



Spring 2018 PSC 745 PE Core

Time: Tuesday 8.30-11.00 am

Venue: Carr 125 (East Campus)

Instructor: Prof. Pablo Beramendi, 207 Gross Hall

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Office Hours: Tuesday 1-3 pm, or by appointment

1 Course Description

This course has three goals: First, to introduce you to the foundational models and empirics that inform contemporary work in the field. Second, to provide a sense of where the ‘research frontiers’ in political economy are today so that you are able to pose and motivate innovative research questions. Finally, the third goal is to strike the right balance between substance and method. Most of you are building up your technical skills quite intensively. These skills are for naught if you lack the ability to identify a core substantive problem on which to apply them. To this end, we will pay close attention to linkages between theory, research strategy, and data throughout the seminar.

The course is organized in three sections: The first section (Fundamentals) introduces key concepts in political economy, examines states and markets as means of allocating resources, and addresses some basic methodological issues in understanding the relationship between institutions, political economy, and history. The second section (Organization of Power and the Economy) turns to analyze the origins and politico-economic implications of different forms of organizing political authority in society. We study the political economy of regime change, variation in the organization of power among dictatorships, and different forms of organizing power under democracy. Finally, the third section (Applications) focuses on how these institutional differences play out in a number of policy spheres, including distributive politics, macroeconomics, and trade.

Each week we will concentrate on 4-5 readings max, with the idea of discussing them in detail. I will try to combine classics, standard, and frontier pieces within each subfield to convey a sense of the intellectual evolution of specific research programs.

2 Requirements

2.1 Research Paper (65 percent)

2.1.1 Discussion and Set-up (25 percent)

The very first task in producing new research is to motivate it. This involves identifying a gap in a literature or set of literatures, and justifying the expected payoff of the research efforts you are about to undertake. Typically, this involves identifying a puzzle. A puzzle could take the form of a logical inconsistency in an argument or, more commonly, a discrepancy between a theoretical expectation and an observable empirical pattern. To get to this point requires research (1) to master the

literature you are engaging with and (2) to establish the unexplained empirical phenomena worthy of effort. These are the tasks you are expected to perform in this first run of the final paper. The goal is to teach you *by doing* how to craft a paper with an eye towards future commitments (in the case of phd students, most obviously, the prelim paper in the third year).

The discussion and set-up paper is due on **March 6th 2018**, right before Spring break.

2.1.2 Argument and Empirical Strategy (40 percent)

Beyond the stage of formulating innovative research questions, being a scholar implies laying out a strategy to answer them, both theoretically and empirically. To this end, you will devote the second half of the semester to develop *your argument* to answer the puzzle previously identified and to craft an empirical strategy to assess the empirical implications that follow. The research design should link theory and data: what is the exogenous variable of interest? what is to be held constant? how? why? what are the advantages and limitations of the data you have? what possible alternative strategies could help you address the most pressing problems you are facing? You should be clear about your theory, data availability/collection, and your identification strategy. The latter may involve experimental or quasi-experimental designs, but you should be very explicit about how you approach the issue of causality.

In writing proposals, both substance and style matter. Be focused, and selective. Use active voice. Spell-check. Proofread. Please, read/review these three pieces (all available online):

- Barry Weingast (1995) Structuring Your Papers
- James A. Stimson (n.d.) : Professional Writing for Political Science: A Highly Opinionated Essay
- Paul Krugman (n.d.) : How I Work

The final research paper is due on **May 1st 2018**.

2.2 Two journal reviews of manuscripts by recent job market candidates (20 percent)

You will write two reviews of a single article. Your review should eschew summary in favor of critically evaluating the paper. The basic goal is to make a *motivated* recommendation as to whether or not the paper should be published. You should support your evaluation with a discussion of theory, method, data, etc. The first review paper is due on **February 20th**; the second is due **March 20th**. You can choose to review any two of these recent job market papers (all available online). The papers are either published in the authors' sites; if not, I have secured permission from them to include them in the syllabus:

- Electoral Reform and Dynastic Politics: Evidence from the French Third Republic (Ali Cirone and Carlos Velasco)
- *only for those who did not take PS750* Building State and Citizen: Experimental Evidence on Taxation and Political Engagement in RD Congo' (J. Weigel)
- Patronage in the Allocation of Public Sector Jobs (Edoardo Teso, Emanuele Colonnelli, and Mounu Prem.)
- The Specter of Instability: Fragile Democracy and Distributive Politics in Pakistan (Rabia Malik)

For some advice on how to write a peer review, see: Miller, Pevehouse, Tingley, Rogowski and Wilson. 2013. 'How to be a Peer Reviewer: A Guide for Recent and Soon-to-be Ph.Ds'. PS: Political Science and Politics

2.3 One (group)replication exercise (15 percent)

Each student (or group of students) will be responsible for a group exercise that involves the replication and extension of a large-n analysis in the literature. Replications/extensions should replicate results from a paper, check for robustness (by, for instance, analyzing subsamples, estimating models using different assumptions, etc), and engage in at least one extension. You will provide 15-minute presentations of these exercises.

3 Outline and Schedule

1. Part I: Foundations:

- (a) *January 16th*: What is PE? Theory, Causality, and Evidence in PE
- (b) *January 23rd*: Markets, Growth, and Development
- (c) *January 30th*: State Authority and Fiscal Capacity
- (d) *February 6th*: Markets, State, and Development: England

2. Part II: PE of Democracy

- (a) *February 13th*: Democracy and Autocracy
- (b) *February 20th* :**NO CLASS**–(to be made up by extending sessions one extra week until April 24th)
- (c) *February 27th*: Microfoundations: Preference Formation
- (d) *March 6th*: Electoral Competition, Preferences Aggregation, and PE: Origin and Implications of Electoral Systems
- (e) *March 13th*: **NO CLASS SPRING BREAK**
- (f) *March 20th*: Electoral Competition, Preferences Aggregation, and PE: Forms of Democratic Competition and Implications
- (g) *March 27th*: Bureaucracy, Capture, and Interest Representation

3. Part III: Applications

- (a) *April 3rd*: The IPE-CPE connection: Interdependencies in PE
- (b) *April 10th*: Inequality, Development, and Politics I: Redistribution and Mobility
- (c) *April 17th*: Inequality, Development, and Politics II: How Development and Inequality Condition Politics

4. *April 24th*: Closing session: PRESENTATION OF PAPERS

4 Policy

I will follow Duke University's procedures to establish whether absences from any event related to this class are justified and merit ad hoc arrangements. Other than in the very restrictive cases contemplated by the university, make up exams are not an option. I will also follow Duke University's policy in any event of plagiarism and academic dishonesty.

Turning in late assignments is not acceptable unless extenuating circumstances apply and those are previously discussed with me. All late assignments will be downgraded by one letter grade for every day they are late. In other words, an A turns to B the first day, B becomes C after two days, and so forth. Finally, as a general rule, I am averse to giving 'incomplete' grades.

5 Schedule and Required Readings

I. Fundamentals

W1 What is PE? Theory, Causality, and Evidence (*January 16th*)

- Milton Friedman 'The Methodology of Positive Economics' In *Essays In Positive Economics* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1966), pp. 3-16, 30-43.
- John Huber 2013 'Is theory getting lost in the 'identification' revolution?' in *The Political Economist*, Summer 2013
- D.L. Teele (ed.) 2014 *Field Experiments and their Critics*, Yale University Press (chapters by Gerber, Green and Kaplan; Stokes; Deaton; Gelman; Imai)
- Jean Tirole 2017 *Economics for the Common Good*. Princeton University Press, chapters 1, 2, 6

W2 Markets, Growth, and Development: review *January 23rd*

- (background/ review) Barro and Sala-i-Martin, *Economic Growth*. Pages 1-72.
- Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson. 2002. 'Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Economy' *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 1231-1296.
- Banerjee, Abhijit and Lakshmi Iyer. 2005. "History, Institutions, and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India." *The American Economic Review* 95(4):1190-1213.
- Dell M. The Persistent Effects of Peru's Mining Mita. *Econometrica*. 2010;78(6):1863-1903.
- Stanley Engerman and Kenneth Sokoloff 2012. *Economic Development in the Americas Since 1500: Endowments and Institutions* (selections)
- Krugman. P. 1991. *Geography and Trade*. Selections.

W3 State Authority and Fiscal Capacity *January 30th*

- Alesina and Spolaore. 2005. ‘War, Peace and the Size of Countries’ *Journal of Public Economics* 1333- 1354.
- Beramendi, Dincceco and Rogers “Intra-elite Competition and Long Run Fiscal Development” Working Paper
- Besley, T. and T. Persson. 2009. ‘The origins of state capacity: Property Rights, Taxation, and Politics’ *American Economic Review* 99:4, 1218-44
- Boix, Carles 2015 *Political Order and Inequality*, Cambridge University Press (selections)
- M. Levi 1988 *Of Rule and Revenue* University of California Press (selections)
- Queralt, Didac 2017 “The Legacy of War on Fiscal Capacity”, Yale University, wp.

W4 Markets, State, and Development: England *February 6th*

- Robert Allen. 2009. *The British Industrial Revolution from a Global Perspective*. Cambridge University Press (selections)
- G. Cox 2016. *Marketing Sovereign Promises*, Cambridge University Press (selections)
- M. Daunton 2001. *Trusting Leviathan: the Politics of Taxation in Britain, 1799-1914*, NY, CUP (selections)
- I. Mares and D. Queralt 2015 “The Non Democratic Origins of Income Taxation” *Comparative Political Studies*
- North, Douglas and Barry Weingast, ‘Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth Century England’, *Journal of Economic History* 49(4), 1989, 803-32.
- S. Pincus and J. Robinson (2011) ‘What Really Happened during the Glorious Revolution?’ NBER 17206

II. PE of Democracy

W5 Democracy and Autocracy *February 13th*

- Albertus, Michael and Victor Gay 2016 ‘Unlikely Democrats: Economic Elite Uncertainty under Dictatorship and Support for Democratization’ *AJPS*
- Ansell Ben and David Samuels 2014 *Inequality and Democratization: An Elite Competition Approach* (book manuscript, selections)
- Boix, Carles and Susan Stokes. 2003. ‘Endogenous Democratization.’ *World Politics* 55: 517-49.
- Mancur Olson 1993: ‘Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development’ *American Political Science Review* 87 3 567-76

FEBRUARY 20TH NO CLASS

W6 Microfoundations: Preference Formation *February 27th*

- James Alt and Torben Iversen 2017 “Inequality, Labor Market Segmentation and Preferences for Redistribution” AJPS
- Ernst Fehr and Klaus M Schmidt ‘ A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation’ QJE 1999
- David Rueda and D Steigmüller 2015 ‘Who wants what? Redistribution Preferences in Comparative Perspective’ book manuscript
- Jean Tirole 2017 Economics for the Common Good, Princeton University Press, chapter 5
- Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman. 1981. The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice. Science 211, 453-58.
- William Riker. 1982. Liberalism against Populism. Chapters on agenda-setting (7) and strategic manipulation (9).
- Hal Varian 1980 ‘Redistributive Taxation as Social Insurance’ JPE

W7 Electoral Competition, Preference Aggregation, and Political Economy I: Elections *March 6th*

- Austen-Smith, David. 2000. ‘Redistributing Income under Proportional Representation’ Journal of Political Economy 108(6): 1235-1269.
- Ernesto Calvo and J. Rodden 2015 ‘The Achilles Heel of Plurality Systems: Geography and Representation in Multiparty Democracies’ AJPS
- Cox, G. 1997. Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World’s Electoral Systems. New York: CUP. Chpts 1-2.
- Anthony Downs. 1957. ‘An Economic Theory of Democracy’ American Economic Review
- Fearon, J. 1999. “Electoral accountability and the Control of Politicians: Selecting Good Types versus Sanctioning Poor Performance” In Democracy, Accountability, and Representation, ed. A Przeworski, S Stokes, B Manin. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press

W8 Electoral Competition, Preference Aggregation, and Political Economy II: Forms of Democratic Competition *March 20th*

- Ansolabehere S., et al 2003 ‘Equal Votes, equal money: Court-ordered Redistricting and Public Expenditures in the American States’ APSR 96(04): 767-777.
- D. Gingerich 2017. “Ballot Reform as Suffrage Restriction: Evidence from Brazil’s Second Republic” Working Paper, UVA
- H. Larreguy et al. 2017 Political Competition and State Capacity: Evidence from a Land Allocation Program in Mexico, Working Paper, Harvard University

- Lizzeri and Persico 2004 ‘Why did Elites extend the suffrage? Democracy and the Scope of Government...’, QJE
- Robinson, James and T. Verdier 2013 “The Political Economy of Clientelism” Scandinavian Journal of Economics
- Susan C Stokes, et al 2013 Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism. The Puzzle of Distributive Politics, CUP (selections)

W9 Bureaucracy, Capture, and Interest Representation *March 27th*

- Dixit Avinash and John Londegran. 1996. ‘The Determinants of Success of Special Interests in Redistributive Politics’ Journal of Politics, Vol. 58, pp. 1132-1155.
- Grossman, Gene M., and Elhanan Helpman. 1994. ‘Protection for Sale’ American Economic Review 84, 833-850
- Olson, Mancur. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action. Harvard University Press. Selections (background)
- Ch. 6 and 7 in A. Przeworski. States and Markets (background)
- Pablo Querubin ‘The Control of Politicians in Normal Times and Times of Crisis: Wealth Accumulation by U.S. Congressmen, 1850-1880’ (with James M. Snyder, Jr.) forthcoming Quarterly Journal of Political Science
- S. Weschle 2014. Money and Politics. Book manuscript in progress (selections)

III. Applications

W 10 Interdependencies in PE *April 3rd*

- (background) Krugman and Obstfeld. International Economics: Theory and Policy. Chapters 4 and 5.
- David Autor, David Dorn, Gordon Hanson and Kaveh Majlesi “Importing Political Polarization? The Electoral Consequences of Rising Trade Exposure” MIT Working Paper, April 2016
- Cai H, Treisman D. 2005. ‘Does Competition for Capital Discipline Governments? Decentralization, Globalization, and Public Policy’. Am. Econ. Rev.
- Michael Hiscox. 2001 ‘Class versus Industry cleavages: Inter-industry Factor Mobility and the Politics of Trade’ International Organization, 55, 1, 1-46. For a more extended treatment Hiscox’s book International Trade and Political Conflict, Princeton University Press (2004).
- Melitz, Marc. 2003. ‘The Impact of Trade on Intra-Industry Reallocations and Aggregate Industry Productivity.’ Econometrica 71: 1695-1725.
- L.Mosley and D.A. Singer 2015 “Migration, Labor, and the International Political Economy” Annual Review of Political Science 18
- Ronald Rogowski. 1987: ‘Political Cleavages and the Changing Exposure to Trade’ American Political Science Review, 81, 4, 1121-1137.

- Venables, Anthony 2007 “Trade, Location, and Development. An Overview of Theory” in Lederman and Maloney (eds.) *Natural Resources: Neither Curse nor Destiny*

W11 Inequality, Growth and Politics: Redistribution and Mobility *April 10th*

- (background) Przeworski, Chapters 10 in *States and Markets*
- (background/motivating evidence) Raj Chetty et al. 2014 “Where is the Land of Opportunity? The Geography of Intergenerational Mobility in the United States”, *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 129(4): 1553-1623, 2014 (See also <http://www.equality-of-opportunity.org>)
- Alvarado F. et al. 2018 *World Inequality Report*, pdf available in Sakai
- Anthony B. Atkinson 2015 *Inequality: What can be done?* Harvard University Press (selections)
- G. Becker and Nigel Tomes 1979 “An Equilibrium Theory of the Distribution of Income and Intergenerational Mobility” *Journal of Political Economy* 87/6: 1153-1189
- R. Benabou 2000 “Unequal Societies: Income Distribution and the Social Contract” *American Economic Review* 90/1, 96-129
- Beramendi, P 2015 “Constrained Partisanship and Economic Inequality” in Beramendi et al. (2015) *The Politics of Advanced Capitalism*
- A. Holland 2016 “Forebearance” *American Political Science Review* 110(2): 232-246

Inequality, Growth and Politics II: How Development and Inequality Condition Politics *April 17th*

- Amat and Beramendi 2017 “Democracy under High Inequality: Political Participation and Public Goods”, working paper
- John D. Huber 2017 *Exclusion by Elections: Inequality, Ethnic Identity, and Democracy*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press
- Erling Barth, Henning Finseraas, Karl O. Moene 2015. “Political Reinforcement: How Rising Inequality Curbs Manifested Welfare Generosity” *AJPS* 59/3: 565-577
- John Voorheis, Nolan McCarthy, and Boris Shor 2015 *Unequal Incomes, Ideology and Gridlock: How Rising Inequality Increases Political Polarization*, WP-Oregon/Princeton/Georgetown

APRIL 24TH CLOSING SESSION: PRESENTATION OF PAPERS/PROJECTS

6 Additional Readings

Additional Readings for W1

- Acemoglu, Daron. ‘Theory, General Equilibrium, Political Economy and Empirics in Development Economics’ Forthcoming, *Journal of Economic Perspectives*

- Angrist and Pishke. ‘The Credibility Revolution in Empirical Economics: How Better Research Design Is Taking the Con out of Econometrics.’ *Journal of Economic Perspectives*.
- Arthur, Brian. 1989. ‘Competing Technologies and Lock-In by Historical Events’. *Economic Journal* 99: 116-131.
- Besley, Tim, 2004, ‘The New Political Economy’ *The Economic Journal* 117: 570-587.
- Dewan, Torun and Kenneth Shepsle, 2008, ‘Review Article: Recent Economic Perspectives on Political Economy, Part II’, *British Journal of Political Science*, 38:3, 543- 564.
- Avinash Dixit *The Making of Economic Policy*, MIT Press, chapter 1-2.
- Dunning, Thad. 2012. Chpts 1-2 in *Natural Experiments in the Social Sciences*. New York Cambridge University Press.
- Duflo, Esther, Rachel Glennerster, and Michael Kremer, ‘Using Randomization in Development Economics Research: A Toolkit’ (available online)
- Thad Dunning 2012 *Natural Experiments in the Social Sciences*, CUP (chapters 1-2)
- Alan S Gerber and Donald P Green 2012 *Field Experiments*, Norton & Company
- Humphreys, M. et al 2009 “Field Experiments and the PE of Development”, *Annual Review of Political Science*
- Leamer, Edward. 2010. ‘Tantalus on the Road to Asymptopia’ *Journal of Economic Perspectives*.
- Nunn, Nathan 2009 “ The Importance of History for Economic Development” *Annual Review of Economics* 1: 65-92
- Thomas Palfrey. 2006. ‘Laboratory Experiments’ Chapter 51 in *Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*.
- Pritchett, Lant and Justin Sander ‘Context Matters for Size: Why External Validity Claims and Development Practice Don’t Mix - Working Paper 336’
- Przeworski, A. *States and Markets*, CUP. Chapters 1 and 2
- Przeworski, Adam. 2006. ‘Is the Science of Comparative Politics Possible?’ Available here: <http://politics.as.nyu.edu/object/AdamPrzeworski.html>
- Robinson and Diamond (eds.). 2010. *Natural Experiments and History*.
- Rosenzweig and Wolpin. 2000. ‘Natural ?Natural Experiments? in Economics’ *Journal of Economic Literature* 38: 827-74.
- Sovey, Allison and Donald Green. 2011. ‘Instrumental Variables Estimation in Political Science: A Readers’ Guide’ *American Journal of Political Science* 55: 188-200.
- Vivalt, Eva 2015 ‘Heterogeneous Treatment Effects in Impact Evaluation” *American Economic Review* 105(5): 467-470
- Wittman and Weingast, Chpt. 1 of *Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*
- Alwyn Young ‘Channelling Fisher: Randomization Tests and the Statistical Insignificance of Seemingly Significant Experimental Results’

Additional Readings for W2-W4 :

- Aghion et al. 1999. 'Inequality and Economic Growth: The Perspective of the New Growth Theories.' *Journal of Economic Literature*. 37: 1615-60.
- Alesina and Spolaore. 2000. 'Economic Integration and Political Disintegration.' *American Economic Review*.
- A. Banerjee and L. Iyer 2005. 'History, Institutions and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India' *American Economic Review*
- Banerjee and Duflo 2011 *Poor Economics*, Norton (selections)
- Bates, Robert. H. 1981. *Markets and States in Tropical Africa*. Berkeley, CA, University of California Press. Selections.
- Beramendi and Queralt "The Electoral Origins of the Fiscal State" Working Paper
- Berkowitz and Clay 2012. *The Evolution of a Nation*, Princeton, Princeton University Press.
- Nancy Birdsall 2007 'Income Distribution: Effects on Growth and Development'. CGD-Wp (online)
- Blaydes, L., & Paik, C. (2015). *The Impact of Holy Land Crusades on State Formation: War Mobilization, Trade Integration, and Political Development in Medieval Europe*. Working paper, Stanford University.
- L. Blaydes and E. Chaney 2012 'The Feudal Revolution and Europe's Rise: Institutional Divergence in the Christian and Muslim Worlds before 1500 CE' APSR
- Boucoyannis, Deborah *State Capacity, Taxation, and Representation: Lessons from European History*
- Dincecco, M. 2010 *Political Transformations and Public Finance*, Cambridge University Press (selections)
- Doerrenberg and Peichl "Progressive Taxation and Tax Morale" *Public Choice* (2013) 155: 293-316
- W. Easterly 2007 'Inequality does cause Underdevelopment' *Journal of Development Economics* 84: 755-776.
- William Easterly (2008). 'Can the West Save Africa?' *Journal of Economic Literature*
- Evans, Peter. 1979. *Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational, State, and Local Capital in Brazil*. Princeton: Princeton UP. Pgs. 3-54.
- Peter Evans. 1992. 'The State as Problem and Solution: Predation, Embedded Autonomy, and Structural Change' in Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, eds., *The Politics of Economic Adjustment*. Princeton: Princeton University Press: 139-81.
- Francis Fukuyama 2011 *The Origins of Political Order*, Farrar-Strauss-Giroux
- Francis Fukuyama 2014 *Political Order and Political Decay*, Farrar-Strauss-Giroux

- Galiani and Schargrotsky. 2010. ‘Property Rights for the Poor: Effects of Land Titling’ Journal of Public Economics 94: 700-29.
- Gerschenkron. 1962. Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective. Cambridge: Harvard UP
- Glaeser, E., La Porta R., Lopez-de-Silanes F, Shleifer A. 2004. ‘Do Institutions Cause Growth?’ Journal of Economic Growth 9: 271-303.
- Robert J. Gordon 2016 *The Rise and Fall of American Growth*, Princeton University Press
- Hardin, R. ‘Constitutionalism.’ Ch.16 in Wittman and Weingast (eds.) of Oxford Handbook of Political Economy.
- Herbst, Jeffery I. 2000. States and Power in Africa: comparative lessons in authority and control, Princeton; Princeton University Press. Pgs 11-57.
- Huntington, Samuel, Political Order in Changing Societies, Yale University Press: pg. 1-92.
- T. Kuran The Long Divergence: How Islamic Law Held Back the Middle East (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010)
- Landes, D. S. (2006). ‘Why Europe and the West? Why Not China?’ Journal of Economic Perspectives 20(2): 3-22.
- Lu and Scheve “Self-centered Inequality Aversion and the Mass Politics of Taxing the Rich”
- K. Marx 1859. A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. Various Editions
- K. Marx. 1867. Capital. Volume I (selections).
- Douglass North and and Robert Paul Thomas. 1973. The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1-158
- Nathan Nunn and Diego Puga (2009) ‘Ruggedness: The Blessing of Bad Geography in Africa’ Review of Economics and Statistics. 2012;94(1):20-36
- Nunn and Qian. 2011. ‘The Potato’s Contribution to Population and Urbanization: Evidence from a Historical Experiment.’
- Kenneth Pomeranz. 2000. The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy. Princeton: PUP. Introduction and Chapters 5 and 6.
- Przeworski, Adam. 2004. ‘The Last Instance? Are Institutions the Primary Cause of Economic Development?’ European Journal of Sociology 15: 165-188.
- Queralt, D 2015 ‘From Mercantilism to Free Trade: A History of Fiscal Capacity Building’ Quarterly Journal of Political Science.
- David Stasavage 2003 Public Debt and the Birth of the Democratic State.
- David Stasavage. 2010. ‘When Distance Mattered: Geographic Scale and the Development of European Representative Assemblies’ American Political Science Review.
- Ken Scheve and David Stasavage 2016 *Taxing the Rich*, Princeton, Princeton University Press.

- Adam Smith. 1776 (1976) *The Wealth of Nations*. (sections on trade/growth/wealth)
- Schumpeter, Joseph. 1962. *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*.
- Tilly, Charles. 1990. *Coercion, Capital, and European States*. Pages 1-95.
- Wade, Robert. 1990. *Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chapters 1 and 11.
- Weingast, Barry, 'Constitutions as Governance Structures: The Political Foundations of Secure Markets' *Journal of Institutional & Theoretical Economics* 1993, pp. 286-311.

Additional Readings for W5

- Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, 'Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective', *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 115 (November 2000): 1167-1199.
- Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson 2006: *Economic Origins of Democracy and Dictatorship* (chapters 1-3; rest of the book recommended).
- M. Albertus 2016 *Autocracy and Redistribution: The Politics of Land Reform* (selections)
- Ansell/Samuels. 'Inequality and Democratization: A Contractarian Approach' *Comparative Political Studies*, 45 (1)
- Dal Bo, Pedro, Andrew Foster, Louis Putterman (2010) 'Institutions and Behavior: Experimental Evidence on the Effects of Democracy', *American Economic Review*, 100(5), 2205-2229.
- Bourguignon, Francois and Thierry Verdier. 2000. 'Oligarchy, Democracy, Inequality, and Growth', *Journal of Development Economics*, vol.62, pp.285-313
- Gandhi, Jennifer and Adam Przeworski. 2007. 'Dictatorial Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats.' *Comparative Political Studies*. 40: 1279-2301.
- Haber, Chpt 38 in Wittman and Weingast. 'Authoritarian Government'
- Houle Christian 2009 'Inequality and Democracy: Why Inequality Harms Consolidation but Does Not Affect Democratization' *World Politics* 61 589-622
- Husted, Thomas and Lawrence Kenny. 1997. 'The Effect of the Expansion of the Voting Franchise on the Size of Government', *Journal of Political Economy*, 105(1), 54-81.
- Seymour Martin Lipset. 1959. 'Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy.' *American Political Science Review* 53 (March): 69-105
- Magaloni, Beatriz. 'The Game of Electoral Fraud and the Ousting of Authoritarian Rule.' 2010. *American Journal of Political Science* Vol. 54 (3)
- Mansfield, Edward D., Helen V. Milner, & B. Peter Rosendorff. 2000. 'Free to Trade: Democracies, Autocracies, and International Trade.' *American Political Science Review* 94(2): 305-321.

- Marx, K. The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte.
- Przeworski, Adam and Fernando Limongi. 1997. 'Modernization: Theory and Facts.' World Politics 49: 155-84.
- Przeworski A. 2009. 'Conquered or Granted? A History of Franchise Extensions' British Journal of Political Science (2009), 39 : pp 291-321
- M. Svobik 2012 The Politics of Authoritarian Rule, Cambridge University Press
- E. Wibbels and J. Ahlquist 'Inequality, Factor Prices and Political Regimes.' Forthcoming in American Journal of Political Science.
- Ronald Wintrobe. 1990. 'The Tin Pot and the Totalitarian: An Economic Theory of Dictatorship' American Political Science Review 84, 3

Additional Readings for W6

- (background) Hinich and Munger. 1994. 'Representing Choice by Consumers and Citizens' In Hinich and Munger, Ideology and the Theory of Political Choice. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- (background) Varian H., Intermediate Microeconomics. Chapters 3-5.
- Alesina, Alberto and Paola Giuliano. 2009. 'Preferences for Redistribution' NBER Working Paper 14825.
- Ansell Ben. 2014 'The Political Economy of Ownership' APSR
- Ballard Rosa C., Martin, L. and Ken Scheve 2015 The Structure of American Tax Policy Preferences, working paper
- Barber, Beramendi, Wibbels 2013. 'The Behavioral Foundations of Social Politics: An Experimental Approach'. Comparative Political Studies
- Benabou, Roland and Jean Tirole. 2006. 'Belief in a Just World and Redistributive Politics' Quarterly Journal of Economics 121, No. 2: 699-746.
- Benabou, Roland, and Efe A. Ok 2001 'Social Mobility and the Demand for Redistribution: the POUM Hypothesis' Quarterly Journal of Economics.
- P. Beramendi and P. Rehm 2016 'Who gains, who pays? Progressivity and Preferences' CPS
- Corneo, Giacomo and Hans Peter Gruner. 2002. 'Individual Preferences for Political Redistribution.' Journal of Public Economics, 83 (1): 83-107.
- De la O, Ana and Jonathan Rodden. 2008. 'Does Religion Distract the Poor?: Income and Issue Voting Around the World.' Comparative Political Studies 41: 437-76.
- Duflo, Kremer and Robinson. 2010. 'Nudging Farmers to Use Fertilizer: Theory and Experimental Evidence from Kenya' Forthcoming, American Economic Review
- Feierherd G et al 2015 'When do the Rich support redistribution? Inequality aversion in Buenos Aires' APSA- Working Paper

- Fehr, Ernst, and Klaus M. Schmidt. 2006. 'The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity, and Altruism: Experimental Evidence and New Theories.' In Serge-Christophe Kolm and Jean Mercier Ythier (eds.), *Handbook on the Economics of Giving, Reciprocity, and Altruism*. Oxford: Elsevier.
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