

Validity of the Charisma Measure¹

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Abstract

The Survey on Political Accountability includes a single measure of charismatic party linkages, question e1. Here I validate the measure by considering the nature of the survey question (content validity), how well the resulting data agree with scholarly judgment (convergent validity), and whether the data correlate in predictable ways with causally related phenomena (construct validity). I find that the measure is a strong one, especially at the level of country averages. Party-level results show more measurement error, including both nonsystematic and systematic error, which suggests that analyses using the party-level data should try to incorporate as many of the observations as possible.

¹ This paper is based on a dataset collected under the auspices of the project “Political Accountability in Democratic Party Competition and Economic Governance,” implemented by a political science research group at Duke University (Principal Investigator: Herbert Kitschelt, Department of Political Science). I gratefully acknowledge funding for the data collection by the World Bank, the Chilean Science Foundation (research grant directed by Juan Pablo Luna and David Altman, Catholic University of Chile), and Duke University, and the support of Brigham Young University in allowing me to participate in this conference. Data analysis and conclusions of this paper are the sole responsibility of the author.

Introduction

In this paper I examine the validity of the measure of charismatic linkages in the Survey on Political Accountability. Like other papers and sketches at the workshop, this one is still a little rough around the edges, but it provides a rather extensive set of results showing that the measure is basically a pretty good one—not quite good enough to put much stock in the result for any one party, but certainly good enough for large-N studies, and even better if we are using country-level averages.

My analysis is structured along the lines suggested by Adcock and Collier's (2001) work on measurement validity. Specifically, I briefly consider the *construct validity* of the charisma measure, or whether the operationalization seems likely to capture the underlying concept. Next, I consider *convergent or discriminant validity*, which refers to the fit of the resulting data with alternative measures of charisma—in this instance, the qualitative scholarly judgments of my peers and a small sample of the parties literature that I could digest before the conference. Finally, I test the *construct validity* of the measure by comparing it with a broad array of likely correlates, causes, and consequences of charismatic linkages to see if we get predictable matches.

To save words, in the rest of this paper I refer to "charismatic party systems" and "charisma," rather than "party systems with a strong presence of charismatic linkages" or "charismatic linkages."

Also, my apologies to anyone whom I still need to cite in this text; there are plenty of you.

Content Validity

In addressing content validity of the charisma measure, we could talk about both the methodological choice—an expert survey versus other techniques—and the design of the survey question itself. I think the measure is satisfying on both counts.

Defending the use of an expert survey is something that other project participants will get to do (and will do better than I can), but I can add a little to this conversation. As it turns out, an expert survey is one of the best options for getting at charismatic linkages. This is because charisma refers primarily to a personality trait, or more precisely, a highly subjective judgment we make about someone's personality. This is why Weber defines charisma as "an extraordinary quality of a person, *regardless of whether this quality is actual, alleged, or presumed*" (emphasis changed to suit my purposes; 1958 [1946], 295). Presumably, if nobody thinks an otherwise smart, self-assured, dedicated candidate is anything special, then he isn't—although if the candidate isn't particularly smart, self-assured, or dedicated, then he is unlikely to retain his charismatic legitimacy for long. And few politicians do. But the point is that surveys are much better at gauging perceptions and subjective judgments than they are at gauging actual events and objective features of politics, and charisma is just one of these subjective judgments. Thus, an expert survey is about as good any technique for gauging this type of linkage, and probably better than it is at gauging clientelism or programmatic linkages, which have more clearly objective/material features.

The survey includes just one measure of charisma, question e5, in a small series of questions that seek to directly gauge a broad array of linkage types. This might seem like pretty slim pickings, but I find it to be one of the more satisfying measures of linkage types in this module of the survey. The question asks "To what extent do parties seek to mobilize electoral

support by featuring a party leader's charismatic* personality?" and the asterisk refers the expert to a footnote that appears just below:

Leaders have charisma, if their followers are attracted to their "personal magic of leadership [that] arou[s] special popular loyalty or enthusiasm" (Webster's dictionary). Leaders project charismatic personal capabilities, if they can evoke emotion, affection, faith, loyalty, and even sacrifice on the part of their followers. Charismatic leadership is thus separate from (1) featuring the competence of party leaders to govern or (2) identifying the leader with the attractive policy positions.

This is easily the longest explanation for any of the questions in this series, and it gives great clarity to what might otherwise be an imprecise concept, especially for those experts without training in the social sciences. It hits all the right notes, highlighting and even clarifying the "extraordinary quality" that lies at the heart of charisma, referring to it as something rooted in a personality trait of the party leaders, and eliminating alternative meanings. When I talked about the resulting data with my comparative colleagues, all of them, without exception, wanted to know what the original question was. Charisma has a different meaning in ordinary language, and they recognized that a badly worded question would produce some pretty odd results. All of them were satisfied with the wording once they saw it.

We could quibble about the scale of responses. There is nothing about the concept of charisma that requires an ordinal scale like the survey uses, and given online survey technology, it would have been easy to include a Likert-type scale or a sliding widget. But like the rest of you I am going ahead and treating the scale as if it were a continuous one, and the results that follow turn out to be pretty convincing anyway, so the scale probably didn't matter much.

Convergent/Discriminant Validity

Convergent validity means that the actual data we collected with the new measure come close to what we already know from other sources, especially when other sources define the concept in the same way we do. Thus, this section is where we get to look at the basic findings and say which parties (and countries—it seems less cumbersome to say "country level" than "party system level") appear to be charismatic. At the end I will also talk about the variance in expert judgments as a way of confirming whether the measure lends itself to confusion or clarity. The party-level results are much too long to paste into the text here, and so I've placed them in an appendix at the end. Country-level averages (weighted by electoral strength of each party in the legislature—question e1nwe in the datafile) are simpler to present, and I include them right here and talk about them first.

As Figure 1 shows, the countries in the sample tend to have high levels of charisma, with an average of 3.04 and a standard deviation of 0.39 on a scale running from 1 to 4.² That highlights roughly fifteen countries as having very high levels of charisma (in descending order of scores, Senegal, Mauritius, Lebanon, Venezuela, Benin, Turkey, Portugal, Philippines, Panama, Georgia, Ecuador, Ukraine, Serbia, Macedonia, and Albania) and sixteen with very low scores (Netherlands, Morocco, Japan, Ireland, Honduras, Denmark, the United Kingdom, Germany, Switzerland, Norway, Ireland, Egypt, Canada, Sweden, Nigeria, and Brazil).

² Eventually I will have a chart that includes 95 percent confidence intervals around each country estimate.

To gauge the plausibility of these scores, as a first take in this first draft, I not only drew from my own knowledge of these countries (limited mostly to advanced industrial democracies and Latin America) but spoke with colleagues in the fairly extensive cohort of comparativists at BYU. These covered much of Europe, both Western and Central/Eastern/former Soviet; Southeast Asia (specifically, Thailand, Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia), Middle East/North Africa (including Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Morocco, and Turkey), and one odd country that turns out to be a puzzling outlier, Mauritius. Thus, I was not able to check the validity of the scores for much of Sub-Saharan Africa. A few colleagues provided me with published references to back up their claims; but most did not, and given time constraints, there is no way rely on more their informed judgments at this point. Presumably I will include a more extensive analysis later for the more surprising cases.

The bottom line is that all of my colleagues—and I—agree with most of the scores we saw at the country level. Whatever problems there may be with individual party scores (and I discuss some below), once we average these over the party system, the numbers usually turn out to be sensible. Looking first at the countries with high levels of charisma, I see few surprises. Here almost without exception we find newer or struggling democracies. My colleagues questioned a bit the high score for Turkey, which seems skewed by an extraordinarily high score for the ruling AKP. And our local Mauritius expert (it is, in fact his principal case study) was stunned by the high scores for parties in this country. With the exception of Mauritian Party of Javier Luc-Duval, the parties are relatively institutionalized nowadays, and their charismatic founders (and some did have them) have died off.

Regarding the countries at the low end of the scale, these are almost all wealthy ones with experienced democracies and stable party systems. Most of the exceptions here are cases of partly-democratic or authoritarian regimes that have managed to freeze in place a set of old parties (sometimes ones with strong charismatic leaders in the past) having fragile legitimacy. For example, Morocco has a set of fragmented but remarkably uncharismatic (specifically, a blend of clientelistic and programmatic) parties, but the parliament is denied a significant decisionmaking role by the monarch (Mohammed VI), who lacks the powerful charisma of his grandfather (Mohammed V, one of the leaders of the independence movement) and currently struggles to reform the government (Szmolka 2010). Egypt, is (was) controlled by a hegemonic party whose leader, Hosni Mubarak, had only a faint trace of the charisma of his political godfather, Gamal Abdel Nasser. And in Honduras, the two-party remnants of the old oligarchic democracy have retained tight control over the country's politics for well over a century (much to the chagrin of former-president Manuel Zelaya).³ Two other exceptions are harder to explain. Brazil's surprisingly low score is an outlier that shows up in other contexts (Kitschelt et al. 2010). Its score may also have something to do with the peculiarities of its electoral rules, a combination of majority-runoff in the presidency and open-list PR in the legislature. These rules allow a number of clientelistic/programmatic parties with strong local ties to flourish in the legislature, but a more charismatic party (the PT under Lula da Silva, rated at a somewhat higher 3.1) to control the presidency. Nigeria is a country I don't know enough about, and I welcome my colleagues' suggestions to explain this case. In summary, most of these surprises at the low end turn out to be scored properly; the problem is that their scores reflect authoritarian

³ Thailand is probably a similar instance; the highly charismatic Thai Rak Thai of Thaksin Shinawatra still has strong popular support but was banned by the government in 2007. If TRT were still intact and in power—and its successor parties soon may be—the score would be close to the top of the chart.

distortions of the “true” nature of politics in the country, or what party politics might be like if they were more fully democratic.

Turning now to the level of individual parties, I find a higher number of questionable scores and some possible biases. I cannot hope to engage in a detailed, party-by-party analysis of these scores, so let me point out some broad trends with a few examples. Generally, both my colleagues and I felt that the scores were about right, with some predictable measurement error that could leave one party a little higher and another party a little lower than we would have scored it. In several instances, however, we saw more surprising scores that seemed to depart from our reading of where these parties stood today. Specifically, we sensed a systematic measurement error in the direction of scoring some parties *too high*. These were parties such as FPO in Austria (scored at 3.8), UDI in Chile (3.8), HDZ in Croatia (4.0), Likud in Israel (3.5), PRD in Mexico (3.9), and several of the parties in Mauritius. All of these were founded by highly charismatic individuals who have since left the party in the hands of less charismatic leaders and activists. While some traces of the old personalistic organization might remain, the parties currently lack any one clear leader who can claim to embody anything close to the founder’s charisma. This trend was not universal; in some instances (for example, the Greens in Germany), experts gave low scores to parties that no longer had a clear charismatic leader, suggesting a tendency to quickly update their assessment. But high measures happened often enough to suggest that either the experts didn’t know which moment of the party’s history to take into account, or that they still felt (despite the question wording) that charisma was a quality inherent in other aspects of the party besides the personality traits of leaders.

These questions about definitions and what exactly the experts understand by charisma came up in one other, very specific instance: Forza Italia and Lega Nord in Italy. Both of these parties are given high scores by the experts (4.0 and 3.9, respectively), but it was clear to me and my colleagues that these parties represent very different kinds of charisma. Humberto Bossi of Lega Nord embodies a more classic, deep kind of charisma: a leader whose superhuman traits and devotion to the cause inspire equal devotion among followers and activities. In contrast, Silvio Berlusconi conveys a shallow type of charisma that seems unlikely to inspire the selfless sacrifice of very many Italians. Thus, these results suggest some continuing ambiguity in the question and even the underlying concept.

Finally, let us consider the standard deviations around individual party scores, also found in the appendix. It would be satisfying to discover that parties with surprisingly high/low estimates of charisma also tend to have high standard deviations around those means. Unfortunately, this doesn’t happen. Instead, variance is often a statistical artifact or a reasonable outcome (although some of the data is a little odd, and the project members who calculated these results may want to comment.) Parties with the smallest standard deviations are, with rare exception, those at the ends of the scale. The exceptions are the Romanian PSD (mean=2.9 sd=0.0), the ANC in South Africa (mean=2.8 sd=0.0), and Labour in the UK (mean=2.3 sd=0.0). Since experts were only allowed to code integers, rather than decimal scores, I find it mysterious that these parties with sd=0.0 have an average score that is not a whole number. In any case, there were no surprises here in these cases of low variance.

Looking at the ten or so parties at the other, higher end of the variance scale, I again fail to see anything that would help explain some of the errors noted above; instead, high scores seem to reflect genuine and predictable confusion. From what I know about the Latin American parties, some of these are small or failing parties whose electoral status is increasingly uncertain. For example, the PSN in Guatemala has merged with the formerly ruling GANA, and the

Christian Democrats and PNC in El Salvador have either shrunk to insignificant proportions or lost their legal status. Others of these are very powerful parties that for years lacked any kind of significant charismatic leadership, but have recently fallen under the sway of some extraordinary leader who essentially directs the party. This is true of the Sandinistas (FSLN) in Nicaragua, the Partido Comunista de Venezuela (PCV, a member of Chavez's coalition), the Frente para la Victoria in Argentina (the faction of the Peronist party controlled by Nestor Kirchner and Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner). In the end, while the disagreement among expert coders fails to help us understand the (relatively small amount of) systematic error in the data, it at least behaves predictably and avoids sending off any warning signals.




Figure 1 Strength of Charismatic Linkages, by Country




Figure 1, cont.

Construct Validity

In gauging construct validity, the point is to determine whether our measure correlates in predictable ways with other indicators—not indicators of charisma *per se*, but of other phenomena that are likely to have some causal relationship to charisma. In fact, I find fairly strong correlations between our measure of charisma and a number of aspects of parties and the country as a whole. Some of these independent indicators are drawn from the survey itself, while others are from outside sources. Specifically, I consider the correlation of our measure with indicators of populism, cumulative democratic experience, other linkage types, economic and political crisis, party organization, and the stability of electoral support.

Populism

Populism can be thought of as any party or movement that manifests a Manichaean discourse pitting the ostensible will of the people against a conspiring elite. Thus, populism is ultimately rooted in a set of ideas (de la Torre 2000; Hawkins 2010; Laclau 2005; Mudde 2007).

However, charismatic leadership plays an important role in populism. To be clear, populist movements may or may not have a charismatic leader (Mudde 2004). But successful populist movements—those that win control of the government—always have a leader who is capable of mobilizing and especially organizing what is otherwise a cacophonous grassroots phenomenon, as well as providing a broad enough appeal to reach beyond the angry activists that provide the core of the movement (Hawkins 2010, 41-43). Thus, if we identify a successful populist party, we should also find that it has a charismatic leader.


To test this, I compare individual parties' level of charisma with their level of populist discourse. To gauge populist discourse, I use data collected in an analysis of speeches by chief executives representing the party in each of these countries, circa 2006 (see Hawkins 2009 for more details); thus, we can only analyze parties from the expert survey that were in power on that date, not those in opposition or serving as minor members of coalitions. The result is a set of 28 parties/leaders, 3 of which are highly populist and another 4 of which are moderately so.

A couple of caveats are in order. First, the original populism scores are not really for the party as a whole, but for the leader of the party who was serving as president/prime minister, although in most cases the same person is leading the party when the expert survey is run three years later; thus, we are assuming that there is some lasting imprint from the leader, or that the leader reflects an affinity for this discourse in other years. Second, two of the most populist leaders in the speech analysis (Alexander Lukashenko in Belarus and Mahmood Ahmadinejad in Iran) unfortunately had to be dropped from this comparison since their countries were not included in the expert survey. Had they been included, they would probably have strengthened the results that follow.

Despite these shortcomings in the data, we get an impressive correlation of $r = .45$ ($p < .02$) between the level of populism and the level of charisma in each of these parties. The positive sign means that higher levels of populism go with strong charismatic leadership. The accompanying scatterplot (Figure 2) helps us see this correlation in greater detail. The three most populist leaders in the speech analysis (Hugo Chavez/MVR in Venezuela, Evo Morales/MAS in Bolivia, and Viktor Yushchenko/Our Ukraine/People's Self Defense) all show up as charismatic. Moreover, most of the mildly populist leaders also turn out to belong to highly charismatic parties. Of course, charismatic leadership is not exclusive to (electorally successful) populism, as demonstrated by the large number of highly charismatic parties in the upper-left quadrant of the

chart, but the key finding is that the lower-right quadrant is vacant. We do not find any highly populist parties/leaders—or even mildly populist leaders—that are not charismatic.

Figure 2 Correlation of Charisma with Populism




Cumulative democratic experience

We should find that our measure of charismatic linkages is correlated with democratic experience at the level of country or party system. We can expect this for several reasons. First, there is at least likely to be a spurious correlation, because charismatic leadership is strongly associated with the kinds of political crises, such as sharp economic decline or terrorist threats, that are also likely to undermine democracy (Merolla and Zechmeister 2009). Next, democratic experience is likely to have a more direct causal effect on charisma. Greater democratic experience means more time to routinize charisma and forge the institutionalized party structures associated with programmatic politics (Kitschelt et al. 2010). Finally, charismatic parties should have a reciprocal effect on democracy, in that quite a few charismatic leaders and their followers (e.g., populist ones) are likely to discount the norms of tolerance required for pluralist politics and to ignore the need for creating stable, independent partisan identities and organizations (Hawkins 2010, chapter 6).

To test this, I compared the country-level charisma measure with the country's cumulative democratic experience. To gauge democratic experience I used the same measure as elsewhere in our study, which is borrowed from Gerring and derived from the Polity IV dataset. The correlation is strong and in the expected direction ($r = -.40$, $p < .001$), in that greater democratic experience is associated with lower levels of charisma. A scatterplot (Figure 3) reveals that this correlation is consistent across the range of either variable, with relatively few

outliers. Of the outliers, Egypt, Nigeria, Morocco, and Brazil have noticeably lower levels of charisma that we would have expected, while Lebanon, Venezuela, and Mauritius have slightly higher levels. This partly bears out the secondary judgments of our expert colleagues and the literature mentioned in the first part of this paper. Among the high outliers, I cannot easily explain Lebanon. But the charisma score for Mauritius, with its relatively old “charismatic” parties, is probably too high. The divergence for Venezuela is more surprising (this really is a very charismatic party system right now), although we could argue that this is an anomaly of the past 12 years and that the country previously had much lower levels of charisma (unfortunately, the current charismatic party seems intent on reducing the average level of democracy...). The low charisma scores for Egypt and Morocco probably reflect the distortions of a long period of authoritarian control over politics, and Brazil’s score fails to capture the charisma embodied in its presidential system. Nigeria remains the one mystery at this end.

Figure 3 Correlation of Charisma with Democratic Experience



Other linkage types

Another way of gauging the validity of the charisma indicator is by comparing it with the results for other linkage types measured in the survey. Charisma is likely to be incompatible with some types of linkage while compatible with others. Of the types measured in the survey, linkage based on policy (e2) seems mostly likely to be incompatible with charisma. In contrast, linkages based on targeted benefits (e3) and general competence (e5) are more likely to be compatible, since charismatic leaders often provide benefits that are directed at party loyalists (Hawkins 2010, chapter 7), and they base part of their charisma on their ability to act decisively and effectively at key moments in the past (Willner 1985).

The relationship of charisma to partisan identity (e4) is more particular and requires explanation. While in theory a strong partisan identity should stand in opposition to charisma—partisan identity in the sense used by Americanists is understood to be identification with a party label and an organization that both stand independent of particular leaders—in fact the wording of the question in the survey is not so discriminating. Although it uses the catchphrase “partisan identity,” the survey further explains that this refers to “the extent to which parties draw on and appeal to voters’ long-term partisan loyalty... Parties may invoke their historical origins *or the achievements of historical leaders*. They may feature party symbols and rituals to reinvigorate party identification” (emphasis added). Most of these specific techniques mentioned in the question are in fact present in charismatic parties, which of course feature the leader himself as one of the key symbols. Although the name of the party or its rituals simply become symbols of the leader, a charismatic party does have its symbols and rituals. Loyalty to the leader translates into loyalty to the party.

The actual correlations between the survey results more or less fit these expected patterns. Because linkage type is both a party- and system-level attribute, I calculate correlation coefficients at both levels of analysis (reported in the text as country/party; see Table 1). Most of the correlations between charisma and other linkage types except policy are positive and statistically significant, if somewhat small. The correlations are very high for targeted benefits ($r=.47$, $p<.000$ / $r=.41$, $p<.000$), lower for partisan identity ($r=.17$, $p<.10$ / $r=.16$, $p<.000$) and somewhat inconsistent for competence ($r=-.10$, $p<.34$ / $r=-.23$, $p<.000$). In contrast, the correlation with policy is consistently negative and, at the country level, moderately strong ($r=-.28$, $p<.008$ / $r=-.14$, $p<.001$).

Table 1 Correlation of Charisma with Alternative Types of Linkage

Linkage Type	Party Level		Country Level	
	r	p-level	r	p-level
Policy (e2)	-.14	.001	-.28	.008
Targeted benefits (e3)	.41	.000	.47	.000
Partisan identity (e4)	.16	.000	.17	.10
General competence (e5)	.23	.000	-.10	.34

For illustration, I show the correlations between charisma and policy at both the country and party level (Figure 4). The trend at the country level is a little muddled but relatively linear. Once again, we see some of the same outliers as in the previous section: Mauritius (higher charisma) and Egypt, Nigeria, and Brazil (lower charisma). However, Morocco, Venezuela, and Lebanon now fall in line with expectations. At the party level, (Figure 5), the trend is much less clear. Given the higher levels of measurement error, this second finding is not surprising.

Figure 4 Correlation of Charisma with Policy-Based Linkages (country level)





Figure 5 Correlation of Charisma with Policy-Based Linkages (party level)




Economic and political crisis

Charismatic leadership is typically seen as a response to political crisis. Because “crisis” can mean many things, I consider two types that are widely discussed in the literature on charisma and on crises of legitimacy: economic decline and political violence. To be brief, let me anticipate my results by saying that neither the economic nor political crisis indicators have any meaningful correlation with charisma when considered alone, but when we combine them into a single index we find something more impressive.

First, I consider each of these measures separately. To measure economic decline, I created three sets of indicators: the average percent change in GDP (“growth”), the level of inflation, and the level of unemployment. Because it is unclear how much these effects have to accumulate in order to have an impact on the party system, I considered averages for two-, five-, and ten-year intervals, and for growth I included an additional twenty-year interval. Furthermore, to provide a baseline comparison, I looked at the correlation between charisma and absolute per capita GDP (PPP) for the year 2009.

At first glance, the only economic measure to have a substantively significant correlation with charisma is in fact the baseline indicator of absolute per capita GDP. This measure of development is very highly correlated with the charisma of a party system ($r = -.46$, $p < .000$). A scatterplot of these results appears in Figure 6; it is similar to the strong country-level findings in other sections and requires little comment.

Figure 6 Correlation of Charisma with Level of Economic Development




In contrast, measures of short- or medium-term growth are not well-correlated with charisma. The correlation for economic growth actually starts out weakly *positive* (for example,

$r=.27$, $p<.01$ for 5-year average growth), then grows flatter and more negative as the length of the period expands ($r=-.02$, $p<.83$ for 20-year average growth).

The findings are somewhat more encouraging with regard to inflation and unemployment. High levels of inflation and unemployment over both the short- and medium-term are associated with more charismatic party systems. But the correlations are relatively small in comparison with what we find between absolute per capita GDP (the highest correlation we find, between 10-year inflation levels and charisma, is $r=.28$, at $p<.01$), and they lack the clarity we normally see in these country-level comparisons.

For example, figure 7 depicts the correlation between charisma and 10-year unemployment levels, one of our better economic indicators. Countries with low levels of charisma all have moderate or low unemployment levels—a finding in line with our expectations. But not every country with high unemployment has high charisma. Macedonia, Namibia, Serbia, South Africa, and Botswana all have extremely high levels of unemployment during this period, and yet two of these (South Africa and Botswana) lack strong charisma.

Figure 7 Correlation of Charisma with Unemployment (10-year average)



Measures of domestic political conflict also produce weak correlations with charisma when analyzed in isolation. Here I use two widely known datasets: the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (hereafter, simply UCDP/PRIO) and the Major Episodes of Political Violence (hereafter, MEPV). Because I again lack any sense of how long political violence must endure to become a catalyst for charismatic leadership, I calculate this number for 10-year and 20-year intervals for each country, all ending in 2009 (UCDP/PRIO) or 2008 (MEPV), the last year in which data were coded for these datasets. I include only domestic conflicts. For UCDP/PRIO,

this means that I include internal (Type 1) and internationalized internal conflicts (Type 2). For MEPV I include civil violence, civil war, ethnic violence, and ethnic war (the variable CIVTOT).

Because these are slightly different measures, I should briefly explain how I use each one. The UCDP/PRIO measure is the number of conflict-dyad-years per country. Thus, for a country with two different internal conflicts raging over the entire period, the average value would be 2; a country that had only one internal conflict over the entire period would have an average value of 1; and a country that only one conflict over half of the period would have a value of .5. UCDP/PRIO also includes a measure of conflict intensity for each dyad-conflict-year, but it is only a binary measure: conflict-years with fewer than 1,000 deaths (scored as 1), and those with greater than 1,000 (scored as 2). To account for this intensity, I doubled the count for any conflict-year with more than 1,000 deaths. Because the total size of the state is not taken into account (presumably, 10 internal conflicts should matter more in Israel than in India), I calculate all measures per capita, using population figures for the year 2000 in millions of inhabitants.

The MEPV is a calculation for each year that takes into account both the number of conflicts and their intensity, all summed into a single measure that ranges from 0 to 10. I calculate the average value of this measure for the 10- or 20-year period. Because a full range of intensity is already taken into account, I do not divide the final average by the country's population.

Unfortunately, these complicated calculations yield only meager results. The correlations between charisma and UCDP/PRIO are somewhat low ($r=.11$ at $p<.33$ for 10-year period, $r=.18$ at $p<.09$ for 20-year period) and for MEPV are even lower ($r=.04$ at $p<.70$ for 10-year period, $r=.11$ at $p<.33$ for 20-year period). Incidentally, while the results do improve when we move from a 10- to 20-year interval, expanding the length of the interval fails to improve these results any further.

Figure 8 shows the correlation between charisma and UCDP/PRIO for the 20-year interval, where we have our strongest results. The picture is actually quite similar to what was found with measures of economic performance. None of the countries with low levels of charisma have any kind of violent domestic conflict—a positive finding. Above this, however, it seems clear that political violence is neither necessary nor sufficient for charisma. A few countries with high levels of charisma (Benin, Portugal) lack significant violent domestic conflict during the preceding two decades, while the two countries with the highest levels of domestic conflict—Israel and Angola—have only moderate levels of charisma.

All of these results show that economic and political crises alone are insufficient to produce charismatic party systems, but it is impressive that weakly charismatic party systems are generally lacking either type of crisis. What if we combine these measures of crisis into a single indicator? My tool is fairly blunt, but as a first cut I calculate a simple binary indicator of crisis that is 1 if the country has a higher-than-average level of internal political conflict *or* if it has above-average unemployment, and is 0 otherwise. For political conflict, this means any positive value on the UCDP/PRIO scale for the 20-year interval, since the modal value is no conflict at all. For unemployment, I consider the 10-year average (where we had our strongest results) and use 9.1 percent as the cutoff. The resulting correlation ($r=.34$, $p<.0001$) is better than that of either indicator alone. But as the results in Figure 9 show, several of our problematic outliers again show up—Mauritius (too high), Morocco, Egypt, Nigeria (too low).

Figure 8 Correlation of Charisma and Domestic Political Conflict (UCDP/PRIO)





Figure 9 Correlation of Charisma with Political/Economic Crisis



Party Organization

A valid measure of charisma will correlate in predictable ways with several features of party organization. Here I consider four drawn from the expert survey itself: (1) Who decides on the parties' electoral strategy (a6)? (National leaders are the lowest category, bargaining among all levels is the highest score; note that this is not a perfectly ordinal scale). (2) Who controls candidate nominations (a5)? (Same scale as the previous question.) And (3&4) whether the party's private (a10) and public (a11) campaign financing is in accord with the law—presumably less so in charismatic systems, since laws are less important than the will of the leader and the preservation of his movement.

These correlations are again surprisingly strong, although as elsewhere they are strongest at the country level. All of the correlations are in the expected direction (in the scale for electoral strategy and candidate nominations features, national control is the lowest value, whereas for the finance questions, noncompliance is the highest value). As the numbers in Table 2 demonstrate, the correlation is strongest for candidate nominations ($r = -.50$ at the country level), which makes sense given the centrality of candidate nominations for party functions. The correlation is higher for private campaign finance than public ($r = .33$ versus $r = .25$), suggesting that charismatic parties hew more closely to the law when it comes to public finance, an unsurprising result given the difficulty of tracking private donations.


Table 2 Correlation of Charisma with Features of Party Organization/1

	Party Level	Country Level
Locally driven electoral strategy	-.27	-.28
Local control of candidate nominations	-.34	-.50
Private campaign finance not in compliance with law	.33	.48
Public campaign finance not in compliance with law	.25	.37

1 All coefficients except that of electoral strategy (country level) are significant at the $p < .000$ level or higher. For electoral strategy (country level only), it is significant at the $p < .008$ level.

What is even more impressive and satisfying is that these correlations come through clearly at the party level, certainly more than in the earlier analysis of alternative linkages types. Figure 10 shows the correlation between charisma and control over candidate nominations at the party level, where the correlation is again strongest ($r = -.34$). The negative linear relationship is certainly not perfect but is remarkably clear. The one obvious outlier—the Communist Party of Greece (KKE)—is an exception that seems to prove the rule. If I could see through the thicket of dots more clearly (wait for future iterations of this graph...), I suspect we would find a few other communist/former communist parties in this corner.

Figure 10 Correlation of Charisma with Candidate Nomination Control



Stability of Electoral Support (Volatility)

While some of the above indicators could be seen as causes or simply correlates of charisma, it is helpful to consider at least one further variable that is more clearly a consequence of charisma: the stability of electoral support, or electoral volatility, of each party. Charisma is a fleeting thing, and charismatic parties seem more likely to take off quickly or to die suddenly. In some cases, charismatic parties maintain their hold on power through undemocratic means, but most charismatic parties that hope to become permanent fixtures of the electoral landscape must routinize their charisma and become more institutionalized, even if they retain organization traces of their charismatic founders (Panebianco 1988).

The indicator I use here is the one developed by project participants: the difference in each party's percent of the vote from the previous election to the most recent one, divided by 2. In this dataset it ranges from 0 to almost 50. As it turns out, there is a moderate relationship between charisma and electoral volatility at the party level ($r = .25, p < .0000$). The pattern is more clearly revealed in Figure 11. The relationship is not entirely linear, but it is noticeable. Although a number of parties with low volatility have high charisma, very few parties with low charisma have high volatility.

Figure 11 Correlation of Charisma and Party-Level Volatility



Conclusion

The results of this validity test are straightforward enough that I won't bother resummarizing my findings. Instead, let me say a bit about some additional things to think about. First, the measurement seems good enough to use in more sophisticated analyses. Those scholars who are interested in charisma alone will be eager to use this data to explore theories on the causes of charisma. Some of the above correlations already get at a few of the usual suspects, such as prior democratic experience and political and economic crisis, but I have omitted a host of other potential factors, such as culture (e.g., traditional versus secular versus postmaterialist values) or formal institutions that typically shape the party system (electoral rules, for example). Charisma is one of the oldest concepts in our field, but no study has ever put existing theories to a large-N, cross-country test.

Participants in this project will undoubtedly be more interested in a more ambitious attempt at a broad theory of linkages. I'm agnostic about whether a general theory of linkages is possible, or if what we think of as comparable types of linkage are really all of a same kind or explicable in similar ways. As I mentioned earlier, charismatic linkages already have some subjective features that distinguish them from the more "hard" or objective aspects of clientelism and programmatic linkage. (And perhaps we are thinking of other linkage types the wrong way, ignoring their own subjective or cultural features). Except at the most general level, it may be impossible to explain all of these linkages with a single theory. Yet charisma is also clearly related to other linkage types and has certain complementarities. It typically represents a response to failure of other types, especially clientelism. And it often provides the seeds for the emergence of other linkage types. Principled punishment of corrupt opponents and rewarding of

the faithful can easily descend back into clientelism, while some leaders manage to push the party system to something more programmatic. Thus, there may be different types of charisma that we also have to take into account (“good” charisma vs. “bad” charisma), subtypes that may be distinguishable through other measures in the expert survey.

Appendix: Party-Level Data on Charismatic Linkages

country	Party	Party Acronym (English)	N	mean	sd
Albania	PD	DPA	12	3.9	0.29
Albania	PS	SPA	12	3.6	0.67
Albania	LSI	SMI	12	3.5	1.00
Albania	PR	RPA	12	2.3	1.06
Albania	PBDNj	UHRP	12	2.1	0.90
Angola	MPLA	PMLA	12	3.4	0.67
Angola	UNITA	NUTIA	12	2.5	0.90
Angola	PRS	SRP	11	1.8	0.98
Argentina	P.Justicialista	PJ	21	3.1	0.89
Argentina	Unión Cívica Radical	UCR	21	2.3	0.72
Argentina	Alianza Frente para la victoria	AFpIV	3	2.7	1.53
Argentina	Frente para la victoria	FpIV	20	3.1	0.97
Argentina	PRO	PRO	8	2.9	0.99
Australia	The Liberal Party	LPA	10	2.7	1.06
Australia	The Labor Party (ALP)	ALP	10	3.0	1.05
Australia	The Nationals	NPA	10	1.8	0.63
Australia	The Australian Greens	AG	10	2.2	0.79
Austria	SPÖ	SPO	15	2.9	0.96
Austria	ÖVP	OVP	15	1.9	0.52
Austria	Grüne	Green	15	2.1	0.80
Austria	FPÖ	FPO	15	3.8	0.41
Austria	BZÖ	BZO	15	3.9	0.35
Bangladesh	Bangladesh Nationalist Party	BNP	12	3.3	1.06
Bangladesh	Awami League	BPL	12	3.3	1.07
Bangladesh	Jamat-E-Islami	ICB	10	1.8	1.03
Bangladesh	Jatiya Party	NPA	10	2.5	1.27
Belgium	CD&V	CDV	5	3.0	0.71
Belgium	VB	VB	5	2.4	0.55
Belgium	Open VLD	Open VLD	5	3.4	0.55
Belgium	SP.a-Spirit	SP-A	5	2.6	0.89
Belgium	NV-A	NV-A	5	3.2	0.84
Belgium	LDD	LDD	5	4.0	0.00
Belgium	Groen!	Groen!	5	1.8	0.84
Belgium	MR	MR	7	3.1	1.07

Belgium	PS	PS	7	3.4	0.53
Belgium	CDH	CDH	7	3.3	0.76
Belgium	Ecolo	Ecolo	7	2.1	0.90
Belgium	FN	FN	7	2.0	1.15
Benin	The Cauri Forces for an Emergi..	FCBE	10	3.7	0.89
Benin	Social Democratic Party	PSD	10	3.8	0.42
Benin	Democratic Renewal Party	PRD	10	3.8	0.42
Benin	The Key Force	FC	10	3.1	0.99
Benin	G-13	G-13	7	3.4	0.79
Bolivia	Juicios sobre MAS	MAS	12	3.7	0.98
Bolivia	Juicios sobre PODEMOS	PODEMOS	12	2.8	0.97
Bolivia	Juicios sobre MNR	MNR	12	2.1	0.90
Bolivia	Juicios sobre Frente de Unidad..	FUN	12	2.7	0.98
Botswana	Botswana Democratic Party	BDP	13	3.4	0.87
Botswana	Botswana National Front	BNF	15	1.9	0.83
Botswana	Botswana Congress Part	BCP	13	2.2	0.69
Brazil	PFL	PFL	19	2.0	0.82
Brazil	PL	PL	17	1.5	0.62
Brazil	PMDB	PMDB	19	1.9	0.85
Brazil	PP	PP	15	1.5	0.64
Brazil	PSB	PSB	16	1.8	0.68
Brazil	PSDB	PSDB	19	2.1	0.91
Brazil	PT	PT	19	3.1	0.78
Brazil	PTB	PTB	14	2.0	1.04
Brazil	PDT	PDT	15	2.9	1.19
Brazil	PCdoBR	PC do BR	15	1.6	0.91
Brazil	PPS	PPS	15	1.5	0.74
Bulgaria	BSP	BSP	13	1.7	0.75
Bulgaria	NDSV	NDSV	13	3.9	0.28
Bulgaria	DPS	DPS	12	3.2	1.03
Bulgaria	Ataka	Attack	13	3.8	0.60
Bulgaria	ODS	ODS	13	2.2	0.55
Bulgaria	DSB	DSB	13	3.6	0.51
Bulgaria	GERB	GERB	13	4.0	0.00
Canada	Bloc Québécois	BQ	11	2.4	1.03
Canada	Conservative Party	CON	11	2.3	1.01
Canada	Green Party	Green	11	2.5	0.93
Canada	Liberal Party	LIB	11	2.4	1.03
Canada	New Democratic Party	NDP	11	2.6	0.81

Chile	P.R.S.D	PRSD	16	1.8	0.54
Chile	U.D.I	UDI	18	3.8	0.38
Chile	P.S	PS	18	2.8	0.73
Chile	R.N	RN	18	3.2	0.92
Chile	P.D.C	PDC	18	2.8	0.79
Chile	P.P.D	PPD	17	3.1	0.70
Colombia	P.L.C.	PLC	12	2.5	0.71
Colombia	Partido Conservador	PC	12	2.5	1.00
Colombia	Partido de la U	P de la U	12	3.7	0.65
Colombia	Cambio Radical	CR	12	3.5	0.90
Colombia	Polo Democrático Alternativo	PDA	12	2.4	0.90
Colombia	Convergencia Ciudadana	CC	8	3.5	1.07
Colombia	Mov. Alas Equipo Colombia	MAEC	9	3.3	1.12
Costa Rica	P.A.C	PAC	17	3.2	1.01
Costa Rica	P.L.N	PLN	17	3.1	0.99
Costa Rica	Mov. Libertario	PML	17	3.2	1.01
Costa Rica	P.U.S.C	PUSC	16	2.9	1.24
Croatia	HDZ	HDZ	16	4.0	0.00
Croatia	SDP	SDP	16	2.9	0.57
Croatia	HNS	HNS	16	3.1	0.72
Croatia	HSS	HSS	16	2.3	0.87
Croatia	HSLs	HSLs	16	2.4	0.50
Croatia	HSP	HSP	16	3.5	0.52
Croatia	HSU	HSU	13	1.5	0.66
Croatia	IDS	IDS	16	2.1	0.62
Croatia	HDSSB	HDSSB	16	3.9	0.34
Croatia	SDSS	SDSS	16	2.4	0.89
Czech Rep.	Civic Democratic Party	ODS	25	2.7	0.95
Czech Rep.	Czech Social Democratic Party	CSSD	25	3.2	0.69
Czech Rep.	Christian and Democratic Union..	KDU-CSL	26	2.0	0.82
Czech Rep.	Communist Party of Bohemia and..	KSCM	25	2.0	0.73
Czech Rep.	Green Party	Green	24	2.7	0.86
Denmark	Social Democrats (Socialdemokr..	SD	15	2.7	0.95
Denmark	Social Liberals (Det Radikale ..	SLP	15	1.8	0.56

Denmark	Conservatives (Det Konservativ..	KF	15	1.7	0.62
Denmark	Socialist People's Party (SF)	SF	15	2.7	0.88
Denmark	Liberals (Venstre)	V	15	2.8	0.94
Denmark	Danish People's Party (Dansk F..	DF	15	3.5	0.74
Denmark	Unity List (Enhedslisten)	RG	15	1.3	0.46
Denmark	New alliance (Ny alliance)	LA	15	2.8	0.77
Dom. Rep.	PRD	PRD	12	3.1	0.79
Dom. Rep.	PRSC	SCRIP	12	2.6	1.00
Dom. Rep.	Partido de la Liberación Domin..	DLP	12	4.0	0.00
Ecuador	Partido Social Cristiano	SCP	13	3.5	0.78
Ecuador	Izquierda Democrática	DL	13	2.8	0.73
Ecuador	PRE	ERP	13	3.7	0.63
Ecuador	Pachakutik	Pachakutik	13	2.3	0.95
Ecuador	PRIAN	IRPNA	13	3.9	0.28
Ecuador	Partido Sociedad Patriótica	PSP	13	3.7	0.75
Egypt	National Democratic Party	NDP	9	2.4	1.19
Egypt	Muslim Brotherhood	MB	9	2.2	0.97
Egypt	Wafd	Wafd	9	2.0	1.00
Egypt	Tagammu	NPUP	9	2.1	1.05
El Salvador	Alianza Republicana Nacionalista	NRA	12	3.2	0.95
El Salvador	P. Farabundo Martí para la Lib..	FMLN	12	3.7	0.65
El Salvador	Partido de Conciliación Nacional	PNC	12	2.3	1.30
El Salvador	Partido Demócrata Cristiano	CDP	12	2.6	1.31
Estonia	Reform	ERP	9	3.0	0.71
Estonia	Kesk	CPE	9	3.9	0.33
Estonia	IRL	UPR	9	2.6	0.73
Estonia	Rahvaliid	PUE	9	2.1	1.05
Estonia	SDE	SDP	9	2.0	0.50
Estonia	Rohelised	Green	8	2.0	0.53
Finland	KESK	CP	18	2.6	0.78
Finland	SDP	NCP	18	2.4	0.85
Finland	KOK	SDP	18	3.0	0.77
Finland	VAS	LA	18	1.6	0.62
Finland	VIHR	Green	18	1.8	0.62
Finland	KD	CD	17	1.8	0.56

Finland	RKP/SFP	SPP	17	2.2	0.90
Finland	PS	TF	18	3.7	0.59
France	Front National (FN)	FN	15	3.9	0.26
France	Union pour un Mouvement Popula..	UMP	15	3.7	0.62
France	Mouvement Démocrate (MoDem)	MoDem	15	3.5	0.64
France	Parti Socialiste (PS)	PS	15	2.8	0.86
France	Les Verts	Green	15	1.5	0.74
France	Parti Communiste Français (PCF)	PCF	15	1.7	0.72
France	Ligue Communiste Révolutionnai..	LCR	15	3.5	0.52
Georgia	United National Movement (UNM)	UNM	9	3.9	0.33
Georgia	Christian Democratic Movement ..	CDM	9	3.4	0.73
Georgia	Georgian Labor Party (GLP)	GLP	8	3.6	0.52
Georgia	New Rights (Conservative) Part..	NCP	9	2.1	0.60
Germany	CDU	CDU	23	2.6	0.59
Germany	CSU	CSU	23	2.5	0.73
Germany	SPD	SPD	23	2.5	0.79
Germany	FDP	FDP	23	2.6	0.90
Germany	Gruene	Green	23	1.9	0.69
Germany	Linke	Left	21	3.2	0.75
Germany	Radical Right	NPD	15	1.7	0.80
Ghana	New Patriotic Party	NPP	11	2.8	1.08
Ghana	National Democratic Congress	NDC	11	2.8	1.17
Ghana	People's National Convention	PNC	10	2.5	1.27
Greece	ND	ND	15	3.3	0.72
Greece	PASOK	PASOK	15	2.7	1.16
Greece	KKE	KKE	14	1.0	0.00
Greece	SYRIZA	SYRIZA	14	2.1	0.73
Greece	LAOS	LAOS	15	3.1	0.80
Guatemala	FRG	FRG	10	3.8	0.42
Guatemala	GANAN	GANAN	10	3.4	0.70
Guatemala	INT	INT	1	4.0	.
Guatemala	PAN	PAN	10	2.7	0.95
Guatemala	PP	PP	10	3.9	0.32

Guatemala	PSN	PSN	5	2.6	1.34
Guatemala	UNE	UNE	10	3.3	0.95
Honduras	Bancada Liberal	LP	12	2.6	1.16
Honduras	Bancada Nacional	NP	12	2.7	1.15
Hungary	Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége	SZDSZ	14	1.9	0.53
Hungary	Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt	KDNP	13	1.8	0.80
Hungary	Fidesz - Magyar Polgári Szövet..	Fidesz	15	3.9	0.35
Hungary	Magyar Demokrata Fórum	MDF	15	3.1	0.64
Hungary	Magyar Szocialista Párt	MSZP	15	3.4	0.51
India	BSP (Bahujan Samaj Party)	BSP	73	3.8	0.49
India	BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party)	BJP	78	3.3	0.73
India	CPI (Communist Party of India)	CPI	70	1.5	0.61
India	CPI/Marxist	CPI/M	73	1.6	0.66
India	INC (Indian National Congress)	INC	79	3.6	0.65
India	Nationalist Congress Party	NCP	45	2.8	0.94
India	Janata Dal (United)	JD(U)	23	2.6	0.95
India	Rashtriya Janata Dal	RJD	45	3.4	0.84
India	Shirmani Akali Dal	SAD	23	3.1	1.00
India	Samajwadi Party	SP	28	3.3	0.82
India	Shiv Sena	SS	20	3.8	0.41
India	All India Trinamool Congress	AITC	16	3.3	0.87
India	Biju Janata Dal	BJD	15	3.5	0.74
India	Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam	DMK	18	3.8	0.55
India	Anna DMK	Anna DMK	17	3.9	0.33
India	Telugu Desam Party	TDP	21	3.7	0.58
India	Janata Dal (Secular)	JD(S)	16	2.5	0.82
Indonesia	Partai Amanah Nasional	NMP	14	2.7	0.61
Indonesia	Golongan Karya	FG	14	2.1	0.66
Indonesia	Partai Demokrat	DP	14	3.9	0.36
Indonesia	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia	IDPS	14	4.0	0.00
Indonesia	Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa	NAP	14	3.2	0.89
Indonesia	Partai Keadilan Sejahtera	WJP	14	1.8	0.70
Indonesia	Partai Persatuan Pembangunan	UDP	14	2.2	0.89

Ireland	Fianna Fáil (FF)	FF	9	2.9	1.27
Ireland	Fine Gael (FG)	FG	9	2.6	1.24
Ireland	Progressive Democrats (PDs)	PD	9	1.9	0.78
Ireland	Sinn Féin (SF)	SF	9	2.9	0.93
Ireland	Greens (Gr)	Green	9	1.6	0.73
Ireland	Labour (Lab)	Lab	9	2.1	0.93
Israel	Kadima	Kadima	27	2.9	1.12
Israel	Labor - Meimad	Labor	27	2.8	0.79
Israel	Shas	Shas	25	2.8	1.19
Israel	Likud	Likud	27	3.5	0.58
Israel	Israel Beiteinu	YB	26	3.7	0.45
Israel	National Unity - Mafdal	NU	25	2.0	0.73
Israel	Pensioners' Party	Gil	23	1.5	0.79
Israel	Torah and Shabbat Judaism (Agu..	UTJ	27	1.7	0.96
Israel	Meretz	Meretz	26	2.1	0.86
Italy	Forza Italia (FI)	FI	26	4.0	0.00
Italy	Alleanza Nazionale (AN)	NA	26	3.3	0.67
Italy	Lega Nord (LN)	NL	26	3.9	0.27
Italy	Partito Democratico (PD)	DP	26	2.7	0.85
Italy	Italia dei Valori (IdV)	IdV	24	3.7	0.56
Italy	Unione di Centro (Udc)	UC	26	2.5	0.76
Italy	Rifondazione Comunista (Rc)	CRP	26	2.3	0.80
Italy	Südtiroler Volkspartei (SVP)	STPP	16	1.9	0.93
Italy	Movimento per l'Autonomia (Mpa)	MfA	18	2.4	0.85
Jamaica	Jamaica Labor Party	JLP	13	2.5	0.97
Jamaica	People's National Party	PNP	13	3.5	0.97
Japan	Liberal Democratic Party Japan	LDP	19	2.9	0.97
Japan	Democratic Party Japan	DPJ	19	2.8	0.92
Japan	Komei Party	Komeito	19	1.6	0.90
Japan	Japanese Communist Party	JCP	19	1.5	0.61
Japan	Japanese Social Democratic Party	JSD	18	2.4	1.04
Kenya	Kenya African National Union	KANU	15	2.2	.
Kenya	Orange Democratic Movement	ODM	16	3.7	0.60
Kenya	Orange Democratic	ODM-Kenya	16	2.6	1.03

	Movement-Kenya				
Kenya	Party of National Unity	PNU	16	2.4	1.15
Latvia	TP	PP	13	3.3	0.88
Latvia	JL	NEP	13	3.4	0.65
Latvia	ZZS	UGF	13	3.2	0.83
Latvia	SC	HC	13	2.3	0.85
Latvia	LPP/LC	LFP/LW	13	3.6	0.65
Latvia	TB/LNNK	FF/LNNK	13	2.5	0.88
Latvia	PCTVL	PCTVL	13	2.3	0.63
Latvia	LSDSP	LSDWP	13	2.2	0.55
Lebanon	Future Movement	Future	10	4.0	0.00
Lebanon	Progressive Socialist Party	PSP	10	4.0	0.00
Lebanon	Lebanese Forces	LF	10	4.0	0.00
Lebanon	Kateab Party	Kateab	10	3.6	0.52
Lebanon	Democratic Left Movement	DLM	8	1.9	0.99
Lebanon	National Liberal Party	NLP	7	2.6	1.13
Lebanon	Jama'a Islamiya	Jama'a	8	2.3	1.04
Lebanon	Amal Movement	Amal	10	3.9	0.32
Lebanon	Hizbullah	Hizb	10	3.9	0.32
Lebanon	Free Patriotic Movement	FPM	10	4.0	0.00
Lebanon	Syrian Socialist Nationalist P..	SSNP	9	2.0	0.87
Lebanon	Lebanese Democratic Party	LDemP	8	2.8	1.28
Lebanon	Marada Movement	Marada	10	3.9	0.32
Lebanon	Tachnak Party	Tachnak	9	2.0	1.00
Lebanon	Lebanese Communist Party	LComP	10	1.5	0.97
Lithuania	Labor party	LP	17	4.0	0.85
Lithuania	Liberal Democratic Party	OJ	17	3.7	0.47
Lithuania	Liberal and Center Union	LCU	17	2.6	0.62
Lithuania	Lithuanian Social Democratic P..	SDP	17	2.7	0.77
Lithuania	New Union (Social Liberals)	NU	17	3.4	0.86
Lithuania	Homeland Union (Lithuanian Con..	HU	17	2.4	0.80
Lithuania	Peasants and New Democratic Pa..	LPPU	17	3.2	0.73
Macedonia	SDSM	SDSM	12	3.3	0.77
Macedonia	VMRO-DPMNE	VMRO–DPMNE	12	3.6	0.51
Macedonia	NSDP	NSDP	11	2.7	1.10
Macedonia	DUI	DUI	12	3.8	0.45

Macedonia	DPA	DPA	12	3.8	0.39
Malaysia	United Malays National Organis..	UMNO	22	2.9	1.24
Malaysia	Malaysian Chinese Association	MCA	22	2.0	0.84
Malaysia	People's Justice Party	Keadilan	22	3.9	0.35
Malaysia	Democratic Action Party	DAP	22	3.0	0.87
Malaysia	Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party	Islamic	22	3.1	0.81
Mali	The Union for the Republic and..	UPRD	12	3.3	0.98
Mali	The Rally for Mali	RM	11	3.6	0.92
Mali	The Sudanese Union- African Dem..	US-RDA	12	2.3	1.06
Mali	The Alliance for Democracy in ..	ADEMA-PASJ	12	2.8	1.03
Mali	The National Congress for Demo..	CNID	12	3.4	1.00
Mauritius	Mauritian Labour Party	MLP	11	3.9	0.30
Mauritius	Mauritian Party of Xavier- Luc ..	MPXD	11	3.6	0.92
Mauritius	Mauritian Militant Movement	MMM	11	3.8	0.40
Mauritius	Mauritian Social Movement	MSM	11	3.6	0.67
Mauritius	Organisation of the People of ..	OPR	7	3.6	0.53
Mauritius	Rodrigues Movement	RM	7	3.6	0.53
Mexico	PRI	PRI	18	2.6	0.98
Mexico	PAN	PAN	18	2.6	0.98
Mexico	PRD	PRD	18	3.9	0.24
Mexico	P.V.E.M	PVEM	15	2.7	1.11
Mexico	CONVERGENCIA	Convergence	14	2.8	1.19
Moldova	Communist Party of Moldova	CPM	14	3.5	0.96
Moldova	Christian-Democratic People's ..	CDPP	14	3.8	0.43
Moldova	Party Alliance Our Moldova	PAOM	14	2.6	0.84
Moldova	Democratic Party of Moldova	DPM	14	2.4	0.85
Moldova	Liberal Party of Moldova	LP	14	3.3	0.83
Moldova	Social-Democratic Party of Mol..	SDP	13	2.5	1.05

Mongolia	Democratic Party	DP	15	2.9	1.09
Mongolia	Civic Will Party	CWP	14	3.4	0.93
Mongolia	Mongolian People's Revolutiona..	MPRP	15	3.5	0.83
Mongolia	National New Party	NNP	13	2.8	1.07
Mongolia	Motherland Party	MP	14	2.7	1.14
Morocco	Parti d'Independence	IP	12	2.5	0.85
Morocco	Parti de la Justice et du Déve..	JDP	13	2.8	1.17
Morocco	Mouvement Populaire	PM	13	2.6	1.19
Morocco	Rassemblement National des Ind..	NRI	13	2.2	0.80
Morocco	Union Socialiste des Forces Po..	SUPF	13	2.8	1.17
Mozambiq ue	Liberation Front of Mozambique	FRELIMO	16	2.7	0.95
Mozambiq ue	Mozambican National Resistance	RENAMO	15	3.3	0.88
Namibia	South West Africa People's Org..	SWAPO	12	3.7	0.49
Namibia	Congress of Democrats	CD	11	2.5	0.93
Namibia	Democratic Turnhalle Alliance	DTA	11	2.6	1.03
Namibia	National Unity Democratic Orga..	NUDO	10	2.7	1.16
Namibia	United Democratic Front	UDF	10	2.6	1.07
Netherland s	Christian Democratic Appeal	CDA	12	2.5	1.00
Netherland s	Labour Party	PvdA	12	2.8	1.03
Netherland s	Socialist Party	SP	12	2.9	0.79
Netherland s	People's Party for Freedom and..	VVD	11	2.5	0.82
Netherland s	Party for Freedom	PVV	12	3.4	0.90
Netherland s	GreenLeft	GL	11	2.0	0.63
Netherland s	Christian Union	CU	12	1.6	0.67
Netherland s	Democrats 66	D-66	12	2.3	0.89
Netherland s	Proud of the Netherlands	Trots op NL	12	3.8	0.62
New	Labour	Lab	13	3.0	1.00

Zealand					
New Zealand	National	Nat	13	3.3	0.95
New Zealand	Green	Green	12	2.0	0.74
New Zealand	NZ First	NZF	12	3.9	0.29
New Zealand	ACT	ACT	12	3.2	0.83
New Zealand	Maori	Maori	12	2.7	0.65
New Zealand	United Future	UF	12	2.4	0.79
New Zealand	Progressive	Pro	12	2.9	1.16
Nicaragua	Azul y Blanco	ALN	8	2.6	1.19
Nicaragua	FSLN	FSLN	9	3.2	1.30
Nicaragua	Partido Liberal	PLC	9	3.2	0.83
Niger	National Movement for the Deve..	MNSD	8	3.4	1.06
Niger	Democratic and Social Convention	CDS-Rahama	8	3.1	1.13
Niger	Nigerien Party for Democracy a..	PNDS	8	3.4	1.06
Niger	Nigerien Alliance for Democrac..	ANDP	8	3.4	1.06
Nigeria	African Congress	ACT	35	2.4	1.07
Nigeria	All Nigeria People's Party	ANPP	37	2.9	1.05
Nigeria	People's Democratic Party	PDP	36	1.9	1.12
Norway	Centre Party (Senterpartiet)	SP	24	1.9	0.58
Norway	Christian People's Party (Kris..	KrF	24	1.9	0.65
Norway	Conservative Party (Høyre)	H	24	1.9	0.68
Norway	Labour Party (Arbeiderpartiet)	AP	24	2.4	0.82
Norway	Liberal Party (Venstre)	V	24	2.1	0.90
Norway	Progress Party (Fremskrittspar..	FrP	24	3.2	0.88
Norway	Socialist Left Party (Sosialis..	SV	24	2.4	0.78
Pakistan	PPP	PPP	22	3.8	0.53
Pakistan	PML-N	PML-N	22	3.5	0.80
Pakistan	PML-Q	PML-Q	20	2.1	1.02
Pakistan	MQM	MQM	22	3.9	0.29

Pakistan	ANP	ANP	22	3.0	0.84
Pakistan	JUI-F	JUI	21	2.7	0.90
Panama	P. Revolucionario Democrático	PRD	8	3.8	0.71
Panama	P. Arnulfista	PP	8	3.9	0.35
Panama	P. Molirena	MOLIRENA	8	3.0	1.20
Panama	P. Solidaridad	PS	7	2.7	1.11
Panama	P. Cambio Democrático	CD	8	3.5	1.07
Panama	P. Liberación Nacional	PLN	5	2.4	0.89
Paraguay	ANR	ANR-PC	13	3.3	0.75
Paraguay	PLRA	PLRA	13	2.6	1.04
Paraguay	PPQ	MPQ	13	3.5	0.66
Paraguay	PUNACE	UNACE	13	4.0	0.00
Paraguay	PPS	PPS	9	2.3	1.00
Paraguay	PDP	PDP	4	2.5	1.00
Paraguay	MPT	MPT	4	1.5	0.58
Peru	Unión por el Perú	UFP	11	3.8	0.40
Peru	Partido Aprista Peruano	APRA	11	3.8	0.40
Peru	Unidad Nacional	UN	11	2.5	1.04
Peru	Alianza por el futuro	ApeF	10	3.3	1.16
Peru	Frente de Centro	FdC	10	2.1	1.20
Philippines	LAKAS-CMD	Lakas-CMD	10	3.6	0.52
Philippines	KAMPI	PFF	10	3.7	0.48
Philippines	NPC	NPC	10	3.9	0.32
Philippines	LP	LP	10	3.7	0.48
Philippines	NP	NP	10	3.7	0.48
Philippines	BAYAN MUNA	PF	10	1.7	0.48
Philippines	AKBAYAN	AKBAYAN	10	1.8	0.42
Poland	PO	PO	14	3.2	0.43
Poland	PiS	PiS	14	3.6	0.63
Poland	SLD	SLD	14	1.7	0.61
Poland	PSL	PSL	14	1.6	0.63
Poland	SRP	SRP	14	3.6	0.65
Poland	LPR	LPR	14	2.6	1.09
Portugal	Socialist Party	PS	20	3.7	0.47
Portugal	Social Democratic Party	PSD	20	3.7	0.47

Portugal	Portuguese Communist Party	PCP	20	2.8	0.67
Portugal	Social Democratic Center-Popul..	CDS-PP	20	3.8	0.37
Portugal	Leftist Bloc	B.E.	20	3.2	0.77
ROK	GNP	GNP	15	2.9	0.66
ROK	UDP	UDP	15	2.5	0.83
ROK	LFP	LFP	14	3.4	0.74
Romania	Partidul Social Democrat	PSD	14	2.9	0.00
Romania	Partidul Democrat Liberal	PDL	14	3.7	0.73
Romania	Partidul National Liberal	PNL	14	2.0	0.55
Romania	Partidul Romania Mare	PRM	14	4.0	0.00
Romania	Uniunea Democrata Maghiara din..	UDMR	14	1.9	0.66
Romania	Partidul Conservator	PC	12	1.8	0.72
Russia	United Russia	UR	14	3.5	0.76
Russia	CPRF	CPRF	14	2.1	0.73
Russia	LDPR	LDPR	14	4.0	0.00
Russia	SR	SR	13	2.1	0.64
Russia	SPS	SPS	14	1.8	0.70
Russia	Yabloko	Yabloko	14	2.7	0.61
S. Africa	African National Congress	ANC	11	2.8	0.00
S. Africa	Democratic Alliance	DA	11	2.5	0.82
S. Africa	Inkatha Freedom Party	IFP	11	3.1	1.14
Senegal	Senegalese Democratic Party	PDS	10	4.0	1.00
Senegal	Socialist Party	PS	11	3.0	0.77
Senegal	Party of Independence and Labour	PIT	10	2.7	0.95
Senegal	African Party for Democracy an..	AJ/PADS	11	2.7	1.01
Senegal	Alliance of the Forces of Prog..	AFP	11	3.5	0.82
Serbia	SRS	SRP	10	3.6	0.63
Serbia	DS	DS	10	3.6	0.52
Serbia	DSS	DSS	10	3.5	0.97
Serbia	G17+	G17+	10	3.3	0.82
Serbia	NS	NS	10	3.7	0.67
Serbia	SPS	SPS	10	2.7	0.82
Serbia	LDP	LDP	10	3.8	0.42
Slovakia	Direction - Social Democracy	Smer	13	3.7	1.10
Slovakia	Slovak Democratic and	SKDU-DS	13	2.6	0.77

	Christia..				
Slovakia	Slovak National Party	SNS	13	3.3	0.75
Slovakia	Party of Hungarian Coalition	SMK	13	1.6	0.51
Slovakia	People's Party - Movement for ..	LS-HDS	13	3.7	0.48
Slovakia	Christian Democratic Movement	KDH	13	1.5	0.66
Slovenia	Social Democrats	SD	15	3.5	0.64
Slovenia	Slovenian Democratic Party	SDP	15	3.9	0.35
Slovenia	For Real	FRNP	15	3.0	0.65
Slovenia	Democratic Party of Pensioners..	DPPS	15	2.7	0.82
Slovenia	Slovenian National Party	SNP	15	3.9	0.26
Slovenia	Slovenian People's Party	SPP	15	1.9	0.59
Slovenia	Liberal Democracy of Slovenia	LDS	15	2.9	0.92
Slovenia	New Slovenia iV Christian Peop..	NSCDP	15	1.8	0.68
Spain	Spanish Socialist Workers Party	PSOE	16	3.3	0.87
Spain	Popular Party	PP	16	2.8	1.06
Spain	United Left	IU	15	1.7	0.96
Spain	Convergence and Union	CiU	14	2.7	0.83
Spain	Basque Nationalist Party	BNP	14	3.0	0.78
Sweden	Moderata samlingspartiet	Mod	20	2.2	0.62
Sweden	Centerpartiet	C	20	2.3	0.73
Sweden	olkpartiet liberalerna	FP	20	2.3	0.72
Sweden	Kristdemokraterna	KD	20	2.1	0.55
Sweden	Miljöpartiet de Gröna	MPG	20	2.0	0.73
Sweden	Socialdemokraterna	SAP	20	2.3	0.73
Sweden	Vänsterpartiet	V	20	1.9	0.72
Sweden	Sverigedemokraterna	SD	15	2.0	0.85
Switzerlan d	CVP	CVP	15	2.1	0.74
Switzerlan d	FDP	FDP	15	1.6	0.51
Switzerlan d	SP	SP	14	1.8	0.43
Switzerlan d	SVP	SVP	15	3.7	0.80
Switzerlan d	Gruene	Gruene	15	1.7	0.59

Switzerland	LPS	LPS	13	1.6	0.65
Switzerland	Lega	Lega	15	3.2	0.86
Taiwan	Kuomintang	KMT	18	3.5	1.20
Taiwan	Democratic Progressive Party	DPP	18	3.2	0.71
Tanzania	Party of the Revolution	PR	15	3.2	0.90
Tanzania	Party for Democracy and Progress	PDP	15	2.7	0.82
Tanzania	Civic United Front	CUF	15	2.4	0.91
Thailand	Pracharaj Party	RPP	9	2.8	0.89
Thailand	Pue Pandin Party	MP	7	2.1	1.07
Thailand	Chart Thai	TNP	9	2.8	1.20
Thailand	Matchima Thipatai	NDP	8	2.1	0.99
Thailand	Ruam Jai Thai Chart Pattana	UNDP	7	1.9	1.07
Thailand	Palang Prachachon	PPP	9	3.2	1.09
Thailand	Prachatipat	DP	8	2.8	0.89
Turkey	Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP)	JDP	11	3.9	.
Turkey	Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP)	RPP	11	3.3	0.90
Turkey	Demokrat Parti (DP)	DP	7	2.1	1.21
Turkey	Demokratik Sol Parti (DSP)	DLP	8	2.3	1.16
Turkey	Demokratik Toplum Partisi (DTP)	DTP	10	1.7	0.95
Turkey	Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (MHP)	NMP	11	3.3	0.65
Turkey	Saadet Partisi (SP)	SP	8	3.1	0.83
UK	Labour Party	Lab	13	2.3	0.00
UK	Conservative Party	Con	13	2.8	0.90
UK	Liberal Democratic Party	LDP	13	2.3	0.85
USA	Democratic Party	Dem	16	3.0	0.94
USA	Republican Party	Rep	16	2.8	0.91
Ukraine	Bloc Yuliya Tymoshenko	BYU	22	4.0	0.83
Ukraine	Party of Regions	PR	21	3.5	0.75
Ukraine	Our Ukraine-People's Self-Defense	OU-PSD	22	3.1	0.87
Ukraine	Communist Party of Ukraine	CPU	22	2.3	1.21
Ukraine	Lytvyn Bloc	LB	22	3.2	0.81
Ukraine	Socialist Party of Ukraine	SPU	21	2.8	0.87

Uruguay	P.Nacional	PN	16	2.8	0.65
Uruguay	P.Colorado	PC	16	2.4	0.96
Uruguay	P.Encuentro Progresista Frente..	FA	16	3.0	0.73
Venezuela	MVR	MVR	11	4.0	0.00
Venezuela	Podemos	Podemos	12	3.1	1.08
Venezuela	PPT	PPT	11	3.0	1.18
Venezuela	PCV	PCV	11	2.7	1.35
Venezuela	Un Nuevo Tiempo	UNT	3	2.7	0.58
Venezuela	Primero Justicia	MPJ	3	2.0	1.00
Zambia	Movement for Multi-party Democ..	MMD	19	2.7	0.97
Zambia	United National Independence P..	UNIP	18	2.1	0.90
Zambia	United Party for National Deve..	UPND	18	3.3	0.67
Zambia	Forum for Democracy and Develo..	FDD	15	2.2	0.94
Zambia	Patriotic Front	PF	18	3.8	0.38
	mean		14.83	2.84	0.77
	median		13.00	2.81	0.80
	sd		8.1	0.7	0.3

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