

Clientelism and Partisan Competition

CEU March 8, 2012

**Herbert Kitschelt
Duke University**

I. The Terms of Exchange Between Principals and Agents in Electoral Processes

Net of other linkage strategies, here focus on two mechanisms of exchange:

- (1) Votes in contingent exchange for targeted goods (from vote buying to long-term patronage relationships): clientelism.**
- (2) Votes in unconditional exchange for public policy (collective or club goods): programmatic linkage;**

Factor Analysis of Linkage Strategies

	Factor 1: Clientelistic versus Programmatic Effort	Factor2: Strong Political Experience versus Newcomers
Clientelistic effort (B15)	.84	.27
Programmatic effort (CoSalPo_4)	-.81	.21
Charismatic appeal (E1)	.51	.34
Party identification (E4)	.26	.70
Valence: Capacity to govern (E5)	-.05	.84
Eigenvalue	1.71	1.43
Proportion of total variance explained	34.1%	28.6%

Conditions for the Choice of Linkage Mechanisms?

- (1) Economic development and affluence**
- (2) Salient ethnic and cultural divides**
- (3) Property rights and economic governance structures, in interaction with state formation**
- (4) economic crises**
- (5) ...and patterns of partisan competition?**




Figure 1: The Relationship between per capita GDP and Partisan Investments in Clientelistic Efforts (linear relationship $r = -.69$)




Figure 2: The Variance of Parties' Programmatic Appeals from Poor to Affluent Countries




Figure 3: The Relationship between Programmatic and Clientelistic Partisan Linkage Effort (linear relationship $r = -.55$)

How Does Competitiveness of Party Systems Affect Linkage Strategies?

Notions of competitiveness:

- (1) *A level democratic playing field:* all competitors with the same opportunities to win; (relevant for discussion of “myth” 1 + 2)**

- (2) *Intensity of competition:* small changes in support make big difference in a party’s power over government and/or policy:**
 - (i) Margin of expected victory?**
 - (ii) Combined share of the two lead parties?**
 - (iii) Size of the electoral market? (volatility)**

→ Relevant for discussion of “myths” 3 and 4;

II. Role of Political Competitiveness?

Four Myths.

- **Myth 1: Clientelism is an affliction of (semi-) authoritarian polities. As competitiveness increases, clientelism gives way to programmatic competition.**
- **Myth 2: Even in a fully democratic context, clientelism thrives in monopolistic systems with *one dominant governing party*. Only one party can credibly offer clientelistic benefits.**
- **Myth 3: More generally, *more competitiveness* of party politics leads to *more programmatic* rather than clientelistic efforts by the contestants.**
- **Myth 4: If politicians offer targeted goods at all under conditions of intense contestation, *they are more likely to extend benefits to marginal supporters than to core loyalists*, as they have the latter in their pockets anyway.**

Myth 1: Clientelism is an affliction of (semi-) authoritarian polities

- **Many robustly democratic regimes (Polity IV) are also clientelistic: see Argentina, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Philippines;**
- **Some electoral regimes with an authoritarian bent are not particularly clientelistic;**
- **Whatever regime effect there is in a bivariate relationship, washes out with appropriate controls in multivariate regressions.... or even reverses: democracies with more clientelistic effort!**

Are Clientelistic Party Systems More Authoritarian? (B15)?

		Average Clientelism of the Largest Party				
		5 - 7.9	8 – 10.9	11.0 – 13.9	14.0 – 16.9	17.0 – 20.0
Polity IV Score of Demo- cratic Contes- tation	8-10	10 BEL, CND, DNK, FIN, GER, NLD, NOR, SWE, CHE, UK	9 AUS, AUT, FRA, IRE, LTV, NZD, POL, USA, URU	13 BTW, CHL, CZE, EST, GRE, ISR, KOR, PRT, SVK, SVN, ESP, SRB, ZAF	16 ALB, BGR, CRI, GUA, HRV, HUN, IND, IDO, ITA, JAM, LTU, MUS, MEX, NGA, PER, ROM	11 ARG, BOL, DOM, GHA, MKA, MNG, NIC, PRY, PAN, PHL, SEN,
	5-7				11 BEN, COL, GEO, NER, COL, HND, KEN, MOZ, NMB, RUS, UKR	5 LBN, MLI, TUR, VEN, ZMB
	2-4			1 THA	2 MYS, PAK	
	<2				2 BGD, MAR	3 AGO, EGY, TZA

Myth 2: Clientelism thrives in monopolistic systems: it privileges a dominant governing party

- **Can second, third and Nth parties gain *clientelistic reputation*? How can they do it?**
 - ➔ **Government alternation;**
 - ➔ **subnational and especially local government participation;**
- ***Product differentiation in linkage strategies (within and between parties)? ...but pays off only in certain situations (see below);***

Are the largest and the second largest party different in clientelistic effort (B15)?

		How much greater is the clientelistic effort of the <i>largest</i> compared to the <i>second</i> party?	
ONLY countries where clientelistic effort is above global average		Effort much greater (1 st party B15 > 15.4; 2 nd party B15 < 12.4)	Effort about the same or less (1 st party B15 > 12.4 and 2 nd party > 15.41; 1 st party and 2 nd party B15 > 15.4; 1 st party B15 > 15.4 and second party B15 = 12.4-15.4)
Polity IV Score of Demo- cratic Contes- tation	8-10	2 (22%) (MLA, SEN)	21 (61%) (ARG, BOL, BGR, BRA, DOM, GHA, GUA, HUN, IND, IDN, JAM, MEX, MKD, MUS, MNG, NIC, PAN, PRY, PHL, ROM, TWN)
	5-7	4 (45%) (HRV, GEO, NAM, RUS)	11 (30%) (BEN, COL, ECU, SLV, HND, KNY, LEB, MLI, NER, TUR, UKR)
	2-4	1 (11%) (MYS)	3 (8%) (NGA, VEN, ZMB)
	<2	2 (22%) (AGO, TZA)	1 (2%) (EGY)

When Do Parties Engage in *Product Differentiation* (“counter-balancing”) Rather than *Convergence* (“band-wagoning”) on a Single Mode of Linkages?

- **The question is a more complicated form of the search for spatial equilibrium party positions:**
 - ➔ **now equilibrium in two dimensions, clientelistic and programmatic effort;**
 - ➔ **more strategic decisions/variables at stake:**
 - (1) **How to *divide effort* between program and clientelism?**
 - (2) ***On whom to target* the clientelistic goods? (broad or narrow?)**
 - (3) **How should *programmatic stance* be identified, contingent upon the clientelistic effort and target size?**

From a Rational Choice to a Behavioral Formulation of the Problem: Clues about “Adequate,” not “Equilibrium” Choices of Strategies

- *Skeptical that formal equilibrium solutions with optimal player strategies could ever be found, especially with N of players > 2, entry of parties, etc.*
- *Formal theory may still be useful to show possibility theorems: Under certain circumstances, a mixed equilibrium in which parties invest in both clientelistic and programmatic effort is possible, but not compelling (Kselman 2010);*
- *Here instead: inductive hope that some simple behavioral shortcuts might offer empirical insights;*

- ***Dominance of the demand side:***
parties engage in “product differentiation” (clientelism and programmatic effort) only when the *expectation is high that there are voters with different “accountability tastes;”* → development;
- ***Supply side: ease of entry into party systems, fractionalization of party systems:***
→ product differentiation is more likely when entry into party competition is easier;
- ***Polity quality:***
more differentiation in full democracies, as entry is easier for outsiders with pure programmatic strategy.

Empirical Test: When will there be Party Systems with more Countervailing Strategies of Differentiation among Linkage Strategies?

- ***Dependent variables:*** (1) standard deviation of parties' clientelistic efforts (B15nsd);
- (2) standard deviation of parties' programmatic efforts (CoSalPo4.nsd)
- ***Independent variables:***
 - (1) per capita GDP at PPP;
 - (2) per capita GDP at PPP-squared;
 - (3) fractionalization (or chance: average electoral district size M);
 - (4) controls: Polity IV; democratic experience;

The Findings: When Product Differentiation of Linkage Strategies Across Parties in a Polity?

- Countries with intermediate development (curvilinear relationship to GDPpc)**
- District size/party system fragmentation;**
- Less democratic polities have marginally more product differentiation (ruling party more clientelistic)**

Myth 3: More competitiveness leads to more programmatic rather than clientelistic effort in the partisan contest.

- *What is “Competitiveness” here?*
 - ➔ Parties make a *particularly intense effort to win* because the stakes of small voter movements are high; how to measure in multi-party systems?
 - ➔ Empirical indicator: interaction effect of
 - (1) *margin of vote difference between the largest and the second largest party* (as anchors of alternative coalitions);
 - (2) *combined share of largest two parties* in the electoral contest (ease of coalition formation);

Constructing the Indicator of Competitiveness

		COMBINED SHARE OF LARGEST TWO PARTIES			
		<60%	60-69.99 %	70-79.99 %	80%+
DIFFERENCE IN THE SHARE OF THE LARGEST TWO PARTIES	> 10%	1	2 or 3, if Volatility >20%	3, or 4 (if vol >10%) or 5 (if vol >20%)	4, or 5, if Volatility >20%
	5 – 10%	2 or 3, if Volatility >20%	3, or 4 (if vol >10%), or 5 (if vol >20%)	4, or 5, if Volatility >20%	5
	< 5%	3, or 4 (if vol >10%), or 5 (if vol >20%)	4, or 5, if Volatility >20%	5	6

Some further considerations in constructing an indicator of competitiveness

- Levels of *voter volatility* (“availability” of party switchers) may influence competitiveness (contingent upon closeness and vote share of the largest parties)
- The *stakes of competition* also depend on the *polarization of parties* (ideal points of alternative coalitions/program or alternative target beneficiaries/clientelism) → not considered here;
- Competitiveness and *fragmentation of party systems*: $r = -.54$;
- A few *(semi-)authoritarian systems* look quite competitive (large share of ruling party) → adjust index for large gaps between first and second party!!

Theoretical Foundations of Myth 3: More Competitiveness, more Programmatic Effort

- *Micrologic of the Dominant Argument:*
 - (1) Incentive to mobilize marginal voters when high competitiveness;
 - (2) Marginal voters cannot be monitored easily → clientelistic targeting wasteful and costly, extend programmatic effort that is less costly for parties ex ante;

Theoretical Alternatives to Myth 3

- *Consider the demand side:* How many voters are available for programmatic appeals?
- *Mobilizational target:* Is it more expensive to mobilize a core voter to turn out or a marginal voter to change her mind? (Cox; Dixit/Londregan)

Alternative Predictions (Kitschelt/Wilkinson 2007):

- *Interaction of Development and Linkage Choice under High Competitiveness:* More clientelistic effort in poor countries;

Empirical Specification of the Competitiveness Propositions

- *Dependent variable:* A party's clientelistic effort (B15) (N = 506)
- *Independent Variables:*
 - (1) $\ln \text{GDPpc}$ at PPP;
 - (2) $\ln \text{GDPpc}$ at PPP squared;
 - (3) competitiveness (different formulations);
 - (4) competitiveness * $\ln \text{GDPpc}$ at PPP;
 - (5) party system fractionalization;
 - (6) systemic and party level controls;

Competitiveness and Clientelistic Effort: Empirical Results


- Net of other effects, clientelistic effort increases with *competitiveness and poverty of the country (interaction effect)*;
- Party fractionalization also increases clientelistic effort; → see Myth 4
- Fairer democracy (higher Polity IV) → *more* clientelistic effort!
- *Usual controls work*: more clientelism curvilinear to GDPpc, greater in larger parties and parties in government;

Myth 4: Politicians are more likely to extend benefits to *marginal supporters than to core loyalists*, as they have the latter in their pockets anyway

- **Formal theory exploration (Cox; Dixit and Londregan, Nichter ...);**
- **Empirical exploration (Calvo and Murillo; Stokes; Nichter);**
- **Opinion poll among intelligent observers: Where do parties put their effort?**

Survey result: Where do politicians place their effort?

- **Experts indicate targeting practice for each party;**
- **Compute averages for each party;**
- **Then use these as dependent variables:**
What characterizes parties earmarked by experts as targeting core voters (marginal voters) more so than other parties do?



Targeting of Benefits to Loyalist, Strategic, or Both Kinds of Voters. The aggregate poll results
 (average % of experts/party who indicate that party uses the technique; N=506)

What makes parties appeal to loyalists?

- *Restrict the analysis to parties that make a modicum of clientelistic effort (b15) → expert responses essentially uninformative for cases where there is little clientelistic effort;*
- *Capture network transaction costs of mobilizing voters: religious and ethnic networks;*
- *Capture demand characteristics of electoral constituencies: rural? Poor?*
- *Capture capabilities of the parties: size? government status?*

Targeting Loyalists: preliminary results

Independent variables	Dependent variable: Party's Propensity to Target Loyalists	
1. Targeting rural voters	-2.079**	[0.981]
2. Targeting the poor	1.445***	[0.406]
3. ties to religious associations	0.00798	[0.412]
4. Ties to ethnic associations	0.895***	[0.220]
5. control: electoral size of party	-0.0378***	[0.0138]
6. control: party's government status	0.0216	[0.0174]
7. Competitiveness of elections (p. 63)	0.282***	[0.0907]
constant	1.972**	[0.928]
observations	N = 346	

Analyzing Competitiveness. Instead of Conclusions

- **Conventional Expectations about the consequences of competition and competitiveness tested and often found wanting;**
- **Fragility of the “positive” results both in terms of**
 - ➔ **theory: often inductive-behavioral trial and error;**
 - ➔ ***empirical analysis*: indicator construction? Single historical snap-shot?**

Limited Differentiation of Linkage Strategies between Largest Parties and Levels of Competitiveness

CONFIGURATIONS OF PARTY COMPETITION: CLIENTELISTIC EFFORT

P.63		#1 LARGEST PARTY: CLIENTELISTIC EFFORT			
		B15 \leq 9.485 Very low (1)	B15 >9.485 & B15 \leq 12.445 Low (2)	B15 >12.445 & B15 <15.405 High (3)	B15 \geq 15.405 Very high (4)
#2 SECOND LARGEST PARTY: CLIENTE- LISTIC EFFORT	B15 \geq 15.405 Very high (4)	Cell 1 N: 0 Mean: NA	Cell 2 N: 1 Mean: 3.00 Peru: 3	Cell 3 N: 6 Mean: 3.50 Bolivia: 4 Brazil: 3 Colombia: 3 El Salvador: 6 Mexico: 1 Romania: 4	Cell 4 N: 18 Mean: 2.72 Bulgaria: 1 Dominican R.: 3 Ecuador: 3 Ghana: 6 Guatemala: 2 Honduras: 5 India: 2 Indonesia: 2 Jamaica: 6 Kenya: 2 Lebanon: 2 Mali: 1 Mauritius: 3 Mongolia: 4 Niger: 1 Panama: 1 Paraguay: 4 Philippines: 1
	B15 >12.445 & B15 <15.405 High (3)	Cell 5 N: 0 Mean: NA	Cell 6 N: 5 Mean: 3.20 Estonia: 3 Chile: 3 Israel: 3 Morocco: 3 Uruguay: 4	Cell 7 N: 8 Mean: 3.63 Albania: 6 Bangladesh: 4 Greece: 5 Lithuania: 2 Pakistan: 2 Portugal: 3 Thailand: 5 Serbia: 2	Cell 8 N: 12 Mean: 2.75 Argentina: 1 Benin: 2 Egypt: 4 Hungary: 4 Macedonia: 2 Nicaragua: 2 Nigeria: 4 Taiwan: 4 Turkey: 2 Ukraine: 4 Venezuela: 2 Zambia: 2
	B15 >9.485 & B15 \leq 12.445 Low (2)	Cell 9 N: 1 Mean: 3.00 Belgium: 3	Cell 10 N: 9 Mean: 3.44 Austria: 3 Czech R.: 4 France: 2 Latvia: 3 Poland: 4 Slovakia: 1 Slovenia: 3 Spain: 6 USA: 5	Cell 11 N: 4 Mean: 3.50 Italy: 5 Japan: 3 South Korea: 2 Mozambique: 4	Cell 12 N: 4 Mean: 3.50 Angola: 4 Croatia: 3 Senegal: 3 Tanzania: 4
	B15 \leq 9.485 Very low (1)	Cell 13 N: 10 Mean: 2.90 Australia: 6 Canada: 2 Denmark: 3 Finland: 3 Germany: 3 Netherlands: 2 Norway: 1 Sweden: 3 Switzerland: 2 UK: 4	Cell 14 N: 2 Mean: 2.50 Ireland: 2 New Zealand: 3	Cell 15 N: 3 Mean: 3.00 Botswana: 3 Costa Rica: 2 South Africa: 4	Cell 16 N: 5 Mean: 2.60 Georgia: 3 Malaysia: 1 Moldova: 2 Namibia: 4 Russia: 3

Instead of a conclusion

- **Study of linkage mechanisms suggests big substantive agenda in comparative politics;**
- **Strategic location at the interface between party competition and political economy, even though the latter may not have figured prominently in this talk;**
- **Democratic Accountability project as start, but need for more (time series!) and better, more detailed data;**