

Contingent Exchange and Contractual Opportunism: Making Clientelistic Relationships Work*

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Abstract

Clientelistic politics is often seen as an uncertain transaction: a vote-seller is unable to insure that a vote-buyer will keep his side of the contract. Therefore, politicians are expected to exert effort in monitoring votes and thereby assuring voters' compliance. While vote-monitoring is a key ingredient in theories of patronage politics, there is no systematic empirical analysis of this issue. We attempt to contribute to this literature on two fronts. First, we present a novel cross-national dataset on the variety of vote-monitoring methods. Second, using multivariate response models, we analyze the characteristics of parties that induce them to choose a particular profile of monitoring. We find that parties that have local intermediaries and ethnic, religious, or professional networks are both more clientelistic and exert more effort on vote-monitoring. Moreover, parties that use consumer goods to buy votes and parties that can sanction voters for renegeing on their promises use direct methods of vote-monitoring (e.g., revolving ballot, cell-phone cameras) while parties which buy votes by offering preferential social policy use turnout-monitoring. Parties that use turnout-monitoring are the most successful in finding out how voters voted but, importantly, the only monitoring method that has a direct effect on efficiency of clientelism is direct monitoring. This finding suggests that direct vote-monitoring can be used not as much to find out voting decisions but to threaten and coerce voters with sanctions.

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1 Introduction

Ability of politicians to monitor voting decisions of citizens lies at the heart of theories of clientelistic politics. Why would a patron provide targeted benefits to voters if he is not able to enforce them to vote in a particular way? Under non-secret ballot, such enforcement can be conducted easily, as has been well documented (O’gorman, 1989). Even when voting is secret but conducted not with the use of an Australian ballot (a secret ballot printed by the government) but with the use of a party ballot (a ballot printed by a party), such enforcement is easily conducted as has been well understood in the literature (Stokes, 2005). However, when the Australian ballot is used in elections, the enforcement of the patronage contract is less obvious. In such cases, one would reasonably expect that parties engaging in *quid pro quo* exchange of votes for tangible and discrete benefits must have some inventive ways to find out whether voters executed their promises.

What methods do parties use to monitor votes? The literature on this topic is very sparse. One can only find indirect discussion of monitoring practices in papers that talk about a wider phenomenon of clientelism and vote-buying (Blaydes, 2006; Schaffer, 2005). A good review of the small empirical case study literature on vote-buying and vote-monitoring can be found in (Schaffer and Schedler, 2007). A meticulous case study of strong monitoring efforts with limited success in Taiwan was conducted (Wang and Kurzman, 2007). Such studies will typically mention some of the methods that politicians use to monitor votes in a particular country or a set of countries. However, since such studies are selective in both their sources and geographic scope, they do not provide enough leverage for systematic understanding of the choice of monitoring methods and their effectiveness in clientelistic politics.

In this paper, we set for ourselves two goals. First, we present a novel cross-national dataset on vote-monitoring methods. The data were collected as part of the global expert survey the Democratic Accountability Project and they present the first systematic attempt to document the cross-national variation in vote-monitoring methods. Second, using these data we attempt to answer two questions: When do parties engage in vote-monitoring and what methods do they choose? How do different monitoring methods contribute to the effectiveness of the clientelistic politics?




Figure 1: Clientelism score (B15) versus composite monitoring effort based on the answers to C2. The darker the circle, the more successful is the party in its clientelistic strategy as measured by B11. The size of the circle indicates the size of the party in terms of its vote-share at the last election during the time of the survey. There is no clear pattern that parties that monitor more are more effective in their patronage politics.

Intuitively, one would expect that vote-monitoring should go strongly hand in hand with clientelism and that the effectiveness of clientelism crucially depends on the degree to which parties are able to enforce the patronage contracts. We use here a measure of effort politicians are making to supply targeted goods to electoral constituencies. It is a summary index based on a battery of questions in the Democratic Accountability expert survey (variable B15). For construction of the index, see the descriptive account in Herbert Kitschelt, *Cleintelistic Linkage Strategies* (paper sketch for the workshop). Figure 1 shows the relationship between the parties' degree of clientelism (as measured by variable B15) and the degree of monitoring effort (question C3).

It is certainly the case that more clientelistic parties, on average, engage in a greater degree of monitoring. Yet, more clientelistic parties also vary greatly in terms of how much effort they spend on monitoring. That is, parties that are not clientelistic do not monitor votes but parties that are clientelistic range from those that spend no effort on vote-monitoring to those that spend massive efforts. Our first goal is to understand this variation.

Second, in Figure 1 the darkness of the circles depicts the success of party’s clientelism (question B11) and the size of the circles depicts their vote-shares in the last national elections around the time of the survey. Question B11 asked experts to assess how effective political parties are in their efforts to mobilize voters by targeted benefits. There is no clear pattern that parties which monitor more are also more successful either in terms of the efficiency of their patronage or in terms of their vote-shares. Our second goal is therefore to understand how much monitoring contributes to the success of clientelism. The ultimate question, of course, is how much monitoring contributes to parties’ vote-shares. However, this question poses major methodological challenges due to endogeneity of clientelism to the size of parties; thus, we do not study this question here.

2 Variety of Monitoring Methods

What is the universe of methods of monitoring? In the expert survey, we asked experts an open-ended question C3 about such methods. After priming experts with examples of monitoring (such as parties placing officials outside the voting station), the survey asks experts to report common practices used by parties to determine how an individual or group of citizens cast their vote.

The main reason the question was open-ended is that we could not possibly know all the means that inventive political entrepreneurs have designed to monitor voting. Such open-ended approach has obvious disadvantages. Firstly, not many experts are willing to spend their time writing in or typing up the answers. Therefore, it is not surprising that experts did not bother answering the question (66% of answers were missing values). The missing values can be interpreted in two ways: either a party at hand does not monitor votes or the party monitors votes but the expert did not know what exact methods it uses or was simply too lazy to write in the answers. We have analyzed the patterns in data missingness to make sure that the former is more likely to be the reason for the missing values than the latter.

In particular, the question C1 in the survey asked whether parties engaged in vote-monitoring and, if so, how successful they were. The survey’s first question on monitoring simply asked experts to indicate how successful parties are at getting information about the voting conduct of specific




Figure 2: Missingness pattern in the open-ended question C3.

individuals or small groups of citizens, if they try to check. The survey avoided the somewhat loaded technical notion of monitoring. It gives respondents three response categories (1-3) to indicate gradations of monitoring success, if they attribute to parties efforts to monitor at all (not at all/somewhat/very successful), another response category (4) to indicate that parties do not try to find out how individuals voted, a dont know category, and, of course, the option not to respond to the survey question. We then used the answers to question C1 to try to predict missingness in question C3. Indeed, if an expert indicated that party does not engage in monitoring in question C1, then he was about 50% more likely to leave the question C3 unanswered.

We have also analyzed the missingness pattern from another perspective. We first lumped the missing values in the question C1 with the response category 4. Non-responses almost certainly indicate that experts believe parties did not try to find out how individuals voted, but we cannot be sure. Nevertheless, we interpret non-response as equivalent to response category 4. To err on the conservative side, we also lumped dont knows into the category of dont tries with the rationale

that if parties made energetic efforts to try, our experts would almost certainly have had some informational exposure to such efforts.

We then looked at the interdependence at the party-level between the number of answers per party that was missing in question C3 and the number of NA or category 4 answers for question C1. Is it the case that parties for which experts give many NA's in the C3 question are also more likely to get many NA's in question C1 and many experts specifying in the question C1 that the party did not engage in monitoring? Figure ?? gives a very clear picture: there is very strong relationship between party getting a score 4 (that is, it does not monitor votes) or NA score with the NA score in question C3. This gives more credence to the belief that NA's in the open-ended C3 question actually signify the absence of monitoring.

The second challenge with the open-ended questions is that experts' answers are semantic statements, which have to be coded if we want to analyze them systematically. We believe that the challenges associated with the coding were outweighed by the fact that experts could provide answers without being constrained by our a priori categories. This way we could learn about many means of vote monitoring we were not even been aware of.

The coding scheme that we used to translate expert answers into numbers is given at the end of this paper in Table 7. We chose an inductive approach by coupling together methods of monitoring that resemble each other in some specified manner. For example, an expert would write that "party has agents in the polling station" or that "they have party people monitoring voters". We would include these and similar answers under category 'Presence at the voting place'.

Similarly, if an expert specifies, for example, that 'It all depends on what the Rabbi order them to do (or vote)' or "meetings with defined targets from civil society", we put the answers under same one category 'Local organizations and agents'. The monitoring method applied in this category is dependent on the existence of formal (or informal) organizations that either find out how particular individuals voted after the vote or induce certain voting behavior ex ante. Unfortunately, experts did not specify what precise methods community leaders use to control voting behavior but we presume that often the symbolism of the organizational authority does the work. For instance, in Senegal and Nigeria voters are made to swear on the Koran that they voted (or will vote) for a

certain party.

What are the methods of vote monitoring and how are they distributed? Empirical distribution of the monitoring methods based on our coding scheme is presented in Figure 3. We see that except surveying (which we don't consider to be a monitoring tool), presence in polling stations and information acquired via formal and informal organizations and networks are the most prevalent types of monitoring. Interestingly, the use of cell-phones to photograph ballots appears also to be a rather prevalent technique.

Some of the categories in the coding scheme do not appear to be associated with monitoring individual voting decisions the way it is understood in the literature. This particularly applies to category 1 'Surveys, exit polls, etc.' Unless a survey or an exit poll is done on a particularly small population, one can hardly make inferences about individual (or even group behavior) based on such information. In only one instance an expert indicated that opinion surveys are conducted by fake pollsters whose purpose is not to sample population but learn about the past behavior of particular respondents. Otherwise, we assumed from the answers that experts meant typical sociological surveys. This category is the most prevalent in the survey. Yet, we do not include it in our further analysis.

The use of state resources (category 13) in monitoring and control efforts can also take variable forms. For example, in Russia and Ukraine, experts reported that state educational institutions press students to vote in a certain way. The same applies to factories, prisons, and even hospitals where patients are offered better treatment in return for voting for a particular party or candidate. It appears that voting in such facilities breaches the principle of secret ballot as election laws cannot be fully enforced in every such instance. Somewhat similarly, such open voting is reported to occur when voting takes place in churches (e.g., in Poland).

Sometimes the ballot structure provide means to learn voters' choices. For example, in Latvia, Senegal, and Niger, experts reported about the following practice: voters bring back from the voting booth 'unused' party lists (category 15). This practice must be very specific to the voting system where voters receive a batch of party lists and then have to choose individuals from those lists. Naturally, if the voter must bring back the lists that she did not use, it is easy to infer which list




Figure 3: Frequencies of monitoring methods.

was used. This practice, however, should not be confused with the revolving ballot where voters bring back to unused ballots to the patron’s ‘captains’ in charge of delivering votes. Instead, these are not the ballots but party lists that voters return to the administrators of the elections.

The data on vote-monitoring show a great variety of methods employed by parties around the world. This high number of categories is useful when analyzing the empirical distribution of monitoring practices but it becomes prohibitively complex once we want to related these categories to other variables because for many categories there are very few answers (that is, some categories are mentioned very rarely). Depending on the purpose of research one can (and perhaps should) collapse the given categories into some more general ones. For example, on can distinguish three types of monitoring among the specified methods:

- *Abstention / Turnout monitoring*: this first set of monitoring mechanisms is directed not at learning the choices of the voters per se but learning whether the citizens turned up to vote. For instance, Cox and Kousser (1981) document how clientelistic politicians paid their

opponents' voters to stay home during the elections. Similarly, Nichter (2008) documents how politicians pay voters to turn up and vote.

- *Indirect monitoring*: this set of methods encompasses practices that provide only indirect information about individual voters through communication in local organizations, communities, and networks. The difference from turnout monitoring is that indirect monitoring is intentionally meant to determine voting choices, not merely the decision to turn up to a voting station. Naturally, the line between these two methods is somewhat blurry.

There is a lot of uncertainty associated with indirect monitoring. For example, a local priest or a union leader might have a symbolic power over decisions of voters but this control is not complete. Voters are expected to follow the orders of their authorities but they might choose not to do that. Similarly, party agents that infiltrate local communities may only receive noisy information about how exactly a particular individual voted.

To be sure, only few experts specified turnout monitoring as a practice in use (category 14). However, the answers in the category 2 (Presence in voting stations) did not specify how, for instance, presence of party members in the voting stations allow them to learn voters' decisions. We presumed that presence in voting stations simply means turn out monitoring. Future research could analyze the robustness of our findings to this classification.

- *Direct monitoring*: such methods include photographing the ballot with a cellphone, stealing voter's identity, or using some sophisticated mechanism of group voting like the 'revolving ballot'. Direct control methods are in this respect nearly noiseless. There is no uncertainty about how a particular individual voted if his vote is tracked via photographing the ballot, stealing his identity or using pre-marked ballots as well using party ballots. Most of these methods are perhaps illegal and require a lot organization capacity and therefore it is not surprising they are not frequent.




Figure 4: The diagram of a possible association between the variables.

3 Clientelistic Effort, Organizational Capabilities, and Monitoring

What explains the variation in the monitoring methods that parties use? We will observe evidence that parties monitor voters only, if they have both motive and opportunity. As evidence for parties being motivated, let us take their effort to provide targeted benefits to specific individuals and small groups of voters (B15). Motives and capabilities interact. As Kitschelt and Kselman elaborate in their paper, the presence of network capabilities is an important correlate of clientelistic effort: Where parties have close ties to local notables (question a3), they are more likely to engage in clientelistic effort. We will now extend this argument to include the types and degrees of monitoring voters. Do parties clientelistic efforts and organizational capabilities also translate into specific monitoring activities? And do these activities have the desired consequences? Figure 3 provides a schematic rendering of our research logic.

In the short run, the sunk costs of parties organizational and network capabilities may be fixed and exogenous to their clientelistic efforts and monitoring activities. In this sense, we can presume a causal structure in our data that runs from organizational endowments to patronage effort and on to monitoring strategies. In the longer run, of course, all three elements may be endogenous to each other. Parties may build local organizations and social networks to service clientelistic targeting efforts. The exigencies of routinized monitoring techniques may play a critical role informing party leaders just how such rebuilding of organizational infrastructure should proceed. As in the broader analysis of partisan organizational design and clientelistic linkage efforts (Kitschelt and Kselman 2011), however, what is crucial for us here is not to determine an ultimate exogenous causal anchor of clientelistic effectiveness, but a pattern of complementarities among organizational features, clientelistic linkage strategies, and the requisite monitoring and sanctioning activities.

Parties that have strong network of intermediaries who keep contacts with local residents and who can distribute benefits should be more likely to engage in patronage and monitoring of votes. Also, these parties should be more able to sanction voters for renegeing on their promises. Sanctions could be both material (e.g., withdrawing a payment) or social (e.g., public shaming). Further, the degree of monitoring and the types of monitoring that parties use could also be related both with their organizational characteristics and the type of clientelism they engage in. These relationships are depicted in the second level of the Figure 4

Further, each type of monitoring might have differential effect on the degree of success with which politicians find out how voters vote and the efficiency of party's clientelistic strategy. Importantly, monitoring can affect the success of party's patronage politics both directly and indirectly. The indirect effect works through revealing information about the decision of voters. The direct effect of monitoring can work through threat and coercion. Here, it is not so important how many votes have been monitored. The very threat that a particular voter could be monitored by direct means of monitoring creates an incentives for voters to hold their promises.

	B15	C2	C4
	1.187 (0.196)	0.072 (0.159)	0.684 (0.223)
a3	0.54 (0.085)	0.215 (0.073)	0.514 (0.103)
d.network	0.146 (0.088)	0.278 (0.06)	0.126 (0.088)

Table 1: Association between organizational capacity (A3), distributive networks (B10) and three outcomes: the clientelism score (B15), monitoring effort (C3 composite), and the sanctioning capacity (C4). Seemingly unrelated regressions with country-level random intercepts. Standard errors in the parentheses.

3.1 The Role of Party Organization

First, let us start with the analysis of how parties’ organizational capacity and distributive networks affect (a) the degree of clientelism, (2) the degree of monitoring, and (3) the sanctioning capability. The degree of monitoring is measured as a party-average of the answers to question E3 that asked experts to specify how much effort a party spends on attracting voters with patronage politics. Degree of monitoring is party-average to the open ended question C2, and sanctioning capacity is taken from the question C4, which asked if parties can assess sanctions for voters who did not vote the way they promised to do.

The two independent variables are: how extensive are party’s networks of local intermediaries who keep up the contacts with local residents (A3) and how much does a party rely on local agents to distribute its goods (B10). The latter question asked experts whether parties rely on (1) unions, (2) ethnic, (3) religious organizations, (4) local urban or rural neighborhood associations, business associations (5), and women organizations (6). The final score we use is the sum across these six categories, meaning that a party with a high score is entrenched in multiple distributive networks and, admittedly, has good information about the preferences and the behavior of voters.

Results are presented in Table 2. Both organizational variables are positively associated with all three outcomes. As we know from the Kitschelt and Kselman (2011) paper, the result for clientelistic effort is robust to many different re-specifications and controls. There appears to be a fundamental relation between a party’s social network ties and its choice of clientelistic linkage strategies.

3.2 Choosing to Monitor

The discussion clientelistic politics without monitoring is typically framed as a puzzle: Why would politicians engage in clientelism if they cannot observe whether voters keep their commitments? (Stokes, 2005; Nichter, 2008). How puzzling is this question depends on one's model of politics. It is not difficult to envision a model of politics where the ability to monitor votes is not a necessary condition for a successful targeted exchange. We can think of at least two sets of conditions where politicians can expect voters to respond to the patronage in a desirable manner even without verification of their voting decisions:

- One condition where patronage politics can easily survive without vote monitoring is when the voters that receive targeted benefits do not expect an alternative party to be able or willing to provide the benefits in the event of victory. For example, Medina (2007) analyzes clientelistic politics when a patron has a monopoly over the provision of targeted benefits. In such case, those voters who receive discrete benefits from a monopolistic patron have a vested interest that the patron wins for otherwise benefits may be discontinued.

In fact, one does not even need a full monopoly for this kind of mechanism to work. At a more basic level, what matters is the credibility of parties commitments to deliver clientelistic benefits. These may depend on a variety of factors. Parties that are in government office obviously have the greatest chance to demonstrate their current credibility by delivering to their electoral constituencies. But opposition parties may have been in office before and could demonstrate that same capacity. Or they are in office in subnational governments that also rely on clientelistic accountability mechanisms such that governing parties pay off their supporters with targeted, contingent benefits.

Furthermore, both the credibility of government and opposition parties may depend on their level of organizational extensiveness and institutionalization, as evidenced by their participation in the electoral game over many rounds. Long-term participation in party competition affects the time horizon of politicians and the credibility of parties commitments. The more parties have demonstrated through their behavior in numerous rounds of electoral competition

that they can act on their commitments, the more credibility their current forward looking commitments will have in the eyes of the voters. Conversely, anticipating the value and effects of credibility, politicians are more likely to honor commitments and assess the electoral payoffs of party competition as an iterative game in which short term gains to be won through opportunistic non-compliance with commitments may be sacrificed in order to maintain credibility in the long run.

Empirically, while office incumbency may give parties a smaller or larger credibility premium over competitors, voters may not oblige to support them, as long as they receive their targeted benefit without the party having a possibility for monitoring and sanctioning. If clientelistic benefits are a sure thing, a free-rider logic might apply: Since their individual vote cannot make the difference between the clientelistic party's winning or losing, voters may want to stay home or vote for another party on purely expressive purposes.

- Another possibility of clientelism without vote monitoring arises when the supply side of clientelistic parties is (credibly) competitive, none of the parties can monitor, but the demand side of voters is uniformly asking for clientelistic benefits. Then all parties will offer clientelistic benefits and the voters may choose randomly among the candidates that make clientelistic bids, yet not those that compete in a non-clientelistic fashion. Only participation in the clientelistic game gives politicians any chance of winning office. Even in a situation of uniform demand for clientelism, however, if one of the parties can monitor, while the others cannot, it may be able to gain more than a random share of votes by concentrating its resources on targeting a smaller set of voters, because these voters then have a higher probability of voting for the party, thus offsetting costs of monitoring.

Overall, while certain supply-side (monopoly of credible clientelistic commitment) or demand side conditions (uniformity of clientelistic voter demand), in conjunction with inability of all parties to monitor, may make parties engage in clientelistic effort even without monitoring, under most circumstances the lack of such capabilities will lead parties to dissipate effort on voters who ultimately defect from the party.

Indeed, there is evidence that vast amount of voters do not comply with their promise to vote for a candidate in exchange for material benefits. Wang and Kurzman (2007) document that, in Taiwan, during 1993 elections about 45% of voters who sold their votes to the Kuomintang party ended up not voting for its candidate. The very fact that politicians engage in clientelism even in the clear absence of compliance on behalf of voters, suggests that a simple scheme on which the puzzle of clientelism without monitoring is based, is somewhat wanting.

- It is sufficient to determine whether a voter turned up to vote. This mechanism has been suggested by (Cox and Kousser, 1981) who analyzed patronage politics in the state of New York after introduction of secret ballot finding that politicians were actually paying voters – supporters of their opponents – to stay home. Later, Nichter (2008) argued for a similar mechanism of turnout-buying: patrons pay their supporters to turn up to vote, which in turn mobilizes their passive supporters to turn up too.

This mechanism clearly requires that voters have easily identifiable political preferences. In the case of abstention-buying, one has to be sure that the voter in question is *not* your supporter. In the case of turnout-buying, one has to be sure that the voter to whom the patron pays *is* his supporter. In fact, in Nichter (2008), this requirement is even stronger: (a) politician has to be able to identify his active supporters *and* (b) citizens (“passive supporters”) ought to be able to determine political identities of those who turn up to vote. One could hypothesize that that this mechanism should be prominent in a political environment where voters have strong and easily identifiable identities.

For example, parties that rely on ethnic, religious or professional networks might expect that their supporters will vote for them though it may not be easy to have them turn up to vote. A voter who belongs to a certain social network (professional, ethnic etc.) is a voter whose political preferences are less ambiguous compared to a voter who does not belong to such network. Consequently, political parties that rely on such networks are in a better position to identify their supporters and opponents.

	Model 1	Model 2
(Intercept)	0.327 (0.047)	0.137 (0.06)
Organization (A3)	0.114 (0.017)	0.09 (0.018)
Network (B10)	0.028 (0.011)	0.015 (0.011)
Sanctioning (C4)	0.257 (0.037)	0.162 (0.041)
Clientelism (B15)	.	0.017 (0.003)

Table 2: Predicting the overall monitoring effort. Linear model with country-level random intercepts. Standard errors in parentheses.

If monitoring does make a difference in most instances of clientelistic effort, let us now explore two questions. First, what accounts for the type of monitoring that politicians might choose to screen the compliance of their targeted voters? Second, is there an association between the types of goods that parties provide and the types of monitoring that they choose? We employ the three types of monitoring—turnout, indirect monitoring, and direct monitoring—as our dependent variables and try to predict them from the organizational capabilities of political parties, and the effort parties make in providing clientelistic linkage.

To study the first question, we use the sum score for the C3 question (that is, the overall monitoring effort across all three types of monitoring) and regress it on four covariates: local party intermediaries (A3), distributive networks (B10), sanctioning capacity (C4), and degree of clientelism (B15). Results are reported in Table 2. The existence of local intermediaries and sanctioning capacity increases the overall monitoring effort, while the distributive networks cease having statistically significant effect once we control for the degree of clientelism in the second model.

This analysis has a somewhat limited reach since different types of monitoring can be affected differently by the covariates. The second analysis overcomes this problem.

The choice of the three monitoring methods is neither mutually exclusive (preventing multinomial logit/probit analysis) nor independent (meaning that it is inappropriate to estimate them in three separate models). Therefore, we fit a multivariate response model in the framework of seemingly unrelated regressions (Zellner, 1962), which was estimated in the Bayesian framework. This type of model estimates the effects of covariates on three type of monitoring while taking into

	Turnout	Indirect	Direct
Intercept	0.19 (0.33)	0.012 (0.25)	-1.094 (0.331)
Organization (A3)	0.364 (0.095)	0.194 (0.078)	0.155 (0.108)
Network (B10)	0.044 (0.063)	0.177 (0.043)	0.045 (0.061)
Sanctioning (C4)	0.044 (0.222)	0.004 (0.183)	0.572 (0.245)
Clientelism (B15)	0.065 (0.019)	0.002 (0.015)	0.092 (0.019)

Table 3: Choice of monitoring methods. Results from the SUR model with country-level random intercepts.

account potential correlations between these three outcomes of interest. Ignoring this interdependence among the response variables (that is, fitting separate regressions for each response variable) leads to potentially biased and inefficient inference. Formally, let

$$(z_{ij1}, z_{ij2}, z_{ij3})' \sim \mathcal{N}([\mu_{ij1}, \mu_{ij2}, \mu_{ij3}]', \Sigma) \quad (1)$$

$$\mu_{ijk} = \alpha_{jk} + \mathbf{x}_{ij}\beta_k, \forall k$$

where $(z_{ij1}, z_{ij2}, z_{ij3})$ is a vector of three outcome variables for party i in country j . Here, α_{jk} is country-level random intercept with mean zero and variance σ_k^2 , estimated from the data and β_k is a vector of parameters for the response k (e.g., turnout-out monitoring or direct monitoring). The covariance matrix Σ controls *conditional* interdependence among the three types of monitoring.

With regard to the first question, linking the choice of monitoring strategies to the clientelistic effort and organizational capabilities of political parties, consider the regressions in Table 3. Independent variables here are the clientelistic effort made by a political party (B15), the liaisons of local notables a party might tie into (A3), the civic associations in different interest group spheres to which a party may be connected (B10), and finally the sanctioning capability the party possesses (C4).

With regard to turnout buying, it appears that clientelistic effort and ties to local notables are most important conditions. Sanctioning capacity plays no role, as voting turnout are overt acts that can easily be policed. In a similar fashion, increasing clientelism increases a party's reliance on

direct monitoring methods. However, for direct monitoring methods, reliance on local notables is not crucial. Instead, now sanctioning capabilities are of critical importance. Parties make the heavy investment in direct and close observations of peoples conduct only, if they also can do something about it. And that comes to the fore in the very large coefficient for parties sanctioning capacities as predictor of direct monitoring.

With respect to indirect monitoring, the result that stands out is the reliance on both ties to local notables as well as connection to associational networks. Where parties are deeply embedded in social connections, they may substitute direct by much cheaper and less intrusive indirect monitoring of the clientelistic exchange.

Next we turn to studying the association between different types of clientelistic goods and different types of monitoring. Here we use five measures of clientelism available from the DA dataset: provision of consumer goods (B1), preferential social policy (B2), government employment (B3), government contracts (B4), and regulation policies (B5). In our analysis, we also include the measure of organizational capacity (A3), distributive networks (B10), and sanctioning capacity (C4).

The results are reported in the Table 4. There is an intriguing pattern here: different types of monitoring are very clearly associated with different types of clientelism. First, parties that employ the most straightforward type of clientelism (votes for consumer goods) and parties that offer government contracts in return for votes, use direct means of monitoring. Second, preferential access to social policy is associated only with turnout buying while indirect monitoring method is negatively associated with clientelism that offers government contracts in return for votes.

The advantage of the multivariate response models is that they allow make predictions about what bundle of monitoring methods a party is predicted to use given a certain set of covariates. For example, is party with extensive organizational networks likely to use only turnout-monitoring, only indirect or direct monitoring or some combination of these methods. Figure 5 show these kind of predictions for each covariate estimated in the model, holding other covariates at their sample average values.

	Turnout	Indirect	Direct
	0.307 (0.36)	0.136 (0.316)	-0.714 (0.419)
b1	-0.041 (0.135)	0.098 (0.094)	0.285 (0.127)
b2	0.50 (0.154)	0.18 (0.125)	-0.122 (0.143)
b3	-0.205 (0.168)	0.007 (0.118)	-0.063 (0.18)
b4	0.067 (0.17)	-0.276 (0.149)	0.493 (0.202)
b5	-0.011 (0.147)	0.036 (0.131)	-0.254 (0.187)
a3	0.451 (0.103)	0.291 (0.089)	0.244 (0.113)
network	0.002 (0.074)	0.136 (0.056)	0.04 (0.065)
c4	0.074 (0.265)	0.15 (0.224)	0.681 (0.275)

Table 4: Seemingly unrelated regressions for three types of monitoring with country-level random effects not reported. Bold-faced entries indicate the estimates where the 95% credible interval does not cover zero (that is, “statistically significant” effect exists).

An interesting pattern emerges clientelism based on consumer goods increases all types of monitoring (though only the effect of the direct monitoring is statistically tractable). In contrast, when parties offer preferential social policy, they tend to rely almost exclusively on turnout monitoring. Further, when it comes to clientelism through government contracts, parties tend to rely on the turnout and direct monitoring while the indirect monitoring declines.

In addition, we see that the sanctioning capacity matters only for parties that engage in direct monitoring. Finally, the existence of the networks of intermediaries matters only for the indirect monitoring method. This is an important result because, as we noted, indirect monitoring methods (as well as turnout monitoring) require that politicians already possess some information about the political identities of voters.

4 Monitoring Methods and Efficiency of Clientelism

In this last subsection, we analyze how different types of monitoring are associated with perceived effectiveness of the clientelistic strategy of a party. Of course, the success of clientelistic strategy will depend on a number of variables: the target set or the ‘clients’ of the party, the types of goods it distributed, its policies, and of course behavior of its competitors. The type of monitoring strategy a party uses (or is bound to use) is merely a fraction of factors that contribute to the ultimate




Figure 5: Predicted effects on three interdependent types of monitoring for each covariate (setting other covariates to sample mean values). Results from the SUR model.

success or failure of its overall political strategy. However, even if such effects on the ultimate success of clientelistic practices are only marginal, it is still interesting to learn if they exist and how they vary across different methods of monitoring.

In the previous section we argued that direct monitoring is not a necessary condition for the existence and success of clientelism. Here we put this proposition to an empirical test by analyzing (a) which monitoring methods contribute most to the success of monitoring and (b) how do these

	1	2	3
(Intercept)	-2.844 (0.058)	-2.023 (0.109)	-2.303 (0.104)
turnout	1.492 (0.234)	0.752 (0.21)	0.693 (0.194)
indirect	1.22 (0.302)	0.079 (0.274)	-0.277 (0.255)
direct	1.02 (0.166)	0.604 (0.145)	0.231 (0.139)
a3	.	0.418 (0.039)	0.338 (0.037)
d.network	.	0.074 (0.025)	0.061 (0.023)
c4	.	.	0.756 (0.079)

Table 5: Predicting monitoring success (C1).

monitoring methods contribute to the overall efficiency of a party’s patronage politics.

In the first analysis, we employ expert answers to question C1, which asked whether parties are successful in finding out how particular individuals voted. The results of the first analysis are reported in Table 5. The first model, reports the effects of all three types of monitoring on monitoring success without any controls. All three variables appear to have statistically tractable effect on the success of monitoring. However, this effect quickly disappears for the two types of monitoring once we control for organizational capacity (A3 and B10) and sanctioning capacity (C4). Only turnout-monitoring appears to have positive effect on monitoring success, controlling for other cofounders.

Lastly, we turn to the analysis of the effectiveness of clientelism or, more specifically, how different types of monitoring affect the effectiveness of clientelistic politics. Do different types of monitoring make people less likely to defect from the contracts they made with clientelistic politicians? To answer this question, we employ expert answers to question B11, which asked how effective is party’s clientelistic strategy. Again, we regress party averages to question B11 on the three types of monitoring and control for three confounding factors: organization (A3), distributive networks (B10), and sanctioning capacity (C4).

The results of analysis are reported in Table 6. Interestingly, after controlling for organizational and sanctioning capacity, the only direct monitoring appears to have an effect on the effectiveness of clientelism. In other words, only the toughest and the meanest form of monitoring contributes to the effectiveness of clientelism net of the organizational infrastructure of the party. In contrast,

the other two types of monitoring have no association with the effectiveness of clientelism net of the information provided by parties' organizational infrastructure. In other words, if we know how much a party relies on local intermediaries, how extensive are its distributive networks, and what is its capacity to sanction voters, the additional knowledge about how much turnout or indirect monitoring it uses would not improve our prediction as to how successful such party is in its clientelistic politics.

What do these findings mean? We believe they suggest several things: First, turnout monitoring, which is statistically related to the success of monitoring but is not related to the effectiveness of clientelism,

Second, indirect monitoring, which is not associated either with monitoring success or with effectiveness of clientelism, poses a puzzle. Why would politicians employ this method? We surmise that indirect monitoring works not through actual revelation of how a particular individual voted but through organizational networks that enforce compliance from voters *even though* they actually do not reveal exact information about voters' decisions. A voter who swears on a holy book that he voted for a certain party will vote for that party just to avoid swearing on a lie. Similarly, a voter who is afraid that someone in his union or his neighborhood community might learn that he voted the 'wrong way' might vote for the wrong party just to void such disclosure although the chances of such disclosure might be very slim.

Third, direct monitoring, (strangely) is not associated with monitoring success but is associated with the effectiveness of clientelism. Again, this is somewhat puzzling. One possible way to explain this is that direct monitoring works not through revealing large amounts of precise information about voters' behavior but through signaling the sanctioning and coercive capabilities to large number of potential defectors. In some sense, this is not really surprising: direct monitoring methods are very expensive and even impossible to implement on a large scale. How many votes you can actually gather through the revolving ballot system or through forging someone's identity? Even with massive organizational resources these are not going to be very large numbers. However, a voter who merely knows that such method does exist and that he can be sanctioned for not complying, might keep his contractual obligations. Thus, direct monitoring, seems to be more a form of coercion than a

	1	2	3
(Intercept)	2.318 (0.06)	3.055 (0.131)	2.685 (0.13)
turnout	0.975 (0.296)	0.278 (0.267)	0.245 (0.252)
indirect	2.035 (0.39)	0.765 (0.357)	0.465 (0.337)
direct	1.396 (0.222)	0.922 (0.2)	0.48 (0.192)
a3	.	0.417 (0.053)	0.314 (0.051)
network	.	0.200 (0.035)	0.176 (0.033)
c4	.	.	0.939 (0.106)

Table 6: Predicting effectiveness of clientelism (B11).

method of information collection.

5 Discussion

This paper presented a painfully inductive and somewhat eclectic analysis that so far has not received any systematic empirical treatment in the literature. We aimed at demonstrating that vote-monitoring is a multifaceted entity and that its relationship with general clientelistic politics is somewhat nuanced. Specifically, we have argued that parties choose between the three types of vote-monitoring (turnout, indirect, and direct) based on their organizational capabilities, distributive networks, and sanctioning capacities as well as their profile of clientelistic policies. Moreover, we have found some evidence in the data to suggest that the three types of monitoring affect parties' clientelistic politics in different fashions.

There are several important venues for the further development in this project. First, there is clearly a need for a more rigorous theoretical framework, in which the empirical patterns are analyzed. Here we only provided some provisional hunches. It seems in particular that deeper theoretical reflection of the substitution effects identified in Table 3 would yield a better understanding how politicians enforce clientelistic contracts.

Second, while in our empirical analyses we tried to advance beyond the canonical simple regression models and tried to take into account interdependencies between the dependent variables, there are still many important methodological issues to be resolved. Specifically, the present analyses can only suggest which variables have direct and indirect effect on the effectiveness of clientelism but

these conclusions are not based on rigorous statistical treatment. An analysis conducted in Rubin's potential-outcomes framework would be more appropriate (but much more challenging if at all feasible) in this setting.

Also, we should note that we used party-averages both on the left- and the right-hand side of the equations as if these were fixed quantities. However, these are averages based on aggregating individual responses, thus they are random variables, which have a measurement error associated with them. While measurement error in the dependent variables does not pose a problem for a regression analysis, measurement error in the independent variables can be highly consequential, especially in the multivariate setting. A latent hierarchical model that would explicitly model the measurement error and would take it into account in the regression analysis should be a next natural step in this project.

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Code	Method
1	Surveys, exit polls, analysis of election results.
2	Party delegates in the polling station. If expert specified that this is for specifically monitoring turn-out, the score 14 (see below) is also added.
3	Local organizations and agents. Examples of these include such intermediaries as local communities (includes infiltration of such communities), unions, religious communities and such.
4	Camera phones and other means of photographing the ballot.
5	Revolving ballot: seemingly widely spread practice where a voter is handed a filled ballot and has to bring an empty ballot upon her return.
6	Assisted voting: illiterate, old or sick voters' choices are monitored or controlled through assisting them.
7	Identity theft.
8	Expectation of loyalty: parties have loyal voters or they simply believe that contingent upon them receiving goods, voters will simply comply with their promise.
9	Pre-marked ballots and ballot marking: either member of election commission numbers ballots according the ID number of voters as it stands in the registration list or a voter puts a special mark on the ballot.
10	Contacts or agents in the electoral commission.
11	Informal networks (e.g., party activists or agents informally talking to voters.)
12	Party ballot.
13	State intelligence institutions, police, other government institutions etc. Includes both the events when secret police finds out voting decisions and when state institutions use their resource to compel voters either to vote openly (voting in the working place in front of your employer).
14	Turn out monitoring. Expert specifically states that turn-out and not voting decision is monitored.
15	Present unused party lists.
111	None / Party has not organization capacity to engage in monitoring
222	Impossible to code, unclear etc.

Table 7: Codebook for expert responses.