

Research and Dialogue on Programmatic Parties and Party Systems

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Executive Summary

Democracy is the only political regime with codified rules to make those charged with governing accountable to the citizenry. Mechanisms of accountability are periodic elections of representatives who typically run in teams under party labels, as well as guaranteed civic and political rights making possible a vibrant civil society in which interests can mobilize against the democratic rulers and subject them to public debate.

But when citizens get a chance to hold elected politicians accountable, *what sort of political performance* is it that makes them approve of a party and its politicians? Conversely, when politicians anticipate the next election, how do they show their responsiveness to citizens in order to earn their approval? Empirical research shows that many considerations come into play when citizens approve of political parties, and it may not be a single one that is decisive:

- unique personal qualities of the party leaders (*the “charisma” of a politician*);
- affective ties to a party based on family or personal experiences with the party (*“party identification”*);
- a party’s willingness to put forward representatives who share similar traits and experiences with its voters (*descriptive representation*: in terms of gender, residence, religion, ethnicity, race, class...);
- a party’s efficiency in delivering targeted benefits to those individuals and groups that vote for them (*clientelism*: gifts, jobs, privileged access to social benefits, procurement contracts, etc.);
- a party’s competence in delivering benefits all citizens want (*collective goods, valence goods and policies*: economic growth, employment, low inflation, peace...);
- a party’s willingness to (re)distribute resources and powers from those who in a party’s views do not deserve them to those who do (*club goods, positional policies*: e.g. redistributive taxes and income support, access to and quality of public education and health care, unemployment insurance and retraining);

If parties emphasize they should be held accountable to their policies to provide club and collective goods, then parties emphasize “programmatic” partisan competition. If they concentrate their efforts on delivering targeted goods to their voters, they are primarily involved in “clientelistic” competition. If they feature the unique qualities of their leaders, net of clientelistic and programmatic considerations, they prefer a “personalistic” electoral game.

For political parties to make a programmatic effort, and allow voters to appraise them based on their programmatic performance, they must accomplish four steps:

- (1) The relevant party personnel must internally agree on policy issues to deliver collective and especially positional goods. Call the assembly of such issue position the party’s “program.”
- (2) The party must prioritize the policy issues on which it agrees and takes a common stance.
- (3) The party’s programmatic stances must differ from that of all the other parties (positional goods) or the party must plausibly claim that it is more competent to deliver the collective goods all competitors also want to supply (in case of collective or valence goods).
- (4) If elected to government office, the party must demonstrate a serious commitment to realizing at least some of the program to which it has committed itself.

For a variety of reasons, normative democratic theory values democratic competition based on primarily “programmatic” rather than mostly “clientelistic” and “personalistic” parties. Against this

backdrop, the charge of this IDEA research project has been *to tackle the empirical question*—and the empirical question only—*to determine the conditions under which parties are likely to prioritize a programmatic effort and to be held accountable by their voters against this programmatic effort*.

Two research methods have been brought to bear on this investigation to find some tentative answers:

(1) Seven *qualitative country case studies*, drawing on the existing research literature, cover a total of close to 45 parties in different settings and over time. All countries are in the developing world and/or among recent democratizers. They were selected in order to vary the extent to which parties make a programmatic effort and/or have changed their effort in the past twenty years. The countries selected are in Latin America, Eastern Europe, the Middle East and Asia.

(2) In order to explain degrees of programmatic party effort and competition, the investigation relies in addition to the case studies on an *88 country “Democratic Accountability and Linkage Project” (DALP) expert survey conducted with over 1,400 respondents and covering a total of 506 parties worldwide* in electoral democracies with more than 2 million inhabitants and funded by the World Bank, Duke University, and the Chilean National Research Foundation (PI: Herbert Kitschelt, Duke University). Among the wealth of information about parties in this dataset, the survey permits the construction of measures of parties’ programmatic and clientelistic efforts.

Section 1. Descriptive Findings of the Case Studies on Programmatic Partisan Effort in Seven Countries

The case studies cover parties from those with minimally programmatic appeals in countries where none of the parties make programmatic efforts to highly programmatic parties in countries where almost all the parties make programmatic efforts. Furthermore, there is variance between the party elites’ programmatic efforts and the voters’ capacity to choose among parties based on programmatic cues. This study primarily tries to explain differences in parties’ programmatic efforts. Only when parties make a modicum of such efforts can voters choose a favorite alternative based on programmatic grounds. But this summary also indicates the extent to which voters choose parties based on congruence between their own policy preferences and the parties’ announced policy programs.

- In the *Dominican Republic* parties show very little programmatic appeal. Party program positions are diffuse so that voters cannot choose among parties based on such information. Parties in the Dominican Republic compete primarily based on clientelistic and charismatic performance.
- In *Brazil*, the electorate evidences little capacity to choose among parties based on policy stances, but some of the major parties have begun to make programmatic efforts over the past twenty years, particularly the *Workers’ Party* (PT) on the left, the *Social Democrats* on the center-right and the (market) *Liberals* on the right. Brazil is a party system engaged in dynamic change of its citizen-politician linkage strategies from clientelistic to more programmatic appeals.
- In *Taiwan*, until recently the two major parties differed programmatically only on few issues and continued to compete for votes primarily, but not exclusively based on clientelistic efforts.
- Also in *India*, the highly complex, regionally diverse party system is mostly geared to clientelistic rather than programmatic partisan efforts, and this has not changed in the past several decades. More programmatic party exceptions are two small communist parties as well as a couple of

regional parties and party sections. There is some class (caste?), education, age and ethnic differentiation in voters' partisan preferences and for some voters parties' issue positions appear to matter as well.

- In **South Korea**, the major parties underwent a rather profound reversal from clientelistic to predominantly programmatic appeals toward the turn of the millennium, but voters have not yet followed: They tend not to choose among parties based on their programmatic differences.
- Also in **Turkey**, new party foundation since the early 1990s and party reforms have boosted the programmatic effort of major political parties. Parties, however, combine their programmatic with vigorous clientelistic efforts ("high everything" parties). As in South Korea, there is little evidence yet that voters are able to structure their choices based on the parties' differing programmatic politics.
- In **Bulgaria**, finally, at the elite level the programmatic structuring of parties is uneven, in part due to the volatility and turnover among the non-socialist parties. In this country, voters do choose between parties more clearly based on the parties' issue positions than elsewhere, but the political elites do not state partisan priorities as clearly as in South Korea and Turkey.

Parties' **organizational arrangements**—their reliance on local notables, the extensiveness of their formal organizations, and the centralization of leverage and control in the top leadership—vary to some degree with the parties' most important linkage strategies. No such direct link can be detected, however, for situations of greater or lesser inter-party competitiveness in elections and government formation.

Section 2. Causes and Correlates of Programmatic Partisan Effort: Qualitative Case Studies and Quantitative DALP survey

Given data limitations, it is easier *to identify the correlates than the causes of parties' programmatic efforts*. But only those conditions that also correlate with programmatic efforts can be their potential cause. Moreover, by observing change over time in the case studies, it becomes more plausible to attribute causal efficacy to some conditions rather than others. Let us distinguish "hard" conditions, not amenable to political alteration, and "soft" conditions, amenable to political change, that this investigation finds to correlate with, and plausibly cause, high levels of programmatic partisan effort:

- The overriding "hard" condition for programmatic party appeals is **economic development**. Educated, higher income individuals for a variety of reasons prefer programmatic partisan accountability, find little satisfaction in clientelistic compensation, and tend to be unimpressed by the personal qualities of politicians. Conversely, the prevalence of poverty in a polity does not forebode well for programmatic politics. Nevertheless, economic development is not full deterministic: In the case studies, the poorest countries tend to be clientelistic (India, Dominican Republic) and some of the richest countries more programmatic (South Korea, Turkey), but the very richest country (Taiwan) is an outlier with mostly clientelistic partisan effort.
- **Periods of economic crisis** offer windows of opportunity to raise the programmatic content of party competition. When the status quo becomes painful, both voters and politicians are willing to consider policy programs that affect the benefits and costs of large voter groups, while funds for clientelistic exchanges are disappearing. Examples are surges in parties' programmatic efforts in

Brazil, Korea, and Turkey and more arguably Bulgaria, whereas in the Dominican Republic, Taiwan, and India disruptions of economic performance were sufficiently mild to avert a surge in programmatic politics.

- Economic crises are particularly prone to generate programmatic party competition, when they come after long runs of economic growth, but the institutions that governed the growth period appear to have exhausted themselves: This typically occurs in the ***transition from export-oriented raw materials production to developmental state industrialization strategies, or in the transition from a developmental state-based strategy to postindustrial science- and service-based economies***. Brazil, Korea, and Turkey reached such cutpoints, when parties became more programmatic. Taiwan did too, but avoided a deep economic crisis and preserved its more clientelistic than programmatic party competition.
- Sometimes, ***highly intense party competition*** leads politicians to make a more intense programmatic efforts. The electoral contest is highly competitive, when small changes in a party's electoral support yield large shifts in parties' legislative representation or power to bargain over government participation. ***Intense competitiveness, however, boosts politicians' programmatic efforts only in more affluent, developed countries***. Only here is it likely that voters available to be persuaded by the competitors respond to programmatic party stances. In poor countries, the demand side will mostly be voters who are attracted by clientelistic benefits. In poor countries, intense competitiveness, therefore, leads to more clientelistic effort. In the case study, competitiveness is particularly intense in South Korea (affluent) and the Dominican Republic (poor). In the former, competitiveness may have encouraged parties' programmatic efforts, whereas in the latter it stoked clientelistic competition.
- Finally, the case studies suggest that politicians cannot choose ***specific forms of party organization in order to bring about programmatic partisan effort***. Nevertheless, if politicians emphasize programmatic party appeals, then their efforts look more credible and sincere, if the organizational form of their parties incorporates the following features: (1) little reliance on informal local elites and notables; (2) extensive formal party organization; (3) transparent party finances; (4) restraint and checks on the power of the party leaders, demonstrating that the programmatic appeals of a party cannot be changed at the whims of a handful of leaders.

On ***the negative side***, the report also identified several conditions that ***clearly do not impact the programmatic effort made by political parties***. These negative findings are as important as the positive findings.

- While a ***democratic level playing field*** offering equal civil and political liberties for all contenders in elections may be normatively desirable, it does not empirically enhance the programmatic effort of political parties, once controls for above factors have been considered.
- In a similar vein, no evidence could be recovered that would link ***particular institutions of democratic political governance*** to more programmatic partisan effort. The investigation examined electoral systems, the relationships between executive and legislative (presidential, semi-presidential, or parliamentary government) and the (de)centralization of jurisdictions (federalism).
- There is ***no evidence that parties become more programmatic as democracies age and actors have more experience***. This is surprising, as democracies do become less clientelistic as party systems age.

- *Ethnic and cultural divisions in society* may boost the clientelistic efforts of political parties, but they do not diminish or increase their programmatic efforts.
- It is unclear how a *vibrant, diverse civil society with a proliferation of civic associations independent of political parties* affects parties' programmatic efforts in the partisan contest. Theoretically, it is plausible that autonomous associations compel parties to become more programmatic rather than clientelistic or personalistic. But we lack the data to test this hypothesis. In a similar vein, this investigation could not test whether more comprehensive, broadly representative interest groups, such as labor unions representing a multiplicity of occupations and industries, foster more programmatic partisan competition.
- Finally, there is *no evidence that international advisory organizations have attempted to alter or actually succeeded in altering the programmatic partisan efforts of political parties*. In any case, such efforts may work only under favorable conditions—in terms of countries' levels of development, political economy, and competitiveness—and with parties in countries that are already closely linked to affluent democracies, where programmatic partisan politics prevails. A good test case should be the EU-member Bulgaria, but no evidence reveals that international consulting agencies might have tried to boost the programmatic content of Bulgarian electoral partisan contests. The same may apply to several other post-communist EU members.

Limitations of the Investigation into Parties' Programmatic Partisan Efforts

More robust inferences pertaining to the causal question could be drawn, if the following data were available:

- a time series with multiple observations of the same parties' programmatic, clientelistic, and personalistic efforts over long periods;
- more and better data on the evolution of party organization and especially parties' legislative organization and coordination;
- more and better data on the interaction between parties and civil society associations;
- more and better data on the actual role of consulting agencies in advising parties about changes in their linkage strategies.

This study has *not investigated a possible unique, historical cause of strong programmatic effort in the OECD-West, but not elsewhere: the arrival of democracy and political parties during the Fordist era of mass production*, when the homogenization of the labor force around low-skill manufacturing wage employment and the contrast to white collar and self-employed class positions was particularly stark, a configuration not to be replicated in currently industrializing countries.

This study has also *not examined what the consequences of programmatic partisan politics* in terms of economic well-being or the political stability, integrity and continued viability of democracy. It therefore does not issue a normative recommendation to consider programmatic party competition a “good” or a “bad” way to practice democracy.

Introduction

In multi-party competitive democracies, politicians may seek voters' attention and approval in different ways. Parties may highlight the *virtues of their leaders* or claim an *administrative and technical competence* to lead governments and achieve results when in executive office ("effectiveness," "governability"). They may also invoke the *great traditions of their parties and their historical achievements of the past*, or they may field candidates that look and talk like their prospective voters to solicit identification with the party ("*descriptive*" *representation based on gender, region, tribe, language religious affiliation*). And they may *promise and extend material incentives* before and/or after election-day to citizens who support them with their vote and campaign efforts. As varied as these methods are to make themselves attractive to voters, in all instances parties venture to demonstrate their "responsiveness" to what they believe and anticipate voters expect from them in order to earn their approval in the voting booth. Parties try to be "accountable" to voters by being "responsive" to their expectations. Of course, in the process they also try to persuade voters to value one kind of responsiveness more than another kind.

Among the various forms of responsiveness enumerated above—offering exciting leaders, material rewards for supporting a party, the identification with a great partisan tradition, and so forth—there is one, however, that democratic theorists and philosophers, but also public intellectuals and many ordinary citizens have prized the most. It is ***holding parties accountable for their responsiveness to citizens' preferences in terms of delivering "policies" and good "policy performance."*** *Ex ante*, parties feature "***policy programs***," i.e., plans of action specifying how they would use the authoritative powers of government in case of victory to improve the lives of their voters and citizens at large. Programs specify the intended enactment and implementation of legal rules and measures that (de)regulate citizens' behavior, create facilities and services, and extract and allocate scarce resources. *Ex post*, toward the end of an electoral term, voters can judge whether government incumbents have delivered on their "programs" and, if so, whether they have acquitted themselves well. In this "responsible partisan government" model of democratic accountability through public policy, voters will reelect those incumbents whom a sufficient share of the electorate deems to have passed the responsiveness test, but replace those who fail the test in the eyes of a sufficient number of voters by other competitors.

One further upfront specification of "policy" and "programmatic" accountability is vital: The rules, services, or benefits enacted by partisan governments affect citizens ***regardless of whether they personally voted for the incumbent government party or not***. Governments discharge activities following general laws and regulations that affect broad categories of citizens or all citizens in the same way, if they qualify for the legally specified treatment. Exercising government authority proceeds under the "rule of (general) laws" and not of "men." Governments deliver ***collective goods*** the benefits of which accrue to everyone (e.g. protection from crime, communication and transportation infrastructure, educational facilities) or "***club goods***" that redistribute resources between large categories of people (e.g. social insurance systems, combined with taxation schedules). Whether or not someone voted for the governing party or not is irrelevant for her treatment by government authority.

This type of "programmatic" government action is set apart from various "non-programmatic" government activities. Politicians may benefit small targeted special interest groups through ***constituency service*** for local districts (called "pork" in American politics) or even individual voters. If the beneficiaries are expected to deliver their vote in order to get access to such targeted services, we call the exchange relationship "clientelism."

- In normative perspective, philosophers, public intellectuals and many citizens have attributed to "programmatic" politics a variety of virtues that set it apart from special interest and clientelistic

politics. First of all, programmatic policies lend themselves to ***rational, intelligible deliberation about transparent objectives and purposes in light of universal moral standards***. They do not grow out of affective and sentimental concerns or purely instrumental material self-interest that may bond a particular voter to a specific politician, or the symbolic significance of a party label, or the purely descriptive identification with candidates because they have certain physical and cultural markers (gender, ethnicity, religion, language...) that make them appear to be “like” some of their constituencies.

- Second, ***the pursuit of partisan responsiveness through policy is consistent with the rule of law***, as it protects citizens from arbitrary treatment: The rules apply to everyone who qualifies under general laws, regardless of how they voted in the election. Clientelism, by contrast, is an allocation of resources based on the politician’s personal discretion bestowing favors on individual citizens.
- Third, ***policy responsiveness respects a baseline of equality among citizens***: Some citizens are not more powerful and persuasive to policy-makers because they have the money to buy votes for them, or to deploy other more indirect material incentives to induce citizens’ support for a particular party or politician. For all these and many other reasons, in the eyes of political intellectuals and many citizens, programmatic party politics is the morally superior mode of conduct for parties to deliver democratic responsiveness and to seek democratic accountability.

For any attentive observer of real political life, however, it is obvious that ***only a small share of democratic party competition and party conduct conforms to the ideals of “responsible partisan government” with “programmatic politics.”*** Often enough, and in some polities more so than others, the vast majority of citizens is simply not sufficiently attentive to politics to develop well-considered policy preferences and recognize the policy programs of political parties to which they can then link their own preferences in the act of vote choice. Anticipating this, vote- and office-seeking political parties find it often more effective for their purposes to relate to voters by invoking affective identifications with party, social group, or individual political leaders or by targeting individual voters and small groups for special material favors in exchange for their vote (“clientelism”) than to develop and enact policy programs.

Furthermore, it is not even entirely beyond the shadow of empirical doubt ***that the presence of “programmatic” parties in office and in partisan competition contributes to superior democratic performance***. Where democratic multi-party competition is more “programmatic” than based on leaders’ personal charisma, citizens’ party identification or parties’ clientelistic rewards to voters, do partisan governments ultimately deliver a ***higher quality of life***, say, in terms of citizens’ mortality and morbidity, literacy or female empowerment, to use some of the UNESO’s human development indicators (HDI)? And how do patterns of party competition play out and affect ***economic growth and employment***: Do polities with a prevalence of “programmatic” politics deliver better growth? Next, are ***citizens more satisfied with democracy***, where “programmatic” party competition prevails over other modes of politicians’ accountability in partisan competition? And how about ***approval of the political regime form itself***: Are more people ready to defend democracy, where its core partisan conduct is primarily based on programmatic accountability rather than on other forms of political accountability?

The project on which this document reports will not examine, let alone answer, these big questions about the impact of more or less programmatic partisan politics, but these questions motivate the smaller questions with which International IDEA charged the project team, when it awarded its research grant:

- What are the ***conditions under which politicians choose to compete in a programmatic mode*** in multi-party democracies?

- And what can *case studies of politics and individual parties in developing countries*—outside the “core” region of the affluent, established, Western democracies with a great deal of programmatic party competition—tell us about the *opportunities and challenges citizens and politicians may encounter in bringing about programmatic competition*?
- When does it become possible in *often young democracies*, operating for less than a single generation, that politicians may *credibly and consistently project a “programmatic” party message*?
- When do *parties’ programmatic messages resonate with voters* such that the latter choose among parties based on those parties’ programmatic appeals? In other words, when do voters accept a party’s programmatic efforts as their main consideration to support it, thus creating a “linkage” between political elites and ordinary voters?

The research documented in this report tackles these subjects in two parallel and interacting strategies of investigation. One strategy is based on a *broad and by and large quantitative comparison of parties and politics* in order to identify general opportunities and constraints that may affect the extent to which citizens and politicians in democracies coordinate around programmatic accountability or linkage. This part of the analysis draws on the contractor’s previous work in this general subject area, but more with an emphasis on clientelistic linkages as alternative to or complement of programmatic linkages. This research took place within the framework of the *Democratic Accountability and Linkage Project (DALP)* at Duke University.¹

The explanatory analysis of programmatic partisan efforts examines two classes of political and economic factors that may correlate with and even causally explain politicians’ choice of programmatic linkage strategies to voters:

(1) *conditions that constitute “hard” constraints or determinants of parties’ accountability strategies*, far removed from politicians’ deliberate choices and strategizing;

(2) *conditions that constitute “soft” constraints or determinants of parties’ accountability strategies, as they identify opportunities under which politicians may deliberately raise or lower their programmatic partisan appeal.*

From a pragmatic perspective of practicing politicians and ordinary citizens, but also that of potential external change agents, like International IDEA, all of whom may want to deliberately alter a party’s linkage strategies to become more programmatic, it is important to recognize the “hard” constraints limiting or encouraging politicians’ efforts to attract voters through programmatic appeals. But *it is really the “soft,” manipulable constraints that command citizens’ and politicians’ greatest attention, as it is those conditions political actors may seize as opportunities to build programmatic parties.*

¹ The project fielded an expert survey in 88 democracies on citizen-politician linkage strategies in 2008-9. The project was funded by the World Bank, the Chilean National Research Foundation, and Duke University. A set of preliminary papers from this project delivered at a May 2011 workshop can be inspected at http://duke.edu/~kkk4/2011_clientelism/. Further papers by these same authors involved in the project were delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in 2009, 2010, and 2011, and they can be accessed through the association’s website for each of these conferences.

The second complementary analytical strategy in this investigation is to gather more detailed and often qualitative evidence on the evolution of partisan linkage strategies in a limited set of countries over time. The broad cross-national quantitative comparison of parties' linkage strategies at a single point of observation is helpful for identifying **robust correlations** between parties' linkage strategies and a variety of economic and political conditions that may be merely coincidental to, but could also be causally responsible for politicians' linkage strategies. The comparative study of political parties' linkage strategies over time in a small number of countries, by contrast, makes it harder to develop or test in rigorous quantitative fashion, whether general hypotheses about the correlations between linkage strategies and social, economic, political or cultural practices of a country are valid or can be falsified. Instead, the country case studies covering evidence of parties' linkage strategies within the same polities over longer stretches of time can speak more directly to questions of causality by observing the sequence of events—what came first and what followed after.

The case study investigation selects seven countries from different regions of the world: postcommunist Eastern Europe (Bulgaria), Latin America (Brazil and Dominican Republic), the Middle East (Turkey), and South and Southeast Asia (India, South Korea, Taiwan). Sub-Saharan Africa is missing in this case study set, and the reasons for this omission will become clear based on the quantitative comparative study with DALP data: ***For most, but not all, of Sub-Saharan countries with multi-party electoral contestation, this investigation finds that the “hard” constraints stifling programmatic party competition faced by African voters and politicians alike tend to be so formidable that there are few “soft” opportunities left to build programmatic party competition.*** Most African electoral democracies, therefore, operate with precious little programmatic party competition and emphasize instead politicians' personality and competence and their ability to deliver constituency service to individuals and groups at the local level in clientelistic and non-clientelistic fashion.

In addition to achieving a broad regional distribution of cases, several other considerations motivated the selection of case studies to analyze the causes of politicians' choice of accountability and linkage strategies:

- The case studies should include a ***diversity of outcomes in terms' of politicians' choice of programmatic partisan efforts***: For this reason, case studies cover countries where parties make strong, or intermediate, or weak efforts to engage in programmatic competition. Sometimes all parties in a country make similar choices of linkage strategies, whether they are predominantly non-programmatic (Dominican Republic, India, Taiwan) or programmatic (South Korea), sometimes these choices vary among parties within the same country, albeit around some central tendency (Brazil, Bulgaria, Turkey). In a similar vein, political parties in our country studies vary within and across the case study countries with regard to their efforts to employ a second linkage mechanism, namely clientelism. Depending on the country, parties make weaker or stronger clientelistic linkage efforts.
- In order to highlight soft, “manipulable” causes of more or less programmatic party competition, the project also sought country studies with ***diversity in parties' programmatic linkage strategies, once hard determinants had been taken into account***.² Which parties (countries) score actual levels of

² This objective emerged only during the detailed research. With the benefit of hindsight, it would have been preferable to choose one or two more cases with parties clearly making more programmatic effort than is predicted based on “hard” determinants only.

programmatic partisan effort that fall far short of, roughly approximate, or substantially exceed the programmatic partisan effort predicted by the most important “hard” constraint on politicians choice of linkage strategy identified based on broad-based quantitative analysis of DALP data, namely levels of economic development and affluence?

- Next, a consideration for case selection was to find countries, or at least parties within countries, that have undergone *considerable change in their democratic accountability strategies over time*. Unfortunately, no rigorously defined and collected cross-national data are available to assess the extent of change in parties’ programmatic effort over time directly. At a broad, bird’s eye level covering many countries and parties, the aforementioned DALP project included only one question providing indirect clues about parties’ use of programmatic linkage strategies. Experts were asked *to indicate changes in parties’ clientelistic efforts in 88 covered countries over the 1998-2008 decade*. While it is only half true that programmatic party efforts and party competition go up, when clientelism goes down (see below), changes in parties’ clientelistic linkage efforts provide at least one yardstick to identify likely parties or indeed entire democracies, where programmatic partisan efforts went down, stayed the same, or increased in the most recent decade.
- Finally, upon the explicit request of International IDEA, the study ventured to *include globally important countries* among the selected cases, and especially those where parties have not been studied much in contemporary comparative social science works. This clearly was a driving force for including *India and Turkey*, as well as the *closely paired East Asian cases of South Korea and Taiwan*, while selecting only three cases from the most widely studied regions of *Latin America* and post-communist Eastern Europe/Central Asia, namely *Brazil, Bulgaria, and the Dominican Republic*.

Let us summarize the most pertinent findings of the study in a few very bald and simple propositions the validity of which will be explored and documented in this report. Let us first turn to the potential “hard” determinants of linkage strategies clearly exogenous to short-term political strategizing:

1. The one empirically valid hard determinant that shapes parties’ programmatic linkage strategies is *economic development*. For both reasons having to do with voters’ demand for programmatic politics as well as politicians’ (in)ability and effort to supply it credibly, something that requires state capacities to deliver and implement policy, *programmatic partisan politics appears to be a severely uphill battle in the world’s poorest countries*, whether in Sub-Saharan Africa, Central America, or South Asia.

2. Surprisingly, it does not appear that *experience with democratic governance over an extensive period of time* is an advantage for the development of strong programmatic competition. Programmatic competition can appear in almost any democratic polity, young or old.

3. *Ingrained ethnic and cultural group inequalities* also do not register as a clear obstacle to programmatic party competition. While inter-group inequalities may affect politicians’ *clientelistic* efforts, they do *not impede or promote programmatic competition*.

Let us now turn to *the “soft” determinants that actually appear to have an impact on politicians’ linkage strategies*:

4. *Difficult economic times*, articulated either by periods of protracted economic decline, resulting in sky-rocketing unemployment and/or faltering economic growth, or by deep, sharp, sudden economic crises may become catalysts for intensifying programmatic party competition. Economic decline and crisis create

dissatisfaction and make non-programmatic rewards to electoral constituencies, particularly clientelistic patronage benefits, expensive to maintain and ultimately unavailable to politicians. Voters then are receptive to “programmatic” politicians who can offer plausible alternative scenarios for social change.

5. ***Great intensity of party competition***, where the largest two parties are in a head-to-head race close race vying to form the next government, tends to increase programmatic partisan efforts. The effect is greatest in the most affluent countries. In very poor countries, however, more intense party competition does little for programmatic politics, yet may reinvigorate clientelistic partisan efforts. Among new democracies, it is thus the relatively more affluent middle-income countries where programmatic politics would benefit most from intense inter-party competition.

6. Certain ***forms of intra-party organization*** are conducive to programmatic party competition, others to clientelism. Institutionalizing parties around rules that depersonalize the selection of leaders, put constraints on their power vis-à-vis party activists, and make party finances transparent go more with predominantly programmatic parties. Where clientelism is in the mix, parties tend to be more personalistic, disempowering the rank-and-file, and keeping finances opaque.

Finally, let us attend to those “soft” potential determinants of programmatic partisan politics for which this investigation actually cannot find robust confirmatory evidence:

7. ***The formal design of democratic institutions—electoral systems, recruitment and powers of the executive, centralization or federalization of state powers***—has often been suspected to affect partisan linkage strategies. While there is some evidence to suggest that this may apply to clientelistic partisan efforts, no such evidence can be identified for programmatic partisan efforts.

8. There is too little evidence to determine whether there is ***a particular relationship between parties and civil society organizations (interest group associations) that is particularly favorable to programmatic politics***. The case studies provide weak leads, but there may be a relationship between intense and autonomous labor union mobilization, on the one hand, and more programmatic partisan politics, on the other.

9. At least in the seven country case studies prepared for this investigation none of the members of the research team could discover any clinching evidence that external monitoring or advice, whether through ***democracy consultancy organizations and/or international election watch associations***, ***affected the more or less programmatic partisan strategies inside a country***. This applies even to the most plausible case where dense European linkages make it most likely that democracy promoting agencies situated within the European region might have some leverage to influence the course of democratic party competition.

1. Descriptive Account. The Incidence of Programmatic Party Politics in the Case Study Countries

This part of the report will first explain the meaning of programmatic partisan linkages between voters and politicians (section 1.1.). We then introduce the parties and party systems in our seven country cases examined in depth in this study (section 1.2.). This gets the stage for an overview of the incidence of programmatic party appeals in these countries (section 1.3.). The separate case studies, of course, provide much more detail about individual parties than is possible in this condensed overview. Several briefer sections examine the presence of other linkage mechanisms (clientelism, charismatic authority of party leaders) in our case study countries (section 1.4.), the party and legislative organization and finance of the parties in the seven countries (section 1.5.) and finally the competitive situation of the parties and their coalition strategies (section 1.6.), picking up on basic information provided in section 1.2.. In the second part of the report, we will use this information to understand potential causes of parties' and voters' coordination around more or less programmatic party competition

1.1. Programmatic Parties and Party Systems. A Clarification of Concepts

For parties to compete for voters in a programmatic fashion, parties have to issue a number of signals that need to come together and fall jointly in place:

- (1) Parties must *announce and compete over programmatic objectives*.
- (2) Voters must *understand such party objectives and have personal preferences* over them.
- (3) Voters must choose between parties based on their announced policy objectives. There must be some *congruence between voters' and parties' objectives*.
- (4) *The victorious party or parties constituting the next government executive after an election must implement some of their key programmatic objectives in government policy*. They must provide the presence of "responsible partisan government." Of course, changing circumstances and public preferences will thwart the attractiveness and feasibility of implementing some of these objectives.

In this study, data was collected on the first three elements of programmatic party competition. It would take a much more involved study to determine which and to what extent governing parties realize programmatic proposals through government policy.

Ad (1): *For political parties to be programmatically recognizable to their competitors and their potential voters*, they must achieve three effects:

- First of all, inside a party, politicians must agree on some policy positions and roughly speak with one voice over some range of issues ("**cohesiveness**"), thus making it possible for observers to discern a "party voice" above all the individual voices of each politician.

- Second, this internal coherence and cohesiveness should apply especially to those issues parties care about and feature in their electoral strategies of communication with potential voters (“*issue salience*”).
- Third, a programmatic party’s positions must be *distinguishable from those of other parties*. If there is no difference between the parties, parties may only appeal to their unique competence to realize policies that every other party promises as well (“valence competition”). But on many issues, reasonable minds disagree and conflicting interests clash in society. On such issues, programmatic politics can unfold only, if parties generate at least a modicum of political “*polarization*,” such that parties take opposite positions on the relevant issues.

Only where parties achieve all three procedural steps simultaneously—internal cohesiveness on salient issues that polarize a party relative to its competitors—can voters enjoy the opportunity to choose between parties based on their programmatic stances. Consider what happens if one of the three elements is missing: If multiple parties have (1) well defined, cohesive positions over (2) a range of salient issues, but (3) these positions are largely the same for all parties, voters cannot discriminate among parties based on policy positions, but maybe based on their different competence to pursue identical goals. In a similar vein, voters have nothing to choose from in programmatic ways, if several parties have (1) coherent and (2) diverse issue positions, but cannot bring themselves (3) to make these issues salient. Logically impossible is the combination of parties that make (1) issues salient, (2) project differentiated positions, but are (3) internally incohesive: If the latter applies, parties’ positions are necessarily so diffuse inside each party that parties’ central mean positions gravitate toward the mean of the scale and largely overlap with those of other parties. This, however, defeats the requirement of inter-party differentiation of appeals.

In other words, only the *cumulation* of all three elements (intra-party issue *cohesion* X issue *salience* X inter-party issue *polarization*)—in short: **CoSalPo**—generates distinct programmatic partisan efforts. The DALP expert survey project computes a variety of indices of programmatic partisan effort at the level of individual parties as well as whole party systems (cf. Kitschelt and Freeze 2010). These indices are based on the issue positions experts participating in the DALP survey attribute to individual parties. The resulting indices are usually quite robust to a wide range of specifications. The appendix I to this report details the construction of the CoSalPo_4 index of partisan programmatic effort a bit more, and a great deal more specific information can be found in Kitschelt and Freeze (2010).

If we consider programmatic politics more broadly as a mode of democratic party accountability to voters, all the CoSalPo indices measure, however, is the *programmatic effort* political parties make to lay out policy alternatives. The index says nothing about the *credibility* of that effort in light of a party’s past actions and revealed competence and/or about the party’s *sincerity* in pursuing its pre-announced programmatic objectives, let alone about the *party’s current capability* to pursue and implement any or all of its programmatic highlights. Such capacity depends not only on the quality of its main political operatives, but also its relative clout in the polity (affected by the electoral size of a party, as well as institutional rules of decision making), its ability to capture public office alone or in negotiation with other parties (legislative and governing coalitions), as well as the *capacity of the public administration to implement effectively* those binding political decisions that politicians make in legislatures and executives as a result of the programmatic process of party competition (“state capacity”).

Ad (2): For voters, *intellectually grasping the competing parties’ issue positions and developing their own personal issue positions to which party positions can be related* is vital to participate in programmatic party competition. If citizens understand parties’ programmatic positions and their own

personal interests, they can relate them to each other and use this information in their choice among parties.³

To detect the ability of voters to act and reason programmatically, the easiest method is to employ a statistical analysis with voters' personal issue preferences as predictors of their party preference. For example, if people want economic redistribution toward the poor, do they vote for a particular party in their polity that actually and sincerely advertises that objective, and do they vote for a different party that rejects the objective, when they disapprove of income redistribution? ***Not only parties, but also voters need to make an effort:*** Programmatic party politics requires that voters choose among parties such that their own policy preferences in fact predict their choice, and the choice is not entirely guided by programmatically irrelevant considerations (candidate looks, gifts and other clientelistic benefits, etc.).

Ad (3): For programmatic "linkages" between voters and parties to prevail there must be some ***congruence between the voters' preferences and the party's declared policy positions***. Voters support a party because it declares similar policy preferences to those endorsed by those voters. In other words, there must be ***some relationship of representation*** between citizens and voters. If this ***congruence*** extends to all parties in a party system, then knowing the average policy positions of each party's voters on salient issues will be highly correlated with the policy positions actually announced by the various parties' politicians themselves.

Finally, (4), as "responsible partisan governments," victorious parties taking over the government executive should ***convert at least some of their salient programmatic statements of intent into actual binding policies during their term in office***. The momentum to implement partisan policies may be blunted, however, if new policies have to be approved not only by elected legislatures, where the governing party dominates, but also by a proliferation of other veto players in the policy process, such as second legislative chambers, state legislatures, or constitutional courts (Tsebelis 2002). Programmatic politics may also be difficult to enact, when ***the state has little administrative capacity*** to implement policies. State capacity presupposes a professional, highly trained civil service that is able to extract taxes from the economy and use them to produce government infrastructure and services. While vital, we have not investigated this fourth element of programmatic politics is the current study. But the presence or absence of state capacity as a condition for "responsible partisan government" enters into consideration, when we discuss "hard" constraints on programmatic politics in section 2.1..

When examining programmatic party competition, the current study essentially examines only the first three elements of programmatic politics, namely

- Do parties make ***"CoSalPo"-strong programmatic appeals*** on at least a subset of policy issues?
- ***Do voters have preferences that inform their choice among parties?***
- Is there ***some relationship of congruence or representation*** between politicians' programmatic appeals and their voters own policy preferences?

³ In the most simplistic models of "naïve" issue voting, first put forward by Anthony Downs's famous *Economic Theory of Democracy* (1957), voters choose party closest to their personal policy preferences in the policy issue space. In more sophisticated, strategic models of programmatic voting, citizens choose the party that most likely will help to bring about legislative majorities that implement policy programs closest to the voter's ideal policy preferences (Kedar 2009).

In addition to programmatic party competition or in substitution of such competition, politicians and voters in electoral democracies may find other ways to develop political accountability relations. The two we briefly address are “*clientelism*” and “*charismatic leadership*.”

Clientelism prevails, when voters and politicians engage in a contingent relationship: The politician gives to a specific individual voter—or some small precisely localized group of voters—a material benefit in exchange for the vote delivered in the past and/or the expectation that the voter will deliver her support again in the (near) future. Here benefits do not accrue to voters based on their general status as citizens or some other legally defined categories, but simply because they made up their mind to support a particular politician or party and were able to signal this to the candidate. There is a wide range of benefits that may constitute a clientelistic relationship:

- **Outright vote buying:** Voters receive gifts (resources, services) and money in exchange for their votes and campaign contributions.
- **Politicians engineering social benefits for voters**, for example scholarships for their children, disability benefits for them, or access to public health services that would not be available without explicit advocacy and political leverage of a political patron.
- Party supporters are awarded **job in public companies or firms and non-profit organizations subsidized or regulated by public institutions** that, in turn, are under control of elected politicians (“patronage”).
- Politicians may award **procurement contracts to employers** who then pressure their employees to support their benefactor party.
- In a similar vein, firms and entrepreneurs may benefit from **favorable regulatory decisions** they obtain only because they and their employees support the politician who influences such decisions.

In the *Democratic Accountability and Linkage Project* (DALP) survey, experts on parties and elections scored each party in each country on how much effort its politicians make to supply clientelistic benefits (“clientelistic effort”), how effective these measures are to produce votes for the benefactor party (“clientelistic effectiveness”), and whether politicians have some measure of capacity to monitor voters who received a benefit and sanction them, if they do not vote in compliance with the gift/benefit exchange. We are using here only a *composite index of parties’ clientelistic effort* that summarizes experts’ scores of the provisions parties are making for clientelistic voters. Unfortunately, there is no cross-national survey evidence available on the citizens’ side of clientelistic deals: What percentage of voters receive clientelistic benefits, make their vote choice contingent upon such benefits, and feel subject to monitoring and sanctioning by politicians in clientelistic parties?

Among the other mechanisms that might establish a relationship between politicians and voters, we mention here only the *charismatic authority of political leaders*. Net of the policies politicians may support (programs), or the selective benefits they can channel to their supporters (clientelism), voters may like politicians simply because of their personal style and the confidence these politicians instill in voters that they can “get things done.” This very personal quality of leadership “charisma” may be particularly important for voters in new democracies and under conditions of political crisis, when all certainties become questionable. In the DALP survey, it turns out that clientelistic linkage, with voters flocking to politicians because of the personal qualities of their presence and flourish, relates in statistically robust ways positively to clientelism and negatively to programmatic politics. In other words: In parties to which experts attribute programmatic effort as an important way to mobilize electoral supporters the cultivation of charismatic leadership personality is relatively less common and less prominent than in parties, where politicians put greater effort into clientelistic benefits provision. This may have to do with the generally

more personalistic relationship of political exchange under conditions of clientelism, when compared to the more rule-based policy mediated exchange in programmatic competition.

1.2. The Party Systems in the Case Study Countries

Linkage strategies are the choice of politicians who band together under party labels in pursuit of votes and office. Multiple parties, in turn, combine in different ways in party systems. A “system” here is the total set of the parties found in a polity, together with the relations among them. Political scientists tend to characterize party systems by the number of parties, the relative strength distribution of parties, and their programmatic location in a polity, the so-called “party system format.” As a way to introduce the seven case studies that are the subject of this investigation, let us describe their party systems in terms of concentration and fragmentation of electoral support across different partisan labels. Our study includes party systems from different regions of the world and with rather different levels of concentration or fragmentation of electoral support across a wide range of party labels.

- Two Latin American party systems with very different levels of fragmentation: the Dominican Republic (little fragmentation, almost two-party system) and Brazil (great fragmentation);
- One East European post-communist party system with rather high fragmentation: Bulgaria.
- A mid-Eastern party system with intermediate, lop-sided fragmentation pitting a single hegemonic party against a divided and over time changing set of small-to-medium sized parties: Turkey.
- Two East Asian party systems with high consolidation, but very different linkage strategies: South Korea and Taiwan.
- Finally, the South Asian case of India with one of the world’s most fragmented party systems in the world’s largest democracy, encompassing more citizens than most other democracies taken together.

To characterize the nature of the party systems in each of these polities, for each country, table 1 lists the three major electoral parties. Furthermore, it lists how many more parties are needed to arrive at a cumulative 90% of all votes cast in the most recent election with the minimum number of parties in that polity. The more parties are needed, the more fragmented is the polity. At one extreme, there are “small,” consolidated party systems with *all the competition for votes concentrated on just two major and sometimes one or two additional minor parties*. These are Taiwan, South Korea, and the Dominican Republic. In each of these countries, the two dominant parties alone or supplemented by one other parties achieve more than 90% of total voter support.

Table 1 about here

The next party system configuration is that of *moderate multi-party systems with anywhere between three and five medium-sized or larger parties* at least two of which are needed to form a legislative government majority. Depending on the relative size of the parties and their programmatic stances or commitments to other linkage strategies, a substantial number of coalition options may be feasible in such systems to form legislative majorities. In the case studies, the moderate multi-party configuration is roughly approximated by Bulgaria and Turkey, although at least Bulgaria is at the outer envelope of that configuration. Turkey has one dominant party, the AKP (Justice and Development Party) that strengthened its position further in the 2011 election. Bulgaria has a more balanced set of medium sized parties. Furthermore, what this table does not reveal is that over time the Bulgarian parties are much more volatile than their Turkish counterparts. It is not only that there are more parties needed to form a government. Also the identity of these parties may differ from election to election.

Table 1: Party System Formats in Seven Countries

	Dominican Repubic (2006)	South Korea (2008)	Taiwan (2008)	Bulgaria (2005)	Turkey (2007)	Brazil (2006)	India (2009)
Largest party	Dominican Liberation Party (<i>Partido de la Liberación Dominicana</i>) and allies 54.6%	Grand National Party (GNP) <i>Hannara-dang</i> – and allies 52.9%	Kuomintang, Pan Blue Coalition 55.7%	Bulgarian Socialist Party and allies (31%)	Justice and Development Party (<i>Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi</i> , AKP) 46.7%	Workers' Party (<i>Partido do Trabalhadores</i> , PT) 16.8%	India National Congress (INC) 28.6%
Second largest party	Dominican Revolutionary Party (<i>Partido Revolucionario Dominicana</i>) and allies 41.9%	United Democratic Party (UDP) <i>Daetonghap Minju-sindang</i> and allies 29.3%	Democratic Progressive party, Green Coalition 40.9%	National Movement Simeon II (NDSV) 19.9%	Republican People's Party (<i>Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi</i> , CHP) 20.9%	Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement (<i>Partido do Movimento Democratico Brasileiro</i> , PDMP) 15.6%	Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 25.6%
Third largest party	Social Christian Reformist Party (<i>Partido Reformista Social Cristiano</i>) 1.5%	Democratic Labor Party (DLP) <i>Minju Nodong-dang</i> And allies 4.7%		Movement for Rights and Freedom (DPS) 12.8%	Nationalist Movement Party (<i>Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi</i> , MHP) 14.3%	Party of Brazilian Social Democracy (<i>Partido da Social-Democracia Brasileira</i>) PSDB 10.1%	Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) 6.2%
Sum of largest three parties	98.0%	86.9%	96.6%	63.7%	81.9%	42.5%	60.4%
Number of parties needed to get to 90% of the total electorate		Independents 11.1%		4 more parties	2 more parties	8 more parties	15 more parties

Finally, party systems can be ***highly fragmented with 10 or more parties needed to capture 90% of the electorate***. Here it takes a large number of parties to constitute workable governing majorities in the legislature. Parties may roughly band together in alliances and coalitions, but even then it takes a multiplicity of external partners to weld together alliances that achieve majority status in a national legislature. In our comparison set, this applies to the two very large countries included here, Brazil and India. India may have the most complicated party system in global comparison. It takes more than 20 parties to capture over 90% of the electorate.

For a study of parties' linkage strategies, isn't it more important to focus on individual parties than the entire party system of a country? An answer to this question depends very much on circumstances and specific questions asked. Innovation in parties' linkage strategies, say an intensification of programmatic appeals, originates with individual parties, but may then reverberate through the whole system. Under some circumstances, parties engage in "bandwagoning" behavior, where every party embraces the same set of strategies, in others we find a "countervailing" or "product differentiating" logic, where, for example, some parties become more programmatic, but others more clientelistic, and a third set of parties embraces a wide range of linkage strategies simultaneously. For some polities and questions analyzed, summarizing a central tendency of party behavior in linkage building at the level of the entire party system is a perfectly reasonable shortcut. In other instances, we have to examine the choices of politicians in individual parties, not the systemic average.

Party system fragmentation and diversity of linkage strategies may not perfectly map onto each other. It all depends on what voters and politicians want to see achieved. In our seven cases, in fact, we have a great deal of diversity with regard to the extent to which parties choose similar or different linkage strategies in each polity. Whether they choose "bandwagoning," i.e. using the same strategy as their competitors, or "countervailing" strategies, using different linkage strategies than their competitors, depends on a variety of calculations. To anticipate the empirical pattern a bit, the following configurations prevail:

- In the three ***low-fragmentation party systems*** of the Dominican Republic and Taiwan, at a low-to-medium level of programmatic effort, and of South Korea, at a high level of programmatic effort, all relevant parties in a party system choose similar linkage strategies, either weak (Dominican Republic) or medium (Taiwan) or strong (South Korea) programmatic appeals. These bandwagoning strategies also extends to their use of clientelistic outreach to electoral constituencies, whether such efforts are medium and rapidly falling (South Korea), or high and only gradually eroding (Taiwan) or very high and intensifying (Dominican Republic).
- In the two ***intermediately fragmented party systems*** of Bulgaria and Turkey, both in terms of programmatic politics as well as clientelistic linkage efforts, the strategies of the different parties are highly diverse. Some may pursue both programmatic and clientelistic linkages vigorously, as is the case with the dominant Turkish *Justice and Development Party* or the *Bulgarian Socialist Party*, while other smaller parties specialize in only one kind of linkage strategy.
- In the two ***highly fragmented party systems*** of Brazil and India, most parties pursue surprisingly similar linkage strategies. With few, but important, outliers, these parties in both countries tread lightly on programmatic appeals and engage vigorously in clientelistic strategies. But in Brazil, in contrast to India, the intensity of programmatic competition has clearly increased over the past twenty years.

For many, but not all, democracies, party linkage mechanisms can thus be studied with some analytical benefit even at the highly aggregative level of entire party systems, as the diversification of individual

parties' linkage strategies is not sufficiently great to matter for answering certain specific analytical questions. For other questions, however, the individual party is the appropriate unit of analysis. In between these alternatives, it may be an interesting question to explore when intra-country diversification of party linkage strategies prevails over party convergence in strategies.

1.3. The Incidence of Programmatic Linkage Strategies

In light of these clarifications about programmatic party competition and the structure of party systems, how do parties in our seven case study countries fare in terms of programmatic appeals? Given that a multiplicity of factors affect a summary answer to this question—the programmatic effort of the parties, the programmatic division of the electorate, the presence of relations of representation between voters and politicians, and the enactment of partisan government—no simply unidimensional ranking of the countries is entirely correct. Each of the elements contributing to a programmatic relationship between citizens and politicians has to be considered on its own terms.

Nevertheless, as a first empirical approximation, table 2 rank orders the countries from the arguably least programmatically structured party systems on the left to the most programmatically structured party systems on the right according to the criteria already introduced:

Row 1: It reports for each country its *parties' average programmatic appeals*, as rated by the country experts in the DALP survey. Keep in mind that the mean score for the entire global set of 88 electoral democracies is about .24. Of the seven cases, only South Korea is clearly above the global mean and Turkey is close to that mean. The other five countries underperform the global mean all the way down to the Dominican Republic, where parties are essentially devoid of programmatic effort. As argued later, however, “underperformance” needs to be recast as a relative, and not an absolute concept in light of external conditions that facilitate or impede programmatic appeals: *Against what odds* did a party (country) develop a certain level of programmatic effort? Sometimes even a mediocre absolute score of programmatic effort may be quite strong, if the odds for parties to develop programmatic appeals are particularly inauspicious in the circumstances of that polity.

Row 2.1 through 2.3.: The rows report whether the *parties' mean scores on each of three policy issue, as well as general ideological left-right orientations*, are different from one another, thus indicating programmatic differentiation between the parties. A simple statistical test (ANOVA) delivers these findings. We conduct this test both for the party elites' programmatic positions, based on the DALP expert juries, as well as for rank-and-file partisan supporters, based on global comparative surveys (World Values Studies 2005-7, Latin American Public Opinion Project LAPOP 2008) that have roughly matching questions to those included in the party elite comparison. The issues on which we run the test are

- 2.1. party experts' *left-right placement of the parties* and partisan voters' left-right self-Placements, the dimension of “general ideology;”
- 2.2. experts' placement of party elite views on *policies of income redistribution* and partisan voters' own preferences over that issue; and
- 2.3. experts' judgments of parties' tolerance for ethnic pluralism: Do party elites prefer that all ethnic groups should be compelled to abide by the norms and customs practiced by the country's dominant ethnic group, or should they be permitted to practice their own ethnic customs? On the voter side, the question is whether the respondent feels a need for a uniform national culture;

Table 2: Programmatic Structuring of Case Study Parties at the Party Elite and Population (Voter) Levels

	<div> <div>Least structured</div> <div> </div> <div>most structured</div> </div>						
	Dominican Republic	Brazil	Taiwan	India	South Korea	Turkey	Bulgaria
1. Parties' programmatic appeal (“CoSalPo_4.nwe”)	.06	.14	.14	.17	.41	.23	.18
2.1. Left-right placement of parties or partisan electorates	E*, M*, R* Substantive differences small	E*, M* ~R* (-.44)	E*, only	E*, M*, R* (.74)	E* only	E*, M*, R* (.88)	E*, M*, R* (.94)
2.2. Economic policy positions	Little of anything	E*, M* small	Only feeble E*	Very little, feeble R*	Only E*	Only E*	E*, M*, R*
2.3. Multi-cultural identity and tolerance	No data	E*, M*, ~R* (-.66)	E*, M*, R* (yes)	E*, M*, R* (-.35)	E*, M*, R* (yes)	E*, M*, R* (.71)	E*, M*, R* (.63)
3. Socio-demographic party profiles?	Very feeble, some ethnic	Next to none	<i>Feeble:</i> age, class, income; <i>strong:</i> ethnic	<i>Feeble:</i> class, education, age, ethnic	<i>Feeble:</i> income, education, age	Gender, age; <i>feeble:</i> income, class; ethnic/ Kurds	<i>Strong:</i> Age, education; <i>feeble:</i> income + class; ethnic/ Turks
4. How Much Do voters' policy preferences influence their party choice? (not=0; completely =1.0)	.0148	.0151	.0153	.056	.0029	.0152	.147

In each instance, if at the elite level the experts indeed register a difference between the parties' programmatic appeals on an issue, the respective cell will show an E*. If there is a difference in programmatic preference between the electoral mass constituencies of the different parties, then the cell will show an M*. If both E* and M* are present, we can compute the congruence between the positions of party elites and their mass followers to determine the existence of representation: If we know one, can we predict the other? And are partisan elites and mass followings on similar "wave lengths?" If there is congruence, indicating a relationship of policy representation in which the elites' programmatic appeals reflect the mass supporters preferences, the respective cell will include an R* symbol. No R* means there is no predictable relationship between the preferences of the parties' mass followings in a country and the parties' elite positions, hence no programmatic representation. A negative score (~R*), present only in a couple of instances in Brazil, actually means *misrepresentation*: Party elite support systematically different positions than those advocated by their followers.

Row 3: The data indicate whether parties attract electorates that differ from those of other parties in terms of any *common socio-demographic attributes*, such as their distributions of age, gender, education, income, subjective class adherence, and ethnic group affiliation. Socio-demographic differences between parties may be, but not necessarily are, a tracer of differences in policy preferences between the electorates of different parties. The empirical test is a simple difference-of-means calculation for each of these voter attributes.

Row 4: For programmatic competition to matter, of course, *voters need to act on their own policy positions and those of the parties*. In other words, voters' own preferences need to affect their vote choice among parties. In this row we therefore report the results of statistical regressions that answer the following question: Knowing a voter's policy preferences over income distribution, multi-culturalism and general left-right ideological position (the latter in order to catch issues beyond distribution and ethnic relations), how well can we predict that voter's party preference? The row reports a round-about measure that runs from 0.0 (voters' policy positions do not predict party choice) to 1.0 (voters' policy positions perfectly predict party choice).⁴

Overall, programmatic party competition in a polity is strong if the following pertains:

- (1) The parties' programmatic efforts are strong (row 1).
- (2) Parties can be distinguished from each other based on (i) their elites and/or their voters' left-right positions, regardless of whether it is purely symbolic or actually linked to policies, (ii) their views of income redistribution, and (iii) their insistence on a national common culture (rows 2.1. – 2.3.).
- (3) Parties assemble electoral constituency support based on unique and distinct socio-demographic support coalitions.
- (4) The voters' policy preferences are good predictors of their party choices at the ballot box.

⁴ The statistical model used is a multinomial logistic regression and the measure reported is the pseudo-R square that it computes, ranging from zero (no predictive power of the model) to 1.0 (full deterministic predictive power of the model).

Table 2 itemizes results for each country on *all four aspects of the “programmatic structuring”* of a party system in the seven countries included in the comparative case studies. The table displays the seven case study countries roughly rank-ordered from the least to the most programmatically structured party system: Dominican Republic, Brazil, Taiwan, India, South Korea, Turkey, and Bulgaria. If we were looking at the *party elites’ programmatic effort alone*, however, Korea would clearly rank ahead of Turkey, and Turkey ahead of Bulgaria.

In the *Dominican Republic*, neither elites nor mass publics have a clear partisan programmatic focus. Political party elites have no distinct programmatic appeals in any policy area, whether it concerns economic distribution or cultural tradition or national identity. At the mass level, this corresponds to an absence of voting based on economic issue preferences and voting along socio-demographic lines. No information about mass level voting on ethnocultural divides is available. The Dominican Republic’s party system incorporates only one potentially programmatic element, namely the consistent and representative division of the electorate and the party leaders into (center-)left and right camps. But left-right identifications could also be entirely symbolic, devoid of meaningful policy content

The second lowest level of programmatic structuring appears in *Brazil*, at least at the aggregate level of the party system. Upon closer inspection in the case study, however, it turns out that programmatic competition is rather uneven across parties, with some parties, and especially the governing *Workers’ Party* (PT) showing at least an intermediate level of programmatic effort, but still relatively little programmatic anchoring at the population level (rows 3 and 4). Also several other Brazilian parties have begun to become more programmatically crystallized, but all of this still translates into very weak representation and actually mis-representation of the parties’ electorates by their elites.

The third lowest programmatic performer in the case study set is *Taiwan*. Other than relations between the island and the Chinese mainland and corresponding ethnic relationships between former Kuomintang refugees from the mainland in 1948/49 and the Taiwanese indigenous population, there has been little programmatic structuration in Taiwan both at the elite and the general voter level. Here only the elites manage to project a consistent left-right differentiation of the two major parties. At the mass level, there are some socio-demographic differences between the electorates, but policy preferences rarely affect voters’ choices among the parties.

Next in line may be the colossus in the comparison group, *India*, where the measurement of programmatic competition should be refined and qualified by information about party competition at the level of each Indian state. Such information, however, is currently not available for a systematic comparative analysis. In India, both partisan elites and partisan electorates do manage consistent left-right positional differentiations that actually map on each other in congruent fashion. Moreover, there is some differentiation among parties by ethnocultural issues, but it does not yield representative citizen-party relations. On economic issues, parties are highly diffuse both at the elite and mass level. Nevertheless, there is some socio-demographic differentiation of party support along education and subjective class lines that suggests an element of economic programmatic differentiation. The investigation’s analysis of vote choice, furthermore discovers a modest influence of issue positions on partisan choices.

Somewhat stronger programmatic structuration prevails in *South Korea*, but primarily on the elite level. Since the case study shows that programmatic partisan efforts took off only in the late 1990s, it is not that surprising that these initiatives are not (yet?) reflected by a corresponding differentiation of the preferences of partisan electorates. Korean partisan electorates manage neither to differentiate themselves from each other based on general left-right position, nor on economic or socio-cultural issues, while the

party elites consistently do, at least in the view of expert observers. Korean voters do not consistently use their policy preferences to make choices among parties. Nevertheless, there is at least a semblance of socio-demographic differentiation among partisan electorates.

The next country up the ladder of programmatic politics may be **Turkey**. Partisan elites are actually somewhat less sharply contoured in programmatic terms than in South Korea (row 1), but there is altogether more congruence between party elites and voter preferences across general ideology as well as distributive and communitarian policy issues (rows 2.1. through 2.3.). Like South Korea, Turkey has only a very limited socio-demographic anchoring of partisan choices or policy-preference motivated partisan choices (rows 3 and 4).

The table lists **Bulgaria** highest as country with the greatest programmatic structuration among the seven comparison cases. While this does not apply at the level of elite appeals where programmatic crystallization is substantially lower than in Turkey or South Korea (row 1), Bulgaria shows consistent elite and mass partisan differentiation on general left-right ideology, distributive and communitarian issues, and in such ways that elite and mass positions map congruently: Where partisan elites place themselves on the “left,” in favor of economic redistribution, or calling for compliance with a uniform national culture, there voters of respective parties do so as well. Conversely, parties with “rightist” positions, weary of redistribution, but more universalist and tolerant of cultural diversity, also tend to have electorates that endorse similar views. In Bulgaria, socio-demographics tends to line up with partisan support more strongly than in the other cases. Likewise, voters’ policy positions have a greater impact on their electoral choices than in the other countries.

Before we buy into the uni-dimensional rank ordering for our comparative analysis of programmatic structuring, however, let us keep in mind several qualifiers:

- In a dynamic, long-term perspective, what may be more important for the development of programmatic party competition in recently founded democracies than a strong anchoring of mass electorates in programmatic partisanship is, in the first place, that ***elites project programmatic positions and compete over these***. If we based a rank-ordering of the countries on the programmatic efforts of the partisan elites alone, manifested by the capacity of parties to project distinctive, and approximately cohesive programmatic positions (rows 1 and 2.1.-2.3., presence of E* qualifications), then Korea would be ahead of Turkey and Bulgaria, Taiwan, Brazil and India, with the Dominican Republic as laggard.

Elite and mass level programmatic structuration would be somewhat at variance with each other, when we rank order countries on each dimension, as table 3 shows. Looked at in terms of the ***programmatic partisanship of mass electorates***, picked up in table 2 by rows 2.1. through 2.3. (presence of marker M*), row 3 (socio-demographic crystallization of party support) and row 4 (representative mass/elite congruence), Bulgaria would be clearly ahead by a league, followed at some distance by Turkey, then India, further back South Korea and Taiwan, and the Dominican Republic and Brazil at the end of the queue.

Table 3 about here

- Table 2 examines programmatic structuration in isolation from other modes of linkage building to voters, especially clientelistic exchange and the deployment of the “charisma” of political leadership by political parties. Even if parties engage in programmatic efforts rather vigorously and if voters respond by aligning themselves with parties on programmatic grounds, these linkages look

Table 3: Incongruence between Elite and Mass Level Programmatic Partisan Structuration

		Elite Level Partisan Programmatic Structuration (rank order)						
		Lowest: 7	6	5	4	3	2	Highest : 1
Mass Level Partisan Program -matic Structu- ration (rank order)	Highest: 1					Bulgaria		
	2						Turkey	
	3				India			
	4							South Korea
	5		Taiwan					
	6	Domini- can Republic						
	Lowest: 7			Brazil				

less robust, if parties and voters also emphasize other modes of linkage, such as targeted clientelistic exchange between politicians and voters or the deployment of “charismatic” personal authority of party leadership. We report on this in the next section.

- The programmatic effort in a country has to be placed in the context of exogenous constraints and opportunities. In other words, rather than comparing “absolute” effort and realization of programmatic competition across a range of cases, we need to examine their “relative” achievements within the settings in which party systems are located. We will turn to this task in the explanatory part of the report.

1.4. Portfolios of Citizen-Politician Linkage Strategies: Clientelism and Charismatic Politics in Relationship to Programmatic Politics

Politicians rarely invest in only a single accountability and linkage strategy to voters. Let us therefore briefly focus on two other strategies that appear as quite prominent in the case studies and may have some influence on the development of programmatic party appeals, namely clientelistic exchange, as defined above, and the deployment of the personal charisma of leading politicians. The only systematic source to assess the use of these linkage mechanisms is the DALP expert survey beyond which the case studies have to rely on anecdotal evidence and local field research at sites within each of the countries. For our purposes, it is primarily relevant to establish how much effort politicians made in cultivating these other linkage mechanisms. A party’s programmatic appeal has more weight, when other linkage mechanisms take a decidedly lesser role and do not trump the programmatic appeals in a cacophony of inducements and lures to voters.

We set aside here the use of other linkage mechanisms, especially the use of a party’s history and voters’ identification with the party as well as the parties’ efforts to engage in “valence” competition in ways characterized earlier: Parties try to emphasize their competence and capacity to govern. Upon close inspection, there are some simple yardsticks that explain more intense inter-party competition with valence aspects and parties’ organizational history. These techniques are deployed more intensely across all national contexts, wherever (1) parties are large and attract a big following and (2) parties are older and therefore have built up a stock of supporters with already adult offspring that may have gone through a lifetime of socialization into the parties.

As described above, expert judgments permit the construction of a summary indicator of clientelistic programmatic effort by summing up the effort experts attribute parties over a range of activities to establish clientelistic inducements. The index ranges from 5.0 (no clientelistic targeting of voters) to 20.0 (extreme efforts to target voters in clientelistic exchanges), with an average score of a touch over 12.0 across 88 countries and 506 parties. On the charisma of leadership, a single question in the DALP survey asked experts to assess the extent to which parties’ use of the personal charisma of their leaders shape their outreach to voters. The highest score experts could award was a 4.0, the lowest 1.0. Table 4 assembles scores reflecting the programmatic structuration of party elites’ competitive efforts at the elite level and the mass level structuration of partisan alignments across the seven case study countries. Added, however, are here scores for three established postindustrial democracies—Canada, Germany, and the United States of America—in order to put scores for developing democracies into perspective.

Because parties vary their electoral strategies even within countries, it is interesting to examine the diversity of linkage strategies within our seven case studies. Of special interest is the presence of parties that are (1) exclusively programmatic in their linkage efforts and (2) parties that combine a vigorous

Table 4: Programmatic Politics in Context: Complex Citizen-Politician Linkage Profiles

	Programmatic Linkages: National Averages Across Parties		Other Linkages: National Averages, weighted by 2008 Electoral Party Size		Individual Party-Level Linkage Strategy Profiles		General Systemic Tendency of Linkage Strategies
	<i>Elite programmatic structuring of the party leadership (highest = 7)</i>	<i>Electoral programmatic structuring of partisan support (highest = 10)</i>	<i>Clientelistic effort, national aggregate, weighted by party size (highest = 4)</i>	<i>Partisan Leaders' Charismatic Authority, weighted by party size (highest = 20)</i>	<i>“Do Every- thing” (DoE) parties (CoSalPo_4 > .25 AND B15.nwe>10.0?)</i>	<i>Purely pro- grammatic parties (CoSalPo_4 > 0.25; B15 < 12.0)</i>	
Dominican Republic	7 (.06)	6	17.93	3.36	none	none	Predominantly clientelistic party system
Taiwan	5 (.14)	5	15.06	3.35	none	none	
India	4 (.17)	3	15.68	3.30	None	[CPI AND CPI/m closest]	
Brazil	6 (.14)	7	15.29	2.15	PT (.256/13.89) PDT (.247/15.00)	none	Beginning differentiation of linkages within and across parties
Bulgaria	3 (.18)	1	15.81	2.92	BSP .277/17.0	none	“High Everything” party systems: Combination of clientelism and programmaticism
Turkey	2 (.23)	2	17.74	3.59	AKP .294/19.86 RPP .277/15.00 MHP.252/15.67	DLP .257/9.67	
South Korea	1 (.41)	4	12.13	2.79	none	[GND: .503/12.50] LFP .368/11.83 UDP .493/10.78	Programmatic politics only
Canada	.41	n.d.	5.79	2.38	none	All parties	Postindustrial democracies: only program
Germany	.35	n.d.	6.65	2.38	none	All parties	
United States of America	.67	n.d.	10.10	2.90	none	All parties	

clientelistic with an intensive programmatic linkage strategy. This information is included in the fifth and sixth columns of table 4.

Before briefly sketching the situation in the individual countries with the assistance of the table and by drawing on the case study, let us point out a couple of general patterns that are visible here. In all of the developing democracies, *there is greater variability of programmatic than of clientelistic linkages*. Were it not for the case of South Korea, there would be only the weakest of direct trade-offs between parties' clientelistic and parties' programmatic efforts: In the other six cases, as a rule, clientelistic partisan effort are hardly lower, where programmatic partisan efforts are higher!⁵ Moreover, again excepting South Korea, there are just about no individual parties anywhere in the sample that would be purely programmatic without also being clientelistic. The only outlier is the small Kurdish minority party in Turkey (DLP) that is cut off from most state and private resources necessary to pursue clientelistic linkage strategies, but quite vigorously highlights programmatic appeals. The preponderance of non-programmatic politics in developing democracies is not a result of small-sample bias from seven countries, but can be generalized to the whole set of recent democracies.

There are, however, some cases of parties that combine clientelistic and programmatic appeals ("high everything" parties). We will obviously return to this observation in the explanatory section: Is it the case that programmatic politics in many developing democracies can be advanced, only or primarily if programmatic parties also provide clientelistic benefits? And why would this be so?

Only in South Korea and in the established democracies that are added in table 4 as contrasting cases do we find a prevalence of purely programmatic parties, and in the South Korean case this is just barely the case: Our expert judges score clientelistic efforts of Korean parties still in the neighborhood of the global mean among the 506 parties covered in the DALP study (i.e., in the 11.5 to 12.5 range, not near the lower bound—with scores 5.0 to 10.0) as in most advanced postindustrial democracies).⁶ Like the postindustrial democracies, Korean parties also tend to place an only muted emphasis on charismatic leadership personalities. This is the case although, as a general rule, experts score parties' emphasis on the personality of the candidate somewhat higher in a presidential democracy with a singular personalization of the role of the chief executive through direct election, when compared to parliamentary democracies like Canada or Germany. The other six countries in our case study set can be roughly divided into three groups, separated by thick horizontal bars in table 4.

The first group is countries with weak programmatic linkages both at the elite and mass levels, yet strong clientelistic linkages as well as considerable charismatic leadership. None of the three cases in this category—the **Dominican Republic, India, or Taiwan**—has *any* political parties that would invest in a strong programmatic stance, and all of their parties combine strong clientelistic efforts with emphasis on charismatic leadership authority. In India, according to the case study, what comes closest to a programmatic party are two of the local communist parties, but they are electorally small and stagnant or even declining in electoral support and capacity to participate in government executives, even at the level of Indian states. Comparing the three countries in this group, note also that these party systems prevail in countries of quite different wealth—fairly poor (India), inching toward intermediate income (Dominican Republic), or already quite wealthy (Taiwan).

⁵ So, just for illustrative purposes: The correlation between the programmatic effort scores in column 1 of table 4 and the clientelistic effort scores in column 3 is only $r = -.10$, when South Korea is left out, but $r = -.74$, when the influential case of South Korea is added.

⁶ Of course, in a few instances, also advanced industrial democracies still have semblance of clientelistic partisan effort (Austria, Ireland, Italy, and Japan are cases, and Greece and Portugal to an even greater extent.)

The second grouping consists of only one case in the comparative set, **Brazil**. It looks just like party systems in the purely clientelistic countries, except that charismatic authority has a distinctly weaker role to play in democratic linkage mechanisms. Most importantly, however, there is at least one important medium-sized party, the *Workers' Party (PT)*, that has become a champion of programmatic politics, although it also is attributed to still making a moderate clientelistic effort. Had we relaxed the criterion for “Do Everything” parties that make both energetic clientelistic and programmatic efforts a bit, we would have had to include two more Brazilian parties, the Social Democrats (PSDB) and a workers' party that emerges from the lineage of Brazil's erstwhile dictator, economic modernizer, and then elected president Getulio Vargas (the PDT).

But in Brazil politicians' efforts to feature “high everything” parties are not as nearly as vigorous as in *the third group*, consisting of **Bulgaria and Turkey**. Here we encounter large or even hegemonic parties that combine clientelistic outreach to voters with programmatic appeals. Past or present service in government may facilitate the combination of clientelism and programmatic appeals in ways later to be specified, but notice also that three of the four parties engaging in “high everything” strategies listed in table 4 are currently in the opposition and often have been in the opposition for a long time.

In important ways table 4 summarizes the explanatory puzzle we address in the analytical part of the project report:

- Why is it that developing country democracies rarely produce programmatic parties?
- Why and when do programmatic parties appear anyway?
- Why is it the case that these programmatic parties tend not to let clientelism fall by the wayside, but combine clientelistic efforts with programmatic appeals to electoral constituencies?

Let us at this point insert brief country summaries of parties' prevailing linkage profiles, based on the case studies that elaborate and qualify these round-about sketches. Following table 4, we outline the state of affairs in individual countries starting with the overall least programmatically structured case (Dominican Republic) and working up to the relatively most structured case (South Korea).

7. Dominican Republic

This country has parties that were initially in the 1960s and 1980s more strongly structured in programmatic terms than over the past twenty years, when it became possible that respective party leaders could pursue their office-seeking ambitions in unprecedented fashion. The successors of the forces backing the Trujillo presidency until the 1960s assembled in the PRSC and for a long while floated on top, fielding time and again the victorious presidential candidate, Joaquin Balaguer, first in manipulated and later in cleaner elections. The main opposition party, PRD, led by a charismatic social reformer, Juan Bosch, split in two, with Bosch founding the new more radical PLD, when he felt that office-seeking politicians moved the PRD too close to the regime and ultimately indeed captured the presidency repeatedly.

The main citizen-politician linkage mechanism in the Dominican Republic appears to remain clientelistic politics, and observers detect a sharp increase in clientelistic efforts over the past decade. Parties are pretty indistinguishable in programmatic terms and they supply few large-scale club or collective goods that would distinguish them from other administrations, when in office. These two features should be kept in mind when reviewing the explanatory section of the report: Here is a country that through fast economic growth has become a middle-income country and continues to rely on clientelistic rather than programmatic citizen-party linkages.

6. Taiwan

Although the parties have very different origins—one as the authoritarian ruling party defeated by the mainland Communists in 1949 and then establishing itself in Taiwan to the detriment of the local gentry, the other as challenger of the non-democratic regime—they have converged on positions that allow only mild programmatic conflict. While in the past the oppositional Democratic Party embraced more social and redistributive policies, all bets were off when it came into office. In a similar vein, the sharp differences between KMT and DP on the question of Indo-Chinese détente and reordering of the mainland-Taiwan relationship, were somewhat whittled away by alternation in office and the former opposition parties holding the presidency for two consecutive terms.

While Taiwan's politics has not been devoid of programmatic content, its intensity is substantially below what one might expect for a country of Taiwan's wealth and educational accomplishments. Taiwan has also lacked the true political maverick outlier party whose rise might wreck the delicate balance between two often almost equally strong competitive, but programmatically bland partisan camps.

5. India

This democracy of almost 1.3 people, a federation with many state-level governments, has a field of well over 350 parties most of which compete only in one or a handful of states. The five major national parties, collecting together about 63% of the national vote in the recent 2009 legislative election, are pretty thoroughly clientelistic, to the exclusion of strong programmatic profiles, with the mild exception of the two small Marxist communist parties. Also among the remaining mostly smallish regional and ideological splinter parties, experts see an overwhelming commitment to clientelistic as opposed to programmatic appeals. This has changed little over time. Experts do mention the possibility that there are, indeed, some more programmatic small parties in individual states. Some mention the socialist Samajwadi Party, others Nitish Kumar's Janata Dal (U) in Bihar and Naveen Patnaik's BJD in Orissa.

At the national level, programmatic structuring may have been actually somewhat stronger in the founding period of the Indian state and political economy, as well as during a brief episode in the late 1980s to mid-1990s when the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) was initially on the rise and a sudden balance of payments and currency crisis compelled the India National Congress (INC) led government to initiate important measures of domestic market liberalization and trade liberalization as well. But both in the BJP and in the INC vote-seeking strategies quickly led to a reassertion of primarily clientelistic orientations. The only true programmatic difference (and mutual precision of positions) between the two major parties may be on the question of secularism, where the INC projects a distinctly secular position, whereas the BJP embraces the primacy of Hinduism in India.

In the smaller parties, the emphasis on clientelism rather than programmatic orientation is buttressed by the personalism and centralization of the party organizations. Political entrepreneurs and their families found political parties and tend to run them akin to family fiefs that can be bequeathed on the next generation in the manner of dynastic succession. The proliferation of regional parties founded recently by political entrepreneurs is thus likely to be a phenomenon that is likely to undermine a movement of Indian politics in the programmatic direction.

Party leaders choose electoral candidates for their parties according to their chances to win seats. This is primarily a function of candidate resources and access to the state apparatus to help provide resources. For this reason, many criminals with deep pockets have managed to win electoral office under a variety of partisan labels.

Overall, programmatic structuring of Indian party systems is quite subdued and mostly limited to socio-cultural questions of identity and governance. There is rather little differentiation of parties' linkage strategies in the polity. Vote seeking efforts (still?) require a predominantly clientelistic orientation to be successful.

4. Brazil

Brazil has both spectacularly clientelistic, yet also fairly programmatic parties. In the early to mid-1990s, it was Fernando Cardozo's PSDB and already before him Inacio Lula da Silva's PT that clearly began to differentiate their approach to the electorate from that of the established clientelistic parties. Their respective terms in the presidential office, as well as the many delicate coalition bargains in the legislature that enabled these presidents to enact some of

their legislative programs—certainly undermined the sharp profiles of these two parties’ programmatic appeals a bit, but did not eliminate them.

This leaves in place a highly differentiated field of parties, with a center-left and an extreme left pursuing distinctive programmatic projects, particularly in the realms of economic and social policy, and a center-right and far-right that used to deny its ideological origins, yet has projected the image of parties that deliver clientelistic benefits to their supporters. The exception here is the PSDB which in reaction to the Lula presidency has moved the market-liberalizing center right. It is now joined by other successors of old clientelistic parties that also try to increase their programmatic profile on economic-distributive issues.

3. Bulgaria

Here an old and never quite entirely reformed authoritarian legacy party, the renamed Bulgarian communists (Bulgarian Socialist Party), provided a programmatic anchor for the Bulgarian party system. Yet at the same time the prowess of this party relies not only on its intellectual heritage and organization, but also its immersion into clientelistic networks in local and even national politics. Liberal-democratic challengers have engaged in a succession of efforts to build alternative political parties, but almost invariably found that to achieve resilience they could not quite do without also embracing clientelistic practices of targeting benefits to small groups and individual voters.

Next to the post-communist party, the most durable party organization, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS) that politically represents the ethnically Turkish, Islamic minority in the Southeast of the country, is at the same time also rated most clientelistic by the expert observers of the Bulgarian scene. Most other parties that experienced some electoral success in the now over twenty years of Bulgarian democracy subscribed more or less to trajectories of economic liberalization and/or fighting corruption in the Bulgarian state. But they also built clientelistic networks at least when they obtained positions of executive office and thus control of state resources, as well as more recently resources coming to Bulgaria from the European Union.

Bulgaria thus offers a case in which clientelism and programmatic appeals are not entirely opposed to each other. Both on the “left,” represented by the post-communist BSP, as well as the “right,” crystallized by a succession of liberal-democratic, economically conservative parties, and, of course, in the “center” with ethnic or sectoral (peasant) special interest parties, politicians have aspired to combine a modicum of programmatic appeals and inter-party differentiation with clientelistic voter inducements. Political experts judge the ten years from the financial crisis of the country in 1996-8 to 2008 as a time period in which clientelism intensified a great deal. But this process has not implied the vanishing of programmatic electoral competition altogether. This is evidenced both on the level of voter structuration by parties where Bulgaria takes the top position in our field of seven country studies as well as the structuring of partisan elite appeals, where Bulgarian parties show a modicum of programmatic effort.

2. Turkey

Bulgaria’s neighbor Turkey has no communist authoritarian legacy, but also a legacy of authoritarian state-centered economic development, albeit not pushed by a single party, but rather the strength of the military standing behind surrogate political parties of the day and guaranteeing the structural integrity of Attaturk’s state edifice beyond the volatility of political parties and governments. Nevertheless, the rise of new parties with stronger programmatic appeals, albeit also clientelistic linkage strategies, has upset this equilibrium in recent decades and put the military on the defensive. The foremost new force is, of course, the moderately Islamic, conservative *Justice and Development Party* (AKP) that stands programmatically for market liberalization and socio-cultural conservatism and traditionalism, but also to its main rival, the *Republican People’s Party* (CHP) with a secular appeal, combined with a moderately redistributive social democratic view on questions of market economics, as well as the third party in Turkey, the *Nationalist Movement Party* (MHP). Only the representative of the Kurdish minority party in the East of the country, the *Peace and Democracy Party* (BDP), cannot combine a distinctive programmatic appeal with strong clientelistic inducements, as it is cut off from a supply of the necessary resources to cultivate a selective incentives strategy among its potential electorate.

The AKP is one of the few parties in the entire 88 country dataset that scores near the upper ceiling of clientelistic effort. It is also in the top quartile of parties with strong programmatic orientation. It is one of roughly 40 “do everything” parties among more than 500 parties scored in the full dataset (see Kitschelt and Singer 2011). Turkish party system experts also indicate that the effort of parties to provide clientelistic incentives has not subsided, but actually intensified in the 1998-2008 decade. And this development is not confined to the AKP.

1. Korea

Korean parties provide evidence for a more “classic” trade-off between clientelistic and programmatic linkage strategies. Starting out as more clientelistic and personalistic political vehicles of leaders with presidential ambitions, experts attribute to these parties very robust and distinctive programmatic appeals, combined with an intermediate clientelistic level that has been waning since the 1990s. The currently governing *Grand National Party* (GNP) has its origins in an authoritarian regime legacy party, but then absorbed a number of other parties and currents in its post-authoritarian history. Programmatically it combines free-market liberalism with socio-cultural conservatism and a strong support for the alliance with the United States and resistance to making concessions to the North Korean regime. Its counterpart is the *Democratic Party* that emerged in 2008 out of a long history of splits and mergers of various more personalistic predecessors. As a mirror image of the GNP, it takes more redistributive policy stances on questions of economics, is less conservative on questions of socio-cultural governance, and embraces a more anti-American, and pro-détente North Korean stance on foreign policy and questions of national identity. There are a variety of additional small parties in Korean politics and even the legislature. They are mostly vehicles of presidential ambitions by losers in the nominations process of the two major parties. Worth mentioning may only be the small Democratic Labor Party, founded in 2000 as the political wing of the Korean Confederation of Labor Unions which situates itself further to the left than the rival and larger trade union confederation in Korea.

The current position of the Korean parties constitutes a remarkable evolution of parties’ investments in linkage strategies over the two decades of Korean liberal democracy. Even taking structural conditions into account, our expert observers attribute more programmatic effort to the two major political parties than would be expected based on economic development and even political experience alone. It should be noted as a reminder, however, that this change at the elite level is not fully reflected by equivalent movements in terms of voter alignments. The Korean electorate still remains in a somewhat amorphous state, with few signs of crystallizing public policy opinion differences around partisan alignments.

Before we turn to this explanatory task of the report, however, let us briefly review some correlates and attributes of the parties and party systems that may be important to know for the further analysis. These are the parties’ organization and financing and the parties’ behavior in government. These brief sections also enable us to identify areas where our knowledge is extremely weak and where more empirical insight into the current state of affairs of parties in developing democracies might help us shed light on the evolution of programmatic party politics.

1.5. Party Organization, Party Finance, and Parties in Legislatures

1.5.1. Party Organization

The case studies find that precious little research has been conducted by political scientists on the nature of party organizations in developing democracies. The only exception is the Brazilian Workers’ Party which has attracted the attention of scholars since the 1990s and led to the production of a small body of academic monographs and articles. But even parties as prominent as the *Indian Congress Party*, hegemonic from 1948 to the early 1980s and still pivotal in most Indian national and state elections ever since, have not encouraged social scientists to plunge into thorough investigations of their operation and organization of internal affairs. There is certainly no literature that would interface parties’ organizational articulation with a study of the linkage strategies parties seek to voters. As a consequence, the small research project documented in this report has to fall back almost exclusively on the DALP survey from 2008 in which country experts scored features of domestic party organizations in the seven case study countries. Since the detailed data are incorporated in the case studies, this overview will report only a few patterns with regard to (1) the ***organizational extensiveness and personnel base of political parties*** in developing democracies, (2) the degree to which ***intra-party political power is centralized*** in a small

national leadership and (3) the *transparency or opaqueness of the acquisition and disbursement of party finance* that characterizes these party organizations.

Both programmatic and clientelistic parties need capable organizational delivery structures, but they may be different, as they serve different purposes. To become electorally successful, both types of parties may need plenty of operatives to speak and act on behalf of their parties in diverse institutional contexts, from local municipal councils all the way up to national legislatures, and in hosts of executive agencies at all levels of government. For organizing clientelistic voter mobilization and linkage efforts, a party's agents and workers are needed primarily to identify and acquire resources a party can then deploy for the distribution of clientelistic benefits to target electoral constituencies. Because of the instrumental orientation of party followers and middle-level operatives, such parties need not create venues for them to participate in a process of deliberation and coordination about their party's policy objectives.

By contrast, for the purpose of organizing a coherent programmatic effort, parties must recruit likeminded activists and coordinate them through processes of deliberation and persuasion to support a joint policy platform that generates a modicum of credibility among potential voters that the party would actually pursue the objectives it announces before elections. Whereas the extensive mobilization of partisan personnel for a clientelistic effort is primarily geared to the imperatives of financial resource mobilization, that of a programmatic party has more to do with the investment of time and effort in the production of a joint programmatic policy commitment.⁷

Because alignments of policy objectives and preferences are close to irrelevant in clientelistic parties, such parties are likely to work with a looser formal organizational structure than programmatic parties. Clientelistic organization relies more on readily available, exogenously evolved, *informal networks of existing notables in local community settings*, such as members of local oligarchies, be they mayors or town councilors, influential businessmen or leaders of civic associations, religious operatives or well-known teachers and intellectuals. These notables are not necessarily formal party members, but they know many voters and assemble the local knowledge that may enable parties to monitor and sanction clientelistic exchange relations, even if the notables themselves never become active within the partisan framework or do not accept a joint platform of policy commitments. The extensiveness of a clientelistic party may therefore articulate itself less in formal organizational membership criteria and more in dense informal networks to local notables. These "notables" help to organize clientelistic exchange as brokers or in collaboration with brokers who are working at the frontier of voter acquisition.

By contrast, a programmatic linkage operates through a deliberative process of policy coordination in which the individual activist endorses a joint statement of intent over policy purposes. Formal membership, tied to each member's willingness to underwrite certain collective party objectives, may be one criterion to create a credible programmatic commitment that policy-motivated voters take into consideration, when choosing among competing political parties.

Chart 1 shows the relationship between parties' programmatic efforts, their clientelistic efforts, and the parties' use of local notables, indicated by the tallness of the individual columns, as assessed by party experts in the DALP survey. The sample is restricted to the electorally more successful parties (>15% of the electorate in the most recent legislative election). Pillars with weak clientelistic or programmatic party commitments include parties that have linkage scores at least one half standard deviation below the global

⁷ To be sure, there is some fungibility and substitutability of money and time: The time spent on programmatic coordination creates often steep opportunity costs for fund-raising and financial resource allocation, contributing to a trade-off between parties' investments in clientelistic and programmatic efforts.

mean for all parties (N=506), those with strong linkages are at least one half standard deviation above that global mean.

Chart 1 about here

The table shows that regardless of parties' programmatic efforts, a party's greater clientelistic commitments (dark blue bars) work through a more systematic use of local notables' networks. It also shows that where parties' programmatic effort is more intense, the share of parties that also makes a strong clientelistic effort is smaller. Moreover, parties with weak clientelistic effort (light colored bars) rely less on notables, especially when their programmatic efforts are very strong (light colored bar on the right). Programmatic partisan effort appears to conflict with a strong reliance on notables.

Clientelistic and programmatic parties appear to use the centralization of political authority in different ways. Centralization here means that a small group of party leaders makes decisions over the party's allocation of resources, policy appeals, or alliance strategy with other parties. In another specification, it also involves leaders' power over the nomination of party candidates for electoral office in legislative elections. In parties with vigorous clientelistic effort, the party leadership may seek high centralization of political authority in order to control the intermediate broker level (Stokes et al., 2011). Leaders wish to limit the resources these intermediaries can divert for their private consumption instead of employing them for targeted distribution to clients. Moreover, since all participants in a predominantly clientelistic party organization are motivated by material payoffs and not political power per se, intermediate level brokers and activists may be indifferent to a strong concentration of political authority setting the party's objectives in a small leadership at the top of the party.


By contrast, in parties with strong programmatic effort, particularly if they are electorally large and assemble substantial numbers of activists, leaders may have to make more concessions to middle level activists' and grassroots members' desires to have a say over party strategy. After all, active party members join with the explicit intent to affect a party's policy objectives ("purposive" incentive for contributions). Moreover, if a party's choice of policy objectives involves a complex process of interaction with middle-level and rank-and-file activist participation, rather than only the whims and moods of a handful of leaders, then parties with programmatic appeals can more credibly demonstrate to prospective voters that they are likely to stick to their objectives after elections than opportunistically defect and change them whenever convenient. Party organization becomes a signal of programmatic resolve.

Chart 2 shows the DALP experts' rating of large parties' power centralization as a function of low, intermediate, and strong clientelistic and/or programmatic party efforts.⁸ A complex interactive relationship prevails. Where clientelistic partisan effort is weak (light colored bars), power centralization within parties is weaker, the more parties emphasize vigorous programmatic appeals. But where clientelistic partisan efforts are strong (dark blue bars), centralization is greater, the more programmatic effort the parties make in addition to their clientelistic efforts. As a result, in "high everything" parties, such as the Turkish *Justice and Development Party* or the *Bulgarian Socialist Party* in our case studies, power concentration around a few national party leaders is particularly pronounced. Only where programmatic politics dominates *to the exclusion of clientelistic effort* are political parties internally comparatively decentralized. As we already know from the overview of the case studies, this is rarely, if ever, the case in the parties present in developing countries and new democracies.

Chart 2 about here

⁸ The measure used here is the survey question about the centralization of political power in parties (a6) and large parties are those with more than 15% of the vote in the most recent national legislative election.

**Chart 1: Closeness of Large Parties to Notables,
Contingent upon a Party's Clientelistic and
Programmatic Effort**



**Chart 2: Centralization of the Nominations for
Legislative Office, Contingent upon a Large
Party's Clientelistic and Programmatic Effort**




Chart 3: Transparency of Private Financial Contributions in Large Parties, Contingent upon a Party's Clientelistic and Programmatic Effort




Chart 3 shows results for a corollary of political power concentration, namely the *opaqueness of party finance*. Transparency of party finance is a constraint on the degrees of freedom of a centralized leadership. We would therefore expect parties that are highly clientelistic to have opaque finances, parties that combine clientelistic and programmatic efforts in “high everything” strategies also to have opaque finances, and only programmatic parties to the exclusion of clientelism to display a modicum of financial transparency that coincides with relative decentralization of intra-party political governance.

Chart 3 about here

Chart 3 pretty much confirms these expectations. If parties make vigorous programmatic efforts (dark blue bars), then they also have the most transparent party finances, ***but only provided they also make weak clientelistic efforts***. By contrast, parties that make both strong clientelistic and programmatic efforts have the most opaque partisan finances of all the parties. Highly clientelistic parties, however, have opaque finances in combination with any level of programmatic effort (bar triplet on the right). The high financial transparency of the low clientelism/low programmatic effort bar on the very left is an outlier, but one has to recognize that it represents a single observation (N=1), whereas there are 39 observations contributing to the high transparency score for the low clientelism/high programmatic effort bar.

Evidence from case studies is consistent with the general tendency revealed in the quantitative analysis at least for the predominantly clientelistic parties. With regard to parties that are (also) programmatic, the case studies are more ambiguous: These parties tend to rely more on informal notables and display more centralization and greater lack of financial transparency than one might have expected. The fairly recent adoption of programmatic stances may account for this feature.

- Parties in the *Dominican Republic*, the country with least programmatic effort among the seven cases, generally lack formal local presence and largely rely on local notables, combined with a highly centralized organizational structure.
- The two main parties in *Taiwan*, though having extensive local units, tend to ally themselves with pre-existing small-scale social networks to mobilize votes. This tendency originates from KMT's linkage strategies of eliciting cooperation from local elites and securing popular support through local level elections under authoritarianism. These local agents do not share a distinct ideological position, and thus some of them were bought off by other parties to provide existing clientelistic networks after democratic transition.
- *Indian party organization* varies substantially across states. In states where parties are more organized and more clearly follow formalized regulations in selecting party representatives, there is a greater coordination of voters around parties rather than around individual candidates (Chhibber, Jensenius & Suryanarayan 2011). Most Indian parties are dominated by a personal founder-leader and/or his extended dynastic family and lack the organizational structures that facilitate programmatic partisan appeals. A partial exception is the small *Indian Communist Party* (Marxism) (CPI(M)), a party rated as having an extensive country-wide organizational network and following formalized procedures in its strongholds, as well as restraining the power of its leadership, while scoring at least in the intermediate range on programmatic partisan effort.
- In *Turkey*, the party that has the greatest level of formal organizational extensiveness, AKP, is also the party that makes the most substantial programmatic effort. But it relies also on extensive

networks of notables assisting its clientelistic effort. The AKP has become the archetypical “do everything” party with extremely great centralization of power in the hands of the party leader.

- The increasing importance of *Korean parties*’ programmatic appeals corresponds to the retirement of the “three Kims” and the depersonalization of party organizations. Parties have made great efforts to institutionalize the internal decision making process and create greater transparency.
- In Brazil, the *Workers Party* was by far the most formally organized party in the country, even before the ascent of its leader to the Brazilian presidency. Whereas the other parties are highly personalistic instruments of political leaders, even a charismatic politician as Lula was checked by internal deliberative processes of his party.
- In *Bulgaria*, finally, the fragmentary evidence again suggests that programmatic appeals tend to be made by the more formally organized parties, whereas the less programmatic parties tend to be more personalistic and centralized projects.

1.5.2. Legislative Organization

A further important element of a party’s organizational power structure has to do with its governance of the its legislative representatives who are formally free of party instructions in most legislatures of the world. Nevertheless, there is an intimate and continuous relationship between a party’s organizational leadership outside legislatures and its intra-legislative coordination of members of the legislature elected under the brand of the party. *How parties’ legislative caucus arrangements and their external organizations relate to parties’ programmatic policy effort is a subject on which precious little systematic cross-national evidence and theorizing is available at this time.* There are no detailed studies of legislative party organization in our case study countries at hand. Such data were also not collected in the DALP survey. Fish and Kroenig’s (2009) *Handbook of National Legislatures* has nothing on party governance in legislatures or the interface between parties in the legislature and parties as organizations. The case studies assembled in this IDEA project are compelled to rely on impressionistic observations and whatever hazardous inferences can be drawn from them.. The lack of information on how parties work in legislatures is one important area to which IDEA’s research activities and concern for improving democratic accountability could turn in the future.

Legislative organizational arrangements compatible with programmatic politics must meet two criteria. First, legislative organization must *give legislators incentives and capabilities to invest in acquiring policy expertise that disposes them to engage in programmatic debates* as well as prepare, review, and oversee legislation with a great deal of competence. In other words, to employ Max Weber’s (1919/1978: 1416-24) famous distinction, parliaments must be in a position to function as “working parliaments” and not just as “speaking parliaments.” And, second, parliamentary governance must give legislators adhering to the same party *incentives to cooperate within their party caucuses* rather than to compete with and against other members of the same caucus. Personalistic competition among legislators belonging to the same party, however, tends to undermine programmatic politics. It may also make them struggle to obtain benefits for personal electoral constituencies, most likely channeled through clientelistic exchange relations.

What kind of legislative organization does it take to bring about investment in programmatic deliberation, yet also “team collaboration” under partisan labels? The existence of a *permanent legislative committee system* well-endowed with resources and autonomous from the government executive, with

rights to review executive conduct through independent investigations and to prepare new legislation, is probably the most important necessary, albeit insufficient precondition for programmatic legislative deliberation. It must be complemented by a partisan governance structure that does not make legislators into independent entrepreneurs: The structure of partisan caucus membership and legislative committee appointment and reward needs to orient legislators toward intra-party collaboration rather than personalistic competition. For one thing, this means that it must be *costly for legislators to leave the party caucus* on which they had been elected to the legislature. For another thing, it means that many of the *benefits of legislative membership*—such as access to resources and positions with special decision-making powers—*should be allocated by party caucus decisions or the caucus leadership* rather than by some exogenous criterion such as seniority. Above all, that would apply to appointments to and advancement within powerful standing legislative committees. Once having placed members in a committee, party caucuses would have the powers to *reward individual legislators' committee performance as an avenue to caucus leadership positions*. Of course, if the party leadership itself is oriented toward clientelistic political linkage mechanisms, even a strong party-centered legislative governance structure that makes possible programmatic competition will actually reinforce clientelistic politics.

Nevertheless, as a necessary condition for programmatic competition to prevail, it cannot be up to the individual legislator to choose her committee memberships or to leave it to a process of seniority-based advancement, beyond party control, to determine committee assignments and promotions to leadership positions. Where parties lose control of committee governance, legislators become champions of individual issues and of acquiring benefits for electoral constituencies that affect their political career prospects, a rationale that often leads to clientelistic rather than programmatic linkage strategies. While party governance of committee work is thus imperative for programmatic party competition, such partisan power, however, should also not be so overwhelming as to suffocate the initiative of individual committee members in trying to achieve the best for their own party.

The little information the case studies could uncover about legislative governance and legislative party organization do not look promising for the implementation of legislative governance designs that meet criteria favorable for programmatic partisan competition. In most instances, legislatures in developing countries simply lack the resources to become important policy players. Even if this hurdle is overcome, the appointment and promotions procedures in legislatures are often unlikely to reward intra-party collaboration or policy expertise. So even where strong partisan caucus organizations do exist, the power of their partisan leaderships may be so overwhelming and intertwined with that of meddling national party leaders that it suffocates the disposition of rank-and-file legislators on committees to invest in policy expertise and legislative committee performance.

In at least three of the legislatures covered by this project's case studies—Bulgaria, Brazil, and Korea—and possibly also in Taiwan, the evidence may suggest that the legislative governance structures of parties have strengthened in recent years. It has become harder and more costly for members of legislatures to switch their caucus and party affiliation. Indications are also that committee work has somewhat intensified. Whether and how such committee work is done and how it influences or is influenced by programmatic partisan debates, however, is anyone's guess. Provided that party leaders underwrite a programmatic orientation, a stronger partisan governance of legislative delegations should eventually contribute to more programmatic partisan competition.

Of course, a great deal more research needs to be done in this general subject area. Unfortunately, the IDEA case studies cannot really build on existing research, even in the most prominent cases in the analyzed set. Scholars of Indian politics, for example, appear to have only the vaguest sense of what is going on in the national *Lok Sabha* and how partisan governance structures assert themselves in its

working process. Rigorous studies of the Indian or of most other legislatures are still to be conducted. By extension, the same lacunae applies to systematic comparative data collection that would specify the resources, capacities, and opportunities affecting legislators' willingness to invest in programmatic expertise, as well as the party-level mechanisms that are likely to coordinate the acquisition of expertise. For this reason, on this important subject area the case studies will unearth only a very thin semblance of information. In many of the case study countries, established huge democracies such as Brazil and India included, political scientists simply have not sufficiently examined legislative procedures and decision-making. We are dealing with a *terra incognita* that needs to be explored in future projects.

Items that need specific attention include the following:

- The governance structures and incentives systems that would make legislators invest in policy competence;
- The resource endowments of legislators, committees, and partisan caucuses (staff, access to information and executive oversight), including the presence of legislative research and information services;
- Rules of internal partisan caucus governance pertaining to the power of the party leadership to allocate valuable positions (e.g. committee member and chair positions) and to nudge caucus members toward partisan cooperation and discipline.

Overall, with the exception of a handful of parties among which the Brazilian PT serves as the model, the case studies simply could not draw on the necessary information about the external organization of political parties and their internal legislative governance structures to draw conclusions about the relationship between organizational arrangements and programmatic partisan competition. This is regrettable, as party and legislative organizations are elements of the political process that may be altered with fewer political obstacles obstructing reform than when basic democratic institutions or political-economic features of a country are at stake.

1.6. From Representation to Governance: Competitiveness of Electoral Contests and Partisan Governments

Let us finally look at patterns of partisan competition and government formation that come with parties' programmatic effort. It is hard to say and to test empirically, whether they are causes, concomitant correlates, or consequences of diverse linkage strategies.

Political competitiveness measures the extent to which politicians can expect that small changes in the proportion of votes they receive translate into substantial changes of their bargaining power and ultimately ability to dominate government executives that shape policies and/or the allocation of resources among partisan clients. Intense competitiveness will make politicians reinforce their efforts to obtain votes with those linkage mechanisms what are likely to appeal to the greatest number of voters available for switching partisan support.

In a two-party system, it is simple to measure competitiveness: Take the gap in electoral support that opinion polls reveal between the two lead contenders before elections. The smaller the gap, the more competitive are elections. Politicians will reckon that a small margin of voters changing their minds can

deliver victory or defeat for their side. Each side will try to make the greatest possible effort to turn out every last voter to win.

In a multi-party system, determining competitiveness is much harder, particularly if it is impossible to know with some precision *ex ante*, before elections, which parties may team up in a government coalition. Partisan “blocs” and their “closeness” in electoral support are often hard to identify. We develop an indicator of “electoral competitiveness” in multiparty systems in the appendix 4 and use it later to understand conditions under which parties may adopt more vigorous programmatic politics. The basic idea is essentially the same as in two-party systems, namely that politicians will make more effort to win, when the difference between winning and losing is great and when small shifts of voters may determine the outcome.

For now, let us simply inspect competitive situations in the party systems of our seven country cases and relate them to politicians’ choices of linkage strategies. The empirical evidence is complicated and, on the face of it, does not suggest a clean and linear hypothesis about the association between competitiveness, politicians’ investments in programmatic appeals, and their clientelistic efforts. As we argue later, the lack of a linear relationship between competitiveness and programmatic effort is in fact what some of the theoretical literature would expect (see Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007):

- The ***Dominican Republic, Taiwan and South Korea*** have all party systems with two and three relevant parties that are often running neck-and-neck in electoral contests with very intense competitiveness. Nevertheless, in two of these polities parties tend to invest primarily in clientelistic linkages (the Dominican Republic and Taiwan), while in the third parties have recently switched over from a clientelistic to a programmatic emphasis, albeit without dropping the former entirely (South Korea).
- ***Turkey and Bulgaria*** have less competitive party systems, but in rather different ways. Turkey has a single hegemonic party and a scattering of smallish to mid-sized contenders with very disparate appeals and unable to displace the dominant party from government. Until 2010, Bulgaria has had two or three mid-sized parties each of which needed at least one and sometimes two additional small alliance partners to assemble a viable parliamentary majority to elect a prime minister and pass legislation. Bulgarian party politics was thus not terribly competitive, particularly as there were many viable combinations in which party could ally in viable coalition governments. Things changed in Bulgaria since 2010, however, as the conservative-market-liberal side of the political spectrum now rallies around a single party that almost won a majority of the legislature on its own and proceeded to form a single-party coalition government. But while Bulgaria’s party system has always been a bit more competitive than Turkey’s, the latter’s parties have been more programmatic.
- In the set of case studies, the least competitive systems with the most fragmented party system and the greatest complexity of government formation—***Brazil and India***—have rather heavily non-programmatic, yet strongly clientelistic parties. For Brazil, however, that statement needs to be qualified in light of the above sketched efforts of several parties to become more programmatic (PT, PSDB, PTB and most recently the PFL and its successor *Democratas*). Furthermore, the PT has become the node of a partisan bloc that might configure the Brazilian party system around two competitive alliance alternatives.

A number of the case studies explain that in the process of government formation through coalition bargaining whatever programmatic efforts parties made *ex ante* before elections, might get whittled away in

the bargaining and horse-trading among a multiplicity of parties all of which have to be assembled under the roof of a single government to create a viable majority. For the sake of government office, parties give up their distinctive appeals in complex multilateral negotiations about cabinet seats and policy compromises. This is a particularly messy problem for Indian government formation, even though the presence of four party camps has simplified things at the margin.⁹ Also in Brazil and in the past Turkey as well the complexities of coalition formation apparently constitute mechanisms that reduce the programmatic clarity of content in government policies. Similar observations have been made about Bulgaria until the most recent election of 2010.

For later reference, a condition that appears not to coincide with the programmatic vigor of parties' appeals is the presence of parliamentary as opposed to presidential constitutions. While it is the case that in the Brazilian presidential system a sitting president without legislative majority will engage in complicated horse-trading among legislators and parties to cobble together majorities over key legislation and lose a lot of programmatic content of the legislation along the way, the coordination of parties around policies appears to fare no better in low-competitiveness parliamentary democracies, such as Bulgaria or India.

The first part of the report has considered parties and whole party systems' programmatic and non-programmatic linkage practices that relate democratic politicians who contest elections to their voter constituencies. It has also covered what may be institutional correlates of parties' linkage strategies, such as party organization, legislative organization, competitiveness of electoral contestation, and modes of government formation. It is not clear whether any of these correlates could also be "causal" in the sense that a change in these practices would ultimately result in a change of politicians' linkage strategies. These correlates seem rather to lubricate the maintenance of given linkage strategies or facilitate transitions that may have been started for other reasons. Let us now turn to potentially causal mechanisms that shape programmatic or non-programmatic partisan strategies to stay accountable to voters by responding to their preferences.

⁹ Of course, the party camps themselves already constitute policy compromises among its constitutive elements and thus a dilution of whatever programmatic content individual parties may have fielded in the election campaigns.

2. Explanatory Account. Why Do Parties and Party Systems Become More or Less Programmatic?

In this part of the report, first some “hard,” most likely exogenous and durable causes for politicians’ partisan linkage strategies to voters in democratic elections will be considered (section 2.1.). Come what may, politicians cannot possibly alter or make these constraints go away in the short- and medium run and simply have to acknowledge them as givens, if it indeed turns out that they constrain the choice of programmatic politics. Among the four potential hard constraints or opportunities that may impinge on partisans’ strategies—(1) economic development, (2) the freedom and fairness of current elections, (3) cumulative experience with democracy, and (4) the ethnic diversity/ethnically based economic asymmetry—only one empirically appears to affect programmatic party competition in a robust fashion: economic development. Both the case studies as well as a more comprehensive quantitative analysis of parties’ programmatic efforts across 88 countries bear out this assessment.

But even a “hard” constraint is not an absolute or fully determinative constraint. As we shall see, there is substantial variability among parties’ programmatic and/or clientelistic accountability strategies, even once the impact of hard constraints has been taken into account. After having appraised the strength and limitations of “hard” constraints on politicians’ choices of democratic linkage strategies, therefore, in section 2.2. the report identifies and analyzes four “soft” constraints and opportunities that may influence parties’ programmatic efforts to reach out to voters: (1) a country’s *political-economic development strategy*, i.e. its basic policy choices to bring about economic growth; (2) the presence of *economic crises* that nudge parties toward programmatic innovation to cope with new development strategies, particularly when these crises signal the exhaustion of a more durable political-economic development strategy; (3) the *competitiveness of the electoral contestation among parties*, whether under conditions of poor or more affluent countries, and (4) alterations in the *internal organization of political parties and their legislative partisan caucuses*.

The four conditions are “soft” for two reasons. On the one hand, these are circumstances that may or may not make politicians choose whether to invest in programmatic appeals. There is no inevitability involved. On the other, these conditions may themselves result from politicians’ choices of more or less programmatic partisan appeals. It is not all that simple to sort out cause and effect theoretically or empirically in these instances, whether with the assistance of the case studies of programmatic politics in seven countries or a more systematic statistical comparative analysis of programmatic partisan effort across 88 countries. Even if, however, it is programmatic linkage strategies that initially help to generate some of these four conditions, the *presence of these conditions, in turn, may perpetuate and maintain programmatic partisan appeals in the competitive electoral contest*.

Finally, in section 2.3., the report appraises three potential causes of programmatic politics on which the case studies unearthed either negative evidence or no evidence at all, as too little systematic information is available at this time. These are clearly subjects, however, that require further study: (1) *the role of democratic institutions for programmatic politics*, and here especially that of electoral systems, executive-legislative arrangements, and subnational territorial division; (2) *the role of civil society* that could not be explored in detail in this modest research project and (3) *the effort and impact made by international inter-governmental or non-governmental organizations* to nudge politicians toward programmatic party competition.

Let us reiterate that given the set-up of the study and the data available, causal claims are necessarily weak. But triangulation of two different perspectives can help. The broad comparison of 506 parties in 88 countries with observations of parties' programmatic efforts at one point in time (2008) can help to identify what kinds of conditions correlate with strong and weak programmatic efforts. But correlation is not causation. Without correlation, there can be no causation; but if there is correlation, the causation can run both ways: Are programmatic party strategies cause or consequence of whatever they are associated with? A time series of data on parties' programmatic efforts and the conditions under which they took place would help here, but it is not available. As a second best strategy, we can therefore rely on the case studies. Here parties are observed over time in dynamic settings. In addition to purely theoretical reasoning, empirical case studies can thus at least suggest in which direction the causal arrow is likely to run. But case studies have their own drawbacks. This study includes only seven of them, and they have not been randomly selected. Moreover, these few cases cannot cover all the possible combinations of conditions that one might want to inspect.

2.1. “Hard” Conditions: Constraints and Opportunities for Programmatic Party Competition

We explore four “hard” conditions past analyses have found to militate against strong programmatic efforts by political parties: poor societies, lack of democratic experience, less than free and fair democratic elections, and ethnic divisions in the polity. Among these four causes, we actually find only a single one that has a lasting and robust impact on politicians' programmatic partisan politics: economic development. A comparison of our case studies illustrates and confirms this conclusion reached on the basis of broader statistical analysis of 88 polities with at least semi-competitive partisan elections for three of the four factors. As far as the first factor goes, the case studies cannot speak to its causal efficacy, as there is too little variance among the cases to tell:

- ***The presence or lack of a democratic level playing field in electoral contestation:*** The case studies only cover countries with approximately free and fair elections. But even employing the DALP survey of 88 countries including a small tier of polities with semi-competitive elections, the variance in the extent to which elections are free and fair does not explain parties' programmatic efforts, once we have duly controlled for rival explanations.
- ***Democratic experience:*** In the our seven case studies and the DALP dataset more generally neither the age of individual parties nor of entire democracies affect the vigor of individual parties' programmatic appeals.
- ***Ethnocultural divides:*** Their presence affects the propensity of parties to make *clientelistic* efforts. But neither across the case studies nor the broad DALP dataset is there evidence that such the presence of intense ethnocultural divides undercuts *programmatic* partisan efforts.
- ***Economic development:*** Greater or lesser levels of affluence in a polity turn out to leave a definitive imprint on the parties' programmatic and clientelistic strategies, but it is complicated by intra-country variance and far from exhaustively shaping politicians' programmatic partisan effort. The case studies and the quantitative analysis demonstrate both.

2.1.1. The Degree of Freedom and Fairness of Elections

At first sight, it would appear logical that in countries where civil and political liberties are fully established and make possible genuinely free and fair elections the chances for programmatic party competition, based on a struggle of ideas about the broad outlines of organizing the economy and society, are genuinely better than in electoral regimes that suffer from restrictions on civil and political rights and offer a slanted playing field in which one of the parties stands much better chances to win elections than the others. Moreover, in such purely “electoral democracies” or “hybrid” semi-authoritarian regimes with electoral features political elites associated with the dominant party and in control of the state apparatus must be tempted to buy the loyalty of crucial groups in society through selective, targeted clientelistic inducements, or coopt opposition parties by giving them access to the disbursement of clientelistic benefits to their followers (cf. Lust 2009).

In fact, a simple cross-table yields a modest correlation: Where democratic quality is weaker, politicians make less programmatic effort. In general, countries with a predominance of parties that make primarily programmatic appeals tend to be fully democratic. But countries in which parties tend to make both clientelistic and programmatic appeals, or only clientelistic appeals, have—on average—a lower democratic regime quality. The statistically discernable effect of democratic regime quality, however, vanishes as soon as we add further controls, particularly one for the relative affluence of countries: Among less affluent countries only, chances that parties (and the average of all parties in a polity) make more programmatic appeals have nothing to do whatsoever with the presence or absence of a level democratic playing field.

Turning to the case studies, there is not a great deal of difference in the quality of democracy among them, as scored by run-of-the-mill democratic regime indicators. All of the seven countries have, by conventional assessments, fully free and fair elections in the last decade. But their parties engage in programmatic appeals to very different extent. But our small set includes rich, medium and poor countries with roughly similar partisan efforts to engage in programmatic competition. Just consider India, Brazil, and Taiwan.

2.1.2. Democratic Experience

It makes sense to expect that in democratic polities that play party competition in elections round after round parties can send more credible signals about their programmatic intentions. After all, parties then can back up their current promises by a track record of previous achievements in the polity (Keefer 2007). Yet statistical analysis yields no sign that “older” democracies with a greater “democratic stock of experiences” have more programmatic parties. Again, whatever modest bivariate correlation can be found between democratic experience and programmatic partisan effort quickly vanishes when appropriate other factors, such as a country’s affluence, are taken into consideration and controlled for.

For clientelism, however, a robust relationship to clientelistic partisan effort can be identified that withstands the challenge of all imaginable controls. But the relationship is more complicated than originally presumed (Keefer 2007). As new democracies gain experience, they become more, not less, clientelistic. Only beyond a certain threshold of experience, the relationship goes into reverse and growing experience correlates to a precipitous fall in parties’ clientelistic efforts (cf. Kitschelt and Kselman, 2011). With regard to programmatic effort, however, experience appears not to matter. Old or young democracies have equally programmatic or non-programmatic parties, once we control for national levels of affluence and a few of the “soft” conditions for programmatic politics to be discussed below.

Also in the set of case studies, there is no relationship between age of democracy, or cumulative democratic experience referred to with the concept and measurement of “democratic stock,” and the amount of programmatic effort parties are making, or with the extent to which programmatic policy considerations affect the choices voters make among rival parties. In India, for example, the parties with the oldest democratic stock are also highly clientelistic (India). Among this study’s seven cases, the country with the second weakest democratic experience, South Korea, has the strongest programmatic partisan appeals.

2.1.3. *Ethno-Cultural Division*

Let us first emphasize that there is no logical necessity that parties with a claim to represent the interests of a specific ethnic group must pursue clientelistic strategies. They may feature programs to give equal rights to the ethnic group they represent or even advantage them in certain legally stipulated ways that are “programmatic” and not “clientelistic,” because the benefits would accrue to all citizens having certain attributes, not just those who deliver their votes to the ethnic party. This, then, is still different from a clientelistic quid-pro-quo where voters receive benefits contingent upon their support of a party.

In the scholarly literature, the claim is fairly widespread that ethnic and cultural divisions undercut programmatic politics and foster clientelism (for a review, see Kolev and Wang 2010). But comparing the case studies, both the countries with the least and the most programmatic parties—the Dominican Republic and South Korea—are ethnically homogeneous countries, whereas the ethnically divided countries show various degrees of low-to-intermediate programmatic efforts by the parties. Of course, our case studies cover not even a total of 50 parties, and we have not controlled for other influences that may affect parties’ programmatic efforts to support the claim of the preceding sentence. But our results are quite robust, even when tested for in the entire DALP set of 506 parties in 88 countries and controlling for alternative explanations of parties’ programmatic efforts. ***Ethnocultural divides are not per se obstacle to programmatic politics.***

What can be said, however, is that where ***ethnocultural divisions are deep, politicians make stronger clientelistic efforts***, but only under well-specified circumstances: As DALP based research has shown, it may not simply be the presence of ethnic pluralism that matters for politicians’ investment strategies, but the *association of ethnic identities with systematic inequalities between the relevant groups* that affects politicians’ linkage strategies (Kolev and Wang 2010). Only if there are ***substantial average income differentials between ethnic groups*** that have a self-understood identity, voters recognize that their personal economic success also depends on the entire ethnic group’s fortunes. Under these circumstances, political entrepreneurs will present themselves as protectors of a group’s particularistic interest. They will develop a particularly intense propensity to deliver special benefits to clients, and voters are likely to become clients because they expect ethnocultural parties to be partial to their kin. Furthermore, ethnic identification, particularly if it is grounded in economic asset differentials, usually comes with the presence of intra-ethnic social networks that make it easier to monitor and sanction the clientelistic contingent provision of political resources by ethnic parties.

2.1.4. *Economic Development: Levels of Affluence*

This leaves as predictor of programmatic partisan effort the general affluence of electoral constituencies, creating a demand side effect that makes parties adopt programmatic politics as a campaign

strategy to attract voters. Affluent voters discount the benefits of clientelistic politics and cannot draw personal advantage from most of the clientelistic inducements that have been in circulation: simple social services, gifts, modest public apartments with preferential leasing stipulations. Sophisticated economies need general policies permitting the infusion of public and large-scale club goods (infrastructure, education, health care) and cannot rely on targeted and localized personal favors handed out by the winning party(ies) as the main output of the political system. At the individual level, where a large share of the population has advanced educational degrees and exercises skilled professions, it is difficult to make job appointments based on patronage rather than skill and experience without great cost to economic efficiency. Relative to people's incomes and expectations, targeted benefits cannot offset the perceived opportunity costs of clientelism in terms of an underprovision, or bad provision, of collective goods and large-scale club goods. Most voters in affluent societies will therefore strongly support programmatic parties and reject clientelism.

What does the evidence of our case studies say about the development thesis?

- Indeed, several of the poorer countries show little programmatic effort by the parties and display more clientelism (India, Dominican Republic, Brazil), while the strongest programmatic efforts are made by all parties in the second richest country (South Korea).
- But there is no deterministic relationship to development: The richest country, Taiwan, only has feeble programmatic politics and rather vigorous clientelism.
- In a relatively poor country, at least some parties are rather programmatic (Brazil).
- And the programmatic efforts of at least some parties in several of the comparatively more affluent countries (Bulgaria, Turkey) are quite modest.
- Nevertheless, over time, programmatic parties emerge only in countries that underwent long periods of economic growth since the 1950s to reach at least middle-level income status or better (Korea, Turkey, more arguably Bulgaria and Brazil).

The case studies thus show both the power as well as the limitations of the development thesis.

Development affects broad global patterns that assert themselves across countries and also over time (although we cannot directly test for that). To put the cases in context, consider the scattergram of the relationship between economic development, measured as the per capita GDP in 2007, corrected for purchasing power parity (PPP), and parties' programmatic effort, aggregated to the national average of parties within each country, for the total DALP set of 88 countries (figure 1). It shows quite clearly a rather powerful relationship between affluence and programmatic effort, but the relationship is clearly imperfect. Some of the imperfection is inevitably due simply to "measurement error," i.e. the problem that expert informants do not exactly know the state of the world, or interpret the survey questions somewhat differently, and therefore make errors of judgment. But the figure may also indicate that development is not all there is, when it comes to accounting for politicians' efforts to project a programmatic appeal in individual parties and whole party systems.

Figure 1 about here

If development was completely explaining parties' programmatic efforts, all countries would be located within a narrow shaded "error band" around the line that runs from the bottom left to the top right. But some countries are rather far removed from that line indicating that their parties' programmatic efforts can only very incompletely be predicted by knowing the country's development level alone. If we showed a




Figure 1: Relationship between Wealth (per capita GDP at PPP in 2007) and Programmatic Partisan Effort (B15nwe) ($r = .62$)

scattergram of all 506 individual parties included in the study, the “errors” resulting from a prediction of the parties’ positions from development alone would be even more glaring (see below). Countries above the regression line show (much) more programmatic parties than development alone would predict. Countries below the regression line show (much) less programmatic parties than development would predict. “Errors” in both directions will be insightful to hunt for other reasons why it is that parties (and entire party systems) become more or less programmatic.

We obviously cannot discuss all the outliers here. But let us inspect here first where our case studies are relative to the development prediction and then just mention a few outliers we will actually address at least in passing, as our analysis proceeds:

- Our country with the second highest economic development, **South Korea**, has the most programmatic parties (table 4). But even so, its actual partisan efforts are above expectations compared to the development model.
- **Turkey and India** are at different levels of affluence and have different levels of programmatic effort that are in pretty much in line with predictions of the development hypothesis: higher in the Turkish case, lower in the Indian case.
- Our four other cases, however, are situated ***disturbingly far below the general trendline specified by the development hypothesis***. How much partisan programmatic effort each party reveals is only partly driven by development itself. To see that our four cases fall behind expected levels of programmatic effort, let us inspect table 4: In the **Dominican Republic**, all parties are invariably clientelistic rather than programmatic; in **Brazil and Bulgaria**, we witness a differentiation of the party systems between more clientelistic and more programmatic parties; in **Taiwan**, parties are predominantly clientelistic and little programmatic, although Taiwan is now among the world’s most affluent countries!
- With our seven countries and 45+ parties, we have chosen a pretty good diversity of absolute and relative levels of programmatic effort. ***But had we been able to expand our sample, we probably would have included some further outliers.*** Let us name some clusters of countries at least one exemplar of which should have received case study attention:

(1) Many of the ***postcommunist countries*** are above and not below the line and show more programmatic politics than one might expect. In addition to Bulgaria, only three postcommunist countries are now substantially below the regression line (Hungary, Lithuania, Russia).

(2) ***Some Latin American countries*** are way above the regression line, such as Ecuador most dramatically, yet also Bolivia, Guatemala, and Paraguay. Others are way below the regression line. In addition to the Dominican Republic in our sample, this applies to Argentina, Venezuela, Panama, and Jamaica.

(3) Above an intermediate level of programmatic effort of about 0.20, there is ***huge variance within affluent OECD countries*** which is not going to be addressed here. Some Scandinavian countries have a surprisingly modest level of programmatic articulation examined in Kitschelt and Freeze (2010). The United States, by contrast, scores extremely highly, counter to foreign perceptions, but probably accurately reflecting the nature of party competition in the United States at this point in time (Abramowitz 2010; McCarthy et al. 2008; Rehm 2010).

Before proceeding in the analysis, let us add a couple of other “anomalies” to the evidence concerning the development hypothesis. We will only graphically visualize problems with the argument here, albeit without examining the cases in detail.

- Figure 2 orders all 88 countries of the DALP study from the poorest on the left (Niger) to the richest on the right (Norway) and depicts the programmatic effort of each party by a dot the size of which reflects its electoral support. While programmatic effort of parties goes up in general, the variance of effort within countries increases as one moves from poor to affluent countries. This is not predicted by the development hypothesis.

Figure 2 about here

- According to the development hypothesis, as a country’s affluence becomes greater, parties’ clientelistic effort will fall in proportion to the rise of their programmatic efforts. Figure 3 depicts a scattergram showing each country’s affluence (horizontal axis) and its national summary index of parties’ clientelistic efforts (B15.nwe: vertical axis), plus a linear regression line with statistical confidence intervals. While over the entire range of countries, clientelistic effort indeed declines from the poorest to the richest countries, a curvilinear relationship superimposed on the linear regression line appears to reflect the actual relationship between development and parties’ clientelistic effort much more accurately and is, in fact, borne out statistically: As one moves from the poorest to intermediate income countries, clientelistic effort actually intensifies, it does not decrease. Only among countries above about \$ 15,000 per capita income at purchasing power parity in 2008 we find preciously few countries with intense clientelism, Taiwan being one of them.

Figure 3 about here

- As a consequence, *when we map both parties’ average clientelistic and programmatic efforts in a single scatterplot (figure 4), there is no simple trade-off*. True enough, the most programmatic countries have little clientelism and the most clientelistic countries have little programmaticism, but in the middle there is a strange “hump:” There are countries where at least some major parties appear to “do everything,” combine clientelistic and programmatic efforts, and from our sample, Turkey and Korea are most clearly above the regression line.

Figure 4 about here

- Over time, in most polities per capita incomes have gone up in the past ten years, with the exception of a handful of African countries. As a consequence, where incomes go up, the development hypothesis would expect clientelism to go down. But that is not the case for most countries, especially countries where affluence has gone up a great deal, such as in some of our study case. Figure 5 shows DALP data for all 88 countries between a summary measure of national parties’ clientelistic effort and the extent to which expert observers see clientelistic efforts having increased in the decade from 1998 to 2008 (scores greater than 3) or decreased (scores smaller than 3). In most countries that are now highly clientelistic, these efforts have increased, presumably from an already moderately high level. Extreme instances are among our case studies: the Dominican Republic and India see a major intensification of clientelism, in spite of much greater affluence. On more modest scales, this also applies to Bulgaria (sharp increase in clientelism, but less growth than in India) as well as Taiwan and Turkey (robust economic growth, small increases in clientelistic partisan effort). Where clientelism was strong in the late 1990s, it has declined only in a small




Figure 2: The Variance of Parties' Programmatic Appeals from Poor to Affluent Countries




Figure 3: The Relationship between per capita GDP and Partisan Investments in Clientelistic Efforts (linear relationship $r = -.69$)

number of countries to the lower right of the dotted line in figure 5. Among them are our case studies of Korea and Brazil.

Figure 5 about here

Putting our case studies in summary perspective to the development hypothesis, then, table 5 places all the developing or recently developed countries in two dimensions.¹⁰ The first indicates whether the average level of programmatic politics observed across the parties that mobilize in a country is near, substantially above, or substantially below what one would expect based on “structural” predictors.¹¹ The second displays whether according to expert judgments, clientelistic efforts have increased, roughly stayed the same, or decreased over the decade from 1998 to 2008 when the DALP survey was fielded. Case studies included in the IDEA analysis are depicted in large bold red letters.

Table 5 about here

Our case studies are actually distributed all over the place which is good. The only categories missing and that should have been added are more countries with above-prediction programmatic effort most of which show clientelism staying roughly the same except in the two outliers of Egypt and Moldova. The Bulgarian case actually barely makes the category of programmatic politics “about as predicted by the development hypothesis and tends to underperform.”¹²

We can also summarize the configuration of our case studies in qualitative ways one more time based on a mixture of interpreting quantitative evidence and case study narratives. Table 6 organizes the countries from programmatic weak performers on the left to strong performers on the right. It first restates where, on average parties make programmatic efforts below, near, or above the level predicted by the development hypothesis. The next row draws on qualitative evidence to judge whether parties’ programmatic efforts have changed over time. The third and fourth row home in on the largest party and any parties with exceptional programmatic efforts in each country. The standard of assessment here is the absolute level of programmatic effort across the whole set of countries. The final row characterizes parties’ average clientelistic efforts in each country.

Table 6 about here

The task now is to throw light on reasons why countries as disparate as the Dominican Republic and Taiwan both have parties that tend to underperform in programmatic effort, while parties in South Korea and, to a lesser extent, in Turkey overperform. In the intermediate tier including Brazil, India, and Bulgaria, it is still worth exploring why individual parties have stepped out of line and developed more programmatic effort. The gist of the explanation is that political economy—with long-term and short-term mechanisms—plays the leading part in accounting for this variance, with patterns of party competition in supporting roles. Party organization can help to sustain programmatic efforts or make it vulnerable to reversal.

¹⁰ To avoid clutter, the older developed countries were left out. They would be almost uniformly situated in the middle column of table 5.

¹¹ The country is scored as substantially below (above) expectations, if the predicted value of programmatic effort is at least one half standard deviation below (above) the observed value, with the standard deviation calculated from the distribution of all 88 countries’ mean scores of programmatic effort. The significant predictor in the regression is a country’s per capita GDP.

¹² The actual score of national programmatic activity is -.49 standard deviations below the predicted score, hence .01 away from the threshold at which Bulgaria would have been classified as “below prediction.”




Figure 5: Change of Clientelistic Effort from 1998 to 2008

($B7 = 1.77 + 0.50 \cdot B6 + e$ R-squared: 0.30)

Table 5. Linkage Dynamics. Clientelism and Programmatic Politics

		Development of Clientelistic Effort over the Past Decade (1998-2008)		
		Clientelism went down from high levels (B7 < 2.5)	Clientelism stayed roughly the same (B7 = 2.5 – 3.5)	Clientelism intensified to very high levels (B7 > 3.5)
Observed average programmatic partisan efforts relative to predicted effort (structural determinants)	Below prediction	BRA , HND, MKD	ARG, JAM, MKD, PAN, THA, SVN, TWN , UKR, VEN	AGO, DOM , HUN, LTU, LBN, MAR, MUS, NAM, PHL, RUS,
	About at prediction	MEX, PER, URY	ALB, BWA, CHL, COL, CRI, HRV, LVA, MLI, NGA, POL, ROM, TUR ,	BEN, BGD, BGR , GEO, GHA, IDN, IND , MNG, NER, NIC, SEN, TZA, ZMB
	Above prediction	KOR	BOL, ECU, EST, GTM, MOZ, MYS, PAK, PRY, SLV, SRB, SVK, ZAF	EGY, KEN, MDA

Table 6: Programmatic Structuring of Partisan Elites

	Dominican Republic	Taiwan	Brazil	India	Bulgaria	Turkey	South Korea
programmatic appeals relative to development	Below	Below	Below	close	Close/ below	close	above
More programmatic effort over time?	Little	little	Yes, select parties	Yes, very mild in select parties	Little	Yes, more effort	Yes, more effort
Programmatic effort Score for the largest party (absolute)	Very low	Low (KMT)	average (PT)	low	average (BSP)	average (AKP)	high (GNP)
Unusually programmatic outlier party?	no	no	Yes, PT, less so PSDB and PTB	Only mild tendency: CPI and CPI (M), as well as SP	BSP	no	no
Clientelistic party effort?	strong	strong	strong	strong	Intermediate	Strong	Intermediate

2.2. “Soft” Conditions: Constraints and Opportunities for Programmatic Party Competition

The report now turns to the “soft” conditions that matter in creating opportunities for more or less programmatic politics. Once again, the “conditions” are far from deterministic. They identify “windows” of political realignment in which politicians may or may not change their strategic appeals to programmatic politics. For this reason, case studies, like those included in this IDEA report, are more suitable in identifying the mechanisms and course of action that unfolds than econometric statistics, although economic conditions are involved in at least two of the four conditions and their mechanisms.

In section 2.2.1., the report argues that (1) there are big long-term political decisions on economic development strategies that trigger programmatic politics, particularly in the transition across different economic growth regimes, a notion to be explained below. Especially when (2) a long run political-economic growth strategy appears to have exhausted its powers to deliver strong economic performance, politicians and voters may get ready to consider big changes that feed into a surge of programmatic competition among political parties.

In section 2.2.2., the report explores that in addition to these political-economic mechanisms, there may also be purely political conditions that may nudge politicians toward programmatic politics and that may *add on to* economic opportunities, or *at least stabilize* programmatic politics, once it has been chosen for other reasons: We return here to (3) the intensity of party competition and find that it stimulates programmatic partisan appeals particularly in the more affluent countries, whereas in poor societies it reinvigorates parties’ clientelistic effort. Finally, we discuss (4) whether party organization is not only a concomitant feature of programmatic politics, but can actually bring programmatic politics about, or at least lock it in, once politicians begin to opt for programmatic strategies..

2.2.1. Political-Economic Development Strategies and Party Appeals I: Long Term Patterns and Episodes of Crisis as Catalysts for Programmatic Partisan Competition

Based on the literature on the political economy of development, starting with Haggard’s (1990) seminal book and borrowing from Rogowski’s (1989) account of trade and political coalitions, let us distinguish three phases or formats of economic development, each of which associated with its own set of choices and development alternatives that may congeal around party programs. ***The general gist of the argument, to be exposed to a first approximate “test” through the case studies and some large-N statistical explorations, is that transition periods from the first to the second and from the second to the third development format are particularly fertile for programmatic politics. By contrast, stable periods of growth in the first and second format are not terribly favorable to programmatic partisan politics. The third format of economic growth, however, is mostly associated with programmatic politics in the sphere of democratic party competition. Nevertheless, in all periods of big economic reforms, parties may choose to complement programmatic initiatives with clientelistic benefits to the losers of economic change, whether they are rural peasants or urban workers and business owners in obsolete manufacturing and service industries.***

Let us propose a stylized account of the three formats of political-economic development and their implications for programmatic politics:

- **Format I: Poor Raw Materials Exporters.** Poor economies start out with very few comparative advantages, primarily confined to raw materials and unskilled labor. Economic growth in this regime relies on the export of raw materials (agricultural or mining). Politically, this economy brings together a rural export-oriented political coalition typically led by oligarchies owning asset-specific natural resources (land, mining deposits). If fortunate circumstances of long-run global resource booms help these economies to prosper, they will urbanize and begin sectoral diversification. Eventually these new urban groups will pressure to change the political-economic growth formula from privileging raw materials exports to the production of manufactures. These challengers get a chance if a crisis of raw materials export markets occurs, such as in the Great Depression of the late 1920s and 1930s. If the new urban groups prevail, they will push for an economic upgrade into a new development format privileging domestic manufacturing and more sophisticated services, at the expense of raw materials exporters. This urban coalition strategy is at the core of the second development format.
- **Format II: Intermediate Income Manufacturing Exporters.** The second format, driven by an urban political coalition of industrial capital and labor, involves a change of a country's institutional insertion into global markets. Whereas the first format relies on free trade, the industrial growth regime supports trade restrictions to protect infant industries as well as currency and trade regulations that either protect domestic producers from foreign competitors or assist domestic producers to gain export markets abroad. These economic growth strategies evolve politically under the *guidance of a “developmental state”* that intervenes in spontaneous market allocation: Since capital markets are underdeveloped and hence capital for investment is scarce and hard to come by, the state will step in to raise capital and create financial instruments to channel resources from savers to politically designated investors. Governments will extract capital through taxation, especially imposed on raw materials exporters, and make funds available to private or even state-owned industrial companies earmarked for “catch up” to global competitiveness and expected to develop a comparative advantage in the world economy. Private investors would find these undertakings too risky, so governments fill the gap.

Format II development states come in two flavors (see Haggard 1990). They are *import substituting industrialization* (ISI), a strategy primarily chosen in Latin America (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico) and parts of the Middle East (Egypt, Turkey) or South Asia (India) after the Great Depression and World War II, but anticipated by Stalinist industrialization of the 1920s and 1930s in the Soviet Union and later extended to the entire communist world, and *export oriented industrialization* (EOI), anticipated by the Meiji Restoration of the 1870s and 1880s in Japan, but later extended to parts of East and Southeast Asia starting in the 1950s.¹³

As ISI/EOI economies grow and designated industries catch up to the world innovation frontier, they encounter two new challenges. First, politically planned capital allocation becomes harder to target and more often results in investments with low capital productivity, eventually triggering an economic slowdown and/or financial debt crises. Second, to continue their growth toward global competitiveness, these economies need to upgrade into providing more sophisticated human and financial capital that operates most productively in more decentralized, flexible market settings for labor, technology, equity and entire firms than what is feasible within the institutional framework of the developmental state. In political terms, parts of the entrepreneurial class and a

¹³ It should be emphasized that many countries in all regions of the world made only feeble efforts to move to either ISI or EOI strategies, but remained poor raw materials exporters. This applies to most of Central America, Andean South America—especially Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela—and all of Sub-Saharan Africa, in addition to the great oil exporters of the Middle East.

broad educated middle class will begin to turn against the developmental state and demand a new programmatic orientation laying out a new economic growth model.

- **Format III: Postindustrial Knowledge Economies.** These economies are based on the increasing generation, differentiation and stratification of human skills and information systems, with the greatest benefits accruing to high-skill professionals in knowledge industries across a wide range of occupations and sectors (especially engineering, finance, health, education, culture/entertainment). Because of these economies' dynamism, both physical and human capital investments are risky and require continuous reviews. In terms of political economic institutions, these risks are buffered by sophisticated capital markets hedging investment risks and by more or less encompassing social policies protecting wage earners from the consequences of becoming uncompetitive in labor markets (unemployment, health, pensions) as well as preparing wage earners to acquire or restore the professional skills that enable them to compete in labor markets (family and education policies, retraining). While the welfare state grows out of the industrial era and made its first appearance in format II development regimes, it has really been deindustrialization and the acceleration of science-based innovation that has led to its vast expansion and beginning retooling (cf. Iversen and Cusack 2000).

It is still controversial what sorts of political divisions are associated with postindustrial knowledge economies. There is clearly a movement away from a class-based conflict between capital and labor to a skill-based conflict between less and more skilled occupations, combined with a quasi-sectoral, yet often more fine-grained occupational conflict between people in socio-cultural services (education, health, culture/media, leisure and travel), financial services (banks, investment, insurance) and what is left of manufacturing and natural resource extraction.

- **Format X: Continued/renewed high-income raw materials exporters (raw materials rentier economies).** Defying a sequential developmental model, there is a set of often wealthy rentier states based on raw materials export revenue that requires little labor, but heavy capital inputs. They derive income primarily from hydrocarbon exports (oil, gas, coal), but also some capital intensive agribusiness (e.g., in Argentina). According to most, but not all, research, such economies hinder democracy and concentrate power in a small oligarchy that pays off their entourage through clientelistic exchanges (Ross 2001; 2006; but see Jones-Luong and Weinthal 2010). Whether democratic or not, they do compensate residents with generous welfare states, however (Ross 2008).

Each of the three major political-economic formats produces its own crises that are particularly likely to prompt a rise or intensification of programmatic politics. In export-oriented raw materials regimes, whether poor or rich (Formats I and X), such crises unfold when raw materials price bubbles burst in world markets and demand declines. In developmental states pushing manufacturing (format II), crises arise when international demand for goods that require low-skill labor inputs decline or new competitors with cheaper capital and labor inputs arrive, or the capital productivity of state-centered finance systems wanes. In postindustrial knowledge economies, crises may derive from excessive deregulation, particularly of financial markets, or inadequate human capital formation, but possibly also of the spread of some new and disruptive technologies.

The critical task for the study of programmatic parties, of course, is *to link political-economic governance structures to opportunities for programmatic party formation*. The stylized account above distinguishes different regimes, but also phases of regime "viability" and "crisis." The argument is two-fold. First, comparing *periods of economic "viability" of each development format*, the opportunities for

programmatic politics improve from poor to rich countries, in line with the development thesis, but they generate interesting combinations of linkage mechanisms not considered by the development thesis. Second, net of development, *often at the beginning or at the termination of a given development format, periods of economic “crisis,” articulated in weak growth, rising and persistent unemployment, accelerating inflation, and sometimes financial crises, generate particularly intense opportunities for programmatic partisan politics.*

In such eras, existing institutions and political coalitions have obviously run out of steam to fix the economy. In a crisis, slack resources that could have been diverted to clientelistic uses have evaporated. Political entrepreneurs and average citizens begin to develop the queasy feeling that they need to come up with brand new ideas and political formulas to excite voters and the political, economic, or cultural elites as well. Such opportunities involve conflicts concerning new proposals for economic development regime and their implications for income distribution and risk insurance. At times, these conflicts may be displaced and transplanted into other fields of non-economic struggle, such as cultural conflicts about social norms, gender relations, or tolerance for ethnic pluralism. And such periods of intellectual and political fermentation are not randomly distributed in time and space. Let us generate a prediction for each condition in turn and then examine systematic comparative and case study evidence.

- **Political-economic format I:** As discussed in the previous section, in poor countries there are relatively few opportunities for programmatic politics, particularly as long as such regimes deliver a modicum of economic growth, e.g., in periods of resource boom and an expanding global economy.
- **Crisis of political-economic format I/transition to format II:** This is a period of intense fermentation for programmatic politics. There is an incipient skilled urban working and middle class in manufacturing and services that attempts to wrest control and economic assets from the raw materials producers whose elites lose power and resources due to a crisis of raw materials export revenues.

➔ If in this period there is a *political opening toward civil and political rights and electoral democracy* that permits collective action and mobilization from below, then “*populist*” *programmatic parties* make a stance that (1) call for state involvement in the development of an industrial and urban economy and (2) redistribution of resources from the agrarian or raw materials owning oligarchies through land reform and/or the creation of social policies primarily benefiting urban wage earners.¹⁴ Populist politics here is associated with the mobilization of labor unions in manufacturing, mining, and services, and more rarely in depressed agriculture. Populism opens a *trajectory toward import substituting industrialization (ISI)* development with incipient welfare states mostly confined to the formal wage earners.

➔ If in this period *authoritarian rule prevails that suffocates bottom-up mobilization*, obviously no programmatic parties will emerge, nor will redistributive institutions such as incipient urban-centered welfare states. Instead, one of two political trajectories is likely. First, political and economic elites may initiate a state-corporatist mobilization of the urban wage earners and industrialists from above and choose an ISI political economy.¹⁵ Or new military and urban elites

¹⁴ In Latin America, for example, the distribution of programmatic parties in the 1990s still reflected the populist struggles about the establishment of import substituting industrialization in the 1930s through 1950s, making programmatic parties particularly tenacious where it translated into urban welfare states. See Kitschelt et al. (2010).

¹⁵ Single-party developmental states such as Brazil under Getulio Vargas’s dictatorship (1931–45) or Turkey under [Mustafa Kemal Atatürk](#) (1924–28) instituted such state corporatist growth formats. Arguably, European fascism at the economic semi-periphery (Italy, Spain, Portugal) followed a similar template.

may *choose export-oriented industrialization (EOI)*, with the new industrial workforce being compensated and kept complacent by long-term job guarantees gradually rising wages and occupational skill formation, but not by social policies that help wage earners hedge against the risks of capitalist labor markets (cf. Haggard and Kaufman 2008).

- **Full-blown Format II ISI or EOI Regimes:** Developmental states combine decentralized market mechanisms with governments' political discretion over the allocation of capital and labor. When political agencies of the state influence business investment decisions (and thus indirectly create or preserve jobs), manipulate trade regulations and currency rates, or award procurement contracts to private or state-owned businesses, their actions open the door to clientelistic politics and over time may degrade and undermine the initial programmatic impulse for partisan politics that originates in the transition from format I to format II regimes. Yet programmatic politics may not disappear entirely. As ISI-EOI countries become richer and more resourceful, office-seeking politicians may be able to combine servicing constituencies through universal programmatic policies with benefits accruing to all or most citizens, regardless of whether they voted for the party or not, on one hand, together with specialized side-payments for their loyal electoral followers only, delivered through a clientelistic exchange mechanism, on the other.

Under format II political economies, there is thus no simple and direct trade-off between programmatic and clientelistic accountability strategies of the political elites. Successful ISI or EOI regimes with democratic party competition offer *a window of opportunity for "high everything" parties promoting both programmatic and clientelistic politics*. Particularly as long as format II economies grow strongly, there will be sufficient slack resources for politicians to satisfy both clientelistic and programmatic demands of electoral constituencies.

Overall, however, the incentives politicians have to build programmatic and clientelistic linkages to electoral constituencies in ISI/EOI regimes are ambiguous: *Installing the developmental state* against the backdrop of faltering raw materials export regimes requires a bold policy program that shakes up existing economic institutions and coalitions. *Maintaining the developmental state* offers enticing opportunities for politicians to entrench political power through clientelistic network building, in addition or, or as partial substitute for programmatic initiatives and citizen-politician linkages. Politicians may choose one or the other strategy, or both strategies at the same time, yielding "high everything" clientelistic-cum-programmatic parties.

Hence, *periods of successful ISI/EOI based growth may be neither particularly auspicious nor inauspicious for programmatic politics*. As long as the economies generate growth and new resources, partisan elites may boost and preserve clientelistic politics even at level of economic affluence, when the simple linear economic development hypothesis would have expected the breakdown of clientelism. Whatever programmatic politics may have inspired the installation of ISI/EOI regimes is gradually whittled away by the day-to-day opportunities for politicians to bind voters with clientelistic benefits.

- **Crisis of ISI or EOI Regimes:** As developmental state move national economies closer to the global technological innovation frontier, it becomes increasingly hard for politicians and state administrators to know what kinds of capital investments in technology, infrastructure, firms and industries will contribute to a country's global economic competitiveness and job creation. As a consequence, the continued political allocation of finance generates a proliferation of financial "mistakes" that begin to weigh down on the whole economy, manifesting itself in declining capital productivity and over-investment. These conditions may generate extended periods of weak

economic performance, in terms of employment growth, per capita GDP growth, jobs and inflation. *Such conditions set the stage for new programmatic partisan appeals that ultimately may institute a new economic growth model.*

There is precious little evidence, however, that this new growth format may be a version of the 1990s “Washington consensus” model of unlimited liberalization of all markets for capital, labor, and land, domestically and internationally. Due to a variety of reasons, ***unrestrained economic liberalization has rarely delivered strong economic performance in low and middle-income countries.***¹⁶ While it is plausible that the political allocation of capital to national champion firms or sectors has become inefficient and that investments in human capital and physical infrastructure are essential ingredients of a more successful strategy, there is little consensus as to many other elements how a successful format III development strategy should express itself in today’s newly industrialized economies.

Conflicts over economically and politically viable reform strategies that liberalize ISI/EOI regimes thus set the stage for a new surge of programmatic partisan vigor in the game of electoral competition. Successful parties will tinker with development formula that promote selective market liberalization, yet also compensate the losers of reform whose votes may be crucial for electoral victory. If they follow the tracks of Western OECD countries after World War II, this compensation may come in the form of *universalistic welfare states* that assist all citizens to limit the social and income consequences of job loss in capitalist labor markets (cf. Adsera and Boix 2003; Iversen and Cusack 2000; Rodrik 1996). But even in some of these countries, programmatic reform was combined and intertwined with efforts to maintain and expand *clientelistic assistance networks based on partisan affiliation* that delivered benefits such as access to state-owned or subsidized housing, disability pensions, health care, or family assistance based on citizens’ membership in partisan networks.¹⁷

Economic crises in the transitions between development formats II and III thus may encourage politicians in some countries to devise “high everything” partisan strategies that combine programmatic and clientelistic elements. This is all the more likely for surviving political parties that were already present as instigators of format II development strategies, often in an authoritarian setting. Examples for such ***authoritarian legacy parties*** (ALPs) would be communist successor parties of Eastern Europe and Central Asia and a few populist authoritarian development parties in Latin America and East Asia that shaped format II ISI or EOI development strategies, but then recently began to compete in a democratic environment just at the time, when these political-economic formats became less efficient. Beyond the communist successors, examples of such ALPs would be the Mexican PRI (*Institutionalized Revolutionary Party*) or the Taiwanese KMT (*Kuomintang*).

Whether authoritarian legacy party or not, it may be a prudent strategy for ascending political parties seeking to establish their political hegemony by promoting a new economic growth model ***to compensate displaced privileged groups from a previous growth model.*** This happened to labor-intensive agriculture in all advanced postindustrial democracies (think Japan or European Union). Some of this compensation will accrue to recipients in terms of specialized, but universal social policy programs and subsidies (e.g., EU Common Agricultural Market), other compensation through conditional benefits delivered through clientelistic networks (some Japanese farm aid).

¹⁶ For a critique of the Washington Consensus economic policy recipes, see authoritatively Rodrik (2011: 164-73).

¹⁷ The most prominent post-World War II examples for this pairing of programmatic and clientelistic compensation for and protection from clientelistic labor markets can be found in Austria, Belgium, Italy, and Japan. See Kitschelt (2007).

- **Postindustrial democracies under conditions of economic “viability” or “crisis:”** Party competition in advanced capitalist democracies at the global technological innovation frontier is not the subject of analysis in this research project. Let it be said only that programmatic politics reigns supreme in polities situated within this development format to the virtual exclusion of clientelistic networks. It is intensely controversial, however, what sorts of lasting political alignments, if any, this sort of democratic setting will facilitate (cf. Kitschelt and Rehm 2011).

Table 7 summarizes the predictions for programmatic partisan politics that follow from the stylized discussion of development formats. As a simplification, the table and the more detailed account in the text emphasize national tendencies across all parties in party systems. But it should also be stressed that the predicted programmatic effort for each political-economic regime should be on display most clearly in the large, hegemonic, successful political parties. Small may thrive through “niche strategies” that are less predictable by broad political-economic formats. In this regard, consider again figure 2 that visualizes both central tendencies of programmatic partisan appeals in national party systems relative to national economic development, but also inter-party variance in programmatic effort at each given level of economic development.

Table 7 about here

Finally, we should keep in mind that not all partisan bids to establish a new political-economic regime may be successful ones and convert into economic growth. New parties and their electoral coalitions may fail to generate economic growth. They then are either swept away or quickly turn to a predominantly clientelistic strategy of partisan entrenchment in the face of economic stagnation. Such arrangements may tenaciously persist for some time.

2.2.2. Political-Economic Development Strategies and Party Appeals II: Testing the Argument with Case Studies and Quantitative Evidence

The IDEA project charge is to test the prospects of programmatic politics in new democracies through case studies documented in separate reports. The task of this overview is to situate and summarize the case study evidence relative to the general theoretical argument about the rise and decline of programmatic politics. Our cases do not cover all configurations just outlined, but a fair number of them. And it is insightful to think about configurations not represented through cases. After discussing the cases, we will briefly consider general strategies to test an argument about long-term development formats and medium- and short-term economic crises for parties’ choice of linkage strategies, but there are many obstacles to make the argument proposed here stick with statistical analysis.

Table 7: Political-Economic Regimes. A Simplification.

Format	Develop- ment level	Economic perfor- mance	Economic Institutions and Strategies: patterns and debates	Clie- ntelistic effort	Programmatic effort?
I	poor	viable	Raw materials exporter, undeveloped capital market	strong	weak
I/II	Poor or inter- mediate	crisis	Shift to developmental state, investing in industry and services? Struggle between urban and agro-raw material coalition	Wea- kening	Strong: economic “populism” supporting developing state
II	Interme- diate	viable	Import substituting or export oriented developmental state; developing state managing capital markets (“planning”);	strong	Initially strong, then waning
II/III	Interme- diate	crisis	Liberalization and/or investment in human capital and infrastructure?	Wea- kening	Strong: liberalism and populism
III	affluent	viable	Embedded liberalism: welfare state, free trade, limits on capital market openness	weak	Strong, centripetalism around economic distribution (left-right)
III/??	affluent	crisis	Liberalization of capital markets ... or (re)regulation? New human capital investment?	Negli- geable	Polarization around economics, second dimension politics
X	affluent	Boom or bust	Export-oriented rentier raw materials exporter	strong	weak

Case Study Evidence on Political Economy and Linkage Strategies

As a roadmap, let us situate the seven cases relative to the political-economic development scheme. Of course, none of the cases fits the stylized, ideal typical formats perfectly, but they approximate one of them to a greater degree, as suggested by table 8. We review each configuration in turn.

- ***Format I/export-oriented raw materials producer, growing economy:*** The case approximating this condition is the **Dominican Republic**. Its main “export,” however, is tourist services, provided with unskilled labor, followed by raw materials and simple manufactured commodities, also with unskilled labor inputs. The prediction is clientelistic politics, despite a rise of the country to middle-income status: A brief period of economic feebleness in the early 2000s notwithstanding, this country has undergone a long run of remarkable economic improvements from levels of great poverty. It is not surprising, therefore, that politicians found no reason to abandon their preoccupation with clientelistic politics yet. While the Dominican Republic is now on the verge of being a middle-income country, it has avoided a development format I/II transition crisis so far, possibly because it may side-step the creation of a globally competitive manufacturing sector in favor of exploiting the natural resource that may permit it to cross over into an approximation of format X development: the beauty of its beaches and their proximity to the United States that increasingly allows the Dominican Republic to earn a “natural resource rent.”¹⁸ This rent translates into economic success and pays for the large manufactured goods trade deficit, as long as foreign demand remains strong.
- ***Format I/poor export-oriented raw materials producer, economic crisis:*** We have no example in the IDEA case study set, but might have considered cases such as Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru or Venezuela. The prediction here is simultaneously high programmatic and clientelistic partisan effort. When these primarily raw materials exporting countries skidded into crisis in the 1980s and 1990s and *Washington Consensus* orthodox market liberalization did not help them to restart economic growth, economic dissatisfaction boosted the support of *intensely programmatic populist-redistributive parties* (“21st century socialism”). The raw materials boom since the early 2000s, however, gave this mobilization yet a different spin, particularly where it was successful first and has been in government longest, Venezuela: If raw materials revenue becomes sufficiently large relative to other traded sectors, a polity may make a transition to development format X, where the generous supply of natural resource rents fuels clientelistic politics with programmatic partisan effort waning, provided that rulers continue to permit democratic competition at all. Venezuela appears well under way on this trajectory toward such a clientelistic transformation, in this instance combined with semi-authoritarian restriction of civil and political liberties, and is scored as such by experts contributing to the DALP survey (see figures 1, 3, and 4). Russia may be another case in point. Countries such as Bolivia or Ecuador may join a similar trajectory, provided their hydrocarbon export revenues will skyrocket in the future. In all these instances, a populist programmatic mobilization begins the cycle, then installs itself in government and pursues an economic policy combining elements of import substituting industrialization (over-valued currency, industrial policy) with features of a hydrocarbon rentier economy (format X).

¹⁸ Of course, in contrast to hydrocarbon royalties, the rent accruing to tourism requires some “mixing” with domestic (unskilled) labor and capital to produce an efficient service sector configured around the natural resource. In that sense, a tourism-based economy does not quite follow a type X development model.

- **Format II/ISI or EOI economy, stable growth: India** is a huge and complicated country the economy of which combines development format I (in its poor agrarian sector) and development format II (import substituting industrialization) under one government umbrella. Contrary to the dominant perception, it was not the financial crisis in 1991 and a purported shift to market and trade liberalism thereafter that set India's economy on a high growth trajectory. Instead, small, marginal reforms in the 1980s began to achieve this, and subsequent reforms in the early 1990s, precipitated by the financial crisis, did not tangibly increase India's economic growth rate. Further incremental reforms in the 1990s and 2000s have helped, but they were never precipitated by a dramatic crisis or chronic economic decline that would have prompted Indian parties opportunities to rally around alternative policy programs. As a consequence, it is not surprising that the Indian party system is prevalently clientelistic and that debates about economic reform have not structured parties' linkage strategies, at least not insofar as most Indian citizens are concerned. Other than during a very brief period after the 1991 current account crisis, it is remarkable how depoliticized—in partisan terms—the incremental process of economic market liberalization has been in India.
- **Format II/III unstable transition windows, economic crises after long runs of economic improvement:** Most of the cases included in the comparison approximate this configuration. Three of the countries in our case studies come out of inwardly oriented ISI development strategies—Brazil, Bulgaria, and Turkey. All three reached serious bottlenecks in the 1980s and experienced both long drawn-out economic stagnation as well as sharp financial crises. The crisis of ISI strategy leads us to expect an acceleration of programmatic effort by new or established parties, but also the realization of reforms that include a clientelistic compensation of some of the social strata hard hit by the change of the development format. A fourth country is a paradigmatic export-oriented industrializer that experienced a sudden and profound financial crisis at an already very high level of development, South Korea. Here, too, parties are expected to transition quickly to programmatic politics, albeit with compensations for reform losers.

→ This configuration applies most clearly to **Brazil** which since the debt crisis of the 1980s has struggled to adjust to a new economic growth strategy that would create more competitive firms and rebuild a welfare state that used to be geared to a small sector of privileged urban wage earners, but that delivered little to most citizens. The first programmatic party was the leftist *Workers' Party* (PT), an alliance of trade unionists and intellectuals that in the 1980s initially rose in defense of the social security and employment in urban unionized employment threatened by the crisis. The next programmatic impulse came from Fernando Enrique Cardoso's Social Democrats who initiated deep economic reforms when its leader became president. Ironically, under the presidency of its leader Luis Inacio Lula da Silva repositioned itself and continued market-liberalizing reforms, albeit with a redistributive twist and investment in human capital. All of the major Brazilian parties, however, appear to continue some pairing of programmatic and clientelistic appeals. While the PT introduced universalist social assistance for the poor, also this party appears still to need a modicum of reliance on clientelistic effort to boost its electoral support. Contingent upon the significance the impending hydrocarbon resource boom may achieve, and the governance of that boom by political institutions, Brazil's partisan politics may or may not tip back into more clientelistic politics.

→ Also **Turkey** went through a long phase of inwardly-oriented industrialization that produced mixed economic results throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Here both chronically volatile and often weak economic performance, combined with a serious financial crisis in 2001, set the stage for a profound realignment of the political party system in which a new

party, the mildly-Islamic *Justice and Development Party (AKP)*, embraced the programmatic banner of liberalizing economic reform. To lock in the AKP's electoral success, however, it required more than a new programmatic appeal and vision. The party attracted and sustained the support of potential reform losers through a popular conservative socio-cultural stance on questions of religion and social norms. Moreover, it vigorously expanded its clientelistic networks to help citizens to adjust to new economic circumstances.

→ **Bulgaria** is a complicated case. It emerges from an import-substituting communist regime and maintains a post-communist authoritarian legacy party that combines clientelistic and programmatic appeals. Repeated economic crises in the 1990s, particularly with a corrupt communist successor party at the helm of government unable to enact comprehensive market reforms, should have triggered a strong programmatic backlash. But in this case the opposition's lack of political experience, as well as the divisiveness and personal vanities of its leadership personnel, prevented the formation of a cohesive and durable programmatic party as political pillar countering the postcommunist BSP. Add to this since the early 2000s Bulgaria's beginning integration into the European Union that unlocked an increasing flow of subsidies from Brussels and contributed to a modest, but sustained economic recovery that relaxed the pressure on Bulgaria to push for vigorous economic reform. It is therefore not entirely surprising that the Bulgarian parties' programmatic efforts have remained near the lower bound of expectations, even though their electorates have been programmatically more crystallized than those of any other country in the comparison set (see tables 2, 4, and 6). Bulgarian parties do, on average, provide a modicum of programmatic politics, yet combined with continued vigorous clientelistic efforts.

→ Next, **South Korea** emerges from a state-led strategy of export-oriented economic growth configured around a small set of national champion corporations that have been spectacularly successful, but also led to an accumulation of low-productivity investments in the 1990s. Together with global financial speculation against the country, this led to a short, but very profound financial crisis in 1997-8. It is in this time window that Korea's parties made decisive moves toward reconfiguring political competition around programmatic appeals, albeit without completely abandoning at least a modicum of clientelistic favors.

Given South Korea's high level of affluence reached in the late 1990s, it may have taken only the catalyst of a single, short crisis to tip the balance of party competitive formats in favor of programmatic politics. The financial crisis became the trigger and catalyst of far-reaching changes in the practice of Korean party competition. As a counterfactual, had the country not already been so rich, this crisis alone may not have nudged partisan politicians toward changing their erstwhile predominantly clientelistic and personalistic electoral appeals.

Given different context conditions of financial crisis in countries such as India (1991-2), Bulgaria (1997-8) or even Turkey (2001-2), short crises in these countries might not have had the same catalyzing effect on party systems as in South Korea. In Turkey, it took the combination of weak economic performance in the preceding decade and financial crisis 2001-2 to build new programmatic electoral coalitions around the AKP. In Bulgaria, the entrenchment of an authoritarian legacy party with deep popular and organizational roots in the electorate made financial crisis a less effective trigger of partisan realignment.

- ***Format II/III—Transition to postindustrial democracy/but without economic crisis?*** The final young democracy in the case study comparison set is **Taiwan**, the richest of the seven polities. Contrary to the simple development hypothesis that would expect a dominance of programmatic politics in affluent societies, Taiwanese parties generated only a modicum of programmatic effort, initially focused on the foreign policy issue of reunification with the mainland, complemented off and on by divisions over economic insurance and redistribution, while continuing to pursue clientelistic targeting of voters in a surprisingly vigorous manner even in the opening decade of the 21st century. Taiwan is a case where programmatic partisan effort clearly fell short of what the economic development thesis would have predicted. In a close paired comparison of Taiwan and South Korea, the opposite configuration where programmatic politics intensified more than expected based on development alone, what appears to differentiate Taiwan most sharply from South Korea is the absence of a major economic and financial crisis in the late 1990s and a smoother pathway of economic growth. Voters and politicians have yet to sense the urgency to abandon clientelism that is highlighted by economic crises at a relatively high level of economic development.

Because the economy kept going comparatively well in the late 1990s and thereafter, Taiwanese politicians never came under pressure to enact a break from past practices of voter-party linkage and abandon clientelistic politics in favor of a primarily programmatic strategy. As a counterfactual, even a moderate worsening of the economic situation through weak growth and increasing unemployment at Taiwan's high level of affluence, however, would induce Taiwanese politicians and voters to abandon clientelistic partisan practices and engage in a wholesale transition to democratic linkage mechanisms through programmatic politics.

- ***Format X: Affluent raw-materials rent-seeking economies/stability or economic crisis:*** Our case study set does not include an example of an affluent "format X" polity where economic wealth is generated primarily through raw materials rents rather than skilled labor and capital in postindustrial services and manufacturing. Very few raw materials exporters are democratic, with Norway being the famous outlier, but coming late to hydrocarbon wealth, when it had followed a firmly and purely programmatic route of partisan competition for some decades and had developed institutions of economic governance that made its politicians impervious to the lures of clientelistic voter targeting, when resources to do so became plentiful.

More interesting may be cases of more recent democratization that reached a crisis of the developmental state as their prevalent political-economic growth format, yet may now have the opportunity to access large raw material rents from the export of hydrocarbons, minerals or agriculture during a raw materials boom. In this configuration, it is less likely that economic crisis yields programmatic partisan mobilization. This may explain why **Argentinean politicians**, when faced with a severe financial crisis in 2001-3, could avoid turning to a predominantly programmatic party linkage strategy in the crisis aftermath. When the China-induced raw materials boom began to fill Argentinean government coffers due to skyrocketing exports of agricultural products, politicians had a way out to maintain established clientelistic practices, yet revive the economy all the same.

As discussed above, the oil boom and the partisan take-over of the national oil company enabled the ruling party in now semi-authoritarian Venezuela to veer toward an intensely clientelistic partisan linkage strategy, a pathway also followed by Russia and possibly to be followed by Bolivia and Ecuador as well, provided hydrocarbon rents become sufficiently generous to sustain clientelistic politics, while undercutting programmatic partisan alignments. By contrast, given the size and diversification of Brazil's manufacturing and service economy, neither the

ongoing agricultural export boom nor the coming hydrocarbon revenue flow from offshore oil and gas fields may encourage politicians to resuscitate clientelistic partisan politics in quite the same way as in polities almost entirely dependent on such financial flows.

Table 8 summarizes the stylized discussion of the case studies and how their evidence relates to the theoretical argument about political economic regimes and programmatic partisan effort. While the theoretical argument does not capture all the details of the cases, there is a sufficiently good fit to underscore the plausibility of the general argument.

Table 8 about here

Large-N Quantitative Evidence on Political Economy and Partisan Linkage Strategies

The stylized account of development formats and their crises yields several distinctive empirical implications for politicians' linkage strategies that can, in principle, be empirically tested in a more systematic and quantitative fashion. The three most interesting implications may be the following:

HYPOTHESIS (1) *Long and successful stretches of developmental state (format II) ISI or EOI economic strategies* should leave their imprint on parties' linkage strategies. Politicians should evidence a penchant to sustain clientelistic practices even at comparatively high levels of economic affluence due to the politicized, discretionary nature of much economic asset allocation. At the same time, after controlling for level of development, ISI and EOI regimes should not decisively boost programmatic partisan efforts. Parties appeal to voters in programmatic terms to set up and justify these political-economic strategies. But once they are in place, they open opportunities for non-programmatic clientelistic politics as well.

HYPOTHESIS (2) *Prolonged or exceptionally deep economic crises*, manifested by low or negative growth and rising unemployment, should prompt politicians to search for new development formats and fuel programmatic partisan competition, especially when they occur after long runs of successful development in political-economic formats I or II.

HYPOTHESIS (3) *The effects of deep and/or persistent economic crisis on programmatic partisan efforts should be more pronounced in more affluent countries*, e.g. at the end of a successful run of developmental state based (format II) economic growth, than in poorer countries after a raw materials (format I) boom. For politicians, a switch to programmatic politics and abandon clientelism at higher levels of development is like kicking in rotten doors. Economic development has prepared broad citizens' demand for programmatic political competition. Development may also have made created capacities on the supply side of politics to satisfy such demands, for example through a professional civil service moderately competent to implement programmatic policies. When as a consequence of prolonged and deep economic crisis growing proportions of the electorate begin to consider clientelism as a wasteful, inefficient, excessively expensive, ultimately unaffordable, and deeply unfair mode of constituency accountability, parties embrace reform or face displacement by new competitors.

Testing any of these propositions quantitatively with the DALP dataset of programmatic and clientelistic partisan efforts in 88 countries in 2008 is tricky and frustrating for a number of reasons. As a consequence, what this investigation offers for now is only a semblance of plausibility generated by statistics that are often fragile and hard to interpret. The quantitative evidence thus has only an illustrative status and is far from providing clinching proof for the validity of the political-economic argument.

Table 8: Development Stage Model and Case Studies of Programmatic Party Politics

Format	Development level	Economic performance	Cases included	Comments
I	poor	viable	Dominican Republic	Prediction: clientelism, no programmatic politics
I/II	Poor or intermediate	crisis	No cases included	Poorer Latin American countries fit the parameters.
II	Intermediate	viable	India	A complicated case, blending format I (agriculture) and format II (import substituting industrialization).
II/III	Intermediate	crisis	Brazil, Bulgaria, South Korea, Turkey	The prediction is programmatic politics, combined with lingering elements of clientelism.
III	affluent	viable	Taiwan?	Taiwan so far escaped a transition crisis between formats II and III. Is the prediction clientelism or programmatic politics?

Just consider a severe limitation of the dataset that would have to be overcome to draw clear cut causal inferences about the role of political-economic development regimes for programmatic politics: DALP delivers only a single observation of parties' programmatic and clientelistic linkage strategies for one time point, the year 2008. In order to test the political-economy argument, we would want a time series of observations that lets us examine how politicians adjust their linkage strategies with changing economic and other conditions in preceding years or decades. We would need multiple observations of all variables over time.

Furthermore, the phenomena of interest, developmental state formats or economic crisis, do not express themselves in identical ways across different cases. What if protracted crisis surfaces more in terms of hyperinflation in country A, but in terms of skyrocketing unemployment in country B? What if the time periods of economic misery vary from country to country, but we cannot vary our data point of observing partisan linkage strategies in each case? We could, of course, measure many conceivable forms of economic misery in many conceivable ways over many conceivable time periods, but that would make us quickly run out of a sufficient number of observations to have any confidence in our statistical estimates.

With only a limited number of observations—in our case 88 countries—only a rather limited number of predictor variables and controls can be entered in the statistical analysis. Our statistical test thus cannot capture the complexity of the situation in which programmatic partisan strategies play out. A quantitative test of the arguments advanced above is thus fiendishly difficult and may appear opportunistic: The statistics ultimately presented may result from “mining” many thousands of regression runs in order to display what delivers the best fit with the investigation's favorite theoretical claim.

We will therefore report here only verbally and with simple bivariate statistics some roundabout empirical findings for the three hypotheses. They are suggested by a more complicated, but ultimately unsatisfactory quantitative analysis on which we will supply a bit more detail in appendix 3. We have no illusions that disputes over the validity of rival arguments about the causes of parties' programmatic efforts could be settled with the currently available evidence and statistical analysis employed here.

(1) Long-run Development Formats and Programmatic Partisan Effort

Satisfactory quantitative measures of long-run ISI and EOI development strategies, or measures of the developmental state, are still missing. We experimented with various ways to determine whether countries exported particularly large or particularly small shares of their manufactured goods production, but existing measures have methodological and conceptual problems and are more suitable to capture ISI developmental states only than also EOI developmental states.

A different, more general approach identifies ISI and EOI countries by performance indicators rather than their profile of economic activities and government policies. Countries that went through a successful run of ISI/EOI development are currently, as of 2007, the year before our measurement of parties' programmatic appeals, (1) among the world's more affluent countries, but (2) have acquired that status of relative affluence only in the last two generations. In other words, they were poor after World War II, but then enjoyed rather high economic growth rates relative to the OECD-West's growth rates, particularly after the decades of post-World War II reconstruction in the West, when economic growth began to falter in the West around the time of the first world oil crisis. Quantitatively, a score of the interaction term of a country's average economic growth rates over several decades since the 1960s with its current per capita GDP in 2007 should thus be particularly high for successful EOI/ISI developers and set

them apart from both the OECD-West as well as poor raw materials exporters or affluent raw materials rentier states.¹⁹

With the qualifications and cautions offered above, statistical tests with many different specifications lead to the conclusion: In countries that have gone through ISI/EOI developmental states, political parties *make substantially more clientelistic effort* even at very high levels of economic affluence than the older cohort of today's affluent countries. With regard to *programmatic effort*, however, ISI/EOI trajectories in the past have neither a beneficial nor detrimental effect on political parties, once appropriate statistical controls are included.

Examples for the relationship between EOI/ISI and the tenacious persistence of clientelism are included in our case study set: Taiwan foremost, but also South Korea, have politicians who still make clientelistic efforts that are unparalleled by other equally affluent countries.

In a way that is not detectable with statistics because of the small number of observations involved, but with case inspection, even among the countries of the OECD-West, it appears to be those that “caught up” with the early leaders, the Anglo-Saxon, Scandinavian, and Germanic country groups, only in the decades immediately after World War II that have preserved relatively more clientelism in their party systems to this very day: the Mediterranean countries such as Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal belong here, but also geographically as disparate places as Japan and Ireland. In all of these instances, the logic is that long runs of rapid economic growth, starting from a level of wretched poverty and approaching great affluence, makes politicians and voter hang on to clientelism at levels of income, when countries in the lead group had long abandoned this linkage mechanism.

Very few statistical specifications, however, show that ISI/EOI countries have parties that engage in measurably more or less programmatic effort than would be predicted by the standard model of economic development and “modernization.” *This is, however, consistent with the theoretical prediction that ISI/EOI development formats provide ambivalent cues to politicians devising linkage strategies.* On the one hand, politicians need a strong programmatic appeal to bring about the ISI/EOI development format by wresting power and resources from the raw materials exporting oligarchies and investing them in the advancement of mostly urban entrepreneurs and wage earners in manufacturing and service industries. On the other, the resulting developmental states offer politicians many opportunities to maintain the loyalty of such constituencies through the clientelistic discretionary allocation of scarce economic resources via partisan-colonized state development agencies. Over time these practices blunt and erode the programmatic appeal of political parties. As long as ISI/EOI development strategies deliver good economic performance and produce “slack” resources that can be deployed for clientelistic linkage building, there will be few challenges to this practice.

(2) The Impact of Economic Misery on Programmatic Partisan Effort

Net of economic development and long-term growth, where recent hard economic times make the “slack” resources disappear politicians have deployed for clientelistic linkage building, there clientelism cannot keep lingering on as the primary mode for parties to attract voters. Instead, politicians with new programmatic ideas on how to improve the situation will emerge either from the established parties or,

¹⁹ The latter, of course, are not really represented in a sample of electoral democracies and semi-democracies, as they have mostly authoritarian systems.

more likely in most instances, through the rise of formerly marginalized parties or the formation of entirely new parties. In our case studies, the Turkish AKP is an example just as much as the Brazilian PT. By contrast, in South Korea the increasing programmatic content of politics was engineered by preemptive reform inside the established parties. And Bulgaria has gone through several waves of new party formation since the mid-1990s in the face of economic crisis, but with rather indecisive results concerning programmatic partisan appeal.

At a more general level, applied to a broad set of countries, we have explored whether periods of heightened unemployment, depressed economic growth, and accelerating inflation affect the capacity of politicians to engage in programmatic partisan efforts. As time frames, we chose averages and change rates of unemployment from the collapse of the Soviet Union (1991) to the year before experts rated the programmatic effort of political parties (2007), or simply a flat decade (1997-2007) preceding our measure of programmatic politics. The rationale here is that politicians and people may cumulatively assess the viability of parties' appeals over longer periods of time. They update their assessment of the viability of alternatives incrementally, unless there is a catastrophic sudden rupture in economic performance.

Knowing how economic misery affects politicians' and voters' propensity to embrace programmatic politics, however, requires micro-level data on how people perceive and evaluate economic performance we lack at this time. We have therefore tested three different ways perceptions may trigger a demand for more programmatic politics:

- ***People may react to the longer term trend of economic misery:*** On an annualized basis, how much have unemployment, economic growth or inflation changed over the specified time periods (1991-2007 or 1997-2007)?
- ***People may respond to relative changes in economic misery:*** If in a country matters are already pretty bad in a previous era, it may take a larger absolute economic deterioration to generate the same effect of frustration or yearning for political innovation that may make political parties adopt new programmatic initiatives than in another polity, where things went initially well, but then started to go downhill.
- ***People may respond only to bad news, but not to good news:*** What matters is by how much altogether unemployment got worse and growth declined in bad years for politicians and voters to seek out new programmatic appeals, never mind intermittent countervailing periods in which the economy improved.

Many statistical specifications of these three general mechanisms were run through which economic misery may affect programmatic partisan efforts. Let us convey the general gist of these estimations and offer a bit more of the flavor of the analysis in the appendix.

With regard to ***absolute changes in economic misery***, no effects could be found for inflation, but fairly robust and consistent effects for ***increases in unemployment*** and to a lesser extent for ***declines in economic growth***. Indeed, in countries where unemployment has increased a great deal and/or growth faltered in the run-up to the 2008 DALP assessment of parties' linkage effort, there is a tendency of politicians to show greater programmatic partisan efforts. Overall, the effect of unemployment is more consistent and robust than that of declining growth. This may well reflect that unemployment is the existentially most threatening and stress-inducing experience that people can make with the economy. In democracies politicians therefore need to be sensitive to people's pain and come up with ideas to fight it.

Also when assuming that ***people respond to bad economic news about unemployment only***, rather than good news as well, the results remain quite robust. The greater the size and number of surges of

unemployment a country experienced in the specified time periods, the higher is the level of programmatic efforts politicians display in 2008. As an illustration, with some additional information about the relationship of the effect to levels of development, consider chart 4 with three sets of bars for poor, intermediate and affluent countries, with the first group having per capita GDPs in 2007 under \$ 3,000 in purchasing power parity (ppp) dollars, the latter more than \$ 14,000. The length of the bar indicates by how much unemployment has gone up since 1991 on an annualized basis, not counting years of decline, in a group of countries. Light blue bars indicate countries with the greatest programmatic effort, dark blue bars those with the least effort. Of course, there are no poor countries with great programmatic partisan efforts and only one rich country with little effort (Taiwan), so bars without color filling indicate too few cases to draw inferences. Overall, among the remaining bars, there is a *tendency that greater unemployment is associated with greater programmatic effort by politicians, indicated by lighter color bars*.

Chart 4 about here

A similar message can be gleaned from chart 5 relating economic growth to programmatic partisan efforts. *Generally the countries with stronger economic growth in the 1991-2007 period tend to have lower programmatic partisan efforts*. This applies across poor, intermediate and rich countries alike. Generally, economic stress makes politicians brainstorm about—and divide over—programmatic alternatives. These results prevail for the most part, even when a battery of controls is added in multivariate regressions.

(3) Economic Misery, Development, and Programmatic Partisan Effort

According to the third hypothesis, *politicians' incentives to increase their programmatic appeals in the face of economic crisis should be particularly strong, where levels of development have made clientelism, as a complementary or alternative citizen-politician linkage mechanism, rather unattractive*. In statistical analysis, one can test this by examining the interaction effect of economic development with economic misery on parties' programmatic effort. For illustrative purposes here, a simple set of scattergrams will suffice that shows average annual change rates of unemployment from 1997 to 2007 on the horizontal axis and the weighted national average programmatic partisan effort in each country in 2008 (CoSalPo_4.nwe) on the vertical axis. In figure 4 the data are disaggregated by world region. A similar set of scattergrams would emerge if instead we divided countries by low, intermediate, and high levels of affluence.

Figure 4 about here

The relationship between increases in absolute levels of unemployment over the whole time period and parties' programmatic efforts is strongest in regions with more affluent countries, such as the advanced capitalist West and Latin America. In Latin America, as well as in Asia, outliers that dampen the relationship between increase in unemployment and parties' programmatic effort are rather poor. Consider the position of Bangladesh, India, and Indonesia in the Asia-Middle East scatter. By contrast, richer Turkey's increase in unemployment coincided with a more vigorous programmatic approach by its parties. The region that shows the least correlation between increases in unemployment and programmatic partisan effort is the overall poorest region, Sub-Saharan Africa.

On the whole, then, politicians may pursue, and be persuaded to pursue, programmatic politics more vigorously, if economic conditions deteriorate. But there are many intervening factors and politicians—as

**Chart 4: Increase in Unemployment 1991-2007 and
Parties' Programmatic Effort by Country
Affluence**





Chart 5: Economic Growth 1991-2007 and Programmatic Effort (CoSalPo_4.nwe) by Country Affluence






Figure 6: Programmatic Partisan Effort and Absolute Change in Unemployment 1997-2007 in Different World Regions

well as voters--definitely have a choice. Economic misery does not translate into more programmatic partisan effort at all times and in all places.

With the existing quantitative data, we cannot, of course, answer the question of causality: Does economic misery drive the choice of politicians' programmatic or clientelistic appeals, or do such appeals produce greater or lesser economic misery? Here the case studies as well as theoretical reflection may help. At least in our cases of South Korea, Turkey, Brazil and arguably Bulgaria, it looks as if revisions of politicians' partisan strategies grew out of situations of economic misery, rather than the other way round. If party alignments and linkage strategies have economic consequences, these should primarily show up in long-run economic performance, possibly with some time lags (see Pierskalla and Fernandez 2010). But our case studies speak to short-term and immediate chains of events, where economics provides the setting and politics a reaction to the setting.

What is the pragmatic upshot of the analysis for those who wish to "nudge" parties toward programmatic competition? Particularly in intermediate income countries, advice and encouragement of politicians to pursue programmatic appeals may fall on fertile soil, when primarily clientelistic parties find themselves in an economic predicament. Under those conditions, the advice to develop a clear political program may be particularly likely to resonate with politicians.

2.2.3. Political Competition and Programmatic Investments

Politicians care most about winning elections. They invest in programmatic stances only when it pays. A politician on a winning course facing weak competitors will be hard to persuade to think seriously about her own party's programmatic appeal and to define a set of policies that distinguish it from competitors. What are the conditions under which party competition is such that politicians will make greater programmatic effort? The general answer may be: when the "stakes" of winning or losing are higher. The stakes are high, when small differences in electoral support translate into big differences in victory or defeat. Consider a two-party election in which both camps run neck-and-neck in opinion polls before elections. Here politicians are likely to make greater efforts to turn out the vote, and voters will be more likely to turn out, as they may reckon that a small number of additional votes could tip the balance one way or another.

By contrast, in a multi-party pre-election situation, where no single party or rival pair of parties are close to winning majorities or able to form winning coalitions with just one partner, the competitiveness of the party system is less intense. Whether or not a party wins slightly more or slightly fewer votes will hardly affect its bargaining power over government formation, the distribution of the spoils of cabinet participation, and the party's impact on policy choices.

But why would high competitiveness necessarily lead to more programmatic partisan effort? In order to win the crucial votes that deliver large increases in a party's bargaining leverage over government formation and policies, could not politicians also try to raise more funds to funnel through clientelistic channels, or make more efforts to recruit personally attractive candidates with charismatic halo? Indeed, competitiveness is a general condition of the democratic electoral game that may advance programmatic efforts only in very specific circumstances, while in others it may promote clientelism. The most important condition is that there is a large pool of voters who are both (i) receptive to programmatic messages and (ii) willing to be persuaded by alternative candidates, rather than wedded to one candidate and her party. ***In other words, there must be a substantial electoral "market" for programmatic votes.*** This market tends to be greater when (1) voters are more affluent and therefore less tempted by small targeted material side-

payments in clientelistic exchange deals and when (2) voters are less wedded to a particular party (“party identification”) and more prepared to consider alternative programmatic partisan appeals. High partisan identification, by contrast, signals a situation in which people will not change their partisan support, regardless of what appeals politicians of competing alternatives are putting forth.

Indirectly, we can observe voters’ degree of “openness to partisan alternatives” or “party identification” in an electoral market by measuring the *volatility of the vote over previous elections*. Volatility is a measure of the tendency of voters to change their party choice from one election to the next. Where volatility is high, there is a greater pool of voters who can be persuaded to choose a different party than in the preceding election. This will make it worth for politicians to compete for votes most vigorously.

Without going here into details included in appendix 4, we measure the intensity of a party system’s “competitiveness” by (1) how close the two largest parties were in terms of their electoral support at the legislative election preceding the DALP survey, (2) what total share of votes these two parties garnered in that election, and (3) how volatile parties’ voter support was from the preceding to the most recent election. If parties are running neck-and-neck, as well as concentrating most votes on just two partisan competitors, competitiveness will be very great, particularly if substantial shares of the electorate can be swayed to support either of the rivals.

There are other aspects of competitiveness we have not managed to include in our measure. For example, at least from the perspective of policy-minded voters, the stakes of the competition look greater, if the policy preferences of the two largest partisan camps are far apart from each other and from the status quo of existing policy and/or if the two parties wish to target very large clientelistic benefits to their exclusive electoral supporters. In those cases, it matters a huge lot for voters whether they are on the side of the winners or the losers. By contrast, if clientelistic efforts are modest and/or the main rival parties announce preferred policies close to the median voter preference and/or the status quo policies, then stakes are smaller.

The independent effect of competitiveness on parties’ propensity to make programmatic or clientelistic appeals is not easy to disentangle from other factors that matter in politicians’ choices of competitive strategies. In our case studies, the competitiveness of the partisan contest is particularly high in the Dominican Republic, South Korea, and Taiwan, where most votes are concentrated on two parties (see table 1 above). Yet the linkage efforts parties are making to win the support of voters in each of these countries go in very different directions. In the Dominican Republic parties are mostly clientelistic, in South Korea they are mostly programmatic, and in Taiwan they are in-between—high on clientelistic effort, but also with a modest programmatic content as well. At the other extreme, competitiveness is rather limited in Indian or Brazilian national elections, even though parties coalesce around alternative umbrella coalitions before the vote. Moderate competitiveness prevails in Turkey and Bulgaria, where one or two larger parties are complemented by a scattering of small parties that are not obviously aligned with a powerful camp.

Only a comparison of large numbers of parties and countries lets the role of competitiveness for politicians’ clientelistic and programmatic efforts come to the fore. This can be achieved with multivariate statistical analysis (see appendix 4) or as a first approximation even with a simple quantitative analysis of the relationship between two or three variables for a large number of observations. Consider chart 6 in this spirit. The length of the bars reflect the average competitive pressure experienced by the largest two parties in each country included in the broad DALP study. It is primarily large parties that should respond to differences in competitive pressure. Parties are grouped based on two criteria. Do they hail from poor, intermediate or affluent countries? Do they display programmatic effort starkly below, near, or above the

global mean effort parties make to advance a programmatic image?²⁰ For each country-income tier, the darker blue bars show levels of competitiveness for parties that make little programmatic effort, the lightest blue bars for those with the most intense efforts. “Hollow” bars indicate configurations with too few cases to draw meaningful conclusions ($N \leq 5$).

Chart 6 about here

In affluent countries, competitiveness and programmatic effort is generally higher than in intermediate or poor countries: The low programmatic politics bar is hollow (too few cases), and competitiveness is greater in parties that make a strong rather than an intermediate programmatic effort. But what is most relevant for us is that *in affluent countries the parties’ programmatic effort increases with the competitiveness of the electoral contest*: When politicians know the stakes are high, they make more programmatic effort. By contrast, in poor countries, on the left of the chart, competitiveness and programmatic effort are not only generally lower, but *parties’ programmatic effort declines with increased electoral competitiveness*: When elections are competitive, politicians do not want to squander their scarce resources (time and money) on coordinating their parties around programmatic efforts.

The logic driving this result is pretty clear: In affluent countries the “market” for programmatic voters is relatively large. Hence, when politicians realize that they have to make the utmost effort to squeeze out the last marginal vote, because it may make a big difference between victory or defeat, they invest more effort in programmatic appeals in a highly competitive situation. Conversely, in poor countries, politicians in a very competitive situation realize that there are few votes to be gained by programmatic appeals. So they may put their effort, at the margin, into providing other and primarily clientelistic rather than programmatic benefits to available voters. Even though available voters are most likely not members of parties’ organizational networks, and a great deal of resources may be dissipated, as parties provide clientelistic benefits to voters who ultimately defect and vote for a different competitor, the odds of winning a vote with clientelistic inducements may still be better than deploying programmatic appeals.

We can test the latter proposition directly with another bar diagram answering the following question: Is it the case that in poor countries large parties invest more in clientelistic effort, when they face a particularly competitive situation? Chart 7 provides a tentative answer.

Chart 7 about here

As in the previous chart, the length of the bars indicates levels of competitiveness, lighter colors a stronger partisan effort, in this case with clientelistic effort. The chart shows that, indeed, in poor countries the clientelistic effort is dramatically greater, when competitiveness is intense. In intermediate countries, it is somewhat greater. In affluent countries, however, the fairly small number of large parties with strong clientelistic efforts is concentrated in less competitive situations.

As in our previous efforts to determine the logic of politicians’ investments in linkage strategies to citizens, it is difficult to determine the direction of causality. Is it competitiveness that creates greater clientelistic or programmatic efforts, or is it such efforts that constitute situations of greater

²⁰ For competitiveness and programmatic effort the cut-off points for the three tiers are the following: (1) a party’s score is one half standard deviation or more below the global mean for all parties (programmatic effort) or countries (competitiveness) = low; (2) a party’s score is one half standard deviation or more above the global mean for all parties (programmatic effort) or countries (competitiveness) = high; (3) the party has scores in between these thresholds = intermediate. Country affluence level cut off points are \$ 3,000 per capita GDP at purchasing power parity in 2007 (below is poor) and \$ 14,000 (above is affluent), dividing the set of countries roughly in three equal sized tiers.

**Chart 6: Competitiveness and Programmatic Effort
(CoSalPo_4) in the Largest Two Parties of Each
Country by Country Affluence**





Chart 7: Competitiveness and Clientelistic Effort (B15) in the Largest Two Parties in each Country by Country Affluence



competitiveness, depending on citizens' demand for clientelistic or programmatic benefits, here seen as a function of the affluence of the countries? Only dynamic data covering longer periods of time would help us address this question.

Even the conditional empirical association, however, allows for some practical implications for politicians. If a highly competitive situation is observed and politicians seek strategies to invest limited resources in the pursuit of more votes, in affluent countries they would be well advised to make a stronger programmatic effort. In poor countries, by contrast, the advice would be to mobilize more resources available for clientelistic targeting.

This does not rule out, however, that some parties may try everything at once, particularly if they face few resource constraints. In the DALP dataset, this applies especially to authoritarian legacy parties (ALPs) that are successor parties to former authoritarian ruling parties. To some extent, this logic can be seen also in our case studies. The *Bulgarian Socialist Party*, for example, is an archetypical ALP that derives directly from the authoritarian communist regime before 1989 and has managed to preserve and cultivate its clientelistic ties, but also to project a programmatic identity. A similar mode of operation can be found in the South Korean *Grand National Party*, although it resulted from the merger of different parties only some constituent elements of which go back to the military dictatorship. And the Taiwanese KMT is a successor party that so far has mostly invested in clientelistic ties, but may be about to develop more sharply programmatic features advocating the preservation of the political-economic status quo against efforts to redistribute economic resources and build a more broad-based welfare state.

2.2.4. The Potentially Causal, but Probably Supporting Role of Party and Legislative Organization

In the descriptive part, the report already reported findings from the case studies and the broader DALP survey concerning the relationship between party organization and programmatic effort. To summarize, at least the larger programmatic parties tend to build party organizations that are (1) more formal and institutionalized, with membership cards and local organizational units, and (2) less centralized in terms of the power over key political decisions, such as the recruitment of leadership personnel and the strategic stances and alliances of the party.

The tricky question is whether organizational form can “cause” political linkage strategies, such as programmatic appeals, or whether they are primarily a complement to programmatic roles. When examining the case study evidence of linkage strategies and party organizations over time, it appears to be more likely that organization building plays a primarily supporting, but not a causally leading role in sustaining programmatic politics. ***In other words, while certain organizational arrangements (institutional formalization and relative power (de)centralization) may stabilize and “lock in” programmatic partisan effort, the organizational forms cannot bring the latter about and are typically chosen against the backdrop of already prevalent linkage strategies.*** The “lagging” role of party organization compared to the “leading” role of politicians’ linkage efforts can be detected in at least two configurations. Parties adopt linkage strategies first, but organizational reforms follow later. Alternatively, parties may invest in linkage strategies, but then fail to develop complementary organizational forms. In that case, the prediction would be that eventually these parties decline electorally, change their linkage strategies to develop greater congruency with the existing linkage appeals, or conversely reform the organization to match the prevailing linkage strategies.

Again, the statistical analysis of the DALP dataset of 88 countries is not really helpful to solve the problem of causality, as only one time point of observations (in 2008) is available. So let us resort to the case studies to throw some light on the potentially causal role of party organization. What we are especially interested in are instances, where parties developed programmatic stances that fly in the face of linkage practices prevailing among their competitors, or even their own past practices. What role did organization play in making the transition to programmatic politics? Did organizational changes trigger the intensification of programmatic partisan appeals, or did linkage strategies and new organizational forms simultaneously occur, or did the organizational structure follow linkage strategies?

The cases that may shed most light on our *question is the emergence of starkly programmatic parties in otherwise predominantly clientelistic party systems*. These are parties that have broken the mould prevailing in their party systems. Under what circumstances may they thrive, and has party organization played a critical role in those parties' fortunes, either as leading innovation or as lagging support?

Parties in several of our countries fit this trajectory: the Brazilian *Worker's Party* (PT) was clearly a game changer from the beginning; the two dominant Korean parties started out as primarily clientelistic parties, but then abruptly shifted toward programmatic appeals; and the Turkish *Justice and Development Party* (AKP) began its existence (under a different label) as a programmatic-cum-clientelistic undertaking that engaged in definite policy innovation. We may add cases of failed programmatic parties that were riding high at some point, such as the Bulgarian *National Movement Simeon II* (NDSV), but then failed to develop staying power. These cases from Brazil, Korea, Turkey, and Bulgaria exhaust our range of examples. There are no suitable observations speaking to our problem in the remaining three case studies of the Dominican Republic, India, and Taiwan where parties have developed rather weak programmatic appeals.

Brazil: As the case study details, the Brazilian *Workers' Party* (PT) was the offspring of political democratization in the 1980s and expressed the desire to make a new start on the redistributive political left. From its beginning, it introduced a for Brazil unusual incentive structure for aspiring politicians that prevented them from pocketing large incomes or enjoying great autonomy from their constituencies, once elected into high political office. The PT certainly displays somewhat higher levels of institutionalization and power deconcentration than its rivals in the same party system. Nevertheless, it is difficult to conceive of party organization here as a causal element shaping the parties' programmatic appeal: It emerges simultaneously with the party's program and embodies the effort to enhance the credibility of the party's programmatic appeals. The founders opted for a relatively rigid formal institutional structure putting great emphasis on the collective, partisan character of the electoral competition, at the expense of highlighting the performance and leverage of individual politicians, in order to make credible the unwavering commitment of the party to its programmatic objectives. The solidity of the party's organizational safeguards repelled against politicians who try to engage in self-aggrandizement and self-enrichment. Ironically, this party nevertheless produced a highly charismatic leader.

South Korea: In this case, parties' programmatic appeals began to increase only in the late 1990s, while the parties, or their precursors, go back decades before that time. And the case study suggests that the parties' organizational structures did not nearly change as much as their appeals in the late 1990s so that, from a cross-national comparative perspective, their organizational structures remain somewhat "out of step" with the organizational features of programmatic parties elsewhere. South Korean parties have continued to rely a great deal on informal networks of support and to exhibit highly centralized decision-making structures, especially when it comes to the nomination of electoral candidates. In recent years, the transparency of party finance appears to have improved and the concentration of parties' decision-making

powers in a small clique at the helm of the organization may have been slightly curtailed. In that light, South Korean parties may count as cases in which party organizational change clearly has a lagging, not a leading role in the transformation of the party system toward programmatic politics.

Turkey: Here we have to keep in mind that the AKP as the dominant party since the early 2000s is a “high everything” party that combines programmatic appeals with an intensely clientelistic apparatus. While it built an encompassing extensive formal membership organization, it also continues to operate through vast informal networks of local support and maintains an extremely leader-centered governance mechanism. In fact, the overwhelming personalistic leadership of the AKP’s party chair and prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, by 2011 already beginning his third term in office, may promote a further concentration of powers at the very top of the party. If it is indeed the case that a somewhat more decentralized and less personalistic party organization reinforces programmatic party competition in political democracies, then a process in the reverse direction toward a strengthening of the party leader may eventually precipitate a massive decline in the AKP’s programmatic profile, as personal loyalties to the party leader and his entourage and relations of material reciprocity gain importance in sustaining the party.

Bulgaria: As in Turkey, the most programmatic party in Bulgaria, the socialist BSP, is a “high everything” party that combines clientelistic and programmatic inducements. Unlike Turkey, however, it is also an authoritarian legacy party (ALP) that has remained resilient within a field of weak and volatile competitors that have had a hard time to sort out popularizing and effectively implementing a market liberal reform of the economy while simultaneously building new party structures from the ground up and resolving the personality disputes of competing leaders many of whom time and again resorted to clientelistic inducements to build their personal following. The lack of organizational crystallization on the liberal-democratic “right” of the Bulgaria party spectrum is one major contributing factor to the limited programmatic appeal of political parties in the country. Each successive liberal democratic party formation has been under the spell of a singular or a few often competing political leaders.

In its most recent incarnation, this applies to the current prime minister Boyko Borisov’s *Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria* (GERD), a party that just took off at the time of the DALP survey in 2008. While its leader has tried to gain programmatic profile through a campaign against corruption and weak governance and in favor of European integration,²¹ his own political trajectory from body guard of the former communist leader via mayor (and therefore: “political fixer”) of the Bulgarian capital Sofia to personal founder and leader of the now largest Bulgarian party and prime minister of the country is quite telling. It remains unclear, whether an organization can emerge out of this trajectory that can credibly project programmatic issue positions and promise pursuit of such issues independent of its leader.

From the perspective of pragmatic politics, assessing what can and should be done to further the objective of programmatic partisan appeals in a competitive multi-party system, party organization, by itself, appears rarely in a leading position. The case studies suggest, but do not prove, that organizational choices do not “cause” parties to adopt programmatic appeals. But once programmatic ideas are in circulation, a party organization that credibly institutionalizes party governance and separates the personality of the leaders from the party’s corporate existence and strategy certainly appears to make the survival of a predominantly programmatic partisan appeal more likely. The experience of the Brazilian PT

²¹ In the DALP survey, Bulgarian experts rated Borisov’s party GERD as the least programmatic party in Bulgaria, but this may be a function of its young age and only incipient development at the time of the investigation. Nevertheless, it is an open question whether Borisov can help to institutionalize a party that can debate programmatic policies independent of the leader’s position.

speaks to that. In many of our case studies, however, the programmatic parties still feature organizational forms that are not quite congruent with the central tendency found in programmatic parties around the globe. It seems that where parties have adopted programmatic appeals only recently, whether through new party formation or party reform, organizational practices still may make them slide toward clientelistic or personalistic politics.

2.3. “Non”-Conditions: What Does *not* Appear to Influence Opportunities for Programmatic Party Competition?

The project considered three other potential influences on politicians’ choice of programmatic strategies. Findings, however, were either unambiguously negative or inconclusive, as too little information is available either at the level of case studies or that of systematic comparative data. The three potential factors are

- ***formal democratic institutions*** such as electoral laws, the power relations between legislatures and executives, and the national centralization or subnational decentralization of political jurisdictions (with political federalism as one extreme);
- ***civil society activism***, evidenced by voluntary associations and their dealings with partisan politicians as well as the more spontaneous political activation of citizens either in the electoral process and/or in protest movements;
- ***consulting and advice by international organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs)*** from abroad interacting with and advising domestic parties about programmatic linkage strategies.

On formal institutions and organizations, the review of case studies yields a negative conclusion, as does the more systematic survey of associational affiliations through the 88-country DALP investigation. On civil society and international NGOs, the result may well be positive or negative, yet we have too little information to tell one way or the other.

2.3.1. *Democratic Institutions and Programmatic Party Formation*

There is a considerable literature arguing that institutional rules of the games in democracy do matter for parties’ linkage strategies. Rules that put an emphasis on competition among individual politicians running for office and being held accountable for wielding public authority are said to obstruct programmatic competition. Programmatic competition requires that politicians’ and voters’ attention is refocused on ideas and government activities, not the unique qualities of individual politicians (“charisma”) and what they can do for small target constituencies in return for the latter’s vote (“clientelism”). Programmatic politics, by contrast, is supposed to thrive, where institutions nudge individual politicians toward cooperation with other politicians on large “teams” that pool their resources and coordinate their activities under the umbrellas of competing partisan labels.

Institutional elements that are supposed to enhance programmatic effort of politicians in the electoral competition and daily work of partisan representation are the following:

- ***Electoral laws:*** Where parties compete in systems of proportional representation with large districts in which many legislative seats are awarded according to a party's proportion of the total vote it received, and voters cannot select individual candidates from the pools of nominees featured by the competing parties ("closed" list ballots), there parties will have considerable incentives to issue a programmatic message. By contrast, where individual candidates stand in the foreground, such as in single member districts with plurality winners or in multi-member districts with "open" lists where voters award their support not to a party list as a whole, but to specific individuals on that list, politicians from the same party compete against each other. They can do so less by highlighting the finer differences between them in their programmatic views than by attempting to attract voters through clientelistic inducements or personal charisma.
- ***Executive-legislative relations:*** Directly elected presidents with considerable powers to make, to bloc or to implement legislation ("legislative powers") and/or to appoint, to guide or to dismiss the senior politicians who run executive ministries, departments, and agencies ("executive powers"), personalize the political process. Often enough, ambitious presidential candidates use patronage to distinguish themselves from rivals in their own party. Once nominated, candidates distance themselves from their own parties' programmatic stances in order to improve their chance to win marginal and uncommitted voters in the presidential contest. The presidential candidates' programmatic ideas then muddy their party's profile before elections, and may make legislative support for presidential incumbents quite volatile and unpredictable after elections, as not even a president's own party is unambiguously committed to his or her support. By contrast, a parliamentary government with prime ministers directly accountable to legislative majorities provides powerful incentives for parties to practice group cohesion around programmatic ideas and support a government that has the parties' own politicians in the cabinet.
- ***National centralization or regional federalization of political jurisdictions:*** Where the power to allocate government funds is decentralized to regional and local decision-makers, chances are they have an easier time to identify networks of personal and local party supporters, as well as to monitor and sanction their behavior, if they do not help the election of their benefactor. As a consequence, politicians in federalist systems may have fewer incentives to invest time and resources into featuring national level policy programs. By contrast, centralized government has less capacity to micro-manage electoral support ties and therefore relies more on round-about programmatic rather than clientelistic appeals.

Empirically, neither the case studies nor broad comparative research with the DALP dataset bears out these institutionalist hypotheses.²² In the latter, democratic institutions appear to matter preciously little for parties' programmatic effort, but marginally for clientelistic effort (Kitschelt 2011). The most robust finding generated is probably a small boost presidentialist democracies give to politicians' clientelistic efforts. Conversely, however, parliamentary democracies do not enhance programmatic effort. Electoral system effects are very weak, often inconsistent with theoretical expectations, and sensitive to small differences in specifying the statistical analysis. No effect of federalism on parties' linkage strategies can be identified one way or another, either as direct effect or as interactive effects when related to economic development.

²² For a detailed assessment of the literature and comparative evidence on democratic institutions and linkage strategies, see Kitschelt (2011). Also further analysis using more complicated ways to explore the relationship between institutions and democratic linkage strategies, e.g. using subtle interaction effects among institutions, and/or between institutional arrangements, country affluence, or democratic experience as predictors of linkage strategies, does not reveal robust and substantial correlations that might explain differential levels of programmatic partisan effort.

This general result is also borne out by the seven case studies included in the project analysis. Some cases obviously reveal institutional patterns that correlate with parties' linkage strategies in ways more consistent with the institutionalist hypotheses, while this is not true for other cases:

- The case with the parties that make the absolutely and relatively greatest programmatic effort, **South Korea**, has democratic institutions that do not unambiguously favor programmatic party competition. True, South Korea is a centralist democracy, but it has a moderately powerful, directly elected presidency and an electoral system that only recently went through reforms making it less clearly conducive to clientelistic exchange relations.
- **Turkey** has institutions that probably come closest to consistency with observable programmatic partisan efforts, although with qualifications. Its closed-list multi-member PR electoral system does favor programmatic politics, as does its parliamentary form of executive governance and its centralization of government authority. But the parties' intensity of programmatic politics, relative to the country's level of development and its institutions, is quite modest, albeit more sharply pronounced than in most of the case studies. At the same time, Turkey's parties, and above all its ruling AKP, tend to also embrace clientelistic politics.
- **Bulgaria** has a closed list proportional electoral system and a centralized form of government, both favoring programmatic party competition. Moreover, it has a weak, but not entirely powerless directly elected presidency. In light of these conditions and its level of economic development, a sturdier support for programmatic benefits would have been expected than is actually observed.
- **Brazil** has institutions that are more or less inimical to programmatic competition, even though an electoral system reform some years ago has removed one of the most notorious stipulations suspected to foster clientelism instead of programmatic partisan politics. Nevertheless, against these odds, but with the catalyst of economic crisis (see above), individual parties, with the Workers' Party in front, have changed their electoral appeals and now feature more programmatic appeals.
- **Dominican Republic, India, Taiwan:** These are the countries where our case studies found precious little programmatic activism in the individual major parties. Yet their institutions are not entirely adverse to programmatic party competition and conducive to clientelistic politics. Consider here only the institutions that are inconsistent with the observed predominantly clientelistic and non-programmatic partisan practices in each of the three countries. **India** does have a parliamentary form of government with a purely ceremonial and indirectly elected president and a single-member district system in which the parties control the candidate nomination and nominated candidates of the same party do not compete against each other. The **Dominican Republic** has both centralized government and a closed list PR electoral system both of which should encourage programmatic party competition.²³ And **Taiwan**, finally, has a semi-presidential system with a centralized governance structure, albeit until recently a personalistic small multi-member district electoral system in which candidates from the same party competed against each other.

At the level of individual case studies, of course, this evidence against an institutional determination of partisan programmatic effort does not rule out that there is also some evidence consistent with institutionalist arguments. Thus, the Indian first-past-the-post system in conjunction with a strict federalism that devolves a great deal of political power over economic resources to the state and local levels, tends to

²³ Preference votes for individual candidates are possible in the Dominican Republic, but rarely practiced, as it is difficult to use that option to coordinate around candidates not approved by the parties' respective leaders.

encourage a personalization of partisan politics and is likely to fuel clientelism. Moreover, the resulting proliferation of state-level parties across India's 35-state-federalism makes it imperative to convene complex coalition governments at the federal level. Here, in fact, sectoral compatibility prevails at the expense of ideological compatibility (Gowda and Sridharan 2010: 158-9). Coalition government in a multi-level state structure thus may systematically undermine programmatic orientation. In Brazil, politicians in many parties have, of course, acted on institutional conditions conducive to non-programmatic politics, but not in all parties. And in Taiwan the transition from a personalistic electoral system (SNTV, the single non-transferable vote system) to a mixed single-member district/closed-list proportional representation system certainly removes intra-party competition among candidates that works against programmatic partisan effort. The trouble is that democratic institutions, by themselves, are insufficient to come up with strong predictions of politicians' linkage strategies. They seem to work only in a highly contextualized way.

Why, then, is it the case that democratic institutions appear not to have much of an independent effect on the nature of programmatic partisan effort? On the one hand, it shows that the power of exogenous "hard" constraints, and for programmatic politics especially economic development, is great: Where there is little popular demand for programmatic politics that would be induced by development, politicians and constitutional designers can try what they may and they cannot contrive a programmatic party system. On the other hand, politicians are resourceful and *may develop organizational party structures that compensate for institutions adverse to programmatic competition*, provided they sense that there is a strategically vital electoral market for programmatic policies. The Brazilian *Worker's Party* is a case in point. Countervailing to the democratic institutions that primed individual competition of politicians within the same party, the PT instituted rules of nomination and conduct that enhanced the solidarity and coordination of the party's elected representatives.

The pragmatic upshot of this examination is that politicians and their advisors probably cannot engineer programmatic competition single-handedly by imposing a particular institutional structure on a polity. This does not rule out, however, that in conjunction with other helpful elements—growing affluence, an exhaustion of the developmental state combined with a lingering economic crisis, for example—an additional institutional reform could be helpful to hasten a transition of democratic competition to programmatic politics. At best, however, institutional reform can be a small part of a broader package of processes that nurture programmatic competition. By itself, constitutional design delivers nothing but institutional blueprints.

2.3.2. *Civil Society Mobilization and Programmatic Partisan Efforts*

There are reasons to hypothesize that a vibrant civil society with numerous civic associations that are independent from political parties, yet enjoy broad popular support, may force political parties to adopt more programmatic appeals than clientelistic exchange strategies. There are several reasons for this hypothesis. For one thing, citizens who are not primarily associated with established political parties, but relatively independent civic associations, are hard to incorporate in clientelistic exchange as they are situated outside the partisan networks that deliver a modicum of monitoring and sanctioning of client behavior to limit benefits to those who actually support a party. When faced with independent civic associations, politicians may therefore be compelled to resort to non-clientelistic linkage strategies, and programmatic effort may provide one possible avenue to accomplish this. For another thing, the presence of autonomous civic associations often constitutes a threat to existing political parties. The failure of existing parties to incorporate demands of autonomous, mobilized civic associations may result in the entry of

political parties nurtured by the activism of civic associations. This shadow of new party entry may make politicians in established parties cater to unaffiliated voters by primarily programmatic appeals.

Not only the autonomy of civic associations from political parties, but also their types of political claims may make party politicians ponder more or less programmatic appeals. Members of religious or ethnocultural associations may be more amenable to clientelistic, contingent, and exclusionary exchange relations with political parties. With regard to labor unions, it may depend on how encompassing their organization is. Highly encompassing labor unions are more likely to emphasize that politicians deliver collective and large-scale redistributive club goods. They tend to embrace clientelistic politics and abhor clientelism. A narrow occupational or sectoral unionism, by contrast, may well be congruent with clientelistic politics..

Empirical evidence on these hypotheses is sparse and more suggestive than conclusive. No systematic investigation could be conducted within the time and resource constraints of the IDEA investigation. But a few examples may make it plausible that this subject deserves more study.

Consider the comparison of *South Korea* and *Taiwan* in our case study set. Korea developed a highly militant, independent labor movement repressed by the military regime in the 1980s, but later emerging as an autonomous political force. After the financial crisis 1997-8 in 2000, the movement made good on its threat to form its own party, the *Korean Democratic Labor Party (KDLP)*, which may have had rather limited electoral success so far, but which may have hastened the post-crisis adoption of stronger programmatic positions by the two major Korean parties. In Taiwan, by contrast, unions developed very different from Korea in a more state-corporatist mould, where unions are closely intertwined with political parties. The larger labor federation affiliated with the ruling (and erstwhile authoritarian) KMT, and the smaller association with the opposition DPP. These party-affiliated associations displayed much less militancy and may have been a much lesser threat to push party politicians toward a more clearly articulated programmatic stance.

Also in *Brazil*, a radical labor movement was at the cradle of the PT, the first party to espouse a clearly programmatic orientation. Over time, the interplay with, and at times the tension to, the labor movement wing has been critical for the development of the PT.

In other countries in our case studies, the DALP experts score close links between several of the dominant clientelistic parties and the labor movements. This applies, for example, to *Turkey*, where the *Justice and Development Party (AKP)* is seen as having close links to the labor movement. In a similar vein, the major *Indian parties* are scored as maintaining very close relations to labor organizations. This applies not only to the *India National Congress* and its small regional allies, but also the *Bharatiya Janata Party* and, of course, the two small communist parties. In *Bulgaria*, only the post-communist BSP boasts close labor links, but none of the other parties. In our *Latin American cases*, with few exceptions (such as the Brazilian PT, on one side, yet also the Argentinean Justicialists with strong union linkages, on the other) the labor movements are generally weak and have rather tenuous ties to partisan government.

In a broader comparison of party appeals and civic associations based on the DALP data, the relationship between parties' more programmatic or clientelistic appeals and their affiliation with civic associations is contingent upon development. Parties with closer linkages to labor and women's movements also tend to make somewhat stronger programmatic efforts, *but only in the more affluent countries with per capita GDPs in excess of \$ 10,000 (2007 \$, ppp corrected per capita GDPs)*. In the poorer countries, there is no relationship between parties' programmatic efforts and their proximity to interest associations of any kind, with the exception of women's movements (and that relationship is negative). When it comes to

clientelism, however, both in rich and poor countries more clientelistic parties have closer relationships with business, labor, religious and—very mildly—women’s associations, yet not with ethnocultural groups or neighborhood movements.

The underlying logic may be that in less affluent countries, particularly those operating within a developmental state political-economic strategy, unions cover primarily a privileged urban sector that may have some programmatic demands, but is quite satisfied with clientelistic targeted payoffs made possible by the considerable partisan discretion over the allocation of economic resources in such regimes. Moreover, it is more likely here that labor and women’s movements experience a corporatist subordination under predominantly clientelistic parties. In poorer countries, the associational mobilization of civil society, thus does not translate into more, but rather less programmatic partisan effort, at least as long as interest associations are closely tied into party networks and use clientelistic networks for rent seeking.²⁴

More generally speaking, beyond these weak clues, however, we do not know how civil society and political parties interact in the creation of stronger or weaker programmatic partisan efforts and linkages to voters. Data on interest group mobilization and interactions with parties are sparse and concentrated on affluent postindustrial countries. There is very limited information on citizens’ group memberships and activism that would satisfy a global comparative analysis. Moreover, one would have to find ways to disentangle the role of development and of political participation and associational grassroots mobilization for politicians’ linkage strategies, a formidable task even with better data. Nevertheless, there is at least a chance that broad-based, autonomous bottom-up political mobilization might leave an imprint on politicians’ strategies, although neither the case studies in this IDEA project nor the broader DALP dataset of 88 countries provide sufficient evidence to bear out this expectation.

2.3.3. External Consultancy Advice for Political Parties

The final strand of causal mechanisms explored in the case studies is obviously of great concern to IDEA, and it has to do with the role of external consultancy organizations—such as international non-profit and non-governmental organizations—in advising politicians to reshape their partisan appeals. Do politicians in individual parties or entire party systems adopt more programmatic partisan appeals, if prompted to do so by advice, training, and discussions initiated by international and regional NGOs or even by organizations sponsored by governments and parties in postindustrial polities?

Quite frankly, in this investigation’s set of seven countries the case study analysts have rarely come across information pertaining to this subject. It appears that advice and consulting targeted at political parties from such sources is either a rare phenomenon or will be politely rebuffed by the local political players do not tolerate external intervention. This general assessment applies certainly to the larger countries in our study set, i.e., Brazil, India, Korea, or Turkey. It is unlikely that major parties in such countries would be receptive to outside communication and persuasion, unless it is sought out of a party’s own initiative, e.g. in consultancy contracts. Moreover, conditions of party competition on the ground tend to be so information impacted that outsiders will need to know a great deal of detailed facts about concrete settings and players in a political contest in order to be taken seriously with advice. As a consequence, outsiders will rarely be accepted as credible sources of advice and strategic or organizational innovation in party competition.

²⁴ This result is consistent with the literature on urban bias of development policies (Bates 2008), but also on the role of labor unions as potentially boosting inequality and disparities of life chances (e.g. McGuire 1999).

Levitsky and Way's (2010) analyzed whether outside political forces may have an impact on domestic political regime change and developed a logic of "linkage and leverage." Only where countries are already tied into an international system in which they have intense and economically indispensable exchanges with countries in their vicinity from where the political impulse to engage in domestic regime change is originating ("linkage"), will such outside forces sound sufficiently persuasive or control enough valuable resources the withdrawal of which could hurt a recalcitrant regime sufficiently to listen up ("leverage"). Applied to the case of programmatic party effort, this probably means that countries may need to be sufficiently small and interconnected with the rest of the world, and possibly poor as well, to be receptive to external advice. But it is exactly these countries that have the least domestic potential to develop programmatic parties, as argued above.

Are there instances of external "leverage" over political partisan strategies in our case study set where external actors also have considerable "linkage" to domestic actors to make advice potentially persuasive? Leverage works only, where linkage already exists. In these terms, the probably optimal case for external influence strategies in our comparison set is Bulgaria. It is one of the poorest members of the *European Union* and has heavily relied on the largesse of structural funds and agricultural support from Brussels. But Bulgaria does not show evidence that external organizations, whether sponsored by the EU, individual EU countries, or non-governmental organizations, made effective efforts to persuade politicians to improve their parties' programmatic appeal or that such proposals—if they were made—had any chance to be acceptable to the domestic political players. German party foundations, for example, have been on the ground with offices, information meetings and cultural activities to educate the incipient political elites since the early 1990s. There is no tangible evidence, however, that these activities had a detectable impact on the political dynamics in the country. The same may apply to the (admittedly recent) membership of Bulgarian parties in the cross-national party caucuses of the European parliament, but it is too early to tell. Hitherto the initiatives towards programmatic party politics in Bulgaria appear to be independent of external advice. Also, according to domestic experts' judgments, clientelism in Bulgaria intensified on the EU's watch since the late 1990s. It is unclear how and where external advice could have left its imprint.

A further complication of the Bulgarian situation, yet also that of many other countries, is the lack of continuity of many political parties. Advice may only pay off through the "constant boring of hard boards," as Max Weber described the process of politics. But the boards (parties) change frequently, at least in some of our cases (Bulgaria, India, to a lesser extent also Brazil and Turkey). It is not clear, then, how advice should stick in many of these instances.

The role of international NGOs in domestic partisan politics is also not necessarily something that domestic party elites look upon favorably or even are willing to tolerate, particularly in the stronger and larger countries. In this vein, the Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan repeatedly criticized the German party foundations in April 2011, intimating that they were indirectly financing the military arm of the Kurdish ethnic movement, the PKK. The foundations retorted that they only held fact-finding meetings with municipal officers in the Kurdish regions of Turkey, but this clash put them clearly at odds with the largest and strongest Turkish party.²⁵ In the same spirit, it is also hard to conceive that outside international organizations could have any impact on the major Indian, Korean or Taiwanese parties.

In a pragmatic perspective, however, even if this assessment was valid and holding up across all seven case studies or even generalizeable to the universe of recently founded democracies in developing

²⁵ For a response to these accusations, see, for example, the press release of the Heinrich Böll Foundation of April 10, 2011: http://www.tr.boell.org/downloads/Microsoft_Word_-_Pressemitteilung.pdf.

countries, the conclusion may not necessarily be to abandon advice missions. For one thing, the educational and advisory work constitutes an exercise of “soft” power the impact of which may be hard to assess by definition, as it creates a culture and political atmosphere, in which some politicians interpret their domestic strategies differently than without this input. For another thing, the negative finding for advice strategies might imply to target resources in a more focused manner, maybe by calibrating them according to the Levitsky/Way (2010) benchmark that leverage must coincide with linkage: Only where countries’ legislatures and parties are strongly tied into close cooperation with parties and legislatures in other countries already practicing the primacy of programmatic party competition (“linkage”) is it plausible that external actors originating in the latter country may have an impact on politicians in the former (“leverage”).

Using this benchmark, recently democratized polities with the least programmatic parties in the European Union, such as Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, and Romania, as well as possibly Latvia and Slovenia would be promising environments in which to address enhancing parties’ programmatic partisan effort²⁶. Outside the EU, one might direct activities toward recent democracies where (1) (most) parties show much lower programmatic structuring than one would predict merely based on that country’s economic development (see figure 1 above: countries way below the regression line) and their long-term (good) and their more recent medium-term (wretched) economic performance and where (2) ties into and proximity to OECD countries, based on indicators such as trade relations, mutual travel/tourism, and communications, make it plausible for domestic politicians to consider the former as their role models. Moreover, receptivity of domestic politicians to foreign models may be greater in (3) smaller rather than larger countries. Using these criteria and once again inspecting figure 1, it is not easy to identify any countries unambiguously that meets these criteria and might be receptive to foreign advice about party system reform. For reasons of political economy, some of the most substantial programmatic underperformers—such as Argentina, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Panama, Mauritius, or Thailand—may be entirely indifferent to foreign advice, at least as long as their economies keep thriving due to raw materials (agro or hydrocarbon) exports and income from tourism.

Section 2.3. earmarks three different causes that might affect programmatic partisan effort, but finds all of them wanting, yet for different reasons.. Only with regard to one of them, *political institutions*, there is plenty of evidence to suggest that most of the time indeed other processes may trump or condition the role of institutions, when parties choose programmatic and/or clientelistic linkage strategies. Institutional design is mostly a chimera. By contrast, with regard to *civil society mobilization* and *external advice and education on programmatic party formation*, an absence of systematic evidence makes it hard to assess currently how much impact such factors have on parties’ programmatic efforts. Circumstantial evidence suggests that the impact of these factors may not be great and may also be highly conditional on a country’s economic development, but there are also examples that suggest these processes might have some impact. The role of labor unions mobilization is a case in point, but it also shows the limitations of the argument: Few emerging democracies have strong or militant labor movements.

²⁶ As figure 1 reveals, there are some established democracies that exhibit curiously low programmatic structuring at this time, above all three of the four Scandinavian countries (Finland, Norway, and Sweden). Possible reasons for this situation are explored in Kitschelt and Freeze (2010).

3. Tentative Conclusions

In 1950, the *American Political Science Association* published a blatantly normative report, “Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System,” in which it issued a clarion call for a “programmatic party system.” Ironically, in the more than sixty years that have elapsed since the report, the United States has achieved that kind of party system now. According to DALP data, it now has the globally far and wide most programmatic divides (see figure 1). The 1950 report, however, was bad political science and therefore also bad policy advice (see Kirkpatrick 1971). It did not analyze the *reasons and causes* for why American political actors behave in ways that diverged from the APSA’s ideal at the time, nor did it study empirically the *consequences* of a programmatic party system. Both empirical steps are preconditions for any normative analysis and policy advice:

- **“Ought” implies “can.”** It is reasonable to advocate certain outcomes only if they are feasible in any empirically conceivable world. We therefore need to know under what conditions certain patterns of partisan mobilization can reasonably be expected. This is the task this IDEA report has taken up, but the APSA 1950 report more or less omitted. The center piece of this report is to identify conditions under which programmatic party appeals become more or less likely as strategies chosen by empirically observable political actors.
- ***What are the consequences of programmatic politics?*** This is a question the APSA report did not systematically examine. It is also a question that was not part of the mission of this IDEA report. Let it be said that it is fairly tricky to determine the consequences of a dominance of programmatic partisan appeals in democratic party systems, when compared to party systems that emphasize other linkage mechanisms (valence/economic performance, clientelism, personality of political leaders). What types and dimensions of consequences are important for the evaluation? And how do we appraise the consequences in light of normative standards?

Let it only be said here that *one should be careful about unqualified enthusiasm for programmatic party systems*, as they may find expression either in a centripetal, consensual, or alternatively in a centrifugal, highly conflictual and divisive, political dynamics. Not all citizens like political polarization, when the division of politics borders on the emergence of almost war-like camps advocating policy positions that are far apart from each other and the status quo. After all, such alignments may yield high volatility and instability of policy-making, when alternation in political office occurs, and/or political paralysis and immobilism. Calmer minds may well want to dilute parties’ programmatic appeals with other linkage mechanisms, whether they involve considerations of politicians’ personality and competence or even clientelism. The United States as the currently most “programmatic” party system provides empirical illustration for these issues: It is at times a paralyzed polity in which deadlock between houses of the legislature and the executive subverts effective policy-making, and at times a highly volatile polity in which policies swing wildly from one side of the political spectrum to the other. These problems may serve as a warning example that there can be too much of a good thing, or that one will be least happy, when one’s wishes for programmatic politics come true (Galston 2010). While many members of the APSA in the 1940s were worrying about too little programmatic politics in the Democratic and Republican parties, now in the early 21st century many are concerned about the programmatic extremism and polarization exhibited by politicians in the United States, particularly those on the extreme right, but also by a radicalization of parts of the electorate.

One conclusion of this report, therefore, is that IDEA should carefully study the empirical implications of programmatic politics in different settings and conditions, as well as critically consider

the normative standards that would qualify programmatic politics as “better” than other mechanisms of democratic accountability, before signing on to a “programmatic politics” agenda in an unqualified fashion.

But let the rest of this conclusion *restate the major findings of the empirical analysis probing into potential “causes” and “correlates” of programmatic politics*. As emphasized earlier, where data are available, it is easier to explore patterns of association between features of political activity, say electoral systems and programmatic partisan effort: Does certain political behavior, such as the programmatic efforts of partisan politicians, coincide with certain types of party systems, say closed-list multi-member district systems? Even if the association in question exists (in this case: it does not), however, it is much harder to determine what causes what: Do closed-list PR electoral systems “produce” politicians’ programmatic partisan competition, or does the latter lead to the adoption of closed-list PR electoral systems? Does the causal arrow run from economic and institutional conditions to programmatic partisan effort or the other way round? Given data limitations, causal claims made in this report are somewhat hazardous. Nevertheless, it is already an important insight to recognize what goes together (correlation), even if causation remains questionable: Something cannot be possible a cause of another thing, if both things do not even regularly coincide.

It is not easy to summarize the major findings of this study in a few sentences, but several positive and negative findings about factors that plausibly do or do not coincide, and potentially cause, parties’ programmatic effort political stand out. On the *positive side*, it is more likely to encounter programmatic partisan effort, if the following conditions exist as well:

- The overriding “hard” condition for programmatic party appeals is *economic development*. Educated, higher income individuals for a variety of reasons prefer programmatic partisan accountability and find little satisfaction in clientelistic compensation or tend to be unimpressed by the personal qualities of politicians. Conversely, the prevalence of poverty in a polity does not forebode well for programmatic politics.
- *Periods of economic crisis* offer windows of opportunity to raise the programmatic content of party competition. When the status quo becomes painful, both voters and politicians are willing to consider policy programs that affect the benefits and costs of large voter groups. These programs at times involve drastic alternatives that require reengineering (parts of) the social organization. Moreover, in episodes of crisis, the slack resources disappear that may grease the wheels of “politics as usual” through clientelistic exchange. It is unclear at this time, however, whether it is long, lingering relative economic stagnation, particularly after sustained growth run-ups, or sudden sharp crises, as in a few incidents (South Korea), that are more effective catalysts to promote programmatic partisan politics.
- In terms of long-term economic development perspectives, the windows for programmatic politics are particularly promising when existing growth models have exhausted themselves, i.e. in crises that follow on long run-ups of strong economic growth. This typically occurs in the *transition from export-oriented raw materials production to developmental state industrialization strategies, or in the transition from the latter to postindustrial science- and service-based economies*. There is one exception, however: When countries can fall back on rentier revenue, generated by hydrocarbon or agrarian exports, they are likely to rely more on clientelistic than programmatic partisan appeals, if they stay democratic at all.

- After a transition to the *developmental state*, however, expect an at least partial relapse into less programmatic and more clientelistic politics. Developmental states create “mixed economies” with heavy political intervention in capital and labor markets as well as for the export and import of goods and services. When embedded in a context of democratic party competition, this political discretion over economic resources encourages parties to devise clientelistic linkages. In other words, *setting up the developmental state* is advanced by *programmatic, often populist partisan appeals* to redistribute scarce resources from rural elites to the urban wage earners and entrepreneurs in manufacturing and services. Once in place, however, *maintaining the developmental state* politicizes economic resource allocation and creates huge opportunities for clientelistic exchange between parties and electoral constituencies. The developmental state is responsible for *the non-linearity in the demise of clientelism*: It thrives as long as developmental states are successful, but then falters quite rapidly at rather high levels of affluence, when the developmental state becomes inefficient.
- If the stakes of party competition are high, i.e. small changes of electoral support among parties trigger huge shifts in the parties’ bargaining power over government formation and policy-making, then the largest parties will make a markedly greater effort to win the extra votes. *High competitiveness, however, translates into more programmatic partisan politics only in more affluent and developed countries, where politicians can rest assured that the market for available, free-floating voters tends to include primarily programmatic voters.* In poor societies, by contrast, high competitiveness will lead to more clientelistic partisan effort: Most of the available voters rather take a targeted material benefit than promises of a better future through policy change.
- Finally, it is unlikely that politicians’ choices of *party organizational forms and/or legislative caucus organization* can “cause” their parties to adopt more or less programmatic linkage strategies. It is, however, a fairly robust finding that certain party and legislative organizational forms are more compatible with and supportive of programmatic party appeals and thus help to sustain programmatic organization. Both successful clientelistic and programmatic parties have more geographically extensive organizations, but the former rely more on informal networks running through local notables, whereas the latter prefer *formal membership organizations with partisan officers*. Furthermore, programmatic parties tend to be *less centralized than mixed or clientelistic parties in that their leaders have less control over the nomination of the party’s candidates for legislative electoral office and that rank-and-file activists have some influence over the party’s strategic orientation*. Finally, programmatic parties constrain party leaders by following somewhat *more transparent and institutionalized financial practices* with partisan fund that take away the discretion from leaders to raise and spend party funds any way they see fit and line their own pockets in that process.

On *the negative side*, the report also identified several conditions that *clearly do not impact the programmatic effort made by political parties*. These negative findings are as important as the positive findings, as they will save those who want to promote programmatic politics to make investments in advocating measures and steps that are unlikely to pay off in more programmatic partisan behavior.

- While a *democratic level playing field* offering equal chances and equal protection of civil and political liberties for rival contenders in the electoral contest may be a desirable normative goal for designing political regimes, it is empirically not a condition that coincides with, let alone produces, more programmatic parties. While programmatic parties occur primarily in full democracies, plenty of full democracies have non-programmatic parties. Controlling for development reveals the

correlation between civil and political liberties, on one side, and programmatic politics, on the other, as purely spurious.

- Once appropriate controls are applied, especially for economic development, it also appears that ***greater experience with democratic competition***, by itself, is no facilitator of programmatic partisan efforts. Parties do not become programmatic simply because they have repeatedly competed in elections and voters have become used to their messages.
- While ***deep ethnic divisions and asymmetries in income and power*** in a polity may foster clientelistic politics, they do not reduce programmatic politics. Some demands that benefit most members of an ethnic community, e.g. for income redistribution, civil and political liberties, and/or tolerance to cultural practices, may well lead to the demand for policies that benefit and apply to all members of society, not just those who vote for the party that promotes them.
- A very important finding is that ***institutional engineering***—whether of electoral systems, or relations between executive and legislature, or (de)centralization of political responsibilities between national government and subnational local and regional governments— ***hardly ever pays off in terms of shaping politicians' programmatic effort***. International consulting agencies investing their time in devising new electoral systems and/or changing presidential powers with the objective of creating more programmatically responsible and consistent parties are wasting their time!
- It is unclear if and how ***a more vibrant civil society of movements and interest associations***, autonomous from state and partisan politics, pays off in more programmatic partisan efforts. With regard to labor unions, however, there are some clues that strong unions combined with strong bonds between parties and unions may foster more programmatic politics, albeit only in the economically most affluent countries. Elsewhere union-party combinations tend to foster clientelistic politics and special interest rent-seeking so that a separation of partisan politics from civil society may be more conducive to programmatic party competition.
- Finally, given a lack of systematic data and empirical examples, it is ***unclear how international NGOs have or can influence the process of programmatic partisan formation***. There is little evidence that democracy consulting has vigorously focused on nudging parties toward programmatic appeals anywhere. There is even less evidence that in countries, where foreign NGOs may have advised politicians to adopt programmatic appeals, anything tangible has been achieved through the advisory process. Nevertheless, external consultants may have some leverage to persuade politicians to try programmatic partisan competition, where a country is already closely linked to other polities that practice programmatic party competition.

What all of these empirical relations between general economic or political conditions and parties' programmatic partisan efforts do not consider, however, is one additional, or even rival hypothesis. ***Could it be the case that highly programmatic party systems, as they exist almost exclusively in Western and Central Europe, as well as European settler democracies of the Americas and the Antipodes (the "OECD West"), are a historically unique articulation of party competition that cannot be replicated anywhere else on earth and is even in decline in the heartland where it emerged?***

Empirically, in all the many statistical regressions that were run with DALP data to determine the correlates of programmatic partisan effort there is almost invariably one additional result that sticks out in addition to those reported above: When entering "geographical region of the world" as predictor of parties'

programmatic efforts, the OECD West almost invariably sticks out as the region with the most programmatic parties, regardless of what additional statistical controls are being applied. So it appears that it is not only distinctive general qualities of society and economy—development, economic governance, ethnic competition—or of the polity—political liberties, democratic institutions, democratic experience, competitiveness, party organization, or civil society—that decisively shape parties’ programmatic efforts, but “OECD region.” But what, in analytical terms, does OECD region stand for that is not captured by the sociological, economic, and political characteristics already considered as determinants of programmatic partisan efforts?

At this point, the temptation, of course, is to resort to religion and culture and attribute the particular programmatic nature of the OECD-West to some universalistic notion of citizenship and sociality rooted in the Christian conception of the religious community that promises compassion and inclusion to every believer, regardless of origin and ability. But the history of political linkage mechanisms in today’s OECD West belies this cultural construction of linkages. The incipient European party systems were often through and through non-programmatic, and programmatic politics arrived in many places only late. Moreover, even then, programmatic politics had to coexist with clientelistic modes of political exchange that stubbornly refused to go away, often until the 1980s and 1990s, as the cases of Austria, Italy, and Japan illustrate.

As an alternative, let us offer a *historical legacy argument*, invoking the sociologically and politically unique circumstances of the democratization and rise of party competition in the OECD-West. When these processes occurred between roughly the 1870s and 1920s or even 1940s-50s, the OECD-West was characterized by a particular historical coincidence of industrial class formation and political democratization. The technological waves of innovations that drove the rise of the OECD-West to affluence—from heavy steel and coal industries, via engineering/machinery, chemicals, and electromechanical industries to ultimately mass consumer durables (automobiles, household durables) in the 1920s to 1950s—configured around manufacturing production systems that employed huge armies of unskilled and semi-skilled industrial workers, herded together in vast factories employing tens of thousands of people with low skills, working side-by-side in standard shifts and living in the same neighborhoods. This system of work organization and labor deployment has been called “Fordism,” after the scientifically designed assembly plants and industrial relations system of the Ford Motor Company in the first decades of the 20th century. Industrial manufacturing employment peaked around fifty percent of the total labor force only in a handful of countries in the first half of the twentieth century, among them Belgium, Britain, and Germany, and only in a few others—from Scandinavia to Switzerland, from the Czech Republic to France—the share of the work force ever came close to that proportion of the total labor force. Even in the Western settler democracies industrial employment leveled off at lower proportions of the labor force.

Only in countries that were at the forefront of this industrial innovation of the 1880s to 1950s did a large homogeneous mass of manufacturing workers mobilize around political parties that could adopt broad programmatic stances under the socialist or social democratic label. Even then, the homogeneity of political mobilization was threatened by multiple cross-cutting fissures (cf. Przeworski and Sprague 1986; Bartolini 2000). Political parties representing other social strata, such as industrialists and professionals, farmers and small shopkeepers, responded with their own programmatic parties, as did “centrist” parties uniting bits and pieces of different social classes under a unified religious program (Catholic and Christian Democratic parties). *The high programmatic content of partisan competition in the OECD-West in the first half of the 20th century and thereafter may, then, in part have been driven by the historical unique homogenization of society into a handful of occupational camps around which politicians could tailor easily intelligible, distinctive and quite general, universalistic party programs.* Policy commitments could

speak to very large groups in the electorate at a time, and it was not difficult for anyone to figure out which group would be advantaged or disadvantaged by a certain partisan policy program.

In the early 21st century, it is much harder to devise partisan programs under circumstances of a more fragmented, if not individualized occupational structure with a great differentiation of skills and techniques, and that applies not just to the postindustrial knowledge economies of the OECD-West. Already Japan and the United States peaked at an industrial employment level in the low 30 percent range of the total labor force, leaving much the rest to highly diverse service employment as well as residual employment in the extractive raw materials sector. In the early 21st century, China may never employ a greater proportion than about 20 percent of its workforce in manufacturing, and most new jobs already now are being created in a multiplicity of service sectors. A vast explosion of job descriptions and work sites has taken place everywhere across the globe that makes it increasingly unlikely that the political interests of whole electorates can be neatly divided into a very small set of class and labor-market based categories each of which can inspire a distinctive partisan program. Never and nowhere in world history since the mid-20th century have societies attained the level of occupational homogenization experienced by the OECD-West in the 1880s-1950s time frame, and technological, occupational and sociological trends ever since have pointed in the opposite direction.

The high intensity of programmatic partisan politics that came with the unique market and occupational experience of the first half of the twentieth century is also likely to have vanished in more recent generations. While deindustrialization and postindustrialization, together with post-modern cultural pluralization, are certainly not the whole story to account for politicians' greater, lesser, or different programmatic appeal, they certainly go some ways toward explaining the challenges current developing democracies are facing in articulating programmatic party systems. A modicum of programmatic partisan politics is likely to enter politicians' democratic accountability strategies with development and political economic change. But how much of this can, will, and should occur, may be constrained by contemporary historical circumstances that render it useless to employ the experience of the OECD-West in the twentieth century as the benchmark of democratic success.

APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Programmatic Partisan Efforts

In this appendix, we address primarily (1) how to construct party-level and national-level measures of “programmatic effort” that parties make in the electoral competition based on experts’ policy scores of individual parties. We will also briefly talk about (2) measures of political representation that reveal whether parties’ programmatic structuration resonates with electorates as well.

We will not address here the broad methodological literature about the problems of measuring parties’ issue positions with expert judgments or some other empirical routine, such as the content analysis of party manifestoes. Each of these methods has its own limitations. In the case of expert judgments, experts may not measure the same thing (parties’ declared objectives or their track record based on legislative and executive activity?) or interpret the scales on which they place party positions differently, based on their experiential frames of reference (the “anchor point” problem). They may have a hard time passing judgment for parties as a whole rather than local sections (the aggregation problem), they may simply not know (the knowledge problem) or they may strategically distorted a party’s scores (the political bias problem). Overall, we nevertheless find this method to deliver more reliable results for our purposes than a party manifesto content analysis method (cf. Rehm 2008). Tests for experts’ knowledge base and partisan bias uncover no serious problems in the DALP data set (cf. Kitschelt 2011a).

Constructing Party and Party System Measures of Programmatic Effort

For more details beyond this appendix, see the paper by Kitschelt and Freeze (2010), accessible at the APSA’s website (<http://www.ssrn.com/link/APSA-2010.html>) or a DALP project workshop website (http://duke.edu/~kkk4/2011_clientelism/). The quantitative index of programmatic partisan effort is based on experts’ scores of parties’ issue positions in the DALP 2008-9 survey. To specify the three components of programmatic politics at the level of “elite effort:”

(1) **cohesion:** Knowing party activist/leader i_1 ’s position on issue j in party k_1 should allow us to predict issue positions of party activist/leader i_2, i_3, i_4, \dots in that same party better than the positions on issue j held by activists/leaders in other parties k_2, k_3, k_4, \dots . Moreover, the relative cohesion of a party should not apply to a single, isolated issue, but apply to a range of issues, albeit not all conceivable issues on the political agenda. Clustering of issue positions makes life easier for voters: They can operate with simple clues (left-right positions) and limited information processing and still get a fairly accurate sense of where parties stand on a wide range of related policy alternatives. Empirically, in programmatic parties the standard deviation of activists/leaders positions in party k on a fair number of issues j_1, j_2, j_3, \dots should be quite small and positions should cluster across issues. Short of that, one can use the standard deviation of expert observer’s scoring of parties’ issue positions as tracer of parties’ internal cohesiveness on issues: Agreement among expert observers on a party’s position on a set of issues is one indicator of parties’ “programmatic effort.”

(2) **salience:** The policy issues on which parties are pretty cohesive should not be trivial for the political agenda, but salient for the party and its appeal. At a minimum, this requires that observers can identify a party with a particular position on an issue. If they cannot associate an issue with a party, it is unlikely that the party can use it in its programmatic toolkit. The best way to measure issue salience is, of course, an issue salience score for a party assigned by a disinterested external observer. The DALP survey could not accommodate salience scores for reasons of space. They are also somewhat redundant, since it is known from previous expert investigations, such as Laver and Benoit’s study, that the salience of an issue for a party correlates with the extremism of its position. Extremism, however, is picked up by the third component in our index, polarization (see below). In addition to that, and short of a direct salience measure, we have used the share of politically informed observers who can associate a position on a specific issue with a political party as evidence for the relative salience of an issue for that party. Salience is maximum, if 100% (score 1.0) of all expert judges can identify a party position with an issue. If few(er) informed observers can make the link between issue position and party, it is likely that the issue has less salience for the party. The proportion of missing expert judgments is thus a measure of issue salience for a party

(3) **polarization:** If every party has cohesive and salient issue positions, programmatic party competition would still not ensue, if all parties took the SAME position on that issue. Voters would have no basis of distinguishing between the parties and identify a preferred party. Parties would have to compete on something else than programmatic positions, for example valence (their competence to realize what everyone wishes to see...), leadership personality, or targeted material inducements (patronage, gifts...generically: clientelism). Operationally, an issue exhibits polarization, if the positions of political parties, captured by the

mean scores experts assign to a party on an issue and the standard deviations of these expert judgments, are substantially distinctive.

Of course, *there may not be a linear relationship between programmatic effort and polarization*: Extreme polarization does not signal more programmatic effort (and is more informative for voters) than some modicum of polarization. Beyond a certain minimum threshold, there will be enough differentiation of parties' issue positions to make party positions discernable to voters even with moderate information about the parties.

We have therefore measured the polarization of party positions and party systems in the following fashions:

- (1) **simple polarization measure, party position on a single issue**: the average distance of a focal party's mean issue position, as assessed by experts, from that of all other parties' mean positions on the same issue;
- (2) **corrected polarization measure, party position on a single issue**: the log-transformation of the simple polarization measure.
- (3) **simple systemic polarization measure**: the standard deviation of all means of party positions, as judged by experts, on an issue, weighted by the electoral size of each party.
- (4) **corrected systemic polarization measure**: the log-transformation of the simple systemic polarization measure.

The log-transformations of this polarization measures dampen the effect of small extremist outlier parties on the score. In practice, however, simple and corrected party or systemic polarization measures are correlated to the tune of .94 or better, i.e. virtually indistinguishable. For empirical estimations, it makes little difference, then, which measure will be used. As a consequence, we use here the simple linear party level and systemic polarization measures.

Altogether, cohesion, salience, and polarization are necessary, constitutive requisites of a party's programmatic effort and of programmatic competition in a party system. If any one of the three elements is missing, programmatic politics unravels. As a first approximation, we can therefore conceptualize programmatic politics as the *product of cohesion, salience, and polarization scores of parties on issues* (see Kitschelt and Freeze 2010). The product is calculated for each issue, and after scores on each of the three scales for cohesion, salience, and polarization have been standardized on a 0 -1.0 scale, with the highest value always indicating highest programmatic emphasis. The product of cohesion X salience X polarization therefore also ranges between 0 (no programmatic politics at all) and 1.0 (maximum programmatic effort).

So far we have obtained only a measure of programmatic effort for each party (system) on each individual issue. Programmatic politics, however, implies that parties develop identifiable issue positions over more than one issue, given that the territorial principle of representation in contemporary democracy, where legislators represent constituencies in a geographically circumscribed area over a range of issues that is uncertain and unpredictable so that voters will not be satisfied, if they represent them on a single issue only (consider budget votes). In the DALP survey, therefore, experts had to rate party positions *on three underlying dimensions* that can be abbreviated through an alliteration as *greed, grid, and group* dimensions. The *greed dimension* has to do with the politics of economic (re)distribution and was represented in the DALP survey by three subtly different issues: whether parties are in favor of redistribution toward the poor; whether parties favor compulsory universal social insurance systems; and whether parties favor political intervention in goods and factors markets ("industrial policy"). The *grid dimension* concerns the extent to which parties demand policy to regulate citizens' behavior by codifying moral rules that call for compliance with traditional moral authorities and values (one score/party). The *group dimension* deals with boundary drawing between insiders and outsiders and asks whether policy should defend a national identity and culture, as compared to practicing multicultural tolerance (one score/party).

In addition to scores on these five 3G issues that experts were asked to assess for all countries and all parties in each individual country customized policy issues were added based on the judgment of a political science advisor of the DALP project (a "country anchor") who identified further issues potentially dividing parties programmatically. It is necessary to add these 'custom' issues for individual countries so as not to bias a measure of programmatic politics against parties (countries) in which issues loading on the 3G dimensions may be less pronounced. For example, the Taiwanese survey included a question about parties' positions on relations to mainland China and Taiwanese independence. This question is salient in Taiwan, but would not resonate in party systems anywhere else in the world.

The summary index of programmatic party structuration, and then for whole party systems, was then calculated in the following fashion:

1. For each party, on each issue (3G and custom national issues) that was scored, a product of experts' cohesion, salience and polarization scores (CoSalPo) was computed.

2. Since parties will be programmatic only by combining higher scores on several issues, but not all conceivable issues, alternative indices were then constructed based on the top-ranked issues on which a party produced the highest CoSalPo score. We chose combinations of 3, 4, or 8 issues the average of which then constitutes the party's overall CoSalPo score. CoSalPo_4, for example, is the average score for the four issues where a party reaches the highest cohesionXsalienceXpolarization product. We also computed the average score of the three highest ranked economic-distributive issues only, whether the three in the general 3G survey or some of those combined with economic issues added in the "custom" part of the issue menu scored by country experts. We engaged in a sensitivity analysis of how much the number and composition of the combined issue scores varied across different aggregation principles and found (1) only rather modest variation and (2) CoSalPo_4 to provide a good central estimate that is not far off all of the other ways programmatic party effort was constructed.

3. To aggregate from the party to the party system level, two different procedures can be used that generate somewhat different absolute scores, but are highly similar in terms of the relative rankings of the countries. First, for each country, we may calculate the average CoSalPo score of all the parties, as always weighted by the electoral proportion a party received in the most recent election. Second, we can also construct the national CoSalPo measure from the ground up. We choose the subset of issues that generates the highest CoSalPo scores, regardless of whether it makes it into the top 3, 4 or n of each and every party. Here we start out with the highest average cohesion score, weighted by party size, the highest salience score, weighted by party size, and the polarization index based on the standard deviation of party means for an issue, weighted by party size. We then compare the issue-specific national aggregate CoSalPo scores and choose the desired subset of top-ranked issues for the national summary measure of CoSalPo programmatic structuration. The first method of aggregation yields somewhat higher scores than the second, as it ensures that each party's top-ranked issues make it into the index, not just the average national top-ranked issues.

Measuring Programmatic Political Representation

A programmatic linkage effort undertaken by politicians who advertise certain policy positions, however, does not necessarily imply a relationship of *programmatic representation* between voters and politicians. The programmatic linkage is a relationship of programmatic political representation only if the same, or very similar interests are articulated by both voters and politicians of a party. At the systemic level, if on a policy dimension j parties k are lined up in a particular pattern, voters of those parties should be lined up in a "very similar" pattern. The pattern may not be identical, because, taking electability and competence of politicians into account, *strategic voters* may not always support exactly the party that is closest to their programmatic positions. Nevertheless, the ordering of parties and the ordering of voters on an issue should be quite similar for programmatic representation.

In operational terms, in a bivariate regression employing partisan voters' issue positions as predictors of the parties' issue positions articulated by their lead politicians, the explained variance should be high, the coefficient positive and moderately large (i.e. if the scales of voter and elite positions are identical, the coefficients should not be below 0.5 or larger than 2.0), and the intercept of the regression should be small. If the explained variance is close to zero, and/or the coefficient is close zero, the relationship between voters and parties is close to random. If the intercept is large, it means that politicians of all parties take systematically different positions than all of their voters.²⁷ If the explained variance is large and the coefficient is negative and substantial, we find a relationship of mis-representation: Voters opt for parties that hold exactly the opposite of their own opinions!

In table 2 of the report, we do not dwell on the detailed components of a representative relations. Where needed, we only present the explained variance of the bivariate regression of the preference positions of parties, as scored by experts, on the preferences of each party's voters, as scored on close to identical issues in population surveys taken around the same time as the expert DALP survey. Therefore, what these figures reveal only is whether or not a representative relationship exists across a country's spectrum of parties, but not how substantively meaningful it is in terms of the absolute distances between voters' and parties' preference positions on individual issues.

If not the programmatic elite effort itself, at least the emergence of a programmatic linkage and programmatic representation are all phenomena of partisan politics that may be likely to emerge with—or at least be strengthened by—political experience. They are less likely in recent democracies, unless such democracies build on a stock of accumulated programmatic experience and exposure either based on preceding episodes of democratic party competition or the intensely programmatic

²⁷ Examples in advanced postindustrial democracies are the death penalty or the free trade issues. Voters of all parties are systematically more in favor of the death penalty and less enthusiastic about free trade than the elites of all or most political parties.

indoctrination of an authoritarian ruling party. Programmatic political relations become more likely, where over time the partisan labels and the identity of politicians associated with labels remain the same. Thus the *institutionalization of party systems and the nationalization of political contests*—similar alternatives everywhere in a polity and all the time—are likely collaterals of programmatic politics. But one might not want to incorporate these elements in the definition of programmatic politics.

Appendix 2: Measuring Clientelistic Effort

One of the objectives of the Democratic Accountability DALP survey, therefore, was to deliver a somewhat more comprehensive coverage of *types of clientelistic effort* across a global field of political parties. We describe first what experts scored as clientelistic effort and then the construction of the summary measure of parties' and party systems' clientelistic effort. It should be emphasized that clientelistic "effort" is different from clientelistic "effectiveness." The latter indicates whether clientelistic effort actually pays off for politicians in that it produces more votes. DALP experts were also asked to assess effectiveness independently of effort. While often enough effort and effectiveness go together, there is a characteristic subset of parties, concentrated in Latin America, where politicians make a substantial clientelistic effort, but experts judge them not to pay off in electoral votes.

Measuring Clientelistic Effort

Based on a thorough review of the anthropological, sociological and political science case study evidence, country experts in the DALP survey scored how much effort politicians made to provide five types of goods and benefits to voters in a conditional, clientelistic exchange. They scored the intensity of the effort on an ordinal 4-point scale from "a negligible effort/not at all" to "a major effort." The section in which experts scored these five activities was preceded by a quasi-vignette with an example and an "interpretation of the scale." The idea here was to ensure that a "major effort" was not interpreted as claiming that most voters of a party are receiving tangible benefits to qualify for that rating, but that "even targeting a rather small share of a party's voters may signal a "major" effort by politicians." (quote from the vignette) Clientelistic activity has a demonstration and multiplier effect that resonates with many more citizens than the actual recipients of the benefit, particularly the (extended) family of the recipient.

- **Outright gifts:** Politicians may give food, liquor, clothes, appliances, building materials, and many other scarce and valuable items to voters. These goods may change hands before elections, after elections, in part before and in part after elections, or even during the regular term at some other point in time.
- **Preferential access to material advantages in public social policy schemes:** Major social programs leave rather little wiggle room for clientelistic manipulation, as they are based on general and precisely operationalized rules of contribution and eligibility. This applies in most countries to the biggest social programs, such as old age pensions, health care insurance, basic unemployment income replacement, and some family benefits. But there is a host of social programs, where administrators enjoy a great deal of discretion, as complicated means-tests and tests of deservingness have to be applied to determine eligibility of applicants. This concerns benefits as varied as disability pensions, and more broadly means-tested income replacement ("welfare"), entitlement to nutritional supplements, access to public health facilities and subsidized courses of treatments, public scholarships, public housing, or access to active labor market policies. Housing and health care benefits, as well as means-tested income replacement, are probably fiscally the most important categories among these discretionary benefits.
- **Preferential access to employment in the public sector or in the publicly regulated private sector:** A focus on civil service hires is clearly not enough. The reach of political parties touches a variety of other employment situations that are not formally in the public economy. First of all, this applies to non-profit social and cultural services that are run in an arrangement of "subsidiarity" by formally non-state civic organizations set up by churches or political parties, running from kindergartens through hospitals and counseling centers to nursing homes. The Low Country system of "pillarization" of social service organizations around political parties that in some measure has survived in Belgium to this day is the archetype of such arrangements. Second, there are state-owned enterprises that may have private legal status, but the corporate governance of which is shot through with party representation, particularly in the personnel departments that make appointments based on political patronage. Third, even where companies are formally private, governments may embed them in a cocoon of regulatory protection from competition that relaxes their hard budget constraints, allows them to carry excess employment, and makes them receptive to partisan demands for patronage appointments.

- **Preferential access to government contracts or procurement opportunities:** The award of government procurement contracts to employers who then function as enforcers of their employees' voting support (or campaign assistance) for their partisan benefactors is a common clientelistic practice that has never been studied in a comparative setting. It may be common practice in state-owned or regulated enterprises, but it extends the reach of party patronage deep into the heartland of private capitalist business. It is particularly common in economic sectors with monopsonistic or oligopsonistic market structures, with the state being the main customer, such as civil engineering/construction or defense goods and services. Not by chance Japanese public construction contracts run upwards of twice the share of GDP as in any other affluent OECD democracy.
- **Application of regulatory rules issued by government agencies.** The logic here is similar to that of government procurement contracts. Politicians and their administrative appointees in regulatory agencies interpret and apply regulatory code in favorable or unfavorable ways contingent upon the company's willingness to make its employees a rank-and-file army in the electoral battle on behalf of the benefactor. Areas in which regulatory discretion may be particularly important for clientelistic quid-pro-quos include zoning laws, construction and environmental codes, product safety laws, certification of companies and professions, a host of rules in finance and banking regulation, including loan guarantees, export and import licenses, or regulated access to foreign currency.

A review of this list of opportunities for clientelistic exchange drives home many points of which we wish to highlight only two. *First of all, equating clientelism with "vote buying" is analytically misleading, at least if vote buying is interpreted as a "spot market" single-shot contract between a buyer and a seller for the fully operationalized transaction of a single vote in a single election, with payment delivered before the vote is cast.*²⁸ There is no doubt that vote buying occurs in spot markets and needs to be understood in its own right. But more often than not *clientelism involves an extended "relational" exchange* in which patrons keep delivering benefits in exchange for a stream of votes in a variety of electoral contests. In these instances, it is difficult to say whether patrons deliver benefits to clients as first movers, before elections, or as second movers, after elections. Just consider a client's tenure in public or state-regulated employment or her residence in publicly subsidized housing, or even her early retirement on a government disability plan. The same applies to procurement contracts where payments, deliveries, and subsequent ancillary services extend over long periods of time.

Second, the relational, extended generalized exchange involved in many clientelistic dealings allows parties to subcontract the enforcement structure to a client organization. This is a highly cost-effective way for political parties to operate, as they save the investment in an explicit enforcement structure. It may partially explain why clientelism appears to coincide with only a modest amount of direct monitoring and sanctioning of voters. The client sets up a brokerage external to the partisan patron to ensure that individual voters do the party's bidding. This is most clear-cut in the case of procurement contracts and regulatory favors, but also applies to many patronage-based employment situations as well as some disbursement of social benefits (if subsidiary civic associations are involved). Parties strike "wholesale" contracts with intermediaries (companies, civic associations) who pattern the behavior of their employees—the individual voters—in the spirit of the political compact. Parties gear up for messy, high-transaction cost "retail" exchange relations with individual citizens essentially only in the areas of gift-giving that is closest to the practice of spot-market vote buying and the granting of social services.

Constructing a Summary Measure of Clientelistic Effort

In examining the more than 1,400 experts' scores of 506 parties in 88 countries, it turns out that parties' scores on the five categories of clientelistic practices are highly correlated among each other, as is confirmed by any cluster or factor analysis of the data that can be conceived. The simple bivariate correlations among experts' scores of parties' practices are in the range of .70 to .85. In factor analysis, this yields one hugely overwhelming factor with an Eigenvalue of well over 3.0, capturing more than 60% of the total variance. At first sight, this result is a bit curious, as one might have expected some trade-offs among individual clientelistic efforts: Parties that provide gifts for their constituencies may extend fewer procurement contracts, or parties that target discretionary social benefits to their communities may make less effort to provide public sector and regulated private sector jobs.

²⁸ For an analysis of the varieties of vote buying, see Schaffer (2007).

In part, the uni-dimensionality of clientelistic effort across all modes of benefits production may be an artifact of the situation that prevails among advanced industrial democracies where, with few exceptions, *none of the clientelistic partisan practices* occur and experts' average scores for parties are near the minimum value on the four-point scales. This clustering of correlated low scores may overwhelm whatever more fine-grained texture of alternatives may be evident in parties and countries, where politicians indeed make a meaningful effort to serve constituencies with some kinds of clientelistic benefits.

It is therefore worth setting the affluent OECD-West countries aside and examining more closely the structure of relations among modes of clientelistic exchange among poor and middle income countries, say with a per capita GDP below \$ 10,000 (2008). Figure 1 depicts the bivariate correlations among the modes of clientelism for these countries.

The three modes of clientelism that among less affluent countries show the highest correlation are *those related to the production sphere—procurement contracts, regulatory decisions, and patronage jobs*—with good chances that votes are captured “wholesale” through relations with firms rather than “retail” through relations with individual voters. Patronage job creation is also quite intimately related to social policy benefits and slightly less so to regulation. *The one form of clientelistic outreach that is not quite as strongly related to anything else but social policy is gift provision (B1), the most archetypical “retail” form of clientelism.* It shares barely over a third of its variance with any of the three production/business- related modes of clientelism. As an aside, let us also show a relationship between gift giving and the constituencies on which DALP experts see political parties target their clientelistic efforts: In the case of gift giving, parties make an exceptional effort to target the rural poor. This is much less so the case with the other forms of clientelistic effort.




FIGURE 1: The Relationship Among Clientelistic Efforts in Less Affluent Countries
(GDP per capita < \$10K/2008)

In spite of these differentiations in the use of clientelistic modes of targeting, the overriding story is one of *cumulative* or at least *complementary* and sometimes at the margin *substitutive* deployment of clientelistic targeting techniques by political parties around the globe. *This legitimizes the creation of a simple additive index of clientelism (B15) that combines parties' scores on all five targeting techniques in a single number.* The workhorse of the empirical analysis will be this indicator B15, aggregated to the level of experts' average judgments for each party. Based on party mean scores for B15, an even more aggregate index can be computed that provides a country average, based on party averages weighted by the electoral support of a party in the most recent election (B15nwe, with n standing for "national" and we for "weighted").

Appendix 3: Economic Development Format, Economic Misery, and Linkage Strategies.

Some Statistical Specifications

The DALP data set provides only a cross section of observations for parties' programmatic and clientelistic efforts at a single point in time, the year 2008. It covers only 88 observations at the country level and 506 observations at the party level. This imposes severe restrictions on multivariate analysis particularly at the country level (Achen 2002).

Let us nevertheless describe some of the steps that were taken in the statistical analyses to isolate the associations between political economy and parties' linkage strategies. We say "association" rather than "causation" as our data on parties' programmatic effort, measured at only one point in time, make it all but impossible to devise a statistical analysis that tells us whether partisan linkage efforts are cause or consequence of the phenomena with which they are associated. We can draw that inference only from the case studies, where a time line can be observed or based on theoretical consideration of what can plausibly be a cause or an effect of partisan linkage strategies.

The dependent variables in all instances are measures of programmatic partisan effort. We focus here on the 4-item programmatic effort index (CoSalPo_4 at the party level and CoSalPo_4.nwe at the national level) and the 3-item programmatic effort in the economic dimension only index (CoSalPo_3econ and CoSalPo_3econ.nwe). We employ simple OLS multivariate regression analysis at the country level and a linear hierarchical models at the party level.

In order to isolate the effect of the developmental state on parties' linkage strategies, our statistical analysis uses a succession of increasingly complicated tests, controlling for other conditions that could promote programmatic and/or clientelistic political linkage:

- All models control for development (per capita GDP in 2007 at purchasing power parity), the extent to which countries institute a level playing field for party competition (from the Polity IV data set), the cumulative democratic experience countries have made with democracy (based on Gerring et al's measure of democratic experience), and the degree to which ethnocultural pluralism is characterized by economic inequalities between the ethnic communities (based on Baldwin and Huber's (2010) between-group-inequality index, as extended to further countries by Kolev and Wang 2010).
- Some models also control for a battery of variables measuring *democratic institutions*, particularly aspects of the electoral system (such as district magnitude, the electoral formula (proportional or majoritarian? Ballot structures forcing voters to choose among party labels or individual candidates of "teams"?), of presidential executive and legislative powers, and of the political decentralization of jurisdictions to the subnational level ("federalism"). Since institutions do not have a systematic stable effect on programmatic effort, we will not display any results including these variables.
- Estimations with parties use nested hierarchical linear models with *party electoral size* and *government status* (cabinet participation or not) as controls, as well as sometimes a *party's general left-right orientation*, although this can be considered to be an aspect of the dependent variable (programmatic party effort) rather than as a separate attribute of political parties.
- Some models use as catch-all device to capture physical proximity, contagion and interdependence among countries, common historical roots, and other unspecified possible explanations for the choice of programmatic partisan politics *regional dummy variables*: Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, Asia/Middle East, and Postcommunist polities, with affluent Western democracies serving as reference category.
- We then added the focal variables of theoretical investigation. Further model specifications then, deleted irrelevant variables and produced reduced models.
- The models were tested for influential cases, i.e. to make sure that hypothesized patterns do not result merely from exceptional outliers.

Testing Political-Economic Models of Programmatic Party Formation: Long-term and Medium-Term Effects

We explored the effects of long-term growth regimes on programmatic party formation as well as the role of medium-term economic stagnation and decline. As expected, countries that went through a long developmental state trajectory in the aftermath of the post-World War II, characterized by sustained high growth rates and arriving at upper-middle income or affluent income status by the 2000s, do not show significantly more programmatic partisan effort than other countries at similar levels of development. But they do (still) incorporate more clientelistic partisan effort (not shown here). We tinkered with other indicators of ISI political economy formats and EOI formats in order to test the robustness of our estimations, but these indicators are generally too questionable and the number of countries for which observations exist is too small to draw firm conclusions (see Kitschelt 2011c).

With regard to the medium-term economic misery hypothesis, we conceptualized macro-measures in line with different micro-logics that might capture the “political psychology” of citizens and politicians when responding to political-economic decline. For the main part, we focus here on unemployment and changes in unemployment. A similar conceptualization of the statistical analysis can, however, be executed for economic growth in different time periods and changes in inflation as well. With regard to inflation, no significant positive findings were generated at all. With regard to growth, findings mirrored those for changes in unemployment to which growth is (negatively) related, albeit not as consistently and starkly as in the case of unemployment. Let us therefore concentrate on the differential operationalization of unemployment changes and their hypothesized impact on programmatic party formation:

- Do they respond to **absolute increases in unemployment** over some sustained period? We conceptualized this in terms of two measures, average annual changes in unemployment levels over the 1991-2007 period and the 1997-2007 period. We ran estimations with and without controls for unemployment at the beginning of the period (made no difference).
- Do citizens and politicians respond to **relative changes in unemployment**, i.e. proportional increases over some baseline? We examined these relative changes for the two time periods as well.
- We examined whether the trend in unemployment plays out differently in richer and poorer countries. If more affluent countries are generally more receptive to programmatic politics, then maybe increases in unemployment in more affluent countries lead to an intensification of programmatic politics in a more pronounced fashion than in less affluent countries. This can be captured by an interaction term between unemployment change rates and economic affluence.

Appendix table 3-1 illustrates results obtained with some of the specifications for the DALP country set (N=82; missing cases = 6). Absolute unemployment rates matter with both time period specifications, with or without controls for the average unemployment rate during the period. Relative unemployment rates matter only in the longer period specification (1991-2007), but are insignificant for the shorter time period (no results reported). The effects are more robust and consistent for the full measure of programmatic partisan effort (see columns 1-4 in table Appendix 3-1: CoSalPo_4.nwe) rather than economic programs only (See columns 5-6 in table Appendix 3-1: CoSalPo_3econ.nwe). This suggests that some political reaction to economic misery occurs by thematic “displacement:” Instead of politicizing economic governance structures and distributive policies, politicians (and voters?) focus on non-economic policy dimensions where programmatic alternatives are more sharply articulated. This matches nicely debates about “second dimension” politics in contemporary advanced industrial democracies.

An interaction effect with levels of development was detected only once, with regard to absolute changes in unemployment levels 1997-2007. Here, indeed, more affluent countries react with an increase in the programmatic effort of their parties to economic misery, whereas in poor countries the reverse is the case. These results suggest *that when regional dummies are controlled, absolute unemployment change is significantly positively correlated with overall programmatic effort*. The pattern is not driven by one or few influential cases. As already shown in scattergrams in the main report of this research project, in regional terms, parties appear not to respond to rising unemployment with increased programmatic political mobilization in Sub-Saharan Africa and in Asian-Middle Eastern countries. This is quite easily intelligible within the framework of the proposed analysis: In these poor countries the market for voters who have programmatic dispositions is too small for parties to bother.

Note also that in all estimations various regional dummy variables return negative and for the most part significant scores. This applies to Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Asia-Middle East. For postcommunist Eastern Europe, the sign of the coefficient is negative, but the coefficient is small and fails to be significant. Also Scandinavia has a significant, negative coefficient for programmatic effort, a strange result discussed in more detail in Kitschelt and Freeze (2010). What these patterns of significance show, however, is that much of the OECD-West is different and more disposed to programmatic partisan politics

than the rest of the world, even net of the systematic factors measured by the independent variables in the various statistical models.

Nevertheless, the quantitative analysis of 80+ countries suggests that there is some resilience and robustness to the claim that hard economic times lead to more programmatic partisan politics. It is not only simple bi- and tri-variate relations, as illustrated by the bar diagrams in the body of the report, but also more sophisticated multivariate statistics that suggests the plausibility of this claim. Still, it goes without saying that the presented results remain inconclusive and are obtained through a thick fog of measurement error and problems to draw inferences from small Ns of observations. For these results to be stronger, we would have wished for consistently large and significant coefficients across all different specifications of changes in unemployment rates (absolute and relative) and across a wide range of different reference time periods.

Appendix Table 3-1: Economic Misery and Programmatic Politics

	(1) Cosal- po_4nwe Programmatic- general	(2) Cosal- po_4nwe Programmatic- general	(3) Cosal- po_4nwe Programmatic- general	(4) Cosal- po_4nwe Programmatic- general	(5) Cosalpo-3- econnwe Programmatic- economics only	(6) Cosalpo_3- econnwe Programmatic- economics only
Average unemployment rate 97~07	-0.00130 [0.00215]				-0.000977 [0.00246]	
Absolute unemployment change 97~07	0.0914*** [0.0340]	-0.457** [0.216]			0.0649* [0.0389]	
Relative change in unemployment 97~07						
Average unemployment rate 91~07			-0.00270 [0.00214]	-0.00293 [0.00228]		-0.00208 [0.00244]
Absolute unemployment change 91~07			0.0797** [0.0338]			0.0601 [0.0386]
Relative change in unemployment 91~07				0.134** [0.0564]		
Absolute unemployment change 97~07 *lnGDPpcPPP		0.0628** [0.0243]				
lnGDPpcPPP	0.0748*** [0.0177]	0.0777*** [0.0166]	0.0703*** [0.0177]	0.0865*** [0.0192]	0.0569*** [0.0202]	0.0538*** [0.0202]
Democracy Stock	0.0000385 [0.0000669]	0.0000179 [0.0000645]	0.0000546 [0.0000668]	0.0000531 [0.0000681]	0.0000448 [0.0000765]	0.0000565 [0.0000762]
Polity	-0.00944** [0.00431]	-0.00779* [0.00414]	-0.00892** [0.00426]	-0.00982** [0.00445]	-0.00454 [0.00493]	-0.00429 [0.00486]
Post-com	-0.0508 [0.0554]	-0.0841 [0.0515]	-0.0321 [0.0544]	-0.0169 [0.0561]	-0.0613 [0.0634]	-0.0472 [0.0620]

Lat Am	-0.132*** [0.0444]	-0.163*** [0.0420]	-0.129*** [0.0437]	-0.102** [0.0452]	-0.176*** [0.0507]	-0.174*** [0.0498]
Sub-Saharan Africa	-0.190*** [0.0601]	-0.222*** [0.0545]	-0.179*** [0.0593]	-0.154** [0.0593]	-0.174** [0.0687]	-0.168** [0.0676]
Asia/Mid east	-0.178*** [0.0466]	-0.204*** [0.0452]	-0.159*** [0.0444]	-0.155*** [0.0454]	-0.194*** [0.0533]	-0.182*** [0.0506]
Scandinavia dummy	-0.201*** [0.0583]	-0.189*** [0.0560]	-0.224*** [0.0585]	-0.198*** [0.0595]	-0.205*** [0.0667]	-0.222*** [0.0666]
_cons	-0.202 [0.164]	-0.219 [0.155]	-0.169 [0.166]	-0.445** [0.195]	-0.110 [0.188]	-0.0843 [0.189]
N	82	82	82	79	82	82
adj. R-sq	0.607	0.639	0.607	0.572	0.525	0.528
LI	84.70	88.17	84.70	80.45	73.71	73.95
Standard errors in brackets						
** p<0.10	** p<0.05	*** p<0.01				

Appendix 4: Measuring the Competitiveness of Multi-Party Systems and Testing its Effect on Parties' Programmatic Effort

Let us first introduce two measures of competitiveness in party systems and then revisit how competitiveness may impact politicians' investments in programmatic and/or clientelistic partisan efforts. The use of the measure will once again be illustrated with simple multivariate regression analysis.

Measuring Competitiveness

Competitiveness is high, when the elasticity between changes in voter support and changes in bargaining power of parties over government participation, and ultimately over government authoritative decisions, is very high (Kitschelt 2007b: 533-5). In a multi-party situation without hegemonic majority or close-to-majority party, what matters is the "identifiability" of alternative coalition possibilities (Strom 1984) before elections. In some countries, alternatives are identifiable, in others not. For external observers, in many more countries, particularly in the developing world and where democracies has been introduced recently, insufficient information about the mutual compatibility of parties in coalition building may make it unknown and unknowable whether voters and politicians can identify alternative government coalitions. In that situation, a simple second-best strategy may provide a first step to develop a measure of competitiveness:

1. The *largest two parties in a party system* are likely to be the focal points of alternative government coalitions, building on the logic of countervailing alliances that in a competitive situation smaller players always gang up on the largest player and try to counter-balance its influence.

2. If the *combined electoral share of the relatively largest two parties* is itself *large in absolute terms, as a share of the total votes cast*, then it is more likely that coalitions are identifiable. Moreover, one or both of these large players may have a chance to win an outright majority or form a majority with just one additional coalition partner needed.

3. If the *electoral gap between the largest two parties is small*, best measured by ex ante opinion poll, but in most circumstances reasonably approximated by ex post measures of the actual percentage of votes received by these two parties, then the electoral situation is more competitive.

As a consequence, the simple measure of competitiveness combines information about the total electoral support for the two largest parties with knowledge of the gap between these parties, measured by the actual results of the election.

There are two complications, however, that need to be taken into account in the competitiveness index.

4. If one of the two parties is close to or above 50% of the vote, as is rarely the case in truly competitive, open democratic competition, but invariably the case in *semi-authoritarian "managed" electoral democracies with a hegemonic party*, the bargaining power of the second party and that of all other parties falls to zero. We can incorporate this by a discontinuous penalty imposed on the competitiveness score of the largest party, as its electoral support approaches and exceeds 50%. Additionally, or alternatively, controlling for the openness of democratic competition by measuring the civil and political rights (Freedom House democracy scores) or the level playing field character of democratic contestation (Polity IV scores) should help to correct distortions in the meaning of competitiveness scores delivered by semi-democratic systems.

5. Whether a large gap between the leading party and its closest competitor is fatal for the latter's chances to form a viable governing coalition on its own depends on the *"volatility" of the vote and the effective size of the "electoral market" that is up for grabs by parties in each election*. What percentage of voters is available to change their electoral support in light of parties' campaign performance, when compared to their vote at the previous election? "Net volatility" is the sum of differences between all parties' votes in a current and a preceding election. *Higher net volatility is a tracer of a larger electoral market for votes and a smaller share of "loyal" voters who could never be persuaded to support a different party*. As a consequence, the competitiveness index has to compensate for electoral market size by boosting the score of situations in which the gap between the lead parties is rather large, but so is the electoral market of voters up for grabs based on the parties' campaign performance.

6. A further element of a potential competitiveness index not considered yet in the index is the size of the "stake" involved in party competition. The "stake" measure the downside risk for a party or a voter of being on the losing side in elections. It captures the distance between the status quo of current policy and authoritative resource allocation and the distributions announced by the major contenders in an election in the event that they will form the government. If the desired new authoritative allocations announced by the major parties diverge dramatically from the SQ, and in different directions for each of

the two parties, then the stakes of competition are greater than when the proposed changes are only marginal. As a first approximation of the stakes of electoral competition, one could calculate the general left-right polarization of party systems, i.e. the electoral support-weighted standard deviation of parties' mean left-right positions, as scored by respondents in expert surveys, or by the self-placement of parties' electoral constituencies in population surveys.

Consider now the simple index of competitiveness that takes only combined size of the two largest parties and gap in electoral support between them into account, yet not the problems of authoritarian hegemony or the opportunities of electoral market volatility. The competitiveness index p63 increases quite monotonously from situations where the combined share of the two largest parties is small and the gap between them is large (little competitiveness) to situations in which the combined two-party shares are large and the gap between them is small:

P63 Simple partisan competitiveness index		COMBINED SHARE OF LARGEST TWO PARTIES (P.6.1.)			
		<60%	60-69.99%	70-79.99%	80%+
DIFFERENCE IN THE SHARE OF THE LARGEST TWO PARTIES (P.6.2.)	> 10%	1	2	3	4
	5 – 10%	2	3	4	5
	< 5%	3	4	5	6

We then tinkered with the index to develop a revised score that takes partisan hegemony into account. Here the index of competitiveness falls off rapidly as one of the two parties crosses the 50-percent threshold and the other stays far behind. The numbers in brackets provide the two party electoral support breakdown when each score for the two parties is at the minimum of what is specified for a cell.

The competitiveness scores assigned to the different configurations are quite arbitrary, but tentative explorations show that further tinkering with them will produce only minor shifts in the rank ordering of real life cases employed in empirical analysis. It would be more rigorous, of course, to invent a non-discretionary algorithm of introducing a mathematical formula that could measure the impact of different configurations in the number and relative sizes of the largest two partisan contenders on political bargaining power and competitiveness in a country. But benefit of a more sophisticated measure may be marginal.

P63-rev Revised complex, non-linear partisan competitiveness index		COMBINED SHARE OF LARGEST TWO PARTIES (P.6.1.)			
		<60% 50	60-69.99% 65	70-79.99% 75	80%+ 90
DIFFERENCE IN THE SHARE OF THE LARGEST TWO PARTIES (P.6.2.)	>=25%	0 (37.5/12.5)	0 (45/20)	0 (50.0/25.0)	0 (57.5/32.5)
	20-24.99	1 (35/15)	2 (42.5/22.5)	1 (47.5/27.5)	0 (55/35)
	15-19.99%	1 (32.5/17.5)	2 (40/25)	2 (45/30)	0 (52.5/37.5)
	10-14.99%	1 (30/20)	2 (37.5/27.5)	3 (42.5/32.5)	3 (50/40)
	5 – 9.99%	2 (27.5/22.5)	3 (35/30)	4 (40/35)	6 (47.5/42.5)
	< 5%	3 (25/25)	4 (32.5/32.5)	6 (37.5/37.5)	8 (45/45)

In a similar vein, the competitiveness index might be improved by taking electoral volatility into account. Larger electoral market places give second-running major parties a greater chance of winning, even when the gap between lead party and second-placed party is rather large. Thus, in the competitiveness scoring matrix for p-63rev, the scores in cells indicating large combined shares of the two major parties, but substantial support differentials between them, should be higher in case of high volatility. Once again, making these changes may leave an imprint on only a few results, but only extreme assumptions yield score cards so different for the two indices that they generate entirely different results, when applied to do real theory-guided “work,” such as explaining parties’ programmatic or clientelistic investments in light of different levels of competitiveness and economic affluence.

Measuring the Impact of Competitiveness on Partisan Strategies: Direct or Contingent Effects?

The report sketched a linear and a contingency based theory of programmatic partisan politics and competitiveness. According to the linear theory, politicians invest more in partisan programs, as the competitiveness of the electoral market place intensifies. Alternatively, according to a contingency hypothesis, competitiveness has different impacts on parties’ programmatic strategies contingent upon the size of the electoral market for programmatic votes. In affluent countries, competitiveness boosts politicians’ programmatic investments, as the linear hypothesis surmises. In poor countries, increased competitiveness does not boost programmatic investments. If anything, it will increase parties’ clientelistic effort.

As in the statistical analyses of the association between political-economic features and parties’ programmatic effort, we develop an increasingly complex statistical model to test the effect of competitiveness. We successively add to the core variables of theoretical interest the (1) baseline structural controls (economic development, freedom and fairness of democracy/Polity IV, and experience with democratic procedures), (2) democratic institutions (electoral system features, executive-legislative relations) and (3) regional dummies to capture diffusion and unobserved historical mechanisms. In case of the competitiveness measure, we also want to exclude a simple “fragmentation” of the party system. While fragmentation, measured as the effective number of parties in an electoral system, is moderately negatively related to the simple competitiveness measure ($r = -.54$) and greater fragmentation indeed taps a situation of lesser competitiveness, it is too diffuse an indicator that does not capture the configuration of size and market share of parties in the way the crisper competitiveness measure does. Nevertheless, it is prudent to control for it.

As a matter of illustration, table 4-1 runs one of the most complicated (and therefore possibly most questionable) estimations with competitiveness as strategic variable. It examines the effect of variable competitiveness on the behavior of the largest two parties in each of the DALP countries. It is reasonable to assume that it is the largest parties that exhibit the impact of varying competitiveness on politicians’ investments in clientelistic and programmatic effort most sharply, whereas for small parties the competitive situation is mostly less intense. The estimation is a multi-level hierarchical model with some determinants of party strategies at the systemic level, others at the party level.

The core external constraint variables are included here. Economic development displays the predicted impact on programmatic effort (positive) and on clientelistic effort (negative). But for estimations of parties’ clientelistic effort, it is also necessary to include the curvilinear effect of economic affluence. Democratic experience (“stock”) has the expected impact on clientelism, but none at all on programmatic politics. And the level-playing field regime variable measuring the openness of contestation and extent of civil and political freedoms (Polity IV) has no direct impact on either programmatic or clientelistic effort. Party level determinants of programmatic and clientelistic effort are included, but they leave an impact only on clientelistic effort in the expected direction, yet not on programmatic effort.

For the sake of demonstration, the estimations also include a large number of theoretically interesting variables that turn out to be more or less irrelevant, especially all of the institutional variables. In some specifications, a theoretically relevant institutional variable is the interaction of electoral district size and ballot structure (M*BS) (see Carey and Shugart 1995). In the analysis of the current cross-national data set, it typically comes out as irrelevant (cf. Kitschelt 2011b) and was omitted here. There are two institutional variables that come into play, yet only in the analysis of clientelistic effort. Presidential systems tend to be more clientelistic, and that, indeed, turns out to be a rather robust effect resilient in many different model specifications. The (weak) effect of district size, however, is not. Note also that it goes in the opposite direction to party system fragmentation, two moderately highly correlated variables. It is therefore very difficult to interpret the measured effect here.

Examining the theoretically focal variables here, democratic competitiveness indeed shows relationship to partisan accountability strategies that is curvilinear to development. In poor countries, higher competitiveness appears to depress the programmatic effort of the largest parties. But in wealthier countries, programmatic effort clearly increases with competitiveness. The results for clientelism are not quite a mirror image of those for programmatic politics. The signs are in the theoretically

expected direction—with poor countries seeing greater clientelistic effort with competitiveness, but this effect weakening and reversing in the more affluent countries—but neither coefficient attains significance and their substantive size is minute.

In part, the clutter of many independent variables and controls that turn out to be irrelevant, both at the party and the country levels, weighs down and undermines the effect of the theoretically focal variables simply because of the loss of degrees of freedom. In principle, therefore, simpler models are to be preferred (Achen 2002). Indeed, in many national-level specifications and tests of the competitiveness argument, the interaction of affluence and competitiveness shows the predicted theoretical effect. Nevertheless, the brittleness of the statistical findings presented here is no chance event and besets the medium N/very large independent variables nature of the data. All that can be said at this point is that differential levels of political competitiveness may or may not have an impact on programmatic politics, with the weight of the argument based on empirical research concluded here tilting the balance slowly in favor of accepting the basic contingency hypothesis that affluence makes clientelism less attractive and programmatic politics more attractive particularly under conditions high inter-party competitiveness.

Appendix Table 4-1: Political Competitiveness, Programmatic and Clientelistic Partisan Efforts

	(1) cosalpo_4 Programmatic- comprehensive	(2) cosalpo_3econ Programmatic- economics only	(3) b15 Clientelistic- comprehensive
log GDP pc (ppp)	0.0702*** [0.0179]	0.0495** [0.0209]	11.38*** [3.177]
log GDP pc (ppp)^2			-0.719*** [0.186]
Democracy stock	0.0000657 [0.0000530]	0.0000585 [0.0000617]	-0.00355*** [0.00102]
Polity IV quality	-0.00495 [0.00399]	-0.00192 [0.00464]	0.108 [0.0701]
Party system fragmentation	0.00303 [0.0913]	0.00103 [0.106]	7.847*** [1.763]
P63_rev	-0.0867** [0.0425]	-0.101** [0.0494]	0.0347 [0.772]
P63_rev*lnGDPpcppp	0.0101** [0.00473]	0.0116** [0.00551]	-0.00228 [0.0859]
Vote share p31	-0.000275 [0.000460]	0.000265 [0.000545]	0.0817*** [0.0142]
Gov. status	0.0106 [0.00706]	0.00884 [0.00837]	0.469** [0.212]
Authoritarian Legacy Party	-0.0212 [0.0144]	-0.0261 [0.0170]	0.620 [0.427]
Presidential system (Pres)	-0.00373 [0.0290]	-0.0332 [0.0338]	0.951* [0.520]
Semi-presidential (SPres)	0.0467 [0.0360]	0.0211 [0.0419]	0.204 [0.622]

Electoral district size M (log)	0.00210 [0.00947]	0.00695 [0.0110]	-0.314* [0.167]
Ballot structure (BS)	0.00991 [0.0313]	0.0415 [0.0364]	-0.567 [0.551]
Pooling	-0.0245 [0.0163]	-0.0150 [0.0189]	0.341 [0.283]
Post-com	-0.00948 [0.00670]	0.00358 [0.00792]	-0.159 [0.183]
Lat Am	0.0152* [0.00803]	0.00314 [0.00949]	0.205 [0.218]
Sub-Saharan Africa	-0.0124*** [0.00474]	-0.00636 [0.00561]	0.136 [0.135]
Asia/Mid east	-0.00109 [0.00443]	-0.00265 [0.00524]	0.145 [0.122]
Scandinavia dummy	-0.205*** [0.0743]	-0.176** [0.0864]	
_cons	-0.274 [0.171]	-0.239 [0.200]	-40.55*** [13.59]
Variance components			
Country level	0.00823*** [0.00147]	0.0111*** [0.00199]	1.782** [0.470]
Residuals	0.00199*** [0.000312]	0.00280*** [0.000441]	2.076*** [0.324]
N	163	163	163
adj. R-sq			
ll	185.3	159.0	-331.4
Standard errors in brackets ="* p<0.10	** p<0.05	*** p<0.01"	

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