transfer to wealthy MNCs will undermine the positive effects of investment flows. In other cases, FDI may actually worsen individual-level poverty by imposing externalities on states that are paid for by taxing the poorest. Thus, in a few years, the puzzle may not be why there is no correlation between FDI and poverty, but why FDI exacerbates poverty. It is hoped that future IPE scholarship will point the way out of this depressing fiscal trap.

Globalization, Public Finance, and Poverty

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Global economic forces might impact poverty in any number of direct ways—by reducing prices, providing access to larger pools of capital, or creating and destroying jobs. Such forces might also work indirectly, that is, through their effect on labor standards, unionization rates, or the development of labor-saving technology. In this research note, we emphasize the impact of “globalization” on the poor via the path of public finances. This is a topic that has received considerable attention from social scientists and particularly political scientists, who have suggested that global trade or finance has led to a reduction in corporate tax rates and receipts (Cao 2010; Jensen and Lindstadt 2012), a concomitant increase in consumption taxes (Wibbels and Arce 2003; Beramendi and Rueda 2007), and reductions in welfare spending. Though the findings might vary across the developed and developing worlds, the basic idea is that global economic forces are bad for the poor to the extent they constrain the progressivity of taxation and/or public spending.

Despite the huge volume of research on the link between globalization and public finance, identifying causal effects running from the former to the latter is incredibly challenging. As Nielson (2015) notes in his piece in this forum, there are important opportunities on the research design side to expand on what we know. Here, we discuss some of the common data limitations that plague research in this area. We argue that there are two profound limitations on what we know: first, the reliance on standard cross-national public finance sources has elided broad budget categories with the actual incidence of taxing and spending across the income distribution; and second, almost no research has considered tax expenditures, which represent a black box in our knowledge of public finances. Indeed, just as Malesky’s (2015) companion piece in this forum emphasizes how the use of transfer pricing by foreign-invested firms limits the redistributive efforts of states, tax expenditures represent an alternative mechanism through which efforts to attract and maintain footloose capital limit governments’ ability to alleviate poverty via the fiscal system. Above and beyond limiting our knowledge, we argue that the failure to consider the incidence of taxing, spending, and tax expenditures has fueled a body of work that aims to explain what on first blush appear to be anomalies but that might not actually be so, including the supposed support of the rich.

20 Huber and Stephens (2001); Korpi and Palme (2003); Rudra (2002); Wibbels (2006)
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for redistribution and/or the resistance of the poor to redistribution in some countries. Once the incidence of public finances is taken into account, we expect these supposedly anomalous preferences to disappear.

In the following pages, we first discuss some of the problems inherent in using standard cross-national budget data to study the link between globalization, public finances, and poverty. We provide some basic evidence that the incidence of taxing and spending within standard budget categories varies hugely across countries and undermines any general claims in most cross-national work on this topic in political science. Second, we then turn to tax expenditures, which represent an important (if under-appreciated) tool of public finance that many governments in the developing world rely on to attract and retain footloose capital, are almost certainly regressive, limit the scope for pro-poor spending, and are completely missed by standard public finance data sources. We conclude with a discussion of how the failure to consider incidence has led researchers astray and led to the emergence of entire research agendas that are probably unwarranted while providing some recommendations for future work that would provide a more solid evidentiary for work on the political economy of public finances.

Globalization and the Incidence of Taxing and Spending

Researchers and pundits often suggest that the link between globalization and poverty or inequality works through fiscal policy. Much hinges then on the ability of budgetary data to proxy the redistributive incidence of taxes and transfers. The redistributive incidence of public policy is an old problem in public economics and political economy (Atkinson and Stiglitz 1980), fields in which it is well established that the budgetary size of particular policy programs or budget categories is a very poor proxy for their distributive impact. The implication is clear: trying to make sense of the socioeconomic consequences of globalization on the poor, or more extensively, the bottom half of the income distribution, by focusing on the budgetary size of policies allegedly benefitting the poor (such as social spending or income taxes) is a fruitless and potentially misleading path.

To see why, consider the standard decomposition of the redistributive impact of fiscal policy. Following Kakwani (1977) and Lambert (Kim and Lambert 2009), the overall redistributive impact of the fiscal system—measured by the difference between market and disposable income Gini coefficients—can be broken into two components: the scope of the effort and its progressivity. The relationship can be formally stated as follows:21

\[
\text{Gini}_{\text{market}} - \text{Gini}_{\text{disposable}} = \frac{\tau}{(1 - \tau)} \beta = \frac{t\beta^T + b|\beta^B|}{1 - t + b},
\]

(1)

where \(t\) denotes the tax level, \(b\) denotes the benefit level and \(\beta^T\) and \(\beta^B\) indicate the progressivity of taxes and benefits. Assuming balanced budgets \((t = b = \alpha)\), we can rewrite this equality as:

\[
\text{Gini}_{\text{market}} - \text{Gini}_{\text{disposable}} = \alpha(\beta^T + |\beta^B|).
\]

(2)

That is to say: the redistributive incidence of public finance is a function of both budgetary effort and design, that is, of the size of the welfare state \((\alpha)\) and the progressivity of its taxes and benefits \((\beta^T, \beta^B)\). Obviously, the same tax, an

21The first equality has been established by Kakwani (Kakwani 1977, equation 3.2), the second by Lambert (Kim and Lambert 2009, equation 3).
income tax for instance, can be more or less progressive. The same holds for
expenditures; spending on social security, unemployment, education, and the
like vary not only in scale but also in progressivity across countries.

Accordingly, any claim on the effect of globalization on poverty via public
finances would have to take the incidence of taxes and spending seriously, but
most research has not. Most cross-national work on the link between globalization
and public finances relies on the IMF’s *Government Finance Statistics* (GFS), which
provides no information on incidence. The GFS reports revenues under four
broad categories and expenditures under 10 broad categories;\(^ {22}\) these broad cate-
gories are in turn broken into a plethora of subcategories. There are important
benefits to the GFS. Most importantly, it provides the best-harmonized and docu-
mented set of fiscal data for the largest number of countries over the largest num-
ber of years.\(^ {23}\) Some serious limitations in hand, particularly those bearing on
nonrandom missingness in country coverage and difficulties comparing across
versions, the GFS is an important tool for cross-national work public finance.

More problematic than the data itself is the way researchers often unreflec-
tively assume that IMF budget categories can be identified as pro-poor or not. In
much research, for instance, “Social Security and Welfare” and “Education”
spending are defined as pro-poor, and consumption taxes are assumed to be
regressive. To the extent exposure to different types of global markets is corre-
lated with a rise or decline in these budget categories, researchers have made
claims on the implications for poverty, inequality, and other distributive con-
cepts. We are wary of most of the conclusions drawn from such work because it
fails to consider the incidence of taxing and spending.

Figure 4 provides some insight into the importance of considering the inci-
dence of taxing and spending policies. In the left panel, we plot the level of social
spending for all available years in 1990–2010 (x axis)\(^ {24}\) against a measure of the
state’s redistributive incidence of all taxes and transfers (left panel)\(^ {25}\); in the right
panel, we consider the relationship between social spending and the percentage
of people below the national poverty line.\(^ {26}\) This gives a more direct picture on
the connection between budgetary effort and the fortunes of the poor.

A close look at Figure 4 reveals three things. First, there is a correlation
between the size of spending effort, reductions in inequality, and poverty. This
captures the fact, clear in expression (2) above, that budgetary effort is a neces-
sary condition for redistribution toward the poor to take place. Second, the cor-
relation is far from perfect: at both low and high levels of social spending, there
is a considerable cross-national spread in redistributive incidence (reflecting dif-
fences in the progressivity of the design of taxes and transfers) as well as in

---

\(^ {22}\) The revenue categories are as follows: taxes, social contributions, grants, and other revenues. The expenditure
categories are as follows: general public service, defense, public order and safety, economic affairs, environmental
protection, housing and community amenities, health, recreation and culture and religion, education, and social
protection. These categories refer to those reported in IMF (2014).

\(^ {23}\) See IMF (2014) for 436 pages of technical details on GFS reporting standards and how budget categories are
coded and harmonized across countries and time.

\(^ {24}\) Data on social spending combine a variety of sources (OECD, GFS, ECLAC). While there is some accounting
noise, for those cases/years in which we have observations for more than one source, the gap between the series
tends to be relatively small. See Beramendi and Rogers (2015) for details on data sources.

\(^ {25}\) Redistributive incidence is defined as the proportional reduction in the levels of market inequality associated
with the policy (or set thereof) under consideration. See Solt (2009) for a description of data and sources. While
inequality and poverty are clearly different concepts, to the extent that changes in inequality are driven by transfers
to the poor, allegedly those in most need of access to the state’s safety net, reductions in inequality also reflect in
part the fortunes of the poor. The connection is only indirect, however.

\(^ {26}\) When possible, we use comparable data from LIS data (Wave VIII or latest), setting the poverty line at 50% of
the national median of equivalized household disposable income. In the absence of LIS data, we rely on the World
Bank Inequality and Poverty database, where national poverty lines may vary. This caveat applies to the following
observations: Chile, Ecuador, Indonesia, Panama, Philippines, Tanzania, and Thailand.
poverty. Third, the spread seems larger as the scope of the effort increases (particularly in the case of reductions in inequality). While Norway and Spain spend about the same amount, for instance, that spending does twice as much to reduce inequality in Norway as it does in Spain. Differences in design matter more as the size of the budget grows. Thus, Figure 4 highlights the importance of two issues for cross-national research on the relationship between globalization and the poor: progressivity and fiscal capacity.

Regarding progressivity, Figures 5 and 6 below provide additional, more precise evidence that all social spending is not equal in its incidence. Since GFS does not provide data on incidence, we have relied on the Luxembourg Income Studies (LIS), which provide very high quality, harmonized cross-country and cross-time data on the basis of a common set of income surveys. Though the LIS is widely recognized as the highest quality, cross-national income survey, it has only recently begun to slowly spread beyond the confines of the OECD. As a result, it has very weak coverage across the developing world. The data presented below are from income surveys conducted in the mid-2000s.

Figure 5 shows how social transfers are distributed across the income distribution for a set of middle- and upper middle-income countries in Latin America and Asia. We also include data for Sweden, the social democratic ideal, as a point of comparison. Figure 5 shows the share of total social transfers by income decile. When reading this figure, it is important to keep in mind that Korea and Taiwan spend much less on social insurance, both as a share of their total budgets and as a share of GDP, than the other cases. That in mind, the figure shows that Sweden spends about 60% of its social insurance on the poorest half of the population, and spending falls as the population gets richer. When researchers code the GFS’s “social security and welfare” spending category as pro-poor, this is what they have in mind. Alas, the other countries spend their social budgets in much more regressive ways. While the share spent on each decile climbs slowly in Korea, Taiwan’s spending is “U” shaped, showing that it is concentrated at the low and very high end of the income distribution. In the Taiwanese case,
the richest decile receives about 60% more of total social transfers than the poorest decile, which is directly connected to generous pensions for high-earning positions in a very competitive public sector. The four Latin American cases display far more regressive profiles. In Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and Uruguay, the poor receive small shares of total social transfers. The shares slowly climb across the income distribution until they spike in the top decile. In Brazil, for instance, the top 10% receives 38 times the share of transfer income as the poorest 10%. This latter finding is particularly striking because the data include Brazil’s large conditional cash transfer program, Bolsa Familia, which is targeted at the poor and has done much to alleviate poverty. The overall regressive incidence of social transfers emerges from the simple fact that the social security system in Brazil is huge and hugely maldistributive.
Figure 5 does not reflect the fact that some countries have much larger social insurance budgets than others. Figure 6 tries to address this by reporting social transfer income as a share of market income by income decile for the same set of cases. Again, the Swedish case stands out. For individuals in the poorest decile, social transfers are nearly three times their market income; for individuals in the top decile, social transfers are a tiny share of their market income. Put differently, social transfers in Sweden have a progressive effect on household income. The Korean and Taiwanese cases evince the same downward sloping curve, but because they spend so much less on transfers, they make up a much smaller share of the poor’s income. Among those in the poorest decile, social transfers represent 65% of market income in Taiwan and 41% in Korea. Again, the Latin American cases evince distinctively regressive social effort. In all four cases, the curves are basically flat, which indicates that social transfers make up about the same share of income for the rich as they do for the poor. Given that the rich have considerably higher market incomes than the poor, this implies that most transfer spending is actually being targeted at the rich, which is exactly what we saw above in Figure 4.

Though the findings are less striking, we could draw similar examples from the “education” and “health” expenditure categories. There is also huge variation in the incidence of all manner of taxation across countries. Obviously, the GFS’s broad budget categories do not provide the foundation for generalizing about the impact of globalization (or anything else) on the pro-poor effects of FDI. It is incorrect, for instance, to suggest that any globalization-induced reduction in the GFS’s “social security and welfare” spending would be bad for the poor. Indeed, in a country like Brazil, a reduction in the size of the social security system would almost certainly be good for the poor. Rather than making untenable assumptions about the distributive implications of broad budget categories in GFS, research should consider the actual incidence of taxes and transfers.

Fiscal Capacity and Tax Expenditures

A second major issue in approaching the relationship between globalization and the poor concerns the relationship between globalization and the capacity of states to collect the revenue necessary to spend on the poor. Malesky (2015) takes up this issue with reference to transfer pricing in his contribution to this forum. He notes that the capacity of multinationals to shift profits across borders for tax purposes probably places sharp limits on the pro-poor effects of FDI. The specific case of transfer pricing points to broader concerns that globalization reduces the fiscal capacity of states and thereby their capacity to spend on the poor. Figure 7 shows the relationship between the strength of the tax bureaucracy27 and the amount of revenue generated (left panel)28 and between the latter and the redistributive incidence on nonpension social transfers.

Countries with long-term legacies of low state capacity, such as India or Peru, are unable to generate significant resources to redistribute via pro-poor policies simply because they have such weak fiscal capacity. Under those conditions, any impact of globalization on the poor via public finances is likely to be quite marginal since fiscal capacity is simply so anemic. At the other end, in rich, open societies, globalization is unlikely to generate costs from the standpoint of the redistributive scope of the state. Many of these societies chose to develop redistributive welfare states and pursue trade-oriented growth strategies concurrently, so exposure to external competition does not come as a shock against prior dis-

27Source: USAID Project on Fiscal Reform. The indicator captures the number of tax agency personnel for every 1,000 inhabitants living in the country.
28Same sources as social spending above (see fn. 4).
tributive equilibria. More interesting is the case of countries with intermediate levels of capacity (Spain, Greece) and revenues (the United States). In these cases, much of the fiscal reallocation takes the form of tax expenditures.

Tax expenditures are abatements; they are taxes that the government agrees to not collect. Imagine that a government wants to build a $10 million bridge. It can collect the revenues, budget the bridge as a capital expenditure, and contract with a firm to construct it. Alternatively, the government can avoid the traditional budgetary process entirely by “paying” the contractor with a $10 million tax credit. Holding the tax treatment of revenue and deferred taxation constant, the contractor is indifferent between these two funding mechanisms. The government might prefer the tax expenditure to the public budgeting since it is subject to less negotiation, transparency, and oversight, even if the sums involved are the same. Citizens, of course, might be concerned with how the foregone revenues implied by the tax expenditure might impact the capacity of the government to spend on education, health, and poverty relief.

One crucial difference between traditional budgeting and tax expenditures is namely that the latter are entirely invisible from a point of view data on public finances. Indeed, there are no systematic data on tax expenditures beyond the OECD, and even there the data are quite spotty. This makes it incredibly difficult for citizens to hold their governments accountable for tax expenditures; for social scientists, it makes it much more difficult to assess the incidence of public finance writ large. Indeed, available and necessarily superficial evidence suggests that among rich democracies, those who rely the most on tax expenditures are the ones with more unequal distributive outcomes. Table 1 presents some suggestive evidence on the basis of the 2009 OECD report on Tax Expenditures and the LIS Inequality and Poverty Database. The first column reports the size of income tax expenditures as a percentage of GDP; the second and third column, as a percentage, respectively, of income tax and total tax revenues. Finally, the last column displays the share of population below 50% of the median dis-
posable income. The limited evidence in Table 1 suggests that greater reliance on tax expenditures is associated with worse outcomes for the poor.

The spotty picture in Table 1 brings bad news for the poor in the developing world. Not only are tax expenditures an oft-used tool in the competition to attract investment from mobile capital, but insofar as governments in the developing world have low fiscal capacity, large, regressive tax expenditures are likely to be attractive tools and pro-poor spending will be most limited precisely in the countries where it is most needed. Indeed, suggestive (albeit ad hoc) evidence suggests that tax expenditures are costing the world’s poorest a great deal. A recent report by ActionAid and Tax Justice Network-Africa (2012) suggests that Uganda and Kenya could both double their health budgets with the revenues that are foregone by tax expenditures and abatements, and Rwanda’s lost revenues amount to 4.7% of GDP. Even in a higher fiscal capacity country like Turkey, tax expenditures have been reported at 5% of GDP (Swift 2006). In the absence of systematic data on tax expenditures, it is hard to be sure, but there is growing circumstantial evidence that much of these tax expenditures are associated with tax competition and an attempt to attract foreign direct investment (Keen and Mansour 2009). Thus, foreign firms are reducing their tax liabilities both by shifting their profits to low-tax countries (as per Malesky 2015) and at the point of investment courtesy of tax abatements.

Conclusion

Our brief discussion has highlighted the importance of taking distributive incidence seriously when analyzing the relationship between globalization and the poor. Redistributive incidence reflects the fiscal capacity and the political taste for progressivity in a particular state. Focusing on one or the other in isolation leads to missing a good portion of the data generating process. Our analysis suggests as well that fiscal capacity is a necessary condition for pro-poor redistribution. In its absence, any impact globalization might have on the poor is unlikely to be mediated by the formal budget process, even if tax expenditures might play an important role in limiting the capacity of governments to collect revenues which could be targeted at the poor. For countries with greater fiscal capacity, there is a growing tension between any potential desire for progressivity and the need to compete for footloose capital. To the extent the latter results in reliance on regressive tax expenditures, globalization is likely to worsen the relative position of the poor. Together, these points emphasize data challenges inherent to establishing a causal relationship between globalization and poverty, and they serve as an empirical corollary to Nielson’s (2015) call for improved research designs in research in this area of inquiry.

Taking incidence seriously has important analytical implications for understanding the political engagement by the poor (and the rich) in developed and

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Table 1. Tax Expenditures and Poverty

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>%GDP</th>
<th>%Income Tax</th>
<th>% Total Tax</th>
<th>Poverty (LIS, 50)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada 2004</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>59.4</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>12.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany 2006</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea 2006</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>13.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands 2006</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain 2008</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK 2006</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>58.6</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA 2008</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: OECD 2009b; LIS Database

29See Fuest and Riedel (2009) for a review of the relevant literature.
developing democracies. One by-product of the failure to take incidence seriously is that a growing body of research is attempting to explain the supposedly anomalous taste of the rich in favor of redistribution and the poor’s resistance to it in some countries. There are many competing explanations: the poor are distracted by religious, ethnic, or national attachments (de la O and Rodden 2008; Shayo 2009); they are divided along a deep urban/rural divide (Haggard, Kaufman, and Long 2013); there is an absence of unions and/or left parties to articulate the interests of the poor (Huber and Stephens 2011); or the rich rationally support redistribution in light of its positive externalities for social peace and prosperity (Alesina and Rodrik 1994; Dion and Birchfield 2010). Yet none of this work takes the incidence of redistribution seriously and fails to recognize the prospect for regressive taxing and expenditure policies. Rather than complicated multidimensional politics, it could simply be that that the rich and poor understand when fiscal policies benefit them and when they do not (Beramendi and Rehm 2013; Holland 2014). In countries where fiscal policy is regressive, the poor will not support redistribution, while the rich will. In short, once we take the incidence of taxing and spending seriously, there might not be a mystery at all.

The implications for future work are fairly clear. We should replace broad and probably insupportable claims on the effect of globalization on pro-poor tax and expenditure policies with more careful analyses of the actual incidence of fiscal policy. The main challenge is that such analysis relies on comparable income surveys that successfully measure the impact of various taxing and spending policies across the income distribution. The LIS aside, the World Bank has done considerable work in this area. Alas, despite its recent ASPIRE project, the Bank has not been forthcoming with its large collection of harmonized income surveys. While awaiting the gradual expansion of the LIS, researchers could put pressure on the World Bank to make its existing income surveys public. Including tax expenditures represents a perhaps more challenging research frontier since there are little systematic data, but awareness of this policy tool is a first step in developing systematic analytic and measurement strategies. In a world where fiscal policy has become a crucial tool for managing the challenges posed by globalizing economic forces, it is crucial that we get serious about understanding how fiscal systems weigh upon the poor.

Promoting Exports, Preventing Poverty: Toward a Causal Evidence Base

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Near the climax of the Scientific Revolution, two influential theories in chemistry were put forward within five years of each other. In 1662, Robert Boyle proposed

30See the ASPIRE project here: http://datatopics.worldbank.org/aspire/. It represents an attempt to provide micro-evidence on distributive effort across more than 80 countries. Branco Milanovic and Claudio Montenegro oversee access to much larger micro-datasets.


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