SOE’s, the clientelistic provision of more traditional civil service jobs and rewards increased drastically between 1973 and 1980, as parties began to occupy entire government Ministries, which they then used as clientelist resource pools and dispersal mechanisms. Not unlike the situation of the late 1950’s, as fiscal flexibility dried in the mid-1970’s so did parties’ capacity to deliver local-level development projects. In response, the RPP and JP resorted to the manipulation of public employment in the civil service and SOE’s.

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98 The most obvious example of such occupation is the NMP’s monopolistic use of the Ministry of Police in the mid- to late-1970’s.
2.4.2. Clientelistic Linkage post-1983

Upon assuming power, the MP availed itself of many of the same clientelist tools present prior to the 1980 coup. It provided deeds of ownership and community-level development projects in exchange for support in squatter neighborhoods (White 2002); it distributed contracts for development projects to its organizational members, who themselves came often from the pool of pro-market entrepreneurs flourishing in an increasingly unregulated environment; and it used the SOE’s for political purposes, availing themselves of extra-budgetary resources not subject to standard bureaucratic of parliamentary oversight (Rodrik 1990; Waterbury 1993). With the advent of another inflationary crisis in the late 1980’s, Turkey entered a decade in which the SQ center-left and center-right parties put less emphasis on the provision of community-development projects than they did on the provision of privileged access to procurement contracts (Çarkoğlu 1995) and the staffing of SOE’s (Kemahlıoğlu 2011), conforming to now recurring trend by which fiscal constraints lead to the emphasis of ‘easy’ clientelistic mechanisms which require little by way of planning or oversight.

While this conventional sequence was playing out among the SQ parties, social movements and political parties associated with political Islam were defying the mold, implementing an extensive and ambitious range of clientelist practices despite the constraints of economic crisis. This was possible due to the fact that their resource pool was not tied exclusively to public sector largesse. As noted above, in 1980’s and 1990’s there appeared a class of private sector entrepreneurs who were fairly committed Muslims. With profits derived in the private sector, this new class of elites supported both civil society organizations addressing Islam’s cultural and political redefinition, as well as networks of charitable foundations (vakıflar) and neighborhood associations devoted to helping needy individuals and communities (White 2002; Yavuz 2003). First the Welfare Party, and subsequently the Virtue Party and the currently ruling JDP, have maintained close and semi-formalized linkages to these organizational networks. Even prior to assuming power, this allowed the Welfare Party to offer a wide range of individual-level goods and services (food, coal, medical bills, local dispute resolution, etc.) and community-level projects (schools, libraries, Iftar celebrations, etc.), at a time when incumbent parties were emphasizing the use of more traditional clientelistic mechanisms such as access to public sector employment. Since coming to power in 2002, access to state resources during a time of economic growth has only enhanced the JDP’s ability to deliver these individual and community-level services.

This is not to say that, as incumbents, the JDP has eschewed other forms of clientelism associated with control over the public sector. One hears frequent complaints from opposition

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99 White (2002) also tells of an illuminating anecdote in which MP operatives are said to have distributed checks for $75 to residents of squatter neighborhoods, which due to an administrative technicality could only be cashed if the MP secured re-election.

100 White (2002) documents complaints from residents of a lower-income an Istanbul regarding the SQ parties’ failure to provide their neighborhood an ambulance. The same residents were thrilled to report that the ambulance eventually arrived when the Welfare Party won office, a tangible manifestation of the advantage political-Islam has maintained in consummating this form of clientelist linkage.
parties and voters that, for example, the staffing of municipal police departments and the granting of public-sector procurement contracts are organized on clientelist grounds. Data from the DALP allows us to assess just how successful the currently ruling JDP has been in cultivating direct material exchanges with voters, and also whether or not that success varies according to the form of clientelist exchange in question. It also allows us to assess whether or not the RPP and, as opposition parties, have continued to implement the ‘easy’ forms of clientelism they emphasized in the 1990’s; and whether they have taken steps to develop the kinds of community- and individual-level strategies honed by the JDP. Finally, it allows us to evaluate the extent to which the Kurdish faction in Parliament engages in clientelistic exchange. The latter is interesting in that there are two distinct elements within this faction: those individuals whose political prominence comes from their ideological affiliation to issues of Kurdish separatism, and those whose prestige comes from their traditional tribal or clan leaders, which are still a common source of power in the Turkish Southeast. We saw above that the DSP exhibited little by way of ideological coherence. That fact, when combined with an assessment their relative effort and effectiveness at consummating clientelistic relationships, may allow for some tentative remarks regarding this party’s core character.

Questions B1 to B5 from the survey instrument ask experts to rank parties on a 1 to 4 scale on five distinct indices of clientelist exchange, with 4 (1) indicating that parties make a ‘heavy’ (‘no’) investment of effort on the type of exchange in question. Table 3 lists the current parties’ average across all experts on the five dimensions of exchange.

Before studying these results note that, aggregated across the entire sample of 506 parties in 88 countries, the party averages on these five items are in the 2’s, with the lowest party average occurring in column 1 (mean=2.29; N=506) and the highest in column 2 (mean=2.57; N=506). These low and high averages increase to 2.56 and 2.76 respectively in less developed countries (below the 80th centile on per-capita income), and suggest that while on average developed countries are less clientelistic than developing countries, this is especially true when it comes to provision of consumer goods, which makes perfect sense: voters’ interest in goods such as food, coal, and washing machines should dull with economic development. Turning to the Turkish results, these data suggest that on the whole, Turkish parties are fairly clientelistic registering scores which are above the sample means in an overwhelming number of Table 3’s cells.

They also confirm the superiority often attributed to the JDP in matters of clientelist exchange, but with some caveats. Firstly, the imbalance in clientelistic effort between the JDP and the remaining parties is most pronounced in columns 1 and 2 (and especially the former), which capture the provision of individual-level goods and services and the provision of social policy/targeted community projects. On the other hand, this effort imbalance shrinks when we move to the traditional forms of public sector-driven clientelism, and is particularly reduced in the third column, which captures the manipulation of public employment. Indeed, the RPP and seem to have maintained the emphasis inherited from politics in the 1990’s with an emphasis on both the provision of public employment and procurement contracts, and a lack of neighborhood and community-level efforts. That said, these two parties are judged by experts to be far less
effective (column 6) at turning their clientelist effort into actual vote shares, a fact which is self-evident given the JDP’s currently dominant electoral position (see Figure 1c). On the whole, the JDP emerges here as uniquely capable clientelist organization, capable of effectively consummating clientelistic linkages of a wide variety. Finally, it is interesting that the pro-Kurdish faction surfaces as the second most intent and effective clientelist party in the parliament. While the image of the Kurdish faction in Parliament is often one of ideological cohesion and radicalism, when paired with this faction’s lack of programmatic coherence, the above data suggest that, in keeping with common wisdom, a good portion of this party’s support is won on quite traditional grounds.

2.5. Party Organization in Turkey

Kitschelt and Kselman (2010) argue that political parties’ organizational structures are related to the types of accountability mechanisms they deploy. Clientelism is most common in highly centralized parties with vast informal network ties to local intermediaries and civil society groups. Programmatism is most common in parties with dense formal organizations (local branch structures, ancillary groups such as sport clubs and women’s associations, etc.), and in large parties with fairly decentralized nominating procedures. Turkish political parties have a reputation for being highly centralized, and highly dependent on the charismatic appeal of their executive leaders (Rubin and Heper 2002; Heper and Landau 1991). It is also common wisdom that the JDP has better developed local networks, both of the informal variety (ties to non-affiliated notables and civil society groups) and of the formal branch variety.

Data from the DALP allow us to quantify these phenomena, and determine the extent to which they vary across parties. Experts were asked to assess the extent to which political parties maintained active formal branch structures (survey item A1); the extent to which political parties maintained informal ties to local notables and civil society leaders (A3); and the level of centralization in their procedures for nominating candidates, moving from highly centralized parties in which leaders dominate candidate selection processes to highly decentralized parties in which rank-and-file party members control access to candidacy (A5). Finally, survey item E1 asks experts to judge the extent to which parties’ electoral support was grounded in the party leader’s charismatic personality. Table 4 provides party means on these indices.

Table 4 about here

The sample means (506 parties in 88 countries) on formal and informal organization are 1.92 and 1.79 respectively (with little difference between more and less developed countries), suggesting that Turkish parties are fairly extensive organizations on all fronts. Furthermore, while the JDP maintains an overall advantage formal and informal network extensiveness, the advantage is a good deal more pronounced for the latter. Average centralization and charismatic leadership in the 506-party sample are 2.43 and 2.84 respectively, which in turn confirms that Turkish parties tend to be highly centralized organizations in which leaders’ charisma plays an important role.
2.6. Legislative Organization of Party Caucuses

Legislative organization in Turkey bears little resemblance to American congressional institutions. Committee structures are areas fairly weak, and most legislative activity is organized by and around party factions. To form an official caucus, which allows even the opposition organizations some access to public resources, parties must maintain the adherence of at least 20 affiliated members of parliament. Generally, party discipline is strictly maintained, though there have been some glaring instances of defection in recent history: the defection of large numbers of JDP backbenchers when Erdoğan presented legislation which would have given the US fly-over rights in the Iraqi conflict; and more recently the defection of a small number of JDP backbenchers on a vote concerning constitutional reform. In the 1990’s, rather than these somewhat dramatic defections on specific votes, party-switching represented the most common form of legislative dissent. As noted above, intra-session movement between caucuses was rampant in the 1990’s; with the advent of JDP majorities such instability dropped sharply. This evolution from party-hopping and fluidity in the 1990’s to ideological defection on major in votes in the 21st century is consistent with the more general trend towards heightened programmatic structuration.

2.7. Party Finance in Turkey

Kitschelt and Kselman (2010) demonstrate that clientelism is associated with non-transparent fiscal procedures, while programmatism in countries where campaigns are run primarily with regulate state subsidies. Party finance in Turkey has traditionally been fairly murky. To this day, the RPP remains a dominant influence in management of the Türkiye İş-Bankası, a powerful banking operation in which the RPP maintains a 28% interest which were bequeathed to the party Atatürk himself. The JDP has benefited from access to resources form abroad, both from Turkish émigré communities in Europe as well as from governments and entrepreneurs in the middle-East and central-Asia, often labeled ‘Green Money’ (Rubin 2005). That said, Turkish parties are also granted public funds for campaign purposes, distributed in proportion to vote shares in the previous general election, such that the highest vote earner receives the highest allotment of campaign money, and so on.

The DALP provides a number of survey items designed to assess parties’ campaign finance practices. While I omit the data for reasons of space and parsimony, some interesting patterns emerge among today’s organizations. The largest three parties (JDP, RPP, and ) receive a fairly moderate percentage of their campaign resources from the public sector, reflecting their access to non-public revenue streams such as those noted above. These same parties are judged to fairly transparent and compliant with existing regulation when it comes to spending public campaign resources; but are judged to be fairly murky and non-compliant when it comes to accessing and disbursing non-public monies. The two remaining parties, representing Kurdish and Islamist factions, depended much more heavily on state resources to run their campaigns,
and we’re judged to use those resources in ways which were non-compliant with campaign finance regulations.

2.8. Systemic Patterns

In addition to individual parties’ trajectories, one can also examine trends in accountability patterns at the systemic-level. Does the system-level mix of clientelistic and programmatic strategies across parties vary systematically with time? Are there particular combinations of clientelistic and programmatic profiles which appear together consistently? The material above suggests that systemic-level of developments exhibit some degree of structure in Turkish politics. Both the 1950’s, 1960’s, and 1980’s were characterized by situations in which one large incumbent party (the DP, JP, and MP respectively) deployed a diverse range of clientelistic tools, while opposition parties scramble to make incursions into the dominant parties’ vote share the fairly modest menu of clientelistic and programmatic tools at their disposal. There have also been more competitive periods (the mid- to late-1970’s and the 1990’s) in which votes were much more evenly distributed across the party system, and elections were more competitive. During the periods, the range of clientelistic tools parties deployed tended to shrink, with parties emphasizing ‘easy’ mechanisms such as public sector employment; and programmatic politics tend to be characterized by fluidity, incoherence, and polarization. Finally, in today’s party system the near hegemonic JDP disposes of a wide variety of clientelistic tools; but unlike similar situations in the 1950’s, 1960’s, and 1980’s, the current party also displays a fair bit of programmatic structure.

3. Analytical Section

Sections 2.2 and 2.3 describe the evolution of clientelistic and programmatic forms of accountability from 1950 to the present, documenting cycles of expansion and contraction in the variety and intensity in parties’ linkage strategies. The 1950’s witnessed both a contraction of the DP’s clientelistic flexibility, and perhaps in consequence increasing efforts to differentiate from competitors, and satisfy its constituents, on programmatic grounds. The 1960’s and early 1970’s represented a period of increased programmatic structure around left-right issues and newly appearing religious and ethno-nationalist issue dimensions; and the advent of a novel set of clientelist networks and tools associated with urbanization and industrialization. Both trends stalled in the late 1970’s which were characterized by the reduction of clientelistic variety and flexibility, and increased ideological fluidity. Moving from the 1990’s, in SQ parties’ exhibited a fairly low capacity to generate both clientelist and programmatic accountability, the 21st century has born witness to a diversification of clientelistic forms and a newfound programmatic coherence. I now suggest that political-economic developments go a long way to explaining these patterns.
3.1. Development

Using DALP data Kitschelt and Kselman (2011) demonstrate that, in keeping with common wisdom, the extent to which parties’ deploy effective programmatic linkages is positively correlated with levels of economic development. This same paper provides a slight nuance to the accompanying common wisdom that clientelism should be negatively related to economic development, uncovering a curvilinear relationship by which clientelism is highest among middle income countries, lower among poor countries, and minimal in highly developed countries. The Turkish narrative is fairly consistent with these findings, though the recent acceleration of clientelist forms and practices begs the question: is Turkey a case in which clientelism can endure at high levels of economic development?

Programmatic coherence and differentiation rises in a fairly consistent and predictable way with economic development. During the 1950’s the RPP remained a party whose support was grounded in the personality of İsmet İnönü, along with traditional clientelist ties in the Southeast. Similarly, while the DP engaged in a bit of programmatic differentiation at the decade’s end, it remained a fairly in-cohesive organization, and its programmatic support came primarily on the basis of short-run policies, often deployed prior to elections, providing cheap agricultural credits and commodity price floors. The dual processes of industrialization and urbanization in the 1960’s and 1970’s led to changes at the individual- and social-level, creating a more educated populous, heightened class consciousness, and a new set of civil society organizations, all of which had the effect of providing an elements of programmatic coherence in Turkey’s party system. However, after peaking in 1973, the party system became increasingly fluid in the run-up to the 1980 coup. Finally, after a prolonged and often stunted process of structural development in the 1980’s and 1990’s, the most recent period of economic growth and liberalization, which has propelled Turkey to the upper-echelons of middle-income countries, has been coterminous with the longest period of programmatic stability since the transition in 1990.

Moreover, and in keeping with above-reported cross-national findings, as Turkey progressed from a poor and mostly rural country to a middle-income industrial economy, the variety and effectiveness of clientelistic mechanisms has also been changing, though the trend is of course not perfectly linear and monotonic (see the following sub-section). On the whole, while targeted exchange consisted primarily of rural development projects and ombudsman services in the 1950’s, the 1960’s saw the advent of a variety of new tools (especially public-sector employment in SOE’s) and social networks (especially labor organizations and squatter communities) effective for clientelistic targeting. Finally, the most recent surge of private-sector led economic development was directly responsible for the deployment by Islamists of clientelist resources and networks unique in Turkish history. Indeed, the continuing expansion of targeted exchange mechanisms despite Turkey’s status as an ‘upper-middle-income’ country suggests that its unique brand of private-sector led and religiously-oriented clientelism may allow such practices to perpetuate themselves even at high levels of economic development.
3.2. Political Economy

While the previous section treated development as a monotonic process, a closer look naturally uncovers spikes in dips in annual economic growth and contraction. Within the broader possibility frontier defined by general development trends, these short-run cyclical patterns are directly correlated with short-run evolutions in the nature and intensity of accountability mechanisms. The following temporal periods were characterized by high economic growth rates: 1950-1954, 1961-1976, 1983-1987, and 2002-present. These periods correspond nearly perfectly to periods of increased clientelistic intensity and variety (under the auspices of the DP, JP-RPP, MP, and JDP respectively). Furthermore, in all but the first (1950-1954) these periods correspond to periods of programmatic germination, on the left-right dimension in the 1960’s and 1970’s, with the initial phases of liberalization and Islamic revival in the 1980’s, and with the onset of a fairly stable programmatic environment in the 21st century.

Outside of the most recent period, in which we currently remain, each of these high-growth spurts was followed by a period of economic crisis, characterized by low growth, spiraling inflation, and genuine material deprivation (1957-1960; 1977-1980; the 1990’s). As with growth spells, these crises had both endogenous and exogenous causes, being in part a result of overspending and economic largesse, and in part a result of factors beyond domestic political control (weather patterns which ruined harvests, the 1973 oil crisis, etc). Just as periods of growth co-existed with clientelistic and programmatic innovation, periods of crisis were associated with the contraction of democratic accountability. They tended to impel parties to emphasize the use more manipulable clientelist tools such as public employment and procurement contracts, to the exclusion of individual goods and services and community-level development. They also co-existed tended to coexist with situations in which parties became increasingly programmatically polarized despite remaining fairly un-cohesives. In the following sub-section, I suggest a theoretical mechanism which may link the distinct mechanisms which characterize this crisis-induced syndrome of clientelistic contraction, decreased programmatic cohesion, and heightened polarization: the onset of electoral competitiveness.

3.3. Institutions and Linkage Strategies

The electoral rules used in Turkish politics have varied over time. During the 1950’s a first past-the-post system which heavily favored large parties contributed to the DP’s hegemony. The Constitution of 1960 then adopted institutions at the opposite end of the proportionality spectrum, choosing a low threshold form of PR with a national-tier that served to generate highly

101 In the early 1950’s growth arose from a series of favorable harvests, the distribution of previously unused land in the countryside, and access to international financial resources as part of American sponsored post-WWII aid redevelopment processes. In the 1960’s and early 1970’s growth was high due to the early successes of ISI development strategies. In the early 1980’s an initial phase of liberalization and loose access to international credits facilitated growth, which after a bad decade has remained uncannily high up to and during the recent international economic crisis.
proportional outcomes. In 1969 the JP and RPP together colluded on the elimination of the national tier and the move a more restrictive electoral formula (d’Hondt) in an attempt to undermine the increasing success of smaller parties. Finally, the 1983 constitution put in place a proportional regime with an extremely high national threshold for office of 10%.

While Kitschelt (2011) finds little evidence of institutional effects on parties’ linkage strategies, institutional change in Turkish politics may at the margins exert some impact on party strategies. For example, in the 1960’s, the existence of institutions favorable to small parties allowed such parties access to parliament and influence on political discourse. It is arguably the electoral threat posed by the Worker’s Party, itself enhanced by highly proportional institutions, which allowed Ecevit to convince traditional RPP-leader to adopt their left-of-center strategy. Similarly, the high threshold system contributed to the 1990’s lack of programmatic cohesion. This threshold generated high volatility, with parties dropping in and out of the Parliament based on scores which often hovered just above or just below the 10% threshold. Most particularly, they prevented the Kurdish ideological current from incumbency, as Kurdish parties often won absolute majorities in individual regions, but always received less than 10% of the nationwide vote. The reason strategy by independent candidates to circumvent this threshold by running as non-partisan represents a potentially counterintuitive development: the increase in independent candidacies has enhanced overall programmatic structuration, allowing a salient ideological current the capacity for voice and representation.

3.4. Party Organizations

Do temporal evolutions in party’s accountability strategies correspond to similar changes in parties’ organizational forms? While this is a vast topic which is well-beyond my current scope, evidence suggests that organizational structures do co-vary with linkages strategies. The data above confirm the common wisdom that Turkish parties tend to be highly centralized affairs. That said, even given this high baseline centralization levels do tend to show some systematic variance. In particular, when considering the periods of growth and crisis noted above, there tends to be a pattern by which parties, both incumbent and opposition, exhibit a measure of decentralization during the height of the ‘growth’ phase, but then become increasingly centralized as growth sputters and party systems become more polarized and competitive. This pattern occurred when growth slowed to a crawl in the 1950’s, and then again in the 1970’s (Sayarı 1975; Bektaş 1988); it occurred again moving from the 1980’s into the 1990’s (Rubin and Heper 2002; Heper and Landau 1991). Some evidence also suggests that the JDP has recently been undergoing a process of centralization (Kumbaracıbaşı 2009), despite the fact that Turkey is not currently experiencing of a period of stunted growth and increasing competitiveness.
3.5. Changing Patterns of Party Competition

Just as these cycles of economic growth and crisis are correlated with changes in the nature and intensity of parties’ linkage strategies, they are also correlated with changes to the competitiveness of electoral contests. High-growth phases have coincided with periods of one-party dominance, by the DP in the early 1950’s, the JP in the 1960’s, the MP in the early 1980’s, and the JDP in the 21st century. During the first three of these phases, hegemonic parties tended to invest heavily in a variety of clientelistic exchanges, while opposition parties made inroads where they could, when they could, with the modest linkage capacities they disposed of. The current hegemonic stage has been unique insofar as the JDP has managed to combine a highly diverse and ambitious strategy of targeted exchange with a coherent and differentiated set of programmatic appeals.

In the first three hegemonic phases, as economic growth began to slow, dominant parties faced increasingly severe challenges to their electoral hegemony, due to both the general discontent generated by economic downturns, and the specific discontent of those individuals and communities affected by the decreased access to clientelistic goods. This led to a weakening of the dominant party’s position, and in turn increased party system competitiveness. Economic crises, which begin during the dominant parties’ reign, then persist through the period of increased competitiveness, and in 1960, 1980, such 2002 these periods of conterminous economic crisis and political volatility led to radical system shifts (coup sof in the first two instances, the transition to JDP hegemony in the latter). The coup of 1960 and 1980 ultimately failed to extricate Turkey form this cycle; rather, they seem to have simply re-started the sequence, by yielding to civilian government to a single dominant party subject to the above dynamic. With regards to the current situation, a hugely important an yet unanswered questions concerns whether the JDP, with a dense network grounded dense private sector organization, might be able to withstand an economic crisis without losing its hold on power. An era of constant growth leaves this question unanswered.

In the 1950’s and 1980’s, economic crisis and increasing competitiveness exposed deep programmatic incoherence in the heterogeneous DP and JP organizations. In the 1970’s and 1990’s increased competitiveness and voter elasticity in fact helped to create programmatic incoherence by impelling vote-seeking parties to constantly absorb new constituencies, which often were of distinct ideological persuasion, and to constantly alter their programmatic message in search of marginal vote returns. All such crisis periods thus featured parties with low levels of programmatic cohesion, whose access to clientelistic incentives was constrained by economic stagnation. Elsewhere (Kselman 2009), I suggest that leader of incoherent parties who lack vast clientelistic endowments often have a clear optimal strategy for maintaining party discipline: ideological radicalism. While beyond my current scope, this suggests a fruitful avenue in future research for understanding both the root economic causes of regime polarization and regime change in Turkey, as well as the political and electoral mechanisms via which economic dynamics exert their impact.
3.6. Civil Society

The number and role of civil society organizations and associations has increased exponentially since the 1960’s. During this period of industrialization and urbanization, new labor and business groups coalesced, and new intellectual movements grounded in increased university attendance appeared. Parties maintained ties to such movements, but through the throughout the second Republic these ties remained somewhat unstable. For example, the labor union confederation Türk-İş maintained loose but non-committed ties to both parties, and tended to work most closely with whoever was in power (Ecevit 1972). Similarly, agricultural interests tended shifted their partisan allegiance on any number of occasions during this period, culminating in the formation of the short-lived Democrat Party (not to be confused with the DP – Democratic Party) in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s. Both the JP and RPP also maintained more or less explicit ties to radical left- and right- groups responsible for much of the violence which occurred prior to the 1980 military intervention. With regards to civil society ties the JDP again demonstrates a certain exceptionalism in the Turkish context, maintaining uniquely stable, consistent, and extensive ties to civil society organizations arising from the 1980’s and 1990’s neo-liberal and Islamic awakening.

3.7. Role of International Advice and Initiatives?

The most obvious external influence on Turkish politics throughout the 1990’s and early 2000’s was the European Union (EU), and affiliated civil society and non-governmental organizations. Throughout this period, as part of Turkey’s gradual accession strategy, the EU and its affiliates were able to generate fairly substantial policy shifts, both with regards to the military’s role in politics and with regards to fiscal and international economic policy. Arguably, these changes had the effect of moving Turkey towards a more reliably programmatic policy, eliminating the programmatic uncertainty generated by the constant threat of military intervention, and consolidating the neo-liberal-state intervention dimension as a salient political cleavage in Turkish elections. However, since the period 2003-2004, both the Turkish elite and the Turkish public have soured on the European process, frustrated with its slow pace. In turn, they’ve developed an Eastward looking foreign policy which seeks to access markets and economic partners in the Middle-East and Central Asia. In many ways, it is civil society actors from these regions whose influence has become more pronounced in Turkey over the past 7-8 years (Rubin 2005). Whether or not this represents a permanent shift, or just temporary reaction to frustration with Europe, is left to be seen.
4. Conclusion

This paper documents the evolution of programmatic and clientelistic modes of accountability in Turkey from 1950-2011. It demonstrates that Turkish accountability cycles correlated strongly with both long-term trends in economic development, as well as short-term periods of economic growth and contraction, or crisis. These cycles of political-economy and political-accountability, and in particular the cyclical ‘valleys’ in which economic contraction generates restricted clientelistic strategies and ideological radicalism, are also correlated with moments of regime change in modern Turkey. The 1960 and 1980 military interventions were followed by the wholesale replacement of laws, institutions, political parties, and political leaders, and eventually the adoption of new constitutions.102 Similarly, while the Justice and Development Party’s (JDP) accession to power in 2002 did not occur under the aegis of military intervention (quite the opposite in fact!), it has led to drastic changes in Turkey’s class of political leaders, system of political parties, and ultimately its legal-institutional infrastructure.103

Turkey appears to be at the beginning of yet another of its familiar political-economic cycles: a hegemonic party using a plethora of clientelistic methods has been in power for nearly 10 years, while opposition parties have scrambled to amass whatever vote shares possible on the basis of their modest set of available accountability strategies. However, this period is in many ways different from those of the early 1950’s, the 1960’s, and the early 1980’s. Firstly, the JDP exhibits a good deal of programmatic coherence and structuration. Second of all, the period of economic expansion has persisted for nearly a decade. One can ask whether or not the JDP’s novel brand of private-sector and civil society led clientelism has in fact allowed Turkey to extricate herself from traditional cyclical evolutions. If not, one can wonder whether, in the event of economic downturn, this novel mode of accountability will allow the JDP to avoid the clientelistic contraction and programmatic radicalism which has characterized past periods of economic crisis. These questions are hugely important for one’s evaluation of the current state of Turkish democracy.

102 The reinstatement of parliamentary governance in 1973 was orchestrated by the pre-intervention parties, which were led by the same executive leaders operating under an identical constitutional and administrative framework. In contrast, after the interventions in 1960 and 1980 new and radically different constitutions were adopted, some subset of old parties were banned, and some subset of old party leaders were executed (1960) or barred from participation in politics (1980).

103 Regarding the latter, one can point not only to legal changes regarding the public expression of Islam, but also to the series of constitutional reforms adopted by referendum in September of 2010, which among other things granted the Executive branch greater control court appointments and the military.
References


____________. 1966. *Political Change in Rural Turkey: Erdemli*.


Figure 1: Electoral Party Support in Turkey

Figure 1a: Center-Right Vote Shares, 1987-2011

Figure 1b: Center-Left Vote Shares, 1987-2011

Figure 1c: Right Party Vote Shares, 1987-2011
Table 1: Issue Positions of Turkish Parties  
(standard deviations in parentheses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Spending on disadvantaged (D1) 1=support; 10=oppose</th>
<th>State role in economy (D2) 1=support; 10=oppose</th>
<th>Public spending (D3) 1=support; 10=oppose</th>
<th>National identity (D4) 1=diversity; 10=nationalism</th>
<th>Traditional authority (D5) 1=oppose; 10=oppose</th>
<th>Religious expression (D7_tur) 1=support; 10=oppose</th>
<th>Overall left-right (DW) 1=left; 10=right</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JDP</td>
<td>4.6 (3.33)</td>
<td>7.6 (1.75)</td>
<td>6.9 (2.12)</td>
<td>4.6 (1.97)</td>
<td>7.9 (1.66)</td>
<td>1 (0)</td>
<td>6.6 (2.20)</td>
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<td>RPP</td>
<td>3.9 (3.07)</td>
<td>4.64 (2.38)</td>
<td>4.1 (2.81)</td>
<td>4.8 (2.62)</td>
<td>4.8 (2.10)</td>
<td>9 (1.66)</td>
<td>5 (2)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAP</td>
<td>5.9 (2.54)</td>
<td>4 (1.94)</td>
<td>4 (1.89)</td>
<td>8.8 (2.22)</td>
<td>8.2 (1.40)</td>
<td>3.4 (2.83)</td>
<td>8.8 (.87)</td>
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<td>DSP</td>
<td>4.1 (3.52)</td>
<td>3.7 (2.78)</td>
<td>3.7 (3.16)</td>
<td>3.6 (3.64)</td>
<td>4.8 (2.91)</td>
<td>4 (3.37)</td>
<td>2.6 (1.75)</td>
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<td>FP</td>
<td>3.3 (2.5)</td>
<td>3.4 (2.07)</td>
<td>3.4 (1.67)</td>
<td>5.3 (2.82)</td>
<td>5.3 (2.82)</td>
<td>1.13 (.35)</td>
<td>8.2 (1.47)</td>
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Source: DALP

Table 2: Issue Positions of Turkish Voters  
(standard deviations in parentheses)

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<th>Party</th>
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<th>Spending on disadvantaged 1=support; 10=oppose</th>
<th>State role in economy 1=support; 10=oppose</th>
<th>Public spending 1=support; 10=oppose</th>
<th>National identity 1=diversity; 10=nationalism</th>
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<td>JDP</td>
<td>7.46 (2.05)</td>
<td>4.98 (3.06)</td>
<td>4.94 (2.76)</td>
<td>4.81 (2.80)</td>
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<td>3.39 (2.01)</td>
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<td>5.41 (2.48)</td>
<td>5 (2.82)</td>
<td>3.92 (2.12)</td>
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<td>NAP</td>
<td>8.15 (1.92)</td>
<td>5.32 (3.06)</td>
<td>4.98 (2.52)</td>
<td>5.48 (2.56)</td>
<td>4.5 (2.25)</td>
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<td>DSP</td>
<td>2.97 (2.24)</td>
<td>4.12 (2.68)</td>
<td>5.01 (2.52)</td>
<td>3.59 (2.10)</td>
<td>2.76 (1.61)</td>
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<td>FP</td>
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<td>3.91 (3.51)</td>
<td>6.5 (2.68)</td>
<td>3.18 (2.40)</td>
<td>4.36 (2.58)</td>
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Average position

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<th>F=114.12***</th>
<th>F=1.31</th>
<th>F=1.31</th>
<th>F=3.98***</th>
<th>F=4.19</th>
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<td>Correlation between elite and mass positions</td>
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<td>.64</td>
<td>-.28</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>.71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: WVS 2005-07
### Table 3: Clientelistic Effort of Turkish Parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Gift and payment (B1)</th>
<th>Social policy benefits (B2)</th>
<th>Patronage jobs (B3)</th>
<th>Procurement contracts (B4)</th>
<th>Regulatory favors (B5)</th>
<th>Effectiveness of clientelistic targeting (B11)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JDP</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPP</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAP</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDP</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FP</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: DALP*

### Table 4: Organizational Investments of Turkish Parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Extensive local units (A1) 1=extensive</th>
<th>Links to notables (A3) 1=extensive</th>
<th>Organizational centralization 1=min; 3=max</th>
<th>Charismatic Leadership Authority (E1) 4=strong</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JDP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.83</td>
<td>3.91</td>
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<tr>
<td>RPP</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td>2.92</td>
<td>3.27</td>
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<tr>
<td>NMP</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.27</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDP</td>
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<td>1.80</td>
<td>2.40</td>
<td>1.70</td>
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<tr>
<td>FP</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>2.86</td>
<td>3.13</td>
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<tr>
<td>World Average</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>1.79</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>2.84</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Source: DALP*