

RSA

Recall from [Cryptography Basics \(https://canvas.duke.edu/courses/24695/pages/cryptography-basics\)](https://canvas.duke.edu/courses/24695/pages/cryptography-basics) that asymmetric crypto systems need a reasonably hard problem at the core of preventing easy computation of the private key f^{-1} given the public key f . In RSA algorithm, the core problem is just *prime factorization*.

In a nutshell, the RSA algorithm operates as follows:

- Find two (large) **primes** p and q . Compute their **product** $n = pq$.
 - Find a positive number r that is coprime with $(p - 1)(q - 1)$. In other words, $\text{GCD}(r, (p - 1)(q - 1)) = 1$.
 - Find the **multiplicative inverse** of $r \bmod (p - 1)(q - 1)$. Let's call this number s , so that $rs \equiv 1 \pmod{(p - 1)(q - 1)}$.
 - We should use the Euclidean Algorithm to find s (because $(p - 1)(q - 1)$ is very much not a prime).
 - The **public key** can be represented by the pair (r, n) . More specifically, assume our plaintext is encoded as a number $x < n$. (Think of sending small chunks of information at a time.) Then the encryption function is $y = f(x) = x^r \bmod n$.
 - The **private key** can be represented by the number s . Given any ciphertext y , we can decipher it back to the plaintext $f^{-1}(y) = y^s \bmod n$.
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That's it. Now let's verify that f and f^{-1} are actually inverses of each other. In other words, we verify $f^{-1}(f(x)) = x$ for all possible plaintext f .

Proof. Since $rs \equiv 1 \pmod{(p - 1)(q - 1)}$, we can write it as $rs = k(p - 1)(q - 1) + 1$ for some integer k . Then we have

$$\begin{aligned} x^{rs} &= x^{k(p-1)(q-1)+1} && // \\ &= x \times x^{(p-1)k(q-1)} && // \text{ factoring out one } x \text{ and rearr} \\ &= x \times (x^{(p-1)})^{k(q-1)} && // \text{ treating } x^{(p-1)} \\ &= x \times (x^{(p-1)}) \times (x^{(p-1)}) \times \dots \times (x^{(p-1)}) \end{aligned}$$

Now, recall Fermat's Little Theorem tells us $x \times x^{(p-1)} = x^p \equiv x \pmod{p}$. Leveraging this fact, we have:

$$\begin{aligned}
x^{rs} &= x \times (x^{(p-1)}) \times (x^{(p-1)}) \times \dots \times (x^{(p-1)}) \\
&\equiv x \times (x^{(p-1)}) \times \dots \times (x^{(p-1)}) \pmod{p} && // \text{ the first two terms } \\
&\equiv x \times \dots \times (x^{(p-1)}) \pmod{p} && / \\
&\quad \vdots \\
&\equiv x \pmod{p}
\end{aligned}$$

The process above tells us $x^{rs} \equiv x \pmod{p}$, which implies $p \mid (x^{rs} - x)$.

Now, let us realize that the entire process can be applied on q instead of p . Try replacing all p in the above by q and all q by p . This gives us $q \mid (x^{rs} - x)$.

But p and q are both primes. If $p \mid (x^{rs} - x)$ and $q \mid (x^{rs} - x)$, and both p and q are primes, we can conclude $pq \mid (x^{rs} - x)$.

Finally, notice $n = pq$. So $pq \mid (x^{rs} - x)$ actually means $x^{rs} \equiv x \pmod{n}$. In other words, we have

$$\begin{aligned}
f^{-1}(f(x)) &= f^{-1}(x^r \pmod{n}) && // \text{ encryption} \\
&= (x^r \pmod{n})^s \pmod{n} && // \text{ decryption} \\
&= x^{rs} \pmod{n} && // \text{ mod rules} \\
&= x && // \text{ because } x^{rs} \equiv x \pmod{n}
\end{aligned}$$

Why is RSA (conceptually) secure? Note that only (r, n) is public information. To decrypt, one needs to know s , the multiplicative inverse of $r \pmod{(p-1)(q-1)}$. Given r and $(p-1)(q-1)$ this is easily computable by Euclidean Algorithm... except malicious parties do not know $(p-1)(q-1)$. We have only announced $n = pq$. **Assuming prime factorization is reasonably hard**, no one can figure out what p and q are in reasonable time, so no one knows what $(p-1)(q-1)$ is.

Remark.

- What is described here is the original concept of RSA. It is not the actual RSA used in real life now.
- We haven't addressed many issues:
 - How large should p and q be? (Nowadays, they should be about the size of **2048** binary digits.)
 - What is a good r ? (Choosing a too small r will make the whole scheme prone to some deliberate attacks.)

- Is the encryption/decryption actually fast enough? (Not really. In practice, asymmetric systems are used to communicate the keys of symmetric systems.)
- Since the public key is, well, public, anyone can send the receiver some encrypted information. How do we prevent fake/malicious information being sent? (Read about digital